IG REPORT CONCERNING PERSONNEL AND DOCUMENT CONTROLS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP69B00596R000100050003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2000
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 30, 1966
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
25X1A
ATTENTION
114/9/7-
DD/S&T 5892/66
e: 1966
25X1A
SUBJECT : 1G Report Concerning Personnel
and Document Controls
I Your draft report concerning personnel and document
controls has been reviewed by appropriate members of the
DD/S&T.
2. This Directorate appreciates the need to clearly
differentiate non-staff personnel who work in CIA buildings
from staff employees and will cooperate with any badge
program reforms introduced toward that end.
3. In the same vein, this Directorate will continue to
encourage and support the Office of Security's position that
individuals whose exposure to CIA buildings and assets is
comparable to staff employees' should meet the same personnel
security criteria as do staff employees. This seems to be
the single most important safeguard built into the current
system and should be maintained. In this connection, one
error in the draft paper should be mentioned. On page 8,
paragraph 2, the statement reading, "All non-staff personnel
who have . . . Visitor-NO-Escort (VNE)badges have an "A"
security clearance . ." is inaccurate. Only some VNE badge
holders have staff-type clearances. The majority get VNE
badges on the basis of clearance certifications provided by
their parent organizations. The majority get VNE badges
without polygraph testing. These people are, of course,
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SUBJE IC Report Concerning Personnel and Document Controls
visitors and their exppsure to Agency assets Should be markedly
less than that afforded staffers.
4. It appears questionable that any badge system can
function as a vehicle to effectively enforce the Agency need-
to-know discipline. While a new badge system might better
portray the holders' over-all status, staff vs non-staff,
meeting or not full Agency Top Secret security standards
including polygraph, etc., it will still be the responsibility
of each Offices and indeed, each staff individual to dispense
information with proper regard for need-to-know considerations.
Perhaps to encourage the Office of Security to embark upon a
rigorous reindoctrination program featuring the them* of
compartmentation and need-to-know is in order.
5. One other general point will be made before commenting
specifically on the recommendations. Page 9, paragraph 3b
states, "The fact that if the Agency had wanted the employee to
be staff and to be treated as staff, it would have hired him as
staff is forgotten or never seriously considered." It has been
the experience of this Directorate that the referenced statement
has not always been the case. Actually, for a variety of
reasons including personnel ceilings and budgetary considerations
it often is not possible to hire as a staffer a particular
wanted individual. Often the services of that same individual
can be tapped via a contractual relationship of some sort to
everyone's benefit.
6.
Doctumen
da one Re d Avai lab:
Personnel 25X1A
Classified
The DD/S&T sponsors approximatelyEMIEcontract
and non-Agency personnel whose document retrievalprivileges
are of concern 'here. Whereas the initial writeup of these
recommendations suggested An extremely time-consuming and
administratively burdensome program, the above recommendations
could be adhered to by this Directorate if necessary.
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IG Report Concerning Personnel and Document Controls
7. IC Recommendations re Bad es and Restricted Areas
The question of the potential security gains to be realized
from a new non-staff badge system must be analyzed by the Office
of Security. Regardless of the configuration of a new non-staff
badge program it must allow the same mobility to Contract Type A
employees (of the kind that DD/S&T utilizes) as they now enjoy.
As to liaison personnel and visitors, it occurs that the
existing arrangements involving the barriers of the "All-Source
Center," the Office of Special Activities, etc., may already be
capturing the goals of recommendations g and h. In all, the
subject appears to require more research and discussion.
8. IG Recommendations re Career Agents
This Directorate would pose no objections to these
recommendations.
9. r DDP ttecks fa al Former
Staff iMp gyees ? a e Present;y Emp oyed as a Non'Staf
amPloTse. Contract or Career Agent
This Directorate feels that such name checks should be
accomplished by the Office of Security. The results of these
name checks should be provided by the Office of Security to each
Directorate and independent Office having interest in the
individual. 2bX1A
25X1A
CARL E. Mid:KETT
Acting Deputy Director
for
Science and Technology
0/0DS&T/iMMEMMIMMEmlf:4006(29 Dec. 1966)
Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee
1 - DD/S&T Chrono
2 - SMS/DDS&T
/k= DD/S&T Registry
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