GUN CONTROL LEGISLATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000200170121-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2004
• Sequence Number: 121
• Publication Date: June 13, 1968
• Content Type: OPEN

ApprOved
June 13, 1968
MiteieMs3Reiii2dith-KWIVENN38R000200170121-4- s 7-225-
APPROPRIATIONS UNIJER THE
STATE TECHNICAL SERVICES ACT
-OF 1965
VIr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senate pro-
ceed to the consideration of Calendar
No. 1209.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill
Will be stated by title.
The BILL CLERK. A bill (S. 3245) to ex-
tend for an additional 2 years the au-
thorization of appropriations under the
State Technical Services Act of 1965.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the request of the
Senator from Montana. Without objec-
tion, it is so ordered.
The Senate proceeded to consider the
bill (S. 3245) which had been reported
from the Committee on Commerce, with
an amendment, on page 1, line 6, after
the word "following:", strike out " ; $7,-
000,000 for the fiscal year ending June
30, 1969; and such amounts as may be
necessary for the fiscal year ending June
30, 1970.'" and insert " '$7,000,000 for the
fiscal year ending June 30, 1969; $10,000,-
000 for the fiscal year ending June 30,
1970; $10,000,000 for the fiscal year end-
ing June 30, 1971.' "; so as to make the
bill read:
S. 3245
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That section
10 of the State Technical Services Act of 1965
(18 U.S.C. 1360; 79 Stat. 682) is amended by
striking the period at the end of subsection
(a) and inserting the following: "$7,000,000
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969;
$10,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30,
1970; $10,000,000 for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1971."
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the committee
amendment.
The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed in
the REOORD an excerpt from the report
(No. 1231) , explaining the purposes of
the bill.
There being no objection, the excerpt
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
PURPOSE OP TNE LEG/SLAT/ON
S. 3245 amends the State Technical Serv-
ices Act of 1965 by extending the period of
authorization of appropriations an additional
2 years. The bill would authorize appropria-
tions of $7 million for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1969, and such amounts as may be
necessary for the fiscal year ending June 30,
1970. The bill would permit continuance of
the matching grants program to the States
In furtherance of the present cooperative
effort to promote the wider diffusion an.
more effective application of the findings
science and technology throughout Ameri? n
commerce and industry. The technical- -rv-
ices program would continue to draw pon
the resources of universities, nonpr t re-
search organizations, and State a.. local
agencies, in locally planned and ad ? nistered
technical services designed to p ce these
findings usefully in the hands o local busi-
nesses and enterprises.
The PRESIDING OFFIC . The ques-
tion is on the engros nt and third
reading of the bill.
The bill (S. 3245) w s ordered to be
engrossed for a third leading, read the
third time, and passed:
The title was amended, so as to read:
"A bill to extend for an additional 3
years the authorization of appropriations
under the State Technical Services Act
of 1965."
MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE?
ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED
A message from the House of Repre-
sentatives, By Mr. Hackney, one of its
reading clerks, announced that the
Speaker had affixed his signature to the
following enrolled bills, and they were
signed by the President pro tempore:
HR. 2709. An act for the relief of Suh
Yoon Sup;
HR. 4030. An act for the relief of Yong
Chin Sager;
HR. 4370. An act for the relief of Sandy
Kyriacoula Georgopoulos and Anthony
Georgopoulos;
HR. 7042. An act for the relief of Dr. Jose
Del Rio;
HR. 7431. An act for the relief of Gilmer
County, Ga.;
H.R. 8241. An act for the relief of Victo
rino Severe Blanco;
H.R. 12639. An act to remove certain
mitations on ocean cruises;
HR. 13439, An act to correct and imp .ve
the Canal Zone Code, and for other ?ur-
poses;
H.R. 15190. An act to amend seer ons 3
and 4 of the Act approved Septe ? ?er 22,
1964 (78 Stat. 990), providing for a investi-
gation and study to determine site for
the construction of a sea-level can connect-
ing the Atlantic and Pacific (Dee:, s;
H.R. 15591. An act for the-lief of Pfc.
John Patrick Collopy, US54615 6;
Ha. 15972. An act to perr it black and
white or color reproductions ? United States
and foreign postage stamp under certain
circumstances, and for ot r purposes; and
H.R. 16489. An act ma g appropriations
for the Treasury and Post ffice Departments,
the Executive Office of the President, and
certain independent ? -ncies, for the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1969, and for other
purposes.
EXTENSION 0 AUTHORITY OF
EXPORT - ORT BANK IN
ORDER TO IMPROVE THE BAL-
ANCE OF rAYMENTS
Mr. MAN:FIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unani Gus consent that the Senate
proceed ? the consideration of Calendar
No. 1082 S. 3218. I do this so that the
bill m be the pending business on
Mond next.
T PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill
will be stated by title.
e ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A
b 1 (S. 3218) to enable the Export-
port Bank of the United States to
approve extension of certain loans,
guarantees, and insurance in connection
with exports from the United States in
order to improve the balance of pay-
ments and foster the long-term com-
mercial interests of the United States.
The PRESIDING OrtoICER. Is there
objection to the request of the Sena-
tor from Montana?
There being no objection, the Senate
proceeded to consider the bill.
UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT
Mr. MANS1sELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that at the con-
clusion of routine morning business on
Monday, June 17, 1968, debate on the
pending bill be limited to not to exceed
one-half hour on each amendment; to
be divided between the proponent of
the amendment and the nator from
Maine [Mr. Musxm] ; t at the time on
the bill be limited to ot to exceed 2
hours, to be divided nd controlled by
the Senator from k.aine [Mr. Musxml
and the minority ader [Mr. DIRKSEN],
in accordance w* h the usual form.
The unani us-consent agreement
reduced to ting is as follows:)
Ordered, t, effective on Monday, June
17, 1968, at t e conclusion of routine morn-
ing busines , during the further considera-
tion of th bill (S. 3218) to enable the
Export-Im ort Bank of the United States
to approv extension of certain loans, guar-
antees, d insurance in connection with
exports rom the United States in order to
impro e the balance of payments and foster
the ng-term commercial interests of the
Un ed States, debate on any amendment,
tion, or appeal, except a motion to lay on
e table, shall be limited to not to exceed
e-half hour, to be equally divided and
controlled by the mover of any such amend-
ment or motion and the majority leader:
Provided, That in the event the majority
leader is in favor of any such amendment
or motion, the time in opposition thereto
shall be controlled by the minority leader
or some Senator designated by him: Pro-
vided further, That no amendment that is
not germane to the provisions of the said
bill shall be received.
Ordered further, That on the question of
the final passage of the said bill debate shall
be limited to not to exceed two hours, to be
equally divided and controlled, respectively,
by the Senator from Maine [Mr. MUSINE
and the minority leader: Provided, That the
said leaders, or either of them, may, from
the time under their control on the passage
of the said bill, allot additional time to any
Senator during the consideration of any
amendment, motion, or appeal.
GUN CONTROL LEGISLATION
Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, in a
recent article in the New Yorker maga-
zine tracing the history of gun control
legislation in Congress, a Senate advo-
cate of strong gun control legislation was
quoted as saying, "As things now stand,
I can't see how any Western Senator
could possibly support the bill."
And, said the author, "None of them
has."
Yesterday, Mr. President, I became a
cosponsor of the administration's gun
control bill, introduced by the senior
Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Dom)].
That bill would extend to rifles, shotguns,
and ammunition the restrictions which
we recently approved on the sale of hand-
guns. It would eliminate direct mail order
sales and sales to non-residents and ju-
veniles under 18.
In addition, I am prepared to support
effective measures to require the registra-
tion and licensing of all firearms, by
State and local action if possible, by Fed-
eral action if necessary.
Last night, I had a call from a good
friend, the editor of a Washington State
sportsman's publication?a publication
which has long fought against gun con-
trol legislation. "You have turned your
back on us," he said, "You have
changed." "Yes," I said, "I have changed
some of my views." "Well, then," he said,
"we are going to have to oppose your re-
election in November."
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I said I was sorry about that. We had
seen eye to eye on so many issues over the
years. We had fought together many
good fights for the conservation of our
fish and wildlife resources, to preserve
Washington as one of the few remaining
natural Paradises for hunters and fisher-
men. rut, of course, it was his privilege to
endorse or to condemn any candidate he
chose.
He asked me what had brought me to
this decision. And, although he was
deeply disturbed, he had the courtesy to
hear me out. And today, I would like to
tell you, as I told him, why I have made
this decision.
I know of no one whose conscience has
not been deeply troubled by the violence
and terror surging through the streets
of every city and every State. Not just
last week, not just last month?but a
? steadily evolving pattern of disorder has
made it seem as if the voice of sanity and
of civil order in our country have been
drowned out by the sound of gunfire in
the streets.
I am not talking primarily about the
terrible decimation of some of our finest
leaders. I am talking about the brutal,
sudden death that each day, each hour
greets ordinary citizens and their fam-
ilies?a high school student standing on
a street corner; two young Marines
stopping for a cup of coffee after an eve-
ning with their girl friends; a young wife
hurrying home having stayed out later
than she had planned to finish the family
shopping.
Yes, I am thinking of President Ken-
nedy and Senator Kennedy, Martin
Luther King, Jr, and Medgar Evers. But
I am also thinking of the 16 dead and
the 31 wounded boys and girls, and Pas-
sers-by, struck down by a deranged stu-
dent firing from the tower of the Univer-
sity of Texas?and all of these were
felled by rifle or shotgun fire. In 1966,
there was a major gun crime committed
every 5 minutes.
Of course, no gun law?even a law
stringent beyond the bounds of constitu-
tionality?could eradicate assassinations,
Murder, robbery, assault. But a sound
gun control law is one sane and rational
Measure which can be of great help in
restbring the balance which now finds
the rate of gun murders in this country
25 times that of Germany, 55 times that
of Great Britain, and 90 times the rate
for the Netherlands.
There is another balance at stake. For
what we are really asked to do by the
opponents of gun control legislation is to
balance the reasonable fear of wives and
children against the convenience of the
hunter.
For the talk of a dark plot to confiscate
the guns of law-abiding hunters and
sportsmen is nonsense. Is J. dgar
Hoover, an outspoken and fervent advo-
cate of strong gun laws, any less a de-
fender of liberty than the most patriotic
rifleman in the country?
No, what we are asking owners of fire-
arms to do is no more than they now do
Uncomplainingly with their automobiles,
their children's bicycles, even their dogs.
I often go duck hunting with a good
friend who has two shotguns and two
good hunting dogs. His dogs are licensed
?his guns are not. Is his liberty in-
fringed if he must do for a lethal weap-
on what he now must do for his dogs?
He will also have to buy his weapons
from a licensed dealer in his State?a
dealer who will be able to see that he is
a grown man, a law-abiding citizen of
his community, and not an escaped con-
vict or a deranged teenager.
Of course, there are legitimate and
necessary reasons for law-abiding citi-
zens to possess guns. This legislation will
protect such citizens, just as the car own-
er is protected through registration
against misappropriation or theft.
This legislation will not disarm any-
one with a right to a gun. It will make it
just a little bit more difficult for the
young of the insane to lay their hands
on a lethal weapon upon receiving their
first impulse to cdrnmit mayhem. It will
enable police officials with somewhat
greater efficiency to trace murder weap-
ons. It should prevent the petty criminal,
if not the organized gangster, who cannot
buy a gun over the counter from a li-
censed dealer, from buying one by mail.
And it might stop the adolescent with a
sudden urge to feel like a man by having
some fun with a gun.
In Dallas, Tex., where guns are freely
obtainable by anyone, the percentage of
homicides committed by gun in 1963 was
72 percent; while in New York, which we
think of as a center of crime, the Sullivan
law, one of the strongest local gun laws,
has kept the rate of murder by gun at 25
percent. Among the country's 10 largest
cities, New York had the fifth lowest as-
sault rate, the third lowest murder rate,
and the lowest robbery rate. Perhaps,
more important, the New York law
makes, it possible for police officials to
make arrests for the illegal possession of
pistols and revolvers before those weap-
ons can be used.
Again, as J. Edgar Hoover has said:
Those who claim that the availability of
firearms is not a factor in murders in this
country are not facing reality.
Is it not time we gave this basic sup-
port to our law enforcement officers?
I have pledged to the Senate that when
the gun legislation is referred to the
Commerce Committee, I will do all with-
in my power to see that legislation is re-
ported out without delay. And I will also
do all that I can to see that that legisla-
tion while reasonable and practical is
fully adequate to the need.
I know what tomorrow's mail will
bring. I am ready for the angry and in-
temperate letters, many of them from
old friends and colleagues?from many
I have hunted with, from men who have
long thought of me, as I have, as one of
them. But for me, this has become a mat-
ter of deep conscience.
The inconvenience will be so insig-
nificant; the contribution to the law and
order of our society, so great.
THE PROPOSED ABM SYSTEM
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I rise to-
day to bring before the Senate an issue
whose costs and consequences for our
defense and security and for our foreign
policy are of the greatest importance.
June 13, 1968
I speak of the proposed ABM system.
The ostensible purpose of the proposed
Sentinel ABM system, as it is now called,
would be to construct a defense against
a possible Chinese ICBM attack. The
total cost for the development, construc-
tion and deployment of this so-called
thin system is estimated to be from $5
to $7 billion, although its final costs
would most certainly be much higher.
The request for fiscal year 1969 totals
$1,195.6 million. This amount is con-
tained in two bills: S. 3293, the military
procurement research and development
bill, and H.R. 16703, the military con-
struction bill, and I understand that
the AEC bill contains $324,500,000 for
Sentinel warhead research.
I ask unanimous consent that a table
showing the amounts contain ed in these
bills for the ABM system be printed in
the RECORD at the conclusion of my re-
marks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I have
been informed today that the Commit-
tee on Appropriations has approved and
will report to the Senate a bill in which
funds will be recommended for appropri-
ation to commence the deployment of
the Sentinel ABM system, for site ac-
quisition and construction, in the amount
of $227,300,000.
The controversy pro and con about
the merits of this system has raged for
several years. .Several committees in the
Senate have studied the issue thoroughly.
The Armed Services Committee, the Joint
Atomic Energy Committee, and the For-
eign Relations Committee, subcommittee
under the able leadership of the Senator
from Tennessee [Mr. Goan], have con-
ducted detailed hearings, both public and
executive. The hearings before these
committees have produced a very useful
record. In addition, Congress, has had
the benefit of the testimony of former
Secretary of Defense McNamara on sev-
eral occasions, and there has been much
discussion in newspapers, magazines, and
scientific journals, particularly during
the past 6 months.
I ask unanimous consent to have
Printed at the conclusion of my remarks
one of the useful and informative articles
that has been recently published in the
March issue of Scientific American; the
testimony of former Secretary of Defense
McNamara before the Committee on
Armed Services, in the early part of this
year; and an annotated bibliography of
the most important works discussing the
ABM system, which has been prepared
by the Library of Congress.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 2.)
Mr. COOPER. But there is still a ne-
cessity to have a full public debate of the
ABM issue on the floor of the Senate. I
recall that several years ago, when ap-
propriations were recommended?I be-
lieve it was for the Nike X system?the
Senator from South Carolina invoked the
rule to close the door, and there was a
very full and informative debate on that
issue.
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In April, when the military procure-
ment appropriation bill was before the
Senate, a bill which included for certain
phases -of the Al3M system, a unanimous-
consent agreement was obtained which
limited debate on an amendment to 1
hour. As a result, the debate on this most
important venture the ABM was limited
to 1 hour for each amendment.
This limitation prevented the full dis-
cussion of the issues that was required
and many desired. But I believe the ABM
issue is of such importance?its purposes
and its consequences?that we should
have a full debate in the Senate upon it.
We should first consider the feasibility,
necessity, and the consequences of con-
structing an ABM system, before approv-
ing appropriations which would lead step
by step to its installation.
Mr. President, my interest in this sub-
ject was stimulated several years ago
when we had the important debate on the
Nike X behind closed doors, and later by
hearings that were held in the Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations by the able Sen-
ator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE]. Since
that time, I have read the testimonies
and the statements by former Secretary
of Defense McNamara and other admin-
istration officials, and I have read, as
much as possible, on the subject. I do not
claim to be a: technical expert, and such
judgments as I have made have been
based upon my own reading and the re-
sults of discussion with others concerned
with the issue.
The ABM issue is not a new one. Two
preVious ABM systems, the Nike-Zeus
? and Nike X, planned by the United
States, were never deployed because it
was judged by the administration and
Congress at the time?and history has
proven that these judgments were cor-
rect?that if such systems were built,
they would have been obsolete before
completion and therefore obviously not
worth the cost. In 1959, President Ei-
senhower, for example, stoppedi the
Nike-Zeus deployment on grounds very
similar to those that now apply to the
Sentinel system. Although these systems
were not built, technological develop-
ment and research for ABM systems
have continued and the state of the art
has progressed.
I shall not go into great detail this
afternoon to describe the Sentinel sys-
tem, but I should like to place in the
RECORD a very helpful description of the
system which was provided by Dr. John
S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Re-
search and Engineering, which he testi-
fied lat year before the Committee on
Foreign Relations, on Monday, February
6, 1967.
I ask unanimous consent that his
statement be printed in the RECORD at
the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OterICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 3.)
Mr.' COOPER. I know that Dr. Foster
has made other more detailed statements,
and he has testified several times and at
length before the Committee on Armed
Services and the Compittee on Appro-
priations. This is a simple statement ex-
plaining the system. I shall read just a
few paragraphs:
The next important development in de-
fense effectiveness came with the introduc-
tion of "area defense" in the period 1964-65.
I would like to define the term "area de-
fense."
The detection sensor is the perimeter ac-
quisition radar (PAR) which detects ballistic
missiles at long ranges. The PAR radar
tracks the incoming missile and predicts its
future path. To intercept the incoming mis-
sile, we employ the Spartan missile which is
a long-range interceptor developed from the
old Nike-Zeus. Once the PAR radar has pre-
dicted the future path of the missile a
Spartan missile is fired so as to intercept it,
This interceptor intercepts the incoming
missile well above the atmosphere. Because
of its long range the Spartan can intercept
Incoming missiles directed at targets several
hundred miles from the Spartan battery lo-
cation. The Spartan missile is guided by a
missile site radar (MSR) which is associated
with each battery.
With the introduction of Spartan, the
Zeus interceptor was no longer required?in
effect, the Spartan replaced the Zeus.
Comparatively few Spartan batteries can
defend the whole United States from simPle
attacks.
You will note I said "simple attacks." It is
still possible for a sophisticated opponent to
confuse the defense and make the firepower
demands on Spartan too high. In this case,
terminal defense Sprints must be relied upon
if we are to furnish a defense. The Spartan
thus functions in two ways. It can provide
a very effective defense over extended areas
against simple threats. Against not so simple
threats, it provides a defense in depth and
is complementary to Sprint. In any case it
forces the enemy, if he wishes to penetrate,
to pay the price demanded by a sophisticated
penetration aids program.
You will note that I have described a flexi-
ble set of building blocks consisting of PAR
and MSR radars and two types of interceptor
missiles, Spartan and Sprint. We also have
a very large, sophisticated radar called
TACMAR, designed specifically against
sophisticated attacks. They can be put to-
gether in various ways -to provide varying
levels of defense against different threats.
For example, if we wished to defend the
United States against a large Soviet attack,
we would provide an overlay of an area de-
fense such as I have described. As I men-
tioned earlier, however, it would be necessary
to depend primarily on terminal Sprint de-
fense, including TACMARs, at selected cities.
A selected city defense (including the area
component) would cost about $10 or $20 bil-
lion depending on the number of cities de-
fended.
As a matter of technical judgment, I be-
lieve that these larger deployments carry with
them technical risks. The likelihood of large
and sophisticated attacks with the deploy-
ment of significant U.S. defenses increases the
technical uncertainty of the defensive sys-
tem. Even with an ABM deployment we
would have to expect that in an all-out ex
change, dozens of their warheads would likely
explode in our cities.
Mr. President, although untested and
unproven as a complete system?and I
know that the various components: the
two radars PAR, and MSR, and the two
missiles Spartan and Sprint have not
been tested as a coordinated fully de-
veloped system and cannot be fully
tested because of the Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty?and even though some compo-
nents have yet to be translated from
theory to practical operation, the imme-
diate production of its elements and the
deployment of the Sentinel ABM system
have been urged by its proponents as
necessary because, in theory, it would
provide a defense against a possible Chi-
nese attack. It is argued that we should
be prepared to spend whatever money is
required to gain the additional measure
of security that might be supplied by
such a defense.
If it can be demonstrated that this de-
fense system is necessary for the secu-
rity of the United States, I would be cer-
tain that every one of us would be will-
ing to vote for any sum of money that
would provide that security. However, I
would hope that this matter would be
fully and fairly debated before we go fur-
ther with the provision of funds for the
deployment of a Sentinel system. I con-
tend that we have not reached the point
where we have the available information
which would prove with any reasonable
assurance that such a system is neces-
sary or that it would provide any addi-
tional security to our country than is
available now through nuclear deter-
rence.
The assertion that the Sentinel ABM
system would strengthen our defenses is
not at all certain. Nor do the facts make
it Clear that there is a need to deploy the
Sentinel system now or that deployment
now or in the future would enhance our
security in the period between 1972-75
as is claimed.
First, let us examine the "threat"
against which the Sentinel ABM system
is designed?the threat of Communist
China.
The Chinese have not yet successfully
fired or deployed an ICBM. It is believed
that they have exploded about seven nu-
clear devices. It is known they are en-
gaged in surface-to-surface firing. How-
ever, there is no evidence they have been
able to fire or deploy an intercontinental
ballistic missile.
A year ago it was thought that an
ICBM would be fired in late 1967 or
1968, and would be in production by
1971 or 1972. The cultural revolution has
caused such turmoil within China that
it is apparent that the original estimate
of successful firing and production had
to be extended. It is still estimated that
Communist China has the capability of
producing a number of ICBM's by the
mid-1970's.
If the present plans of the adminis-
tration?the immediate deployment of
the Sentinel ABM system?should pro-
ceed 'according to schedule, supported
by the appropriations recommended and
to be provided by the bills I have noted,
it is estimated that the ABM system
could be installed in our country by
1974.
Comparing the capabilities of China
to successfully fire and develop an effec-
tive ICBM system with the capability of
the United States to install a thin sys-
tem if it should be determined necessary,
I can see no reason for the Congress to
approve this year the deployment of an
ABM system and start on the road to
larger systems, with all the unfortunate
consequences such action can entail.
I know that in the testimony of former
Secretary McNamara before the Corn-
mittee on Armed Services this year?
which I referred to earlier?he did say
that our intelligence would indicate that
the Chinese had this capability. However,
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at other points in his testimony, he con-
cluded that the missiles would be primi-
tive and inaccurate, and by 1975 they
would not be able to produce a large
number of these missiles.
We must ask as reasonable persons if it
is likely that Communist China would as-
sure its own destruction by a nuclear at-
tack on the United States?armed with a
vast array of nuclear weapons.
Some advocates assert that the Soviets
are building an ABM system and that we
must begin the construction of an ABM
system to match or surpass their efforts.
Is the reason compelling some to urge the
deployment of the Sentinel ABM system
that it could be a "building block" lead-
ing toward the development of an ex-
tensive and heavier ABM system to
defend the United States against an at-
tack by the Soviet Union?
Will it be argued that the deployment
of a "thin" ABM system against attack
from China would itself provide some
measure of protection against a possible
Soviet nuclear attack and even greater
assurance of American nuclear superior-
ity in the event of a Soviet attack? These
arguments can be challenged.
Both the United States and the Soviet
Union have the nuclear capability many
times over to destroy each other and we
have been assured again and again by our
Secretary of Defense and our military
authorities that the United States has
the capability to destroy the Soviet Union
even after a first strike by the Soviet
Union.
Former Secretary McNamara has
termed this the "assured destruction
capability of the United States," and, that
assuming a first strike on the United
States, that our own weapons systems
have that element of "survivability,"
which is the term he has used to express
the view that we would have the nuclear
systems inviolate required to strike back
and destroy the Soviet Union.
This testimony, which I shall place
In the lisemo, provides the number of
Missiles which the United States pos-
sesses and the estimate of the Soviet
Missile strength. There are additional
tables that show the consequences of a
first strike by the Soviet Union upon the
United States, and of our response upon
the Soviet Union. These tables include
an estimate of the damage that would
be inflicted, the loss of life, and produc-
tive capacity. These tables, and the tes-
timony of Secretary McNamara, argue
that either the attainment of nuclear
parity by the Soviet Union, which / be-
lieve to be unlikely, or the installation
of ABM systems here in the United States
directed at the Soviet Union, would not
alter the capability of either country
to destroy each other. That capability,
a course, is the deterrent. We have be-
lieved, thus far, that if there were any
intention on the part of either to strike
at each other, the deterrent or what has
been called the balance of terror, has
prevented any possible intentions from
being carried out.
As I Shall note later, the installation
of the ABM systems could upset this de-
terrent. Instead of achieving greater
security for the United States, it could
lead to greater danger. If the Soviets
achieve parity with the United States,
which is unlikely, the assured ability to
destroy each other remains. An ABM de-
fense system?"thin" or "heavy"?de-
signed for protection against the Soviet
Union would not alter this ability to
completely destroy each other. It would,
in fact, only accelerate the arms race.
More offensive missiles or more defensive
missiles would lead only to a multiplica-
tion of the destruction capabilities of the
United States and the Soviet Union.
There does not seem to be any good rea-
son to add more destructive power to the
existing ability to destroy each other and,
for all practical purposes, all civilized
life.
We know that the Soviets have built a
primitive ABM system near Leningrad.
Intelligence indicates that the Tallin sys-
tem is an antiaircraft system for use
against high-flying bombers and recon-
naissance aircraft. According to recent
Intelligence estimates?this, again, is a
statement by Secretary McNamara?
construction of the so-called galosh sys-
tem surrounding MOSGOW which was be-
gun in 1960 has not been completed and
Is not being pursued according to sched-
ule. It has not been extended to other
cities in the Soviet Union. Of course, we
do not know whether the Soviets are re-
considering its usefulness or considering
more fruitful negotiations with the
United States to limit the deployment of
ABM systems.
In my view, the balance sheet comes
down to the following:
First. There is no present threat to
American security from a Chinese ICBM
attack. According to the consensus of the
Intelligence community, the Chinese will
not have a capability to launch an ICBM
attack until the mid-1970's, and reckless
as some consider the Communist Chi-
nese to be, it is difficult to believe that
they would invite the certain destruction
of their country by a nuclear attack upon
the United States.
Second. The destructive capabilities of
the United States and the Soviet Union
will not be altered by a thin or heavy
ABM system.
Third. Our surveillance and intelli-
gence capabilities are of such magnitude
and quality that the United States has
the capability of providing information
of new situations in China or the Soviet
Union which would require greater effort
to develop and deploy additional offen-
sive or defensive weapons.
Fourth. When the proposed Sentinel
ABM system's technical characteristics
are examined, one must conclude that
the planned system would not provide
the assurance of protection to justify its
cost. The history of progress in missile
technology is that offensive technology
will always outdistance defensive efforts.
Had Nike-Zeus been deployed, for ex-
ample, it would have been obsolete before
completion. The Sentinel system now
planned for deployment may become
quickly obsolete. It is not designed to
defend against MIRV?missile with mul-
tiple warheads and independently tar-
geted?which the United States, and we
can assume the Soviets, are developing,
or whether they are reconsidering its
usefulness. ,
June 13 149.68
Again, as pointed in the testimony of
both Dr. Foster and Secretary Mc-
Namara, the value and effectiveness of
the ABM system is diminished as the
number of objects coming in is increased.
Assuming that the Soviet Union or,
some time in the future, the Communist
Chinese could develop a MIRV system
with a number of missiles which can
be released and independently find their
targets, this thin system would have little
value.
Fifth. The Sentinel cannot be fully
tested as a complete system. That is not
to say, however, that research and de-
velopment, including the building of pro-
totypes, will not go forward, for the
amendments I will propose would not
strike from the bills funds for continued
research and development. The advance-
ment of the state of the art will not be
restricted. It would be perfected, and
available, if the Congress should deter-
mine on better evidence than is now
available that an ABM system is feasible
and necessary for the security of the
United States.
It has been effectively argued on the
Senate floor that some of the elements
have not yet been thoroughly tested or in
some cases even built. The technical re-
liability of all its components is not yet
known. Certainly, extension of research
for another year would give an oppor-
tunity for perfection of the art.
Finally, I come to another matter
which I think is very important:
Sixth. Since the Glassboro Conference
In May 1967 when the President and Sec-
retary McNamara informed Premier Ku-
sygin that the U.S. Government desired
to work with the Soviet Union to limit
mutually the development of strategic
nuclear weapons, including ABM systems,
efforts to work out an agreement with
the Soviets have continued. The Vietnam
war?and other factors?have stood in
the way of a favorable conclusion, but
our effort to halt the nuclear arms race
should continue as long as there is any
possibility of bringing about a ;imitation.
I believe that a decision by the Congress
to begin the deployment of the thin sys-
tem would only make agreement more
difficult.
I should like to quote from President
Johnson's address to the United Nations
General Assembly yesterday, on the occa-
sion of the nuclear proliferation pact
ceremony.
He said in part:
We desire?yes, we urgently desire?to be-
gin early discussion on the limitation of
strategic offensive and defensive weapons sys-
tems.
We shall search for an agreement that will
not only avoid another costly ,ind futile
escalation of the arms race, but will de-
escalate it.
I believe that this treaty can lead to fur-
ther measures that will inhibit the senseless
continuation of the arms race. I believe that
it can give the world time?very precious
time?to protect itself against Armageddon.
It has been noted by Secretary Mc-
Namara, and our intelligence, that the
Soviet Union is not proceeding with dis-
patch to complete installation of an ABM
system around Moscow, and that it has
not extended it to any other city. If we
now begin to deploy an antiballistic mis-
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she system, in the light of past behavior.
then, the Soviet Union will respond, and
we will respond to their response, and
we will have entered again a new phase
of the nuclear arms race.
In the light of these conclusions, it is
my intention to introduce amendments
to the military procurement appropria-
tions bill, and H.R. 16703, the military
construction bill, to strike from these bills
funds to be used for the deployment of
the ABM system. My, amendment would
not, and I repeat, would not, strike funds
for continuing research and development
upon such systems.
The United States cannot afford at this
time to spend money on a system cost-
ing $5 to $7 billion; which may be ex-
tended to a heavier system costing $40
billion or more, unless it is essential to our
security. We have found it necessary to
commit ourselves to an expenditure re-
duction of $6 billion. We believe it neces-
sary to raise the taxes of our people and
we have found it necessary to cut needed
and essential domestic programs. In view
of our difficulties, and in view of our
priorities, I do not believe the deploy-
ment of the Sentinel can be justified at
the present time.
There are other questions concerning
the proposed Sentinel ABM system that
should be addressed by the Congress and
the people of this country. We must ask
the question. If we build the ABM, what
response will this bring from the So-
viet Union-the only great nuclear pow-
er other than the United States? In the
light of past experience, there will be a
radical response-an escalation of the
nuclear arms race-offensive and de-
fensive. We must ask, How much of our
national energy will be devoted to meet-
ing the actions and counteractions pro-
duced by our decisions to go ahead with
such a sjstem? Will such a system con-
tribute to strengthening the security of
our country, or will it increase the danger
of a nuclear catastrophe?
I do not believe that the deployment
of an ABM system at this time is in our
country's best interests. I do not believe
it offers any advantage to the United
States, military, political or moral. My
discussion today is not detailed. I have
wanted to present some issues for the
Senate's consideration, discussion, and
debate, and, hopefully, to raise questions
which can be discussed later and should
be discussed thoroughly when the first
bill on that subject comes before the
Senate, providing for funds to be used
in the deployment of that system. It is
my intention to further elaborate these
issues and others when the bills are be-
fore the Senate for action.
We have hopefully learned a hard les-
son from Vietnam. We did not rigorously
consider the implications of our increas-
ing involvement in Vietnam when it
might have been possible to extricate our-
selves with relatively small loss and at a
time and in such a Nay that might have
furthered the opportunity for self-de-
termination and peace in South Vietnam.
We dare not fail to look at the implica-
tions of the deployment of the ABM and
to ask, if taken, whether it would lead
to more dangerous involvements and con-
sequences.
EXHIBIT 1
MISSILE DEFENSE FUNDING LEGISLATION-FISCAL YEAR 1969 DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS
lin millions of dollars]
Activity
Military
procurement
authorization
bill'
Military
construction
authorization
bill'
Military
construction
appropriation
bill
Procurement:
Production base support
Ground support equipment
Spartan components
Total
342. 7
Construction: Site acquisition and construction
227.3
227.3
Operations and maintenance
Military personnel
Total, Sentinel deployment
342.7
227.3
227.3
Sentinel R. & D
312.9
Total, Sentinel
655.6
Other ABM R. & D.:
Nike-X
Defender
268. 0
Total ABM program
923.6
227.3
227.3
Defense
appropriation
bill
342. 7
39. 0
5. 7
387.4
312.9
700.3
268. 0
968.3
1S. 3295, passed Apr. 19.
H.R. 16703.
MISSILE DEFENSE FUNDING REQUESTS-FISCAL YEAR 1969
DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS
(In millions of dollars]
Procurement:
Production base support 137.2
Ground support equipment 199.2
Spartan components 6.3
Total 342. 7
Construction: Site acquisition and construction 1 227. 3
Operations and maintenance 39.0
Military personnel 5.7
Total, Sentinel deployment 614.7
Sentinel R. & D 312.9
Total, Sentinel 927.6
Other ABM R. & D.:
Nike-X 165.0
Defender 103.9
Total
268. 0
Total, ABM request 2 1, 195.6
'Dons not include $36,000,000 to be carried over from fiscal
f
year 1968 appropriation or construction planning.
In addition, AEC appropriation will reportedly include
$324,500,000 for Sentinel.
EXHIBIT 2
[From the Scientific American, March 1968]
ANTI-BALLISTIC-MISSILE SYSTEMS
(By Richard L. Garwin and Hans A. Bethe)
(NOTE-The U.S. is now building a "light"
ABM system. The authors argue that offen-
sive tactics and cheap penetration aids could
nullify the effectiveness of this system and
any other visualized no far.)
Last September, Secretary of Defense Mc-
Namara announced that the U.S. would build
"a relatively light and reliable Chinese-
oriented ABM system." With this statement
he apparently ended a long and complex de-
bate on the merits of any kind of anti-
'ballistic-missile system in an age of intercon-
tinental ballistic missiles carrying multimeg-
aton thermonuclear warheads. Secretary Mc-
Namara added that the U.S. would "begin
actual production of such a system at the
end of this year," meaning the end of 1967.
As two physicists who have been concerned
for many years with the development and
deployment of modern nuclear weapons we
wish to offer some comments on this impor-
tant matter. On examining the capabilities
of ABM systems of various types, and on con-
sidering the stratagems available to a deter-
mined enemy who sought to nullify the effec-
tiveness of such a system, we have come to
the conclusion that the "light" system de-
scribed by Secretary McNamara will add lit-
tle, if anything, to the influences that should
restrain China indefinitely from an attack
on the U.S. First among these factors is
China's certain knowledge that, in McNa-
mara's words, "we have the power not only to
destroy completely her entire nuclear offen-
sive forces but to devastate her society as
well."
An even more pertinent argument against
the proposed ABM system, in our view, is
that it will nourish the illusion that an effec-
tive defense against ballistic missiles is pos-
sible and will lead almost inevitably to de-
mands that the light system, the estimated
cost of which exceeds $5 billion, be expanded
into a heavy system that could cost upward
of $40 billion. The folly of undertaking to
build such a system was vigorously stated by
Secretary McNamara. "It is important to un-
derstand," he said, "that none of the [ABM]
systems at the present or foreseeable state of
the art would provide an impenetrable shield
over the United States, . . . Let me make it
very clear that the [cost] in itself is not the
problem: the penetrability of the proposed
shield is the problem."
In our view the penetrability of the light,
Chinese-oriented shield is also a problem. It
does not seem credible to us that, even if the
Chinese succumbed to the "insane and
suicidal" impulse to launch a nuclear attack
on the U.S. within the next decade, they
would also be foolish enough to have built
complex and expensive missiles and nuclear
warheads peculiarly vulnerable to the light
ABM system now presumably under construc-
tion (a system whose characteristics and
capabilities have been well publicized). In
the area of strategic weapons a common
understanding of the major elements and
technical possibilities is essential to an in-
formed and reasoned choice by the people,
through their government, of a proper course
of action. In this article we shall outline in
general terms, using nonsecret information,
the techniques an enemy could employ at no
great cost to reduce the effectiveness of an
ABM system even more elaborate than the
one the Chinese will face. First, however, let
us describe that system.
Known as the Sentinel System, it will pro-
vide for long-range interception by Spartan
antimissile missiles and short-range inter-
ception by Sprint antimissile missiles. Both
types of missile will be armed with thermo-
nuclear warheads for the purpose of destroy-
ing or inactivating the attacker's thermo-
nuclear weapons, which will be borne through
the atmosphere and to their targets by re-
entry vehicles (RV's) . The Spartan missiles,
whose range is a few hundred kilometers, will
be fired when an attacker's reentry vehicles
are first detected rising above the horizon by
perimeter acquisition radar (PAR) .
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U the attacker is using his available
propulsion to deliver maximum payload, his
reentry vehicles will follow a normal mini-
mum-energy trajectory, and they will first be
sighted by one of the PAR's when they are
about 1,000 kilometers, or about 10 minutes,
away. If the attacker chooses to launch his
rockets with less than maximum payload, he
can put them either in a lofted trajectory or
in a depressed one. The lofted trajectory has
certain advantages against a terminal de-
fense system. The most extreme example of
a depressed trajectory is the path followed by
a low-orbit satellite. On such a trajectory a
reentry vehicle could remain below an alti-
tude of 160 kilometers and would not be
visible to the horizon-search radar until it
was some 1,400 kilometers, or about three
minutes, away. This is FOBS; the fractional-
orbit bombardment system, which allows in-
tercontinental ballistic missiles to deliver
perhaps 50 to 75 percent of their normal
payload.
In the Sentinel system Spartans will be
launched when PAR has sighted an incom-
ing missile; they will be capable of inter-
cepting the missile at a distance of several
hundred kilometers. To provide a light shield
for the entire U.S. about half a dozen PAR
units will be deployed along the northern
border of the country to detect missiles ap-
proaching from the general direction of the
North Pole. Each PAR-avill be linked to sev-
eral "farms" of long-range Spartan missiles,
which can be hundreds of kilometers away.
Next to each Spartan farm will be a farm of
Sprint missiles together with missffesite
radar (MSR), whose function is to help guide
both the Spartans and the shorter-range
Sprints to their targets. The task of the
Sprints is to provide terminal protection for
the important Spartans and MSR's. The
PAla's will also be protected by Sprints and
thus will require MSR's nearby.
Whereas the Spartans are expected to in-
tercept an enemy missile :well above the
upper atmosphere, the Sprints are designed
to be effective within the atmosphere, at alti-
tudes below 35 kilometers. The explosion of
an ABM missile's thermonuclear warhead
will produce a huge flux of X-rays, neutrons
and other particles, and within the atmos-
phere a powerful blast wave as well. We shall
describe later how X-rays, particles and blast
can incapacitate e reentry vehicle.
Before we consider in detail the capabili-
ties and limitations of ABlVI systems, one of
us (Garwin) will briefly summarize the pres-
ent strategic position of the US. The pri-
mary fact is that thy U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. can annihilate each other as viable
civilizations within a day and perhaps within
an hour. Each can at will inflict on the other
more than 120 million immediate deaths, to
which must be added deaths that will be
caused by fire, fallout, disease and starva-
tion. In addition more than 75 percent of the
productive capacity of each country would
be destroyed, regardless of who strikes first.
At present, therefore, each of the two Coun-
tries has an assured destruction capability
with respect to the other. It is usually as-
sumed that a nation faced with the aseured
destruction of 30 percent of its population
and productive capacity will be deterred from
destroying another nation, no matter how
serious the grievance. Assured destruction is
therefore not a very flexible political or mili-
tary tool. It serves only to preserve a nation
from complete destruction. More conven-
tional military. forces are needed to fill the
more conventional military role.
Assured destruction was not possible until
the advent of thermonuclear weapons in
the middle 1950's At first, when one had
to depend on aircraft to deliver such weap-
ons, destruction was not really assured be-
cause a strategic air force is subjeot to sur-
prise attack, to problems of command and
control and to attrition by the air defenses
of the other side. All of this was changed
by the development of the intercontinental
ballistic missile and also, although to a
lesser extent, by modifications of our B-52
force that would enable it to penetrate
enemy defenses at low altitude. There is no
doubt today that the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.
have achieved mutual assured destruction.
The U.S. has 1,000 Minuteman missiles
In hardened "silos" and 54 much larger Titan
U missiles. In addition we have 656 Polaris
missiles in 41 submarines and nearly 700
long-range bombers. The Minutemen alone
could survive a surprise attack and achieve
assured destruction of the attacker. In his
recent annual report the Secretary of De-
fense estimated that as of October, 1967, the
U.S.S.R. had some 720 intercontinental
ballistic missiles, about 30 submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (excluding many
that are airborne rather than ballistic) and
about 155 long-range bombers. This force
provides ass-ured destruction of the U.S.
Secretary McNamara has also stated that
U.S. forces can deliver more than 2,000
thermonuclear weapons with an average yield
of one megaton, and that fewer than 400
such weapons would be needed for assured
destruction of a third of the U.S.S.R.'s
population and three-fourths of its indus-
try. The U.S.S.R. would need somewhat
fewer weapons to achieve the same results
against the U.S.
It is worth remembering that intercon-
tinental missiles and nuclear weapons are
not the only meane of mass destruction. They
are, however, among the most reliable, as
they were even when they were first made in
the 1940's and 1950's One might build a
strategic force somewhat differently today,
but the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have no incen-
tive for doing so. In fact, the chief virtue of
assured destruction may be that it removes
the need to race?there is no reward for
getting ahead. One really should not worry
too much about new means for delivering
nuclear weapons (such as bombs in orbit or
fractional-orbit systems) or about advances
in chemical or biological warfare. A single
thermonuclear assured-destruction force can
deter such novel kinds of attack as well.
Now, as Secretary McNamara stated in his
September speech, our defense experts reck-
oned conservatively six to 10 years ago, when
our present strategic-force levels were
planned. The result is that we have right
now many more missiles than we need for
assured destruction of the U.S.S.R. If war
comes, therefore, the U.S. will use the excess
force in a "damage-limiting" role, which
means firing the excess at those elements of
the Russian strategic force that would do
the most damage to the U.S. Inasmuch as the
U.S.S.R. has achieved the level of assured
destruction, this action will not preserve
the U.S., but it should reduce the damage,
perhaps sparing a small city here or there or
reducing somewhat the forces the U.S.S.R.
can use against our allies. To the extent that
this damage-limiting use of our forces re-
duces the damage done to the 'U.S.S.R. it may
slightly reduce the deterrent effect resulting
from assured destruction. It must be clear
that only surplus forces will be used in this
way. It should be said, however, that the
exact level of casualties and industrial
damage required to destroy a nation as a
viable society has been the subject of sur-
prisingly little research or even argument.
One can conceive of three threats to the
present rather comforting situation of
mutual assured destruction. The first would
be an effective counterforce system: a system
that would enable the U.S. (or the U.S.S.R.)
to incapacitate the other side's strategic
forces before they could be used. The second
would be an effective ballistic-missile de-
fense combined with an effective antiaircraft
system. The third would be a transition from
a bipolar world, in which the 'U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. alone possess overwhelming power,
to a milltipolar world including, for instance,'
China. Such threats are of course more wor-
risome in combination than individually.
American and Russian defense planners
are constantly evaluating less-than-perfect
Intelligence to see if any or all of these
threats are developing. For purposes of dis-
cussion let us ask what responses a White
side might make to various moves made by a
Black side. Assume that Black has threatened
to negate White's capability of assured de-
struction by doing one of the following
things; (1) it has procured more intercon-
tinental missiles, (2) it has installed some
missile defense or (3) it has built up a large
operational force ,of missiles each of which
can attack several targets, using "multiple
independently targetable reentry vehicles"
(MIRV's).
White's goal is to maintain assured de-
struction, He is now worried that Black
may be able to reduce to a dangerous level -
the number of White warheads that will
reach their target. White's simplest response
to all three threats?but not necessarily the
most effective or the cheapest?is to provide
himself with more launch vehicles. In addi-
tion, in order to meet the first and third
threats White will try to make his launchers
more difficult to destroy by one or more of
the following means: by making them mo-
bile (for example by placing them in sub-
marines or on railroad cars), by further
hardening their permanent sites or by de-
dending them with an ABM system.
Another poasibility that is less often dis-
cussed would be for White to arrange to
fire the bulk of his warheads on "eval-
uation of threat." In other words, White
could fire his land-based ballistic missiles
when some fraction of them had already
been destroyed by enemy warheads, or when
an overwhelming attack is about to destroy
them. To implement such a capability re-
sponsibly requires excellent communica-
tions, and the decision to fire would have to
be made within minutes, leading to the
execution of a prearranged firing plan. As a
complete alternative to hardening and mo-
bility, this fire-now-or-never capability would
lead to tension and even, in the event of
an accident, to catastrophe. Still, as a sup-
plemental capability to ease fears of effec-
tive counterforce action, it may have some
merit.
White's response to the second threat?
en increase in Black's ABM defenses?might
be limited to deploying more launchers, with
the simple goal of saturating and exhausting
Black's defenses. But White would also want
to consider the cost and effectiveness of the
following: penetration aids, concentrating
on undefended or lightly defended targets,
maneuvering reentry vehicles or multiple
reentry vehicles. The last refers to several
reentry vehicles carried by the same, mis-
sile; the defense would have to destroy all
of them to avoid damage. Finally, White
could reopen the question of whether he
should seek assured destruction solely by
means of missiles. For example, he might
reexamine the effectiveness of low-altitude
bombers or be might turn his attention to
chemical or biological weapons. It does not
much matter how assured destruction is
achieved. The important thing, as Secretary
McNamara has emphasized, is that the other
side find it credible. ("The point is that a
potential aggressor must himself believe that
our assured destruction capability is in fact
actual, and that our will to use it in re-
taliation to an attack is in fact unwaver-
ing.")
It is clear that White has many options,
and that he will choose those that are most
reliable or those that are cheapest for a given
level of assured destruction. Although rela-
tive costs do depend on the level of destruc-
tion required, the important technical con-
clusion is that for conventional levels of as-
sured destruction it is considerably cheaper
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for White to provide mori offensive capabil-
ity than it is for Black to defend his people
and industry against a concerted strike.
As an aside, it might be mentioned that
scientists newly engaged in the evaluation of
military systems often have trouble grasp-
ing that large systems of the type created
by or for the military are divided quite
rigidly into several chronological stages,
namely, in reverse order: operation, deploy-
ment, development and research. An opera-
tional system is not threatened by a system
that is still in development; the threat is not
real until the new system is in fact deployed,
shaken ?down and fully operative. This is
particularly true for an ABM system, which
is obliged to operate against large numbers
Of relatively independent intercontinental
ballistic missiles. It is equally true, however,
for counterforce reentry vehicles, which can
be ignored unless they are built by the hun-
dreds Or thousands. The same goes for
IVIIRV's, a development of the multiple reen-
try vehicle in which each reentry vehicle is
independently directed to a separate target.
One must distinguish clearly between the
possibility of development and the develop-
ment itself, and similarly between develop-
ment and actual operation. One must refrain
from attributing to a specific defense system,
such as Sentinel, those capabilities that
might be obtained by further development
of a different system.
It follows that the Sentinel light ABM sys-
tem, to be built now and to be operational
in the early 1970's against a possible Chinese
Intercontinental ballistic missile threat, will
have to reckon with a missile force unlike
either the Russian or the American force,
both of which were, after all, built when
there was no ballistic-missile defense The
Chinese will probably build even their first
operational intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles so that they will have a chance to pene-
trate Moreover, we believe it is well within
China's capabilities to do a good job at this
without intensive testing or tremendous
sacrifice in payload. '
Temporarily 'leaving aside penetration aids,
there are two pure strategies for attack
against a ballistic-missile defense. The first
is an all-warhead attack in which one uses
large booster rockets to transport many small
(that is, fractional-megaton) warheads.
These warheads are separated at some instant
between the time the missile leaves the at-
filosphere and the time of reentry. The war-
heads from one missile' can all be directed
against the same large target (such as a city);
these multiple reentry vehicles (MRV's) are
purely a penetration aid. Alternatively each
Of the reentry vehicles can be given an Inde-
pendent boost to a different target, thus mak-
ing them into MIRV's. MIRV is not a pene-
tration aid but is rather a counterforce weap-
on; if each of the reentry vehicles has very
high accuracy, then it is conceivable that
each of them may destroy an enemy missile
silo. The Titan TI liquid-fuel rocket, designed
more than 10 years ago, could carry 20 or
more thermonuclear Weapons. If these were
employed simply as IVLRV's, the 54 -Titans
'Could provide more than 1,000 reentry ve-
hicles for the defense to deal with.
Since the Spartan 'interceptors will each
cost $1 million to $2 million, including their
thermonuclear warheads, It is reasonable to
believe thermonuclear warheads can be de-
livered for less than it will cost the defender
to intercept them. The attacker can make a
further relative saving by concentrating his
strike so that most of the interceptors, all
bought and paid for, have nothing to shoot
at. This is a high-reliability penetration strat-
egy open to any country that can afford to
spend a reasOnable fraction of the amount its
opponent can spend for. defense.
The second pure strategy for attack against
an ABM defense is to precede the actual at-
tack With an all-decoy attack or to mix real
warheads with decoys. This can be achieved
rather cheaply by firing large rockets from
unhardened sites to send light, unguided de-
coys more or less in the direction of plausible
city targets. If the ABM defense is an area
defense like the Sentinel system, it must fire
against these threatening objects at very long
range -before they reenter the atmosphere,
where because of their lightness they would
behave differently from real warheads. Several
hundred to several thousand such decoys
launched by a few large vehicles could readily
exhaust a Sentinel-like system. The attack
with real warheads would then follow,
_ The key point is that since the putative
Chinese intercontinental-ballistic-missile
force is still in the early research and devel-
opment stage, it can and will be designed to
deal with the Sentinel system, whose inter-
ceptors and sensors are nearing production
and are rather well publicized. It is much
easier to design a missile force to counter
a defense that is already being deployed than
to design one for any of the possible defense
systems that might or might not be deploysd
sometime in the future.
One of us (Bethe) will now describe (1)
the physical mechanisms by which an ABM
missile can destroy or damage an incoming
warhead and (2) some of the penetration
aids available to an attacker who is deter-
mined to have his warheads reach their
targets.
Much study has been given to the pos-
sibility of using conventional explosives
rather than a thermonuclear explosive in the
warhead of a defensive missile. The answer
is that the "kill" radius of a conventional
explosive is much too small to be practical
in a likely tactical engagement. We shall con-
sider here only the more important effects of
the defensive thermonuclear weapon: the
emission of neutrons, the emission of X rays
and, when the weapon is exploded in the at-
mosphere, blast.
Neutrons have the ability to penetrate
matter of any kind. Those released by de-
fensive weapons could penetrate the heat
shield and outer jacket of an offensive war-
head and enter the fissile material itself,
causing the atoms to fission and generating
large amounts of heat. If sufficient heat is
generated, the fissile material will melt and
lose its carefully designed shape. Thereafter
it can no longer be detonated.
The kill radius for neutrons depends on
the design of the offensive weapon and the
yield, or energy release, of the defensive
weapon. The miss distance, or distance of
closest approach between the defensive and
the offensive missiles, can be made small
enough to achieve a kill by the neutron
mechanism. This is particularly true if the
defensive missile and radar have high per-
formance and the interception is made no
more than a few tens of kilometers from
the ABM launch site. The neutron-kill
mechanism is therefore practical for the
short-range defense of a city or other im-
portant target. It is highly desirable that
the yield of the defensive warhead be kept
low to minimize the effects of blast and heat
on the city being defended.
The attacker can, of course, attempt to
shield the fissile material in the offensive
warhead from neutron damage, but the mass
of shielding needed is substantial. Witness
the massive shield required to keep neutrons
from escaping from nuclear reactors. The
size of the reentry vehicle will enable the
defense to make a rough estimate of the
amount of shielding that can be carried and
thus to estimate the intensity of neutrons
required to melt the warhead's fissile
material.
Let us consider next the effect of X rays.
These rays carry off most of the energy
emitted by nuclear weapons, especially those
in the megaton range. If sufficient X-ray
energy falls on a reentry vehicle, it will cause
the surface layer of the vehicle's heat shield
to evaporate. This in itself may not be too
damaging, but the vapor leaves the surface
at high velocity in a very brief time and the
recoil sets up a powerful shock wave in the
heat shield. The shock may destroy the heat
shield material or the underlying ?structure.
X rays are particularly effective above the
upper atmosphere, where they can travel to
their target without being absorbed by air
molecules. The defense can therefore use
megaton weapons without endangering the
populaiton below; it is protected by the inter-
vening atmosphere. The kill radius can then
be many kilometers. This reduces the ac-
curacy required of the defensive missile and
allows successful interception at ranges of
hundreds of kilometers from the ABM launch
site. Thus X rays make possible an area
defense and provide the key to the Sentinel
system.
On the other hand, the reentry vehicle
can be hardened against X-ray damage to a
considerable extent. And in general the de-
fender will not know if the vehicle has been
damaged until it reenters the atmosphere.
If it has been severely damaged, it may break
up or burn up. If this does not happen, how-
ever, the defender is helpless unless he has
also constructed an effective terminal, or
short-range, defense system.
The third kill mechanism?blasts?can
operate only in the atmosphere and requires
little comment. Ordinarily when an offensive
warhead reenters the atmosphere it is de-
celerated by a force that, at maximum, is on
the order of 100 g. (One g is the acceleration
due to the earth's gravity.) The increased
atmospheric density reached within a shock
wave from a nuclear explosion in air can pro-
duce a deceleration several times greater. But
just as one can shield against neutrons and
X rays one can shield against blast by de-
signing the reentry vehicle to have great
structural strength. Moreover, the defense,
not knowing the detailed design of the re-
entry vehicle, has little way of knowing if it
has destroyed a given vehicle by blast until
the warhead either goes off or fails to de so.
The main difficulty for the defense is the
fact that in all probability the offensive re-
entry vehicle will not arrive as a single object
that can be tracked and fired on but will be
accompanied by many other objects deliber-
ately placed there by the offense. These
objects come under the heading of penetra-
tion aids. We shall discuss only a few of the
many types of such aids. They include frag-
ments of the booster rocket, decoys, fine
metal wires called chaff, electronic counter-
measures and blackout mechanisms of several
kinds. ?
The last stage of the booster that has pro-
pelled the offensive missile may disintegrate
into fragments or it can be fragmented de-
liberately. Some of the pieces will have a
radar cross section comparable to or larger
than the cross section. of the reentry vehicle
itself. The defensive radar therefore has the
task of discriminating between a mass of de-
bris and the warhead. Although various
means of discrimination are effective to some
extent, radar and data processing must be
specifically set up for this purpose. In any
case the radar must deal with tens of objects
for each genuine target, and this imposes
considerable complexity on the system.
There is, of course, an easy way to dis-
criminate among such objects; let the whole
swarm reenter the atmosphere. The lighter
booster fragments will soon be slowed down,
whereas the heavier reentry vehicle will con-
tinue to fall with essentially undiminished
speed. If a swarm of objects is allowed to re-
enter, however, one must abandon the con-
cept of area defense and construct a terminal
defense system. If a nation insists on re-
taining a pure area defense, it must be pre-
pared to shoot at every threatening object.
Not only is this extremely costly but also it
can quickly exhaust the supply of anti-
missile missiles.
Instead of relying on the accidental targets
provided by booster fragments, the offense
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will almost certainly want to employ decoys
that closely imitate the radar reflectivity of
the reentry vehicle. One cheap and simple
decoy is a balloon with the same shape as
the reentry vehicle. It can be made of thin
plastic covered with metal in the form of
foil, strips or wire mesh. A considerable num-
ber of such balloons can be carried unin-
Sated by a single offensive missile and re-
leased when the missile has risen above the
atmosphere.
The chief difficulty with balloons is putting
them on a "credible" trajectory, that is, a
trajectory aimed at a city or some other
plausible target. Nonetheless, if the defend-
ing force employs an area defense and really
seeks to protect the entire country, it must
try to intercept every suspicious object, in-
cluding balloon decoys. The defenSe may,
however, decide not to shoot at incoming
objects that seem to be directed against non-
vital targets; thus it may choose to limit
possible damage to the country rather than
to avoid all damage. The offense could then
take the option of directing live warheads
against points on the outskirts of cities,
where a nuclear explosion would still produce
radioactivity and possibly severe fallout over
densely populated regions. Worse, the possi-
bility that reentry vehicles can be built to
maneuver makes it dangerous to ignore ob-
jects even 100 kilometers off target.
Balloon decoys, even more than booster
fragments, will be rapidly slowed by the at-
mosphere and will tend to burn up when
they reenter it. Here again a terminal ABM
system has a far better chance than an area
defense system to discriminate between
decoys and warheads. One possibility for an
area system is "active" discrimination. If a
defensive nuclear missile is exploded some-
where in the cloud of balloon decoys travel-
ing with a reentry vehicle, the balloons will
either be destroyed by radiation from the
explosion or will be blown far off course.
The reentry vehicle presumably will survive.
/f the remaining set of objects is examined
by radar, the reentry vehicle may stand out
clearly. It can then be killed by a second
interceptor shot. Such a shoot-look-shoot
tactic may be effective, but it obviously
places severe demands on the ABM missiles
and the radar tracking system. Moreover, it
ean he countered by the use of small, dense
decoys within the balloon swarms,
Moreover, it may be possible to develop de-
coys that are as resistant to X rays as the
reentry vehicle and also are simple and com-
pact. Their radar reflectivity could be made
to simulate that of a reentry vehicle over a
wide range of frequencies. The decoys could
also be made to reenter the atmosphere?at
least down to a fairly low altitude?in a way
that closely mimicked an actual reentry ve-
hicle. The design of such decoys, however,
Would require considerable experimentation
and development.
Another way to confuse the defensive ra-
dar is to scatter the fine metal wires of ehaff.
If such wires are cut to about half the wave-
length of the defensive .radar, each wire Will
_ act as a reflecting dipole with a radar cross
section approximately equal to the wave-
length squared divided by 2r. The aetual
length of the wires is not critical; a wire of
a given length is also effective against radar
of shorter wavelength. Assuming that the
radar wavelength is one meter and that one-
/nil copper wire is cut to half-meter lengths,
one can easily calculate that 100 million
chaff wires will weigh only 200 kilograms
(440 pounds),
The chaff wires could be dispersed over a
large volume of space; the chaff could be
so dense and provide such large radar reflec-
tion that the reentry vehicle could not be
seen against the background noise. The de-
fense would then not know where in the
large reflecting cloud the reentry vehicle is
concealed. The defense would be induced to
spend several interceptors to cover the entire
cloud, with no certainty, even so, that the
hidden reentry vehicle will be killed. How
much of the chaff would survive the defense
nuclear explosion is another difficult ques-
tion. The main problem for the attacker is
to develop a way to disperse chaff more or
less uniformly.
An active alternative to the use of chaff is
to equip some decoys with electronic devices
that generate radio noise at frequencies se-
lected to jam the defensive radar. There are
many variations on such electronic counter-
measures, among them the use of jammers On
the reentry vehicles themselves.
The last of the penetration aids that will
be mentioned here is the radar blackout
caused by the large number of free electrons
released by a nuclear explosion. These elec-
trons, except for a few, are removed from
atoms or molecules of air, which thereby
become ions. There are two main causes for
the formation of ions: the fireball of the
explosion, which produces ions because of its
high temperature, and the radioactive debris
of the explosion, which releases beta rays
(high-energy electrons) that ionize the air
they traverse. The second mechanism is im-
portant only at high altitude.
The electrons in an ionized cloud of gas
have the property of bending and absorbing
electromagnetic waves, particularly those of
low frequency. Attenuation can reach such
high values that the defensive radar is pre-
vented from seeing any object behind the
ionized cloud (unlike chaff, which confuses
the radar only at the chaff range and not
beyond).
Blackout is a severe problem for an area
defense designed to intercept missiles above
the upper atmosphere. The problem is aggra-
vated because area-defense radar is likely to
employ low-frequency (long) waves, which
are the most suitable for detecting enemy
missiles at long range. In some recent pop-
ular articles long-wave radar has been hailed
as the cure for the problems of the ABM
missile. It is not. Even though it increases
the capability of the radar in some ways, it
makes the system more vulnerable to black-
out.
Blackout can be caused in two ways: by
the defensive nuclear explosions themselves
and by deliberate explosions set off at high
altitude by the attacker. Although the for-
mer are unavoidable, the defense has the
choice of setting them off at altitudes and
In locations that will cause the minimum
blackout of its radar. The offense can sacri-
fice a few early missiles to cause blackout
at strategic locations. In what follows we
shall assume for purposes of discussion that
the radar wavelength is one meter. Transla-
tion to other wavelengths is not difficult.
In order to totally reflect the one-meter
waves from our hypothetical radar it is nec-
essary for the attacker to create an ionized
cloud containing 10? electrons per cubic
centimeter. Much smaller electron densities,
however, will suffice for considerable attenu-
ation. For the benefit of technically minded
readers, the equation for attenuation in
decibels per kilometer is
4.34 a
a=3 X 105 a2+7,2 7?
Here cop is the plasma frequency for the
given electron density, La is the radar fre-
quency in radians per second and .ye is the
frequency of collisions of an electron with
atoms of air. At normal temperatures, this
frequency Pe is the number 2 x 1011 multi-
plied by the density of the air (s) compared
with sea-level density (se), or yess2 X10 11
po. At altitudes above 30 kilometers, where
an area-defense system will have to make
most of its interceptions, the density of air is
less than .01 of the density at sea level. Under
these conditions the electron collision fre-
quency la is less than the value of ce.,- (2r
X 3 X 10?) and therefore can be neglected in
the denominator of the equation, Using that
equation, we can then specify the number of
electrons, N., needed to attenuate one-meter
radar waves by a factor of more than one
decible per kilometer:Ne > 350p./ p. At an al-
titude of 30 kilometers, where se/p is about
100, N. is about 3 X 10?, and at 60 kilometers
N. is still only about 3 x 10?. Thus the elec-
tron densities needed for the substantial at-
tenuation of a radar signal are well under the
100 electrons per cubic centimeter required
for total reflection. The ionized cloud created
by the fireball of a nuclear explosion is typi-
cally 10 kilometers thick; if the attenuation
is one decibel per kilometer, such a cloud
would produce a total attenuation of 10 deci-
bels. This implies a tenfold reduction of the
outgoing radar signal and another tenfold
reduction of the reflected signal, which
amounts to effective blackout.
The temperature of the fireball created by
a nuclear explosion in the atmosphere is
initially hundreds of thousands of degrees
centigrade. It quickly cools by radiation to
about 5,000 degrees C. Thereafter cooling is
produced primarily by the cold air entrained
by the fireball as it rises slowly through the
atmosphere, a process that takes several min-
utes.
When air is heated to 5,000 degrees C., it is
strongly ionized. To produce a radar attenu-
ation of one decibel per kilometer at an alti-
tude of 90 kilometers the fireball temperature
need be only 3,000 degrees, and at 50 kilom-
eters a temperature of 2,000 degrees will suf-
fice. Ionization may be enhanced by the pres-
ence in the fireball of iron, uranium and
other metals, which are normally present in
the debris of nuclear explosion.
The size of the fireball can easily be esti-
mated. Its diameter is about one kilometer
for a one-megaton explosion at sea level. For
other altitudes and yields there is a simple
scaling law: the fireball diameter is equal to
(Ypdp)112, where 17 is the yield in megatons.
Thus a fireball one kilometer in diameter can
be produced at an altitude of 30 kilometers
(where ado - 100) by an explosion of only 10
kilotons, At an altitude of 50 kilometers
(where p,/p= 1,000), a one-megaton explosion
will produce a fireball 10 kilometers in diam-
eter. At still higher altitudes matters be-
come complicated because the density of the
atmosphere falls off so sharply and the mech-
anisms of heating the atmosphere changes.
Nevertheless, fireballs of very large diameter
can be expected when megaton weapons are
exploded above 100 kilometers. These could
well black out areas of the sky measured in
thousands of square kilometers.
For explosions at very high altitudes (be-
tween 100 and 200 kilometers) other phenom-
ena become significant. Collisions between
electrons and air molecules are now unim-
portant, The condition for blackout is simply
that there be more than 10? electrons per
cubic centimeter.
At the same time very little mass of air is
available to cool the fireball. If the air is at
first fully ionized by the explosion, the air
molecules will be dissociated into atoms. The
atomic ions combine very slowly with elec-
trons. When the density is low enough, as it
is at high altitude, the recombination can
take place only by radiation. The radiative
recombination constant (call it Cs) is about
10-12 cubic centimeter per second. When the
initial electron density is well above 10? per
cubic centimeter, the number of electrons
remaining after time t is roughly equal to
1/Cat. Thus if the initial electron density is
101? per cubic centimeter, the density will
remain above 100 for 1,000 seconds, or some
17 minutes. The conclusion is that nuclear
explosions at very high altitude can produce
long-lasting blackouts over large areas.
The second of the two mechanisms for
producing an ionized cloud, the beta rays
Issuing from the radioactive debris of a nu-
clear explosion, can be even more effective
than the fireball mechanism. If the debris
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June 13,1 1968
is at high altitude, the beta rays will follow
he lines of force in the earth's magnetic
field, with about half of the beta rays going
imniediately down into the atmosphere and
the other half traveling out into space before
returning earthward. These beta rays have
an average energy of about 500,000 electron
volts, and when they strike the atmosphere,
they ionize air molecules. Beta rays of aver-
age energy penetrate to an altitude of about
60 kilometers; some of the more energetic
rays go down to about 50 kilometers. At these
levels, then; a high-altitude explosion will
give rise to sustained ionization as long as
the debris of the explosion stays in the
One can show that blackout will occur if
X t-1.2>10-', where t is the time alter the
explosion in seconds and y is the fission yield
deposited per unit horizontal area of the
debris cloud, measured in tons of TNT equiv-
alent per square kilometer. The factor t-1.2
expresses the rate of decay of the radioactive
debris. If the attacker wishes to cause a
blackout lasting five minutes (t=300), he
can achieve it with a debris level y equal to
10 tons of fission yield per square kilometer.
This could be attained by spreading one
megaton of fission products over a Circular
area about 400 kilometers in diameter at an
altitude of, say, 60 kilometers. Very little
could be seed by an area-defense radar at-
tempting to look out from under such a
blackout disk. Whether or not such a disk
could actually be produced is another ques-
tion. Terminal defense would not, of course,
be greatly disturbed by a beta ray blackout.
The foregoing discussion has concentrated
-mainly on the penetration aids that can be
devised against an area-defense system. By
this we do not mean to suggest that a ter-
minal-defense system can be effective, and
We certainly do not wish to imply that we
'favor the development and deployment of
such a system.
Terminal defense has a vulnerability all
its own. Since it defends only a small area,
It can easily be bypassed. Suppose that the
20 largest American cities were provided
With terminal defense. It would be easy for
an enemy to attack the 21st largest city and
as many -Other undefended cities as he
chose. Although the population per target
'Would be less than if the largest cities were
attacked, casualties Would still be heavy.
Alternatively the offense could concentrate
on just a few of the 20 largest cities and ex-
haust their supply of antimissile missiles,
which could readily be done by the use of
multiple warheads even without decoys.
? /t was pointed out by Charles M. Herzfeld
in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists a
few Years ago that a judicious employment
of ABM defenses could equalize the risks
of living in cities of various sizes. Suppose
New York, with a population of about 10
million, were defended well enough to re-
quire 50 enemy warheads to penetrate the
defenses, plus a few more to destroy the city.
If cities of 200,000 inhabitants were left un-
defended, it would be equally "attractive"
for an enemy to attack New York and pene-
trate its defenses as to attack an uncle-
tended city.
Even if such a "logical" pattern of ABM
defense were to be seriously proposed, it is
hard to believe that" people in the unde-
fended cities would accept their statistical
security. To satisfy everyone would require
a terminal system of enormous extent. The
highest cost estimate made in public dis-
cussions, $50 billion, cannot be far wrong.
Although such a massive system would af-
ford some protection against the U.S.S.R.'s
present armament, it is virtually certain that
the Russians would react to the deployment
of the system. It would be easy for them to
increase the number of their offensive war-
heads and thereby raise the level of ex-
pected damage back to the one no esti-
mated. In his recent forecast of defense
needs for the next five years, Secretary Mc-
Namara estirnated the relative cost of ABM
defenses and the cost of countermeasures
that the offense can take. He finds invari-
ably that the offense, by spending consider-
ably less money than the defense, can re-
store casualties and destruction to the origi-
nal level before defenses were installed. Since
the offense is likely -to be "conservative," it
is our belief that the actual casualty figures
in a nuclear exchange, after both sides had
deployed ABM systems and simultaneously
Increased offensive forces, would be worse
than these estimates suggest.
Any such massive escalation of offensive
and defensive armaments could hardly be
accomplished in a democracy without strong
social and psychological effects. The nation
would think more of war, prepare more for
war, hate the potential enemy and thereby
make war more likely. The policy of both
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the past decade
has been to reduce tensions to provide more
understanding, and to devise weapon sys-
tems that make war less likely. It seems to
us that this should remain our policy.
STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
ROBERT S. MCNAMARA
Before I discuss the analytical basis for
these conclusions and our specific program
proposals, I would first like to present the
latest estimates of the strategic threat.
B. THE SIZE AND CHARACTER OF THE THREAT
Each year in presenting our projections
of the strategic nuclear threat to the United
States, I have cautioned that while we have
reasonably high confidence in our estimates
for the closer-in period, our estimates for
the more distant years are subject to con-
siderable uncertainty. This is still the case
with regard to our current projections. The
estimates through 1369 are reasonably firm.
Beyond that point they become progressively
less firm, especially where they deal with the
period beyond the production and deploy-
ment leadtimes of the weapons systems
involved.
1. The Soviet strategic off ensive-defensive
forces
Summarized in the following table are the
Soviet strategic offensive forces estimated
for October 1, 1967. The programmed U.S.
forces for those same dates are shown for
comparison:
UNITED STATES VERSUS SOVIET INTERCONTINENTAL
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES
Oct. 1, 1967
United U.S.S.R.
States
ICBM launchers 2
1,054
SLBM launchers, 656
720
30
Total, intercontinental missile
launchers 1,710
Intercontinental bombers 4
Total force loadings, approximate num
ber of warheads 4,500
697
750
155
1,000
These are mid-1967 figures.
2 Excludes ICBM test range launchers which could have some
operational capability against the United States. Soviets also
have MR/IRBM's capable of striking Eurasian targets.
I n addition to the SLBM's on nuclear-powered submarins%
the Soviets also have SLBM's on diesel-powered submarines
whose primary targets are believed to be strategic land targets
in Eurasia. The Soviets also have submarine-launched cruise
missiles whose primary targets we believe to be naval and
merchant vessels.
In addition to the intercontinental bombers, the Soviets
have a force of medium bombers/tankers capable of striking
Eurasian targets.
a. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
Over the past year, the Soviets have con-
tinued their build-up of hardened and dis-
persed land-based missiles. We estimate that
as of 1 October 1967 they had a total of 720
ICBM launchers operational compared to 340
a year earlier. We believe the Soviet ICBM
force will continue to grow over the next few
years, but at a considerably slower rate than
in the recent past.
As you may recall, I announced last No-
vember thaat the Soviets were intensively
testing what we believe to be a- Fractional
Orbit Bombardment System (FOBS). Such a
system?which is really an ICBM of different
trajectory?could be launched on a very low
trajectory across the northern approaches of
the United States, thus reducing the possi-
bility of timely detection by the Ballistic
Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS); or,
alternatively, around the southern ap-
proaches which are not covered by BMEWS.
In either event, the weapon would not have
a very high order of accuracy and would have
to pay a heavy penalty in payload. It would,
therefore, be useful primarily against soft
targets. Although years ago we considered
and rejected such a system for our own use,
the Soviets may believe it to be useful in a
surprise nuclear strike against our bomber
bases or as a penetration tactic against ABM
systems. Later, in my discussion of the de-
fensive programs, I will touch on some of the
measures we have taken in anticipation of
that type of threat.
b. Antiballistic Missile Defense
Last year I noted that in addition to the
GALOSH system around Moscow, the Soviets
were deploying another type of defensive sys-
tem elsewhere in the Soviet Union. I cau-
tioned, however that the weight of the
evidence at the time suggested that this
system was not intended primarily for anti-
ballistic missile defense. Now, I can tell you
that the majority of our intelligence com-
munity no longer believes that this so-called
"Tallinn" system (which is being deployed
across the northwestern approaches to the
Soviet Union and in several other places) has
any significant ABM capability. This system
is apparently designed for use within the at-
mosphere, most likely against an aero-dy-
namic rather than a ballistic missile threat.
Although construction of the Galosh ABM
system around Moscow is proceeding at a
moderate pace, no effort has been made dur-
ing the last year to expand that system or
extend it to other cities. It is the consensus of
the intelligence community that this system
could provide a limited defense of the Mos-
cow area but that it could be seriously de-
graded by sophisticated penetration aids.
Nevertheless, knowing what we do about past
Soviet predilections for defensive systems,
we must, for the time being, plan our forces
on the assumption that they will have de-
ployed some sort of an ABM system around
their major cities by the early 1970s.
2. Red Chinese nuclear threat
Our current estimates of the Red Chinese
nuclear threat are essentially the same as
those I presented here last year. The Chinese
have the technical and industrial capabili-
ties required for the deployment of ballistic
missiles and we believe that they are making
an intensive effort to develop a medium range
missile. We estimate that the first of these
missiles could be deployed as early as 1967-68
and that by the mid-1970s, they could have
a modest force operational.
With regard to ICBMs, we continue to be-
lieve that the Chinese nuclear weapons and
ballistic missile development programs are
being pursued with a high priority. However,
it is now clear that they failed to conduct
either a space or a long-range ballistic mis-
sile launching before the end of 1967, as we
thought possible last year. We still believe
such a launching could be made on relatively
short notice. In any event, our estimate last
year that it appeared unlikely the Chinese
could achieve an IOC with an ICBM before
the early 19700, or deploy a significant num-
ber of operational ICBMs before the mid-
1370s, still holds. And, of course, those ICBMs
would not have a very high degree of relia-
bility, speed of response or protection against
attack.
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mu) SiaNATE
The Red Chinese also have several types of
aircraft which could carry nuclear weapons,
but most, of them have a limited operational
'radius and none have an intercontinental
radius. It is highly unlikely on the basis of
cost alone that they would undertake the
development, production and deployment of
an intercontinental bomber force. I they
chose to do so, it would take them a decade
or more before they could deploy such a
force.
C. CAPABILITIES OF THE PROPOSED U.S. IITACES
FOR "ASSURED DESTRUCTION"
As I noted earlier, the only true measure
of the effectiveness of our "Assured Destruc-
tion" forces is their ability, even after ab-
sorbing a well-coordinated surprise first
irtrike, to inflict unacceptable damage on the
attacker. In this next portion of my State-
ment, I would like to examine with you our
latest analyses of how well our strategic
forces can be expected to accomplish that
mission: first, against the "highest expected
threat" projected in the latest National In-
telligence Estimates and, second, against a
Greater-Than-Expected Threate
1. Capability against the "highest expected
threat" in the NIE
Even if the Soviet strategic forces by 1972
reach the higher end of the range of esti-
Mates projected in the latest NIEs and even
if they were to assign their entire available
Missile force to attacks on our strategic
forces (reserving only refire missiles and
bomber-delivered weapons for urban targets),
about one-half of our forces programmed for
1972 would survive and remain effective. If
the Soviets expand the Mopcow ABM defense
and deploy the same or a. Similar system
around other cities at the highest rate pro-
jected in the latest NIEs, about three-quar-
ters of our surviving weapons would detonate
over their targets. The destructive potential
Of such a U.S. retaliatory attack is illustrated
by the following table:
SOVIET POPULATION AND INDUSTRY DESTROYED
(Assumed 1972 total population of 247,000,000; urban population
of 116,000,000]
Total population Industrial
fatalities capacity
destroyed
Millions Percent (percent)
1 megaton equivalent
delivered war-
heads:
100 37 15 59
200 52 21 72
400 74 30 76
800 96 39 77
1,200 109 44 77
1,600 116 47 77
Even if the Soviets deploy a substantial
number of ABM interceptors by 1972, our
strategic missile forces alone could still de-
stroy more than two-fifths of their total
population (more than 100 million people) ,
and over three-quarters of their induatrial
capacity. As the foregoing table demon-
strates, beyond 400 one-megaton equivalents
optimally delivered, further increments
would not meaningfully change the amount
of damage inflicted because we would be
bringing smaller and smaller cities under
attack.
These results, of course, reflect the deci-
sions we have taken in recent years to en-
1 The "highest expected threat" is actUally
composed of the upper range of NIE projec-
tions for each element of the Soviets' stra-
tegic forces. In many cases, these represent
alternatives and it is highly unlikely that
all elements would ever reach the top end
of the quantitative range simultaneolasly.
Therefore, the "highest expected threat" is
really a greater threat than that projected in
the NIE.
han.ce the future capabilities of our "Assured
Destruction" forces, including:
1. The production and deployment of the
POSEIDON missile with 1V1IRVs.
2. The production and. deployment of im-
proved missile penetration aids.
3. The increase in the proportion of MIN-
UTEMAN Ins (with MIRVs and a new im-
proved third stage) in the planned force.
4. The initiation of development of new
small reentry vehicles in order to increase
substantially the number of warheads (or
penetration aids) which can be carried by a
single missile.
5. The development and production of
SRAMs for our strategic bombers.
These and other measures will not only
enhance the survivability of our strategic
missile forces but will also greatly increase
the number of weapons which we could place
'over the Soviet Union in 1972. As I stated
earlier, numbers of weapons will be much
more important in the future than gross
megatonnage. Our calculations show that,
even if the Soviets deploy a substantial num-
ber of ABMs by 1972, our offensive forces
(after absorbing a surprise attack) would
still be able to inflict about the same percent
fatalities on the Soviet population in a sec-
ond strike in 1972 as they could have in 1966.
Indeed, if the Soviet offensive-defensive
threat does not increase beyond the highest
level now projected through 1972 in the latest
National Intelligence Estimates, we will have
more "Assured Destruction" capability than
we will probably need. However, I have re-
peatedly cautioned that our "Assured De-
struction" capability is of such crucial im-
portance to our security that we must be
prepared to cope with Soviet strategic
threats which are greater than those pro-
jected in the latest intelligence estimates. Ac-
cordingly, we must continually reexamine the
various actions, beyond those which now
seem probable, by which the Soviets might
seek.,, to strengthen their strategic forces and
take appropriate steps in a timely manner
to hedge against them.
2. Capability against "greater-than-expected
threats"
As was the case last year, the most severe
threat we must consider in planning our
"Assured Destruction" forces is a Soviet de-
ployment of a substantial hard target kill
capability in the form of highly accurate
small ICBMs or MIRVed large ICBMs, to-
gether with an extensive, effective ABM de_
tense. A large Soviet ICBM force with a sub-'
stantial hard target kill capability might
be able to destroy a large number of our
Minuteman missiles in their silos. An ex-
tensive, effective Soviet ABM defense might
then be able to intercept and destroy a large
part of our residual missile warheads, in-
cluding those carried by submarine-launched
missiles. In combination, therefore, these two
actions could conceivably seriously degrade
our "Assured Destruction" capability-.
Again, I want to remind you that both
of these threats are quantitatively far greater
than those projected in the latest intelligence
estimates. Moreover, we believe that the ac-
curacy of Soviet ICBMs is still substantially
inferior to that of our own missiles. Neverthe-
less, even though such a threat is extremely
unlikely, we have taken account of the pos-
sibility in our longer range force planning.
Our calculations show that against either
one of the Soviet Greater-Than-Expected
Threats, the offensive or the defensive threat,
the presently programmed forces could still
perform their missions through the mid-
1970s.
Against the massive and highly unlikely
combined Greater-Than-Expected Offensive
and Defensive Threats, these same forces with
POSEIDON missiles carrying a full load of
warheads and with bomber penetration aids
(options which we could exercise in FY 1970)
could still destroy in a second strike (de-
June t3, 1968 -
pending upon how we target our forces)
about 18 to 25 percent of the population and
two-thirds to three-quarters of the industrial
capacity of the Soviet Union, even after ab-
sorbing a surprise attack. The prospect of
having to absorb losses of this magnitude
from a U.S. retaliatory strike should, in it-
self, pose a very substantial deterrent to the
Soviet Union. Nevertheless, for the purpose of
planning our forces so far ahead, this level
of damage may become too low for complete
confidence in our deterrent. Accordingly,
prudence dictates that we act now to place
ourselves in a position to strengthen our
"Assured Destruction" capabilities in the
unlikely event that both of the Greater-
Than-Expected Threats actually begin to
emerge.
Fortunately, we have a large number of
additional options from which we can draw
to strengthen those capabilities by the mid-
1970s. We can convert the entire force to
Minuteman Tar, increase the number of war-
heads each Minuteman missile could carry,
emplace the entire Minuteman III force in
superhard silos, and/or protect the Minute-
man force with an ABM defense.
There are, of course, still other options
available, such as the construction and de-
ployment of more Poseidon submarines, and
the development and production of a new
land-based missile. Although a new land-
based ICBM does not appear to offer any par-
ticular advantage over the Minuteman III
in superhard silos, I believe we should keep
that option open by starting development
now of a silo which could be used for either
the Minuteman III or a new ICBM. The op-
tions of defending Minuteman with the AI31V1
and of constructing more Poseidon subma-
rines will continue to be available for some
time into the future and neither requires a
commitment at this time.
As I noted in previous years, under certain
circumstances there may be some advantage
in maintaining a miXed offensive force of
missiles and a limited number of bombers.
By having a capability to attack some cities
with missiles only, and others with bombers
only, we can force the Soviet Union to main-
tain defenses against both. But to do this,
we do not need either a very large bomber
force or a new bomber. The present program
provides for a mixed force of missiles and
bombers into the latter part of the 1070s, and
the options open to us will permit extending
the life of the bomber force and increasing
its capability, and/or the addition of a new
bomber, should threats greater than that
projected by the NIE develop.
Against the Greater-Thar -Expected
Threat, any bomber force ought to be
equipped with improved penetration aids to
ciepe with the kind of anti-bomber defense
systems postulated in this threat. We have
no evidence the Soviets are actually deploy-
ing such systems, although they are devel-
oping new high performance fighter aircraft.
Nevertheless, we should keep the options
open to upgrade our presently programmed
bomber force and to deploy a new bomber if
one should eventually be required.. But the
pacing items at the present time are the
penetration aids, particularly those needed
to counter the improved interceptors the So-
viets may deploy in the future, and these
are the programs which should receive our
first attention regardless of which option we
may ultimately choose to exercise.
Again, may I remind you that all of these
missile and bomber options are directly re-
lated to the combined Greater-Than-Ex-
pected Threat, and until we have some evi-
dence that this threat is actually beginning
to emerge, we need not and should not de-
cide to deploy any of these systems. Instead,
we should carefully time our actions on all
of them in step with the development of the
threat, keeping in mind the various develop-
ment, production and deployment leadtimes
involved.
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D. CAPABILITIES Or mr-TE IlEOPOSED FORCES 5011
DAMAGE LIMITATION
There are two major issues this year in the
Damage Limitation portion of the Strategic
Forces Program. The first concerns the de-
ployment of an anti-ballistic missile defense
and, the second, the future size and compo-
sition of the anti-bomber defense forces.
T. Anti-ballistic missile defense
Last year I presented to you in consider-
able detail our analysis of the anti-ballistic
Missile defense issue. I described the three
major purposes for which we might want to
deploy an ABM system, the kinds of radars
and misisles which would be involved, the
technical uncertainties which still remained
to be resolved, and the costs and benefits of
some of the alternative deployments. With
regard to the three purposes, I concluded
that:
1. The deployment of an ABM defense for
MINUTEMAN might offer a partial substi-
tute for the further expansion of our offen-
sive farces in the event the Greater-Than-
Expected Soviet threat began to emerge.
2. The deployment of an austere ABM de-
fense against a Red Chinese ICBM threat
might offer a high degree of protection to the
entire Nation, at least through the 1970s.
3. The deployment of an ABM defense for
the protection of our cities against the kind
of heavy, sophisticated missile attack the
Soviets could launch in the 1970s would al-
most surely cause them to react by increas-
ing the capabilities of their offensive forces,
thus leaving us in essentially the same posi-
tion we were before.
Further study of this issue during the last
year has served to confirm these conclusions.
Since I have already touched on the first
purpose in connection with the analysis of
our "Assured Destruction" capabilities
against the Greater-Than-Expected Soviet
threat, I will limit my discussion at this
point to the other two purposes.
a. Defense Against the Red Chinese
Nuclear Threat
As I noted earlier, there is mounting evi-
dence that the Red Chinese are devoting
very substantial resources to the develop
ment of both nuclear warheads and missile
delivery systems. Within a period of 39
months, they detonated seven nuclear de-
vices. The first, in October 1964, was an all
U-235 fission test with a low yield; the sec-
ond, in May 1965, was a similar test with a
low-intermediate yield. In May 1966 they
detonated their first device involving ther-
monuclear material. Then, in October 1966,
they tested their first missile-delivered de-
vice with a low yield fission warhead, thus
demonstrating sufficient engineering skill to
conduct a missile-warhead systems test. In
December 1966, they detonated their second
device involving thermonuclear material. In
June 1967, they detonated a device with a
yield of a few megatons dropped from an air-
plane. Finally, last December, they detonated
another device, but this test was apparently
a partial failure.
These seven nuclear tests, taken together
With their -continuing work on surf ace-to-
surface missiles, lead us to believe that they
are moving ahead with the development of
an ICBM. Indeed, if their programs proceed
at the present pace, they could have a modest
force of ICBMs by the mid-1970s.
In the light of this progress in nuclear
weapons and missile delivery systems, it
seemed both prudent and feasible to us last
September to initiate the deployment of an
austere Chinese-oriented ABM defense. We
knew from our continuing study of this sys-
tem that it could be deployed at an invest-
ment cost of about $5 billion, and could be
highly effective against the kind of threat a
Chinese force might pose in the 1970s.
As presently defined, the Sentinel ABM
, system (i.e., the system specifically designed
against the Chinest threat) would consist of
Perimeter Acquisition Radars (PARs), Mis-
sile Site Radars (MSRs), long range Spartan
area defense missiles and, later, some Sprint
local defense missiles for certain special pur-
poses. The effectiveness of this deployment
in reducing U.S. fatalities from a Red Chi-
nese attack in the 1970s is shown in the
table following:
U.S. FATALITIES FROM A CHINESE FIRST STRIKE, 1970's
]la millions]
Number of Chinese ICBM's
X 2.5X 7.5X
U.S. fatalities:
Without Sentinel 7 11 15
With Sentinel (1) (1) 1
1 Fewer than 1,000,000 U.S. dead with some probability of no
deaths.
It is apparent from the foregoing table
tha,t the Sentinel system, facing a relatively
"primitive" attack, could probably hold U.S.
fatalities below one million. Obviously, if
and when the Chinese ICBM force grows,
quantitatively and qualitatively, beyond the
levels shown in the foregoing table, additions
and improvements would probably have to be
made in the Sentinel system. We believe,
however, that for relatively modest additional
outlays the system could be improved so as
to limit the Chinese damage potential to low
levels into the mid-1980s. The Sentinel sys-
tem would also have a number of other ad-
vantages. It would provide an additional
indication to the people of Asia that we in-
tend to support them against nuclear black-
mail from China, and thus help to convince
the non-nuclear countries that acquisition
of their own nuclear weapons is not required
for their security. Furthermore, this initial
deployment would serve as a foundation to
which we could add a defense for our Min-
uteman force if that later becomes desir-
able. Finally, it could protect our population
against the improbable, but possible, acci-
dental launch of a few ICBMs by any one of
the nuclear powers.
b. Deployment of Nike?X for Defense of
Our Cities Against Soviet Attack.
Nothing has occurred during the last year
to change my conviction that the deploy-
ment of the Nike?X system for the defense
of our cities against a Soviet attack would,
under present circumstances, be a futile
waste of our resources. I believe it is clear
from my earlier discussion of the trends in
the nature of the threat, as evaluated by our
intelligence community, that the Soviets are
determined to maintain a nuclear deterrent
against the United States. If this is true, as
I believe it is, any attempt on our part to re-
duce their "Assured Destruction" capability
below what they might consider necessary to
deter us would simply cause them to respond
with an offsetting increase in their offensive
forces. It is precisely this process of action
and reaction upon which the arms race feeds,
at great cost to both sides and benefit to
neither. This point is illustrated in the table
on the following page which is based on nu-
clear strike capabilities as they might be
viewed by the potential adversaries.
NUMBERS OF FATALITIES IN AN ALL-OUT STRATEGIC EXCHANGE, MID 1970's!
n millions]
U.S. program
Soviet response
Soviets strike first against
military and city targets;
United States retaliates
against cities
United States strikes first
at military targets; Soviets
retaliate against U.S. cities;
United States retaliates against
Soviet cities
U.S.
fatalities
Soviet
fatalities
U.S.
fatalities
Soviet
fatalities
Na ABM
None
120
120
120
80
Sentinel
None
100
120
90
80
Pen-Aids
120
120
110
80
Posture A
None
40
120
10
80
MIRV, Pen-Aids
110
120
60
80
Plus 100 mobile ICBM's
110
120
90
80
Posture B
None
20
120
10
80
MIRV, Pen-Aids
70
120
40
80
Plus 550 mobile ICBM's
100
120
90
80
'At fatality levels approximating 100,000,000 or more, differences of 10,000,000 to 20,000,000 in the calculated results are less
than the margin of error in the estimates.
"Posture A" is a light defense against a
Soviet missile attack on our cities. It con-
sists of an area defense of the entire con-
tinental United States, providing redundant
(overlapping) coverage of key target areas,
and, in addition, a relatively low-density
Sprint defense of 25 cities to provide some
protection against those warheads - which
get through the area defense. "Posture B"
Is a heavier defense with the same area
coverage, but with much greater sophistica,
tion -in its electronics and a .higher-density
Sprint defense for 52 cities.
Postures A and B would also require
some improvement in our defense against
manned bomber attack in order to preclude
the Soviets from undercutting the ABM de-
fense; we would also want to expand and im-
prove our anti-submarine warfare forces to
help defend against Soviet missile-launching
submarines. The "current" estimates of the
investment cost of the total "Damage Limit-
ing" package are at least $13 billion for
Posture A and at least $22 billion for Pos-
ture B. On the basis of past experience, how-
ever, actual costs would more likely be $40
billion by the time the system had been
completed.
Cost, however, is not the problem. If we
could actually build and deploy a genuinely
impenetrable shield over the United States,
we would be willing to spend $40 billion.
But, if after spending these tens of billions
of dollars, we could still expect to find our-
selves in a position where a Soviet attack
could inflicit unacceptable damage on our
population because of their response to our
defensive efforts, I do not see how we would
have really improved our security or free-
dom of action. And neither can I see how
the Soviets will have improved their se-
curity and freedom of action if after all their
additional expenditures for offensive and de-
fensive systems, we can still inflicit unac-
ceptable damage on them, even after absorb-
ing their first strike. For this reason we have
come to the conclusion that both sides would
be far better off if we can reach an agree-
ment on the limitation of all strategic nu-
clear forces, including ABMs.
In any event, there is no point whatever
In our responding to a massive ABM deploy-
ment on their part with a massive ABM
deployment of our own. Instead, we should
act realistically and further strengthen our
offensive forces, if and when necessary, to
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Ai. ICLWRD ? SENATE Jane 18, 1968
preserve our "Assured Destruction" capa-
bility.
E. STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES
The force structure proposed for the PY
1969-73 period is shown on a classified table
provided to the Committee.
1. Missile farces
In overall terms the missile forces We are
proposing for the FY 1969-73 period are
essentially the same as those I discussed last
year-1,000 Minuteman, 496 Poseidon and
180 Polaris, plus 54 Titan Us. Within these
overall numbers, however, we are proposing
some changes in mix and payload.
a. Minuteman
Last year / told you that in order to in-
crease the capability of our offensive forces
against a possible strong Soviet ABM defense,
We proposed to increase the number of
Minuteman Ms in the force. I also pointed
out that by FY 1973-74 it would probably
become necessary to replace the earliest
Minuteman II missiles, and that we could
then add more Minuteman Ms if that should
appear desirable.
Although the Soviet ABM deployment is
not moving forward as fast as anticipated last
year, we now believe it would be desirable to
increase the number of Minuteman Ills. And,
as I indicated earlier, we have included funds
in the FY 1969 Budget for the development
of dual-purpose super-hard silos for the
Minuteman or a new land-based ICBM. Be-
cause the development program for the
Minuteman III is taking longer than we had
planned, and because we want to pursue a
More efficient overall Minuteman moderniza-
tion schedule, initial deployment of the
Minuteman III will slip some months behind
the schedule envisioned last year. The phase
out of Minuteman I will be slowed down to
compensate for the slip in the Minuteman
III program.
b. Titan II
Although the Titan II will decline in im-
portance as the Minuteman III and the
Poseidon are deployed, it may be advisable
to retain the present force of 54 missiles on
launchers. Its heavy payload would be useful
against large soft targets which are not de-
fended by ABMs. On the basis of a recent re-
view of the Titan H follow-on test program,
we now believe that four testa per year, in-
stead of six, will be enough to ensure that
the missiles in the force are operationally re-
liable. Thus, with the procurement of a small
number of missiles in FY 1969-70, we can
maintain the present force of 54 Titan mis-
siles on launchers throughout the program
period, instead of allowing it to decline after
FY 1970 as we planned last year.
c. Polaris-Poseidon
The Polaris-Poseidon program is essentially
the same as the one I presented here last
year. Thirty-one of the 41 Polaris submarines,
all of which have now become operational,
will be refitted with the Poseidon missile.
The other ten (five 598-Class and five 608-
Class) cannot be refitted without replacing
the center section of their hulls. The cost
would be about equal to that of a new sub-
marine, and even then they would not be as
good as the other 31. Accordingly, these sub-
marines will continue to carry the Polaris
missiles The five 598-Class ships, which orig-
inally carried the A-1, have already been re-
fitted with the A-3. The five 608-Class ships,
which now carry the A-2, will be refitted with
the A-3 during their second overhaul. The
proposed FY 1969 shipbuilding and conver-
sion program includes funds for six Poseidon
conversions and advance procurement for
nine more.
d. New Strategic Missile Systems
Last year I told you that we are making a
comprehensive study of new strategic missile
systems. This study was completed last sum-
me?, and on the basis of its findings we have
included $56 million in the FY 1969 Budget
for advanced ICBM technology.
? ?
b. Manned Interceptors
The ultimate U.S. manned interceptor force
will consist of modified F-106Xs (supported
by C-130s which Would be used to move
ground crews and equipment to the dispersal
recycle bases), plus an Air National Guard
F-102 squadron in Hawaii. This squadron,
together with the search radars, will con-
tinue to provide a local air defense capa-
bility for that remote state. We plan to start
the phase-down of the interceptor forces in
FY 1969.
c. Surface-to-Air Missiles
On the basis of our present plans, all of
the Bomarc force would be phased out when
the full F-106X force becomes operational.
Most of the Hercules and all of the Hawks.
however, will be retained.
2. Missile and space defense
The decision to deploy a Chinese-oriented
ABM defense system will undoubtedly have
an important impact on other strategic de-
fensive programs. For example, we already
know that the Perimeter Acquisition Radar
(PAR) planned for the Sentinel system could
also be made to handle some of the long-
range acquisition and tracking functions
presently performed by the three BMEWS
sites. Conversely, the over-the-Horizon (back-
scatter) radars planned for the anti-bomber
defense could also be used to provide limited
detection and tracking of ballistic missiles
launched from submarines. 'Moreover, in
order to provide a backup for BlVIEWS, we
have already deployed several Over-the-
Horizon (forward-scatter) radar transmitters
and receivers, and we have under active de-
velopment for a number of years a satellite-
borne missile warning system which now ap-
pears to be capable of providing earlier warn-
ing than BMEWS. (The forward-scatter 0TH
and the satellite-borne missile warning sys-
tem are two of the measures I alluded to in
my earlier discussion of the Soviet FOBS.)
Clearly, the time has come when we must
systematically examine all of these warning
systems in relation to one another, with a
view to eliminating unnecessary redundancy
and ensuring that the remaining systems are
truly integrated into a workable whole. Ac-
cordingly, I have recently asked the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to establish a Joint Conti-
nental Defense System Integration Planning
Staff to study this entire problem in depth,
including the function of all defensive Sys-
tems in a wartime environment.
a. Missile Warning
Pending the completion of the aforemen-
tioned study, we are not proposing any
changes in the BlVIEVeS program. However, we
are making certain changes in the siting of
the Over-the-Horizon (forward-scatter)
radar program. These radars have demon-
strated a very high order of capability. Al-
though originally designed to detect ICBM
launches (including FOBS), these radars
have demonstrated a good capability to de-
tect smaller ballistic missiles.
As I indicated earlier, we are developing
a back-scatter 0TH radar for use in the
anti-bomber defenses In this system, echo
signals from the target are returned directly
to the transmitter, thereby eliminating the
need for separate receiver stations. It is also
more effective than the forward-scatter sys-
tem in locating and tracking vehicles moving
through and below the' ionosphere, for ex-
ample, aircraft or SLI3Ms. We presently plan
to begin installing the first back-scatter 0TH
radar in the near future. While the chief
function of this radar will be research and
development, we hope that it will also pro-
vide some useful operational data. It will also
give us an opportunity to test the back-scat-
ter system in theelCBM warning role.
b. Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense (Sentinel)
As previously mentioned, the Sentinel sys-
tem will consist of PAR and MSR radars and
Spartan and Sprint missiles.
The PAR is a low frequency phased-array
radar used for long-range surveillance, ac-
quisition and tracking. The presently
planned characteristics of this radar place its
design well within the "state-of-the-art",
and for this reason the first PAR can be in-
stalled directly at its tactical site rather
than at a field test site. Its performance can
be simulated by an ARPA Altair radar al-
ready at Kwajalein, for purposes of the full
systems tests.
The MSR is a phased-array radar used to
control the Sprint and Spartan intercep-
tors. It can perform much the same func-
tions as the larger MAR, which is not re-
quired in a limited deployment, but on a
smaller seale. The MSR was tested at the
contractor's plant before being sent to Kwaj-
alein, where it is currently being installed
for the full systems tests. The MAR, which is
the most sophisticated component of the
Nike-X system, will remain in an R&D status.
A Tacmar (a smaller version of the MAR)
will be installed at Kwajalein for final de-
sign and testing.
The Spartan missile, as presently designed,
will have three stages and utilize an advanced
warhead, a,nd should be able to intercept
objects at ranges in excess of several hundred
miles and-at exoatmospherie altitudes. How-
ever, we now plan to make some further
improvements in the Spartan to enhance its
capability against a Fobs. The Spartan will
also be included in the full systems tests
planned at Kwajalein.
The Sprint missile is designed to attack
Incoming warheads after the atmosphere has
helped to separate out the accompanying
decoys, chaff, etc. The missile is capable of
climbing thousands of feet in a few seconds
to make intercepts between 5,000 and 100,000
feet at ranges between 15-25 miles. It uses
a "pop-up" launch technique in which the
missile is ejected from its tube by the gen-
eration of gas pressure on the piston upon
which it rests. Actual ignition does not take
place until after the-missile has left the tube.
This technique conserves propellant, allows
the missile to "get away" sooner and reduces
the missile size. Initial flight tests are cur-
rently being conducted at the White Sands
Missile Range, and beginning in early 1969
the missile will be tested at Kwajalein,
where the overall systems tests against actual
ICBMs fired from Vanderberg Air Base will
be conducted.
Although, as stated earlier, ABM systems
to protect population centers against large
sophisticated attacks do not appear practical,
we will continue to explore new technical
approaches to this objective. The Nike-X
development program will be used for this
purpose. In addition, we will continue to
support a number of other ABM related
programs, particularly ARPA's Project
Defender.
In total, the ele 1969 Budget request in-
cludes about $1,232 million for ABM defense:
$651 million for the deployment of Sentinel
(in addition to $229 million in FY 1968);
$313 million for Sentinel development; $165
million for ABM advanced development
(Nike-X); and $103 million for Defender. In
addition, the AEC's FY 1969 budget includes
funds for ABM warhead development and
production,
c. Anti-Satellite Defense
As described in previous years, we have a
capability to intercept and destroy hostile
satellites within certain ranges. This capa-
bility will be maintained throughout the
program period.
Spasur and Spacetraek are our satellite
tracking and identification systems in the
Hared Spadat system. The Spasur system is
designed to give a warning when a new space
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object passes through its field, and the
Spacetrack system detects, tracks and com-
putes the orbits of objects in space. Both
systems are tied to the North American Air
Defense Command.
One of the projects that the Joint Con-
tinental Defense Systems Integration Plan-
ning Staff will undertake is the development
,of a master plan for the evolution of these
two systems. The ever-growing population of
space objects and "junk" that must be iden-
tified and tracked means that we will have
to make major improvements in these sys-
tems in the near future. In the case-of the
Spacetrack system, we have included funds
In the FY 1969 Budget for the modification
of the data processing and communications
equipment at existing sites and for some
new construction at these sites. Any fur-
ther improvements or expansion will be de-
layed pending a full study of the require-
ments for electro-optical sites in addition to
the camera and radar sites, the links with
the Sentinel system, the need for a sepa-
rate data processing center, etc.
G. CIVIL DEFENSE
The Civil Defense program proposed for
FY 1969 contemplates no important change
In basic objectives from those which I dis-
cussed last year. However, we have held the
FY 1969 program to the lowest possible sus-
taining rate, pending the end of the Viet-
nam conflict.
The major objective of the Civil Defense
program since 1961 has been the establish-
ment of a comprehensive nation-wide shel-
ter system to help protect our population
from radiological fallout in the event of a
nuclear attack. Most of this shelter is in-
herent in existing buildings but needs to
be identified, marked and stocked with sur-
vival supplies before it can be considered
truly useful. By the end of the current fiscal
year we expect to have identified about 170
million spaces with a standard protection
factor of 40 or more, of which about 101 mil-
lion will have been marked and 55 million
stocked with an average 14 days of supplies.
Total shelter capacity should continue to
grow in the future as a result of the con-
tinuing survey and design assistance efforts
being conducted as part of the Civil Defense
program. In total, we can probably expect
an additional 55 million spaces from these
sources over the next five years.
DEPLOYMENT OF AN ANTI-BLALLISTIC-MISSILE
SYSTEM: ISSUES?SELECTED ANNOTATED
BIBLIOGRAPHY
(By Nancy T. Gamarra, analyst in national
security, Foreign Affairs Division, June 10,
1968, the Library of Congress Legislative
Reference Service)
PERIOD/CALS AND SPEECHES
Address by Honorable Robert S. McNamara,
Secretary of Defense, before United Press In-
ternational Editors and Publishers, San Fran-
cisco, California, September 18, 1967. Depart-
ment of Defense news release no. 868-67,
Sept. 18, 1967. 25 p. Speech in which Secre-
tary McNamara announced U.S. decision to
deploy a thin ABM system and outlined rea-
sons for this decision.
Ashworth, George W. Sea-missile key to
U.S. defense? Christian Science Monitor, July
22, 1967: 11. Discusses the concept of a sea-
borne ABM intercept system.
Baldwin, Hanson W. Military concern on
lack of missile defense grows. New York
Times, May 21, 1967: 1, 16. 'The continuing
development by the Soviet Union and Com-
munist China of strategic missile systems is
causing mounting concern among top mili-
tary officers in the Pentagon."
Beecher, William. Soviet reported stressing
multiple-warhead missile. New York Times,
Sept. 10, 1967: 1, 18. It is reported that the
Soviet Union is developing multiple warheads
for its missiles that "could increase several-
fold its ability to hit a number of 'targets
In the United States simultaneously."
Bird, David. Nuclear scientists disagree on
missile defense. New York Times, Nov. 15,
1967: 24. Nuclear scientists disagree on
whether an anti-ballistic missile system will
halt or escalate arms race.
Bottome, Edgar M. Mythology of the A.B.M.
Commonweal, Oct. 20, 1967: 74-76. Author
argues that deployment of an ABM system by
the United States will not add to nation's
security because it will result in further es-
calation of the arms race between the United
States and the Soviet Union.
Brennan, D. G. New thoughts on missile
defense. Bulletin of the atomic scientists,
June 1967: 10-15. ". . . there are impor-
tant possibilities in which BMD [Ballistic
Missile Defense] could play a constructive
role, possibilities that support the traditional
arms control objective of mitigating the con-
sequences of war if it occurs, without con-
flicting with the objectives of reducing the
likelihood of war and reducing the burdens
of the arms race. These possibilities have not
been much discussed in the arms control
community, quarters which have tended to
be surprisingly hostile to any suggestion of
deploying BMD."
Brown, Neville. Unreason in strategy. New
scientist, Oct. 1967: 746-747. "It can be shown
that there is little evidence for the idea that
national strategic and defense planning is
governed by reason. Many recent defense un-
dertakings, including anti-missile missiles,
are based on ignorance and prejudice."
Bussey, Donald S. Deployment of the anti-
ballistic missile (ABM) : the pros and cons.
Legislative Reference Service, Library of Con-
gra% April 19, 1967. 43 p. Discusses ABM and
the risk of nuclear war; ABM and damage
limitation; and ABM and foreign policy.
Critics claim "thin" ABM not enough,
Armed forces management, Oct. 1967: 21. The
joint Chiefs of Staff "is willing to accept the
'thin' nationwide deployment only if it is
a first step toward providing protection to
the 25 most heavily populated cities in this
country."
Crosby, Col. H. Ashton. The case for anti-
ballistic missiles. United States Naval Insti-
tute proceedings, July 1967: 2T-31. The au-
thor does not believe that the arguments
which have been raised against deployment
of an ABM system are valid and states his
objections to these arguments.
Finney, John W. X-ray missile to be key in
defense against China. New York Times, Nov.
16, 1967: 1, 22. The Atomic Energy Commis-
sion is reported to be "making significant
progress in developing a radically new nu-
clear X-ray warhead that would be a vital
element in the Sentinel ballistic missile de-
fense system being erected against Commu-
nist China."
Finney, John W. G.O.P. group says 'thin'
missile net could split NATO. New York
times, Nov. 6, 1967: 1, 16. The U.S. decision
to deploy an ABM system could rupture
NATO and drive Europeans into position of
"defensive neutrality."
FOBS, ABM and arms control. Survival,
Jan 1968: 10-11. "At the root of much of the
criticism of ballistic missile defence for the
United States has been the fear of a new
strategic arms race. The recent announce-
ment of the probable Soviet development of
a 'fractional orbital bombardment system'
(FOBS) has increased this fear, and the . .
article analyzes some of the arguments be-
ing used in the debate in the United States."
Frank, Lewis A. The ABM debate. Military
review, May 1967: 45-52. "On balance, it
would seem that the U.S. deployment of at
least a light or anti-Chinese ABM system is
justified by both the technical progress re-
cently achieved in the design of such sys-
tems, by the need to know more about its
performance utilizing the actual hardware,
and by the necessity to provide active de-
S 7237
fenses against the growing Soviet and the
emergent Chinese nuclear threats to be ex-
pected within the coming decade."
Gilpatric, Roswell L. The brink of another
arms race? New York times magazine, Jan.
15, 1967. Because of the Soviet offensive and
defensive buildup the United States is faced
with the possibility of a stepped-up arms
race with the Soviet Union.
Johnston, Lt. Douglas M., Jr. ABM: the
high cost of living. United States Naval In-
stitute proceedings, Oct. 1967: 26-38. "Man-
kind's most basic, and most frequently
threatened, right?the right to live?is
menaced today as never before. A defensive
system against enemy nuclear missiles will
be enormously expensive and it will not bar
our doors completely: but it will raise the
price of admission."
Hamilton, Thomas J. U.S. says Nike net
will spur atom pact. New York times, Sept.
20, 1967: 1, 18. U.S. officials at the Geneva
Disarmament Conference claim that the "de-
cision to establish an anti-ballistic missile
network against Chinese Communist attack
should improve the prospects for the pro-
posed treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons."
Kleiman, Robert. MIRV and the offensive
missile race. New York times, Oct. 9, 1967:
46. "Pressure from Congress and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff for a heavy antiballistic-mis-
sile (ABM) system oriented to defense against
Soviet attack reflects an old military weak-
ness: preparing to fight the last year."
Lall, Betty Goetz. Congress debates the
ABM. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, Sept.
1967: 28-33. "On the ABM question . . . the
pattern of Congressional interest shows some
usual and unusual aspects . . . They (Con-
gressmen) are pondering many of the con-
sequences of a decision to deploy or not to
deploy. There is no panic and little oratory.
They do not pretend to have pat solutions to
the problem and clearly most would like to
be confronted with a case of successful diplo-
macy to avoid a commitment to deploy."
Lyons, Thomas C., Jr. Anti-missile defense
systems. Editorial research reports, vol. 1, no.
7, Feb. 15, 1967: 123-139. Article discusses
the following topics: Current Debate on Anti-
Missile Systems; Development of the Missile
Competition; and American Missiles and Na-
tional Security.
Martin, Laurence W. Ballistic missile de-
fense and Europe. Bulletin of the atomic
scientists, May 1967: 42-46. "West Europeans
have two interests in the prospects for ABM.
Being deeply affected by the state of U.S.-
U.S.S.R. relations, United States' allies have
a direct interest in all the arguments con-
cerning the wisdom of ABM from a strictly
U.S. point of view ... As Europeans, however,
they also perceive certain special implications
for themselves."
The missile defense question: is LBJ right?:
a background report. Washington, D.C. Re-
publican National Committee, Feb. 20, 1967.
55 p. "Great responsibilities rest on those
who must make the decisions regarding our
defense against a nuclear threat. It is in an
effort to help these persons, by providing
them with available information, that the
material in this booklet has been assembled."
Missile defense: LBJ's bid to curb arms
race gains support. Science March 31, 1967:
1651-1654. ". . . President Johnson's proposal
that U.S. and Soviet negotiators seek an
agreement to refrain from, or limit, deploy-
ment of antimissile missiles thus far has
considerable bipartisan support on Capitol
Hill."
Morris, John D. Senators call Nike plan a
step to full defense. New York Times, Sept.
17, 1967: 2. "The Administration's decision
to deploy a limited missile defense around
the country was viewed by some Senators
. . . as the first step toward establishment
of a full-scale system that would cost $7-
billion to $15-billion."
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it was realized that the offense would replace
the relatively easy-to-intercept single war-
head with clouds of objects, or take other
deceptive measures. Examples of these ob-
jects were decoys designed to look like war-
heads to the radar, and chaff designed to
conceal the warhead in a cloud of light ob-
jects. Against those more sophisticated tar-
gets there was a necessity for the defense to
discriminate among them so as to know
which objects to take under fire. Hence many
objects might have to be tracked and ob-
served simultaneously. Also, it might be nec-
essary for the defense to wait for atmospheric
reentry of the targets and rely on slowdown
and burnup of the lighter objects before this
discrimination could be accomplished.
The old Nike-Zeus system, when con-
fronted with these more sophisticated tar-
gets, had two fatal defects. One was that it
used what are now considered to be old-
fashioned mechanical radars, which had to
be mechanically slewed or pointed at each
target in turn?a matter of seconds. One
practically had to have a radar for each
target. And the Zeus missile could not be
delayed in firing until atmospheric reentry
of the targets took place, because it was too
slow. Hence discrimination could not be
aided by atmospheric filtering.
Because of these defects, the Nike X con-
cept was born. First, the mechanical radars
of Nike-Zeus were replaced by phased array
radars, which by varying the electrical phase
of the power over the Lace of a fixed antenna
array could change the direction of the
radar beam in a matter of microseconds.
This imparted a capability of tracking many
objects simultaneously, and thus removed
one of the Zeus defects. Second, a very high-
performance, short-range-interceptor missile,
the Sprint, was introduced. It was smaller,
cheaper, and had much higher acceleration
than Zeus, and thus could afford to wait
until reentry of the targets before being
committed to fire. Atmospheric filtering was
now feasible and the remaining targets could
be attacked with the high firepower Sprints.
The old Zeus interceptor was retained in
the system for long-range attacks on simple
targets. We now had two interceptors?the
Zeus and the Sprint.
Norman, Lloyd. Nike-X: big chip in the
deadly gamble of nuclear exchange. Army,
March 1967: 25-32. ". . . the shifting balance
Of nuclear killing power between the United
States and the Soviet Union sets off a series
of moves and countermoves in the ancient
game of offense-versus-defense. The game is
played on no simple checkerboard, but on
One that resembles the tangled maze of wir-
ing in an electronic game with its interplay-
Mg factors of psychology, military power,
international politics, and national doc-
trines.
Pay, Rex. U.S. ABM would imperil test ban
treaty. Technology week, March 20, 1967: 14-
35. "A decision by the TJnited States to deploy
an operational anti-ballistic missile (ABM)
system would probably require the resump-
tion of atmospheric nuclear testing by this
country, according to some high-level weap-
ons experts."
Rabinowoitch, Eugene and Ruth Adams,
eds. Debate the antiballistic missile. Chicago,
Illinois, Bulletin of the atomic scientists,
1967. 172 p. (Collection of articles on ABM.)
"The layman must respect the creative in-
telligence which went Into the development
of the ABM system; but this appreciation is
entirely apart from the process and privilege
of decisionmaking, which need not remain
behind closed doors. The subject is one of the
most important questions before this nation.
ABM is an open-ended armament program,
Of incalculable importance for our future and
for the future of the world."
Rodberg, Leonard S. ABM-some arms con-
trol issues. Bulletin of the atomic scientists,
June 1967: 16-20. "The deployment of ABM
systems will not only postpone the day when
we can look elsewhere than to nuclear weap-
ons for the key to national power, but it will
also place greater emphasis upon the possi-
bility of nuclear war, the role of nuclear
weapons in providing a defense, and the value
to a country of nuclear independence."
Schmidt, Dana Adams. Kosygin is cool to
redselles curb. New York times, Feb. 10, 1967:
1, 6. Soviet Premier Kosygin is reported to
have said that defensive ABM systems were
leas dangerous to mankind than offensive
systems.
Strategic defense: what the ABM deploy-
ment means. Armed forces management,
April 1968: 71-74. Outlines the reasons for
the Defense Department's decision to deploy
an ABM system and the limitations and
drawbacks of ABM deployment.
Thurmond, Senator Strom. ABlVI: lessening
the threat of nuclear blackmail. Data, Oct.
1967: 10-11, Argues that the United States
"will not be as susceptible to nuclear black-
mail or Soviet miscalculation" since the de-
cision has been made to deploy a U.S. ABM
system.
U.S. missile plans criticized in Bonn. New
York Times, Oct. 28, 1967: 11. A West Ger-
man official says that U.S. plans to deploy
an ABM system would erode the Western
Alliance.
Weisner, Jerome B. The case against an
antiballistic missile system. Look, Nov. 28,
1967: 25-27. Author does not believe that
a "really effective antimissile system is re-
motely possible for either the U.S. or the
RUssians."
Weisner, Jerome B. The cold war is dead,
but the arms race rumbles on. Bulletin of
the atomic scientiste, June 1967: 6-9. ". . . If
the ABM systems are built, there will cer-
tainly be further large increases in military
expenditures for new and more sophisticated
weapons as both sides jockey to maintain
a credible deterrent to try to protein their
citizens from the horrors of nuclear war."
Young, Elizabeth. ABM: no alternative to
politics. Bulletin of the atomic scientists,
June 1967: 47-49. "The only reason for U.S.
deployment [of an ABM system] seems to
be the fact that the Soviet government is
deploying it?and the U.S. government Can-
not refuse to give their people a defense that
the Soviets have." But the author argues
that sophisticated military power can no
longer solve the world's disagreements.
Young, Oran It. Active defense and inter-
national order. Bulletin of the Atomic Scien-
tists, May 1967: 35-42. Author "analyzes the
consequences that would result from alterna-
tive patterns of ABM deployment."
CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS
U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy. Hearings: Scope, Magnitude and Im-
plications of the United States Antiballistic
Missile Program. 90th Congress, 1st session,
1967. 153 p. Hearings "review the plans and
programs relating to our ABM program in
the context of three recent developments":
the Soviet offensive buildup, the Soviet defen-
sive buildup, and the emergence of China as
a nuclear power.
Testimony is given by Dr. John S. Foster,
Jr., Director of Defense Research and Engi-
neering; Alice Langley Hsieh, Rand Corp.;
Dr. Philip E. Mosely, Professor of Interna-
tional Relations and Director of the European
Institute, Columbia University; Paul H. Nitze,
Deputy Secretary of Defense; and Thomas
Wolfe, Rand Corp., and member of the Sino-
Soviet Institute, George Washington Uni-
versity.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Ap-
propriations. Subcommittee on Department
of Defense; and Committee on Armed Serv-
ices. Hearings on Military Authorizations and
Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1968.
90th Congress, 1st Session, 1967. Part I.
Testimony of Secretary of Defense McNa-
mara, pp. 44-61; 231-241; 260-269. Testimony
of Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of Joint
Chiefs of Staff, pp. 249-252.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed
Services. Statement by Secretary of Defense
Robert S. McNamara on the Fiscal Year
1969-73 Defense Program and 1969 Defense
Budget. Prepared January 22, 1968, pp. 41-69,
74-75.
Statement of Defense Department policy
with respect to the deployment of an ABM
system.
Exmair 3
STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN B. POSTER, JR., DIREC-
TOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
I am pleased to be here today. I understand
that you have requested a discussion of the
technical status of the U.S. ballistic missile
defense program.
In discussing the general subject, let me
first say that every system we have ever seri-
ously considered for deployment involves the
use of radars to detect and track the incom-
ing targets, and the use of these same or dif-
ferent radars to guide ground-to-air inter-
ceptor missiles to the vicinity of the targets.
There a command from the ground causes
the Interceptor warhead to detonate and de-
stroy the target. It is clear that such a de-
fense system does not provide a shield which
makes a nation impervious to attack, since
the interceptors can always be avoided or
outnumbered?provided always that the ene-
my is willing to pay the price in decreased
fatalities or increased cost to his offensive
effort.
In reviewing the history of ballistic mis-
sile defense over the past 10 years, it seems
there has always been controversy over its
value or lack of value. Of course, if the de-
fense had been a true shield, there would
have been no controversy, and we would have
made deployment decision long ago.
The first controversy arose around the
question, "Could a bullet hit a bullet?" This
phase passed, first when calculations showed
the feasibility of such an intercept and later
and most definitely when successful inter-
cepts of actual ICBM targets fired from Van-
denberg Air Force Base were accomplished
by the old Nike-Zeus system in 1962-63. We
had 10 out of 14 successful intercepts.
After this "simple" problem was solved,
The Nike X development, initiated in 1963,
was thus much more effective than the old
Zeus system. It must be noted, however, that
it was essentially a "terminal defense" sys-
tem. The Sprint could only defend cities or
selected sites. Hence, since it is obviously
Impractical to deploy terminal defenses at
every small city or village in the United
States, It was subject to bypass attack. An
enemy could always target the undefended
cities and obtain high casualties. This option
was available even to unsophisticated oppo-
nents. The sophisticated opponent, by con-
centrating his firepower, could overwhelm
the defense at any selected defended site.
The value of ballistic missile delnse was
therefore questioned.
The next important development in de-
fense effectiveness came with the introduc-
tion of "area defense" in the period 1964-
65. I would like to define the term "area
defense."
The detection sensor is the perimeter ac-
quisition radar (PAR) which detects ballis-
tic missiles at long ranges. The PAR radar
tracks the incoming missile and predicts
its future path. To intercept the incoming
missile, we employ the Spartan missile which
is a long-range interceptor developed from
the old Nike-Zeus. Once the PAR radar has
predicted the future path of the missile a
Spartan missile is fired so as to intercept it.
This interceptor intercepts the incoming
missile well above the atmosphere, Because
of its long range the Spartan can intercept
incoming missiles directed at targets several
hundred miles from the Spartan battery lo-
cation. The Spartan missile is guided by a
missile site radar (MSR) which is associated
with each battery.
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With the introduction of Spartan, the
Zeus interceptor was nt3 longer required?
in effect, the Spartan replaced the Zeus.
Comparatively few Spartan batteries can
defend the whole United States from simple
attacks.
You will note I said,"simple attacks." It
la still possible for a sophisticated opponent
to confuse the defense and make the fire-
power demands on Spartan too high. In this
case, terminal defense Sprints must be relied
uRon if we are to furnish a defense. The Spar-
tan thus functions in two ways. It can pro-
vide a very effective defense- over extended
areas against simple threats. Against not
so simple threats, it provides a defense in
depth and is complementary to Sprint. In
any case it forces the enemy, if he wishes
to penetrate, to pay the price demanded by
a sophisticated penetration aids program.
You will note that I have described a flex-
ible set of building blocks consisting of
PAR and MSR radars and two types of in-
terceptor missiles, Spartan and Sprint. We
also have a very large, sophisticated radar
called TACMAR, designed specifically
against sophisticated attacks. They can be
put together in various ways to provide vary-
ing levels of defense against different threats.
For example, if we wished to defend the
United States against a large Soviet at-
tack, we would provide an overlay of an area
defense subh as I have -described. As I men-
tioned earlier, however', it would be neces-
? sary to depend primariry an terminal Sprint
defense, including TACMARs, at selected
cities. Afielected city defense (including the
'area component) Wourd cost about $10 or
$20 billion depending on the number of
cities defended.
As a matter of technical judgment, I be-
lieve that these larger deployments carry
with them technical risks. The likelihood of
-large and sophisticated attacks with the
deployment of significant U.S. defenses in-
creases the technical uncertainty of the
defensive system. Even with an ABM deploy-
ment we would have to expect that in an
all-out exchange, dozens of their warheads
would likely explode in our cities.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. COOPER. I yield.
Mr. JAVITS. I congratulate the Sena-
tor for his remarks today, for the follow-
ing reasons: First, he is not accepting as
sacrosanct a decision which has been
? taken by alleged authorities in the execu-
tive branch. One of the most significant
developments in recent months here in
the Senate, in my judgment is that we
are no longer willing to accept blindly
even what the Senate Committee on
Armed Services brings in with respect to
fundamental issues of national security.
This is a big step forward. There is too
much Involved, in peace, security, and
competing financial considerations, to
justify any continuance of what was al-
most a tradition of accepting anything
proposed by the administration and ap-
proved by the Armed Services
Committee.
Second, the Senator is taking nothing
for granted. It appears to many of us
that the "thin" ABM was agreed to
give partial satisfaction to those power
elements of the Military Establishment?
and their champions in Congress and
elsewhere?who wanted a full scale
heavy ABM system directed against the
Next, he challenges some of the in-
telligence assumptions upon which all
of this is based. As the Senator has said,
our intelligence experts have changed
some of their own earlier estimates. He
points out the danger of being leap-
frogged technologically on an important
and costly security system which, once
launched, we might have to continue for
a long time, without being able to change
direction or take full advantage of sub-
sequent technological breakthroughs.
It was well for our colleague to have
dealt with this subject as thoughtfully
as he has today. I shall study his sug-
gestions concerning appropriations cuts
on deployment items with a view to see-
ing whether I can join with him in his
proposed amendments. I appreciate his
having laid it out to stimulate my think-
ing and, I hope, the thinking of other
Senators.
Mr. COOPER. I thank the Senator. It
was my purpose to present my views that
I arrived at on the basis of the study
I have been able to make. I know the
intellectual powers and the judgment
with which the Senator from New York
will study this matter. Whatever conclu-
sion he comes to I know will be based
on judgment, reason, and facts, and not
just on emotional feelings, as strongly as
they appeal to all of us to want to do
everything possible to protect the secu-
rity of the United States. The question is,
Will it protect the security of the United
States?
The more I have read the testimony of
those who have testified in favor of the
system, the more I found that there are
so many contradictions. All the propo-
nents admit that the installation of the
system will lead to a greater pressure to
produce more defensive weapons which
can cope with any system which could
be installed.
Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator.
Mr. CASE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. COOPER. I yield.
Mr. CASE. I, too, commend the Sen-
ator and, in my case, join with him at
least as far as he has reached his own
determination in opposition to the anti-
ballistic missile system, both the large
system which is not being immediately
projected and the so-called thin system.
It seems to me the Senator has pointed
out many things that needed to be said,
and he has correctly posed the issue as
this: Will what is proposed add to or
lessen the security of the United States?
Will it increase or decrease the possible
destruction of human life?
In this connection I would put to the
Senator a specific argument by, I think,
the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
in some testimony I have read or heard,
to the general effect that an antiballistic
missile system might save the lives of
some 30 million to 60 million Americans,
and would it not be worth putting into
effect for that reason, even if hundreds
of millions of people were killed? This
Is not a precise statement of the argu-
ment, but it is the substance of it.
There is, I know, in the Senator's
mind, a very specific answer to this argu-
ment. He has answered it already, in
fact, in the way he has made his state-
ment, but I wonder if he would comment
on that specific point.
Mr. COOPER. I did not discuss in de-
tail, in the limited time I had, every
phase of the system and the arguments
for it and the arguments against it. For
that reason, I had said I would place in
the RECORD the testimony of former Sec-
retary McNamara on this subject. It is
not too long. It gives very concisely the
facts as far as we understand them on the
question which the Senator has raised.
It is one which we have discussed, and
one which has bothered me and to which
I have given much thought.
I think the testimony is clear that the
installation of a heavy ABM system to
try to meet a Soviet attack would do little
to save,human life, because, if the So-
viet Union made a first strike, with or
without an ABM system, millions and
millions of our people would be de-
stroyed.
I do not think it would have any effect
at all upon the ABM system.
There is, however, a table in this testi-
mony which deals with estimated U.S.
fatalities from a possible Chinese first
strike. It is stated that if seven or eight
Chinese intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles were launched against the United
States, without a Sentinel system, 15
million American lives would be lost;
and that with the Sentinel system, the
loss of life might be held down to 1
million. That is, in my view, the strongest
argument and the only argument for the
Installation of this system.
But against that, there is certainly
some elementary reasoning. By 1974 or
1975, when the Chinese might be able
to fire seven or eight intercontinental
ballistic missiles at the United States,
knowing that the United States has to-
day 1,710 missiles and, of course, will
be producing more; and realizing the
effectiveness of those missiles, which
number will be tripled or, perhaps mul-
tiplied by 10, when MIRV is introduced.
I do not know how irresponsible we
think the Chinese are; but it would be
hard for me to believe that they would
fire 10 missiles at the United States,
knowing they would as a result be liter-
ally wiped off the face of the earth.
Then, if we have installed this ABM
system, and the Soviet Union begins to
worry about our installation of the sys-
tem, it would, in turn, of course, install
one. We would then respond and install
a heavier one, and nothing would be ac-
complished as far as our protection
against the Soviet Union or their protec-
tion against us is concerned, except a
multiplication of arms.
Mr. CASE. And the point, of course, as
the Senator has just pointed out, is that
the risk of the loss of life will be much
greater, in total, because we will not be
dealing with a static situation, one which
we can keep within our control, which
will stop developing when we build our
light system.
Therefore, it is not only a queition of
possibly saving 15 million American lives,
or whatever the number from a Chinese
first strike, but of the danger to 200 mil-
lion Americans and hundreds of millions
of others in other countries, which will
be so much greater from the accelerated
development in numbers and types of
missiles all over the world, and partic-
ularly vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.
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Mr. COOPER. I think so. There again,
I refer to Secretary McNamara, who was
speaking to the committee upon the basis
of hard intelligence.
He admitted that after this so-called
thin system is installed, one which he
believed would be sufficient or effective in
the middle 1970's, then the Chinese could
Improve their intercontintental ballistic
? missiles, and then the United States
would have to extend its thin system and
make it a heavier system even to ,keep
tip with the growing destructive capa-
bilities of the Chinese. Of course, that
would inexorably move into the qpniPleth
system which it is said by some would
protect us against a soviet attack.
Mr. CASE. One further question, if the
Senator will yield.
Mr. COOPER. Yes.
Mr. CASE. Is it not the Senator's un-
derstanding, as it is mine, that the top
scientific advisers to the executive de-
partment for the last several adminis-
trations have unanimously agreed in ad-
vising against the deployment of either
a full or a light antiballistic missile sys-
tem?
Mr. COOPER. I have been so informed,
and I have heard at least one of those
advisers say that all those who had been
the principal scientific advisers of Presi-
dent Eisenhower, President Kennedy,
and President Johnson had advised
against taking this step of deploying an
antiballistic missile system. I am sure
that is .the, Senator's infoimation also.
Mr. Ci4E, . That has been my experi-
ence also. rn fact, two of them have spo-
ken to me in those terms.
I thank the Senator from Kentticky.
I eoinmend him for his statement, and
wholeheartedly 4lain him in it.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I yield
the floor. +
Mr. TI11,7R1VIOND. Mr. President, dur-
ing the past few days we have been hear-
ing an increasing number of minors
about the methods that would be em-
ployed by the President to effect a $6
billion redaction in the fiscal year 1969
budget. This reduction is ,the required
trade off that the Congress imposed last
month in return for enacting legislation
to authorize a 10-percent surtax.
Recently, I heard from a good author-
ity that there is an unannounced ad-
ministrative policy decision to take the
bulk of the $6 billion cut out of expendi-
tures for defense. Moreover, it is well
known that military authorities in the
Pentagon are now reviewing their re-
quirements in an effort to reduce the
budget. In this regard, it has come to my
attention that large hardware items are
Particularly vulnerable for reduction,
and that the Army's Sentinel project?
the "thin" ABM defense?is a certain
target.
In that connection, today's issue of the
Washington Post carries a colurrin by
Evans and Novak entitled "ABM Project
Due To Bear Brunt of Cuts, Soaring
Great Society." We are all familiar with
the administration's policy of "leaking"
news on controversial subjects to the
newspapers as trial balloons to sample
public ?Pinion. This is an apparent case,
and I think that it is important to flush
the issue out of the conjecture stage and
into the open for a clear scrutiny.
I ask unanimous consent to have
Printed in the RECORD the article en-
titled "ABM Project Due To Bear Brunt
of Cuts, Sparing Great Society," written
by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak,
and published in the Washington Post
of June 13, 1968.
There being no objection, the a.rticle
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
ABM PROJECT DUE To BEAR BRUNT OF CUTS,
SPARING GREAT SOCIETY
(By Rowland Evans and Robert Novak)
A still undisclosed scheme to eliminate all
new money for the embryonic anti-ballistic
missile (ABM) system is the first dramatic
step of President Johnson's grand strategy
for complying with congressional economy
strictures without cutting into Great Society
spending.
The opening wedge of that strategy is an
amendment to the Defense Appropriations
bill that Sen. Philip A. Hart of Michigan
plans to offer, eliminating the entire $1.2-
billion appropriation for the ABM Sentinel
project. That would result in an estimated
half-billion-dollar cut in spending for the
new fiscal year (starting July 1).
What makes this a significant move in the
tortuous game of budget-cutting between
Congress and the White House is the origin
of the ABM ripper amendment. It was scarce_
ly Phil Hart's own idea. Rather, the White
House asked Hart, a dependable Administra-
tion wheelhorse, to put in the amendment_
when the defense money bill reaches the Sen-
ate floor in late June.
Moreover, the President's effective post-
ponement of the Sentinel ABM program is
but one part of his undeclared policy to take
the bulk of the 6-billion reduction in expen-
ditures out of defense. Because of this deci-
sion, word has been passing in the highest
levels of the Administration that Great So-
ciety and other social welfare programs will
not be further reduced to make up the $6
billion.
From the moment that Mr. Johnson an-
nounced on June 1 that he would most reluc-
tantly accept the congressional mandate for
$6 billion in spending cuts to get $10 billion
in higher taxes, his top budgetary experts
have been looking around for ways to in-
sulate the Great Society. Examining and dis-
carding numerous gimmicks to circumvent
the congressional edict, they glumly decided
that the congressional order to cut $6 billion
was ironclad.
From that conclusion flowed the unan-
nounced policy decision to cut into an al-
ready pared-down Pentagon budget to satisfy
congressional demands.
Of the $4 billion in spending reductions
that the President originally insisted would
be the maximum he would accept, $2 billion
was to have come out of the Pentagon?a
figure, it was then said, that could go no
higher. Now, however, the defense cut will
be at least $3 billion and possibly more. The
rest of the spending cut will come out of
foreign kid, space, and other non-social wel-
fare items, according to present plans.
Consequently, Pentagon staffers have been
working overtime in recent days to find addi-
tional sources for reducing their budget.
There are not many. For instance, a further
reduction of U.S. troops in Europe, while
winning hurrahs on Capitol Hill, wouldn't
make much impact on the current spending
budget.
That leaves big hardware items: the
manned orbiting laboratory and, more im-
portant, the Sentinel project, which always
has had more than its share of enemies in-
side the Pentagon. But Mr. Johnson did not
wait for the Pentagon's considered judgment.
Instead, he decided on the Hart ploy.
Hart tried to keep his proposal a secret,
at least until the Senate Appropriations
Committee finished work on the defense
Jane t3,. 1968
money bill?perhaps today. Whether he then
planned to surface it overtly as a White House
proposal or to disguise it as his own, is not
known.
In any event. Hart and the White House
have one hard argument on their side: The
Chinese intercontinental missile, which the
Sentinel is supposed to guard against, is now
some nine months overdue.
Furthermore, all the elements of political
gamesmanship will be on Mr. Johnson's side.
He will be asking the ecenomy-minded Con-
gress to cut an item put into the budget
partly because of pressure from conservatives
in the House. If Congress refused, he could
still impound the funds and point to con-
gressional refusal to cut spending when it
really counted.
Nor is there must of a popular constituency
today lobbying for anti-missile systems,
whatever their importance to the country's
survival may be. The pressure, rather, is for
no further cuts in Great Society spending,
and that is what Mr. Johnson also is bent on
avoiding.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, my
colleagues will note that the Evans and
Novak article predicts that an amend-
ment eliminating the entire $1.2 billion
for the Sentinel antiballistic missile
project will be introduced. Today the
distinguished Senator from Kentucky
has stated that he expected to offer such
an amendment. I have also heard it
rumored that the distinguished Senator
from Michigan [Mr. HART] might offer
such an amendment. This possibility re-
minds me of Senate action taken on
April 18 when S. 3293?appropriations
for procurement of missiles, aircraft,
naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles,
and research and development?was
acted upon. My colleagues will remem-
ber two separate attempts to block work
on the Sentinel system.
The first attempt was an amendment
to drop $342.7 million for the Sentinel
from the Army's procurement funds.
This was rejected by a 17-to-41 rollcall
vote. The second attempt was an amend-
ment to prohibit deployment of an ABM
system until the Secretary of Defense
certified that it was practicable and that
its Cost was known with reasonable ac-
curacy. This amendment was defeated by
a very close vote of 28 to 31.
It is apparent from the action of last
April, that many of my colleagues were,
at that time, ready to delay the deploy-
ment of the Sentinel system sacrificing
the prompt installation of this sorely
needed vital defense system on the altar
of economy. In my opinion, the climate of
protest now so evident in the Nation's
Capital might serve to influence even
more Senators to vote against the ABM
when the defense appropriations bill
comes up for approval. In an effort to
emphasize the importance of the Senti-
nel system, and to forestall any pre-
cipitous action that might result in an
impetus wave of economy, I should like
to discuss the need for ABM defense of
this country in some detail.
The U.S. ABM system has been under
development for more than 10 years. It
was only through the pressure of the
Congress that the administration finally
dropped the foot-dragging policy that
had caused delay after delay in the au-
thorization of the deployment of the
antiballistic missile defense system.
Senators will recall this long and tor-
tuous fight from the following summary:
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Mid-1950's. Each year Congress 'pro-
vided funds for ABM research and de-
velopment. By 1967, a total of $2.8 billion
had been spent on Nike-Zeus and
Nike-X.
1963. In the first secret session of the
Senate since World War II, Senators
were briefed on our strategic posture and
were warned that the Soviets had a
prototype ABM system. The Senate
Armed Services Committee added an
amendment to the annual procurement
bill, authorizing appropriation of $196
million to begin procurement of ABM
parts. At the instigation of the adminis-
tration, this amendment was struck on
a rollcall vote-58 to 16.
1966. At the insistence of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, Congress
approved $167.D million for ABM pro-
curement. Secretary McNamara had not
asked for these funds and 'did not use
. them.
November 10, 1966. McNamara an-
nounced that the Soviets had begun de-
ployment of an ABM system around
Moscow.
January 1967. President Johnson stated
that no deployment of a U.S. ABM
system would be made until completion
of the arms control negotiations with
Russia. Secretary McNarnara's military
posture report to the Congress contained
a lengthy argument against deployment
of a complete, nussian-oriented ABM
system. He stated that it would be waste-
ful and ineffective, and it would disturb
the strategic balance. Two days later,
Gen, Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, disagreed with the
Secretary of Defense, and recommended
"a measure of defense" for the country.
1967. Congress approved the follow-
ing amounts for the fiscal year 1968 mili-
tary budget:
[In millions]
ABM procurement
$297.6
ABM R and D
421.3
ABM construction
61. 0
June 17, 1967. Red China detonated
its first hydrogen bomb. Public pressure
for immediate installation of ABM de-
fense mounted.
September 18, 1967. Secretary McNam-
ara announced the decision to deploy a
"thin" ABM defense system?the Sen-
tinel?oriented against the Communist
Chinese threat that would exist by the
mid-1970's, He justified this step on the
grounds that the Chinese might "miscal-
culate," but failed to admit that the most
dangerous threat to our security would
be a similar miscalculation by the Soviet
Union.
At this point, Mk. President, I should
like to document the history of ABM de-
velopment by placing in the RECORD a
speech given by Dr. Finn Larsen, Prin-
cipal Deputy Director, Defense Research
and Engineering, Department of Defense,
at Millsaps College, J.ackson, Miss., on
January 10, 1968. I ask unanimous con-
sent that this address, entitled "The De-
ployment of Nike Sentinel," be printed at
this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the address
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
THE DEPLOYMENT OF NIKE-SENTINEL
(Address by Dr. Finn Larsen)
On September 18 the Secretary of Defense
announced that a decision had been made
to deploy throughout the United States an
Anti-Ballistic Missile System. In light of the
interest that this decision has engendered I
Welcome the opportunity to speak to you on
this subject.
The original need to provide a defense
against ballistic missiles came in the 1940's
with the introduction of the German V-2
short-range ballistic rocket, and the experi-
ence subsequent to World War II with this
class of weapon confirmed the importance of
a defense. By the middle 50's the potential
threat to the United States had become seri-
ous because of the extension of missile ranges
to intercontinental distances. The threat pre-
sented by the ICBM is unique because of
the ICBM's speed and thermonuCrear war-
head. Traveling at four miles a second, an
ICBM can reach this country in 30 minutes
compared to the hours previously required
by enemy bombers. For almost a decade the
ICBM was considered by many to be a weapon
against which defense was impossible.
Every ABM system we have ever seriously
considered for deployment involves the use
Of radars to detect and track the incoming
targets, and the use of these same or differ-
ent radars to guide ground-to-air interceptor
missiles in the vicinity of the targets. At the
point of nearest approach to the ICBM, a
command from the ground causes the inter-
cepting warhead to detonate and destroy the
target. It is clear that such a defense system
does not provide a shield which makes a na-
tion impervious to attack, since the inter-
ceptors can many times be outnumbered?
provided always that the enemy is willing to
pay the price of decreased fatalities or in-
creased cost to his offensive effort.
In reviewing the history of ballistic missile
_defense over the past ten years, it seems
there hag always been controversy over its
value or lack of that value. Of course, if the
anti-missile defense had been an invulner-
able shield, there wuld have been no con-
troversy, and we would have made a deploy-
ment decision long ago.
The first controversy arose around the
question "couls1 a bullet hit a bullet?" This
phase passed, first when calculations showed
the feasibility of such an intercept and later
and most definitely when successful inter-
cepts of actual ICBM targets fired from
Vandenberg APB were accomplished by the
old Nike Zeus system in 1962-63. We had 10
out of 14 successful intercepts.
About the time this "simple" problem was
solved, it was realized that the offense would
replace the relatively easy-to-intercept single
warhead with clouds of objects, or take other
deceptive measures. Examples of these ob-
jects were decoys designed to look like war-
heads to the radar, and chaff designed to
conceal the warhead in a cloud of radar-
reflecting objects. Against these more
sophisticated targets it was necessary to dis-
criminate among them to know which ob-
jects were incoming warheads. Therefore
many objects had to be tracked and observed
simultaneously. If high altitude discrimina-
tion was, unsuccessful, it was necessary for
the defense to wait for the targets to reenter
the atmosphere and to rely on slow-down or
burn-up of the lighter objects before the
discrimination could be accomplished.
The old Nike-Zeus system, when con-
fronted with these more sophisticated
targets, had two major defects. One was that
It used, what are now considered to be old-
fashioned, mechanical radars, which had to
be mechanically slewed or pointed at each
target in turn?a matter of seconds. A radar
for each target was almost a necessity. The
second defect was that the Zeus missile
S7241
launching could not be delayed until at-
mospheric reentry of the targets took place,
because it accelerated too slowly to possibly
reach its incoming target in time. Hence
discrimination could not be aided by at-
mospheric filtering.
At about the time these defects were recog-
nized, three developments were reaching the
point where their application might over-
come shortcomings in the Zeus system. First,
by the early 1960's phased array radar tech-
nology, with its instantaneous electronic
beam steering, was demonstrating that it
could overcome the low traffic handling
capacity of the mechanically slewed radars.
One radar could now track hundreds of ob-
jects in space simultaneously. Second, new,
large computers provided vastly improved
data processing technology which enable an
ABM system to handle the increased informa-
tion provided by the improved radars. And,
lastly, a small, very high acceleration missile
was conceived which, because of its speed,
need not be launched until enemy objects
had penetrated the atmosphere and the at-
mosphere had filtered the heavy objects, like
warheads, from the lighter objects such as
decoys, chaff, etc. This new, missile was
named SPRINT, and the new concept was
called Nike-X. In January of 1363 the Secre-
tary of Defense directed the Army to pursue
Nike-X as its highest priority development
effort.
In spite of these quite significant develop-
ments, it was not yet time to deploy an
ABM system, for at best what we had was
a terminal defense, one which could only
defend the city or installation near which
it was deployed. It was not until the intro-
duction of a long range missile called Spar-
tan that an area defense became possible.
With a high yield warhead and the ability
to reach hundreds of miles into space, Spar-
tan missiles may be deployed at relatively
few (15-20) locations in the United States
and still protect the entire country. With
the addition of the Spartan, we had all the
ingredients necessary to assemble an effec-
tive defense against a limited ballistic mis-
sile threat: PARS (Perimeter Acquisition
Radars) to provide long range acquisition
and tracking of the threat cloud and perform
simple discrimination functions; MSRs (Mis-
sile Site Radars) to track targets, track and
guide defensive missiles, and provide limited
surveillance and discrimination; long range
Spartan missiles to attack the threat cloud
Outside the atmosphere; short range Sprint
missiles to attaok the enemy warhead within
the atmosphere; and the data processing
technology required to tie the hardware to-
gether into an effective system.
I stated that these ingredients could pro-
vide a defense against a "limited ballistic '
missile threat." This phrase needs explana-
tion. To explain requires that we examine
our offensive capability, for the military plan-
ner must consider the offensive and defen-
sive capabilities together. An increase or
decrease in one invariably permits or requires
a variation in the other, the sum of which
may result in a reaction from a potential
enemy such that the threat picture
changes?and the planner must start over
again.
The cornerstone of our strategic policy is
to deter deliberate nuclear attack upon the
United States, or its allies, by maintaining
a highly reliable ability to inflict an unac-
ceptable degree of damage upon an aggressor,
or combination of aggressors, at any time
during the course of a strategic nuclear ex-
change?even after absorbing a surprise first
strike.
We call this our "assured destruction capa-
bility," and it will remain such as long as
we maintain both the equipment (missiles,
bombers, submarines, etc.) and the win to
use it. This latter, of course, determines the
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credibility of our assured destruction with-
out which we become a strategic "pares
tigesr."
Sat us blare a look at Our StZat' egiC Posture
eda-a-vis that of the seeengi West ijqwe1u1
nation on the earth today, the Soviet Ma n.
Our forces are inneenee: 1040 Minnterean
missile% 656 missilelatinchers carried abeard
Polaris submarines; and about 600 long-range
bombers, approximately 40% of which are
always on alert. Our alert forces alone carry
more than 2200 weapons, averaging more
than one megaton each, and only 400 eine-
megaton weapons are eafficient to destroy
over one-third of the population, of the Soyiet
Union and one-half her industry. These forces
are more than those, required to absorb a
surprise attack by the Soviet Union and till
p-kflArt damage on the Soviet Union such that
she is no longer viable in any meaningful
twentieth-century sense. That ability is called
"emend strike" eapaleility.
What are the relative Seviet situate:ins?
Maw are in essentially the sanee,position..A.1-
thengle have a substantial nuclear Au-
perlorlty over the Soveet Union, by a factor
of about four to one, they also possess a
"seemed strike" capability for precisely the
,fleme reason that we possess Ore. The result
Is that neither the Soviet Union nor the
United States can attack the _other without
being destroyed in retaliation. Surely, this
is the strongest possible motive for each to
a.vaid a /lacquer war.
What then iiteight be the effect on this
"balance" Of depleying an ABM system by
rrntegainst? At current prices and
wLt today's state-of-the-arte it costs pea
priatimetely the same in mougy and other
resiltardes ?for the offense to re-establish the
balance as it costs the defender to installhis
ABM system. Either can do this by one of
several means: increase the number of ben...l-
iters and missiles, provide them with pene-
lanllon aids, free:ease the hardness of ICBM
silo*, disperse the silo% or improve the mo-
bil:1U of nuclear forces, to cite but a few. Tlie
net result would be that both protagonists
WoUlei spend a great deal of money without
Oving their relative positions. In this
fashion the Soviet Union and. the 'United
States Influence one another's strategic plans.
It is this action-reaction phenomenon that
can initiate an arms race.
'Were it technically feasible to develop an
impenetrable ABM system, the foregoing
worfid no longer be true; but the inescapable
tact is that no ABM system ha the foresee-
able future will prove 100% effective against
a determined, sophisticated attack. For these
reasons this nation has tiecided against de-
ploying an AlfM system to counter the Soviet
nuclear threat. We have chosen, rather, to
propose a strategic arms-limitation agree-
ment. I am sure you will agree that both
nations?the world, in fact?would benefit
from such agreement, first to limit, then
reduce, strategic nuclear forces. I think we
may be confident that, if agreement is not
poserible, both the United States and the
Soviet Union, will maintain their assueed
deetracedon capabilities.
'We have, however, announced a decision to
deploy an ABM system and, at the same time
stated that we cannot protect our cities frem
a Soviet ballistic missile attack. What is the
purpose of our light ABM system called
Sentinel? The primary objective is that of
achieving protection against nuclear capa-
bility of Conimunist China. China detonated
a =dear device in October 1964 and has
since detonated six more. We have evidence
that they are devoting substantial resources
to the development of missile delivery sys-
tems. It is likely they will have an initial
ICBM capability in the early 1970's and a
modest force in being in the ned-1970's.
These weapons will be crude, similar to our
first ICBM's.
Further, the Chinese-oriented ABM de-
polyment would enable us to add?as a con-
current benefit?a further defense of our
Minuteman sites against Soviet attack, which
means that at modest cost we would in fact
be adding even greater effectiveness to our
offensive missile force and avoiding a much
more costly expansion of that force.
We cannot be sure why the Red Chinese
wish to develop an ICBM system but the de-
velopment may be for two reasons: the inter-
national prestige that goes with the posses-
sion of a nuclear capability and, more im-
portantly to provide a basis for threatening
her neighbors. Of course, this is only con-
jecture since, although we have some ability
to monitor China's development effort from
the technological point of view, it is im-
possible for us to determipe the intent be-
hind their effort. The Communist Chinese
effort has been followed for several years and
we waited as long as was prudent before de-
ciding to deploy our Sentinel system. The de-
termining factors were the lead times in-
volved. We estimated as accurately as pos-
sible the date the Chinese would have an
operational ICBM, and then backed off from
that date the time it would take to have our
Sentinel system in operation. By placing
Sentinel in production early this year, the
operational dates will coincide.
You may wonder why we deploy an ABM
system to oounter the Red Chinese threat
when we discarded it as a rational course of
action with respect to the Soviet Union. The
answer is that only the passage of time will
provide us with proof of Chinese intent, and
military planners must be conservative, and
secondly, we can provide an effective defense
against any Chinese attack possible in the
1970's.
The United States now posseeeee and will
continue to possess for as far as we can see
Into the future an overwhelming strategic
superiority over Communist China, and the
Chinese know that fact. However, it is con-
ceivable that Chinese leaders at some future
time might risk destruction by attempting
nuclear blackmail against the United States
in order to gain concessions, perhaps in
Southeast Asia. If we had no defense, they
might gamble that we would never accept
the destruction of one of our cities in ex-
change for concessions so far removed geo-
graphically.
Although we know that the Chinese Com-
munist leaders understand the devastation
which the use of nuclear weapons by China
could bring home to the Chinese mainland,
we have no reason to believe that they will
be any less cautious than the leaders of
other nations with nuclear weapons, hostile
action by Red China is not totally incon-
ceivable. We can deploy, for a cost we can
well afford (approximately 5 billion dollars),
an ABM system which, against the Chi-
nese threat, will remain effective with fore-
seeable improvements at least until the
1980's. We have decided to deploy that sys-
tem.
Moreover there are other benefits to be
derived from the deployment of Sentinel.
By deterring Communist China from nuclear
blackmail, we hope to discourage nuclear
weapon proliferation among the present
non-nuclear nations of Asia. A second bene-
fie I have already mentioned?the option of
providing additional protection of our
Minuteman sites, even against a Soviet at-
tack, which will improve our assured de-
struction capability. And, lastly, Sentinel
is reliable enough to add protection for our
population in the unlikely event of an ac-
cidental launch of an ICBM by any power.
The deployment of a system such as
Sentinel can lead to mistaken attitudes
about our military posture. One pnesible at-
titude is an inclination to treat Sentinel as
a cure for all our military problems. This
should certainly not be the case. Sentinel
provides a defense against a narrow portion
of a very broad threat spectrum, and then
only in a unique set of circumstances. It is
a strategic nuclear weapon and, by no
means, can Sentinel serve as a substitute for
rd, 1968
conventional forces to deal with the far
more likely type of threat to the security
of the free world. In cautioning against this
danger last fall when he announced the
decision to deploy Sentinel, Secretary Mc-
Namara noted that "The so-called heavy
ABM shield?at the present state of tech-
nology?would in effect be no adequate shield
at all against a Soviet attack, but rather a
strong inducement for the Soviets to vastly
increase their own offensive forces. That . . .
would make it necessary for us to respond
in turn?and so the arms race would rush
hopelessly on to no sensible purpose on
either side."
A second potential danger stems from the
possibility of forgetting the purpose for
which Sentinel has been designed: to coun-
ter an emerging Communist Chinese threat.
It will be quite easy to fall into this trap
with a system such as Sentinel because it
consists of a flexible set of building blocks--
the two types of radars and two types of
interceptor missiles?which can be assem-
bled in various combinations and numbers
of provide varying levels of defense against
different related threats. Now that we have
a system that will work, there will be pres-
sure to expand Sentinel, by adding snore
and more radars and missiles, into a heavy
Soviet-oriented ABM system.
This we must not do. I remind you of the
action-reaction phenomenon. It can only re-
sult in a great deal of expenditure by both
the United States and the Soviet Union with,
in the final analysis, no improvement in the
relative strategic position of ?Weer.
There is a third dangerous ceedcept which
is of particular interest to me in my position.
as Deputy Director for Defense, Research and
Engineering and that is the danger of think-
ing that we can allow a relaxation in re-
search and development in the broad field of
defense against ballistic missiles because we
are about to deploy an operational system.
To date this nation has spent approximate-
ly four billion dollars on ABM Research and
Development. Our current level of effort runs
to approximately one-half billion dollars a
year in R & D alone. We intend to maintain
this level of effort. We cannot afford the
luxury of imagining that we have reached
some sort of ABM technological plateau. We
cannot afford to become complacent?I be-
lieve we will never develop an impenetrable
ABM shield regardless of the sophistication
of the attack and the dedication of the at-
tacker; or, and vitally important, until we
can reach an enforceable agreement with the
rest of the community of nations to outlaw
nuclear weapons entirely.
I have talked about the history of ballistic
missile defense and the rationale behind the
decision to deploy Sentinel. I would like to
address a few points frequently raised by the
detractors, the people who feel we should not
deploy the Sentinel. Their reasons are nu-
numerous, for example some believe that the
system is either too expensive in terms of
the benefit to be derived; others that the
Interceptor warheads exploding overhead will
cause casualties; still others, that the system
is provocative to the Russians, for example.
One question frequently asked is: "Flow
do you know if the system will work, since
there's no way to test it without violating
the ban on atmospheric nuclear testing?"
The warheads for both the Spartan and
Sprint missiles can be tested quite adequate-
ly underground. It is not necessary that they
be tested in or above the atmosphere. The
remainder of the system will be tested at
Kawjalein Atoll in the Pacific where sites
are under construction and where we have
been conducting similar missile and radar
tests for research and development purposes
for some years.
The claim has been made that our own
population will suffer casualties from the
Spartan and Sprint warheads detonated over-
head. There are three effects to consider:
Flash, blast and radioactivity. When the war-
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head explodes there will be a bright flash of
light. Most of the population underneath
would scarcely notice it. If anyone were look-
ing in that part of the sky, there is a pos-
sibility that the flash could temporarily blind
him, but there would .be no serious after-
effects.
Because the high yield bursts take place
above the atthosphere, there would be little
or no blast. The effect would be like a sonic
boom.
, There would be no significant fallout from
'the radiation emitted at the time of the ex-
plosion. If dozens of defensive bursts oc-
curred, they would deposit radioactivity in
the atmosphere. There would be no harmful
short term effect and the long term effect
would be negligible?very similar to that ex-
perienced from our test series in 1962.
Although the Sprint warhead would ex-
plode in atmosphere, it would not cause
gfound damage because of its low yield.
Another point that arises from time to
time is whether we really expect the So-
viets to believe that -the Sentinel system is
not aimed at them, and if they do not believe
it, is it not an escalatory move on our part?
Frankly this is difficult to assess. We have
no positive assurance that they believe the
system is designed to protect us against Chi-
nese missiles. We hope that they believe us
and we are counting on their sophisticated
knowledge and their years of experience in
the field. It should be quite obvious to the
'Soviets from the technical design of the sys-
tem and the deployMent plans that will be
Made public that the system is Communist
Chinese-oriented and not Soviet-oriented.
A question that May have been raised in
:your minds is: "If Red China continues to
progress zither current rate in strategic weap-
0117, how effective will Sentinel be in the
1980's and later?" First, let me say that we
,will hava maintained our superiority through
'that or any time period. Nevertheless, the
point is a good one because the technical
gap will have narrowed. As the Chinese Com-
munists improve their technology and in-
crease their forces in number, we may ex-
pect them to have developed their own 'sec-
ond strike" capability; and the dangerous
period of possible irrationality will have
passed. The result then may be a U.S.-Chi-
nese impasse similar to that existing today
between ourselves and the Soviet Union.
In closing; I would like to make two sig-
nificant points. First is that we in the De-
partment of Defense earnestly believe that an
enforceable strategic arms-limitation agree-
ment is n desirable first step toward the
eventual abolition of nuclear weapons. To
quote Secretary McNamara: "What the world
requires in its 22d year of the Atomic Age
is not a new race toward armament.
"What the world requires in its 22d year
of the Atomic Age is a new race toward rea-
sonableness,"
Secondly, the decision to deploy the Com-
munist Chinese-oriented Sentinel system
Is not another lap in the race toward arma-
ment, but rather a protective umbrella which
enables us to get on with the race toward
reasonableness.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, while
Doctor Larsen's historical account of the
development of the Sentinel system is
very good, I am not in agreement with
some of his philosophy concerning Soviet
and Red Chinese reactions to its instal-
lation.
An excellent refutation of the philos-
ophy that antimissile systems spur the
arms race appeared in a feature article
of the November 1067 issue of Air Force
magazine. The article entitled "The Case
for the Defense," was written by Mr. J. S.
Butz, technical editor of Air Force. He
pointed out that, whether we like it or
not, both offensive and defensive tech-
nologies are advancing. Mr. Butz warned
that we should not be trapped in an "all-
offense" posture and that the path to
security required a technologically ad-
vanced, balanced offensive-defensive
posture.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the article be printed at this
point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
THE CASE FOR THE DEFENSE
(By J. S. Butz, Jr.)
The proposal by Secretary of Defense Rob-
ert S. McNamara that the U.S. produce and
deploy a so-called "thin" antiballistic mis-
sile (ABM) defense system has provoked a
crossfire of pro and anti arguments. Very
little of the discussion has succeeded in hit-
ting the real target, which is the proper re-
lationship between strategic offensive and
defensive capabilities in a U.S. strategy that
aims at deterring all-out nuclear war under
conditions favorable to U.S. interests.
No military problem has ever captured the
attention of the United States?and the
world?as has the problem of defending
against nuclear missiles. The Vietnamese
War has been a strong diversion, but there
is much evidence that more people are con-
oerned about the consequences of nuclear
war than about any other problem mankind
has ever faced.
Sadly, the potential threat is far better
understood than are the alternatives, either
for removing the threat or for living with
It. Part of the problem is that nuclear strat-
egy discussions tend to become complicated.
Partly this is due, in Mr. McNamara 's words,
to the "psychologically unpleasant" aspect
-of the problem. People simply don't like to
,think about the "unthinkable." But mostly
the lack of understanding stems from the
fact that only bits and pieces of the range of
alternatives in nuclear strategy are debated
publicly.
After reviewing the commentary triggered
by the action on a thin defense, one can only
conclude that the public is ill-informed on
several vital strategic factors. The extent of
misinformation is serious. It is almost totally
blocking public awareness of what lies ahead
for the United States in the next twenty
ydars.
For example: It is widely argued that in-
stalling any kind of a U.S. ballistic missile
defense system?thin or thick?will generate
a new arms race. Unfortunately, the-opinion
has become so widespread that there is a
solid scientist/civilian administrator front
holding the line against a missile defense on
the grounds that it would lead to a new
arms race. The adversary is pictured, not
as the Soviet Union or Red China, but as a
mythical and ill-defined U.S. "military-
industrial complex."
The truth is that the United States and
the Soviet Union have long been heavily
engaged in the most rapid, expensive, and
potentially most dangerous arms race in re-
corded history. Somehow, as the accusations
fly over the "illogic" of the ABM, this central
fact of our time is ignored.
Nothing short of an agreement on total
disarmament can stop this race. It will churn
on even if defensive missiles are never em-
placed, even if the nuclear proliferation
treaty is signed tomorrow. Nothing being
done today by our government, the Soviet
government, or any other government can
head off this race.
The race centers on offensive weaponry,
and it is being forced by the apparently un-
stemmable revolution in science and tech-
nology that is making every weapon obsolete
before it can be deployed. There is no secret
about the pace that technology is forcing.
Long-range missiles have been operational
for only ten years; yet the first generation
(Atlas and Titan) has been retired, the sec-
ond generation (Minuteman I, II, and
Polaris) is in service, development is well
under way on the third generation (Minute- .
man III and Poseidon), and the fourth gen-
eration is well in the planning stage.
Officially, the need for most current im-
provements in these offensive systems is laid
at the door of the Russians with their devel-
opment of a missile defense. Somehow the
idea has spread that our current offensive
missiles in their silos and submarines are
going to last a long time if the status quo
can be maintained.
Two developments in offensive technology
negate this idea. Massive changes in pace and
direction must soon be made. The existing
systems must be replaced almost entirely in
the next decade if the U.S. strategic missile
forces are to remain safe.
The first development is a three-way com-
bination of guidance and mapping improve-
ments and development of the cluster or
multiple warhead. Satellite mapping has
made it possible for the first time to locate
targets with an accuracy of a few hundred
yards. Today's guidance systems almost
match this precision, while ten years ago they
had an error of more than one mile after
a flight of 5,000 miles. With curent accuracy
a small nuclear weapon can be used to knock
out a missile buried in a hardened silo. When
a series of such weapons is clustered in a sin-
gle missile, it becomes possible for a rela-
tively small offensive force to destroy large
numbers of hardened missiles. Since Soviet
ICBMs have heavy payloads, they stand to
reap big benefits from this technology.
The eventual development of this situa-
tion comes as no surprise to the technical
and military communities. Dr. Ralph Lapp
warned in congressional testimony in 1960
that hard-target accuracy was inevitable. By
1962, scientists predicted in the open litera-
ture that such a capability would be here
before the end of this decade.
The counteraction for improvements in
guidance accuracy also have been discussed
for years. One either builds harder silos, in-
stalls defensive missiles to protect the silos,
or moves the offensive missiles out onto mo-
bile carriers. The Air Force has asked that
the fourth generation of ICBMs be mobile
and has explained its requests to DoD and
the Congress.
Satellite reconnaissance is the second tech-
nical development that will force multibil-
lion dollar changes in offensive systems. It
has been established through high-altitude
aircraft experiments, as well as satellite
flights, that several instruments operating
simultaneously in the visible, infrared, and
radio portions of the electromagnetic Spec-
trum can show variations in the surface
radiation patterns of land and sea well
enough to reveal a great deal of what is
going on underneath.
For example, certain underground rivers
and tunnels can be spotted, and large bodies,
such as schools of fish or submarines, can be
"seen" under the water to a depth of more
than 200 feet.
When this equipment reaches operational
use in satellites, and it undoubtedly will in
the 1970s, much of the submarine's protec-
tion will be gone. The only answer will be to
build a new fleet of undersea boats which can
operate at greater depths than those of to-
day.
CASE FOR THE DEFENSE
The cause of misunderstanding on nuclear
war strategy and the relative merits of of-
fensive and defensive weapons can be traced
back to one point on which there seems to be
universal agreement. This crucial fact is that
no foolproof, airtight defense against mis-
siles is possible with today's technology or
with foreseeable technology.
Two basic lines of thought have grown
out of this situation. One is that only a per-
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S 7244 CONGRESSIONAL.
RECORD ? SENATE June Z3, 1968
feat defense is worthwhile in nuclear War,
because even if only ten percent of the at-
tacking warheads reach their targets they
will wreak unacceptable devastation. Ac-
cording to this theory, it is most logical to
put all resources in the offensive forces.
US nuclear policy has been built on this
idea, and the objective, according to Mr.
McNamara, has been to create an "actual
assured destruction capability" that is "cre-
dible." That is, the US has built a force of
offensive missiles so large there is no doubt
it Could withstand a first strike by any enemy,
or combination of enemies, and still deliver
such a blow to the aggressor that "his society
is no longer viable in any meaningful,
twentieth-century sense."
In this "all-offense" concept the only
credible deterrence to nuclear aggression lies
in the threat of an overwhelming counter-
attack. A US ABM is considered a destabiliz-
ing force because it degrades the enemy's
offense to some extent and forces him. to
install more attack missiles. And in any
arms race, to gain a nuclear advantage the
offense is in the favorable position because
ICBMs are cheaper than an improved defenee.
Opposition to a ballistic' missile defense
over the years has been voiced by such
scientific policy advisers as Doctors Killian,
Kistiakowsky, Wiesner, Hornig, York, Brown,
and Foster?men who have served in the top
science posts in the DoD and White House.
The theory has been that a missile defense
is of no real importance against nuclear
powers at any stage of development, China
included. The fact that the Soviets started
installation of a defense system more than a
year ago also is of no consequence. This,
the anti-anti school holds, is simply a costly
Russian mistake. In this theory the only vi-
able deterrent to the use of nuclear weapons
is the threat of an overwhelming counter-
attack. -
The ultimate objective of this policy is to
work for and maintain a balanced nuclear
deterrence between the great nuclear pow-
ers while seeking disarmament through
negotiation.
. A second nuclear strategy concept has de-
veloped which is in direct opposition to the
one espoused by the United States until the
decision last month to deploy a thin defense.
In this second theory, missile defense has
several beneficial roles, and it is a stabilizing
rather than a destabilizing force.
The top US military authorities, a signi-
ficant percentage of the US scientific com-
munity, and apparently the key men in the
Soviet Union are exponents of this theory.
For the past tWo years, according to Gen.
Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the JCS has recommended
unanimously that the (IS deploy a missile
defense that is stronger than the thin sys-
tem now proposed by the Administration but
less dense than the so-called "thick" de-
fense whose price-tag is $40 'billion, spread
over a ten-year period.
General Wheeler has been specific in pre-
senting the reasons for the JCS view to the
Congress. The Joint Chiefs fear that failure
of the US to field an ABM will lead to So-
viet and Allied belief that we are interested
only in the offensive, that is, first strike, or
that our technology is deficient, or that we
will not pay to maintain strategic superiority.
If the Russians are in sole possession of the
ABM, it is considered possible that they may
Come to believe that their defense system
coupled with a nuclear attack on the United
States would limit damage to them to an
acceptable level. While this acceptable dam-
age level is an unknown, if it is ever reached
our forces will no longer deter and the first
principle of our security policy would be
gone.
The JCS also believe that some form of
ABM is needed to reduce the chances that
a new nuclear power, such as China, could
destroy several US cities at will with an un-
sophisticated missile force. Such a thin
ABM also would provide a high probability
that any missile launched by accident could
be stopped.
Finally, the JCS believe that damage to
US cities by a nuclear strike could be re-
duced in a meaningful way with an ABM
system. General Wheeler, last February,
stated that despite the mass destruction,
"one nation will probably survive in a nu-
clear exchange. The thirty, forty, or fifty
million American lives that could be saved by
Nike-X, therefore, are meaningful, we believe,
_ in every sense of the word."
Significant support for the JCS view exists
in the US science community. All scientists
do not accept the "all-offense" theory. In
congressional hearings this year, Dr. Michael
M. May, Director of the Lawrence Radiation
Laboratory, strongly backed the deployment
of an ABM. In an exchange with Sen. Joseph
S. Clark (D.-Pa.) , Dr. May said that from
the standpoint of deterrence it might make
sense to put available funds into the of-
fense rather than build an ABM. But, he
added, "let me take up the question of what
if war actually occurs; what if deterrence
fails? In that case, even an imperfectly ef-
fective ballistic missile [defense] system with
shelters will certainly save some tens of mil-
lions of lives. . ." Senator Clark replied,
"So what you are saying is, instead of having
fifty million Americans killed you have only
ten million Americans killed. . To me this
is just nonsense." Dr. May disagreed com-
pletely, saying, "Not to me."
Soviet opposition to the all-offense theory
has been repeatedly voiced by Russian mili-
tary writers. Maj. Gen. N. Talensky was typi-
cal in writing in 1964, "It is said that the...
situation cannot be stable where both aides
simultaneously strive for deterrence through
rocket power and the creation of defensive
antimissile systems. I cannot agree. ... Pow-
erful deterrent forces and an effective anti-
missile defense system, when taken together,
substantially increase the stability of mutual
deterrence."
A number of US sources also have reported
strong Russian favor for the missile defense
concept. Richard B. Foster, Director of the
Strategic Studies Center at Stanford Re-
search Institute, wrote in 1966 that "the
favorable Soviet attitude toward BMD [bal-
listic missile defense] was evidenced at the
last three Pugwash Conferences. When West-
ern spokesmen attempted to persuade the
Soviet delegates that there were good reasons
to refrain from developing BMD, the USSR
representatives at first failed to understand
the arguments. At the third conference they
informed the Western delegates that it was
too late; the USSR was going ahead with
its BMD program."
Professor Freeman J. Dyson, a nuclear
weapons expert and student of the Soviets,
has said that it is "Wally naive to suppose
that any Soviet leader could be persuaded to
forgo 'defense' for the sake of preserving
'deterrence.' Attempts from our side to pres-
pressure the Soviet government into aband-
oning deployment of ABMs would almost
certainly backfire."
In view of such reports from outside the
government, it is curious that insiders could
convince themselves in November 1966 that
the Russians could be talked into a ban on
missile defenses, long after deployment of
their BMD had begun. At any rate the talks
failed and the US belatedly is following the
Soviet lead,
To sum up, military men generally believe
it is incorrect to put emphasis on casualties
when the central objective is to avoid all
casualties by deterring war. The aim should
be to develop a war-winning capability with
a balanced offensive/defensive force ready for
combined operations that will minimize our
damage while maximizing the enemy's. Pos-
session of a combined force, war-winning
capability is considered the beet deterrence
to enemy action. If the US went for the 100
percent offensive ,force, there is no way it
could limit the damage inflicted by the
enemy except by a first strike.
THE FUTURE OF THE ABM
Most commentators opposing the ABM have
echoed Mr. McNamara and warned that the
greatest danger in installing the thin system.
is that there will be a temptation to seek
more protection and to expand it into a heavy
defense. And, according to the Defense Sec-
retary, this temptation will lead to a "sense-
less spiral upwards of nuclear arms," in which
huge sums would be spent, with neither side
buying more protection for its people and
both running the risk of having more mega-
tons of explosive strike its soil.
To anyone who questions the logic of the
"all-offense" theory, there is a greater con-
cern for the future. This worry involves the
pace of technology and the major improve-
ments in weapon systems that will be forced
in the next decade. Defensive systems face
innovations just as revolutionary as the ones
previously described for offensive missiles,
Briefly, the two most important compo-
nents in the ABM?the radar and the kill
mechanism?apparently are in a period of
accelerating improvement with no end in
sight. The flret major upgrading in radar was
the ability to track hundreds of objects rath-
er than a single warhead. The early Nike-
Zeus radar was mechanically slewed and re-
quired seconds to look at each target. It
proved many important technical points and
knocked down ten out of fourteen ICBM
warheads during 1962-1963 tests, but it was
at a serious disadvantage against mass at-
tacks with decoys supporting the warheads.
This limitation was relieved with the Nike-X
phased-array radar, which can sweep the en-
tire sky with its electronically steered beams
in microseconds. Future developments are
aimed sit higher frequency devieee which will
reduce the radar blackout time following the
detonation of large nuclear weapons in the
upper atmosphere. Another objective is to
improve multispectral methods of sorting
warheads from decoys.
Nuclear weapon development is in its most
revolutionary period. For several years both
the US and USSR have been working on pure
fusion weapons, often called neutron or
N-bombe. S. T. Cohen, of the RAND Corp.,
last June wrote of the fact that these weap-
ons use nuclear processes which emit no ra-
dioactivity and shower forth neutrons of a
"unique nature" with sufficiently high energy
to permit "new domains of utilization." One
of the practical results of this new tech-
nology is that designers can improve the
capacity of nuclear weapons to stop ICBM
warheads. Another effect of the new technol-
ogy, according to Mr. Cohen, is that the cost
of nuclear weapons will drop sharply.
Very large warheads also are being investi-
gated for the ABM system because it was
found that the original US scaling theory
was inaccurate and that very large weapons
probably produce 1,000 times more neutrons
than was estimated a few years ago. As the
effectiveness of the defensive warheads is in-
creased, a system can approach the point
where each defense weapon can take out
more than one ICBM warhead.
One of the stickiest technical facts that
must be faced in the next 10 years is that
space operations can materially increase the
effectiveness of an ABM system. The opti-
mum vantage point for observing and track-
ing an ICBM strike is out in space where the
launch can be seen and the entire thirty-
minute flight followed. Observing from space
is a substantial improvement over the cur-
rent system of sitting in the target area and
picking up the warheads in their terminal
dives. Present-day moving target indicators
and other tracking equipment could handle
the observation-from-space task admirably,
and undoubtedly improvements can be made.
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- Space operations offer the additional pos-
sibility of attacking an ICBM strike along its
entire route, during the boost and midcourse
phases as well as the terminal. Defensive
warheads positioned in space could be
brought down on command to form a "mine-
field" before the attacker. Many other
schemes are possible.
Without doubt, talk of a spaceborne com-
ponent of the ABM system will bring imme-
diate and loud objections from anyone who
embraces the "all-offensive" theory or from
anyone wh-ei is concerned about an expansion
of the thin defense and fears the cost of space
operations. Still, there is no escaping the fact
that rapid, constant change, in military sys-
tems as well as in everything else, is a part
of our life. Technology is forcing it.
One of the great expectations is that the
technical revolution will lead to stronger de-
fenses. Somewhere in the unforeseeable fu-
ture, a decade or so ahead, if man is persist-
ent enough, he should be able to build a de-
fense that will all but neutralize the nuclear
offense.
Effectively, man has two roads for seeking
a way out of the nuclear dilemma. The first
is with science and technology?the areas
that started the trouble in the first place.
The second is through negotiations to see if
national governments can talk themselves
out of their ancient antagonisms and cur-
rent fears. Both of these efforts are vital to
building a world safe from nuclear catastro-
phe. Perhaps neither could ever do the job
alone. -
It is difficult to see how peace would be
served for the US and USSR to seek a status
quo and wait for China, and possibly other
nations, to creeeahead with the development
?loan "assured-destruction capability" with
the power to annihilate all whom they con-
sider to be an enemy.
In any event, it is impossible to see what
purpoSe is served by leaving the impression
that the US is helping to precipitate an arms
race by belatedly okaying a thin ABM system
while the Soviets are already beyond that
stage and at work on a heavy model. Mr.
McNamara, in his announcement, fueled
critics of the military to overflowing by leav-
ing the impression that he was being pushed
into approving the thin system and would
never alter his opposition to a further ex-
pansion of the defenses.
At this stage in the technical revolution
It would seem mandatory for the Secretary
of Defense to make it clear that we are far
from the end of the line in strategic arms,
and that the fifth and sixth generations of
? long-range missiles and a heavier defense
may be necessary in the next decade. No one
would expect the Secretary to present a long
shopping list of exotic new space and weapon
systems. But he should at least create a cli-
mate in which all new systems are not viewed
? as part of a vast military-industrial plot.
Such a climate is necessary to public accept-
ance of the thin ABM for what it is, a neces-
sary step in the twenty-year-old US-USSR
arms race that cannot be terminated without
a near-miracle in negotiation or a technical
breakthrough comparable to the first atomic
Weapon.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, re-
cently the Senate Preparedness Investi-
gating Subcommittee held hearings on
offensive and defensive strategic weapons
and weapon delivery systems. The re-
sults of these hearings are not yet avail-
able, but I can assure Senators that the
need for antimissile defense was care-
fully ,explored. I should hope that any
Senator who might be inclined to delay
the deployment of the Sentinel system
would, before he votes on the defense
appropriation, contact the Senate Pre-
paredness Subcommittee and obtain a
copy of the hearings showing the hazards
that such a delay would involve.
Mr. President, in concluding my coin-
meats in defense of the Sentinel system,
I should like to summarize. I have
pointed out the grave consequences of
any delay in the deployment of the Sen-
tinel system. I have reviewed the history
and the threat against which the ABM
defends. I have presented the case for
this defense and have cited the Prepared-
ness Investigating Subcomittee hearings
on strategic offensive and defensive
weapons systems as the authority for
continuing with the Sentinel deployment.
I urge the Senators to familiarize them-
selves with this entire problem before
taking any precipitate action in reduc-
ing defense appropriations when the
money bill comes before the Senate.
It has been estimated that if an all-
out war should occur, an antiballistic
missile system could save from 80 mil-
lion to 100 million lives. Taking into
consideration the tremendous jeopardy
that could result to our Nation because
of the loss of millions of lives as well
as the loss of hundreds of millions of
dollars worth of property, it would seem
the part of prudence not to delay in
going forward with an antiballistic mis-
sile system. Military experts believe we
should go forward without delay. In
fact, they further advise that we go fur-
ther with the full system, not merely
with a thin system, with which the De-
partment of Defense is now proceeding.
However, the thin system will lay the
base to proceed later with a complete
system that would be a defense against
the missiles of the Soviet Union.
PERSONAL PRIVILEGE
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I do not
like to detain the staff or other Senators,
but I believe this matter is so important
that I must do so for a little while
tonight.
This morning, Drew Pearson and
Jack Anderson made their latest at-
tack against me, and it appeared in
many of the morning newspapers across
the country.
Pearson's vendetta against me began
when I first entered the House of Rep-
resentatives approximately 14 years ago,
and this morning's column is the 123d
which he has written condemning me.
He has accused me of almost every
imaginable impropriety and wrong and
now he has gone even further by say-
ing that even in the area in which I
have fought the hardest, and to which
I have dedicated much of my senator-
ial career, I am not honest and, in fact,
have been working against the public
Interest.
Pearson's lying attacks upon me no
longer hurt me. I believe I am beyond
that point. They no longer anger me.
But the charge of this morning appalled
me and amazed me, because it was so
incredible, so totally inaccurate, so
blatantly false.
While all of his charges against me
have been untrue, the falsity of many of
them has been difficult for me to prove,
because, unfortunately, there has not al-
ways been sufficient evidence and docu-
mentary proof of the truth. With respect
to this morning's charges, however, I am
in possession of overwhelming proof that
Pearson is what all knowledgeable Amer-
icans know him to be?an unmitigated
and scandalous liar.
Today, Pearson and Anderson and .
their lying, thieving jackals charge that
I, while pretending to vigorously work
toward curbing violence among the
young people of our country, have ac-
tually been working in the opposite di-
rection?specifically, by suppressing a
Senate Juvenile Delinquency Subcom-
mittee study of the impact of television
crime and violence on our young people.
I quote what he wrote:
These (television) studies, written more
than six years ago, were suppressed, ironi-
cally, by the same Senator Torn Dodd
(D-Conn.) who introduced the gun control ,
bill to curb violence.
He goes on to quote from a series of
memorandums written by members of
the staff to me about the substance of
these studies, and claims that all of
these, as well as the study itself, were
suppressed.
Pearson claims that my motive Was
my desire not to embarrass the powerful
television networks.
Mr. President, all these charges are
completely false and an incredible dis-
tortion of history. Here is the real truth
and the real proof. Fortunately, I have it.
As chairman of the Subcommittee on
Juvenile Delinquency, I have been con-
cerned with violence since 1961. For the
first 3 years, I dedicated myself to the
problem of violence on television and its
potential effect on the public and on
young people.
From 1963 on, I have been interested
in stronger gun control legislation.
Between 1961 and 1963 I did con-
duct?and the record will establish that I
did?an intensive investigation of crime
and violence on television.
During this period we held many days
of hearings. The hearing record is here.
It is voluminous. Many, many witnesses
appeared. The foremost experts in psy-
chiatry and criminology and in the tele-
vision industry.
In all, we heard from 56 witnesses, and
on my desk are the records, which I hope
every Member of the Senate will read.
They were printed and released to the
public and to the press in the usual way.
Finally, on October 27, 1964, with the ap-
proval of the majority of the subcom-
mittee, I made a public and thorough and
comprehensive report On crime and vio-
lence on television and its impact on our
young people.
We released 10,000 copies of that re-
port. It was released to the public. I do
not know how it could have been done
better.
That this unforgivable liar can claim
that I suppressed this investigation, in
the face of these facts and documentary
proof, is utterly beyond my comprehen-
sion. I try to be a gentleman. I want to
be. But so many lies have been told about
me, and so many people have believed
them, that my patience is broken.
But Pearson himself is beyond compre-
hension in the depths to which he will
sink and the outrageous lengths to which
he will go to assassinate the characters
of those whom he hates. He hates me. I
do not hate him. I am sorry for him; but
I ,feel it is incumbent upon me, for my-
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LuNGE_ESSIONAI RECORD ? SENATE
Jiirte 1, 1968
self, for my family, and for my friends
that the record be written straight.,
The crowning proof of this morning's
hes by Pearson and Anderson is Drew
Feetraan himself in an article which he
Mote just 13 days after the release of
this subcommittee report.
+ ha that column of November 9, 1964, he
praised inc for releasing this report and
talcovering the truth about the violent
nature of the television network pro-
Maris.
I would think that it would behoove
irresponsible and lying columnists such
as Anderson and Pearson to at least re-
niertiber what they have written and
said in the past. But when a, person starts
to lie, he gets in trouble because he can-
t remember the lies he told.
And I hue. always felt that it was in-
evitable that Pearson and Anderson who
lie to the degree that they do, would
sooner or later get caught up in their lies.
I want to briefly quote from this 1964
Pearson column:
The current report by Senator Tom Dodd
(D-Oonn.) on juvenile delinquency snows
th40 efaine of the networks are serving just as
brazen a crime diet as ever And sinoe the
*Vie of Calif ornie have set a precedent ehat
individual Americans cannot see entertain-
they pay for, it might be well fer the rest of
obtultry to diagnose carefully what it is
gelatin free.
, l'heSenate ,,Tuvenile Delinquency Commit-
tewdieg into the secret files of the American
Broadcasting Company to get its intexeselce
MeMO.e some ef them pertainieg to "The 'Un-
touchables," This is a show originally
watched over a five-year period by 5,500,000
children a week. (It is no longer on the ABC
netWork.)"
Ironically, these are some of the very
memos which Pearson claims in this
morning's column were suppressed by
me.
Let me quote from another peexecn
column, which appeared or August 19,
1904.
Wer Various reasons, it looks as if televi-
sion is going to be up against the congres-
sional gun this year.
Sharpshooter No. 1 is Sen. Tom Dodd (p-
coma.), who blames television for our scan-
dalous eivenile delinquency increase. He is
supported by Sen. Ken Keating (R-N.Y.).
In tough language they have warned the
networks that there's been absolutely pa
eheege in the diet of crime and sex being
disbed out to the publie--especially by NBC
and ABC.
This highly important television study,
which Pearson, Anderson, and their
jackals and thieves would have the
American public believe I suppressed, re-
sulted in many significant findings.
want to briefly review some of the more
important ones for the RECORD.
First. Normal people who view violence
on film exhibit twice as much violence
thereafter as persons not exposed to such
preeentation. This was proven by sciet-
tific experimentation.
Second. Television programs which
feature excessive violence tend to reiri-
force overly aggressive attitudes and
drives in juvenile viewers where such at-
titudes and drives already exist.
Third. Children can be taught to per-
form aggressive acts by being exposed to
suchacts on television.
Fourth. Continuous exposure of the
young to programs containing violence,
crime, and brutality tends to produce a
cumulative effect which can build up ag-
gressive tendencies and the viewers' ac-
ceptance of excessive violence as the
normal way of life.
Fifth. Filmed violence can serve as the
motivation for the release of hostility
and aggressive behavior in some individ-
uals already under stress for other rea-
sons.
In this report I was highly critical of
the television industry and I warned the
industry that it had to cut the amount
of violence and crime on its programs or
face congressional intervention.
I have often repeated this criticism,
and as recently as last Tuesday, on the
floor of the Senate, I described the re-
sults of this important study.
Nothing means more to me, there is
nothing closer to my heart, nothing to
which I have dedicated more time than
my campaign, and, persistent efforts to
investigate the causes of violence in our
society, particularly among our young
People. This was the reason for my ef-
forts to see that we have strict gun con-
trol legislation enacted. This was the
reason for the television study. It
brought me a lot of trouble. But that
never bothered me.
However, Pearson lied again this
morning when he challenged my sincer-
ity in, this regard and impugned my in-
tegrity with respect to this most impor-
tant aspect of my career in the Senate.
But this is just another example of the
countless lies, misrepresentations, and
distortions made by this man and his
associates against me. I shall have more
to say about the subject. It may take a
few days, but I am preparing to do it.
Drew Pearson is a liar. He is a mon-
ster. Someday the American people will
recognize it. Those associated with him
are thieves, liars, and monsters. Some-
day the American people will recognize
it. His business is lying. He is a devil.
It appalled me that he was honored
as a Big Brother; a molester of children
who had the records of his arrest de-
stroyed. What is his strange power in
this Government?
I said on another occasion he is the
Ra,sputin of our society, and he is. I do
not know what his influence is.
/ know he had the effrontery to call
me and ask me to vote against Mr. Bress
as U.S. attorney for the District of Co-
lumbia. One of my colleagues brought
the memorandum to me and asked me
not to say who gave it to him. I told him
I must know and he said, "It is Pearson."
I have been learning more about
Pearson and Anderson and their lying
and thieving associates than perhaps
any other man in this body. I am going
to put it in the RECORD.
They should be put away. They prey
on the frailties of human nature, and
they get evil things done.
Mr. President, this is not the last thing
I am going to have to say on this subject.
I am, as I said, at the breaking point in
my patience and I am going to tell all
I know about them. It is going to shack
the Senate, it is going to shock this coun-
try, and it is going to shock the world. I
have some pretty good evidence.
He has caused more men to destroy
themselves than perhaps any other man
In my time. He is not going to cause me
to do so. He will ruin you, Mr. President
(Mr. LONG of Louisiana in the chair) ,
and every Member of the Senate if you
do not serve his Purpose. He is the Devil's
own slave. He does not know honor. He
does not know truth. He is a monster
and his jackals are just as bad.
Mr. President, lam sorry for this delay.
I ask unanimous consent to have
printed in the RECORD two articles writ-
ten by Drew Pearson,
There being no objection, the articles
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
f Nov. 9, 1964]
WASHINGTON Menee-Go-Roesm
(By Drew Pearson)
Wesel's/Grose?Now that California has
elected a song-and-dance man to the Senate
and simultaneously killed the right of its
people to see pay-as-you-go teleeision, it
should be up to the TV networks tc improve
the quality of their programs.
However, the current report by Sen. Tom
Dodd (D-Conn.) on juvenile delinquency
shows that some of the networks are serving
just as brazen a crime diet as ever. And since
the people of California have set a precedent
that individual Americans cannot see enter-
tainment they pay for, it alight be well for
the rest of the country to diagnose ?arefully
what it is getting free.
The Senate Juvenile Delinquency Commit-
tee dug into the secret files of the American
Broadcasting Company to get its inter-office
memos, some of them pertaining to "The
Untouchables." This is a show originally
watched over a five-year period by 3,500,000
children a week. [It is no longer on the ABC
network.]
Here is one ABC inter-office memo describ-
ing the blood-and-guts proposed for these
viewers:
"Opens right up . . . a running gunfight
between two cars of mobsters who crash, then
continue the fight in the streets. Three killed.
Six injured. Three killed are innocent by-
standers
"There's a good action scene where the
mail truck is held tip and the driver killed.
"Colbeck suspicions it was Courtney and
beats it out of Joe's henchman. Courtney is
trapped in an alley and beaten unconscious
and tossed in the river, . .
"Colbeck pressures a police lieutenent who
owes him a favor to pick up (Courtney's) gal
and deliver her to a spat on the bridge where
Colbeck's men will shoot her dead"
On one occasion, ABC program people ad-
vised ABC president Tom Moore that there is
a tendency of recent episodes to become
"talky" and as a result much of the action
and suspense is lost. Moore then wrote pro-
ducer Quinn Martin:
"I hope you will give careful attention to
maintaining this action and suspense in fu-
ture episodes. As you know, there has been a
softening of the ratings, which may or may
not be the result of this talkiness, but cer-
tainly we should watch it carefully''
Martin is known in the trade as a "blood-
and-guts" producer. Regarding another
show, "A Killer Called Paddy-0," Martin
wrote this memo marked "personal and con-
fidential.":
"I wish we could come up with a different
device than running a man down with a car,
as we have done this now in three different
shows.
"I like the idea of sadism, but I hope we
can come up with another approach for it."
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