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August 6, 1965
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August 6, 1965APproved Fdr_13PieUe 2093.0 0/15 : CIA-BDP6ABMR000500110005-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SE are part of that oppression?it must blunt our faith and sap the strength of our high purpose. Thus this is a victory for the freedom of the American Negro. But it is also a victory for the freedom of the American Nation. And every family, across this entire searching land, will live stronger In liberty, more splendid in expectation, and will be prouder to be American be- cause of the act I will sign today. [Pro- longed applause.] At 12 o'clock and 28 minutes p.m., the President and Vice President of the United States, followed by Members of the Senate and House of Representatives and distinguished guests who had been Invited to witness the ceremony, pro- ceeded to the President's Room, where the President slgi, the Voting Rights Act of 1965. IfV THE DOMI CAN REPUBLIC Mr, CLARK. Mr. President, the Sen- ate Committee on Foreign Relalions is conducting an inquiry in executive ses- sion on the armed intervention of Amer- ican troops into the Dominican Republic. One of the most controversial ques- ti,ons are the extent of Communist infil- tfation in Latin America generally and the Dominican Republic in particular. Another is what damage, if any, has the intervention done to the standing of the United States throughout Latin America. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD three articles deal- ing with these questions. The first is an article in the Atlantic Monthly, written before our troops moved in, entitled "The Decline of Communism in Latin America." The second is a column by Marquis Childs which appeared in a recent issue Of, the Washington Post entitled "Re- luctant Allies in the Hemisphere." The third is an article by Juan Bosch former President of the Dominican Re- public entitled "Communism and Democ- racy in the Dominican Republic" which appeared in the Saturday Review of August 7. I believe these three articles present a point of view which should be seriously considered by the Senate. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: [From the Atlantic Monthly] THE DECLINE OF COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA (By Ernst Halperin) (Norz.?Ernst Halpern, a research as- sOciate at the Center for International Stud- ies of the Massachusetts Institute of Tech- nology, has spent 2 years in Latin America studying communism and has arrived at some surprising conclusions about its pros- pects below the border. Currently living in Hio de Janeiro, he has written for news- papers and many major periodicals and is the aufhor of he Triumphant Heretic," a book about Tito.) The contrast of opulence and poverty in Latp .krgerica Is so striking that visitors Irequentfy assume the region to be on the verte Of a social cataclysm. In the big cities, the elegant residential districts and the downtown business sections with their sky- scrapers are /*hilted with shantytown areas? vast agglomerations of shacks that would make any European slum dwelling look palatial. The streets in the shantytowns are un- paved. There are no water pipes or drains. The shacks of wood and cardboard are in- fested by vermin. One would think that their miserable, underfed inhabitants would be kept in a constant paroxysm of envy and class hatred by the sight of the villas, the automobiles, the office buildings gleaming with chromium and plate glass, the luxury goods displayed in the windows of air-con- ditioned shops. Yet although there have been occasional outbursts of violence in Bogota, Santiago, and other cities, the shantytowns are not the hotbeds of revolu- tion which the foreign observer assumes them to be. Truth is, there are many factors working against the posibility of a dominant Com- munist influence in the affairs of Latin America. One is the emergence of a highly nationalistic middle class more disposed to exploiting Communist assistance than to adherence to Communist discipline. An- other is the absence of revolutionary zeal among the urban working classes. Though the prospects in store for U.S. in- terests in Latin America may well be harsh, the chances of a Communist-dominated re- gime are slim indeed. There are many trends and incidents to substantiate this conclu- sion. In the Peruvian presidential election of 1963, for example, the shantytown districts of Lima, which are among the worst in Latin America, favored Gen. Manuel Odria, the most conservative of the four presidential' candidates. In the Venezuelan presidential election later that year, Arturo Uslar Pietri, a conservative intellectual and representa- tive of business interests, polled a majority of the shantytown vote in Caracas. In the Chilean presidential election of 1964, the Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei prevailed over the Marxist candidate, Salvador Allende, in the shantytowns of Santiago and Val- paraiso. ' Latin-American Mandsts attribute the fail- ure of their propaganda in the shantytowns to lack of political consciousness, but the real reason would appear to be a different one. Most shantytown dwellers come from depressed rural areas, and city life -offers them certain advantages not easily perceived by the foreign visitor who is appalled by the squalor of the shantytown. There are health centers and other social services, and occu- pational and educational opportunities are far better than in the stagnant rural areas. There is also the prospect of one day moving out to an inexpensive apartment in a gov- ernment housing project. Many Latin- American countries are building government housing on a vast scale, although unfortu- nately even the most ambitious housing pro- grams barely manage to keep pace with the movernent of people from the rural areas to the cities. Only the most energetic of the shantytown dwellers manage to take full advantage of these opportunities, but these are exactly the people who form the opinions and determine the spirit of the whole community. They are realists on the lookout for material im- provement, and in politics they tend to sup- port the man who is in a position to provide such improvement, even if he is a dictator or a politician with an unsavory record. Shantytown dwellers may occasionally vote for a Marxist politician, but they are not attracted by Marxist ideology. Marxism holds that the capitalist system inevitably produces the pauperization of the toiling masses: that at best it may permit a tempo- rary alleviation of their suffering but never a substantial, permanent improvement of their condition; that this system is doomed to disappear in a catastrophe; that it is the 1919A histOric 'mission of the working clasS to over- throw capitalism by a revolution; and that this task must be carried out through the collective action of the working class orga- nized as a revolutionary political party. This doctrine does not tally either with the aspirations or with the experience of the leaders of shantytown opinion. Their con- dition is already better than it was when they arrived from the countryside, and they cannot be made to believe that revolution is necessary to achieve the further material improvements they desire. THE LABOR ARISTOCRACY Besides the shantytown population of un- skilled laborers who have drifted in from the rural areas, the urban working class of Latin America contains a second element: a highly organized and exclusive labor aristoc- racy composed of groups such as dockers, railroad men, and other transportation work- ers, and the skilled labor employed by in- dustry and the trades. Through political influence and the militancy of their unions, these groups have attainecta wage level that in many cases compares favorably with that of European, if not of North American workers. In some Latin American countries, the Communists appear to have established a measure of control over the labor aristocracy, whose trade unions they have infiltrated. However, this does not mean that they have truly won the allegiance of the workers, let alone converted them to Marxism. In times of crisis, when the government moves to sup- press and persecute the party, the workers invariably fail to come out in defense of the Communists. The Latin American urban working class is clearly not a revolutionary element. Furthermore, it lacks the pre- Marxist tradition of militant socialism and anarchism that causes French and Italian workers to remain faithful to the party in spite of material improvement. As early as the 1920s. a brilliant Peruvian intellectual, J. C. Mariategui, advised the Communist parties to shift their efforts from the urban workers to the Indio peasants of the Andean highlands, and to base their propaganda on a nationalism emphasizing the native Indian element of Latin American culture. Mariategui's proposal was not ac- cepted by the Communist International, and to this day, Latin American Communist parties, in the face of constant disappoint- ments, stubbornly cling to the Leninist for- mula Of the decisive revolutionary role of the urban proletariat. In accordance with the precepts of Lenin- ism, Communist Party pronouncements in- variably stress the importance of "a arm alliance of the workers with the peasants." This is usually empty talk, since most Latin American Communist parties lack the cadres which the arduous and dangerous work of proselytizing in the villages would require. The Communists of some Central American republics at one time exerted considerable influence over the workers of the big indus- trialized plantations, but they lost it after a series of unsuccessful strikes. There are one or two pockets of Communist Party influence in the mountain valleys of Colombia. The Chilean Communists?the only Latin Ameri- can Communist Party with a substantial corps of trained propagandists?has recently made headway among agricultural workers and tenants on the big estates. With these and a few other minor exceptions, the Com- munist parties of Latin America are an urban phenomenon. Nearly all these parties are very small, con- sisting of a number of intellectuals of the type known as drawing-room Communists, some trade union leaders with their per- sonal retinue, and a sizable but undisci- plined student and youth group. Apart from Cuba, where recruitment to the party ranks is promoted by the government, the only Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000500110005-0 Approved For Release 003Il 0/15 : CIA-RDPVB00446R000500110005-0 920 CQNGFESSIQNAL RECQRD SENATE August 6, 1965 Citable exception to this, pattern is Chile. There the intillatrial workers, particularly those in the copper, nitrate, and coal mines, have a tradition of nallitent unionism and political activity dating back to the first years of the century, and this has worked to the advantage of the Communists. The Chilean Communist Party is the only one in Latin Arnerica which has a sound working-class bee!. , The doctrine of the decisive revolutipnary role of the uaban proletariat has had a aux- ! prising effect on the policies of the Latin American Communist parties ? ? it has rendered _ _ them inglaly opportunistic. The diflicnit task of proselytizing among a social group entipathetie to Communist ideology can only be Carried on Where party members enjoy aotae freedern to operate. Latin American "??Communiste therefore, reluctant to undergo 'the tisk of total suppression, have ;re- qtlently come to terms with a dictator, agree- ing to Miff* themsgliree to a purely verbal position and to decline , cooperation with e democratic opposition groups. TOEEEANCE TOWARD ,SIEDVERSIVES In Latin America, public opinion does not regard subversion with the, same abhorrence as it does in Enrope or the 'United States. Mae most respectable Latin American demo- Cratic parties of the center and right have MOTO ealispiracies, uprisings, coups, and pro- inftelamentos on record than the Corainn- Mita have. The current communist guerrilla catupaign in Venezuela is a departure from the Usual pattern of Communist Party activ- ities in Latin America. There has been atalY Mae aarlier attempt to seize power by force in the entire bietory of the Communist move- inept in Latin America; the Brazilian u,pris- Mg of 1935. This was an army coup in the Pla!ssiCal Latin American manner; it failed because the expected civilian support did not Materialize, Tbe leader of the coup, Luis Carlos Prestos, had been an army officer and a Celebrated guerrilla leader before he had joined the Communists. He has since be- come One of the Most consistent and de- tern:Lined adVecaJes of peaceful methods ailiOng the leaders of Latin American eCtarannisin. The CoMmlinists' very lack of success has Maale it posalble for non-CoMmunist political groups to accept them as allies. Most Latin Arnericen politicians do not regard their local CoMMUnist Party as a serious threat, while the Cemanallilists' small but tightly knit party organization, their ability to mobilize stlidente for, demonstrations, and their in- fluence in the trade unions can make their C011aboratien useful to dictators and demo- crats alike. The easygoing attitude of non-Communist and even strongly anti-Communist Latin American politicians toward the party is the devair of European and North American ?la- SeaVera, but their warnings are usually dis- regarded because they am not borne out by practical experience. In Latin America it is simply not true that anyone who has deal- ings With the Cornm.uniste becomes their prisoner. Democratic politicians such as Gonzalez Videla. of Chile aid caudillos sych as Velasco Ilaarra. of Ecuador Welcomed Coni- munist sopport in their struggle for power; and later, when the Comraimists ceased to be useful, these politicians had no difficulty In Casting them off. The latest case in point IS that of Fidel Castro. When Castro began to favor the Cuban Communists, and even entrnsted them with the task of, organizing his own ruling party, Moat foreign observers assumed he would Soon be reduced to the eongitIon of a mere pUppet in the hands of the pld Guard Cora- Mainisit leaders. Yet today, Castro is in un- disputed command of the party which the Old Guard Comramaiats bad helped him to build, and the old party leaders are either gashed aside or relegated to positions of sec- onlaty importance. This rank outsider, who hat no Communist Party training and has new been subjected to party discipline, has evigi,forced the Russians to accept the situ- ati On and to admit him into the councils of world conmximlata?a telling symptom of State Of =fusion and disintegration inio which the Commileist movement has be aiplunged since the outbreak of the Bine- Bo conflict. , adIDDLE-CLASS NATIONALISTS Ono of the most widespread of the many mi conceptions about Latin America is that its political troubles are due to the absence of a strong middle class. Democracy is said to be the way of life of the middle class; therefore, it is argued, there would be a func- tioning, healthy democracy in Latin America if . t had a middle class capable of asserting its, af. I hit this concept of Latin American society as a rigid structure composed of the very rlc I and the very poor is taken from the des- criptions of 10th-century travelers. Today !lipplies only to the backward rural areas. Fc i ..the lest half, century, the cities of Latin An erica have been the scene of great social cluaige and economic development. Photo- graphs of the downtown areas of cities such as qaracas, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Bentl- eyde Chile that were taken 15 years ago are !hardly recognizable today. 5 Octal mobility in Latin America is greater, nol less, than in Europe. The amazing eeoaornic success of immigrants from Euro- pea a countries, as well as from the Near and Far East, testifies to this. At the same time, the cities of Latin America have witnessed the ,emergence and rapid growth of an ambi- tious, politically conscious, and highly as- serilve native middle class. The political wel Oat and influence of this urban middle class is all the greater because the bulk of Lat xi America's rural population is politi- cally passive and inarticulate. Li the more important Latin-American couatries, political power long ago passed froi a the hands of the aristocracy into those of iniddle-elass politicians, or of army offi- cers, who are also usually of middle-class origin, These politicians and military men may not represent the collective will or the Int( rests of their class, as the Marxists would hay it, but their policies certainly reflect the attitudes prevalent among people of the if middle-class background; specifically, a vi ;mous nationalism. Inevitably, this middle-class nationalism expaesses itself in resentment against what- eve. foreign power occupies a dominant po- sition in the economy of the hemisphere. 4arig'el World War II, when British capital still_held important positions in the econ- om)pf some Latin-American countries, their nationalism was anti-British as much as or even more than anti-American. Through the war, the 'United States came into a posi- tion of undisputed economic and political hegemony over the entire hemisphere, and in c Msequence, Latin-American nationalism is nivi directed almost entirely against the Unt id States. SLIND NATRED OIP THE UNITED STATES Ti care are, however, varying degrees of na- tionalism. The leaders of the middle-class parties now in power in a number of Latin- Atm rican states are fervent nationalists, sem of them with an anti-American record, but they are also responsible statesmen and real ate. They recognize, that in view of its overwhelming economic and military streiwth, the United States must inevitably play a leading role in the hemisphere. They also _realize that their countries can reap substantial benefit from association with a pow, a? of such magnitude. They are willing to accept partnership?but not blind sub- servience in their foreign policy, or sub- oral: teflon of their domestic policies to the requ tremerits of American business interests. Such is the attitude, for example, of the Mexican and Venezuelan Governments, and of President Fernando :Belannde Terry of Peru and President Frei of Chile. But there are also more extreme national- ists, who regard any arrangement with the United States as treason. Extreme national- ism is not a mass movement in any Latin- American country, with the possible ex- ception of Cuba, where it is fanned by extensive Government propaganda. It is rarely to be found among workers, least of all among those employed by American- owned companies, which usually pay higher wages and provide more social services than any local capitalist does. In most Latin- American countries, extreme nationalism and virulent anti-Americanism are prevalent in certain restricted sectors of the political and intellectual elite: among university and high school students and teachers, lawyers, jour- nalists, writers, and artists. Since the ruling political parties often recruit their leading cadres precisely from these groups, the ab- sence of a mass following does not render extreme nationalism either impotent or in- nocuous. Roberto Campos, the Brazilian Minister of Planning? and former Ambassador to the United States, recently wrote of the extreme nationalists of his own country that in many respects their "false Brazilian nationalism boils down to hatred of the United States, as if Brazil's true interest were in direct mathe- matical proportion to the harm we could cause to the great country in the north." This blind, hatred, as Campos rightly calls it, is aroused by the mere fact of U.S. political and economic hegemony in Latin America, and not by any particular aspect of U.S. pol- icy. The extreme nationalists object to any and every, policy implemented by the United States. Even when the U.S. Government gave financial support to the Bolivian revolution- ary government, which had nationalized the tin mines and carried out the most drastic agrarian reform in the history of the conti- nent, the extreme nationalists only com- plained that the Bolivians had sold out to the United States. The airs of the extreme nationalists is nothing less than the destruction of U.S. power in Latin America. Since no combi- nation of Latin-American countries is strong enough to achieve this, the extreme national- ists seek an outside ally?a world power capa- ble of inflicting a military defeat on the United States. Before and during World War II, Latin- American extreme nationalism sought alli- ance with Germany and Italy. After the war, its interest was aroused by the new great power which had emerged to challenge the United States in Europe and Asia, the Soviet Union. Extreme nationalism now swung left: It established contact with the Soviet Union's unofficial Latin-American agents, the Com- munist Parties. The first fruit of their co- operation was the establishment of a coali- tion government of nationalists and Com- munists in the Central American republic of Guatemala. When the Guatemalan Government was overthrown by a CIa,as?poxieered uprising in 1954, indignation swept Latin America. Moderate nationalists like Eduardo Frei of Chile joined the extremists in condemning U.S. interference in the internal affairs of Latin-American country. The Guatemalan affair demonstrated that the time was not yet ripe for the establish- ment of a Soviet base in the Western Hemi- sphere. Three years later, a revolutionary innovation in military technology completely changed the situation: the development of the intercontinental ballistic missile freed Soviet military power from its restriction to the Eurasian land mass. This at last put Latin America within the range of Soviet aspirations. As early as the spring of 1959, the Soviet Union established contact with 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000500110005-0 August 6, 19 proved For 0005-0 Fichal. Castro, offering him material support against the United States. Soviet aid began pouring in, and in 1960 the Soviet Govern- ment uttered its first, rather cautiously worded threat of nuclear retaliation in the event of an attack on Cuba. CUBA, A TEST CASE There is some evidence of Russian hesita- tion and doubt about the wisdom of the Cuban venture. Nevertheless, Russia's ap- pearance on the Latin-American scene had an electrifying effect on the extreme nation- alists; Cuba seemed to them to be the test Case which demonstrated the Soviet Union's ability and readiness to support them in an out-and-out struggle against the United States. They had hitherto been skeptical of the Soviet Union, and in 1956 many of them had condemned Soviet intervention in Hungary. This critical attitude was now supplanted by one of adulation. There was something utterly artificial about this enthusiasm; it was not accom- panied by any genuine desire to observe Cur- rent events in the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc. Such fascinating developments as destalinization, the rewriting of party his- tory, the rehabilitation of many of Stalin's victims, the new trends in Soviet art and literature, the strains in Soviet relations with the satellites did hot arouse the in- terest of these new admirers of the Soviet Union. Although they could not help tak- ing note of the Sino-Soviet conflict, they failed to recognize its significance, its rele- vance to Soviet foreign policy, and its effect on the power and cohesion of the bloc. Their lack of discernment was unwise but understandable, To them, the Soviet Union was a military ally, and the real subject of their interest was Soviet nuclear and con- ventional military capacity. In the years 1960-62, numerous extreme nationalists announced their loyalty to the doctrines of Marx and Lenin. Theirs was a very superficial Marxism-Leninism; it amounted to little more than weptance of Marx's definition of capitalism as exploita- tion of man by man, and of Lenin's formula that imperialism was the last stage of capi- talism. There was no serious study of the subject, no interest in current developments. The unsophisticated observer nevertheless found it impossible to distinguish the ex- treme nationalists from party line Commu- nists. And they were indeed Communists in the sense that they professed belief in Marxism-Leninism, supported Soviet foreign policy, admired the Soviet economic system, and strove to impose a similar system in their own country. But they were not Com- munists if that term is understood to imply Subjection to Communist Party discipline and readiness to implement the policies of the international Communist movement. The distinctien may appear to be mere hairsplitting, yet it is of vital importance to an understanding of the politics of the Latin American extreme left, .Party line Commu- nists are trained to follow Soviet instructions to the letter, to retreat on order as well as to attack. The extreme nationalists, who cell themselves Marxist-Leninists, cannot be relied upon to do so. To them, the Soviet Union is not a leader to whom they owe un- conditional allegiance but merely an ally, and even this only so long as Soviet policy is to their liking?that is, one of unrelenting and unceasing hostility to the United States. Fidel Castro is an example of this independ- ence Of mind; although completely depend- ent On Soviet epomonnie and military aid, he UM often openly?and sometimes dramati. early, as in his refusal to sign the test ban treaty?registered disagreement with any softening of the Soviet attitude toward the United States. REvolarrioN TI-iftouat rtason Catsro's revolutionary strategy for Latin America is diametrically opposed to the strategy of the Oomiriunist parties. As ex- pounded in Che Guevara's book on guerrilla warfare, its three basic principles are that guerrilla bands can defeat a regular army; that by its activities, a guerrilla nucleus can create a revolhtionary situation where it is not already in existence; and that the .peasants and not the urban workers are the main revolutionary force in underdeveloped Latin America. A major effort to implement this strategy was made in Venezuela, where nationalist groups were joined by a Communist Party which had seceded from the Soviet fold. In December 1963, after a year of guerrilla fight- ing, sabotage, and terrorism, the Venezuelan people expressed rejection of Castroism and communism by widespread participation in a presidential election which the leftists had first attempted to prevent and then to boy- cott. Minor attempts to launch guerrilla campaigns in Colombia, Peru, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Argentina were either nipped in the bud or crushed at an early stage, leaving only scattered guerrilla bands in the mountains. The Cuban strategy of revolution through guerrilla warfare has thus proved ineffec- tive in countries where conditions are less favorable than they were in Batista's Cuba. Most Latin American governments have greater popular support than that of Batista. The armies of such countries as Venezuela, Colombia, and Peru are efficient and have a long fighting tradition; they cannot be as easily demoralized by guerrillas as Batista's inglorious army. And finally, Castroite doc- trine probably overestimates the revolution- ary potential of the Latin American peasan- try, for the elements of this group most likely to rebel are constantly being drawn off to the cities. The Cuban strategy of guerrilla warfare is attractive to nationalistic youth. The older generation of extreme nationalists know that there are more effective ways of winning political power. They are members of the political elite; among them are influential politicians and even top-ranking army offi- cers. There is, therefore, always the possi- bility of extreme nationalism coming to power in some Latin American country through a coup or even by constitutional means. Such was the case in Brazil, where an extreme nationalist, Vice President Joao Goulart, acceded to the presidency in a per- fectly constitutional manner after the volun- tary resignation of his predecessor, President Janio Quadroe. Goulart was a man of vacil- lating charter, incapable of steering a definite course, but his extremist friends were push- ing him toward a revolution of the Cuban type when in March 1964, he was deposed by an army coup. At that time the wave of extreme nation- alisut and communism that had swept Latin America was ebbing. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 had been the turning point. The withdrawal of the Soviet missiles and aircraft showed the Latin American extreme nationalists that their entire policy had been based on a miscalculation?an overoptimistic assessment of Soviet possibilities and Soviet Intentions. The Soviet Union was not, after all, willing to risk war in order to back a Latin American revolution. It had only pushed onward as long as the United States permitted it to do so, and had beaten a hasty retreat as soon as the United States showed its strength. THE SWING TOWARD CHINA One of the effects of the missile crisis has been to awaken the Latin American extreme nationalists' 'interest in the Sino-Soviet con- flict and to swing their sympathies to the Chinese side. Before the missile crisis, they had regarded the Sino-Soviet conflict as ir- relevant to the Latin American situation, and Chinese criticism of Soviet foreign policy as unjustified. The Chinese accuse the So- viets of planning to betray the cause of 18921 revolution by coming to terfns with the United States. This certainly did not seem to apply to the Western Hemisphere, where the Soviet Union was challenging the United States by its support of Cuba. But after the missile crisis fiasco, these accusations ap- peared to gain in substance. At the time of the missile crisis, the Corn- munist Party of Venezuela changed over to the strategy of guerrilla warfare. At the same time, it ceased to support the Russians against the Chinese. In Brazil, a sizable faction broke away from the pro-Soviet Brazilian Communist Party to form a rival Communist Party of Brazil apparently subsidized by the Chinese. A similar split took place in Peru, while minor secessions occurred in Bolivia, Ecua- dor, and Chile. Too much importance should not, however, be attached to these events. The Latin American Communist Parties are small and ineffectual; internal dissensions will hardly lead to anything but a further decline. As for the nationalists, their sympathies for China are likely to remain platonic; they are primarily interested in military strength, not in ideology, and China is not yet nearly strong enough to assert its interests in Latin America through the force of arms. After the Venezuelan presidential election of December 1963, and the Brazilian coup of March 1964, the extreme left suffered a third blow in the spectacular defeat of the Marxist Salvador Allende by the Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei in the Chilean presidential election of September 1964, and Frei's sub- sequent victory in the parliamentary elec- tions this March. On all these occasions, the weakness displayed by the leftists was un- doubtedly an effect of the missile crisis, which had robbed them of their hope of de- feating the United States through alliance with the Soviet Union. The following lesson may be drawn from this. Economic aid alone is not enough; it must be supplemented by an effective American foreign policy. The Alliance for Progress is the proper way to win the friendship of the moderate nationalists, who today constitute the most important political force in the area, but it cannot disarm the extreme na- tionalists, who will only continue to de- nounce it as one more maneuver to per- petuate U.S. domination. In themselves, these extreme nationalists may be troublesome to American business Interests, but they do not represent a threat to the security of the United States. They become dangerous only through their al- liance with the Soviet Union. The aim of American foreign policy in the area must therefore be to persuade the Soviet leaders that Latin America is not within their reach. This cannot be done by inflicting punish- ment on Central American army colonels, Caribbean adventurers, and other exponents of extreme nationalism while avoiding direct confrontation with the real adversary. The American policy of harassing the recipients of Soviet arms has not been effec- tive in Latin America or anywhere else. The only effective policy is that of standing up to the donor, to the Soviet Union itself. That was done in the Cuban missile crisis, and the result has been a very marked decline of anti-American extreme nationalism and communism in the area. [From the Washington Post] RELUCTANT ALLrES risr THE HEMISPHERE (By Marquis Childs) SANTIAGO, CHILE.?The U.S. State Depart- ment line, observed with a letter-of-the-law faithfulness, is that the crisis in the Domini- can Republic has made no real difference in the standing of the United States in Latin America. Machinegun slugs fired into a few embassies, bomb threats, yes; but, the visitor is told, no big demonstrations. Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67600446R000500110005-0 Approved For Relees 003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000500110005-0 18922 CONG1 SSIONAL RECORD ? $ENATE August 6, 1965 This is, dr course, literally true. Tet it Seems to one observer to be a form of self- deception. /t is not hard to detect a deep . disquiet and not only in Government' circles but, according to those with contexts at - lower levels, among the people themselves. The landing of the marines was taken as a return to the use of naked power by an America bent on exercising control where Control in the national interest is judged essential, One of the first casualties was the Inter- American Foreign Ministers Conference, orig- inally scheduled for May and then postponed to August 4. Now it has been pbstponed again, presumably to a date to be set prior to the end of the year. The Conference has been an important prestige symbol for Brazil, since it was to be held in ttio de Janeiro on the 400th anniversary of that City's 'founding. Moreover, it would have been a pits for the hard-pressed government Of President.tininbertO 'Ca.stelo tranco. ?Viie Countries voted against postponing the Conference, Chile being one of the minor- ity in opposition to the 14 nations, including' the 'United States, that voted for delay. The Chileans had a number , of things they Wanted to say at the earliest opportunity about the wea,kneS.s Of the Inter-American system and the Meaning of the Dominican crisis in this connection. Postponement was interpreted as a confession that in vie* of the vastness' of the problems confronting the benitsPhere, With the Dominican mess still tinrebolved, IV was better not to meet at all rather than to have a session that would be likely to descend to acrimony and vitupera- tion. 'Washington's goal Was the creation of an Inter-Amiericen permanent peace force ready ,to intervene to repel outside aggression. But Wilde from a half dozen states in the client or aerificlient relationship with the United States, this concept has little support. NOW the cloud of American involvement in a full-scale war in Vietnam darkens the horizon. The World War of 25 years, ago began against a wholly different background. The good-neighbor policy of Franklin Roose- 'Veit, purified with 4 such zeal by his Secre- 1tairy of State, Cordull Hull had created an _atmosphere of good will and cooperation. Most Latinos wanted to believe that this 'was 'the l'Uture order for the hemisphere. But another and perhaps more important 'difference set that time apart. The leftist leaning and even the center parties were op- posed to nazism and fascism. When the , Germans attacked the Soviet Union in June of 1941 and Pearl Harbor followed 6 months later, Washington and Moscow were allies. The present crisis confronting the United States comes after 20 years of hostile Cora- `Mai:list and leftist,propagancla that has been intensified in recent month. In a constant drupffire_ through a wide variety of channels, 'radio in particular, the United States is pic- tured as an imperialist power bent on sub- jugating a small nation in seutheast Asia. It is in this context, distorted and false as .it is, that the Dominican intervention must be put. ' Another factor in the atmosphere of 1940 as contraSted to the. present day was Presi- dent Roosevelt'i refusal in 4938 to intervene with force when Mexico nationalized the oil properties of American companie: with corn- penaation provided by the Mexican Govern- ment. It made a deep impression through- Out the continent that despite powerful po- litical presaizes, F.D.R. declined to act. Today the Hickenlooper amendment, auto- . poetically suspending aid to any country that nationalizes, hangs over the heads of goy- eminent leaders faced with mounting de- Mande, from all sides. Foreign ownership Of utilities and basic commodities such as oil is bound to become , a hotter issue throughout the continent. T se, in he view of one observer, are trogy's realities. They will be ignored at the ;ask of serious miscalculation in assess- ing the future of the relation between Wash- ing:on and the rest of the hemisphere. Am mica's power is overwhelming. That is a moi important reason for the comparative qui cacence with which the Dominican inter- yen Eton was accepted. But this power, does not necessarily mein 'loyalty, a willing al- lbgance, when the chips are down. [Friona the Saturday Review, Aug. 7, 16651 005 LIVIIINISM AND DEMOCRACY IN rara Domin- ica* Raman= ( Cforz.?Juan Bosch is the first man in the hist Ory of the Dominican Republic to have bee me 1t President through a free election. He won his overwhelming?and surprising victory in December 1962. But in September r 196 I, he was overthrown by the military. In April of this year, pro-Bosch forces revolted against the government of Donald Reid, lead- ing to the present crisis. This article appears in I laturday Review through special arrange- met it with War/Peace Report in which Mr. Bosth's article is also carried this week.) (By Juan Bosch) Srl Juitar, Pm= farm?After the U.S. intervention in Santo Domingo, the Depart.- of State Ant released a list of 53 Dominican Communists; then a list of 58; and finally, a list of 77. 'Mien I was President of the Dominican , /tea tiblic, I calculated that in Santo Domin- . go there were between 700 and 800 COM- MIE lists, and I estimated the number of Conitnunist sympathizers at between 3,000 and 3,500. These 700 or 800 Communists weri divided into three groups, of which, in ray judgment, the largest was the Popular , Dor Unicorn Movement, with perhaps between 400 end 500 members in the entire country; nexa came the Popular Socialist Party with son fisthat less, around 300 to 400; and then, , in it, number that in my opinion did not reac h 50, the Communists had infiltrated the June 14th Movement, some of them in execu- tive Tpoeta and others at lower levels. I ought to make clear that in 1963 in the Dor dnican Republic there was much politi- cal zoxdusion, and a large number of people, esproially middle-class youth, did not know for certain what they were and what they wanted to be, whether democrats or Com- mis lista. But that has happened in almost all countries where there have been pro- longed dictatorships, once the dictatorships past-, After a certain time has elapsed and the political panorama becomes clarified, many people who began their public life as Con imunists pass into the democratic camp. In 1963 the Dominican Republic needed time for the democratic system to clear up the con aision, and in a sense the time was used thal, way, since 700 or 800 Communists, di- vided in three groups, with sympathizers nun thering between 3,000 and 3,500, could in 110 case?not even with arms in their hania?take power or even represent a seri- ous threat. If _there weren't enough Communists to takt_power, there was, on the other hand, a stro az sentiment against persecution of the Con munists. This feeling developed because during his long tyranny Trujillo always ac- cuse el his adversaries of being Communists. Becianie of that, anticommunism, and Tru- jillo Lem ended up being equivalent terms in the Dominican political vocabulary. More-, the instruments of oppression?the po- lice and the armed forces?remained the semi in 1963?with the same men who had servmi under Trujillo. If I had used them against the Communists I would have ended up tit their prisoner, and they, for their part, woug,have completely destroyed the Domini- can democratic forces. For those men, hav- ing Learned from Trujillo, there was no dis- tinction between democrats and Commu- nists; anyone who opposed any of their vi- olence, or even their corruption, was a Com- munist and ought to be annihilated. My presumption was correct, as events have .shown. From the dawn of September 25, the day of the coup d'etat against the govern- ment I headed, the police began to Perse- cute and beat without mercy all the non- Communist democrats who in the opinion of the military chiefs would be able to resist the coup. It was known that in all the country soot one Communist had infiltrated my party, the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PhD), but still the leaders and members of that party were persecuted as Communists. The chief of police himself insulted the pris- oners by calling them Communists. Many leaders of the PRD were deported, and?a curious fact--numerous Communists who had been in Europe. Russia, and Cuba were permitted to return. But the leaders of the PRD were not permitted to return, and if one did he was immediately deported again. During the 19 months of the' government of Donald Reid, thousands of democrats from the PED and hundreds from the Social Chris- tian Party and the June 14 movement were jailed, deported and beaten in a barbaric manner; the headquarters of these three parties Were assaulted or destroyed by the police. All the vehicles, desks, typewriters and other valuable effects of the PRD were robbed ba the police. In the months of May and June 1964, more than 1,000 mem- bers of the PRD who had been accused of being Communists were in jail at one time. That anti-:Communist fury launched against the democratic Dominicans was an important factor In the eruption of the April revolution because the people were fighting to regain their right to live under a legal order, not a police state. If it had been I who unleashed that, fury, the revolu- tion would have been against the democratic regime, not in favor of democracy. It was not necessary to be a political genius to realize that if anti-Communist persecu- tion began in the Dominican Republic, the -police and the military would also persecute the democrats. Neithea need one be a po- litical genius to understand that what the country needed was not stimulation of the mad forces of Trujilloisrn which still existed in the police and the military, but rather the strengthening of democracy by demon- strating to the Dominicans in practice that what was best for them and the country was to live under the legal order of a democratic regime. Now the:n, in the Dominican picture there was a force that in my opinion was determin- ing the pointer of the political balance, in terms of ideologies and doctrines, and that force was the June 14 movement. I have said that according to my calcula- tions there was in the June 14th Movement an infiltration of less than BO Communists, some of them in executive positions and others at lower levels. But I must state that control of this party, at all levels, was held by an overwhelming majority of young peo- ple who were not Communists and some of whom were strongly anti-Communist. How can one explain that there should be Com- munists together with non-Communists and active anti-Communists? There is one reason: the June 14th Movement was based, in all its breadth and at all its levels, on in- tense nationalism, and that nationalism was manifested above all in terms of strong anti- Americaniem. To convert that anti-norte- anaericanism.o into dominicanismo there was only one way: maintain for a long time a democratic regime with a dynamic and cre- ative sense. I knew that if the country saw the estab- lishment of a government that was not elected by the people--that was not constitu- tional and not respectful of civil liberties? Approved For Releasei 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67800446R000500110005-0 Approved For Release 2003/10/15,: CIA7RDP671300446R000500110005-0 August 6, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 18923 the Communists would attribute this new government to U.S. maneuvers. I also knew that in view of the anti-Americanism of the youth of the middle class--especially in the June 14th Movement?Communist influence would increase. The equilibrium of the po- litical balance was, then, in that party. Any sensible Dominican politician realized that. The trouble was that in 1963 the Dominican Republic did not have sensible politicians, or at least not enough of them. The appe- tites for power held in check for a third of a century overflowed, and the politicians turned to conspiring with Trujillo's military men. The immediate result was the coup of September 1963; the delayed result was the revolution of April 1965. It is easy to understand why Dominican youth of the middle class was so nationalistic. This youth loved its country, wanted to see it morally and politically clean, hoped for its economic development, and thought?with reason?that it was Trujillo who blocked morality, liberty, and development of the country. It is also easy to understand why this nationalism took the form of anti-Amer- icanism. It was simply a feeling of frustra- tion. This youth, which had not been able to get rid of Trujillo, thought that Trujillo was in power because of his support by the United States. For them, the United States and Trujillo were partners, both to be blamed for what was happening in the Dominican Republic, and for that reason their hate for Trujillo was naturally converted into feelings of anti-Americanism. I am not discussing here whether they were right or wrong; I am simply stating the fact. I know that in the United States there are people who supported Trujillo and Others who attacked him. But the young Domini- cans knew only the former and not the latter, since Trujillo took care to give the greatest publicity possible to any demonstra- tion of support, however small, that was of- fered directly or indirectly by a U.S. citizen, whether he was a Senator or an ordinary tourist; and on the other hand, he took great pains to prevent even the smallest notice in the Dominican Republic of any attack by an American citizen. Thus, the Dominican youth new only that Trujillo had defenders in the United States, not that he had enemies. For his part, Trujillo succeeded in creat- ing with the Dominican people an image of unity between society and government that can only be compared with what has been produced in countries with Communist re- gimes. For more than 30 years in. the Do- minican Republic nothing happened?noth- ing could happen?without an express order from Trujillo. In the minds of Dominican youth this image was generalized, and they thought that in the United States also nothing could happen without an order from whoever goverened in Washington. Thus, for them, when an American Senator, news- paperman, or businessman expressed his sup- port of Trujillo, that person was talking by order of the President of the United States. To this very day, a large number of Domini- cans of the middle class think that every- thing a U.S. citizen says, his Government is saying too. The pointer of the political balance, as I said earlier, was in the June 14 movement which was saturated with anti-Americanism. This group included the most fervent youths and even those best qualified technically? but not politically?as well as the more numerous nucleus of middle-class youth; it also constituted the social sector where Com- munist sermons could have the most effect and from whence could come the resolute leaders that the Communists lacked, Tru- jillo had tortured, assassinated and made martyrs of hundreds of members of the June 14 movement. To persecute these youths Was to send them into the arms of com- munism, to give strength to the arguments of the few Communists that had infiltrated the movement. The Communists said that the democracy that I headed received its orders from Washington, the same as had Trujillo, to destroy the nationalistic youths. Little by little, as the days passed, the non-Com- munist and anti-Communist members of the June 14 movement were gaining ground against the Communists, since they were able to prove to their companions that my democratic government neither persecuted them nor took orders from Washington. In 4 years the democratic but nationalistic sec- tor of .the June 14 movement?which was in the overwhelming majority?would have ended the Communist influence and made it- self into a firm support of Dominican democ- racy. The weakness of the Dominican Commu- nists was also shown by the activity of the Social Christian Party, which presented itself as militantly anti-Communist. It persecuted the Communists everywhere, to the point that they could not show themselves in pub, lic. But when the Social Christians realized that the best source of young people in the country was the June 14th Movement, they stopped their street fighting against the Com- munists and began a campaign against im- perialism? Norteamericano. When they showed with this battle cry that they were not a pro-U.S. party, they began to attract young adherents who had been members of the June 14th Movement as well as many others who already had a clear idea of what they wanted to be: nationalists and demo- crats. Thus, the Social Christian leaders came to understand that the key to the Do- minican political future lay in assuring the nationalistic youth of a worthy and con- structive democracy. What the Social Christians learned by 1963 'would have been understood by other polit- ical groups if the Dominican democracy had been given time. But this was not to be. Reactionaries in the Dominican Republic and the United States set themselves ferociously against the Dominican democracy under the slogan that my government was "soft" on the Communists. This is the point at which to analyze "weakness" and "force," if those two terms signify opposite concepts. There are two ways to face problems, particularly political ones. One is to use intelligence and the other is to use force. According to this theory, in- telligence is weak, and the use of in- telligence, a sign of weakness. I think that a subject so complex as polit- ical feelings and ideas ought to be treated with intelligence. I think also that force is a concept that expresses different values, as can be seen in the United States or in the Dominican Republic. In the United States, the use of force means the application of the law?without crimes, without torture, with- out medieval barbarism; in the Dominican Republic, it means quite the contrary: one does not apply the law without instruments of torture, not excluding assassination. When a Dominican policeman says of a per- son that he is a Communist, he is saying that he, the policeman, has the full right to beat him, to shoot him, or to kill him. And since this policeman does not know how to distin- guish between a democrat and a Communist, he is quite apt to beat, shoot and kill a democrat. It is not easy to change the mentality of the people who become policemen in the Dominican Republic, especially with lit- tle time to do it. When the New Eng- landers burned women as witches, those who did the burning believed absolutely that they were destroying witches. Today, no- body believes that they were witches. But it is still like early Salem in Santo Domingo. When a Dominican policeman is told that he should persecute a young man because he is a Communist, the policeman believes with all his soul that his duty is to kill the youth. The problem that my democratic govern- ment faced was to choose between the use of Intelligence and the use of force, while the time passed during which the hotheaded youths and uneducated police learned to distinguish between democracy and com- munism. And if someone says that in this period the Communists would be able to gain strength and take power, I say and guar- antee that they could not do it. Only a dictatorship can give to the Communists the arguments they need for progress in the Dominican Republic; under a democratic regime the democratic conscience would out- strip the Communists. To return to the concepts of intelligence and force, I think that they apply to com- munism itself in. its light for the conquest of power. No Communist Party, in no coun- try of the world, has been able to reach power solely because it was strong; it has needed, besides, a leader of exceptional ca- pacity. The Dominican Communists have not had and do not have force, and they have not had and do not have a leader compara- ble to Lenin, Mao, Tito, or Fidel; and ac- cording to my prediction, they are not going to have either the force or the leader in the foreseeable future. Dominican communism is in its infancy, and began, as did Venezuelan communism, with internal divisions that will require many years to overcome. Only the long dictator- ship of Perez Jimenez was able to create the right atmosphere for the different groups of Communists of the Venezuela of 1915 so that they could come together into a single party, and the lack of a leader of exceptional ca- pacity has, in spite of the power of the party, voided the chance of Venezuelan com- munism coming to power. How many Communists did France have? How many Italy? But neither French nor Italian communism ever had leaders capable of carrying It to power. In the Dominican case, there are neither the numbers nor the leadership. I cannot hope that men like Wessin y Wessin, Antonio Imbert, or Jules Dubois will know these things, will think about them, and will act accordingly. But logically I had the right to expect that in Washington there would be someone who would understand the Dominican political scene and the role that the Communists could play in my country. As is evident, I was mistaken. In Washington they know the Dominican prob- lems only as they are told of them by Wessin y Wessin, Antonio Imbert, and Jules Dubois. The lack of adequate knowledge is tanta- mount to the nullification of the power of Intelligence, above all in politics, and this can only lead to sorry results. When intel- ligence is canceled, its place is occupied by fear. Today there has spread over the coun- tries of America a fear of communism that IS leading us all to kill democracy for fear that democracy is the mask of communism. It seems to me we have reached the point where we consider democracy incapable of resolving the problems of our peoples. And if we have truly arrived at this point, we have nothing to offer humanity. We are denying our faith, we are destroying the columns of the temple that throughout our life has been our shelter. Are we really doing this? No, I should not say this. It is the others. Because in spite of everything that has happened, I continue to believe that democracy is the dwelling place of human dignity. NEBRASKA CENTENNIAL, 1967? PART II Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, last year at this time I addressed the Senate regarding the celebration of the 100th anniversary of Nebraska statehood. My purpose was to acquaint my colleagues Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67600446R000500110005-0 Approved For Releas 2003/10/ 8924 CON ,J ESSiO th the planned celebrations and to highlight the past 100 'years of Nebraska 'development. Since last June much Work has been undertaken by the citizens of Nebraska and the foundation Ls being laid for a successful and enduring cen- tennial year. Now I would like to review some of the activities of the people of Nebraska and The enthusiastic response which the local endeavors have engendered. grassrbots approach is the keystone to the many centennial 'celebrations being planned across the State and in the many ,COMMunities. There has been a ground -Swell of activity on the local level to 'plan 'and develop projects 'which will have a 'Significance not only for the centennial ear of1907, but also for many years to roe: There has been no request for funds from the Federal Government to aid in the planning and carrying out of Centennial activities, as was the case in geyeral other statehood anniversaries. /The principal rnearis of support, finan- cially and Morally, are coming from local Orgaritiations and private individuals. President, on March 1, 1967, Ne- braskans will formally commence cele- bration of their f 00th anniversary of tehood. Carved out of the center of the vase, peopled by 'travelers Westward who crossed the Mts- . sburi /liver 'to settle' aTong the famous :overIana routes of The Oregonand Mor- mon Traild, and organlied in the irnme- dia,te post-Civil War period, Nebraska 'became, the Nation's g'7th State. 'TodaY a hew aWaretiess of the histo- rical background of local areas in the .State being given Impetus by the ap- =proaching centennial. The local citizen ls probing and questioning the long and, gometimes, unknown past. Undoubtedly, but of the prepal'ations and responses ,frein, this 1.00th anniversary, local his- 'tiOries will abound and new knowledge 1 be gained Of the mysteries of un- reeorded eOns Of gine. The beneficiaries - ?of this historical searching will not alone ' be the generation of' today but the ones Of the future as welt The Lincoln Star ?etlitoriallY Put it in this way: One' the early r'ewarffs of Nebraska's centennial planning, is' not occurring on the -State ceiel but in the communities them- aehteS. It is arising interest'in history of the area, the sorti that goes wa? back, not the usual kind that repeats the Story of how the pres- ent town WaS starteff. All parts of the world have a Ifistory of eeival length. The land in Nebraska is the same age as that of ancient ' Greece. But we have not sufficiently con- Idered bur history beyond our own time. We ,,tread onArOntid made sacred by great strug- gles of En early and alinost unknown people. ?But in Of us don't know it. The Nebra,ska town with the lovely name Of Weeping Water is a case in point. The town now has an historian. Recent- ly, the poetry and narrative of the Indian legends' which gave the area its special significance have been collected and pub- lished by the townspeople. The future ? Will benefit. In "other instanced, Nebraskans, on the eVe Of their centennial, are planning celebrations which Will both dictate 10 Of pioneer" heritage and initiate Of lasting *Value in the coming : CIA-RDP6714 A RECORO - !,ears. The centennial tree planting pro- am is a fine illustration. Prairie voy- agers of the 19th century on Nebraska's la'assy seas found a land barren of trees laid, seemingly, a desert of opportunities. Turning to their most precious natural ASource--the soil?ingenious pioneers :Itshioned sod houses until timber could lk brought in and seedlings planted. - In keeping with the tradition of these '71oneers and with the work of J. Sterling 'clorton, whose tree planting efforts are .mcognized each Arbor Day, the centen- alai tree planting program is encouraging Sebraskans to plant 6 million trees per Tear through 1967 on lands both public ind private. Here again the key is the beal efforts of the citizens to dramatize their appreciation for the beauty of na- ture and enrichen recreational facilities arid leave a bountiful legacy of natural beauty for future generations. This, like most the other centennial Programs, is being promoted and per- formed largely at the local level. Each of the State's 93 counties is forming its Centennial committee, either alone or With neighboring counties. Thus, Ne- braska's 100th birthday will be a truly grassroots celebration with emphasis on organizations at the city and county levels. ?- The people of Nebraska have been tinite creative and have brought forth a rmiltitude of ideas. Early in 1967 the hard work and achievement of the local towns and counties will be recognized by the naming of a centennial city and a Centennial county which have made the 'greatest contributions in the respective 'Centennial betterment programs. Al- though all the cities and counties cannot Win and be so honored, this is a contest In which no one will lose. All of the projects will enrichen the locale and inspire the people. The young people in the State have teen enthusiastic and interested in the .1nany programs being carried on at the _local level. For instance, Otoe County held a county flag design contest in which the result would be the adoption ;of an official county flag. The winner of -the most creative design was a 13-year- -old student, Mary Lindell. This is not -the only area where student participa- tion and contribution have been signif- =icant. In Burt County the students in a local school have designed, written, and published an attractive booklet on the 'many visiting places in the area, those of historical significance and those of a -recreational nature. The contribution -of these students has been well received 'by the citizens of the community and will be an invaluable aid to visitors. , The citizens of Saline County have been ambitious in their efforts to insure a successful centennial. As in other counties across the State, a historical 'marking program is being pursued. Sites and symbols of local historical signifi- cance are being carefully recorded and marked for the benefit of the residents and visitors. The story of the West is - complex and contains many historical "threads. Through efforts of these local groups the complete and complex his- torical weave of time will be more un- derstandable and reveal the essential in- 044M1000500110005-0, August 6, 1965 gredients of the broad Picture of Araeri- can history. In addition, the county is contemplat- ing a centennial scholarship program for students in the county schools. Here the intense interest in education and the, means, to provide the necessary oppor- tunities for deserving young people are the bases for a program of widepread significance not just for the centennial but for years to come. Out in Deuel County, the impact of centennial planning has taken another course. The importance of history is be- ing highlighted and efforts are being di- rected toward the establishment of a county historical society to insure that the past is not lost to the future and that records are preserved. For the mod- ern-day traveler, the citizens of the county are focusing their efforts upon placing and improving rest stops and parks along the Interstate Highway which traverses the country, the State and the Nation. This is a practical and Important contribution. Finally, it would be an oversight of a Senator representing the beef State not to mention the nationwide program to boost Nebraska beef. Across the country the appearance of the Nebraska centen- nial sirloin has attracted the attention of the connoisseur and the man in the street who enjoys good beef. The cen- tennial sirloin is the finest piece of corn- fed beef that can be bought anywhere; it must meet certain established minimum specifications; and it must be Nebraska beef. Increasingly, the restaurants and fine eating places in Nebraska and around the country are advertising and using the Nebraska centennial sirloin. This is a fine testimony in itself. Senator CURTIS and I want to extend to our colleagues and the citizens of their States the hospitality and friendliness of Nebraskans. Come to Nebraskaland any time, and particularly mark the cal- endar for the many activities of Ne- braska's centennial year. The warmth and openness of Nebraskans can be found in few other places. The tourist attractions and wealth of history of the Old West abound in Nebraska. What- ever your pleasure or fancy, seeing Ne- braska will be immensely profitable and satisfying. In this regard, I ask unani- mous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article I wrote on this subject for the Omaha World-Herald on May 2, 1965, "Nebraska?Big as All Outdoors." There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: . [From the Omaha World-Herald, May 2,1965] "HOY,DY, NEIGHBOR"--NEBRASKA?BIG AS ALL OUTDOORS , . (EDITOR'S NOTE.?ROMAN L. HRITSKA was born August 16, 1904, in David City, Nebr. He was educated in Omaha and received a law degree from Creighton University. He practiced law in Omaha for years, then served as chairman of the county board and eventu- ally was elected to the U.S. Senate. A sports- man, he loves the outdoor hunting and fish- ing of his home State. For this tourist magazine, we asked him to welcome travelers to our State in 1965.) (lty ROMAN L. HRTJSKA, U.S. Senator) Nebraska is a land of diversity and variety. It is diverse in offering to the traveler rolling 2003/10/15 : CIA-kbP67B00446R000500110005-0 '