STANIC ON ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP69B00369R000200080041-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: March 6, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

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K OR R 0358/67
Reference Date: 6 March 1967
Stanic On Antimissile Defense
...It seems that the Soviet Union has decided to carry out the plan of
organizing the antimissile defense of the biggest cities -- of Moscow first.
This hat induced the Americans to propose that both WE powers waive the
building of such systems, which would surely be enormously expensive.
There were rumors that the Soviets had heard the US proposal with
interest, but Premier Kosygin, talking "to journalists during his recent
visit to London did not confirm this interest, He refuted Western core-.
mentaries on the building of antimissile"systems in connection with the
armaments race or the topic of disarmament.
In Kosygin's opinion the building of an antimissile system cannot be
considered in the. same manner as the other matters resulting from the
armament$ race because this is a defensive action which threatens no one.
It cannot be denied that this statement is correct, although it is
also certain that the balance between the two military giants would be
disturbed if only one possessed an antimissile system. Military experts
think that a change. in the balance would be very dangerous. Therefore
such a definitely defensive action as the building of an antimissile
system does not effect only those who build it,' but also the enemy, even
the entire world.
A great deal has always been said about the antimissile defense, and
both sides have thought that this was just propaganda destined to tranquilize
the public. To judge from everything, a really effective anti-missile de-
fense is an entirely new invention. On 20 February General Kurochkin in
all seriousness told the public at a press conference in Moscow for the
first time that an effective antimissile defense was indeed possible.
It has been learned from other same to t.in th Soviet Union -- and
obviously also in the United States -- essential progress has recently
been made in detecting enemy missiles. Former means would have enabled
the Soviet specialists to detect missiles when they were about halfway
to the target on Soviet territory, which means 10-15 minutes prior to
the explosion.
Much is often said about buttons -- assertedly these have only to
be pushed and the missiles or antimissile missiles start flying. Actually,
it is much more complicated. Experts assert that at least five minutes is
necessary from the moment the signal is given to the moment that the anti-
(cont'd)
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missile is launched; this is Glitue only if the missile is already in the
final stage of readiness. l they are in the first or second saute---
as is usual - it takes much more time for them to start. This
w ans
that even under the most ideal conditions the ten minutes between the
detection of enemy missiles to their explosion are obviously induff icient
for defense missiles to stop and destroy them in time.
Only recently, it seems, a method has been found through which enemy
missiles can be detected two minutes after their firing, which doubles
the time for the organization-.of defense. . This is the essential progress
which transforms antimissile defense from wishful thinking to reality.
At present, antimissile defense has ceased to be only a tranTejl=zer for
the public, and is now a technically accomplished, although extra-
ordinarily expensive'affair.
For the time being, it is said, one cannot organize ant zaissi.le
defense for an entire state, only for several cities. Technically it
would be possible to organize it for an entire state, even if this were
as large as the Soviet Union or the United States, but all this is so
enormously expensive that there is no such state in the world able to
afford such luxury. The only really possible goal for the time being is
the building of an antimissile system which could more or less defend
individual cities.
.'This is precisely why the United States 'was in a very unpleasant posi-
tion in connection with the antimissile defense. Since there is no pos-
sibility of defending the entire territory it must select only several
cities. Some US diplomat-in Moscow said that no US Government and no
US President would prepare a list of the cities to be defended because
.the decision to defend only some cities, whichever they were, would
mark the end of any government or President who made this decision.
Even the well-known proposal by 1'r t Buchwald that all bigger cities
send girls to a contest .at which the most beautiful ones would be selected
and a defense system would then be built for those cities whose re re-
sentatives won the contest -- even this proposal -- would very probably
not convince the Americans to give up their right of defense in favor
of others.
Regardless of whether this dilemma is really as difficult as the US
diplomat sees it, the US Government is still in a predicament precisely
because it has no way to defend the entire state. This is also cbvious
fzom the US proposal that the United States and the USSR waive the
building of such systems. With respect to this proposal, the political
difficulties which the US Government faces certainly played a much more
important role than ordinary love for peace.
(comt'd)
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The Soviet Union has much fewar political difficulties, print ri~y
because it is considerably easier for the Soviet Union to kee;, a secret
frolm the domestic public, while the pubic reaction to the disclosure of
a plan for the defense of individual cities would not be such as is feared
in the United States. At any rate, there are fewer political prejudices
against the building of a defense system for several cities in the Soviet
Union, although the other significant difficulty still remains -- the new
enormous. material burden....
"How R'fective Is Antimissile De ense1?
by J. STANIC, Special Correspondent
Zagreb. V.iesnik. 6 March 1967- n i.e
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