C.I.A : MAKER OF POLICY, OR TOOL?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP68B00432R000500020002-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 25, 1966
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP68B00432R000500020002-7
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Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP68B00432R000500020002-7
 Monday, April 25, 1966
Approved For Reease - 8B00432
?
C.I.A.: Maker of Policy, or,L'
Suf.yeyFinds Widely
Feared Age~icy Is
Tightly Controlled
Following Is the first of five
articles on the Cenilral Intelli
gence Agency ~he articles are,
by a team of Xew York Timet,
correspondents ''consisting of
Tom Wicker, 767in W.. Finney,
Max Frankel, 4W Ifenworthy
and other mem s o f the Times
staff.
Spec1s1 to Tht fl w York Times
WASHINGTQN, April 24-
One day in 1960 an tgent.of the
Central Intelligence Agency
caught a plane in ''okyo, flew
to Singapore and c]1eCked into
a hotel room in ` timaa, tc receive
a visitor. The agent plugged a
lie detector into an overloaded
electrical circuit and blew out
the lights In the bui .ding.
The Central Intelligence Agency, whit r 'es not often
appear in the news, made headlines on two counts in recent
days. The agency was found to have interceded in the
slander trial of one of its agents In an effort to obtain his
exoneration without explanation except that he had done its
bidding In the interests of national security. And it was
reported to have planted at least five agents among Michi-
gan State University, scholars engaged in a foreign aid
project some years ago in Vietnam. Although the specific,
work of these agents, and the circumstances of their em-
ployment are in dispute, reports of their activities have
raised many questions about the:'purposes and methods of
the C.I.A., and. about its relationship to other parts of the
Government and nongovernmental institutions.' tven larger
questions about control of the'.I.A. within?Te fraxnewq
of a _free government and about its role ,in :foreign airs
governnnnts. ' To provide 'bac'kground for,
and to dlAtermine what issues of pul lie pp
se uegtions,
are by,
re,
4 41
months looking ' into its affairs.: This series, 'is the result.
invasion of Cuba, spied and
counteispied established air-
lines,,radio Sts to "schools
al?d??supportedmloo s ri agazines
In the investigation that fol and,: businesses, rt i ink out of
lowed, the agent and a C.I.A. the Control of its supposed poli-
collea Were arrested and
jailed a erican opies.
The t was an interna-
tional inWAnt that infuriated
London, not once but-twice, . It
ent ssed an American Am-
bas " 4 It jefi an American
Segf Mete { to write a!
le tided an opportu- mentv.`..more powerful than even
nit dunce tht, perfidy of the President?
all cans an file C.I.A:
These ar _Uestions constant-
in pa Cular, thus increasing
.,... ld Some
r
neighbors about the agenn:y ali,a
enhancing his own political po-
sition
Ultiii tely, lie )neident led
the , illxited Sttes . Government
to tell a lie inpublic and then
to admit the lie even more pub-
licly.
The lie was, no sooner dis-
closed than a world predisposed
to suspicion of_ the C.I.A. and
unaware of what really' had
happened in Singapore five
years ' earlier began to repeat
questions that have dogged the
intelligence agency' and the
United States Government for
years:
q Was this secrebody, 'which
was known to h` V own
I governments and inn ailed
tical master?
9Was it in. fact damaging,
while it sought to advance, the
national interest? Could it spend
huge sums for ransoms, bribes
and subversion without4 check
or regard for the cc sequences?
l1Did it lie to or' Irtfluence'the
R00050Th20sid',7carried out over
several months, disclosed, for
instance, that the SingaPO
aff air resulted not from a I>
or political control or from re
lessness by the C.I.A., but from
bad fortune and diplomatic
blundering.
it found that the C.1-A., for!
all its fearsome reputation, is
under far more stringent politi-
cal and budgetary control than'
most of its critics know or con-
cede, and that 'since the Bay of
Pigs disaster in Cuba in 1961
these controls have been tightly
exercised:
The consensus of those inter-
viewed was that the critics'
favorite recommendation for a
strQl gel' rein on the agency -
a Congressional committee to
oversee the C.I.A.-would prob-
ably profade little more real
control th,~ now exists and
,might both restrict the agency's
effectivenesg and actually shield
it from those who desire more
knowledge about its operations.
In a public memorandum ad-
dressed to the court, the C.I.A.
stated that it had ordered the
agent, Juri Raus, to disclose no
further details of the case, in
order to protect the nation's
foreign Intelligence? apparatus.
Mr. Raus is claiming complete
legal'Immunity from the suit on
the grounds that he had acted
-'as' an official agent of the Fed-
#r.i Government..
Such incidents, bringing the
activities of the C.I.A. Into dim
and often dismaying public view,
have caused members of Con-
gress and many publications to
question ever more persistently;
the role and propriety of one- of
Washington's most discussed
and least understood Institu-
tions. Some of the misgivings
have been shared by at least
two American President, Harry
S. Truman and John F. Ken-
nedy. -
.
ly asked around the wo
of them lPPte'r'aised again re-
cently mien it was disclosed
that Michigan State University
was the cover for some C.I.A.
agents in South Vietnam during
a multimulion-dollar technical
assistance program the univer-
sity conducted for the regime of
the late President Ngo Dnnh
11.11 Iiast week, It also became)
known that an Estonian refugee
who-Was. being sued for slander(
in aederal 'District Court inl
Baltimore. was resting his de-
fense on the fact that the . al
leged slander had been commit-
ted in the course of his duties
as a ,C.I.A: agent.
A Wide Examination
To $gek. reliable answers to
these questions; to sift, where
possible, fact from fancy and
theory'frtinicondition; to deter-
mine what real questions of
public policy an International
relatipfis are osea-by the exist-
ence ' and o erations of the,,
C.I.'A., 'The New York Times
has compiled information and,
opinions from?informed Ameri-
cans throughout the world.
It has opined reports from
p foreign correspondents and
editors w1t ., recent service in
more than.,' 5 countries and
from reporters In Washington
who Interviewed more than 50
present Iancl former Govern-
.ment officials, members of. Con-~
gress and military officgrs..
A Matter of Will
Other Important conclusions
of the study include the follow-
Ing:
q While the institutional forms
of political control appear of-I
fective and sufficient, it is really
the 'Dill of the political officials
who must exert control that is
important and that has most
often been lacking.,
gEven when control is tight
and effective, a more important'
question may concern the extent
to which C.I.A. information and
policy judgments affect political
decitions in foreign affairs.
9VVlether or not political con-
trol is being exercised, the more
serious question is whether the
very existence of an efficient
C.I.A. causes the Uni States
Government to'rely to much on
clandestine and illicit activities,
back-alley tactics, subversion
and what Is known in official
jargon as "dirty tricks."
h
e
(Finally, regardless of t
facts, the C.I.A: s reputation in
the world is so horrendous nits role In events so exaggerated
that it is becoming ,a burden on
American foreign policy, rather)
that the secret weapon it wasi
intended to be.
The Singapore incident, with'
its" bizarre" repercussions five
years later, is an excellellt,,..lesson
in how that has happened, al-
though none of the fears of the
critics are justified by the facts
of the particular case.
Problem in Singapore
The. ill-fated agent who blew
out the-lights flew from Tokyo
to ' Singapore , only after a pro-
longed- argument inside the
'C.I.A. Singapore, a strategic
Asian-port with a large Chinese
population,, was soon: to get its
pidence from Britain and
eijd the Malaysian Federation.
Shotil(?C.I.A. recruit some Well-
placed~spies, or should itr,asbe-
the $rlf~sh
' '
on MI-6
e
,
, rely
for
CIA-RDP68B00432R00050 viic~ee, `and on B td ~1~-ltiaintann good d rela-
tions and good sources in Singa-
pore?
)others, raised armies, stag oved For Release 2003/03/25
 I and who was one of his prin-
cipaj" advisers was ? . C.LA.
operative.
When the U-2 incl dent is men-
1ione y critics, as it always is,
the ephasis is usually on the
C I A. s - and the,., 1 hoover
Administration's -?? p ho r. _ in
permitting I`rancis Gary Pow-
ers's flight over the Soviet'-Union
in 1960,? just before'a scheduled.i
summit conference. Not much isI
usually said of the incalculable
intelligence value cf the undis-`
turbed U-2 flights between 1956
and 1969 over the heartland of
Russia. I
And whelt critics frgquently
chargeca rat C.I.,Ai, operations
contradict and sabotage official
American ' policy they may not
know that the C.I.A. is often
overruled in its ppolicy judg-
ments.
As an examplef; the C.LA.
strongly urged the :Kennedy Ad-
ministra~t'on not to recognize
tlLe_ Eg p$ian-baelted Yemeni
regime and warned that Presi-
dent Nasser woZ1 not quickly
pull' his tfoops d t Of Yemen.
Ambassador Joni Badeau
thought otherse, His ',advice
was accepted, 'the republic was
loed, that -the C I A., had fore-
.&n- and' the State' Department
had not. 11 1
Not.do critics allays give the
C:I.A. 'oredit*hzre It is due for
its vital and daily service s. an
accurate and encyc OpOdic s u?ce
of quick news, information, anal-
ysis and deduction about every-
thing from a new,,' Alice chief in
:Mozambique to Ni aid agree-
ment beveen Communist China
and Albania, 'from th state of
''resident. Sukarno's alt , to
shchev fall from power' .
Yet the critics, fi Lvorite inAict-
ments are spectacular enoug'fi
to explain the wortli-s suspicions
and fears of the"C.I.A. and its
operations.
A. sorry episode in Asia in
the early nintgeiy-fifties is a fre-
quently cited' ekample. C.T.A.
agent$"`athered. remnants of
the defeated Chiriele Nationalist
armies in the jungles of north-
west Burma, supplied them with
gold ,and arms and encouraged
thent,?tg raid Communist China.
Qn :him was to harrass Pek-
ing1o a point where it might
retaliate against Burma, forcing
the Burmese to turzi to the
United States for protection.
Actually, few raids occurred,
and the army became a -
rouble-some and costly burden. The
C.LA. had eulistecl the help of
Gen. Phao ?. 'nod, the police
chief of Thail and a Leading
narcotics deaThe, with tide: I and . gold
filrnisd agents,
went too tsiness.
By t tIm mu- e eou eiLs ve
nounced' American A
ened to quit the Unit
that i I Moreover, some of the Nation-
.. I on American policies but also.
age ., tioly 1 UM(I r erTrgaeeae-ra'J--.,
dyad an foijenting tro e a rat- beyond its real int#-i4ions and
leader's ins governme in' area, capacities.
a though they have not been Through spuriou eports, gos-
s p orted d by the C.I.A. or aq.YJ
sip misunderstan ings, deep-
AOermcan agency far.a decd seated fears and ft*'geries and
In 1958, a C.I.A.-ai .. d opera ations, the agency has,
t, o involving South Vietnamese 9paccused of almost any -
e
Prow him. It failed but drove,
tnA farther down the road that
liitirnately led to his break in
advice .of American
a s the CLwas all-
11 .tp fl in sdpplies from
i'PaiwaT 8nd illippines to
aid ari~ ' ens rldng
igaiiist President:,-?uka in
can pilot V TLS "shot, do a
bombing mission and
q~n
gin Bring the "pl(
bec pretext for t
der rg Indonesia
qS therigntist.army
plot ria.
q ng Patrice Lumum-
ba ongo.\
c ping M toccan agents
the ohrow of
Y 11 o f e chars and many
similar tot em are fabrications,
authorita~ officials outside
th' C.I.
e C ~,'s notoriety e