NOTICE: In the event of a lapse in funding of the Federal government after 14 March 2025, CIA will be unable to process any public request submissions until the government re-opens.

1] HOW I GOT IN AND WHY I CAME OUTOF THE COLD:

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP70B00338R000300030001-1
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
16
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 1, 2005
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 1, 1967
Content Type: 
MAGAZINE
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP70B00338R000300030001-1.pdf2.03 MB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300030001-1 Approved For Release 2005/11/21 :.CIA-RDP70B00338R000300030001-1 [Page 10] Stokely Carmichael [Page 29] Canada Apologia: RAMPARTS has won the George Polk Memorial Award for ex- cellence in journalism, an honor shared this year with the essay depart. meat of Time magazine. Any remarks about strange bedfellows would be fatuous, idle and undignified, Our account last month of the CIA's secret financing of the National Student Association made the Washington press corps eat foundations for Lent, Outside the Internal Revenue Service headquar- ters ace journalists waited impatiently in line, two score deep, to get their cracks at scouring tax records in search of still another CIA conduit. RAMPARTS Con- [Page 15] Three Tales [Page 34] Conservation suiting editor Paul Jacobs, who was there, swears reporters were trading off copies of foundation tax reports as if they were bubble gum cards. That is funny, but funnier still is the fact that America is the only country where an outmoded and incompetent intelligence agency could become a national joke and still retain its power, In a continuing effort to bring the CIA's operations under sonic effective national control, and since we started the whole thing anyway, we take a further look at the CIA beginning on page 15. Since we exposed the CIA, we have received our share of hot story tips from public-minded citizens. One gentleman, a professor, phoned to tell us that Dis- neyland is hollow underneath and right VOLUME 5, NUMBER 10 APRIL 1967 MARGINALIA LE ZERS 3 EtIAL: The New Innocence 4 Sacrr:TY: The Deer Party 5 Ay Paul Krassner MEIn A: The Father of Advertising 5 by Dugald Sterner OPNk $JN: The Plot Thickens 8 by "William Turner ESSAYS MY FATHER AND STOKELY CARMICHAEL 10 by Eldridge Cleaver SANCTUARY by Donald Duncan Am1RWA THE RAPED--PART 1 34 by Gene Marine SPECIAL REPORTS THREE TALES OF THE CIA 15 LITERATURE 46 BOOK REVIEWS byNoarn Clornsky and Peter Collier SOREL'S BESTIARY: 47 The Giant Swallowtail wingers haul people below it to do ter- rible things, then hypnotize them and send them home. Another lady said that the Army was feeding LSD to the troops in Vietnam so they would turn on at the sight of bombs bursting and blood and so forth. The February issue, with Senator R. Kennedy on the. cover, took a full five weeks to reach subscribers through the post. This is outrageous, even for the U.S. system of mail. Remedies in such a disaster are few. If we were willing to give Postmaster General Larry O'Brien, a Kennedy man, the benefit of the doubt, we would say that it is President John- son's fault. If we really wanted to cause trouble, we would, of course, threaten to nationalize the post office.-- W.H. Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300030001-1 Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R it is clear that nothing less than full-scale public investigations of the agencies must be carried out if any future of national probity and individual sacrosanctity is to be preserved, D. HOWARD ADY (ex-Captain, British Intelligence Corps) Los Angeles, California Letters : SUBVERSION SIRS: Recent disclosures by RAMPARTS [March 1967] regarding. the CIA's pene- tration and subversion of the NSA and of other domestic and international stu- dent bodies, viewed in conjunction with mounting evidence of CIA manipulation of the Peace Corps, the labor unions, in- ternational aid programs, news and information media, cultural missions, academic circles, emigre groups, reli- gious councils and scientific congresses, will shock hitherto unsuspecting Amer- icans into realizing that for totalitarian amorality their own government is with- out equal among nations. What, however, has yet to be brought home to the people of the United States is the extent to which similar methods are being employed to control thought, subvert principle, and stifle dissent in their own country, the "Land of the Free." As the 1964-66 invasions-of- privacy findings of the U.S. Senate judi- ciary subcommittee chaired by Senator Edward V. Long made clear, few indeed are the areas of government, industry, education and culture that are free of some form of big brotherism. With clandestine agencies like the CIA and the FBI, it is standard practice to manufac- ture false evidence, to build up incrim. inating dossiers on individuals regarded as a threat to the powers-that-be. Infor- mation from such dossiers is passed freely between the various agencies (even being transmitted to corresponding agen- cies in other countries to which the sub- ject plans to travel), to be disclosed by them in whatever quarters it is likely to do most harm to the subject's reputation and interests, and all this without the victim being able to respond and clear himself, for he can only guess at the iden- tities of his detractors and the precise na- ture of their machinations against him. In the light of exposures of such prac- tices on the part of the CIA and the FBI, SIRS: I have learned, with deep concern, of the present crisis in the United States, in which it has been revealed that the CIA has been subsidizing the international exchange programs of the NSA. I take this opportunity to congratulate RAMPARTS on the fundamental role it played in uncovering this political scan- dal. If your magazine continues such ex- cellent work, true international exchanges, unmotivated by Cold War interests, will multiply and bring about the direct con- tact between peoples, the only hope for the future of universal brotherhood. ANDRE SOCII General Councillor of the Jura Department and Mayor, Champagnole, France HOMOSEXUALITY SIRS: I am a homosexual myself, and conse- quently I speak from an intimate knowl- edge of the subje:t. Had Gene Marine ["Who's Afraid of Little Annie Fanny," February 1967] been more circumspect, he would not have gone to every conceiv- able length to fortify his he-manliness; he would have suspected that by over- emphasis of that point, he might well be exposing that which he was trying to conceal. Who started this denigration of Woman? Did it not start back in the Garden, in which the de-feminized male when caught redhanded looked around for sonic convenient alibi? And ever since, every lying male-including your Marine, has thought to pull the wool over the All-Seeing "I." Far from being women-haters, the average homosexual is Woman's most faithful ally-the unfortunate thing is thatlboth of us should sacrifice our dig- nity, (on the altar of his conceit. But all thin::; having a purpose, perhaps that is God"?s final effort to save the obstrep- erous male from himself! IMRRY GRAY R'c: yal Oak, Michigan SIRS: Wrlhoever you are, Mr. Marine, I love youi.`You have put down, in admirable literairy style, my very feelings on the subj?ct of homosexuality dominating the so-cailled Arts-but more than that, you have: given a tremendous boost to my flagging spirits about being a WOMAN and'azmot a nubile teeny-bopper or. a mini- skirtc,,d high fashion colt. Yi au've done more for me than six montths on an analyst's couch in helping me tto realize that the only similarity be- tweeln the Playmate of the Month and me ii-s that we are both creased in the midtll'.e. CONSTANCE LEVINE Fairest Hills, New York SIRS k: Without challenging the general ac- curarwy of Gene Marine's wisecrack aboutt "Our Man Flint," I'd like to point out. tthat there was never a mention of "sur;gery" in the gag about converting girlt. -into pleasure units. It was all pills a.nd:ifiashing lights-early Leary is all. As for Mr. Marine's reading of the intent, I can see how he reached the con- clusiaon, but a good look at the material whi0h. was cut out of the final film might have convinced him that our problems were thespian, rather than lesbian. S?"yUL DAVID 20th Century Fox Productions Bicverly Hills, California SIR5^: Mr. Marine would not have had "a goad time at Truman's party." It took himfour pages to tell us that he wouldn't kna,v how. NsANCY GOETZ Washington, D.C. Approved For Release 2005/11/21 :-CIA-RDP70B00338R000300030001-1 Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300030001-1 Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300030001-1 Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300030001-1 11 How I got in and why I came of the Cold: HEN IT WAS ANNOUNCED that a CIA re- cruiter would visit the university campus where I was studying, I decided to con- tact him. I had previously served in a military intelligence branch and had found a certain challenge and spirit of adventure, even an intellectual stimulation, in gathering and fitting together the pieces that composed an intelligence picture. It was 1959, before the thaw in the Cold War and the. start of the hot little war in Vietnam. I was what might be called, for the sake of political labeling, a liberal Democrat, and I was convinced that a professional intelligence apparatus was vital to the defense of a free society. I envisioned the CIA as a tidy professional group mod- eled after Britain's MI-5, and I pictured its role as confined to a battle of wits with "the opposition." The CIA recruiter was noncommittal. I knew my background would interest him. But he merely jotted down my vital statistics and vaguely remarked he would "be in touch." Months went by, and I had almost forgotten about the CIA when I received a long distance call. "We're really interested is you; can you come to Washington?" This time the testing started in earnest. First a rigid physical exam, then psychological tests. Finally I was ushered into an office for a psychiatric interview, and there sat the psychiatrist with his fly unzipped. I studi- ously ignored the display, not wishing to embarass him, but later learned that the little psychological shocker was just one of many to test a man's personality. The wind-up of this grueling session was a series of interviews. It was evident by this time that they pretty well knew what made me tick. I left, certain only that all of me-my past, present and future--was now securely and permanently filed with the CIA. It was only a short time before I got the call: "We can use you." I reported to a ramshackle World War as told to the editors Ut II building in the Foggy Bottom section of Washing- ton that the CIA had inhwrited as the postwar stepchild of OSS. There were 60'V us in the training class. We were called Junior Officeir Trainees, or JOTs; The CIA refrains from calling its diirect employees "agents." In background and appearance we were a fairly heterogeneous lot. One #OT was a lanky professional type; another a brawny former athlete; another a rotund, jovial stereotyper, of the insurance salesman. The largest group of us; seemed to be from the Ivy League universities, with: 'a heavy representation from West Coast institutions such as Stanford and UCLA, and a fair-sized contingent from the Southern schools. As for political outlook,. -ithe largest part of the group was what I would term establishment liberal, although there were a few jingoisits like the cocky, rather loud- mouthed ex-Marine ands the tough, would-be Ken- tucky colonel. There were no Negroes (a later class did have one) and no Orlientals. There were no women JOTs either, because the Agency was leery of investing considerable time and tnmoney in marriage-prone fe- males. However, it turnod out that there were several husband-wife teams posited to small :remote stations, in which case the wife was given a nominal JOT classi- fication and trained to assist in routine clerical work. I found that the bul`)k of my classmates had been motivated to join the CLiA by extra-monetary considera- tions-the standard pa-y was hardly a princely sum. A JOT started at government pay level GS-7, at approxi- mately $7500 a year,.:Tlh.ough a JOT with a PhD was .usually afforded a GS-9$. By comparison, and it was a source of some disgrunrfiement, FBI agents, who didn't have to risk their necksutside the U.S. started at GS-10. But the CIA quite logiLadly feels that if one is in strictly for mercenary reasons, Ihe is susceptible to being bought off by "the opposition:' Melodramatic as it may seem, I would say that the vast majority of our class had Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300030001-1 9 been attracted by the romance, real or imagined., that they associated with the espionage trade. IRST ON TIIE TRAINING AGENDA was a two-day indoctrination. There were pep talks on the history of the CIA and the indispensible role it was playing in fighting communism and pre- serving the American way of life. The pitch was subtle; these were- not brass-band superpatriots, but intelligent men. Espionage is a dirty game, we were told, but the ruthless and unscrupulous tactics of "the opposition" left.us no alternative but to fight fire with fire. We were shown Agency-produced films depicting the CIA in action, films which displayed a kind of Hollywood flair for the dramatic that is not uncom- mon inside the Agency. A colleague who went through a 1963 training class told of a film on the U-2 episode. In his comments prefatory to the film, his instructor intimated that President Eisenhower "blew his cool" when he did not continue to deny that the U-2 was a CIA aircraft. But no matter, said the instructor, the U-2 was in sum an Agency triumph, for the planes had been overflying Soviet territory for. at least five years. During this time the Soviet leaders had fumed in frus- tration, unable to bring down a U-2 on the one hand, and reluctant to let the world know of their inability, on the other. The photography contained in the film confirmed that the "flying cameras" had accomplished a remarkable job of reconnaissance. When the film ended and the lights came on, the instructor gestured toward the back of the room and announced: "Gentle- men, the hero of our film." There stood Francis Gary Powers. The trainees rose and applauded. The training lectures and films gave analyses of do- mestic and international communism, The Communist Party, USA, was described as something of a toothless tiger, defanged by FBI counterintelligence. But interna- tional communism was touted as a formidable global threat. It soon became evident that in the CIA idiom, the term "anti-communism" was a recurring shibboleth, and I became aware that the Agency's covert support of political factions around the world was predicated on how "anti-communist" those factions were. It was not until much later that I realized that many of the factions favored by the CIA were equally, if not more, totalitarian than their communist opposition. During the lectures, the jealousies that exist be- tween the various "spook" agencies forming the in- telligence community began to surface. I recall one instructor boasting that the CIA never had a defector, while the National Security Agency was as "leaky as an old tub." Notvr. was there any love lost between the CIA and the. FBI:, an alienation that had historical roots. When OSS was dIi banded after World War II, J. Edgar Hoover pushed. tto take over its overseas intelligence functions but was: rcbuffed by President Truman, who was chary of conecentrating too much power in one pair of hands. When 'f ruman created the CIA as a surrogate, Hoover never forgot it, and he seemed to delight in letting the Agency know he knew of its missteps. The urgency of f being security-conscious at all times was constantly ditummed into us. We were instructed that if another JC3)T ever became ill or was injured in our presence, w e ~ lwere not to leave him alone, on the. theory that in a se:kmi-conscious condition he might un- wittingly betray sercret information. We were also told not to detail ourr lbackgrounds to our fellow trainees. This set the stage for a little security game. One by one we were takes ii aside and confidentially assigned another trainee fiomy whom we were to try to casually elicit as much background information as possible. Not only did the ex ,excise demonstrate how much data could be gleaned .from a person without his knowing it, but it detected several trainees who were prone to babble about their:- past in disregard of instructions. Security precautiions taken by the Agency were ex- treme. Even inside the closely guarded premises, type- writer ribbons had' to be removed from the machines at the close of but,,iness and locked up in safes. For highly secret conversations within the Agency we were not to use the oixdinary intra-building phones, but a special "red line"' ,whose security was repeatedly being checked. And we; knew that at any time, in training or in the field, Give might be picked at random for a polygraph test: to insure that we had not become a security risk in, tthe interim. Despite this olhsession with a security rubric, the CIA was in some, ways vulnerable. For one thing, the Agency encouraged bachelors to share apartments, and married couples: tnded to cluster together in the same apartments or lisousing developments; it didn't take long for neighboits familiar with the Washington scene to sense a "spoor,." Although most of our social life was spent with, (other Agency people, we did go to "outside" cocktail! parties and social affairs, and when the inevitable gl7nstion "What do you do?" arose, we would mumble ssoinething about being an "evaluator with DOD" (Department of Defense), then wait for the cynical smil a. Some sporting types co-inhabited with girls, usual y Agency girls, but nonetheless, . they were leaving themselves open to compromise and pos- sible breaches of security. Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300030001-1 Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300030001-1 the phase called Tradecraft, in which we learned the actual methods and techniques of a spy. Since we were to leave Washinb ton, we were to tell anyone who asked that we were on a volunteer DOD mission of "program evaluation." The Agency became "the company," a euphemism commonly used by CIA officers. We flew in a plane belonging to one of the CIA's private airlines to a base several hundred miles away. The Tradecraft course included how to recruit agents, file reports and conduct physical surveillances. Experts in invisible inks and writing, bugging and wiretapping, lockpicking, photography, microfilming and microdots, and other espionage crafts flew from Washington to teach us the rudiments. We weren't expected to acquire expertise ourselves-we could always request "the company" to send out a safecracker or forger. But we were expected to develop some proficiency in case of emergency. We were flown to New York City and practiced tapping and bugging each other's hotel rooms. The extent of the CIA's electronic eavesdropping, inciden- tally, is anybody's guess. The Agency has sophisticated devices that can be attached to telephone trunk lines and automatically record conversations. The FBI has a measure of accountability for its eavesdropping, but the CIA could be spending millions of dollars a year on the practice, and no one would be the wiser. We drilled in radio communication and dead drops (special places to leave messages for agents). We ran through practical problems: for one, the proper ap- proach to a Communist Party member who was thought to be ripe for defection. We staged exercises similar to war games in which we were CIA agents in an enemy country. We would hang around outside a naval yard, for example, quizzing workers to see how much "intel" about the yard and the ships we could obtain. We had to take surreptitious photographs, from less than five feet, of a policeman, a store detective and others. In case we were picked up by. the police, the FBI or ship- yard security people, we were instructed to try to talk our way out. Failing that, we were given a special Washington number to call, but to call it obviously meant we had failed as potential spies. It soon became apparent that our instructors were sizing up our suitability even during off-duty hours. In one gambit they would join us at the base bar and keep rounds of drinks coming to test our alcohol toler- ance. A couple of trainees who became tipsy after a few drinks were quietly phased out of the program. But the bar was also a prime source: f information. I discovered from other base pcrsonnel,',r.over a few friendly drinks, that groups of Cubans were:ssecretly being trained in an isolated part of the base. I'l:presume these Cubans later went ashore at the Bay.of'ivligs. The Bay of Pigs, incidenttally, was a terrible blow to CIA morale, After the debaetle, the word spread through the company grapevine (Il. ;assume it represented the thinking at the top, since ifv,was repeated by fairly high officials) that the operatio.ra had failed because "Ken- nedy lost his nerve" and rerreged on a commitment to provide air cover for the mounding force. At the time of the invasion, Castro had onily a few obsolete Liberators, Mustangs and so forth, a, rrragtag air force that could have been driven from they sky by planes taking off from Florida. Kennedy got_s,scared, it was said, so that the planes had to take offifrom Central America and thus were left with little tiirne over the beaches. The equipment used in the invaesion-ships, planes, guns- was surplus purchased by cother nations, re-purchased by the CIA and completely "sanitized" to remove all American markings and seriial numbers. In time, Agency employees took the philosoj1hical position that "our ex- ploits are unsung, our misa(rlventures are known to the world." Still it is strange tthat even after the Bay of Pigs the "company.' continued to train Cuban counter- insurgents at the base, andl may still be training them. It apparently has never abandoned hope of clandestinely forming another invasion fca::ce. OLLOWING OUR "(GRADUATION" from training school, we drew;: assignments. There are two main sides to the "company" house. One is DDI (Deputy, Director for Intelligence), which is the overt side.. I.)DI openly collects and col- lates material that may 1flave some bearing on intelli- gence. Its representatives.,, who carry CIA credentials, recruit American citizens; for the manifold positions within the Agency, brief:' sand de-brief certain coopera- tive. U.S. and foreign citaiiens who travel abroad, and perform similar functions. Most of the FBI retreads who join the "company"' -.are funneled either into DDI or into the Agency's secuivity department. Security does personnel screenings, kerl# s tabs on the security of the "company's" farflung operations, and acts as a sort of inspection staff, or "goonl:squad," to keep personnel in line and check on theiir ,activities. The. other side of dire house, completely divorced from the DDI, is the DEW` (Deputy Director for Plans), which handles covert or " tblack" operations. This is the down-and-dirty phase, embracing everything from espi- RAMPARTS 19 FTER THE INITIAL training phase we entered Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300030001-1 onage, or "Intel," to the overthrow of governments. Some idea of the sweep of the DDP's activities can be gained from several recent projects: financing, training and supplying the Thai border police; training the house- hold security force of the King of Nepal; supplying anti- communist guerrilla bands in Tibet; and using Project Camelot, an anthropological cover, for political manip- ulation in South America. Thus it was not surprising that the CIA'S man in the White House, who worked closely with McGeorge Bundy (and probably works closely with his successor), is a member of the DDP. A DDI official I met tried to proselytize me by arguing that 90 percent of the Agency's intelligence comes through overt sources. "These spooks with the big budgets play a lot of cloak-and-dagger games," he said, "but not many of them pay off." Whether his esti- mate was true or not, I wasn't about to be talked out of. the elite DDP. My first assignment was on one of the foreign desks at headquarters. I reviewed reports coming in from overseas and made recommendations. Every once in a while I had to pull maps and photographs of cities behind the Iron Curtain and select park benches, bridges and other Sites suitable for dead drops, meets and signal posts. Much of this material was pitifully outdated, and I had a sinking feeling some of the sites might no longer exist. It was at this point that some of the gloss began to rub off the Agency image. This was, of course, a demanding business, and the Agency tolerated no mediocracy or dead wood. I ran into many veteran "Intel" types, men who had spent perhaps 15 years in.the field, who were being pulled back to headquarters and superannuated. They were washed up, and they knew it; they had spent their entire career in "Intel" and knew no other trade, although the "company" makes efforts to case them into the National Security Agency, Army Intelligence, or some other agency in which they can finish out their time until retirement (after all, a disgruntled agent is dangerous to security). The extent of the Agency's operations is awesome- and a bit frightening. DDP operatives were planted in virtually every U.S. government branch that had foreign aspects, for example, the U.S. Information Agency, the Agency for International Development (AID), Radio Free Europe and the State Department (although State shied away from bestowing full diplo- matic status on "company" men in a half-effort to keep its skirts clean abroad). The Agency runs all sorts of commercial and industrial front companies overseas. Air America in the Far East is a now well-known "company" enterprise; the Civil. Air Transport is no longer subsidized by the Agency, but at least one of its board of directors is still a "company" man. ET "RIDING THE DESK" in Washington head- quarters did not impart any deep-seated doubts about the Agency and its role. The actual intelligence operations were distant happenings and it was easy to be academic and ob- jective. When messages from an agent in a foreign country did not contain the safety signal-a deliberate mistake or misspelling to indicate that all was well and it became obvious that he had been captured and was being forced to communicate, the terrible fate that awaited him was only an abstraction to me. I didn't know the agent's name, only his code name, and he was no more than a pawn on a great chess board. But eventually, when I was sent to a field station, such detachment was no longer possible. It was not that I feared arrest or exposure; I had been well trained and was confident of my Tradecraft skills. But suddenly the pieces I had manipulated so intellectually from my ivory tower at headquarters became real people. During the tedious process of recruiting and running them, I came to know them intimately. Among them were students, many foreign students, and young idealists. From various sources I obtained reports, descriptions and evaluations of them, so that by the time I requested permission from headquarters to attempt to recruit them, I knew them like a book., In the face of this interpersonal relationship, I often had to use the Agency's bag of dirty tricks to nail down a man's compliance. As an example, I might give him $10 "expenses" for his help in performing some in- nocuous task and get him to sign a U.S. government receipt. Then I would kite the amount to $1000 by adding zeros and threaten to expose his "valuable assistance" to us if he didn't cooperate. In time I came to despise this kind of deceit, especially when used against the young and the naive idealists. Their faces began to haunt me. The attrition among agents on both sides was high, and they probably sensed it. Some, obviously terrified at the thought, simply failed to meet me as arranged and dropped from sight. Others were arrested; and they disappeared. The ones that remained had been transformed into cynical, hardened spies. This was not what I had bargained for. It was not pro pitted against pro, 1 was the pro, cheating, cajoling, persuading and blackmailing decent young men into a sordid business-all in the name of democracy. Assassination was never explicitly mentioned, but Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300030001-1 Approved For Release 2005/11/21.: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300030004--1--- the impression was urimistakenly left with us that it was at our disposal should there be no other way. I remember the training class' suspicion fell on an enigmatic group called Staff D, which was referred to only in whispers. There was no Staff A, B, or C. What did the "D" stand for? No one knew for sure, but a co-worker said his class had been told a story with a clear implication: a man photographed one of the staging areas in Nicaragua for the Bay of Pigs invasion; his photos included the numbers and markings on American. planes which had. not yet been removed. Hitchhiking from Florida to New York, he talked about it to a man who picked him up. The man chanced to be a CIA man returning from one of the Agency's numerous staging areas in Florida; he notified "the company." The hitchhiker was intercepted and in- terrogated. He could not be bought off----he was an idealist who was going to divulge the whole thing to the newspapers. "Well," the instructor who told the story stressed, "that man was on his way to the news- papers when he was struck by a laundry truck and killed. And those photos just plain disappeared." There came a time when these things preyed on me incessantly, so rather than take a second tour in the field I opted to return to headquarters and from there go to paramilitary school. The stated purpose of para- military school was to train and equip us to become instructors for village peasants who wanted to defend themselves against guerrillas. I could believe in that. Some of the training was conventional: but then we moved to the CIA's demolition training headquarters. It was here that Cubans had been, and still were, being trained in conventional and underwater demolition. And it was here that we received training in tactics which hardly conform to the Geneva Convention, The array of outlawed weaponry with which we were familiarized included bullets that explode on impact, silencer-equipped machineguns, home-made explosives and self-made napalm for stickier and hotter Molotov cocktails, We were taught demolition techniques, prac- ticing on late model cars, railroad trucks, and gas stor- age tanks. And we were shown a quick method of saturating a confined area with flour or fertilizer, caus- ing an explosion like in a dustbin or granary. And then there was a diabolical invention that might be called a mini-cannon. It was constructed of a con- cave piece of steel fitted into the top of a # 1.0 can filled with a plastic explosive. When the device was detonated, the tremendous heat of friction of the steel turning inside out made the steel piece a white-hot projectile. There were a number of uses for the mini- cannon, one of which was demonstrated to us using an old Army school bus. It was fastened to the gasoline tank in such a fashion that the incendiary projectile would rupture the tank and fling flaming gasoline the length of the bus interior, incinerating anyone inside. It was my lot to show the rest of the class how easily it could he done. It workh :d, my God how it worked. I stood there watching the flames consume the bus. It was, I guess, the morlen.t of truth. What did a busload of burning people have to do with freedom? What right did I have, in the name of democracy. and the CIA, to decide that random victims should die? The intellectual game was over. I had to leave. RESIGNED for "personal reasons." The resigna- tion was reluctantly accepted, for the Agency is always loath to Lose a promising young JOT. I was subjected to, the usual blandishments and veiled threats. But I had had it. I could see the road ahead: a career of lying, entrapping, possibly killing. The process had already begun: duplicity had become second nature to me and even in non-Agency relation- ships I had trouble telling the truth. Up to now the American people have had little inkling of what goes on b.:.hind the CIA's curtain of secrecy. The decision to recruit students, to employ treachery, assassination and terrorism has been made by a small clique of CIA executives as their version of the requirements of "national security." I have told this story because I believe that the people, knowing the facts, would have qui !Ae a different version. We have seen recently how the CIA infection has spread into myriad facets of our national life. The Agency is virulent because, in the final analysis, it is a bureaucracy. But unlike other bureaucracies it is unfettered by the normal checks and balances. It receives untold hundreds of millions of dollars annually with practically no accountability. Thus it is a dangerous paradox that an agency created to preserve "national security" has become a clear danger to the Arncrican system. The continued proliferation of the CIA, with its corrupting money and its alien philosophy, could in the end destroy our democratic society, As Justice Brandeis once said, using the philosophy that the end justified the means in the name of justice invites terrible retribution. . Unless we restore the CIA to its original concept- a modest, stringently regulated group of profession- als concerned purely with intelligence gathering-that retribution may not be too far away. T21.: ".-d