BRIEFING FOR CINCLANT AND STRIGOM PLANNERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP68B00255R000300010006-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2005
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: October 11, 1962
• Content Type: BRIEF

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11 October 1962
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BRIEFING FOR CINCLANT AND STRICOM PLANNERS
Gentlemen, the purpose of this briefing is to present a picture
of Cuban military capabilities as of the period 1960-1961 for
background, as of today for current planning, and an estimate of
what the Cuban order of battle will be next year, in the summer
of 1963.
In 1960 the revolutionary Army consisted of the Ground Forces,
six Rural Police regiments, and the Army Air Force, under the
command of Raul Castro. The Rural Police were not combat troops.
They were dispersed throughout Cuba in small Cuartels. Each
Rural Police Regiment had police jurisdiction over one of the six
military districts. Combat training was inadequate and units of
the Army had not participated in field maneuvers. Combat effective-
ness was poor, even by Latin American standards.
At the end of 1960 and the beginning of 1961 the first of Soviet
Bloc weapons began to flow into Cuba. Tanks, artillery, antiair-
craft weapons, automatic weapons for ground troops, and aircraft
arrived, and the task of training Cuban soldiers in their use
began under the tutelage of Soviet Bloc instructors. The Navy,
which had been decimated following Castro's takeover, began to
reorganize with politically reliable personnel, and the new Cuban
Ground Forces based on three territorial commands began to form.
By the time of the Bay of Pigs disaster, however, very few military
units had been trained in the use of their new weaponry and Castro
could only get six aircraft into the air. As it turned out, with
no air cover, it was sufficient to destroy the invasion effort.
Since May 1961, the Cuban Ground Forces have developed into a
standing army of about 75,000 men and a ready reserve of about
100,000 men. There is also a home guard of 100,000 men. By now
the ground forces have received intensive training in the use of
Bloc-supplied arms and equipment and tactical training through the
battalion combat team level. Great attention has been paid to the
political indoctrination of troops. It has acquired capabilities
for the combat employment of armor and artillery, including anti-
tank and conventional antiaircraft weapons hitherto unknown in Latin
America. There are some 265 battalions in the Cuban ground forces
including the ready reserve. A full strength battalion consists of
about 1,000 men. However, battalions vary greatly in strength and
efficiency. The over-all strength of the ground forces is probably
sufficient to repel any invasionsh'rt of a direct US military inter-
vention in strength.
A new Cuban Air Force has been created. The Cuban Revolutionary
Air Force (CRAF) like the Army has been reorganized and supplied
with Soviet equipment and Bloc training during the past two years.
The Air Force is apparently organized into 1 Fighter Regiment
MIG 15/17/19 based at San Antonio de los Banos, 2 Fighter Squadrons
MIG 15/17/21) based at Santa Clara Airfield, 1 Fighter Squadron
MIG 15/17) based at Camaguey Airfield, and 1 Utility Unit (IL-14,
MI-l, MI-4) based at Playa Baracoa Airfield. An ambitious training
program is underway designated to give the CRAF a fully operational
capability at an early date. We believe these units have a limited
capability at this time.
It is estimated that the CRAF now has a total of at least 60 MIG
15/17/19's. In addition they have recently received at least 25
MIG-21's and 10 IL-28's in crates. Only one MIG-21 is known to
be fully assembled; the rest are either still crated or in some
stage of assembly. None of the IL-28's have been. assembled.
DIA review(s) completed.
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The CRAF also still has 17 B-26's and 8 to 10 Sea :Fury MK-l's
(prop subsonic fighter). It has 25-30 assorted US-made transports
plus 11 IL-14's which belong to the civil airline Cubana but could
probably be used by the CRAF. At least 3 additional IL-14's are
believed to have been received recently. There are a total of 35
helicopters of which 12 are MI-41s and 11 MI-11s. The CRAF has
27 various type trainers only 4 of which are jet (T-33). Additional
aircraft and helicopters apparently are being received. The addition
of the MIG-21's to the operational inventory will greatly enhance
their air defense capability. Inclusion of the IL-28's will provide
an air support interdiction capability.
Radar equipments of various types have been present in Cuba for
some time. The effectiveness with which the EW/GCI capability
has been tied into an integrated air defense system is not discern-
ible at this time. Training with this system is probably underway
but it will be some time before the operational efficiency of the
system becomes apparent. Radars have been identified which could
perform at least the functions of early warning, acquisition and
guidance for the SA-2 SAM missile system as well as conventional
antiaircraft fire control. These radars, by nickname, are listed
below:
Token; Knife Rest A and B; possibly Wood Gage; Spoon Rest;
Fruit Set; Track Dish; Whiff; and Fire Can.
Although the Cubans are considered proficient in the use of AAA
weapons, they are not believed to be fully trained. and familiar
with fire control equipment assiciated with the AAA. Therefore,
we believe that the dffectiveness of their AAA would be much
better under visual than all-weather conditions. AAA equipment is
generally dispersed throughout Cuba to defend airfields, ports,
army installations and beaches, with concentrations in the Havana
and Guantanamo areas. (See map showing AAA OB). The SAM defenses
now under construction, (shown on the map,) are dispersed throughout
the island and when operational will further enhance their air
defense capability.
The Cuban Air Force is estimated to have a personnel strength of
between 2,420 and 3,750 divided as follows:
Associated with MIG program Flying Pers 600-800
Maint Pers 800-1100
Grd support 200-500
Totals
1600-2400
Associated w/Helicopter and
Flying Pers
80-120
Mis Acft
100-150
20-50
Totals
200-320
Associated w/radar
620-1030
The extent to which Soviet personnel are involved in CRAF
activities is not clear. Soviet personnel are known to be
engaged in training; they may be being used as pilots and in
the operation of radar, SAM, and AAA equipment.
Along with the build-up of the Cuban Air Force, there has been an
effort to augment Cuban air facilities. Several new airfields
have been built, including one at Santa Clara with a 10,400 ft.
runway, and many of the already existing facilities have been
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significantly improved, including a new 8,800 ft. runway at Holguin.
There are indications that this runway either has been or is being
extended to 10,000 ft. The existence of military fields with 10,000
feet runways cannot be explained by the needs of existing aircraft.
Cuba now has seven airfields with runways over 8,000 ft. and 12
with runways between 5,000 ft. and 8,000 ft.; although two of these--
San Francisco in eastern Cuba and El Jiqui in the Cienaga de Zapata
area--still have dirt runways. There are indications of construction
activity at San Julian in western Cuba, which has been inoperative
for the past year because of the poor condition of the runways.
At least half, and possibly more, of these fields are capable of
supporting jet fighter operations, although MIG's are known to be
based only at San Antonio de los Banos in the Havana area and at
Camaguey and Santa Clara in Central Cuba and it is anticipated
that they will be based at Holguin. These and other major fields
such as Los Canos in eastern Cuba and those in the Havana area
could support light bomber operations. Santa Clara and Holguin
are capable of supporting heavier bomber operations.
In addition to the major airfields, there are a number of airfields
with less than 5,000 ft. Most of these are located in the Guantanamo
area and, for the most part, have dirt runways. While some of them
conceivably could be capable of supporting jet operations, their
military significance has not yet become apparent.
In general, parking and field facilities have been improved, but,
except for the major airfields, they are still believed to be
relatively limited.
As in the case of the Air Force, a new Navy is being developed.
Formerly coastal patrol was accomplished by militiamen in confis-
cated fishing and pleasure craft. Now the Soviet Bloc has provided
14 to 16 guided missile Komar class boats, 16 "P-6" class motor
torpedo boats, three or four Soviet "P0-2" class patrol craft and
six large Soviet submarine chasers of the "Kronshtat" class. This
has added to their collection of 30 to 35 miscellaneous patrol and
auxillary small craft and the three US patrol escort class ships
already in their order of battle.
This brings us to the current missile build-up in Cuba. So far
a total of 20 SA-2 antiaircraft missile sights have been confirmed,
as well as three cruise-type coastal defense missile sights. A
fourth facility which may become a coastal defense sight has been
located. The SA-2 sites are at different stages, varying from
early construction to possibly operational. The Coastal Defense
site at Banes, on the eastern and of the island, is probably
partially operational.
The estimated strength of the Cuban Armed Forces for the summer of
1963 is as follows:
(a) No change in number of ground force personnel.
(b) A total of 24 to 36 SA-2 missile sites.
(c) 20 to 30 coastal defense sites.
(d) The Air Force will have between 2,500 and 4,000 personnel
and these aircraft:
84 MIG 15/17 and 19's.
24 to 36 MIG 21's and
8 B-26's.
(e) the Navy will have 4 to 5,000 men and:
10 Kronshtadt patrol craft
16 PC patrol boats
24 Komar class guided missile boats
The 3 US patrol escort ships and their present small craft.
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Finally, a word about potential anti-Castro resistance from
within Cuba: It is estimated that most of the 80% of the Cuban
population who are against the Castro Regime are apathetic and
passive because of the repressive measures of the police state
and the fact that since the Bay of Pigs tragedy there has never
been a dramatic incident to spark hopes for an ultimate over-
throw of the Communist regime. For planning purposes, resistance
from within Cuba to support any US action will depend mostly upon
the degree to which the Cuban people can be convinced at the outset
that the effort is not another unsupported exile action but is the
action of forces in sufficient strength of the United States govern-
ment capable of causing the downfall of the Castro regime. The
same applies to defections in the Cuban Armed Forces. If the Armed
Forces were convinced for example, that they were up against a
full US intervention in strength, large-scale defections could be
expected.
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