CIA HEAD DULLES RETIRING AFTER 20 YEARS OF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70-00058R000200110024-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 1999
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: December 3, 1961
• Content Type: NSPR

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-Appravetr rem:Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-R130
?STm R-p344R00
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1-lead Dulles Retiring After 20 Years of
MA.
Re
yst o os spa c
WASH TON, Dec. 2.
PRESIDENT KENNE made' an un-
arinounced trip by helic er to the new
Central .Intelligence Aey headquarters
last Tuesday to award, ifieNational Secur-
ity medal to Allen W. bullee,. the retiring
chief of the CIA.
The medal was awarded for distinguished
service in the field of intelligence. The
President praised Dulles as "an almost
unique figure in our country," a man who
has served the United States under seven
Presidents as a diplomat, wartime Chief
of Undercover operations and head of
CIA.
"I know of no man who brings a great-
er sense of personal commitment to his
work," Mr. Kennedy said of Dulles, "who
has less pride in office than he has."
Dulles, who is 68 years old, is ending a
career of 20 years of active intelligence and
cloak-and-dagger operations.
FBOM APPEARANCh.., one would never
associate Dulles as an'unquestioned maseir
of espionage and undercover operations.
tweedy gentleman, gregarious, eveniatintY,
with a hearty laugh and a manrie143cliding
frieetness, Dulles, nevertheless, had the
toughnessfo send friends and agents on
missions from which he 1414 they knew the
chances of 'returninkalive were not more
than even.
e -
At one ti e, some years before Dulles
joined the CIA at the teqUest of the late
Oen. Walter Bedell Smith, nine out of 10
espionage agents sent into the Soviet Union
were Caught.
This is tlin 'hard duty' that is inevitably
lessociated with espionage and undercover
operations. But in the less important as-
peots of being director of CIA, he is some-
thing of a softy. He hates to fire or retire
an employe -whose usefulness is limited be-
causfof age dr other reaSons.
past two years have been rough
ones fOr'the CIA and its director because
of the 13:2 fifeident and the failure of the
Cuban invasion. In
both caAes Dulles
offeretto resign
tistd?seeept the
6. But neither
adent Eisen-
ower nor Presi-
dent Kennedy was
willing to let him
should* the burden.
Most officials be-
lieve that in the U-2
case Dulles should
have been sacrificed
.rather thaneto have. ,
the PreSitiont - take
the respOsTitilifY.,.
notge Y s e-
becatt p ?
cific blame attached
to Dulles, but be-
cause of the higher
interests of the
United States.
Failure was due
both to the activity
of Soviet counter-es- ALLEN
pionage and to the
rather elementary training, documents
eat reduction in tension between the United
States and the Soviet Union.
The really embarrassing aspects of shoot-
ing down the U-2 were the transparently
un,true cover story, which probably had
been on the shelf for so long that no one
thought much about it until it had to be
used, and then the successively changed
stories until the truth was admitted after
the United States had
fallen into Khrush-
chey's trap of keep-
ing secret the cap-
ture of the pilot.
Maj. Francis G.
Powers.
"Your successes
go unnoticed," Pres-
ident Kennedy told
Dulles, "your fail-
ures are advertised.
I have sometimes
had that feeling
myself."
The most adver-
tised failure was the
invasion of C u b a.
Because the whole
story has not been
told, CIA was sad-
dled in the public
mind with the ma-
jor blame for the
failure. CIA may
have underestimate I
' Castro's strength,
a vital error.
and equipment given to the spies.
The U-2 flights had been going on for
four years and had become almost routine.
The President was acquaindd with, the
schedule and had approved it. It iboar-
eng,t occurred to no one that these flights
were eepecially risky at a time of appar-
DULLES
but this was not
THE CUBAN rebel group taking part in
the invasion had their own intelligence in
which they had complete ?faith. They were
the- men who were risking their lives and
wrte determined to fight Castro. Even
though their intelligence was optimistic, the
landing was a surprise and a success.
F."
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Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200110024-1
!Or
r operating without adequatel
controls in the conduct of under-
We knew all abcut the invasion
cover operations. The fact is of Egypt well in advance. CIA
that no undercover operations haa information on Nasser's plots
in Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq.
Nothing was known of Kassim's
revolution in Iraq, by the Brit-
ish, the United States or Egypt.
It was a minor plot completely ,
separate from Nasser's, that took
place fortuitously when Kassim's
brigade was ordered to Bagh-
dad en route to the Syrian fron-
tier.
CIA furnished information
about the trouble to be expected
in connection with former Vice
President Nixon's trip to South
America. It was aware of the
Soviet plans for orbiting a Sput-
nik a year before the event took
place.
CIA has often been blamed for
erroneous intelligence, when in
fact correct intelligence had been
supplied.
Dulles's motto is: "Never alibi,
never explain, never boast."
He is returning to the practice
of law with his old firm, Sullivan
and CromwelL of New York City.
He also plans to write a book on
Communism.
The operation failed apparently because
of lack of air cover. The authority for
"volunteer" flyers to support the invasion
was withdrawn at the last minute on orders
from the President. Two ships loaded with
ammunition and artillery and one ship with
eonininnications equipment were sunk by
Castro's jet trainers.
When the invadeis -got ashore in a .suc-
cessful landing, many of the militia de-
fected and went over to them. When they
saw finally that the expedition was a fail-
ure, as the landing battalions ran out of
ammunition, the defectors redcfected to
Castro and saved their lives.
Adm. Arleigh A. Burke, in an address
In Chicago Nov. 21, said that American
naval planes-were "in the air and ready,
willing and able to provide air cover" for
the invading forces. The American planes
were armed and "for a short time were
over Cuban territory and "territorial wa-
ters," but "did not fire a shot."
It is not generally known that t1ke inva-
sion was launched from Nicaragua, not
Guatemala. According to former United
States Ambassador to Nicaragua Thomas
Whelan, there were 2000 trained Cubans
ready to sail and support the landing force
Of 1500 Men. When the landing force was
destiOyed, through lack of air cover, the
reinforcements were held back. Whelan
blamed the failure on the advice Chester
Bowles and Arthur Schlesinger Jr. gave to
President Kennedy and called for the re-
moval of Bowles and Schlesingerz
Richard M. Bissell, who was Dulles's I
deputy for covert operations, was the re-
sponsible official in both the U-2 and the
Cuban operations. He had been selected
by Dulles as the best man to succeed him
when he retired.
The CIA under Dulles has been criticized
are ever undertaken without the
approval and on the orders of
the National Security Council.
THE FEWER PEOPLE who
know about the CIA operations
the greater the secrecy and secu-
rity. CIA employes are covered
by a special law with ample
punishment which binds them for
life not to reveal anything of its
operations.
In 1948 Dulles was appointed
chairman of a three-man com-
mittee to survey the United
States intelligence system. When
Gen. Smith became director of
CIA in 1950, he called Dulles and
said: "You've written this re-
port. suppose you come down
here and put it into effect for
me."
Dulles came to Washington for
a six-weeks' job under Smith and
has been with CIA ever since.
He became director Feb. 26? 1953.
In the last years under
Dulles, CIA has expanded
greatly and its operations are
worldwide. It is supposed to
take a generation or more to
build an effective intelligence
service. Dulles and his prede-
cessors in 14 years havp built
one of the most effective intel-
ligence systems in the world.
Probably not more than 2 or 3
His book, "Germany's Under-
,ground," published in 1947, is
Ikri the rare book category. It-com-
mands a price of $10. It deals
with the anti-Hitle,,r underground
during World War II.
Dulles was in contact with this
underground from 1942 until V-E
day. He kept the United States
per cent of both the successes informed of the plot against Hit-
and failures of the CIA have ler and found no one interested in
been made public. The successes helping it along. He supplied the
are testified to by the tirades in President with the date of the at-
he Communist press about , tempted assassination of Hitler
Dulles and CIA operations. 1, July 20, 1944, a week before it
Scme V them included the I! took place, mil-6 to the surprise
overthrow of Premier Moham-
and consternation of intelligence
med Mossedegh in Iran, of Kingilk
yllaf ficials in Washington.
'Farouk in Egypt, of Jacob Ar- -
benz Guzman in' Guatemala (he dte( States thinks are ne'ed.ed if
is now in Cub with Castro), and s to turn back the Communis i
ts s
the placing of NgoDinh Diem in percusSiDriS In. Washimet011. AS
'titian in Indonesia rumored to ttsh is id ring the teuil
of bringing pressure on Diem the /
power in South Viet Nam. A revo-
have been supported by CIA 'at.. .new cons o
. . ? 'I IC
did not succeed. It provided the
rare spectacle of revolutionaries
trained in United States military
schools fighting against govern-
ment officers tralneil in the same
schools.
DEC Woved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200110024-1