PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS, BY ALEXANDER L. GEORGE. ( EVANSTON, ILL.: ROW, PETERSON AND COMPANY. 1959. PP. 287. $600)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70-00058R000200020036-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2000
• Sequence Number: 36
• Content Type: REPORT

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PROPAUNDA AMYSIS, by Gear ( ansetcaxa, x13. ,r,
Peterson and Ce ny a 1959. Pp. 287- 6*. )
This echolarlr and imaginative book by one of Rand Corpor
scientists is of special significanco because it oval,
propaganda an, eis techniques actua p used in an operatic situation
and has therefore had to consider the atmioe of politics, rather
science in devoted, Mr
ich the usual echolar3y study In political
rgee+e guinea pig is the analysis of man
Propaganda done r the Flies Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service
during World War II. He leas it in the light of information obtained
later from Gar-man war documents and German official
emiquee opportunity to validate the inferences drawn from propaganda bearing
on intelligence problems and questions critical to Allied polio,
CC percent of the FCC inferences that could be scored
te.
The reader who does not rake a specialty of propaganda analysis will
be most interested in Part fI, "Methodology and Applications,," in which 20
case studies are presented to illustrate the broad ran.
Problems Approached ' the FCC. The aria]yetaet rftecaning is reconstructed
and their Inferences matched against the available historical record on
Russia in 1943
srth Africa, the
the question of a German offensive against
expectations in 1942 of en` Allied second front
public's attitude toward the Nazi information
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Rue
the Germn V-t pone pvpapmda
did not do an w*U as their Briti
The brilliant British ane lies may be known to some readers.
ssie that Germ propaganda would not
deliberately
it concluded
of the now weal
the propagetnda,
between udd-Jo
and a predicted change in the propaganda presentation of mili
-d the German people about an istex asaer of Gamin pr:
he Germans actually had some, sort of n
igof the V
secribed the German leads e' eausttioan
1 observation about Nazi propaganda
subtle shifts In
ders'' private
ingenious use of a
at Goebbels wmad be oareful not to give
the promise could be .ruled. ... i a
publics. promise of retaliation too far ahead of the date
into acct,, the British
would give hi
propagandize fo,
1943 the Germans expect
three months as
ebbeis
maxiymma period ,.to
a.
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One o
on this robles in that
their o'm and were not
See
unlike the griti,
TOM or briefed to look for indications of Nazi concern
of North Africa, and so continued to search for signs of the
ude turd a possible second front ac $s the lInglish Channel
igence
or in Northern Cxrope.
These two cases, in both of e&ich the Asia was
are not regarded as.-esss:u
author recc raieess and discusses at some hk gth the aeib tty t ha,
e misy decide to forego
propaganda preparation which
in advance* in either event,, he
The valuer to the policy naker of inferences assessing the
ob jective$ of the major action once it in taken s otad
usefulness of having
ced for the lower somber of
edicted the
adow, in importance the
6r scholars and
go has get himself a
eanting these inter" ing case studies*
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and policies); (2
s of inference made about conditions
e the coommioation content
"situational factors," and slits satim,
identify other possible deet ii me aboul
rencees, and tai to d
up the a rsstte of behavior; and (3)
identify rem,
patterns in individual Inference* and codif'r the more
d indirect, that were used. Oct of this thorough
and painstaking study curs his cautious cc nclueian:
It some that propaganda analysis can
ob3eective diagnostic tool for ate' certain kinds of
and that its techniques are capable of refinement and Improv,
and "public a*
ion,," also undefineed* Readers find
e relationships between r nda ar*~yssis,
.a,, content
;s iyeie.. And mwW a reader mar never gent bead a choker on
the introductiani
4. Dichotomous attributes
ss which can b
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-If he
96, wher, he can learn that a dichatc us attribute is
Addressing an a deem c audience which hie mca. t has tend
ial ),'
4 an page 81 will refer him to
:author overstates
his references to the fact that antttative to hniqu,
of propaganda analysis,
in de!crib
++ .
tbsxnce" of a designated symbol or the
4 his judgment that "another deicisaty of
FO 'e procedure was its failure to make use a
procedures in evaluating certain aspects of
Debate ovw quantitative vs, qualitative techn.
I%# real question is how boot to e=blne
each specific inteUigesnce
gr*
4 objective
Mgt
ifrin to find an
be made for wining all of the output of a
d for emluatin
of labor rhich divorcee trend
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so-section.
-o da. strategr may rest
ids*
es, but he needs more cxm
the basic aee ti
he can obtain only
et of epiricar derived gen
4a theory* SO
and that of
sk
aof
diets
st have rather specific,
of the entire' of
order to a praiee
of what is said to di fesre t audiences in
of siderable veaue in Zing infereceeeo
sie, it is tVpI
concerned with establishing sli&t ahanges
or subtle differ ces in the wording empkr
t audis see.
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