H. PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNITY COORDINATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP68B00255R000300010001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

.... lc;'+!a-x 4 !.W"-`ASCh:-~':ralty ~ avlrsol v
Approved For Release:;200.5/D5/'F8 lCtAIP
B00255R00030001000-8
H. PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNITY COORDINATION
4. PLEASE GIVE SPECIFIC EXAMPLES, INCLUDING DATES AND
CONTENTS, OF ANY ITEMS OF INTELLIGENCE PRESENTED BY THE AGENCY
WHICH HAVE BEEN WITHHELD FROM PUBLICATION, DELAYED, OR SIGNIFI-
CANTLY ALTERED BY THE COORDINATION PROCESS. IF DELAYED, HOW
LONG? IF ALTERED, IN WHAT WAY?
As a result of USIB discussion on 7 September, a restraint
was placed on the dissemination of all intelligence alluding to
the existence of coastal defense cruise missile sites in Cuba,
except to those who had an absolute need to know. Following
the USIB meeting on 13 September, this restraint was expanded
to restrict the dissemination of any intelligence relating to
the delivery of offensive weapons to Cuba, the use of Cuba as
a Soviet base, the stockpiling of weapons in Cuba for trans-
ment to other points in Latin America and indications of
hi
p
s
Cuban aggressiveness. Again dissemination was to be accomplished
only to those personnel who had an absolute need to know. Thus,
the DIA/CIIC was unable to report developments of this nature in
its publications.
12 October a formal control system was established with
O
n
frespect to intelligence relating to the delivery or presence in
Cuba of offensive weapons, actual or implied. A specific code-
word (PSALM) was created under which all such intelligence was
wrapped up at the TOP SECRET level. Very narrow lists of
personnel eligible to have access to TOP SECRET PSALM intelligence
were created within the military departments (outside of intelli-
gence) under the criteria that only those serving in an advisory
to the President on the Cuban problem were to have access
acit
a
y
p
c
to such intelligence. (Again DIA was unable to publish any intelli-
gence relating to offensive weapons including the significant
disclosures from reconnaissance on 14 October. .While these
restrictions created a number of internal problems within DIA/CIIC
and the Estimates Office and may have retarded to some degree the
analytical effort, DIA considers the real impact of these
dissemination restraints was on the Unified and Specified Commands
which were responsible for contingency planning and which were
charged with operational responsibilities in the Cuban area.
DIA review(s) completed.
Approved For Release 2005/05/18 : CIA-RDP68B00255R000300010001-8
 Approved For Release 2005/05/18 : CIA-RDP68B00255R000300010001-8
B. COLLECTION ACTIVITIES
The Defense Intelligence Agency has not had and
does not have now any collection facilities under its
immediate control and direction. All information on
the Cuban situation received by DIA during the period
of this report was collected through facilities sub-
ordinate to other intelligence agencies and activities.
Therefore, no response to this portion of the report
is provided by DIA.
Approved For Release 2005/05/18 : CIA-RDP68B00255R000300010001-8 0e.
 Approved For Release 2005/05/18 : CIA-RDP68B00255R000300010001-8
C. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
The Defense Intelligence Agency did not originate
any raw intelligence reports during the period under
review. Consequently, no response is addressed to this
area of examination.
Approved For Release 2005/05/18 : CIA-RDP68B00255R00030001000 e