MINUTES OF THE SPECIAL GROUP MEETING, 9 APRIL 1964

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP67B00558R000100060032-9
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 24, 2007
Sequence Number: 
32
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 9, 1964
Content Type: 
MFR
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PDF icon CIA-RDP67B00558R000100060032-9.pdf78.47 KB
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Approved For Release 2007/09/24: CIA-RDP67B00558R000100060032-9 9 April 1964 State Dept. review completed MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of the Special Group Meeting, 9 April 1964 PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone. Also present was Lieutenant General Alva R. Fitch. 1econnaissance Effort against Cambodia. 1. In a discussion of the reconnaissance effort against Cambodia the following points were made: Mr. McCone noted that, in regard to Cambodian radar, there was evidence that, whereas 2. . Mr.. Johnson registered the State Department view that any reconciliation between General Khanh and Prince Sihanouk was of considerable importance and any event which would impede such a trend was undesirable. 3. General Fitch then briefed the members on the existing intelligence collection problem. He indicated the types of infor- mation needed, i.e., sources of supply, improvement of routes, scale of infiltration, build-up indicators, etc. He emphasized that agent reports were of questionable validity, a watcher system was still in an embryonic stage, and P/W interrogations could not normally produce timely data. Only through overhead reconnaissance then, could many of these requirements be satisfied. As an example, he suggested that the Viet Cong were covertly moving in materiel and personnel by water to Cambodia, then overland up the Mekong Delta through Cambodia and along Route 13. Proof could be obtained only from the air. 4. Messrs. Bundy, Vance and Johnson raised the question as to the usefulness of the "take." It was clear that evidence is still insufficient. Mr. McCone indicated that his latest reports raised considerable doubt as to the success of the missions thus far. Mr. Vance was of the opinion that until all the reports are in and analyzed, a fair estimate of the value of the missions cannot be determined. General Fitch also believed that.further coverage was necessary for proper evaluation. BYE 26514/64 (Series B) copy of 5 copies Handle voa HYEAI4 Control Svstpm Approved For Release 2007/09/24: CIA-RDP67B00558R000100060032-9 Approved For Release 2007/09/24: CIA-RDP67B00558R000100060032-9 5. Mr. Johnson urged that the 11 priority objectives (as yet uncovered) within the 30-mile limit be completed before the Cambodian radar capability improves. The members agreed to tiri.s suggestion. (. Mr. McCone then suggested, as a solution to coverage of the seven COMDR priority objectives outside the present 30-mil.e limit, that the U-2 undertake ful coverage on a sing e mission at the time teat the aircraft departs The other members agree to this 7. The Special Group will make further determinations on Cambodian reconnaissance when the results of completed missions have been analyzed. Peter Jessup Distribution Mr. Johnson Mr. Vance Mr. McCone 13YE 26514/64 (Series B) COPY ,2. of 5 copies andia By E'rIAt Control Svstpn Approved For Release 2007/09/24: CIA-RDP67B00558R000100060032-9