S-1010 PPA WRIST DISCONNECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP68B00724R000200280003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 11, 2003
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 10, 1969
• Content Type: MFR

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10 February 1969
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REFERENCE: (1) dated 3 February 1969
(2) ated 5 February 1969
1. Because of a recent U.S.A.F. F-104 fatal accident
attributed to the accidental disconnect of the pilot's full
pressure suit glove at a cabin altitude above 50,000 feet,
the accident board's subsequent conclusions and recommenda-
tions, and recent message tra.ffic.(Ref I and 2), the following
information is presented for the record.
2. The request for a proposal submitted to the David
Clark Co. and their technical proposal for the S-1010 PPA
submitted in response, specified that the full pressure suit
gloves would be like the S-901J PPA (used in the SR-71).
However, it was also stated that all efforts would be made to
reduce suit bulk/weight to the maximum extent possible. The
S-1010 Prototype that was evaluated in October 1967 had wrist
disconnects as pictured in Figure IA. attached. The wrist
disconnect was identical to the S-901J, using a high profile
latch, with the exception that a. protective flap on the
glove that covered the wrist disconnectha.d been deleted.
The primary purpose of the aluminized material flap on the
S-901J glove was to prevent heat leakage into the suit via
the wrist disconnect if the metal ring came in contact with
very hot cockpit walls/canopy in the SR-71. The S-1010 PPA
for use in the U-2R did not have this requirement and the flap
had been deleted in order to help reduce overall bulk.
3. During an altitude chamber evaluation flight with
the prototype S-1010 PPA, a glove became disconnected as the
undersigned, a.s test subject, manually inflated the suit at
an altitude of 30,000 feet just prior to ascent to 75,000 feet.
At 30,000 feet there was no physiological impairment caused by
glove disconnect, so the glove was reconnected, checked, and
the flight continued. Upon post-flight analysis and dis-
cussion, it was concluded that in evaluating mobility during
the chamber flight the high profile latch came in contact
with some object in a. manner that released it and rotated the
USAF review(s) completed.
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disconnect to the open position. With subsequent suit in-
flation, the glove disconnected. The primary fix chosen at
this time was to use a low profile latch to lessen or eliminate
the likelihood of inadvertantly opening the wrist disconnect.
The low profile latch selected was that used on the USAF's
standard A/P 22S-2 full pressure suit. It was felt that
thousands of flights and flight hours on that suit system
without known accidental glove disconnects was positive
evidence that the low profile latch was the solution we sought.
In the personal experience of the undersigned in conducting
and participating in hundreds of A/P 22S-2 full pressure suit
chamber flights, no accidental glove disconnects had ever
been observed. The change to the low profile latch is de-
picted in Figure IB. attached. As an added precaution, a
protective flap was added to the suit sleeve that would cover
the wrist disconnect after it was locked and be held in place
by velcro hook-tape. This modification is depicted in
Figure IC.
4. Normal operation of the S-1010 PPA wrist disconnect
(or the standard A/P-22S-2 or the S-901J type) is depicted
in Figure IIA. The normal sequence for disconnecting the
glove would be as follows:
a. The disconnect, in the locked configuration,
after opening the protective flap if present
(i.e., S-1010 or S-901J) is depicted in Figure II A-l.
b. The latch is opened by pushing (or pulling) it
towards the glove, in the direction of the arrow
in Figure II A-2.
c. The wrist disconnect is then unlocked by
rotating the ring in a direction 900 from the latch
opening direction, as indicated in Figure II A-3.
Pressure, either mechanical or pneumatic, exerted
outward on the glove will then accomplish disconnect.
5. Accidental opening of this style wrist disconnect,
as likely occurred in the previously mentioned F-104 accident
or S-1010 prototype chamber flight, is visualized to have
occurred as depicted in Figure IIB. A force exerted on the
latch (or a. blow) in an angular direction can result in the
latch being released and the ring being rotated to the open
position with only the single angular motion involved. A
possible accidental disconnect related to this could involve
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the pilot grasping one wrist disconnect with the opposite
hand and pulling the sleeve down to relieve pressure on the
ends of his fingers exerted by the gloves. If the pilot
gra.sped the disconnect and pulled down and outward in a
specific way, unlatching and unlocking of the disconnect
could occur.
6. The interim fix used with the S-1010 PPA to prevent
accidental disconnect, as outlined in the referenced messages,
is depicted in Figure II C. Once the. disconnect is locked in
the normal fashion, as shown in Figure II C-1, a neoprene
0-Ring with a. tab a.tta.ched (Fig. II C-2) is inserted in the
space between the wrist disconnect and the glove ring, as
seen in Figure II C-3. The 0-Ring installed in this fashion
prevents the latch from being opened until the 0-Ring is
removed by means of the attached tab. In the case of the
S-1010 PPA use of this interim fix, the sleeve flap is still
retained a.nd used.
7. The permanent fix being developed into appropriate
mod kit/service bulletin action at the present time is depicted
in Figure II D attached. This fix incorporates a lock
button/mecha.nism on the latch. The action required to open
the latch involves depressing the new button in a direction
that is 180? to the ring opening direction, as shown in Fig. II,
D-2. When the new button is depressed, the latch can then be
moved outward (Fig. II D-3) and finally, the ring can be
rotated to the open position (Fig. II D-4). Even an angular
force or blow that can depress the new button and open the
latch will not result in accidental glove disconnect because
such an angular force is still acting opposite to the opening
direction of the disconnect ring. Therefore, once the angular
force is released, the latch and lock button will snap back
to their locked position. For use with the S-1010 PPA, the
new modification will not eliminate the sleeve flap as
additional protection.
8. Concludions and Recommendations:
a.. OSA Life Support may have been remiss in not
making other USAF users of full pressure suits aware
of the accidental glove disconnect encountered during
S-1010 PPA prototype chamber evaluations. Since the
S-1010 was a. prototype at that stage, and the wrist
disconnect was not exactly'like others in use in
every respect, the failure was not thought to have
application to other users at the time. Upon current
examination, this thought was in error. All future
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adverse findings or failures encountered during
evaluation or operational use of U-2R life support
equipment will be made known to appropriate USAF
agencies (i.e., Life Support SPO, AFFTC, USAF
Surgeon General's Office, etc.), within security
limitations.
b. The general contents of this memorandum should
be made known and discussed with all pilots using
the S-1010 PPA and all support personnel maintaining
such equipment. To this end, copies of this memo-
randum are being sent to Detachments G and H and
the U-2 SPO at Warner-Robbins AFB.
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CAPT. USAF BSC
AMS/OSA
AMS/OSA
Distribution:
Cy 1 - D/SA w/atts
2 - AMS/OSA w/a.tts
3 - D/R&D/OSA w/atts
4 - D/M/OSA Watts
5 - D/O/OSA Watts
6 - TDEA/O/OSA Watts
7 - (Life Support) w/atts
8 - Life Su ort a.
1
9 -
w/a.tts
10 - w a. s
11 - RB/OSA w/o atts
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