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/- Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R00P200,020033-1 Zig II:actor a rigaza. IzteU.gence mug tribute to jgg former Inv =INK J. DONOVAN AND THE NATIONAL SEOUH Allen W. Dulles It was py privilege to be associated with William J. Donovan both as a lawyer between the wars and then during World War II, when / served under his command in the Office of Strategic Services. His courage and leadership made a profound impression on ma. I should like to convey to you eomething of that impression, and some idea of what his pioneering has meant to all of us. His interest in our national defense and security started early, In 1912, aa the war clouds gathered in the Balkans, he helped organize Troop / of the New. York National Guard. In 1915 he went to Poland as a member of a Rockefeller commission charged with relieving the great ahortage of food there, and particularly of milk for the children. When the National Guard was mobilized in 1916, he came home to join his Troop / on the Mexican Border. Service Then came his fabulous career in Worldlier / with the 165th Infantry of the 42nd Division -- the renowned "Fighting 69th" of the Rainbow Division. Here he got his nickname "Wild Bill." The legend goes that after the regiment landed in France he ran them five miles with full packs to limber them up. As the men were grumbling with ekhaustion Donovan pointed out that he waa ten years older and carrying the same Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 - 2.. 50-pound pack. One of the nmn replied, "But we ain't Eta wild as you, Bill!" Another story has it that the honorary title was transferred to him from a professional baseball pitcher of the same name whose control left mamething to be desired. Whatever its origin, the title atuck. The citations Colonel Donovan received in Prance tell the military story: On July 28, 1918, a Distinguished Service Cross: "He was in advance of the division for four days, all the while under shell and machine gun fire from the enemy, who were on three sides of him, and he was repeatedly and persistently counterattacked, being wounded twice." Three days later the Distinguished Seivice Medals "He displayed con- spicuous energy and most efficient leadership in the advance of his battalion across the Ourcq River and the capture of strong enemy positions. ? 'His devotion to duty, heroism, and pronounced qualities of a Commander enabled him to successfely accomplish all missions aasigned to him in this important operation." And then, for action in combat in the Meuse-Argonne on October 14, the highest of all awards, this Congressional Medal of Honors "...Colonel Donovan personnally led the assaulting wave in an attack upon a very strongly organised position, and when our troops were Buffering heavy casualties he encouraged all near him by his example, moving among his men in exposed positions, reorganizing decimated platoons and accompanying Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 - 3 - them forward in attacks* When he use wounded in the leg by a machine gun bullet, he refused to be evacuated and continued with his unit until it withdrew to a less exposed position." "No man ever deserved it more," said General Douglas MacArthur, who had seen this action. Three aide were killed at Donovan's side in the course of these actions. Reverend Francis P. Duffy, the chaplain of the 69th said, "Hie men would have cheerfully gone to hell with him, and as a priest, I mean what I say." Several years ago General Frank McCoy, describing his close association with Bill Donovan during World War 1, eaid he was one of the finest soldiers he ever saw in his life-long service in the Army, that he had the qualities of the ideal soldier, judgment and courage and the respect and affection of his men. ciirev Al In 1922 Donovan wse appointed U.S. Attorney in Buffalo,A and shortly thereafter he entered a new phase of his career. In 1924 President Coolidge reorganised the Department of Justice and called Bill to Washington to be assistant to the Attorney General, heading the Antitrust Division. Here he showed both hie fearlesenees in law enforcement and his intense interest in making law a practical vehicle to promote the economic welfare* Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 ?4-. He was firmly convinced that individual freedom is vitafly linked to our system of free enterprise* He attacked restraints and monopoly with effective enthusiasm* In the Trenton Potteries *lee he won Supreme Court agreement that price fixing among dominant competitors is of itself illegal* He brought under legal attack such diverse industries as Oili sugar, harvesting machinery, motion pictures, water transportation, and labor unions* Yet he recognised that the uncertainties of our antitrust laws pose serious business problems, and accordingly lnatitu the practice of giving advance opinion on the legality of proposed mergeTsand other business activities that might be questioned under the Offered the Governor Generalship of the Ph GO Mien President Hoover entered the White Houee in 1929, Hill turned it down and went into law praotice in NOW York City* He waa Shortly appointed counsel to several of the New York bar asaoci?tions in connection with a general overhauling of the bankruptcy laws* During this period he also served as counsel to a committee for review of the laws governing the State's Public Service Commission* In 1932 he unauccessfally ran for Governor of the State* As a corporation ,attorney he won in 3.935 the inportant Humphrey case in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the President could not arbitrarily remove a chairman of the Federal Trade Commiesion* He also Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 5 won an important decision in the Appalachian coal calm, upholding the right of coal producers to organize a joint selling agency in economic eelf-defense. This agency in still in exiatence. During this period of corporate law practice, Bill never lost his intereet in world affairs* He took time off to visit Ethiopia during the 1935 Italian invasion* He was in Spain during it CI:vulgar, carefully observing the Axis efforts to test their new equiment in these foreign adventures* Preeidelltlal Emipaarr In the early days of World War II Donovan was caited into action by President Roosevelt. In 1940 he was it on a fact-finding mission to England and in 1941 to the Balkans and the Middle Eaet. Anthony Eden told Waehington that the Balkan mission had been moat helpful to the British aesesament of the eituation there. From the first trip, the one to Britain not long after Dunkirk, Bill had brought tack to Washington a very important report. You will recall thare was skepticism at that time in some quarters as to whether the British could effectively carry out Churchill's thrilling promise, We shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we ehall fight on the landing-grounde, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we &lel' fight in the hills; we shall never eurrender. Donovan reported to Roosevelt that the British could and Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 - 6 - would do just that. This had a direct effect on American policy. He also warned Harry Hopkins that the Germans night strike toward Suez through ?ranch North Africa -- a prophecy that goon became a reality. Donovan also recommended to the President that the United States tart preparing immediately for a global war. He rarticearly stressed the need of a service to wage unorthodox warfare and to gather information through every means available. He discussed this idea at length with his close friends in the Cabinet, Secretaries "Knox and Stinson, end with Attorney General Jackson. The seeds which Bill panted bore fruit. In July 1941 the President establiahed the Office of the Coordinator of Infornation and called Donovan to Washington to head it. In original concept this Office was to combine: the information and Intelligence programs with psychological and guerrilla warfare. This proved to be too big a package for one basket, and in 1942 the organization was split. That portion of it coordinating wartime information services became the Office altar Information, and the intelligence and =orthodox warfare work, where Bill greatest interest lay, was put under an Office of Strategic Services. MAL Truly one of the remarkable accompliehmente in World War II vas the organization and activity of the 0.8.3. -- feats utich would never have Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 been achieved out Bill Donovvits ie&dership and his vast interest in the unorthodox, the novel and the dangerous. Starting from scratch in 1941, he built an organization of about 25,000 people that made a reel contribution to the victory. Many of the deeds of 0.3.8. will have to remain secret, but with the passage of time many have been disclosed. Bill conceived the OZ.& as a world-wide inte,ligence organization that could collect the facts necessary to develop our policy and war strategy* He was convinced that Axis seorets were to be found not only in Berlin, Rome, and Tokyo, but in other capitals and outposts around the world, So he immediately set about dispatching officers to kW' mote in Zurope, Asia and later Africa. The pey-off Justified the effort. He was able to obtain information of great value from carefully establidaed agents with contacts in Berlin, in the German High Command, and in the Abwehr? the German military intelligence service. The work of these *gents gave us advance information about the development of German jet aircraft, about German work with heavy water in the effort to develop a nuclear weapon about the Tf-lts and V-218, and about the plot against Hitler. In addition to hie organization for the collectionof strategic inteUeice,Donovan provided means to help gather tactical nfozation in the combat areas forming teams of parachutists Americans as well as indigenous to drop behind enemy lines. But not content with paseive intelligence, he also wanted action. He knew that well-organized querril'es Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 operating behind an line n areas where the locel population was friendly could wreak havoc on enemy lines of communication and tie down troops that could otherwies be used in combat Working:with our allies, he built up team of leaders and communicators to organize resistance in the countries occupied by the Nazis, Feecists, and Japanese* There were also air drape of euppliee and equipment deep behind the Axis lines in France and Italy, in Burma and elsewhere* Theee action tam e were well supported by a headquarters technical group, Uhiah under Donovan's, guiding hand was imaginative*y developing new ways to sabotage the enemy war effort and new gadgets either to hareem the gamy or help our own cause -- equipment ranging from the most sophisticated communications systems to a repellent used by pereonnel forced to bail out in ehark?infested waters. Not all of the products were so practical as these* Ambassador David Bruce, one of Bill Donovan's closeet associates, in a recent tribute to the General's valitiea of leaderthip, vividly deeoribed his excitement aver ideas. AMbaseador Bruce wrote, and / sUbecrfbe to every word of its "His imagination was unlimited* Ideas were his pleything xettnent made him snort like a race horse* Woe to the officer who turned dawn a project, because, on its face, it seemed ridiculous, or at least unusual For painful weeks under his 'Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 th command I tooted the poaibility of using concentrations inliestern cavee to destroy o[with delayed action incendiary bomb. The General, backed by the intrigued President Roosevelt, was only dissuaded frmnfurther experimente in this field when it appeared probable that the cave bats would not survive a tramp-Pacific flight at high altitudes. tt Many ingeniaue ideas to er part of the 0.8.8. rk on the nerves of the enemy were born in Morale Operations Branch. This wa undercover peychological warfare branch of the war effort. the Office of War information, was telling the enemy about the ntude of the U.S. war effort and getting the facts and figures well circulated this Brsnch was dedicated to confusing the enemy and brooking their will to resist General Donovan was convinced that there were great untapped reservoirs of information in this country about foreign areas which had become of vital interest in the war effort -- data in the archives of business orprizations, information acquired abroad by American scientists, academicians, and tourists, and ale* that held by foreign experts residing here. He set about to collect thie information and data and a =as of photograille of foreign areas. As the war reached more and more areas of the globe, this infomation came to have great importance. Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 10 - Haalao riiEd the importance of analyzing and presenting Wotion to the policy makera in readily usable form - one of the a of intelligence. He establihhed in the 0.54. rah and analysis, assenbLing in Whshington the beet academic and analytic brains he could beg, borrow, or steal from the universities, laboratories, libraries, museums, the business world, and other agenciee of government. Theirs was the task of probing the political and economic aepects of the war, assesning both our alliee and our enemies, both neutrals and the occupied lands. Theirs aleo was the ta0k of etiinatfng Axis vulnerability and war potential and the staying power of the Russians who even then told us almost nothing about themselves. Dill Donovan had the qualitiest intelligence offic have. He took nothing for granted and at the same time was insatiably curioue He had a good nosethi/the newt a faint whiff of something unusual would speed his mind into a dozen possible emanations, gen- erally as ingenious as the wiles of the snows He wanted to see things on the spot and judge for himself. He want constantly on the move and drove his staff wild trying to keep him from places they thought too exposed. He also put them into a state of near exhaustion trying to keep up with the pace he set himself, One of his great malities was his dedication to the men who served under him, and hie ever-readinees to give them his full 'support. He, in turn, had their complete loyalty respect and affection I vividly recall a personal instance. Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 MISSING PAGE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT MISSING PAGE(S): 7/98 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 For about two years, from Novnter 1942to September 1944 Wan woridng for Donovan in 9witzerlend, then entirely encircled by the Nagi4aecj!t forces* In September 1944 the American Seventh Army, coming up from Southern Trance, broke through to the Swiss border ziear Geneva. Under orders to return to Washington to report, / had joined a group of the French underground in a secret hideout in the Rhone Valley between Geneva and Lyon to await a clandestine flight to take me to London, As far as I knew, General Donovan was in Washington and had not the slightest idea where I was hidden. After weather had held up my plane for several days there was a knock on the door of my hideout in the middle of the night It was one of General Donovan's aides, telling me that the General %se waiting for me at the nearest availsble airstrip south of Lyon, which had just been evacuated by the Nazis. He had been searching the area for same twenty-four hours before he discovered Where / was. Together flew back to emenber, on that day in ember 1944 first of their bailiitio miaailes on the British capital. It descended near the center of an after a flight of nearly two hundred miles. Both the Arnerian d the Britieh intelligence services had been closely following the de iopnwt of thia missile, I have often wondered why, in this Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 country, our technicians and strategiststailed to see earlier the !uU of the success of the 7-2, as I believe the Soviet did, and to rlize niioh earlier in the game that the combination of the ballistic missile with the atomic bomb, which was then about to be unveiled, cou.d change the nature of war and the security position of this country*. Few men of hie time were more alert than Donovan to the new threats that might develop. In late 1944 sending a man to Cairo to take over the idrection of act vities at that poet, he gave oral instructions to the effect that the main target for intelligence operations should now be at the Soviets were doing in the Balkans rather than German aotivities in the Middle East. The German threat was receding. The Soviet danger was already looming* Operations were to be adjusted accordingly, although each instructions could not be put into official iting. Also the war was still in progress, General Donovan wee looking forward to the peaoe. He foresaw the need for a permanent organisation not only to collect intelligence but, perhaps even more portant,,to coordinate the whole government intelligence effort and eee that the Preaident and policy makers get comprehensive and conso idated analyses to guide their decisions as to our course of actions 2111 WIC 21 tm1 4ato134Aeloe In the fall of 1944 Donovan preeented to the President a paper ing an Intelligence organisation operating on a world-wide scale Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 and having direct respon bility to the Presidents While it ae not to take upon itself the responsibilities of the departmental intelligence services, it would eiot as a coordinating mechanism for all intelligence. The paper stressed that the proposed organization mould have no police or subpoena powers and would not operate in the United States. President Roosevelt expressed considerable interest in this proposal, and a week before his death in April 1945 eked Donovan to poll the Cabinet and the heads of agencies concerned for comment on it. These comments ranging from the opinion that there mss no need for such a peacetime organ- ization to the belief that it was vital to national security, make intereeting reading today. Donovan received an Oak Leaf Cluster to his Dist Service Medal for his wartime work, but his plan to develop the M.S. into a peacetime intelligence organization was beset with conflicting views. Some mould have the new organization, like the M.S., report to the Joint Chiefe of Staff, while others preferred that it be put under the Department of State.- And there was controversy as to Whether one individual could or should be responsible for presenting a consolidated view of the intelligence picture to the policy makers, rather than leave this the collective responsibility of the oblate of all the intelligence Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 ? 1 service. No agre ent had bean reached by the time the we ended in August 1945, and the 0.S.S. was soon ordered diebanded, A proposal for a central intelligence organization such had conceived was contained in the firet draft of the so.called unifi a ion act submitted by Ferdinand lberstadt to Secretary Forrestal in October 1945. And in January 1946, to preserve assets while the Josue was being settled President Truman Segued the order creating the Central intelligence Group, whidh later picked up some of the activitiee and personnel still remaining from the 0.8.8. and other scattered independent intelligence activities. Bill Donovan's dream wags not yet completely realized. Congress had to act. After extensive hearings to which General Donovan contributed important testimony, the provisions for a Central Intelligence Agency were incorporated into the National Seturity Act of 1947, which created a Department of Defense and set up the National Security Council to advise the President and oversee the new intelligence agency. In July 1947 final executive and legialative endorsement was thue given to the views which Donovan had been striving to have accepted. T have always felt that the decision to place the C.I.A. under the President as Donovan recommended, mewls*" and neceasary. Bill Donovan's restless energy had turned eleewhere of 0.S.8., although he never gave up his interest in the or stopped hammering home to the pdblic the neceesity for providing Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 adequate and acourate in order to protect being called an for other vast knowledge of German wartime acti 0 -16- to the policy nkers of the government rity, His varied talents were es. His legal lability and e used to help prepare the NureMburg trials for the Nazi war criminale. He vent to Greece to investigate the murder of nommen George Polk, a clear effort of the Communists to prevent the truth about the extent of their activities in the Greek civil wer from seeping out. The more General Donovan saw of the Soviets in tetion the more concerncl he was with alerting the American people to the dangere. He co-authored an article in the Yale Law Journal for July 1949 presenting a stftogram for a Democratic Counter Attack to Communist Penetration of Government Servioes" the article said: ?The Conammist Fifth Column... ses to identify itself with every. &nisi grievance. Ruesian espdonage and eUbversive operations are made up of trained and skilled ;spy technician* and telligenoe officers, propaganda specialists, experts in rtg rumors. Instruction is planned too that the agent d it as saw for a minority to operate a labor union* oifist league, or any other such movement, as it is for Approved For Release 2001/03/02: CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 a ndn 17? o control a large corporation hei nt of the stockholder? take no active interest in the In 1950 President Zieethowe, thai Pretdentb UniversitY, presided on the ocoaeion of the award to Bill Donovan of the Alexander Hemilton Medal, given by the ColuMbia Alumni Aesociationfor distingnithed ervice and accomplishment in any of the great fields of human endeavor, In 1953 the President named him AMbassador to Thailand. At thin time the ancient kingdom of Siam was a main target for Communist stibvereion, With a vigor that belied his years, this remarkable man of 70 threw himself into the job of helping the Thais bolster their defenses against the Communists so that this ksystone of anti-Communium in Southeast Aeia could continue free. Upon his return to the United States one might have expected him to odic retirement but notMng W&3 further from his mind, He became National Chairman of the International Reftgee Committee and the director of that group's fight against the Soviet program to induce Ruesians who escaped from Communism to return home. At the time of the Hungarian Revolution he turned his energies to aiding the refugee* of this unsuocessfUl effort to win freedom from Soviet tyranny. He was Chairmen of the American Committee an United Earope from its inception Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 18- in 1949, and through this or tion he continued to fzrter the cff of our major allies in Western Europe to achieve a greeter wity in the fa of Communist danger* 3411n after ill health forced hie ret5emt to Whiter Reed Ho eral Donovan continued his interest in the fight against Communiem nd the development of our intelligence work* In recognition of his role in the intelligence field, President Eisenhower in 1957 awarded him the National Seoarity Medal The citation reads: vilhrough his foresight, wisdom, and ience, he foresaw, during the course of World War II, the probiie whiCh would face the postwar world and the urgent need for: a permanent, oentralised intelligence function* Thus his wartime work contributed to the establiahement of the Central lhtelligenoe Agency and a 000rdinated national intelligence structure*" Th1ai959hepeeedayatWa1teReedI3nongthernenhehad As soldier, public prosecutor, leader of the bar, director of the Strategic Services in wartime pdblic servant in time of peace, he had eft his record with the nation he served so well. Re wae a rare combination of physical courage, intellectual ability, and political acumen* He was a mild?mannered man, with an insatiable curiosity, an unflagging imagination, and the energy to turn his ideas into action* Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1 -i The heritage of Bill Donovan is written in the national eecrn'it. He awoke the American people to the need of a permanent peacetime intelligence service* He bestirred Washington into creating a mechanism whereby all the government components which receive information on utlat is going on anywhere in the world pool their knowledge, *are their interpretatione, and work together to make one unified estimate of what it means* He helped place intelligence in its proper perepeotive and stimulated the policy makers to recognise its role in determining American policy abroad* He was one of the architects of an organization that should keep our government the best informed of any in the world* Hietoryte epitaph for William J. Domovanwill bet Up madejits more 'fourth Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020033-1