POSSIBLE DISCLOSURE OF SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00558R000100090003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 21, 1964
• Content Type: MF

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RO REVIEW
State Depart
completed
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ment review
the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is
D
WARNING
information affecting the National Defense of the United
he within the meaning of te espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794,
prohibited by law".
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21 January 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR: State - Secretary Rusk
Defense - Secretary McNamara
CIA Mr. McCone
ACDA - Mr. Fisher
White House - Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Dr. Wiesner
Dr. Welsh
Mr. Johnson
NASA - Mr. Webb
USIA. - Mr. Murrow
SUBJECT Possible Disclosure of Satellite
Reconnaissance
Conclusions:
Following discussions among your representatives, we
have concluded that no additional action to disseminate more
knowledge of our satellite reconnaissance capability is
required at this time in support of our disarmament and
other policies.
This memorandum summarizes our findings on the
nature of present official and unofficial knowledge of
U. S. satellite reconnaissance, and on ways in which wider
knowledge might affect allied and Soviet acceptance.of our
disarmament proposals.
State of Allied Knowledge of U. S. Satellite Reconnaissance
Program:
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Non-Bloc Attitudes:
We have examined NATO and other non-Bloc press
coverage of reconnaissance satellites but, with the
exception of the U. S. press, find nothing of significance.
We plan to query selected U. S. Embassies in an effort to
determine more clearly the level of public and official
awareness of the y'. S. satellite program and attitudes
toward it. If our experience with recent proceedings of
the UN Outer Space Committee is a valid indicator, most
non-Bloc states tend to accept space reconnaissance as a
fact of life and to view attendant political considerations
with indifference. This situation is satisfactory from our
standpoint.
Soviet
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Soviet Statements on and Awareness of U. S. Satellite
Reconnaissance Program:
Over the past 18 months we have noted a decline in
Soviet press articles and statements on U. S. satellite
reconnaissance. The Soviet press regularly reports
'secret" launches of U. S. "spy" satellites, but these
are only two or three sentence summaries of U. S. press
agency stories, usually without Soviet comment. We have
seen little else in the Soviet press since last summer
on any aspect of reconnaissance satellites, and certainly
nothing to compare either with earlier Soviet assaults on
such activity or with recent U. S. articles on 'this subject.
There has been no Soviet commentary yet on these IT. S.
articles aderting to extensive IT. S. space reconnaissance
operations,
In the UN Outer Space Committee ne otiations, the
Soviets have relaxed (but not abandoned their position
of long standing on banning reconnaissance satellites, at
least to the extent of making agreement possible last fall
on general principles of space law, without reference to
reconnaissance. It is clear that the Soviets have taken
this action without prejudice to future negotiations, but
it does represent a significant shift in Soviet tactics.
The new Soviet attitude may result in part from
experience they have acquired with reconnaissance satellites.
In the last year the USSR has launched a large number of
r;:coverable satellites, some of which carried low res ion
cameras
It is quite possible, given
the 10,000 lb. weight of the Soviet COSMOS vehicles, that
higher resolution cameras were aboard as well. Khrushchev
hinted as much when he told Spaak last summer that the
Soviets were photographing the U. S. and even offered to
show Spaak some pictures. Adzhubey is reported to have
made a similar statement in Finland in September 1963.
On the basis of the inconclusive evidence we have
acquired in the last year or so, we believe that (a) the
Soviets are certainly aware of the U. S. program, although
probably still uncertain of its precise scope and quality;
(b) they are prepared for the moment to live with it, in
part because there is no feasible alternative open to them
to stop
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to stop it, and (c) they are probably engaged in a
reconnaissance effort of their own. As they acquire
first hand experience, their awareness of the strength
and weaknesses of space reconnaissance may have some
influence on their future proposals in space and
disarmament matters.
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Relationship of Satellite Reconnaissance to Current U. S.
Disarmament Proposals:
At Tab B is a study, prepared by ACDA, attempting to
gauge the impact of satellite photography on the principal
current arms contiol proposals under consideration in ACDA,
and on the contribution satellites can make in monitoring
agreements already in effect, i.e., the test ban and the
resolution against bombs in orbit.
A separable first stage proposal on strategic nuclear
delivery vehicles and production cutoff would, of course,
be heavily dependent on our unilateral reconnaissance
capabilities. The degree of this dependency may well have
to be. revealed in part to make a separable first stage
proposal acceptable to our Allies and domestically. Until
a U. S. position on this matter is fully worked out, however,
we cannot usefully anticipate possible solutions to this
problem. 25X1
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Tab A - List of Non-U. S. Officials
Briefed on U. S. Satellite Reconnaissance
Program.
Tab B - The Contribution of Satellite
Photography to the Verification of Current
Arms Control and Disarmament Proposals.
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CC:
Defense
-
Mr.
William Bundy
Air Force -
Dr.
McMillan
ACDA
-
Dr.
Scoville
CIA
-
Dr.
Mr.
Wheelon /
Cline
State
?-
Amb.
Mr.
Mr.
Thompson
Chayes
Hughes
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14 January 1964
The Contribution of Satellite Photography to the
Verification of Current Arms Control and
Disarmament Proposals
Problem
The United States has developed an observation satellite
system which is now able to furnish reasonable quality and
reasonably timely photography of any area in the world which
may be of interest. This unilateral capability effectively.
provides the "open skies" coverage of the USSR which was requested
by President Eisenhower in 1955 as part of a disarmament agree-
ment. It is clear that possession of this photography changes
the requirements for ground or other types of inspection as part
of the verification of a number of different proposed arms control
agreements although it does not obviate the need for complementary
means of data collection. This brief discussion has been prepared
as an attempt to gauge the impact of satellite photography on the
principal current arms control proposals under consideration in 25X1
the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
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2. Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles, Interim Reduction
and Production Cut-off. The current proposal specifies armament reductions-and
curtailment of test and production for the following major
strategic weapons categories: ICBMs and IRBM/i\RBMs; heavy and
medium bomber aircraft with air-to-surface missiles; submarines
equipped to deliver weapons by ballistic or cruise missiles; and
ABMs.
Strategic delivery systems are vulnerable to identification 25X1
and monitoring by photograp
and dep lovment hic satellites during test, production
.
c. Heavy
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FORM IV' WHIPCH MAY BE USED10-101
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