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December 21, 2016
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July 10, 2008
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October 31, 1962
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PDF icon CIA-RDP68B00255R000200110005-7.pdf1.73 MB
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP68B00255R000200110005-7 31 October 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Mc Cone The attached memorandum and maps spell out in detail the answers to some of your questions relating to the chronology on Cuban overflights. Of particular importance are the following factors: I. After were first discovered and immediately on the heals of a U-2 which violated the Soviet Far East (7`'SeptemDer). and the loss of the Chinese U-2 (8 September) a meeting was held in Bundy's office on 10 September to discuss the question of Cuban reconnaissance. We wanted to overfly all SAM sites not believed to be then operational and all areas of Cuba which had not been covered in the recent past. Because of growing concern for the safety of U-2 operations, however, it was the sense of the meeting (particularly Secretary Rusk) that CIA would be permitted to make four flights against Cuba; two peripheral and two overflights. The overflights were limited to Banes, a coastal defense le !:site in Eastern Cuba and the area around Guantanamo. We were given permission to overfly the Isle of Pines in the course of one of the two peripherals. II. The Agency made the operational determination that none of these flights would be made unless weather along the flight routes was less than 25 per cent overcast. The first of the four flights was made on 26 September; the last one on 7 October. You will note that weather was sometimes satisfactory during this interval and that flights were not made. This is explained by the fact that as each of the four approved flights was made we were looking for specific delimited weather breaks in areas to be covered by the approved flights not ,yet flown. III. SAC became responsible for U-2 operations over Cuba on 12 October. Its first mission on 14 October was planned to fly over two SAM sites in the hope of triggering the SAM system to permit ELINT collection from offshore. Included in the planned track was an area west of Havana which COMOR suspected to be an area of possible missile activity. In the course of the flight, the SAC pilot (the pilot was not the one later killed) photographed this suspect area and turned up the first MRBM. Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP68B00255R000200110005-7 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP68B00255R000200110005-7 IV. There never was a stand down of Cuban operations. It is true that we were inhibited by the guidelines set down at the 10 September meeting, but the only stand down was on Taiwan, where all reconnaissance operations have been grounded since the China incident on 8 September. V. The peripheral flights did turn up additional SAM sites and coastal defense cruise-missile sites, but that's about all. Be sure to see the map attached at the very back of this package. It shows the kind of coverage CIA wanted at the meeting on 10 September as compared with what we were actually permitted to do. 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP68B00255R000200110005-7 I. RE-CAP OF SAM AND CRUISE MISSILE SITE PHOTOGRAPHY AND REPORTING NOTES ON AUGMENTED SPECIAL GROUP MEETING ON 1a SEPTEMBER 1962 III. WFA'i'?." :; ';_~.i.3JATIVE TO U-2 OPERATIONS, 5 SEPTEMBER THROUGH 14 OCTOBER 1962 (23 MAPS) IV. SEPARATE MAPS DEPICTING TRACKS OF U-2 OVERFLIGHTS FOR AUGUST, SEPTEMBER, AND OCTOBER 1962 (4 MAPS TOTAL) MISSIONS 3086, 3088, 3089, 3093, 3095, 3098, 3100, AND 3101 V. MAP SHOWING COMOR TARGET AREA FOR MISSION 3101 AND DEPICTING CIA PLANNED ROUTE AND SAC ROUTE FLOWN ON 14 OCTOBER 1962 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP68B00255R000200110005-7 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RD P68B00255R000200110005-7 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP68B00255R000200110005-7 28 October 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Notes on Factors Bearing on Reconnaissance of Cuba 1. As a result of the Soviet protest of a SAC U-2 overflying Sakhalin the initial dis - covery of SA-2 sites on 29 August and additional SA-2 sites in Western Cuba on the 5 September mission, a meeting was held in Mr. McGeorge Bundy's office on 1: September 1962. Among those present were Mr. Bundy, Special Assistant to the President; Mr. Rusk, Secretary of State; Mr. Robert Kennedy, Attorney General; General Carter, DDCI; General Lansdale, JCS; Mr. Ed Martin, Assistant Secretary of State; Mr. Tom Parrott, Secretary to the Special Group; Dr. Scoville, DD/R; Mr. Reber, Chairman, COMOR; and Mr. Cunningham, DAD/OSA, et al. Operations had submitted proposed tracks for additional coverage of Cuba. These tracks were reviewed by those present and the following was approved at this meeting: a. Four flights to be flown against Cuba: two peripheral and two overflights. b. The overflights were limited to Eastern Cuba east of 770 West. c. Overflights to be designated to minimize time over denied territory. d. Isle de Pines could be overflown as an individual mission. safety. e. All four flights to be designed to maximize 2. Four missions were planned and approved at this meeting. A phone call at a later date between Mr. McCone and L' L 25X1 2bA11 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP68B00255R000200110005-7 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP68B00255R000200110005-7 State Department authorized overflight of Isle de Pines and the Zapata Swamps on a single mission. (See Mission 3095 flown 29 September 1962.) The other three routes were mission 3093 on 26 September covering Guantanamo area and the suspected SSM site at Banes; mission 3098 on 5 October to cover peripherally the Southern coast of Eastern Cuba and mission 3100 on 7 October to cover the Northern coast of Eastern Cuba to search for addi- tional SA-2 sites. Both peripheral flights were designed essentially to remain outside the three-mile limit around Cuba. (See attached maps. ) 3. These missions--3095, 3093, 3100, and 3098--were planned to enter the Cuban radar net at the latest time commen- surate with shortest route from radar penetration to target. As an additional safety factor the overflight and peripheral missions were carried out at 73, 000 feet plus, instead of the normal 70, 000 foot altitude. This necessitated air-to-air refueling before enter- ing or after exiting the radar perimeter and automatically limited the amount of coverage due to range-fuel problems. 4. As was stated earlier, permission was given to commence planning and flying four missions on 1d September. Normally, the earliest date a mission could have gone would be 13 September. However, in anticipation the Operations Division had been studying the weather daily commencing 6 September through 26 September. The Isle of Pines mission was flown on 17 September, but the weather was worse than briefed and the target completely cloud-covered (Mission 3091). Hurricane Celia was approaching the vicinity of the Caribbean at this time which accounts for much of the poor weather forecast and en- countered in mid- and late September. The first successful flight of the four flights approved, flew over Banes and Guantanamo on 26-September. The weather was studied continuously, and flights were to be launched only when the weather was forecast to be.less than 25 percent overcast. The fourth mission was flown on 7 October 1962, a time span for the four missions of almost a month. Upon completion of the analysis of all missions through 7 October 1962, it was concluded that virtually the whole island of Cuba was now almost completely protected (potentially) by Soviet type SA-2 sites. As a result of this analysis, it had to be assumed that any further overflight of Cuba was or would be in the near future subject to intercept by an SA-2 when the sites became operational. Approved For Relea Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP68B00255R000200110005-7 yet operational. The film from mission 3101 was flown by jet 5. Shortly after 7 October, a proposal was made by CIA to quick-fix a Ryan QZC drone with special ELINT collection equipment. The concept of the operation. as planned was to over- fly an SA-2 site most likely to be operational. The drone, if tracked by the SA-2 associated FRUIT SET radar, would be so designed that it would initially receive the FRUIT SET radar impulses, convert the electronic impulses to another frequency and re-broadcast the data to ground and air-borne receivers stationed well offshore Cuba. The drone if fired on by the SA-2 site would also possibly acquire the SAM fusing electronic signals and simi- larly broadcast the signal to the offshore collectors before the drone was hit and destroyed, or before it exhausted its fuel pro- viding it escaped destruction. This proposal was made by CIA to NRO and action was initiated to implement the electronic components for the drone and modification of the drone to whatever extent neces- sary to perform the planned flight and operation. The minimum time frame for implementation of this operation was estimated to bout six weeks which would have put the drone--on its first flight in late~November or early December. 6. It was soon decided that the time element involved was unacceptable and another plan evolved wherein the J-75 powered Agency U-2 would be used to overfly_theSAM site and by stationing specifically equipped ELINT aircraft in the vicinity, but at a legal distance from the Cuban coast, the FRUIT SET signals would be acquired from a safe distance. It was clearly understood that the risk of sending the U-2 over one or more operational SA-2 sites would be high, but the risk was considered to be valid relative to the importance of the FRUIT SET signal acquisition. 7. The results of SAC mission 3101 (14 October) over the planned route and target gave us our first look at a MRBM site under construction in Cuba. The FRUIT SET radar signal was not recorded at this time presumably because the SA-2 sites were not transport to Andrews Air Force Base for processing ~ at about 6 a. m. on Monday. ~,? vctooer. During the photo interpretation phase at the the first MRBM site was located and the information passed to Secretary MacNamara; Tuesday 16 , October, Secretary MacNa'mara`pre'senteci the photographic evidence to the President. It is interesting at this point to re-cap the fre- quency of U-2 flights during this period. One mission (3101) was flown on Sunday, 14 October; two missions on Monday; none on Tuesday. After the President viewed the evidence on Tuesday and 3 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP68B00255R000200110005-7 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP68B00255R000200110005-7 a limited number of people in the intelligence community apprised of the results of mission 3101, SAC apparently received permission to fly maximum effort over cuba. A total of six U-2 missions over- flew Cuba on Wednesday, 17 October. A total of 17 missions were flown by SAC in their first week of operations. For the Record: Date of Previous Photography Coverage First MIG-15/17 discovered in Cuba 15 Jun 61 N. A. First MIG-Zl discovered in Cuba 05 Sept 62 N. A. First MRBM discovered in Cuba 14 Oct 62 29 Aug 62 First IRBM discovered in Cuba 15 Oct 62 29 Aug 62 First IL-28 discovered in Cuba 15 Oct 62 29 Aug 62 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP68B00255R000200110005-7 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP68B00255R000200110005-7 s''sr`: . a e p~ ~e; f s x_'37" i/~ b d~~?2'/ Q A/ay'`%e I /! fn1t F2 4' 4# ~ 'C e~ ?~ _` Or, ~ ~G d i"c;: ' C Chi ~,?%, yi2l~ + ?s') GF ~' _ e P ~t~ii 80?W ?;* 1.~: Cft~E /77011S 4~1e- moors c.~S~` cad/;j 19Z494 4 17L~'/~~ e'3 C toE PREPARED BY ACIC, USAF, ST LOUIS 18, MO., JAN 1962 80?W Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP68B00255R000200110005-7 s T CUBA JPC-12a 75~ W i mom,. Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP68B00255R000200110005-7 MEXICO IDEALIST Missions from 5 August 1962 to 14 October 1962 _ rte-- ? 85' W F:E%tiED BY A