'THE COMMUNIST ALSO HAVE THEIR PROBLEMS' ADDRESS BY ALLEN WELSH DULLES, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BEFORE THE ADVERTISING COUNCIL, INC., 19 SEPTEMBER 1957 ST. FRANCIS HOTEL, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70-00058R000100250026-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 26
• Content Type: SPEECH

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"THE COMMUNISTS ALSO HAVE THEIR PRQSLEi"
ADDRESS BY ALLEN WELSH DMLES*
DIRECTOR OF CWRAL INTELLIGENCE
ICE TIE ADVER71StN4 COUNCIL, INC.,
19 September 195?
31. FRA1*I3 HOTEL,
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
It is a privilege to have this opportunity to recognize publicly
the generosity of the Advertising Council in devoting so great a share
of its time and resources in the general welfare. You have freer
supported those great causes which promote domestically and inter-
nationally the ideals of our people. You have been in the forefront
of campaigns to alert the people of this country to the dangers of
alien and destructive movements such as international communism. As
one in Government who has had the opportunity of judging of the
effectiveness of this work, I wish to express gratitude.
it may seem a bit paradoxical that the Director of Central
Intelligence should be addressing the Advertising Council. You
present the trend -- which seems quite irresistible -- that it
pays to advertise."
I arm the head of the silent service and cannot advertise ny
wares. Sometimes, I adr t, this is a bit irksome. Often we know
a bit tie about what is going on in the world than we are credited
with, and we realize a little advertisement might improve our public
relations. For for reasons of policy, however, public relations
met be sacrificed to the security of our operations.
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fir, have ouch in common. We
h the tact of ideas an hum n behaviour. In e
out one of the Central Intelligence Agency 4a important tasks -- that
of estimating future developments in they foreign field -- the ability
to analyze public reactions is essential in our job. We,
to judge whether ideas have a transitory value or will have an enduring
eat upon the behaviours of people.
In particular, it is a
study to follow the develop-
Ott of the ideas behind certain of the great rwvo1utionary movements
Son* such r
religious fervor,, some by brute
military force, max by a combination of might and assertions of
right. These a re nts have had their day -- long or short. Some
have had broad geographic appeal -- s
test to a particular
of some has never really been deciphered* our
civilisation, despite the dark ages, has ben tough enough to survive
the =oat vigorous and long-lived revolutionary assaults on u ind and
Tonight I propose to give you the results of an analysis of
nt happenings within the Soviet Cost world and I shall
be bold enough to draw certain conclusions which support xV conviction
that radical changes are taking place and awe are in the asking.
1 ideological fervor,, I believe, is seeping out of
vOlutionary COm ar at atovemnt, particularly in
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mt
. xie* was aot designed for the atoesio age of the
ritury. Effective as Cemsaeuniem has been in establishing
ontrol of two powerful nations and imposing its will on a nu ber of
Satellite countries, it is begi ng to encounter difficulties in
ling with the coap2eac indUstrta2 and technological problems of today.
Yurti er, while some of the industrial and military achievements of both
d to devise a political system capable of commanding
stirred the pride of its citiaezis,
the loyalties of governed peoples without resort to the cruel barbariti. s
of mass terror. It has satisfied neither the ideals, the aspirations,
needs of the people subject to its domination.
AccordLx g1 , the leaders of international cazsmouzzim are being
forced to review their situation and to consider major changes-changes
strike at the very heart of the system, The theories of .lac
and Lenin proved useful window-4 ressing behind which the C*wnwists
established their monopoly of p itictal power--the so-called dictator-
ship of the proletariat. These ideas are of little aid in guiding
the Com amist dictatorship in meeting the challenge of the world today.
History tells us that at wave point the fervor and drive seem
revolutions, The founders the off. Their followers for a
ims mouth selected precepts convenient to their aims and forget the
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Be it is with the Soviet brand of Coswaniss. What prophet is
there left in Soviet Russia? Nam and Lenin are given lip service,
but their advice and counsel have little applicability today, Stalin
bras been discredited - though his embarrassing ri-" are still on
view in the Rr.mlin. shch v is un ksly to blossom out as a
creator of now C+emniat doctrine though his inetuosity and
unpredictability remain a matter of grave concern in an international
as. tons* as that of today. NiLo retaiess his male as a
prophet in China, but has, too, is hawing his troubles.
Stalin disappeared from the scene a little less than five
years ago, he left a clouded heritage. His later years of dictator-
.at Unjon close to war and disastero Yen..
tunes in Greece, at Berlin, and finally in Korea had opened the eyes
siren of the credulous abroad. Do eetically, harsh measures of forced
Industrialization and military buildup, successful as they were
technoiogioally, had left little place for meeting the needs of the
X100
the systematic cruelties of the secret police had
created popular unrest, suspicion and despair. Khrushehev told us
story of how terror-ridden Soviet life had beams in his now
in secret speech at the 20th Party Congress aver a year
ago- speech still unpublished in the Casmeamist world. It was
medicine for popular consumption, although bits and pieces
of it were al3rad to look out.
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s successors
dictatorship but yet m 4ntainLng complete authority, a
of secret police repression and yet keeping
lne, of aining in a tight rein but
lion, and giving some of the substance,
of a now Meaaurs of freedom,
found it hard, to fit into this picture. He did not want
his personal aolttrol of the secret lies through
which he hoped to gain the tear position. His plot was discovered
and he was liquidated. Since thorn the mdlita iy seem to have become
the decisive element whore two or the threat of force was rewired
tical decision.
crisis vs were told that the dictatorship of
the prolet+sriat had beoe + a collective leadership-am PMPer2y
a collective dictatorship. True enough, the crisis of
rea ustment to the
era brought together in uneasy
.harmer the arriving mgrs of the governing bo4 known as
of the Party. )WW here at boars and abroad wrozig1y eeti
ring form of
. Actually
biter personal rivalries and basic differences of philosophies
and south remain uareaencilsd.
ity to make orsola1 decisions lust rest
fir ay awn where and that "somewhere" is unlikely for long to be
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in a oollaotive, ljority rule is appropriate for legislative and
judicial bodies, but it doss not function satisfactorily in the
For a tine
decisiveness of action is essential..
Stalin's disappearance from the scene,
1 .1.i*ov tried to lead the collective team, se ngiy
which promised a better break for the people than they had eve had
In 1955 he was forced to confess his incapacity and Khrueh-
committing himself, like his predecessor, to the
olleotive rule formula.
Theo, last June, the inevitable irreconcilable conflict of
opinions emerged, the collective broke down and, with the approval
of the military, in particular Zhukav, Khrushchev eliminated his
rivals-4b1otov and Kaganovish, who really felt that the old Stalin-
ist and foreign polisiee were preferable, and Ienkonr, who due
to his relative youth, political experience, and apparent popularity,
was a dangerous potential rival. At the moment, Khrushobov is busi3,v
engaged in implicating 2 1ankov in the crrizee8 of Stalin's later
days, classing him as "shadow and tool" of Beria. Since Beria was
shot for treason, the threat to Hrlenkov is raked enough for all
to see,
So the history of Soviet governmental changes repeats itself,
although in a slightly different pattern from that of the two
previous dsoades. Those recently purged have not yet been liquidated
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hike Beria or eliminated by crack trials such as those of the late
1930's. With a touch of al mint sardonic humor, the miscreants
have been assigned to the oblivion of Siberia or the darkness of
Outer Mongolia,
It was the hand- irked Central Caeesaeittee of the Catuamiet
Party, with the backing of the Army, which piged the decisive role
in last summer's changes
high comeaand, This suggests that
the Presidium on its own can to longer deal with recalcitrant
at least in a situation where the issues
and where those to be eliminated are not in a hopeless minority.
The claim that the purpose of these chews was to got back
to the puce Leninist Ceaems 4 of the past is camouflage, No
differing theories of Ccmunist and Idarncist dogma played
decisive role in this struggle. It was a question of power
tics in a situation where hard decisions had to be sade in both
the domestic and foreign fields. There we
very deep
and f ~sneiesmsntal divergences of views among the members of the
Presidium and the collective tailed to function becas?se the differ..
enoes were not susceptible of oomp1'U ise,
Three main issues divided the Soviet leaders, The first
concerned the decentralisatit of industry.
After yews of extolling the virtues of a centrally planned
of the Soviet leaders have r.oen y begun to stress
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the need of local initiative to improve efficiency at the punt
of local tesourass, it was hoped to ease the burden
t sport facilities, mintaiss daepliee-tion of effort and atimaz-
ative. Acting on these theories, Thruahcherv
recently foroed through a program to daessntsali so air
merry elsaaraute of control of the great Soviet industrial ma chime,
in the most swssping reorganization of the soaawde management
machinery aims the first live Year Plan was adopted
Sams 27 apeaialised oconraaic ministries in Moscow coons abolished
and replaned by 1#5 regional econoni c councils.
Z,ast , several of Nkm,, v' a collsagusa tried to
reverse all this.
The reason for the retaa nissation is readily undsrstandabl~e
a to conceive of the bureaucratic mess which we would
have if we attempted to man* frog the Capital all the details
of a growing iz strial a * z more disputed go*graphical2y
than that of the United Stat> -a and thing One-half of its sues.
be eventual economic benefits from the deccen-
Shruabsv's plan
t as many problem
as it solves.
A loft period of transitional confusion is
istrative command and coordination vela ass
out.
for the Soviet, Union that a
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kind of eeononic; provincialism will develop to threaten the
domin*nce of the central gavertte ant.
The reason for the bitter fight against this reorganization
of Khrushchev+s oolleagaes is clear. The decentralization
will remove some of the power from the central government in Moscow
and transfer it to the province. Here only two members of the
Presidium are in a position to exercise real influence, Khrushchev,
h his control of the party machinery throughout the Soviet
on, grid the military, presently represented by Marshal Zhukov.
econd issue dividing the Soviet leaders in June last
was the agricultural probl+srn, often called the Achilles het*l of
the Soviet system. Kbrushchev has been pressing for ever-increasing
areas of State-controlled farm ;awls, on the pattern of the Mtge
development he had started in the so-called "virgin lands" east of
an, in order to make geed the shortcomings of Cum's
greatest fiasco -- the collectivized farm systett. This involves
some 80 - 100 million acresl larger than the entire wheat acreage
of the United States,
For many years Soviet emphasis on heavy industry and military
ngth drained manpower and capital imrestaments away from the
making agriculture the stepchild of the Stalinist econc.
In contrast with the rapid growth rate of other parts of the
Soviet econmW, for the pant twenty years Soviet production
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oossaodities has failed to rase as fast as the
population of the WSR.
Aftw all, soil conditions, rainfall and temperature do not
favor the Soviet Union despite its vast area. Less than 10% of
is likely to produce reasonable agricultural yields
in normal years. . areover, the combination of bureaucratic
ml.amanagement, and Communist neglect of the motivating force of
nel incentives had reedited in an inefficiency of farm labor
so groat that it takes about one farm worker to food and sly
every four persona in the USPRa whereas the ratio in the united
States is about one for every sixteen persona. flame, 45% of
Soviet labor is on the farms as compared with 10% of American
xtors.
~hoherv Is responsibility for the policy of investing
heavily in the semi-arid, air icull trolly marginal "virgin* Undo
is very great. So far he has been lucky, with one excellent crop
and one fair one. This year (1957) promises to be only fair and
there is no doubt that mewy Soviet leaders fear a major crop
f+a,i1ur a as the moisture is used up in the new lands. Even Mikoyan,
who has stuck with Tahsv so far and now is probably the
number two an in the regime, is said to bane been dubious about
the "virgin's lands program.
The final suoaess or fdlure of the program is still to be
determined and Khrn.hev e s personal reputation is deeply involved.
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butter by 1958 and in scat by 1961. This latter
promised. his people *quality per capita with Americans
old involve an increase of 3 1/2 time in Soviet mgt production
the least, is an ambitious program, even taking
noted fertility of the rabbit, which is
included in the Soviet calculations as wall as their clmimsd
e a larger number of twin lambs,
finally, a third point at issue between Shruahchev and his
oppments lay in the related fields of foreign policy and policy
toward the Axropean Satellites. Here Bhruahohev vas attacked
by Molotov and his followers for having weakened the
tion by his policy of reoc ciliation with Yugoslavia and by
his Austrian settlement. Brae, in fact, valneraIgm to the charge
rine of "differing roads to 8octdiam,w a heresy that
opened the flood gates to revolt by ati~ acing support
is now threatening the monolithic structure of the $cmiet
during the l ungKrism Rwo3.ution, the ranks in
leadership had closed and Shrus chev personally as well
s meet bear the responsibility for the rutb ass
on in November 1956. The scam of dissent remain.d, how
in the Indictment of tov by the Central Cvadttee,
his Yugoslav and Austrian polietes are the subject of particular
criticism. Hungary goes unmentioned.
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Moscow's future policy toward the European Satellites remains
unresolved. Though Molotov was vigorously attacked for his mistaken
attitude,, rushchev, since the Polish and Hungarian revolts, has
feared the contagious influence of granting freedom awe
Certainly none of the Soviet leaders carea to remember the precepts
of Lenin, who had this to say in 19171
*If Finland, if Poland, if the Ukraine beak away
from Russia there is nothing bad about that....
No nation can be free if it oppresses other nations."
These were the major issues on which Xhrushchev fought for,
and by an eyelash won, the leadership of the Soviet Union.
There are many other burning problems facing the now group
First of all,, they have the problem of Eastslest Contacts,,
which for propaganda purposes at least they strongly claim to favor
Can the leaders really permit the people of the USSR to
the facts of life? Do they dare open tip to the press, to
radio, to television?
Except for certain supervised and guided tours, the answer
to this no far seems to be "no." We can guess how frightened they
it panicky warnings to Soviet
about being deceived
by the words of the American boys and girls who went to Moscow
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ly for the big Soviet Youth Festival.
Sianilarly, they do not dare publish such dosrusnts as the
Khrushchev secret speech, the U.t}. report on Hungary, nor the basic
attack on Cotanuntst doctrine by the tugoslsv, D3ila*,
recently published book, 'OTh. Now Class."
Instead of dealing with such criticisms opsniy, Soviet leaders
try to sweep there under the rug and keep their own people in the dark.
Tbrre Was recently publish*d in Moscow a highly realistic novel,
with the eloquent title Not 33y tread Alone. It evoked great popular
interest in the USSR because it showed 80=8 of the seamier Bide of
life and bur+aaucracy In the Soviet Union today. All the
big g' of the Soviet regime began to fire at the author, Dudintssev,
v himself recently lambasted the book as misguided
angerous. It is signtfio$i t that they have not yet banned it*
probably they were too late in realising its subtle attack On the
foundations of the Co=nu iat system.
By and large the bulk of the Russian people still live in a
orld about everything outside the USSi, and the most tragic
part about this is the distorted facts and fancies the Soviet leaders
r own people abo it the allegedly hostile attitudes of
d them. The exchange of a few controlled travelling
delegations is not enough. The barriers to information and know
am down.
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The Soviet leaders also have to deal with the problems created
own educational system and by the development of an indus-
trial and technical elite. Under the lash of its pelf-moll
industrialisation program, the ASR in the past decade has
Usly speeded up the education of the Russian people, partic-
scientific and technical field. As a result, the
USSR is. turning out hundreds of thousands of graduates of schools
responding to our high schools and colleges.
It is true that in their educational system they emphasise
scientific and technical fields much more than social sciences and
the humanities. But knowledge is not an inert substance. It has
a w a y of s e e p i n g across lines a . into adjacent compartments of
learning. The Soviet leaders, I firmly believe, cannot illuminate
their scientific lecture halls and laboratories without also letting
the light of truth into their history and economics classrooms.
Students cannot be conditioned to turning off their analytical
processes when the instructor chenges a topic,
Stadent and intellectual unrest is a troublesome challenge
to a dictatorship. The Chinese Commum.ets experimented briefly
with placating critics by libera sing their thought-control system
enunciating the doctrine known as *let a h dyed flowers bloom,
let a hundred schools of thought contend." In the face of the
aching criticisers promptly voiced by Chinese intellectuals,
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regime quickly reversed itself and has only a few weeks
ago reauaed they practice of publicly executing students who dared
to suggest that Chinas s ills result in part from flaws in the Communist
system itself.
The education which Soviet and Chicoa leaders give their
people is a dangerous commodity for a dictatorship. Ken and women
who have their critical faculties sharpened are beginning to question
the Russian people cannot be freed from rigid Coast Party
and Police-state dieciplite:, given a greater economic share of the
fruit of their labors, and alloyed to participate -- at least by an
effective expression of consent -- in their own governing.
in the past the Soviets counted particularly upon their ability
to appeal with success to the youth and the students, In 1905 Lenin
wrote, TWO are the party of the future but the f tore belongs to
the yob. We are the party of innovation, and it is to the
innovators that youth always gladly gives its allegiance. We are
y of self-sacrificing s niggle against the ancient rot,
and the young are always readiest for sacrificial combat -- and we
shall always be the party of the youth of the advanced class."
That proud boast could not be made today. The Hungarian
students were ready for combat, but Maine the Soviets, not for
them. The deep disillusionment of the Polish youth with the
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Soviet4nposed version of Co ism can be read in their brilliantly
edited publications, and in spite of Soviet censorship there in
evidence that they are read eagerly by those who can obtain them in
the Russian verities*
government can ,still, organise mar aive propaganda
circuses like the recent Moscow Youth Festival. They can train an
r of young scientists and o icians. They
can bribe the ambitious with the rewards of power and special privi-
the swollen bureaucracy. But they are finding it increasingly
Lenin once so counted on and who are the real motive
power of successful revolutionary movements,
The Soviet leaders also have the growing problem of the tech-
nical and managerial elite which has been created to run Soviet
industry -- now being decentra-lized. It will not be easy to restrain
this class of people from using its critical skills to question the
cumbersome governmental and Consuni,st Party bureaucracy and what it
is doing -- or not doing ?- to give the ambers of that elite a
better life ?
Probably it is out of respect for the growing perceptiveness
of the people of Russia, and at least out of recognition of popular
awning for peace# that Soviet ).eaders have been forced to gF
service to disarmament, another grave problem before the Moscow
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leaders. Now that the isms of conceding some fa m of inspection
and control in the USSR is squarely presented, they are hesitating.
propseect goes against every tradition and instinct of the
These are some of the practical issues wbieth Kh ruahchev now
.faces. There is no easy solution. After all, dictatorships,
of the Stalin or of the hitter type, can for a time exact
great sacrifices from their peoples and achieve great materialistic
accomplishments. In fact, for a limited period, it may be easier
for a dictatorship to make steel than broad and boater -- easier
to build a mighty war machine than to satisfy the moral, a
and material needs of a groat and diverse people. This is certainly
with the Co mmusii.st dictatorship in the USSR.
Today communism is more valuable as an article of export than
it is as a solution for the problems of a country like the Soviet
Union, which is making great strides in fields of material progress,
but which has still found no war of creating a government which
can meet the needs and aspirations of its people.
Undoubtedly in many areas of the world, particularly those
recently freed from Colonial rvge, the image of Comm em still
has an appeal. It seems to combine the advantages of strict die-
aipline at the top with the prooMdse of quick in atrialisation.
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These factors appeal to new nations struggling with the task of
making a goverment work among peoples who have had little experi-
ence with it and who at the aaamrs time, have the desire to become
quickly an Industrial force in their own right.
The politically unsophisticated peoples of the underdeveloped
nations have yet to learn what the peoples of the Communist world
are slowly coming to understand about Marxism and industrial growth
D3ilaa, the Yugoslav Cormnist heretic, put it wells
"Modern Commadsaa began as an idea with the
inception of modern industry. It is dying
out or being eliminated in those countries
where industrial development has achieved its
basic purposes, It flourishes in those
countries where this has not yet happened."
In fast, I would add to thi
that the force of ideological
they have had no practical experience with
Comm niaam seems weakest in those countries like the USSR, where it
has been the largest in control. It has its strongest appeal to the
minds of these peoples in the underdeveloped areas of the world where
Viewed in broad perspective, Coim uaei.sm is only Ong of the
MAY great revolutionary movements that have swept into world
Such movements seemed to combine an ideology or a faith
expressed as a program of action; and a discipline through a
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political or military machine capable of organizing the energies
of the people in order to carry out the ideas that have captured
their imaginations and loyalties.
at historical analogies are notoriously treacherous.
But there may be food for
t in comparing the evolution of
Soviet Communism with the classical periods of revolutionary mare--
Possibly the closest parallel in history is with the French
Revolution.
The pattern seems to be this the intellectuals desert their
political institutions and adopt what they calla "Reform Program."
".Chen, revolutionary elements take over from the intellectuals and
seize power, generally beginning with the moderates of the Denton
type, and passing through the extremists like Robespierre, with a
reign of i.nhssman seal and terror. Successive groups of leaders are
destroyed with each change in the tempo of the revolution. As
Yergniaud said in the cowree of the French Revolution, "The
Revolution, like Saturn, devours its own children," Eventually,
human nature rebels and demands a more normal life. Then the
practical political and military leaders depose the extremists.
in the case of the French Revolution, there was the
temptation, to which they quickly yielded, to indulge in foreign
military adventure,, and ..- eventually the access to power of the
military man on horseback, Bonaparte. There is, naturally,
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considerable speculation these days as to whether this last phase
of the French Revolution will be repeated in the case of Soviet
Camminisn. I have no crystal ball answer, but certainly military
dictatorship is one of the possible lines of evolution in the Soviet
Union.
From this analysis of dsvelopss nts in the Soviet U
fair to conclude that I believer that the old Cyst dialectic of
an Stalin does not answer the problems of the
Soviet Union today -- either these of its industrial growth or of its
lasting control aver the great peoples living within the Soviet Union.
It would flow from this that Khrushchev and whoever he may
associate with himself in the leadership, assuming he keeps his control
Cass a time,, will have to determine how they are going to accomplish
this dotal task. Will they met it by further relaxation, thereby
asing the moral and industrial potential of the Soviet union
itself, and the prospects of peace, but risking the loss
Satellite countries? Will they attempt a reversion to something
like Stalinism under another name as some of the tough, uncompromising
language and actions from Moscow of recent days would suggest? Or
will they be tempted to risk foreign venture with a view to uniting
their people and their energies to abet alleged enemies they claim
are encircling
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the issues. I would not wish to suggest that what
I have referred to as the decline of the Marxist Coax am ha
left the Soviet Union materially weak in facing them. The Soviet
be ideologically lours menacing, technologically its power is
stil], increasing.
he entire revolution, once the Co=st regi
established in Russia, the emphasis was placed on heavy
induetrj, and on building up the war machine. This has been a con-
stant policy and has been one phase of Soviet life that has
been affected by changing leaders or interpretations of Cc-air st
ideology. After all, the in who are at the helm in the Soviet
Union are not the original revolutionary heroes. Khrushchev and
.koyan and
r heerchmsn belong to the ever-present class of
ists who see in revolutionary movement the path
to power and privilege.
id not make the revolution, like
Lenin. It made thus, and they want above all else to preserve
their positions,
melee Marxism at one time or anther has inva'eed most rents
of Soviet life, including the any with its political commissar
and indoctrination agents; those who have planned the Soviet asi.i-
tary buildup have been little hanpered by it. In their concentra-
a n on the fields of nuclear energy, aircraft design and construction
and the dsvelopae:nt of guided missiles,, they experienced little ideo-
logical interference except during, brief periods of Stalin's last
hectic days.
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Tako# for ea pla, the case of guided missies
never ceased work from the days of 1945 when they took over the
German missile installation at Peenemuende with its ro?ket$ of
a range between 150 to 200 miles.
modern missiles of meter times the
they have dieveloped
and efficiency of the
The Soviet Union which we face tom presents a series
of aontradiotions. Its 3aader has practic.
.oh control as
tee,
backed by a formidable war meahins--a leader committed by his
express policies to impawe the lot of his people, and pre-
sumably committed also to relax the harsh controls of Stalin
which he has described so vividly himself and which he prports
to abhor.
At the same time, this leader, iShruehchev, faces the
emma that any subsetaati relaxation at horse or abroad,
given the nature of the Comuniet dictatorship as it has evolved,
my spell his own downfall. For he faces, and be knows it, a
people who are questioning the basic tenets of 1 rxiet Comen -
nism, and in particular a student body that is bung
and more vocal in dermndixtg the truth and myr not be satisfied
with half mews.
The Co niat leaders are also facing a growing body of
highly educated, technologically competent men and woven in the
'-22-
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field of industrial manager nt and production. It my prove impo w
Bible for them to stop the growing wave of inte7ctual unrest in
the Soviet Union. iushchev cannot turn back education or stop
technolc ical development and keep the USSR a great power.
Yet Khrushobev seems to be in a burry to solve a whole aeries
of such probe as I have described and gain the personal success
necessary to maintain his own position.
to all tbis, hi has deeply cowd.tted himself in
n foreign adventures, particularly in the Middle East
it may be assumed, to distract attention from problems at home and
in the Satellites. All this rightfully makes is cautious in our
judgments and does not suggest that there are any quick or easy ways
out in our relations with the USSR,
over the longer ranges we can rest assured that revolu
Cc munt8t tyranny cannot provide a final am or a satisfactory
answer to the needs of a civilized coaamznity. No power on earth
he zsgrth that Coisam Is the wave of the .future after
20 million Hungarians, after a decade of experience with it, and
at the risk of their lives, gave it such a resounding vote of no
confidence.
people of Russia, if given the time to continue their
evolution to freedom out of the narrow bounds of Consnuntst dicta-
torship, will themselves help find a peaceful answer.
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