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Document Creation Date: 
November 17, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 3, 2000
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Publication Date: 
September 10, 1956
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PDF icon CIA-RDP70-00058R000100130052-9.pdf195.32 KB
MINNEAPOLIS TRIBUNE SEP 1 (1 1956 FOIAb3b Circ.: mAp,663or Release 2000/08/24: CIA-RDP70-00058R000100130052-9 S. 621,792 Front Edit Page Page Other Page JW Allen Dulles Warns New Loo k" Doesn't$hange Russ Objectives 1 DITOIi. S NOTE: Allen 31'. Dulles, di- rector of the re submitted an di ys. s o curren o u- nist tactics to the house committee on un- American activities. Dulles and 120 other government officials, military leaders, edu- cators; journalists, labor officials and po- litical scientists are contributing statments for a symposium on the techniques of So- viet cold warfare. Following is a condensed I have always been im )ressed at our seeming re-1 uctance to give credence to fficial statements which are tide by political leaders in ther countries when we dis- warning of intent,_ it iiay be useful to review bbl some past examples of Communist attempts to subvert free gov- ernments. Past Communist take-overs: of free countries have general- ly featured most if not all of gree fervently with what these four elements: hey say or when their state- nents seem at the time to be From Khrushchev we had The use of force from out- ombastie or unrealistic. an eight-hour speech and side, or the overhanging threat For example, Hitler's "Mein roughly 56,000 words, from of force. Bul anin four hours and 27 - The obtainin b the Corn- " written in 1924, had ampf, wide circulation in Germany nd left a deep impression on he German people. Over here t received comparatively lit- tle attention until after the outbreak of World War II. Yet in this book was the blueprint of the Hitlerian policy of the superiority of the Herrenvolk, of the manifest destiny of the German Reich, of the anti- semitic campaigns and of the whole trend of Hitlerism. SIMILARLY, I am afraid we I rewrite a proper Soviet hi - nest elements were Mriven out Americans do not pay as ! tory, the speechs of the Party of positions of influence. much to what attention as Communist we leaders, oshould cngress can serve as a texts The best example of t h i s book. process is, of course, that of tell us about the techniques Czechoslovakia. Additional they intend to adopt to under- WHILE WE read in thesie I variants are found in the cases mine the structure of free ',speec estbat war is no longer of Hungary and Poland, Ro- government based on the rule inevitable, and that some kind' mania and Bulgaria. of law. b f co-existence is possible, it LL OF h ese cases, ex- t A is clear Soviet objectives re; 11,4 A from gthe pronouncements learned of main basically unchange cept for Czechoslovakia, t Sh oviet! the 20th Party congress, held but, they say, can be achieve r actual presence in Moscow in February 1956. by new methods. forces on the spot played a de '['his was an extraordinary af- The Communists propose to cisive role. In Czechos'ovakia fair. Over a period of 12 days infiltrate our free legislative some of the same effect was Soviet leaders poured out a systems, to take over our par-.[ obtained by the presence, just cascade of verbiage - theliamentaxy governments and' across the border, of strong length of the speeches corre-to use the, freedom which our ?Soviet forces- kArid by the fact; spective positions in the pres- destroy all vestiges of that pie Prague an many other i'rit Soviet hierarchy. system. important Czech centers and g $ y 000 words, from Mikoyan two k munists through popular vote hours and 14,000 words, and of at least an effective minor so on. The total amounted to ity position. some five to six million words' The willingness of o t h e r which the patient party faith- parties, most often the parties ful had to endure. to the left, but in some cases The recent de-Stalinizationeven parties of the extreme` program has rendered obsq- right, to join in political alli- lete practically all of the his- antes and to admit Commu- tory books and many standard nists to key position in t h e textbooks used throughout the government . Soviet Union. Something has Communist manipulation of these books anti' to re lac p e until the new historians chi' key ministries"so non-Commu- Approved For Release 2000/08/24: CIA-RDP70-00058R000100130052-9 CPYRGHT Approved For Rel During all this period, Sta- lin had cultivated genes and lulled him into a feeling of security as to Moscow's in- _tentions. Meanwhile, the Com- munists were building up their control of the Czech military forces, the trade' unions and the internal secur- ity policy. Finally, one of Mogtow's'-principal "expedit-I eta, Valeri4n Zorin., now So-' viet anibassador to Bonn, wa serif to Prague, and the mi4 nosy Communist ` p a r t y seized ? power in February 1948 without firing a shot. I had been able, by their ter- rorist and infiltration methods, to gain a positiom..Of strength which far exceeded`the numer-1 ical representation in the pop-' ulation at large. In fact, they' prepared the way for the coup before they evacuated .their': troops in 1945. Beginning in 1945, Moscow, "xercised heavy pressure on she free Czech government headed by President Benes. hoping to be able to work! with the Kremlin and anxious to insure quick withdrawal of . Russian troops, Benes went to Mosco' in March of that year. He sought agreement on the; forming of a coalition govern- ment acceptable to the Soviets which would include some of the pro-Communist emigres who had, been collected in Moscow during the war `'and who flooded back to their! home country to play r 01 e s preassigned to them ' by "thej Kremlin. When the parliamentary, government of Benes was ac-; tually reconstituted, anti- Communist forces were bad- ly divided among four or more parties. The Communist party, as usual, presented a monolithic front. UNDER THESE conditions.' elections of 1946 gave the; Communists 38 per cent of the votes. Thus they became the largest single party, their;( leader Gottwald was named!( prime minister and the Corn-1. munists were able to take I, over certain key ministries, ! -finterior, informa- ?