'EVOLUTION IN THE COMMUNIST WORLD' ADDRESS GIVEN BY ALLEN W. DULLES, DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AT THE MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY MID-AMERICA CONFERENCE HELD IN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, ON 16 FEBRUARY 1957

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70-00058R000100250044-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 44
• Publication Date: February 16, 1957
• Content Type: SPEECH

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"EVOLUTION IN THE COMMUNIST WORLD"
ADDRESS GIVEN BY ALLEN W. DULLES, DIRECTOR CF THE CEN'I.'RAL INT'ELLIGEI'CE
AGENCY AT THE MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY MID FICA
CONFERENCE HELD IN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, ON 16 FEBRUARY 1957
It is a great pleasure to hav' this opportunity to meet with
the Mid-America Conference. Its sponsor, the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, is playing a central role in the shaping and maintaining
of America's scientific genius. Like our country which it serves so
well, MIT has made important and dramatic forward strides in the past
half century.
Winston Churchill, at a convocation of this institute eight years
ago, spoke admiringly of MIT's resolution to maintain a faculty of
the humanities. Your fruitful contacts with so many foreign students
and scholars and your launching of a Center for International Studies
are further examples of a broad and imaginative approach to the place
of technology in the modern world.
There have indeed been many changes since those earlier days
when MIT was a small institution on Boylston Street,Boston. America
then was a young nation relatively free of the troublesome-cuncerna
of world politics. But times do change; and we in this country have
never shrunk from the challenge of changing conditions.
In fact, having generally accepted the idea that we live in a
world of change, it is perhaps rather surprising that we have been
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somewhat slow to recognize than this principle also applies to
political and social life in the Communist world.
We ascribed to Hitlerite Germany a political solidity which
it never had though it took a World War to prove this. Today many
of the experts on Soviet and Satellite problems have been forced
to revise their calculationb and pay closer attention to new forces
within the Communist world which have been dramatically revealed
during the year 1957.
When Khrushchev denounced Stalin a year ago, he said those fatal
words which destroy faith and which once said can never be explained
away. The flood of self-questioning let loose by the anti-Stalin
crusade has plumbed the depths of doubt about the integrity ;cif the
Communist political structure.
When history is written the Khrushchev statement of February
1956 may well be described as the Kremlin's admission of the general
crisis of Communism.
Stalin.' s Le ac
Stalin died in March 1953, leaving one of the most reactionary,
despotic police states the world has ever known. He had given himself
a name which meant steel. He expressed his views in a journal named
"truth." He had concentrated more power in his own hands than had
been commanded even by his own great historical idol, Ivan the
Terrible. For nearly thirty years he had exercised arbitrary rule
over his own and many other peoples. He had killed most of bio
friends, and transplanted or annihilated innumerable people.
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The prospect of ruling this leviathan without Stalin awed his
successors. Indeed the official 4nnouncement of his death spoke of the
need to "prevent any kind of disorder or panic." This defensive note
on the part of the heirs to a seemingly all-powerful state may have
been the first of the many hints we were to get of the complexity of
the problems faced by Russia's new rulers.
The evolution bf' the USSR over the last four years can be
explained in terms of the new Soviet leaders' response to three main
problems: problems with themselves, problems with their own and
subject peoples, and problems with the outside world.
* * * *
A Problem within the Leadership
The first problem that the new leaders faced was an elementary
one: that of clearly re-establishing their ultimate authority. This
is no simple problem in a revolutionary regime with no roots in either
historical traditions or popular consent. Dictatorships are rarely
transferrable or inheritable, and Stalin like most dictators made
no provision for the succession. He had been busy playing his
lieutenants off against one another; he appears to have had no real
number 2 man -- just a group of number 3 men.
This group set up an uneasy oligarchy, the so-called "collective
leadership." Shortly they agreed to get rid of Stalin's Police Chief,
Beria, and mitigated some of the worst excesses of his secret police
system.
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But these very changes were only to help bring to the surface
internal problems that had been art ,cially suppressed during the
Stalin era.
A Problem with their Peoples
One of these problems was that of restoring initiative and enter-
prise to a people numbed by lpng years of discipline and fear. Little
Stalins had set themselves up at the local level throughout Russia,
and the Satellites, and people everywhere in the Soviet sphere had
decided to play it safe.
Thus, while the "system" may have been functioning satisfactorily
in terms of the relative increase in industrial production, it was
slowly running out of steam.
Having let up a little on the stick of the secret police, the
oligarchy tried to budge the populace with a carrot.
In the economic sphere, this "carrot" took the form of the
so-called "new course" announced by Malenkov in the summer of 1953?
This policy promised to give greater attention to the manufacture
of consumer goods, which had long been subordinated to the basic
Soviet emphasis on heavy industry.
In the intellectual sphere, a prominent Soviet writer called for
a new turn to "sincerity" in literature. Writers and artists began
to speak of a "thaw" as arrests ceased within their ranks and long-
imprisoned artistic and literary figures trickled back from Siberia.
The leaven of mass education was beginning to work; and while this
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paid off handsomely in the field of technology, it had other conse-
quences which proved most unweleone to the worried men in the Kremlin.
The regime soon found that use of the carrot had to be checked.
In the months leading up to the Writers' Congress of December 1954,
attempts were made to reassert the Communist Party's right to regulate
art and literature; and Khrushchev reasserted the primady of heavy
industry at the time of Malenkovts demotion early in 1955.
However, the Soviet leaders discovered that they could not go
back all the way to conditions as they had prevailed under Stalin; for
they found themselves faced with the most serious of all challenges to
a totalitarian regime, the revolution of rising hope and expectations.
When a tyrant gives real hope to the oppressed, then, in the
long run, the position of tyranny as-a system tends to become hopeless.
Rising expectations were most serious and hardest for the USSR
to control on the periphery of Stalin's empire in the East European
satellites. The new economic course was taken farthest in Hungary
under Imre Nagy in 1953 - 1955; Hungary went considerably beyond the
Soviet Union- in playing down heavy industry in favor of consumer
goods, and even de-emphasized one of the most hated of all Stalinist
exports, the forced collective farm.
Meanwhile, writers in Poland as well as Hungary were going
farther than their Soviet counterparts in voicing the pent-up feelings
of their countrymen.
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Of special importance was a poem which became a cause celebre
behind the iron curtain, "A Poem for Adults", by the Polish poet,
Adam Wazyk, which was published in Poland in August 1955- Wazyk spoke
with the scourging hate that both writers and ordinary people were
coming to feel toward the hypocrisy of their Communist overlords,
He recalled how s, fos`eru:er o: t: Marx;
",.,charmingly foretold
that lemonade would flow in seas.
Does it not flow?
They drink sea-water,
crying
'lemomide'
returning home secretly
to vomit."
These were ominous rumblings. They can be read in retrospect
as harbingers of the great upheavals in Poland and Hungary. However,
the problem of rising expectations was a common problem throughout
all the lands which Stalin had ruled. Indeed, popular expectations
proved far in front of the policies of the reactionary regimes
administering Stalin's colonial empire.
A Problem with the Outside World
Throughout all their troubles, Communist politicians have to
continue believing that they are riding the wave of the future. The
expectation of the Communists continues to be, as Khrushchev recently
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put it, that "we will bury you," - the "you" being the Free World.
Nevertheless, Khrushchev appears to have concluded that Stalin's
policies had ceased to be profitable; that, so to speak, our "burial",
the predicted doom of capitalistic society, was being unnecessarily
delayed.
To shift the metaphor a little, Stalin had been piled up on the
line of scrimmage in Korea, as he had been earlier in Greece and
Berlin. The new quarterback was deciding that instead of continuing
to run line-bucks, he should try a few end runs, reverses, and forward
passes to teat the enemy's secondary.. Accordingly, the Soviet leaders
finally agreed to a truce in Korea and took a compromise settlement
in Indo-China.
When menacing threats of the Stalinist variety failed to prevent
a continued growth in free world unity -- evidenced by the further
consolidation of NATO and the adherence of West Germany the presure increased for drastically new tactics.
The Smiles Campaign of 1955
Thus, beginning in the late Spring of 1955, the Soviet leaders
launched their famous "smiles" campaign. In a remarkable series of
policy reversals, they sought to dispel the evil image that the world
had acquired of the USSR and to win new friends and the ability to
influence people abroad.
They agreed to an Austrian peace treaty; began to court Tito
with an elite pilgrimage to Belgrade; relinquished their Porkkala base
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in Finland; and struck friendly poses - with Molotov waving a cowboy
hat to American photographers and Khrushchev and Bulganin posing
smilingly at the Summit Conference at Geneva.
In a second round of activity later in the year, the Soviet leaders
began to deliver economic and. military aid to non-Communist states;
stepped up their ptablis reletibns campaign with a trip to India and
13urma; and stopped their monotonous vetoing of new members' applicatiox
to the United Nations.
The Soviets seemed to be making some progress with their new
policy as 1955 went into history -- even though their stand at the
Foreign Ministers Conference in the Autumn of 1955 made it clear that
they did not intend to budge on basic international issues.
As it turned out, however, these smiles and concessions may have
cost the Soviet leaders dearly; for, if they did mislead some people
abroad, these actions continued to feed rising expectations in the
far-flung Soviet empire.
The Two Great Events of 1956
Two great events in 1956, deeply affecting the Communist world,
followed from the new Soviet domestic and foreign policies. The
first was the attempt to persuade the leading communists in the USSR
and the Satellites that the Soviet leaders had really broken with the
dreadful past of the Stalin regime. The second was the attempt by
Poland and Hungary to secure the freedoms which they felt were
implicitly being promised them by i"oscow.
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Although Stalin's heirs had downgraded his importance fairly
consistently since his death, Kh shchev's secret revelation of Stalin's
crimes at the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956 represented a
real turning point.
These revelations destroyed the myth of infallibility of the
Soviet system and its leaders. It was this belief in infallibility,
which however wrong had inspired the faithful and given them
the courage to sacrifice everything including common sense and their
very lives to advance the cause of Communism.
Many questions -including the obvious one; of "where were you,
when all this was going on?" -- continue to be asked in the Soviet
Union. Stalin's heirs had been morally compromised. The ideological
foundations of this secular religion had been seriously shaken.
The circumstances surrounding the Khrushchev secret speech remain
a mystery to this day. It was delivered at an unexpectedly summoned
meeting of the Twentieth Party Congress attended by the 1400 members
from the USSR, but with the exclusion of visitors and delegates from
the rest of the Communist world.
Apparently it was felt that it was too heady medic'ne for the
Soviet people, since the secret speech has never been published in
the USSR and only small parts of it have been allowed to creep out in
the Soviet press, though copies of the speech were distributed among
Soviet and Satellite leaders.
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It is hard to understand the Kremlin's apparent failure to
assess accurately the damage to their position from the publicity which
the speech would eventually receive. Some very impelling domestic
reason must have made them take the calculated risk they assumed.
Possibly they felt that such a thorough denunciation was required
if initiative was to be liberated from the pall of fear at home, and
if the image of the USSR abroad was to be bs'.ghtened.
The second event unsettling the Communist world in 1956 was,
of course, the uprising in Hungary and Poland. When the Soviet leaders
made their peace with Tito in June 1955, they implicitly recognized,
as Stalin never had, that genuinely different national paths were
permissible within the Communist world. This idea was given some
encouragement at the Twentieth Party Congress, which urged Communist
Parties to use different, perhaps peaceful rather than violent means
in seeking to gain power in non-Communist states. During the state
visit of Tito to Moscow last June, the Soviet leaders formally
recognized the validity of different paths of socialist development.
But no sooner had they done this, than the people in Poland and
Hungary began to demand the right to determine their own destinies.
Hardly had Tito returned home, when the workers in Poznan rose up to
demand "bread and freedom".
The contagion spread to Warsaw in spontaneous meetings of workers
and others who demanded an end to Soviet rule. In Hungary the people
went even further in their assertion of complete independence of Moscow.
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Throughout the summer Soviet policy zigged and zagged. When
they were confronted with the events of late October, the Soviet
leaders acquiesced reluctantly to some important changes in Poland,
and temporarily appeared to do the same in Hungary before falling back
on cruel repression.
Through it all, the Soviet Union was discredited internationally;
and no non-Communist was left to justify the savage slaughter of the
heroic Hungarian people. Small nations in Asia, which are special
targets for Communist blandishments, recognized the moral of Hungary;
and young countries 'like Burma, Nepal, and Laos voted for condemna-
tion of the Soviet Union.
In the face of these events, the Khrushchev position of trying
to take bits and pieces of both a Stalinist and a non-Stalinist policy
becsme increasingly untenable.
If the Soviet leaders want to increase productivity and initiative
they have to lift controls still further. If they want to improve
their reputation abroad, they cannot continue to act as they are doing
in Hungary. But, if they go too far in conciliating the people, they
fear for their own positions.
Stirrings in the TTSSR
There are stirrings in the USSR as well as the Satellites.
Pressures for change appear to be coming from industrial managers and
professional classes, who seem anxious to gain a greater share in running
the economy, These groups appear to have increased their responsibility
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at the expense of professional party administrators in the recent
reshuffling of the planning apparatus.
Perhaps even more disturbing to the Soviet regime are the rumblings
of discontent which involve the very groups which Communism claims to
favor: the workers and the students.
From the workers In the USSR there have been growing indications
of discontent in the past year, including several strikes and strike
attempts and demands to know more about the patterns of worker
administration and control which have come into being in the Polish
workers councils.
Even more important, perhaps, is the increasing unrest among the
students; which has been evidenced in riotous meetings and illegal
handbill Hype journals. The regime has staked much on its appeal to youth
and the "new Soviet intelligentsia" which it hoped years of careful
indoctrination would produce. But it has found, that, in educating
large numbers of youths to fill the positions required for the
administration of a large modern state, it has taught people to think
and ask embarrassing questions for themselves.
The youth in the Soviet Union are suffering from boredom with
the drabness of their system. This discontent cannot very logically
be dismissed as a "holdover from the past"; and the regime cannot
dismiss it all as "hooliganism" -- the Soviet version of juvenile
delinquency.
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Student unrest in the USSR, e recent events in Poland and
Hungary, show what many of us seem to have forgotten: that the love
of freedom has deep roots.
The bravery of the youth in Budapest, who had known only totalitarian
rule, serves as a reminder that modern weapons do not provide the final
answer to moral forces.
There are numerous signs in Soviet intellectual life that this
human desire for individual integrity and free expression is making
itself felt. The :aajor Soviet journals in the fields of history,
philosophy and literature have all come under official Communist Party
censure recently for deviations from the party line. There has been a
revival of interest in long-neglected writers including Dostoyevskii,
whose major writings had been.taboo under Stalin. Probably the most
widely-discussed single book in Russia today is a new novel with the
distinctly non-Ccmmunist title of "Not by Bread Alone."
The hero of this novel is a persecuted inventor who succeeds not
because, but in spite of, the system. A true individualist, he refuses
to be bought off at the end by the very men who had sent him to Siberia
on trumped-up charges. He hangs on them the label of "meshchanokii
(middle class, philistine) communist", thus bringing back to the Russian
vocabulary a traditional adjective of abuse from Tsarist times.
There is no pattern to tell us precisely how this intellectual
ferment may affect the political development of a modern totalitarian
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and technocratic state. But it is doubtful indeed that these pressures
for change can be satisfied merely by Khrushchev's combination of limited
reforms and exhortations to observe party discipline.
In particular, the disaffection of thinking youth - their restless
desire for real integrity and honesty in their society - must deeply
concern a regime which needs their services and shapes its claims to
allegiance on an ideology.
The General Crisis of Communism
For many years now that ideology has predicted the doom of
capitalism -- recently with a little less assurance as to the date of
Doomsday. The Communist leaders have not, however, given up the dogma
that World War I marked the beginning of a new epoch which would witness
the general crisis of capitalism. According to all good Communists,
this general crisis would embrw:e many individual crises caused by
wars over markets and colonies, by workers' revolutions in protest against
economic depressions, and by capitalist greed. These "inner contra-
dictions", the doctrine preached, would inevitably lead to the collapse
of capitalism and the triumph of the Communist system.
Today, with a great deal more assurance, we can advance the thesis
that it is they rather than we who face a general crisis. A Yugoslavian
Communist, Milovan Djilas, alerted the world to this crisis of Communism
in his famous article of last November. He said this: "Despite the
Soviet repression in Hungary, Moscow can only slow down the processes
of change; it cannot stop them in the'long run. The crisis is not only
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between the USSR and its neighbors, but within the Communist system
as such. National Communism is itself a product of the crisis, but it
is only a phase in the evolution and withering away of contemporary
Communism... World Communism nnw faces stormy days and insurmt4untable
difficulties."
With the flood of self-questicning loosed by the anti-Stalin crusade
and by the events in Hungary and Poland, the Soviet system certainly
evidences inner enntradictions that are harder to cope with than any-
thing now facing the non-Communist world.
The Soviet leaders have been trying for some time now to cover up
the cracks in their ideological plaster by talk of a "return to, Leninist
norms of party life." They tell their people to avoid the "cult of
personality" by going back to Lenin for guidance; but is not this a new
"cult of personality"? And who is to say what part of Lenin is to be
kept and what rejected? Why should they not follow the advice Lenin
gave in May 1917, that: "If Finland, if Poland, if the Ukraine break
away from Russia there is nothing bad about that. What is there bad
about it? Anyone who says there is, is a chauvinist.... No nation
can be free if it oppresses other nations."
The Cb&Ienge to the USSR
No regime could stand still in the face of events such as those
of the past few years. Sooner or later, the challenge facing the USSR
at home and abroad must be met.
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A well-known passage ip. Toynbee's Stud of Histor is relevant
to the USSR today: "The unanswered challenge can never be disposed of,
and is bound to present itself again and again until it either receives
some tardy and imperfect answer, or else brings about the destruction
of the society which has shown itself inveterately incapable of
responding to it effectively."
What is the shape of the society which might develop out of the
evolutionary forces presently at work in the USSR if the Kremlin
leaders do not blindly seek to reverse them?
Domestically, the USSR would take cognizance of human dignity
in its society. Censorship of thought would be eliminated and greater
emphasis placed on satisfying the economic wants of the individual.
Here it must be noted that the USSR has taken a forward step in doing
away, at home, with the special tribunals and some excesses of the
secret police.
In the foreign field, such a development would require the USSR
to accept a genuine cooperation with other nations as distinct from the
tactical, Leninist idea of a temporary truce. It would have to concede
to those lands it has occupied the freedom of political choice. It
would have to assume a constructive role in the United Natbns.
Of course, such an outcome is not yet in sight. The future is
still cloudy, and the possibility of an attempted reversion to a hard
line remains.
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Nevertheless, the reality of pressures for change is undeniable,
and they seem unlikely to diminis'i'with the passing of time. An
evolutionary accommodation to these forces may even be more lil'ely
than the convulsive developments which the history of the anci,en regime
in France or the Roman. Empire might lead one to expect.
Continued Danger
Of course, it would be folly to assume that international communism
is on the verge of collapse. It continues to possess and develop
increasing physical power; and we face the very real danger that it
may bolster up its position in two particularly sensitive areas,
The first of these is, of course, the Middle East where a general
policy of aid, infiltration and stirring up troubled waters offers
considerable prospects for creating serious mischief.
The second area of danger -- which is perhaps not receiving as
much public attention as it deserves these days -- is the Far East.
Communist China, during the past few years, has been posing an ever-
increasing threat to many nations in the area which are relatively
unsophisticated in the ways of Communist subversion. Within the
Communist world, the prestige of Communist China has been relatively
enhanced by the fact that its leaders have not been so morally com-
promised by the revelations about Stalin.
Macaulay's Prophecy
While there is no justification for complacency in the Free World,
there are some real signs of hope. Sporadic success abroad will not
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change the basic problems within the USSR if we correctly assume that
the evolutionary process has started. And even in Communist China, as
revolutionary fervor dims, the reaction may come as man's reaching for
freedom and human dignity asserts itself.
In a prophetic speech in 1833, Macaulay spoke words which might
well be pondered by the leaders of the Communist world as they face
the problems that lie before them today. Macaulay was urging his
countrymen not to shrink back in fear from the possibility that
education and modernization would lead the people of India to seek
independence.
"What is that power worth," asked Macaulay, ".. which we can
hold only by violating the most sacred duties, which, as governors,
we owe to the governed?...We are civilized to little purpose if we
grudge to any portion of the human race an equal measure of freedom
and civilization. .., do we think that we can give them knowledge
without awakening ambition?...."
And Macaulay concludes: "It may be that the public mind of India
may expand under our system till it has outgrown that system; that by
good government we may educate our subjects into a capacity for better
government, that having become instructed in European knowledge, they
may at some future age demand European institutions. Whether such a day
will ever come I know not. But never will I attempt to avert or retard
it. Whenever it comes it will be the proudest day in English history."
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When the day of freedom for Russia and the peoples under Soviet
rule may come, no one can prophesy. But when it comes, it will be the
proudest day in Russian history
If that day is to be hastened, we cannot afford to be timid in
asserting profound faith in our democratic institutions, and in acting
decisively on that faith. I sincerely believe that the time has come
when no reasoning, thinking peoples with freedom of choice can continue
to believe that Communism is the wave of the future. The lasting,
enduring values axe in our free way of life.
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