INSPECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00146R000100180032-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2006
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: March 2, 1967
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Inspector General's Report on Foreign
Intelligence Collection Requirements
REFERENCE: Your Memo, ER 67-207, 18 January 1967
1. The subject survey I Ireport) is addressed
to the problem of intelligence requirements. It is a well-
written, balanced document and the best study on this subject
that I have seen. The recommendations set forth are, for the
most part, sound and, if implemented, should materially improve
the requirements process. I do not believe, however, that the
so-called information explosion can be remedied or controlled
by improving the requirements process alone. The critical
problem here is the management of collection resources. In
this respect, an effective requirements process is an essential
tool; it is not, however, the final solution.
2. The I ireport points out that CIA is collecting
too much information and, like the rest of the Intelligence
Community, "it makes up for not collecting enough of the right
kind of information on the most important targets by flooding
the system with secondary matter." It is a regrettable fact of
life that the value or success of a collection resource is
judged more often by the quantity of the material produced
than by the intelligence content. This is perhaps understand-
able, since quantity can be measured mechanically and non-
contentiously, whereas quality involves subjective, and often
highly biased judgments. It is a further fact of life that a
collection resource, once established, will continue to collect
to the limit of its capability--against targets of highest
priority if possible, but if not, then against targets of any
priority which may be used Justification of its collection
mission. As noted in the I Ireport: "Once we develop
a capability we use it and it develops a life of its own, with
a momentum and imperatives which control us rather than we it."
3. There are two approaches which, if adopted, would in
my opinion, measurably increase the capability of the Intelligence
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Community to cope with the information explosion by establish-
ing management controls, based on intelligence priorities, on
the collection resources. The first is to promote the concept
of selectivity at the source of collection. This is, of course,
not a new idea but it must be given fresh stimulus and greater
facility for implementation. In effect, the collector must
be told what not to collect as well as to emphasize the need
for attention to top priorities only. This objective is
probably easier to achieve in the field of technical collection
where receivers can be tuned to pick up only signals of certain
clearly defined parameters or cameras programmed to photograph
only a limited number of top priority targets. It is clearly
much more difficult to effect this selectivity where the human
element prevails and where the understandable concern exists
that the collector in the field is not capable of evaluating
which piece of information should or should not be transmitted
to Headquarters.
4.! 1 believe, therefore, it is not unreasonable in this
connection to consider establishing some sort of quota system
to be imposed upon individual collection resources. Such a
concept would no doubt be viewed as arbitrary and to a degree
it is; 'I believe, however, that the information explosion is a
problem of such dimensions that hard decisions must be made to
deal with it. A quota system would not be immutable but would
serve as a guide for management in programming collection
activities. Since the quota would in most cases be something
less than the capability of the resource to collect, it should
force management to concentrate on higher priority collection
targets. The quota concept would apply both in the tasking of
collection assets as well as in the transmittal of information,
once collected, back to Headquarters. If requirements are
refined and validated in line with recommendations of the
I freport, it should not be too difficult for the
managers o- a collection facility to determine if the information
collected falls in Priority I, II or somewhere else. Quotas
could be adjusted periodically in relation to the quality con-
tent of the information collected; thus, the mines producing
higher grade ore would receive higher quotas than those pro-
ducing low grade ore which would be accorded lower quotas. In
such asystem as this, there is obviously a risk that a key
piece of information might be collected but languish in a for-
ward area. Through proper application of an intelligence
priorities system, however, this risk should be minimal and is
probably no greater than having the same information lying un-
noticed in a sea of unanalyzed data in an analyst's in-box. In
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any case, I believe the time has come where the Intelligence
Community must accept the risk of missing a possible "nugget"
in order not to be buried in t e s ag hea
5. The second approach which I propose is to establish
some sort of a community mechanism for a coordinated management
of co ec ion resources. Experience has shown that it is much
easier to create a collection resource than to terminate one.
is a case in point. In fact, positive action to close
out low yield collection resources is rare indeed. I believe
the Intelligence Community must take steps to correct this
situation if the information explosion is to be brought under / \ 25x1
control. Specifically, USIB, at the time it considers any re-
quireme,nt which involves establishment of a new collection
resource, should simu taneous y review existing resources to
determine those which might be eliminated in order to maintain
acceptable level of collected information. By accep a e
here, mean a volume of data which can be effectively processed,
analyzed or utilized by exploitation capabilities available to
the Intelligence Community.
6. As an example, USIB now has before it certain proposals
for the collection of ABM intelligence. These proposals in-
clude several new collection resources which will produce a
high volume of data to be processed by the Community. I would
propose that, before approving any new collection resource,
USIB should ascertain which of the existing collection resources
producing roughly the same volume of data to be processed should
be eliminated so that the overall processing load is maintained
in balance. In order to assist USIB in making such determina-
tions,a Resources Coordination Board might be established which
would maintain an inventory of collection resources to ether
with o her pertinent ata in this connection. Here again, the
Intelligence Community will be faced with certain actions which
might be considered arbitrary. As before, however, I feel that,
unless management faces up to its responsibility and is willing
to make bold decisions, the Intelligence Community will continue
to drift he direction in which it is now headed. As
the eport points out, "The information explosion has
alread' gott en out of hand...its deleterious effects will
certaily intensify as well, unless it is brought under rigorous
contro."
7, With respect to the recommendations of the survey per-
taining specifically to the CIA SIGINT Officer, I submit the
following:
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