HOW C.I.A. PUT INSTANT AIR FORCE INTO CONGO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP68B00432R000500020003-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 26, 1966
• Content Type: NSPR

THE, NEW YORK TIMES 26 APRIL 1966
How C.1'.ArAut rlns, ijIQ[zyFoie7hTatTOTtlgo
Intervenikio.n, Invasion, Spying All in a Day's Work
Following is the Beep of
five articles on the Central In-
telligence Agency. The articles
are by a team of ,lbw York
Times correspon~dentw`consist-
ing, of Tom Wick John W.
Finney, Max Fra 1 E. W.
Kenworthy and 4 members
of The Times sta.
Special to The NeW:; Times
WASHINGTON, Aril. 25-
At the Ituri River, eight miles
south of Nia ;pia, in i,he north-
east Congo, aI.V 'nment col-
umfl of 600 Co ese troops
ag 100 white mercenaries had
b ambushed by a rebel force
ark was under heavy fire Sud-
denly, three B-26's sdmm. ed in
over the rain forest and bombed
and strafed a path through the
rebel ranks for the forces sup-'
ported by the United States.
At the controls of the Ameri- 1
can-made planes wero anti-Cas-
tro Cubans, veterans of the Bay
of Pigs . invasion of Cuba in
1961, three years before. They
had been recruited by a pur
portedly private ecmpany in'
Florida. Servicing their planes
were European me,hanics so-
licited through adviirtisements
in London newspape ,-s. Guidingli
them into ac ' ` re Ameri-
cane "dipiom>? nd other
officials in appa. n;ly civilian
Positions.
''J;6 sponsor, paymaster and
director of all of there, however,
was the Central : Cntelligence
Agency, with headquarters in
fective provision of an
air%force" in the Congo w
e C.I.A.'s operation
supply the advice and support toy
enable that government to sur-
vive.
From wire-tapping to influ-
encing elections, from bridge-
blowing to armed invasions, in
the dark and in the light, the
Central Intelligence Agency has
,become vital instrument of
American policy and a major
component of American govern-
ment.
ti4 but also rebuts an ad-
information. It not
's
01
br 'organizes its own i far-
fluing operations but alsfi- re-
'sists an adversary's operation.
Against the Soviet Union
lone, it performs not only cer
n of the services performed
'Moscow by the K.G.B., the
'lso many of the political,1
inmunist parties around the]
tld.
~~' yW hen the Communist and
trestle for control of the vast,
developed Congo in 1960 after
office in Leopoldville mush-
y"~tbis was 'not to compete with
the real United States Embassy,
and militar attaches but to
the to a seecnmg evnLCao a = ..
conflicting forces.
man
y
go was at all times re&n-
gs to and welcomed byl the
5'ltcy-makers of the United
to was these policy-makers
o chose to make the agency
the instrument of. political-and
military interventio a in another
eaders and to finau,ce their bids
nation's affairs, for in five years ovine informants and. disburs-
ing funds without the bureau-
UL a`Jt;11V "' cratic restraints imposed on
it was only in Lan?'ley thh the other government agencies, the
White House, the State i't- C.I.A. soon found Joseph Mo-
ment and the Pentagon und. butu, Victor' Nendaka and
the peculiar combinati~ of Albert Ndele. Their eventual'
talgnts necessary to block , the l emergence as President of the'i
creation of a. pro-Communist', country, Minister of Transporta-
'regime, recruit the leaderPgpr1Rg12g~r~(1~Q?
pro-American government and bank, respectively, proved a
tribute to the Americans' judge
ment and tactics.
So pervasive was the C.I.A. It could engage 20 British
influence that the agency was mechanics
s and ofurnish ut legthecom-
widely accused of the assas;ina- p ic
tfon of Moscow's man, Premier tical expertise .from its own
ranks or from Americans under
Patrice Lumumba. Correspond- contract.
ents who were in the Congo More9ver, some C.I.A. agents
are` convinced the C.I.A. had eventually felt compelled tofly
nothing to do with the murder, some combat missions them-1
though it did play a major role selves in support of South Afri-
can and Rhodesian mercenaries.
in establishing Cyrille Adoula The State Department denied
as Mr. Lumumba's successor for this at first - then insisted
a time. the Americans be kept out of
Toney and shiny American combat.
automobiles, furnished through But it was pleased by the over-
the logistic wizardry of Lang- all success of the operation, in
ley, are said to have been the which no planes were lost and
, all civilian targets were avoided.
deciding factors in the vote that
Meanwhile, in Other Areas...
brought Mr. Adoula to power.
Russian, Czechslovak, Egyptian
and Ghanaian agents were
simply outbid where they could
not be outmaneuvered.
In one test after Mr. Adoula
had been elected, rival agents of
East and West almost stumbled
over each other rushing in and!
out of parliamentary delegates'
homes, On the day of the roll-;
call, American and Czech repre-
sentatives sat one seat apart in
the gallery with lists of mem-
o s, winking at each other in
triumph whenever a man
pledged to the one turned out
to;iave been picked off by the
other. Ultimately Mr. Adoula
won by four votes
More Than Money
'By the Congo period, how-
e er, the men at Laflgley say
tl},ey had leaped that weir
earlier instinitg,,: to try to Solve
nasty political' problems with
money alone had been overtaken
by, the recognition of the need
fo far more sophisticated and
e!during fortnls of influence.
,,Purchased?T'._.oiie American
commented. "You can't even
rent these guys for the after-
noon."
.pond so the C.I.A. kept grow-
in in size and scope.
By the time Moise Tshombe
had returned to power in the
Congo - through American
acquiescence, if not design
it .became apparent that hastily
supplied arms and planes,, as
well as dollars and cars, would
be needed to protect th'e hme i-
me
effort, the C.I.A. was also smug-
gling Tibetans in and out of
Communist China,,..' drawing
secrets from Col. Oleg Penkov-
sky of Soviet' military intelli-
gence, spying on Soviet missile
Mild-ups and withdrawals In
Cuba, masterminding scores of
lesser operations, analyzing the
world's press and radio broad-
casts, predicting the longevity
of the world's major political
leaders, keeping track of the
world's ? arms traffic and
of many arm$ ,. manufacturing
enterprises and supplying al
staggering flow of information,
rumor, gossip and analysis to
the President and all major de-
partments of government.
For all this, the C.I.A.
employs about 15,000 persgns
and spends about a half billion
.dollars a year.
Its headquarters, the brain
and nerve center, the informa-
tion repository, of this sprawl-
ing intelligence and operations
system, is a ,mddern, eight-story
building of precast concrete and
inset windows - a somewhat
superior exampleof the faceless
Federal style - set in 140 acres
of lawn and woodland over-
looking the south bank of the
Potomac eight miles from down-
town Washington.
In this sylvan setting, some-
what reserilbling an English
deer park, about 8,000' C.I.A.
employes -- the top managers,
the planners and the analysts!
-live, if not a cloistered life
at least a kind of academic one'
can-sponsored govern
with the materials they are'
Leopoldville. studying or the plans the
This, apparently, was a job hat or p they may
for the Deferise_iepartment, but Formerly, the C.I.A. was scat-'
involvement, and in the inter-
ests of speed and efficiency,
the Government again turned
to the C.I.A.
The agency had the tools. It
knew the Cubans in Miami and
their abilities as pilots. It had
the front organizations through
tered through many buildings in
downtown Washington, which
in c, ceased the problems and ex-
pense of security.
In the earlyiineteen-fifties,
2paidda1*" #166 600500020003-6
 a $30-million appropriation ppf,o~r r0
fa new, unitary headquaL
was inserted without identifi- I
cation in the budget of another
agency-and prompt .y knockeill
out by a Congressional com-
mittee so befuddled by C.LA.I
secrecy that it did not know
what the item was for.
When Allen W. Dulles, then
director of the C.I.A., came'
back in 1956 vnt i more
candor, he asked for $50,-
million, and Congress gave him
$46-million. He justifies the
bite that he proposed to take
out of a 750-acre Government
reservation on the :''otomac by
saying the site with "its isola-
tion, topography and heavy
forestation" wgp1 provide the
agency with th.C j x'ed secu-
r'tv
ing undo ids ` secure( peens psychiatrists and even
ts and
i
d!
'
s
agronomists, geolog
as fences, fes an
elaborate ele ices can foresters.
make i , th hardly Some. of the-achiAYC'Xients of
Ahri the these experts are prodigious,
t
s
ecre
a
. George Wa ? - . atrkway if regdrts filtering tliroafli the
pointing to''' raj In- secrecy screen are eve~i half
en on re- For instance'
ate
A
g
accur
telligence
. moved, but tl people cFrom ordinarily_; ilable',
know ou ca to the information, reliable , c areal
--...+, iii have'
i
n
re
g
the same r marxed by been prepared on major rV the sign -
" `-"Bureau of leaders.
m the case of one leader,
"
c
Public Roads, There, beyond the affable 'from'not-so ordinarily av liable
lctii -oant
rar at-u ,. .. ..i,-t - -- -
ectangu
!wings, the ground-level. win- made a urinalysis from a specs-;
dows barred, which stands as men stolen from a hospital in
the visible symbol of what is Vienna where the great man
supposed to be an Invisible oper- (was being treated.
atiio r nraranizational purposes, ?C,L. ' shipping experts,
expertise, spot-
Among the Lllullly-.a ----I agancia purposea.
Plans Division are the (fevelop- ? While such operatives may
merit of the U-2 higl.altitude be known to "the chief of sta
plane, which, between Gad tion" the top C.I.A. office)
May, 1960, when Fr ?, Gary y in any country - they are
Powers was shot dov,_ly a rarely known to the American
Soviet rocket, photoglrhed Amb said r although he may
much of the Soviet Union' the som - oe aware of their
t
nyissi ii fact, these deep
digging of a tunnel to ar
Berlin from which C.I.A. agents a nQt, known to the
tapped telephone cables le~ding A tells enee Division in
to Soviet military headquaz'teaf ashiii oil, end! their reports
in 'fie acquisition of act y e It dentifeed tw it by name.
Preis r Khrushcev'S sgccrr t 1".Cor 'Monde' s' of The New
ents
I
,
in's ~eqx'c`esses, and bruto +
. i to' x eTMty aueac
1Ll ag
berals in the C.I A t although tla e on occasion
ts of "tine 1 across io"ine unaccountable
l
ys
ana
The C I A? Intelligence -Division, in the erican of whom they have
opinion of 'iYi'any experts, are) their. suspicions. Often un
the deepI
aware of the embedded antagon- to ear o
f , eopleR a t mastirl1rit as business
o
into faux div Sion-, .plans, in- males to Cuba before e
a deputy director I had cleared the Black Sea. I !tolerant than the activists m
telligence, science and technol- +11 Some anthropologists at the Plans Division of the flam
ogy, and support:"; C.I.A. headquarters devote their boyant nationalism and socialist
What the b[~iisions Do time to helpful studies of such 1 orientation of the leaders in
The Division b" Science and minor, - but strategically cru- former colonies and more flex-
?
Able . than many of the State
Technology is., responsible for trial -- societies as those of t'he i
keeping current re developing dill tribes of Laos and Vietnam . I Diesel tam fli lomats. tious and
(techniques in science and gonelifetimespen theI In cllscusying the Portuguese)
weapons, Inducing nuclear rofe the ana-
weapons and for aLalyzing ency doing nothing buu Col- territDrforkexgmple,na-
photos taken, b 'U-2 reconnais- lecting, studying, col'iatin bique,
by and reportin, lysts are 'said'to take the at-
sane planes and oy space sate)- analyzing that can be i armed titude that change is inevitable,
! liter. everything
The Division of Support Is bout President Sukarno of In- that the Unite pluralistic has to
responsible for pr derequip- roes. one officiI mean eve- deal with a al ep rted.ry The State Department, on the world.
~ment and for logirgistics; com- thing,'. other hand tends to be diverted
munications and sectttty, in- t Heavy With Ph.D: s i s by Partuguessgg, sensitivities and
eluding the C.LA? codes, ' is the agency's bo&"at th the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
The Division of Plan s and the It fr?
Int in the Division of Intelligence per- it could staff any college aoi atportuguese territoryres
I form the basic functions of the its analysts, 50, per, de `"iso State Department officer
agency. They represent the ;whom h erec nt efcwhom aw mid thata there are more liberal
alpha and omega, the hone) and odor orates. d " i intellectuals per square inch at
brain, the dagger and the lamp, per cent` ,f? `the C.I.A. -than anywhere else in
the melodrama and the mop- Sixty p
ograph of the intelligence pro- 1lgence';pivision personnel hat LI the ge br rmen ., and agents of ope
fission. Their presence under served cent Ohavyears. Twenty-ftv~c e have with the the 15 fans Division;- on the other
one roof has caused much of the p the I hand, are described as more
controversy that has say ageI A. ncsince established. The conservative in their economic
about the C.I.A. since'the e Bay heaviest recruiting occurred outlook and more single-minded
of Pigs. the Korean War - in their anti-Communism. This
It is the responsibility of the durg but by no means is particularly true of those
semble Intelligence analyze Divi end sion t evaluate. in- - exclusively, ea mong ivy League, engaged in deep-cover opera-.
,
formation from all sources, and graduates. teens, many of whom are ex-
, military people or men formerly sion of to produce dale and periodical I -oThe r title )for what Plans is
actually in the Office of Strategic Ser-
n
au
co
B
Qenj.~4 ----a --.--.. --
.wotkers.
Second, there are those!
agents, by far the larger num-
b ho opal rate under the
la e Cover of the official:
diplatic mission. In the mss-i
I stet they are listed asI
Vnt pt5litie 1 or economic officers,
Tre~s ury representatives, con-
siilar'officers or employes of the''
Agency` for international De
velopm'ent (the' United StatesI
foreign aid agency) or United{
States Information Agency. Thel
C.I.A. IAchief ,,of station may be
(listed as a special assistant
to thg.Ambassador or as the top
political officer.,
Not Very Secret II
This official cover is so t n'
as to be meaningless s e c pae
t o
)avoid embarrassment
host government. These agents
usually are readily identifiable.
The chief of station is recog-
nized as the man with &.,c ar as
big as the Ambassados and
a house that is sometimes - as
in Lagos, Nigeria-better.
In practically all the allied)
countries the C.I.A. agents
identify themselves to host gov-
ernments, and actually work in
close cooperation with Cabinet
officials, local intelligence . and
police.
y
ure
intelligence regorts on a
(country, person or situation for the division of secret opera vices of the Federal
and tin iced 0t
Re40a4'ti0d! i/ ras 1k-AD 6'9'00432R'000500020003-6
1 inf ation - military', as those of Rahab and :some as it has been said, however,
~~-~ 2OG8Y 31 5~tef I9 k$?~(~ 5 of the agents
industrial - is grist for t i with the blac anTd~ , w7iShd'~etially information
of espionage and subversion. gatherers and who work under
Perhaps'u more are as sophis-
division's mill. C
than one-fifth - by volume and' The operations of the LA. l transparent cover
not ne'e'ssarily importance - go far beyond the -hiring and I ticated as the analysts back
comes " from agents overseas training of spies who seek out home, and like them are syin-
under varying depths of cover. informers and defectors. pathetic to the "anti-Cam mu-
Most. information is culled t was the Plans Division that nist left" in underdeveloped
from foreign newspapers, 5C r- I. set up clandestine "black" radio countries.
entific journals, industry publi- stations in the Middle East to The C.I.A. agents abroad fall
(cations, the, reports of other; counter the propaganda and the into two groups -- both under
il to revolution
-____+
--Division.
s a
the
s
- -
ll
Since
-. ? --
11111.e
broadcasts monitored by C,I?A
stations around the world.
All Soits of Experts
anu muruer by r 11 at" L--c-~ ---
in the `really dirty business +1 0
Abdel Nasser's 1{adio Cairo'
that
1954 thes
i
n
The -- males, -- Cla u
organized geographical sect - Premier Mohammed Mossadeghl operate un er deepest cover, ai'i tions that are re served by residen in Iran in 1953 (two notable their activities become known
specialists from almost every ` successes) and the Bay of Pigs only when they are unfortunate
prospssion and discipline - ip-I invasion. in 1961 (a resoundingI enough to be caught and "sur-
-_-- _1 ..hvci ni qt". Y _ _ u n nrnn
Security Council, the President. 5I cnarheu -- as old
top advisory 9:7011P on defense i gems and wiles -- some
and foreign policy.
 In some embassies tAe C.I.A.
agents outr"umber the regul
political and economic office.
In a''few they have made up as
much as 75 per cent of the
diplomatic mission.
The chief of station often has
more money than the Ambas-
sador. Sometimes he has bWn
in the country longer and Is
better informed than the Am-
bassador.
For all these reasons the host
government, especially ink
underdeveloped areas of thei
world, may prefer to e,eal with
the chief of station rather than
the Ambassador, belie'7ing him
to have readier. accesa to top
policy-making officials in
Washington.
Top Quality People
Obviously the number of
agents,abroad is a closely held'
secret, `kept from even such
close presidential adljsers -in
the St as the historian Arthur
M. , c`il esinger Jr. In ,,his book
"A,'! Thousand Days," Mr.
Schlesinger, states that those
nifi F almost as many as
StatC""Department employes.
This would be roughly 6,600.
The ;actual number, however,
is believed to, be considerably
less,` probably ' around 2,200.
c to'soine amusing situa-
tia nee when Allen Dialled,
then .I,. director, visited New
Delhi, , every known "spook"
(C.I.A, man) was lined up in
an anteroom of the epLbassy to
greet him. At that rr.oment a
newspaper correspondent who
had been interview!.ng Mr.
Dulles walked out of, the inner
office. A look _of,bew,'lderment
crossed the facet of .the C.I.A.
men, plainly asking, ' "Is this
one we didn't l iltfi -A=1::
Mr. Schlesinger has'' written
that "in some areas the C,I.A.
had outstripped the Rate De-
partment in the quality of its
personnel."
Almost without cxeeptlon,
correspondents of The New
York Times reported that the
men at the top overseas were
men of "high competence and
discipline," "extremely ' know-
ing," "imaginative, "sharp and
scholarly" and "generally some-
what better than thosc in State
in work and dedication."
>#ut they also found that
below the top many C.I.A.
people were "a little, thin" and
did not compare so favorably
with Foreign Servlce officers
on the same level..
The C.I.A. screens and re-
screens applicants, because it is
quite aware of the nLt raction
that secrecy holds for thd:psy-
chopath, the misfit an i t1le im-,
mature person.
The greatest danger obvious-
ly lies in the area c f special
operations. Although it is gen-
erally agreed that the agents
- overt and covert - have
been for the most part men of
competence and character, the
C.I.A. has also permitted some
of limited intelligepp6,;and
emotignal ..instabi ty'R '! to
through its screen anc. }ias even
,assigned therm, to sensitive
tasks, with disastrous results.
pro rt7l~arcd X25
exile leaders during the pre-
liminaries of the Bay of Pigs
operation. A German refugee
with only a smattering of Span-
ish and no understanding of
Latin America or Latin
character, Bender antagonized
,the more liberal of the leaders
'by his bullying and his obvious
(partiality for the Cuban right.
Offices in This Country
The C.I.A. maintains field of-
fices in 30 American cities.. These
offices are . overt but discreet.
Their telephone numbers ai'e
listed under "Central Intelli-
gence Agency" or "United
States Government," but no ad-
dress is given. Anyone wanting
the address must know the
name of the office director,
ad ss are listed.
tone time these field of-
fices..Sought 'out scholars, busi-
nessmen, students and even
ordinary tourists whom they
knew to be'-planning a trip be-
hind the Iron Curtain ai ked
them to record their db.9 yya-
tions and r6pbrt to the C LA,
on their return.
Very little of this assertedly
is done any more, probably be-,
cause of some embarrassing r
rests and imprisonment of t9ur-
i.sts and students. While' the
C.Iy:A.. deals franlily with busi-
cc! Ilromise their traveling',
reresentatives.
Most of .the work of domestic'
field agArits involles contacts j
with ' industry and universities.'
For example, an agent, on in-
structions from headquarters,
wjl1 seek evaluation of captured
equipment, analysis of the color
of factory smoke as a clue to'
production, an estimate of pro-
duction capacity from the size
of a factory, or critiques of
articles in technical and sci-
entific journals.
The Human Inadequacy
In greater secrecy, the C.I.A.
i subsidizes, in whole or in part, a
wide " 'enterprises -
tang of
"private" foundations, book and
magaiin.e publishers, schools'oif
international studies in uniVer-
sitles, law offices, "businessyes"
of :. various kinds and foreign
broadcasting stations. Some of
these perform real and valuable
wgfk. 'for the C.I.A. Others ar
not much more than "'mail
dr~aps;`'
Yet all these, human activi-
ties all the value received and
the dangers surmounted, all the
organization and secrecy, all the
trouble averted and all the set
backs encountered, still do not
describe the work of the C.I.A.
For the most gifted of analysts,
the most crafty of agents -
like all human beings - have
their limitations.
At the time when the Ameri-
cans were successfully keeping
the Congo out of the Commu-
nist orbit, it still took the same
Men are fallible and limited,'i
ar4 a MM#9*0500020003-6
today, some of the most valu-
akla,.spies are not hur
and
some of the most omnipotent
agents hum through the
pro 'Ag*025 : CIA-RDP68B00432R000500020003-6
in the Congo,f6-check on the
lives and fat some arrested
Americans.