ADVENTURES IN THE O.S.S.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70-00058R000100090027-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 1998
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: March 20, 1954
• Content Type: NSPR

approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP 1000100090027-2
1'I NATION MARCH 20, 1954 CPYRGHT
Advent res 'n the 0. S. S.
THE SCARLET 'IKEA ventures
in Wartime Espionage. By Dohald
Downes. British Book-Center. $3.50.
By H. H. Wilson
or for political education, this is a
fascinating book. Mr;, Downes, a Cape
Cod school teacher, worked for British
Intelligence and then for the American
Office of Strategic Services from 1940
to 1945. He was engaged chiefly in
establishing subversive movements in
enemy territory, but he has some pithy
observations on men and movements in
the United States. When the public is
being bamboozled by Senators and Rep-
resentatives who pretend to be searching
out subversion, it is invaluable for the
layman to learn something of the na-
ture of genuine intelligence and counter-
espionage operations.
There is also utility in the reminder
that our support of anti-democratic
regimes did not need the excuse of
building an alliance against Soviet im-
perialism. State Department `personnel
demonstrated an early affinity for reac-
tion, and Mr: Downes-f convinced that
betrayal of those who worked with us
against the Nazis and'. our failure to
support the European non-Communist
left undermined the possibility of a real
post-war democratic movement. We
short-changed'the Italian partisans, toler-
ated the Communists because they had
Russian support, and, says Downes, per-
H. H. WILSON, a' contributing editor
of The Nation, is professor of political
science at Princeton and author of
"Congress.-. Corruption and 'Compro-
mise."
March .20, 1954
parties to wither. Through Lauchlin
Currie, whom he defends against Con-
gressional smearing, Downes tried to,
get reports to President Roosevelt that
wduld counteract the official British
line-on Greece and Italy. He believes
that Harry Hopkins diverted these re-
ports and that the President never saw
them. "Every report I wrote to the
White House ended with a warning that
if we did not take the side of democracy
and reform, we should have to contend
with a large Communist Party in the
period after the war."
Unlike some observers who have been
disturbed by Allen Dulles's connections
with German financial and' industrial
cartels, Downes considers his work with
O. S. S._ brilliant,, and for William J.
Donovan he has highest praise: "I do
not think that there was another Amer-
ican in 1941 capable of creating a
functioning secret-intelligence organiza-
tion overnight. His raw materials were
thousands of 'enthusiastic amateurs.
Maybe 75' per cent of the effort was
fruitless. To my knowledge there were
projects in the remaining 25 per cent
which contributed enormously to win-
ning and shortening the war, to saving
many thousands of Allied lives. . . .
Nothing was too fantastic for Donovan
if you could convince him that it had
a chance of success or that .:it would
Mann the enemy.'
With the persistent glorification of
J. Edgar Hoover it is sobering. to read
that both' British Intelligence and
O. S. S. "were't oinstantly being hounded
by the ' F. B. I." That organization,
"with its police mentality, was jealous.
While we were organizing our projects,
CPYRGHT
'here was always the danger of -the knife
in the back from the F. B. I." People
willing to risk their lives and undergo
Gestapo tortures in the service of the
Allies were constantly subject to F. B. I.
sniping. "Baseless and indiscriminate
charges of communism and disloyalty
were brought against them." In the
light of its subsequent coddling of police
spies,and professional `perjurers, it is
interesting that the F. B. I. should have
treated those who were operating against
the Nazis as "so many stool-pigeons
[and] inferior people."
When the F. B. I. deliberately broke
up an 0. S. S. operation that had suc-
cessfully looted foreign embassies in
Washington, Downes asked the 0. S. S.
political adviser if President Roosevelt
would not do something "about such
near treason." He received an answer
which is still pertinent: "No, he won't.
No President dare touch John Edgar
Hnnv'r
Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP70-00058R000100090027-2