(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70-00058R000100010051-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 17, 1998
• Sequence Number: 51
• Publication Date: April 3, 1953
• Content Type: MISC

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The following is a chronological account of a background talk,
NOT for attribution to any official source, by Allen Dulles before an
Overseas Writers' luncheon on April 3s
Mr. Dulles: Intelligence here is a relatively new toy, its use
made more difficult by the fact it operates in a goldfish bowl, England
has the tradition for it, and is able to operate in some secrecy. That
is NOT possible in this country, so the US system is NOT patterned
especially after the British model.
The nucleus of the CIA is the old OSS. It has both overt and
covert functions. On the overt side is the coordination of intelligence
throughout the government, with a regular Thursday morning meeting of the
intelligence heads of all agencies - CIA, State, armed services, FBI, AEC,
and JCS.
This advisory intelligence committee prepares papers on existing
and developing situations - e.g., Stalin's death - but, for purposes of
making poticy, if agreement is NOT reached, the separate opinions (the CIA
"paper," plus dissenting footnotes) are sent to the National Security
Council.
NO ONE PREDICTED QUITE AS SUDDEN A SOVIET PEACE OFFENSIVE AS HAS
ACTUALLY TAKEN PLACE.
Requests for intelligence estimates on particular situations
can come from a variety of sources: NSC, Secretary of Defense or Secretary
of State. Where there is disagreement, there is NO attempt to muddy up
or gloss over such differences; the minority view also gets an airing.
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Also part of the overt task is the collection of intelligence
from offices and agents in about 25 United States cities, The product is
NOT overt, of course, because the agency doesn't advertise what its
objectives or intentions or conclusions are.
On this matter of secrecy: Dulles is now trying to find a way for
his employees to tell people where they work: so that his secretaries, for
example, won't have to say they work at the Pentagon. He finally has put a
"CIA" sign over his office door, since everybody in town knows where it is,
and the address is in the telephone book.
Covert operations are in two fields: secret intelligence and
secret operations. CIA has intelligence agents in all critical world areas
some operating quite overtly, however, such as in
where the agents are known at least to the governments involved. They
operate under various covers:
THEY DO NOT USE NEWSPAPERMEN - with few exceptions, they being
those papers which would NOT by any stretch of the imagination have foreign
correspondents. The agency does NOT want suspicion cast on bona fide
newspapermen, when the agency already gets so much from the press, with
newspapers "the greatest purveyors of intelligence we have."
Any information available by normal means is out of bounds for
the CIA; that is left to State and the service agencies.
OSS was the government's first development of a covert intelligence
service; it will take time to organize to optimum efficiency, but in 10 years
it ought to equal the British.
The CIA maintains close relations with the intelligence agencies
of the free world. All realize that there is only one really central
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intelligence target.
Secret operations, in a cold war, are a good deal more dangerous.
The need grew out of the situation in 1948, when the Communists took over
in Czechoslovakia, and came close to it in Italy. It was decided then that
there should be somewhere in the government an agency for aiding the forces
of democracy throughout the world in a covert manner.
Dulles opposes separation of secret intelligence and secret opera-
tions. Britain tried, but abandoned it. That will be his advice to the
Jackson committee, which will make the decision.
The CIA is faced with the most difficult problems of intelligence
that ever existed. The Iron Curtain really works. Dulles would give "a good
many million dollars" to a Soviet newspaper comparable to those available
to anyone in the United States. The Soviet uses NOT only those papers, but
technical studies, SEC reports and other rich veins of information.
Yet the US is NOT without information about the Soviet Union, The
FBIS reports of monitored radio broadcasts are an example. And there are
"other methods." "But we are always dissatisfied with what we do get," and
wish we had as many agents as the Soviet says we have.
The CIA reports to special committees of Armed Service and
Appropriations committees to provide information on which to base appropriations.
A Richmond paper recently criticized the CIA for being a "free-
wheeling outfit." Dulles called Son. Byrd on the phone, read him the
editorial, and indicated he thought the term was unjustified. Byrd replied:
"Well, if you're NOT a free-wheeling outfit, why aren't you?"
Dulles said his agency "may have a little trouble with McCarthy,
but NOT as much as my eminent brother is having." He added that the agency
is dependent on the goodwill and support of Congress in carrying out its job,
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Relations with the press are a little more difficult, because the
agency is doing some sensitive jobs; it obviously can't make public the
things that go well, but the press sometimes reports on matters that don't
go so well. Dulles wants to avoid having to go to the press to ask that
certain information NOT be printed. There is a discipline in this field
in England, where it is taboo to talk publicly about the British secret
service.
Ilya Ehrenberg on Allen Dulles: "If they let Dulles into heaven,
they would find him mining the clouds, shooting the stars, and slaughtering
the angels."
The following summarizes his answers to questions:
The CIA has NOT yet prepared an estimate of the Soviet peace
offensive, although the component parts are being lined up side by side with
the acts of toughness - e.g., the air incidents. The latter, it's felt,
don't mean an aggressive attitude, just a show of strictness and strength,
for internal consumption in part, on the matter of borders.
Q. What goes on inside Russia?
A. The Stalin regime was a one-man regime; the present government
is a committee regime. The committee type is usually weaker. But he sees
NO fissures in the Soviet Union, partly because you don't detect the small
cracks until the gaping holes are apparent. You don't have civil uprisings
in a modern totalitarian state, as you did in France; you don't revolt in
the face of tanks, artillery and tear gas, Revolutions are now at the top,
with the army going to one side or the other.
Q. Information on Molotov's influence?
A. We were surprised by the relative relegation of Molotov. Our
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intelligence was divided between Molotov and Malenkov as the new leader,
but slightly inclined toward Malenkov, who was ten years younger, among
other things. It looks as though Molotov does NOT wield great political
power, though he has influence in foreign affairs, THE BIG ISSUE IS WHETHER
MALENKOV AND BERIA CAN GET ALONG, AND FOR HOW LONG.
Q. What about the Russian amnesty for prisoners?
A. It is quite common for a new regime to declare amnesty. They
found the prisons pretty full, and didn't think it would do any harm; also
probably thought it was a good move in psychological warfare. Dulles said
he had "heard" - was NOT sure - that 2,000,000 (M) or 3,000,000 (M) prisoners
were involved. He didn't think the move had any very subtle implications.
Q. Was Trumants secrecy order necessary?
A. Don't think they do much good. There is a tendency to publish
in the technical fields a good deal of information for which the Soviets
would give their eye teeth if we weren't already giving it to them free.
Q. Were Oatis or Vogeler, or any of the correspondents now
traveling in Russia, agents?
A.
NO.
Q.
What are potentialities of split between Moscow and Peiping?
A.
I don't see any.
Q.
What are you doing to promote it?
A.
That's my brother's department, and the White House. CIA
merely carries out covertly the policies of the Government.
Q. What about the Burma dispute?
A.. The bodies found there were NOT American bodies; think they
were German deserters from French Foreign Legion fighting in Indo-China. The
US has been trying for some time to get the Chinese troops out of Burma.
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Q. Is Russian intelligence improving? Is it getting more
sophisticated?
A. On technical side, it's very good. Also, Molotov and Vishinsky
are "very smart fellows."
Q. Is the Voice of America any good to you, and what should be
done with it?
A. Voice has done some pretty good work; NOT perfect, of course.
But in many areas of the world, effective. Perhaps in some places, its
output shouldn't use the US label too much. BBC is a good example of effective
broadcasting.
Q. In both secret intelligence and secret operations, are we
getting meaty and productive reports from Belgrade?
A. Our working relations with Yugoslavia are satisfactory. We
have to move slowly in that area. They know we dislike and don't trust any
Communist state, but there has been a "very substantial development of
cooperation in last year and a half."
Q. Soviet progress in atomic energy?
A. It's a matter of public knowledge (despite inexplicable Truman
statement) that the Soviets have tested three A-bombs. But NO tests in over
a year and a half. WE BELIEVE THE SOVIETS ARE CONTINUING TO MAKE ATOMIC
BOMBS, SINCE THEY HAVE THE SECRET, AND WE WOULD BE NEGLIGENT NOT TO ASSUME
THAT THEY HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL STOCKPILE OF BOMBS.
Q. They couldn't test one without our knowledge?
A. NOT likely.
Q. What about the "germ warfare" confessions, and the technique
of "brain washing?"
A. The Russians have undoubtedly discovered effective techniques
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have been seen showing three US airmen blandly telling about their indoctrina-
tion in germ warfare methods, who taught them, how high they flew to drop
germ containers, etc. NOT a word of truth in it. This is accomplished NOT
by torture, and probably NOT by drugs; just forced sleeplessness, special
lights, endless interrogation. It's possible they'll work this on a hundred
or so prisoners in Korea, who will then say they don't want to return to the
OFF THE RECORD - The US has asked a panel of eminent brain experts,
psychiatrists, etc., to scrutinize all the evidence we have, and to
get their views on the technique.
END OFF THE RECORD
Dulles also cited interview with John Hayes, a Presbyterian
Missionary, in US News and World Report. Hayes was in Communist China for
three years, was interrogated for 75 days, broke after 1i5 or 50, with his
brain washed.
Q. Is CIA impleienting policy of liberation?
A. Do the best we can to keep alive in the satellites the hope
of eventual freedom and liberation; NOT doing anything to promote uprising
or action of that nature. Just try to keep in their minds the consciousness
of a better world.
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