ACTION MEMORANDUM A-444, ADP IN CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP68R00530A000200120002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 9, 1965
• Content Type: MF

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9 June 1965
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Dir
ector - Comptr
oller
THROUGH
: Deputy Direct
or for Science
and Te
chnology
SUBJECT
FBPC
: Action Memo
randum A-444;
ADP i
n CIA
Transmitted herewith is a report prepared in response to your
Action Memorandum A-444. Committee members included:
The DD/S&T member did not concur in the Committee's report.
His statement of dissent is attached.
For the record, the Committee met 12 times, visited NPIC, RID,
OCS, and were briefed on those operations.
I wish to commend each and every Committee member for the
positive way he approached the discussions. Despite honest. differences
of opinion, the forum provided an excellent base for improving mutual
understanding and clarifying the basic ADP issues which face the Agency.
25X1
cc: All Members ADP Committee
DD/S&T
FBPC
Chairman
ADP Committee
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The purpose of this exception statement by the DD/S&T Representative
to the ADP Committee is to sharpen the focus on the nature of the or-
ganizational issue in question here and to provide Agency Management
with some coverage of the economic and the technical considerations
relevant thereto. Also included under "Conclusions" is a course of
action for consideration.
2. The management question posed in Action Memorandum A-444 is:
Given CIA's increasingly heavy investment in
computing activities, how should Agency Manage-
ment organize those resources for the next five
year period to maximize effectiveness at minimum
cost?
Stated in alternative form, the basic question becomes:
Shall CIA continue and extend until complete its
present effort to centralize computing resources
at the CIA level?
Shall CIA dissolve what is now structured at
the CIA level (OCS) and reorganize its computing
resources at the Directorate level?*
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3. The ADP Committee's majority conclusion is that the CIA-level
centralization thrust, which has characterized CIA organizational
actions in recent years, should not be continued; instead, it should
be checked... and even reversed. The Committee's report is in-
tended to lay the groundwork for a) assuring continued separateness
of the Agency's present computer centers, and b) creating a manage-
ment climate within which additional centers might reasonably be
expected to emerge.
4. There are three logical areas of consideration regarding the or-
ganization of CIA's computing resources: (a) technical, (b) economic,
and (c) political. The Committee has seriously concerned itself in
both its discussions and its report with but one of these areas: the
political. *
5. If it is reasonable to assume that Management, before making this
study assignment to the Committee, was already familiar with the
major political considerations involved here then what Management
most needs is coverage of the other aspects of the question; i. e. ,
the economic and technical considerations. The Committee has not
provided coverage of same to Management in its report because it
was the majority opinion of the Committee that sufficiently reliable
technical and economic projections were not now possible as
ingredients to Management's decision on the organization of CIA
EDP,'.,* resources. The DD/S&T Representative, however, feels
economic and technical projections not only can be made but, indeed,
must be made if Management is to be equipped to consider this or-
ganizational question. These are the sine qua non ingredients of
such decision.
The term "political" is not used to deride or belittle this area of
consideration. Political considerations (such as present organi-
zational lines, functions, habits, preferences, and plans) are
important and must be taken into account by Management in any
organizational decision. Directorate security concepts, as a
specific, are part of these "political" considerations. (See
Para. 8below)
The acronym "EDP" (Electronic Data Processing) is used in this
report to mean "computing" or "relating to gomputers. "
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6. TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS:
The computing science is moving into a dramatic third
generation. New generation capabilities in both hardware
and software constitute the largest step forward in both
_productivity and reduced costs in the history of the com-
puting era. As a consequence, the new generation capa-
bilities will have a major impact on all aspects of computing,
including the organization of computing resources.
Some new generation characteristics:
New generation gear is faster by several
orders of magnitude.
Its high speed memories have much larger
capacities.
Immediate "on-line" access to very large
information files is now feasible (several
billion characters of on-line storage).
A vast array of remote terminals for input,
query, and display can now be handled... a
requirements in upcoming computing support
to all CIA Directorates.
New generation systems will operate under
sophisticated Executive Control Programs
which enable the computer to pace and control
its own work... to the near exclusion of the
Computer Operator in the traditional sense.
Manual control of the computer from job to
job (serial processing) will be grossly
inefficient.
The capacity for work is increased manyfold.
Thruput for the IBM System 360 Mod 67, for
example, is equivalent to eight 7090's or
thirty 1410's or thirty-five RCA 501's. . . even
when operated serially.
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The larger models of the new generation computers
provide major bonuses over the smaller models.. .
in work capacity, in sophistication of techniques,
and in significantly lower costs per unit of data
processed.
b. Impact on Organization:
The impact of the above processing capacities of the new
generation hardware and software will be felt in virtually all
aspects of computing--management, user, and EDP areas alike.
The direction of impact on organizational structure is
patently clear. The tremendous work capacity, the far-reaching
systems design implications, and the pronounced cost advantages
of the larger models relative to the smaller models will force
greater centralization throughout the computing field.
c. The new generation OCS Computer Center:
During the past twelve months, OCS has developed its plan
to shift to new generation equipment as rapidly as possible.
(See OCS Computer Systems Planning Report) All computers
in the present CIA Computer Center will be replaced by but
two IBM 360/Mod 67 computers. The first one will be installed
in nine months; the second twelve months thereafter. CIA will
be one of the first major centers to shift to new generation
capabilities. This is much more than a status symbol; the
production and economy gains are truly remarkable.
Some specifics on the OCS third generation center:
The OCS configuration will be a twin-Mod 67
system to which the full range of peripheral
devices can be attached as required by Agency
needs.
The OCS system is a complete "fail-soft" system.
That is, all components are duplicated in the system
so that failure of any component does not stop the
functioning of the system... it only reduces thruput.
The on-line systems now in development in support
of all Agency Directorates will require such fail-
soft support. (This fail-soft structuring of the
machine configuration will tend to characterize
future computing centers of whatever size.)
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The specific configuration of hardware selected
by OCS is based on the OCS workload as OCS is
now charged within CIA (all Headquarters com-
puting except RID.)
Projected scientific computing needs of themselves
would require a system of similar scale to that
planned for the CIA Computer Center because of the
stringent speed, memory, and backup requirements
which characterize such applications. The production
capability of the system, however, would be only very
partially tapped if limited to scientific applications
alone.
The Mod 67, selected for the CIA Computer Center,
falls in the "upper middle" size range. There are
two larger models and three smaller models announced
to date. (The Mod 67 is the smallest model of the new
IBM 360 series which possesses the I/O controller and
sub-selector multiplexor capabilities. These capa-
bilities, in themselves, represent a major third
generation stride.) The next smaller model (Mod 50)
does not have the capacity to support the Agency's
more demanding scientific tasks... and is considerably
more costly per unit of information processed.
No change in the main frame configuration of the OCS
Center would be required to do all Headquarters Building
computing as anticipated for the next 3 to 5 years.
If and when additional main frame processing power
were needed at some future date, a third CPU could
be very simply added to the planned configuration at
a cost of about I This additional CPU,
would provide additional processi
at
ng
power to the system equivalent to five Mod 50's... each
one of which would cost much more.
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OCS estimates that all Headquarters Building
computing (OCS and RID) can be done on the
Mod 67 system within a single shift. This is
intended as a measure of work volume only.
Any Center, of course, which serves remote
terminals in user areas must remain open
during periods of authorized usage. (For
justification of this timing estimate see Ap-
pendix B of the OCS Computer Systems
Planning Report)
d. Other pertinent specifics:
New generation gear will process most efficiently
with a job mix of maximum diversification. If re-
stricted, organizationally or otherwise, to, a single
application, much of its thruput power is wasted.
The concept of re-structuring Agency EDP resources
along Directorate lines suggests the following penalties:
1) The Mod 67, while doing DD/S&T processing,
could concurrently process all other Agency
computing with less than 15% delay (under worst
peak conditions) to DD/S&T processing.
2) All non-DD/S&T internal computation tasks would
be serviced by the Mod 67 in less than half the time
required on Directorate centers equippedwith their
own Mod 50's (the next size down from the Mod 67)
and all purely input/output flows (no computation)
would run on the Mod 67 system in slightly better
time.
Software extensions and improvements over time will
continue to increase the thruput of the gear under dis-
cussion so that appreciable increases in workload can be
absorbed without acquisition of additional main frame
equipment. OCS has projected a utilization of 130 hours
per month initially on the Mod 67. Software improvements
should permit the handling of a four-fold increase in work
in something less than double the machine time.
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Can the IBM 360 software, which is yet to be proven in
operations, be counted on to meet specifications? - OCS
feels the risk here is a safe one. IBM has traditionally
equipped its users with the strongest software packages
in the computer industry. This massive corporation has
staked its entire future on the success of the 360 system--
including software. IBM is less likely to fail in its com-
mitments than its users are to fail to fully exploit the
capabilities being offered.
The full exploitation of new generation capabilities will
require on the part of user organizations advanced tech-
nical capabilities in the systems programming area.
Although OCS has made a strong start over the past two
years at assembling a pool of such skills, system pro-
gramming skills will be in short supply in CIA and
throughout the computing industry with the advent of
third generation processing. Decentralization of com-
puting to the Directorates would serve to make the
shortage of such hard-to-find and slow-to-grow skills
all the more critical.
The Committee's report contains the following statement:
". . . 'on-line' applications involving complex interplay
between manual and computer based reference facilities...
are most effectively managed under complete Directorate
control. "
The above statement is in no way concurred in
by the DD/S&T representative. There are no
technical arguments to support it,o and is
directly contrary to good economics.
This section presents some measure of the price tag attached
to decentralizing Agency EDP resources to the Directorate level.
Three types of resources have been considered: a) machine rental
dollars; b) people; and c) Headquarters floor space. The figures
given are minimum figures in each instance. Although this section
on economics is brief, its relevance and import to the organizational
issue is second to none.
Major economic overtones are apparent in the preceding section on
"Technical Considerations"; q. v.
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a. Additional Rental Costs
In measuring the hardware rental costs for additional
centers, the following guidelines were followed:
(1)
(2)
Costs of "remote on-line" devices and extra
capacity peripheral equipments (such as multiple
data cells) were excluded. (Basically, they are
constant costs whether hooked to Directorate
Centers or to the CIA Center and are thus irre-
levant to Management as a decision factor).
Only those peripheral devices necessary to the
operation of a stand-alone center have been in-
cluded.
(3) A double-thruput configuration has been assumed
for all centers because:
EDP systems in development to support
all Directorates (CHIVE, MIS, scientific
systems, WALNUT, etc.) call for remote
terminals in user areas. The machine
language data store for such systems is
retrievable only with great difficulty in
the event of equipment failure. Thus, in
practice, it would be highly improbable
that any center, centralized or decentralized,
would not find valid justification for double
thruput support within the first two years of
the five year period under consideration.
The minimum additional annual rental for equipment for any
Directorate -level center is presented in Table 1 on the next
page.
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Table 1
Unit # Description
2 2050 Mod 50 CPU
4 6980 Selector Channel
2 4478 1410 Computability
2 1052 Adapter
2 2804 Tape Control
5 2402 Mag Tape $1, 520
5 7161 R/W $20
2 2841 Storage Control
2 7950 2302 Attachment
2 2302 Disk Storage
2 1052 Printer-Keyboard
2 2821-5 Control Unit
2 3615 1100 LPM Adapter
2 2540 Card Read/Punch
2 1403 Printer
Minimum Total
Per Month
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MINIMUM ADDITIONAL RENTAL COST PER CENTER...
MINIMUM ADDITIONAL RENTAL COSTS PER CENTER
(360/MOD 50 Center)
"Additional" means extra costs per center which would result from
Directorate-level structuring as opposed to CIA-level centralization.
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b. Additional People:
The personnel figures given in Table 2 are, in each case,
minimum extra personnel requirements to be expected with the
endorsement of Directorate-level centers instead of CIA-level
centralization.
Computer Operators - Multiple computing centers, of
course, mean more computers (2 per center) and more
computers mean more Computer Operators. Two-shift
operations are assumed in Table 2.
Systems Programmers - As pointed out in Paragraph 1j
above, third generation gear and remote terminal systems
will force the development and use of Executive Programs
for automatic control of operations. Systems Programming
will become a must in staffing any center. Our figure of
four Systems Programmers per local center is an initial
level only; expansion to more than twice that level would
soon become a requirement.
Managers/Supervisors/Secretaries - The additional per-
sonnel needs in this category stem from the requirement
that each EDP center appoint the following: Chief of
Operations/Deputy/Secretary; Chief, Systems Programming;
Chief, Job Programming/Secretary; Chief, Systems Design/
Secretary; Chief, Punch Section; Shift Supervisor of com-
puter room, etc. The figures given in Table 2 are thus
very conservative.
Systems Designers/Job Programmers - EDP Systems
Designers and Job Programmers have been omitted entirely
from Table 2 because of the difficulty of finding an agreed-
upon algorithm. Decentralization would, nonetheless, con-
sume additional Designer and Job Programmer man-hours
and would retard development of skills.
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c. Headquarters Building Floor Space:
The entries in Table 2 are self-explanatory.
The NPIC Center will remain as a physically 25X1
separate center whether or not full centralization of Agency EDP re-
sources is determined upon by Management... unless or until adequate
and secure communications facilities are installed between the Head-
quarters Building Thus, in this Section on Economic
Considerations, NPIC has not been reflected. Full centralization of
CIA EDP resources would produce technical and some manpower gains
(in the management/administrative, programming, and career develop-
ment areas) but hardware and space costs would not be affected.
For the additional dollar, people, and space resources re-
quired by decentralization of EDP operations to the Directorate, see
Table 2 on the following page.
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8. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
There are four parts to "Political Considerations. " The first
of these is clearly anti-centralization at the CIA level; the second and
third of these support such centralization; the fourth (security) is,
perhaps, a matter of opinion and can be viewed either way.
From a purely parochial view, each Directorate (and NPIC)
would probably prefer to have its own EDP resources... people
and machines. The majority of the Directorate Representatives
to the Committee have reflected this kind of judgment. Some of
them feel very strongly about it. It must be noted that this
attitude is the' only element of this entire organizational question
which does not support centralization at the CIA-level. Thus,
Management must pay it particular attention and weigh it carefully.
In sum, DD/P wants its own center, NPIC wants its own center.
DD/I wants its own center. DD/S has traditionally supported
centralization at the CIA level but in Committee discussions has
generally acquiesced in the drift of the Committee's thinking
toward multiple centers. DD/S&T is, no doubt, subject to the
same parochial temptations as any other Directorate but DD/S&T
policies in computing and in other areas have traditionally sup-
ported centralization across the Agency; the DD/S&T position on
the subject issue is that the economic and technical pressures
supporting centralization clearly over-ride political considera-
tions and that the objective of CIA policy on EDP should be
centralization at the CIA level. The OBPAM Representative
to the Committee has voiced no objection to the majority view
of the Committee members.
The momentum of past CIA centralization actions support
increasing centralization within the Agency. Major centraliza-
tion actions by CIA Management in the EDP field are as follows:
1) DD/I Automation Staff (functions, personnel, and
slots / 50 /) centralized into CIA ADP Staff with
Agency-wide functions (1961).
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2) CIA ADP Staff (including its IBM 7090, 1410, 1401
center) and ADP Division (including its RCA 501,
301 center) centralized into the Office of Computer
Services for Agency-wide support (1963).
3) Two NPIC computing facilities centralized into the
Information Processing Division for NPIC-wide
support (1964).
4) The bulk of DD/P computing has been centralized in
RID from the start.
The five-year evolution of OCS into CIA's all-Directorate
computing organization is the dominant theme of the above
management actions. The Office of Computer Services is now
charged with all Headquarters Building computing for three
(DD/I, DD/S, and DD/S&T) of the four CIA Directorates. To
turn back now toward Directorate structuring of OCS EDP re-
sources will, of course, be to fragment again what has, since
the beginning of this decade, grown together.
c. Extra-CIA Pressures on CIA's Top Management:
The substance of BOB and other Department Circulars
and of proposed Congressional actions in the EDP field supports
the theme of centralization. These external pressures, although
of course based on economic considerations, constitute inputs to
the "political" climate in which Agency Management functions.
As a specific, the most recent and most authoritative
Government Directive in this area (BOB Circular A-71, dated
6 March 1965) includes the following as a responsibility of the
Heads of all Executive Agencies:
"Merger or integration of data systems irrespective
of intra-agency or interagency organizational lines,
when cost effectiveness in equipment utilization, data
systems management, or program accomplishment
can be increased. "
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d. Securit :
The Committee has discussed the question of security in
connection with centralization of EDP resources. In such con-
text, security becomes an element of the "political" considera-
tions to be considered. It is directly tied to organizational
lines and attitudes. This kind of security concept is called
"organizational compartmentation" and for the computing function
its rule reads: "EDP people inside the organizational boundaries
of a Directorate may handle the sensitive materials processed by
that Directorate; EDP personnel in a CIA center may not." The
distinguishing factor here is the organizational boundary.
Security is a very difficult area to penetrate with the intellect.
And, it is often embedded in very strong feelings. A few comments,
however, on this security issue as it relates to EDP centralization
may be helpful.
1) Issue has already been fully staffed out:
The entire question of handling sensitive materials
in the CIA Computer Center arose soon after OCS was
formed. As a result, the Executive Director, in Action
Memorandum No. A-365, dated 10 March 1964, requested
a thorough study of the question. The issue was analyzed
in detail and very comprehensive security control proce-
dures were devised for the Agency's central computing
facility and for components using the services of OCS.
These detailed security procedures were thoroughly
coordinated with all Directorates and then formally
approved by the Executive Director.'
OCS has the most studied and presumably the tightest
physical and procedural security protection of any com-
puting facility in the Agency. The surfacing of this issue
at this point in time tends to reduce a very valid area of
CIA concern to a polemic anachronism.
See Staff Study on Security Compartmentation within OCS, DD/S&T,
dated Z6 March 1964.
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2) The rule of security control:
A basic rule for protection of data might be the
following: "Access to sensitive data by the fewest
people feasible, in a highly secure area, under tight
procedural controls over both data and personnel. "
The Agency has invested a great deal of thought,
time, and money in assuring that its centralized com-
puting facility fits that rule.
(As for the "Fewest people feasible"--Data
processed by computer is in machine-language;
not human language. It is translated into human
language by the machine as it is. printed on the
computer's printing device. Computer Operators.
tend such printing devices and can observe its
outputs. From the Agency-wide point of view,
there would, of course, be significantly fewer
Computer Operators in a fully centralized
shop than in localized centers... as pointed
out in Paragraph7 of this statement. )
Centralized processing of sensitive data not limited
to EDP:
Centralized processing of sensitive data is the
pattern in several functional areas in the Agency in
addition to computing; to wit: security, finance,
personnel, printing services, communications, the
Cable Secretariat, etc. , which serve as offices of
common concern for the processing and control of
much, if not all, of the sensitive operational, intel-
ligence, and support data in question in computer
processing.
4) In sum, because of all the attention already given this
question of data protection in the Agency's centralized
computer shop, it seems doubtful that Directorate-level
centers would be able to improve appreciably security
controls so that 1) fewer people would have access to
the data or that 2) less likelihood would exist of re -
leasing data to unauthorized persons.
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9. CONCLUSIONS:
The above economic and technical considerations outweigh that
portion of the political considerations hostile to continuation and ex-
tension of CIA-level centralization policy.
Therefore, CIA should continue its CIA-level centralization
policy:
1) As opposed to Directorate-level structuring,
centralization will:
in rentals 25X1
... save 57 ceiling positions
... save 6, 000 sq. ft. in the Headquarters
Building
(See Table 2)
It is technically feasible and is most in harmony
with the future trend of the EDP science.
3) It is in harmony with the extra-CIA pressures
from BOB and other Departments.
It continues to build on what CIA has already
built at the cost of past dislocations.
5) Given renewed management support, it is
managable. (Without that support, it is totally
unmanagable. )
To reverse directions and go the Directorate route would mean:
1) Splitting up the present CIA-level organization (OCS)
into Directorate pieces.
2) Physically dividing the present CIA Computer Center
and its peripheral rooms into separate Directorate
areas.
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3) Building a new computer center for the DD/I.
4) Continued operation of a separate RID center.
5) Committing this Agency to all the personnel and
hardware and software and space redundancies
and efficiencies pointed out in Paragraphs sand
7 above.
6) Impairment to acquisition, training and Career
Development of computing personnel.
7) Moving counter to a) the direction increasingly
urged by BOB and other government departments,
b) the direction of past CIA organizational actions,
and c) the direction which the "third-generation"
state of the EDP science virtually dictates.
Firm assertion by Top Management that CIA policy should be
to support the centralization progression for this Agency's com-
puting resources need not, of course, --and indeed must not--
lead to operationally destructive implementation actions from
any quarter. With the clear assertion of Management's policy
determination, we can then proceed over time to constructive
integration.
The Agency can reasonably proceed toward more effective
centralization via the following gradual (phased) program:
1) Issue policy statement now clearly supporting
centralization at the CIA level of computing re-
sources but scheduling such centralization in two
phases:
Phase I - Centralization of hardware/
operations resources now.
Phase II - Centralization of outlying EDP
Systems Design and Job Pro-
gramming skills after the full
completion of Phase I (2 yrs. hence).
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2) Centralize over the next few months the day-to-
day management and supervision of CIA computer
operations (hardware, operators of hardware, and
systems programming) --leaving OCS, NPIC, and
DD/P equipment in place, pro tem.
3) Physically consolidate all Headquarters hardware
at the earliest date possible following the intro-
duction of third generation equipment to the CIA
Computer Center.
4) Leave present NPIC, DD/P, and DD/S&T EDP
systems design and job programming resources
under their present components until full realiza-
tion of step "3" immediately above is achieved.
NOTE: It is recognized that, although already feasible technically, it
may be some years before (if ever) it proves profitable to install the neces-
sary communications facilities between Headquarters Ito 25X1
permit performing on-line NPIC mensuration computing from the Headquarters
Building. Thus, computer operations in can be placed under the 25X1
central computing component but must be operated as a second physical site
unless or until adequate communication facilities are installed.
. A separate CIA-level EDP management policy and control staff?
1) Certain control, policy, liaison, and reporting func-
tions in the computing field must be performed for
the Agency.
Responsibility for same now resides with the AD/CS.
(These Agency-wide "staff" functions had resided
with the former CIA ADP Staff from the inception of
that Staff and came to OCS with the merger of the
ADP Staff into the Office of Computer Services in
1963.)
3) The Committee has talked at length about breaking
this function out from OCS and establishing it in
the Office of the Director.
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4) There is no question but that such "staff" functions
must be performed. How extensive they should be
and where they should be placed organizationally
within the Agency are direct functions of which way
Management decides the major organizational question:
CIA-level or Directorate-level structuring of this
Agency's EDP resources.
(If Management opts to organize its EDP
resources by Directorate, a multiple-person
staff should clearly be established at the
Agency level; if, however, Management
determines upon CIA-level centralization
of Agency ADP resources, most of these
"staff" functions will be inherent to the
tasks of that central EDP organization and
there will be very little, if anything, a
separate staff could more properly do.)
5) Therefore, considerations of this issue (and it
is a reasonably simple one) logically must follow
determination by Management of the major issue..
whether to proceed with the centralization of
Agency EDP resources or break-up OCS and
provide full EDP resources to each Directorate.
There is a strong need for Agency Management decision now
on this EDP organizational question. Whether rightly or wrongly,
management resolve on the EDP organizational issue is in full
and common question. In the absence of clarification, the ability
of our EDP leaders to cooperate or even think constructively about
our mutual tasks and objectives is in jeopardy. The direction in
which CIA computing resources are to be structured must be set,
and quickly, to avoid serious damage to the collective capabilities
of this segment of CIA activity.
25X1
DD/S&T Member
CIA ADP Committee
c
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