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March 14, 1967
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Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 March 14, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE or yellow skin and pay homage to other religions. On the surface, the deficiency lies in the policies and priorities of the advanced coun- tries. More deeply viewed, the stagnation of policy and commitment points to the shrink- ing moral boundaries of peoples whose com- forts are increasing dramatically. And at bottom, widespread complacency in the face of accelerating disparity is building up to a massive indictment of the breadth of outlook, adequacy of theology, compassion and efficacy of action of Christians and their establish- ments in the industrialized countries. No area is more subject to misleading fig- ures than the aid field. Grants, long-term loans, hard bank loans, strictly commercial export credits, surplus food, private invest- ment for profit, and contributions to inter- national organizations can all be loosely called "aid" Lumping together all these ap- ples and oranges, The New York Times on July 20, 1966, headlined the annual stock- taking meeting of the "rich man's club"- the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization of Economic Cooperation Development-as follows: "Aid to the Poor Nations Soared to Record $10.98 Billion in 1965." Nothing could be more misleading. Few readers could be expected to draw from the article the real news: that once again there was no significant increase in governmental aid; that no progress was being made in liberalizing interest rates and matu- rities; that the slump in new commitments in 1965 threatened to become an actual drop in the future flow of aid. The unvarnished fact is that governmental foreign aid for development from the dozen or so rich countries to the hundred poor ones has reached a dead level-less than $6 billion a year-where it has remained stuck for the past five years. The total represents six- tenth of 1 per cent of a trillion-dollar econ- omy. This level becomes steadily less im- pressive as the economies of Europe, America and Japan reach new highs, as repayments of principal and interest from the poor in- crease, and as the terms of trade (what can be bought from the rich by the exports of the poor) remain unfavorable. Even now over half of the flow of development finance is offset by the return flow of amortization, dividend and interest payments. At the present rate the world of the poor will, in shortly more than a decade, be repaying the rich more than it receives, It is already arguable that the flow of brains has been at least as much to the rich as to the poor. This stagnation of developmental aid has taken place at a time when the administra- tive capacity of the developing world, the national and regional planning of practical projects and uses for resources, together with the population and its other needs, have all increased. What could have been a brilliant, historic, developmental achievement of the last decades of this century seems to be turn- ing into a Sargasso Sea of wrecked hopes, frustration, mutual recrimination and de- spair. THE MYTHOLOGY OF FOREIGN AID All too few Americans are aware of this global grinding to a halt. Even fewer would point an accusing finger at the United States. In this field, particularly, we subscribe un- critically and arrogantly to a mythology that has less and less resemblance to facts. The first myth is that we are giving either just enough or too much aid. (A 1965 poll showed only 6 per cent of Americans favor- ing an increase.) Actually we are fast ap- proaching an annual gross national product of $795 billion. Each year's increase exceeds the total combined product of all but seven developing nations. We can take a special lack of pride in seeing our aid percentage of GNP decrease from 2,5 percent in the Mar- shall Plan era to less than three-tenths of 1 per cent today. In absolute terms we are spending far less today on our entire overseas development programs than when we were one-third as wealthy and helping only our white Christian neighbors in Europe. Aid accounts for less than 2 per cent of the national budget. Our balance of payments ledger shows the over- seas aid expenditures have been out from nearly a billion dollars in 1961 to less than $250 million in 1965-a small fraction of our net deficit. In 1966, Congress, after the usual dreary debate, cut the President's "bare bones" aid request by 13 per cent to the lowest level since 1958. And this year the prospect is even more dismal, with the President's re- portedly seeking even less for aid than he requested last year-and from a more hostile Congress, Where we are heading is crystal clear, Our average yearly per capita income is $3,000. That of the 80 developing countries that are members of the World Bank is $120. Our growth is 5 per cent a year, theirs is 1 per cent. By the year 2000, our average per capita income will have risen by $1,500 and theirs by $50. The gap will have widened by a ratio of 30 to 1. In 15 years, accord- ing to Hugo Fisher of the Resources Agency of California, the U.S. will have 95 per cent of the total population and will be using 83 per cent of the world's natural resources, He adds that the understatement that the rest of the world will take a "dim view" of such consumption (The New York Times, March 20, 1966). A second myth is that we are the only nation giving substantial aid. In fact the countries of Europe, Canada and Japan have already given more to the developing world than they received under the Marshall Plan. The U.S. is not first, but fifth, in the size of its aid program in relation to its income. Others give a larger proportion of outright grants, send more experts and teachers over- seas and make loans on more generous terms. Indeed, as the Western world's top aid pol- icy-makers were _meeting in Washington last summer, Canada announced its new policy of making interest-free dvelopment loans, while the U.S. Senate sought to increase our interest rate for the third time in recent years. Another myth holds that U.S. aid is poorly planned and administered. In fact, nearly two decades of aid activities (and particu- larly the last four years under the leadership of David E. Bell) have seen continued im- provement in administration, planning, the delicate linkage between external aid and internal efforts and discipline, inspection and follow-up. Rare indeed are the bloopers that made the headlines a decade ago (but which im- mortally retread the stairs like Jacob Mar- ley's ghost). And somehow a cadre of de- velopment experts-who are the envy of the aid ministries of Europe but prophets with- out honor at home-has been attracted to and stuck with this program, both in Wash- ington and overseas, Perhaps the myth most dangerous to our ability to assist in this historic task of de- velopment with grace and effectiveness is that we expect more "progress" in remote places and alien cultures, for our money, than we do at home. When we fight juve- nile delinquency, crime, narcotics addiction, mental illness, poverty and racial discrimi- nation, we know that success will come slowly, that failures will often outnur.aber successes, and that a great deal of effort and funds will thus be "wasted." Not so with foreign aid. If the countries we try to help do not respond immediately with gratitude, political support, competent planning, in- ternal discipline and social justice, we are all too ready to abandon the effort. We are not content to do God's work. We want to play God. S 3737 OUR "CONSCIENCE GAP" If there is a widening gap between the rich and the poor, between supply and de- mand, there is an equally serious "conscience gap," a gap that represents an erosion of spirit and a moral hardening of the arteries of the American people-and their cousins in Europe. It represents a missed oppor- tunity for the modernized world. And it represents a Pilate-like abdication by the Christian Church at what is, for better or worse, %watershed in history. So far in this two-decade-old adventure in helping other peoples, the Christian estab- lishment can take little credit for what has been done. I exempt from this harsh obser- vation the quiet, steady, effective work that has been done by the numerous Catholic, Protestant and Jewish service agencies, to- gether with their corps of keen and dedicated officials, that have been active in the de- veloping countries. But the "Church" as a center of contemporary doctrine, under- standing, education and inspiration appli- cable to this historic demand on our breadth of view and depth of concern might just as well not have existed. Resounding resolutions, well-drafted testi- mony for Congressional committees, partici- pation in conferences and last-minute lobbying with other internationally-minded groups to stave off disaster in Congress have not been lacking. There has been coopera- tive fellowship but no creative leadership. There has been no sustained or effective effort by top church bodies to relate our development aid effort to Christian doctrine. Their headquarters are woefully lacking in staff equipped to collect, analyze and present facts. The result has been that an administration or Congress can and does slash aid requests and appropriations, raise interest rates, short- en periods of repayment, attach self-defeat- ing conditions and restrictions to aid, cut per- sonnel and limit the number of countries assisted, without any danger of hearing from the Church or its constituency. The President, a few dedicated officials and a small and dwindling stable of weary Con- gressional workhorses have had to sponsor and defend aid policy without the assistance of strong voices from the Church or an ef- fective aid constituency. Any church pro- nouncment on the need for greater, more sustained or more effective assistance is likely to be such a melange of factual error or in- adequacy and sweeping generality that it cannot be expected to influence the levers of power. At the grass roots, priests, pastors and rabbis all too often exhibit either indifference or a lack of grasp that emasculates their effectiveness in helping to find the link be- tween religious tradition and this most con- temporary challenge to it. Congregations respond generously to concrete, specific op- portunities but not to the overriding chal- lenge to national commitment. They will rally generously to support a family in Chile or a misison school in the Philippines; they will listen with warm hearts to a returning church worker, government employee or Peace Corps volunteer. But when national policy and programs of assisting other peo- ples are discussed, Christians are just as ill- informed, unconcerned and hostile as any- one else. There are signs of change. As a result of Vatican II, there is burgeoning cooperation between Roman Catholics and Protestants in the aid field. The National Council of Churches (NCC) has created an Advisory Committee on Peace with the needs of devel- oping countries as one of the concerns. And the World Council of Churches' Conference on Church and Society set forth the problem in clear, unmistakable terms. More recently there was the action of the NCC in Miami that gave prominent recogni- Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 S 3738 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 14, 1967 tion to the development challenge in its peace program. But the most concrete evi- dence of good intentions lies in the action of the United Church of Christ, whose Coun- cil for Christian Social Action opened a Washington office on Jan. 3. un1ter the direc- tion of Rev. L. Maynard Catchings, to pro- mote substantially Increasedgovernment and private spending on International develop- ment The Council hopes that representa- tives of other denominations will soon join the staff. THE CHURCH AS CATALYST Notwithstanding these straws in the wind, I sense a blandness, a proclivity to phrase general propositions, an avoidance of any program smacking of action, Barbara Ward closed her eloquent call to action In the Feb. 8, 1968, issue of CHRISTIANITY AND CRISIS with the question: "What shall we do?" It seems to me that we begin by doing what we have power to do-and not by issuing ring- Ing pronouncements. The crying need Is for the soil of Christian spirit to be tilled at home and abroad. This is a humble but doable task If the Church is so minded. The specific tasks start with the develop- ment of Christian doctrine consistent with the task ahead and the setting of Its priority. The work should continue with equipping the Church with headquarters and field staff to collect, analyze and present facts and Issues, while developing training programs and materials for its clerical and lay leaders. At the same time the Church should strive to be a catalyst for a truly national, broadly representative, nongovernmental, continuing effort to stimulate and sustain understand- ing and support of this dimension of na- tionsil policy, Finally, there should be a joining of forces with the Christian and Jewish communities abroad, toward the end of revitalizing the conscience of the rich. It may well be that the task is too big. But failure is less to be feared than striving. For while this is a crisis for the times, it is also a crisis for the Church. CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morn- ing business l concluded. 111- / WYV7 'r CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION The PRESIDING OFFICER, Without objection, it is so ordered. The pending question is on the adop- tion of Reservation No. 1, offered by the Senator from South Dakota, to the reso- lution of ratification. Debate is limited to 4 hours, to be equally divided and controlled by the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. MUNDT] and the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT). RECESS UNTIL 1:30 P.M. TODAY Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess until 1:30 p.m. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TAL- MADGE In the chair.) Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Mon- tana? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. Thereupon (at 12 o'clock and 10 min- utes p.m.) the Senate took a recess until 1:30 o'clock p.m., the same day. At I o'clock and 30 minutes p.m., the Senate reassembled, and was called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. TAL- MADGE in the chair). CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION The Senate resumed the consideration of the Consular Convention between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, together with a protocol relating thereto, signed at Moscow on June 1, 1964 (Ex. D., 88th Cong., second sess.). Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum, and ask that the time be taken out of both sides. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll. 'T'he assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll. Mr. MORTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded, The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, It is so ordered. Mr. MUNDT. Mr, President, I yield myself 20 minutes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota is recog- nized for 20 minutes. Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, before getting into a discussion of the reserva- tion which is now before us, Executive Reservation No. 1, I should like to read into the RECORD two statements which have come to my office today. Yesterday, during the colloquy intro- duced by the Senator from California [Mr. MURPHY], during the discussion led by the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. IIIIUSKA], some interesting observations were made in connection with the rather surprising fact that none of the national pollsters had taken polls, or at least had not reported them generally in the press, or. this very important and difficult ques- tion now before us. Early last evening I received a tele- phone call from a Mr. Jim Nicholls, of KDAY, a radio station in Tacoma, Wash., who operates a program called "Party- line." He said that this radio station In the State of Washington read been con- ducting a poll for severa days on this particular topic. I said: That Is Interesting. Why don't you send me a telegram and tell me what is in it, and I will be glad to read it into the RECORD? A telegram from him came this morn- ing. I shall read it into the RECORD. I should add I shall be pleased to place Into the RECORD any other authentic polls which can be secured from radio sta- tions, newspapers, or the famous poll- sters, George Gallup and Louis Harris, both of whom have apparently over- looked taking a poll in connection with this question, to see how those who are interested have expressed themselves on this subject. I reaffirm what I said yes- terday. I think on issuer of this kind, when we should hear and heed, as I think we do, the hopes and prayers of people everywhere for an early conclusion of this czar, that at least their expressions should be heard by Members of the Senate. The telegram reads: Senator CARL MUNDT, The Senate, Washington, D.C.: In F. phonein written poll on the Consular Treaty on my radio program covering the greater Tacoma area thirteen hundred ten opposed and one favorable. This sampling appears Indicative of how the average citi- zen feels ... Then follow some com;)liments about my efforts here, which it might be im- modest for me to recite. However, I shall have to put them into the RECORD be- cause they are a part of the telegram, but that part will appear in the RECORD without my reading it. I mk unanimous consent that the tele- gram be printed in the RECORD at this point. There being no objection, the telegram was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: TACOMA, WASH., if arch 14, 1967, Senator KARL MUNDT, The Senate, Washington, D.C.: In a Phonein writin poll on the Consular Treaty on my radio program covering the greater Tacoma area thirteen hundred ten opposed and one favorable this sampling appears Indicative of how the average citizen feels many thank God for your courageous leadership in opposing the chief suppliers of arms killing American boys In Viet Nam. JIM NICHOLLS, ' Partyline," KDAY, Mr. MUNDT, Second, this morning I had a group call at my office represent- ing the Military Order of the World Warr, the District of Columbia Chapter, and they asked me to present to the Senate the judgment and the recom- mendations of their order, which is com- prised solely, of course, of distinguished officers and soldiers who have fought for our colors in previous wars. Their resolution is dated March 10, and reads as follows: Resolution relative to the Consular Con- vention between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist, Republics now pending before the United States Senate: The District of Columbia Chapter, the Military Order of the World Wars held its usual luncheon meeting at Noon, Thursday The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair lays before the Senate the pend- ing business, which the clerk will state. The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK, A Consular Convention between the United States of America and the Union of So- viet Socialist Republics, together with a protocol relating thereto, signed at Mos- cow on June 1, 1964 (Ex. D., 88th Cong., second secs.). The Senate proceeded to consider the convention. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum; and I ask unanimous consent that the time for the quorum call be charged against the time allotted to the junior Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FUL- BRIGHT]. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll, Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 March 14, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 9 March 1967; at which the members present unanimously adopted the following Resolu- tion; Resolved, That the District of Columbia Chapter petition the United States Senate not to ratify the Consular Convention pend- ing between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Attest: HUGH H. HARTLEY, Adjutant. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that the resolution of the Military Order of the World Wars be printed in the RECORD at this point. There being no objection, the resolu- tion was ordered to be printed in the RECORD., as follows: [From the Military Order of the World Wars, District of Columbia Chapter] Resolution relative to the Consular Con- vention between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics now pending before the United States Senate: The District of Columbia Chapter, the Military Order of the World Wars held its usual luncheon meeting at Noon, Thursday 9 March 1967;. at which the members present unanimously adopted the following Resolu- tion; Resolved, That the District of Columbia Chapter petition the United States Senate not to ratify the Consular Convention pend- ing between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Attest : HUGH H. HARTLEY, Adjutant. Mr. MUNDT. Now, Mr. President, so that Senators who are not present, and who may have occasion to reflect upon what is being debated this afternoon when they read the RECORD tomorrow morning-unhappily, after they have voted-and also so that those who study the RECORD back home, and historians who may comment upon the decisions we are about to make may have ready access to the focus upon which this debate hinges, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD the full text of Executive Reservation No. 1. There being no objection, the reserva- tion was ordered to be printed in the REC- ORD, as follows: Before the period at the end of the resolu. tion of ratification insert a comma and the following: "subject to the reservation that no exchange of instruments of ratification of the convention shall be entered into on be- half of the United States until the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall have agreed (1) to permit.the distribution to the Soviet press or any segment thereof by United States diplomatic and consular officers of announce- ments of United States public policy, both foreign and domestic, and answers to any criticism of such policy contained in the So- viet press, and (2) not to impose or enforce any limitation on the number of United States citizens permitted to be in the Soviet Union at any time as representatives of the United States press which would effectively reduce them below the number of Soviet press representatives entering the United States, or to impose upon them any condi- tions of travel or objective reporting which do not prevail for Soviet press representatives within the United States.'." Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President; as I see the decision which we are about to make by a rollcall vote sometime this after- noon, two major questions are involved; and the same two questions will be in- volved when we vote on a much more sig- nificant and far-reaching proposed res- ervation which I have proposed some- time late tomorrow afternoon. The first of these considerations, it seems to me, is the question of whether or not the U.S. Senate still has the right-and I believe the responsibility- to exercise its full constitutional preroga- tive of both advising and consenting on the matter of international treaties. The second consideration is, of course, the desirability, the usefulness, and the wisdom of the specific reservations being discussed. I propose to discuss first, Mr. President, what I consider to be the continuing re- sponsibility of,Senators, all of whom took the oath, as they entered the Chamber for the first time, to support the Con- stitution of the United States. I think that oath carries with it the constitu- tional responsibility of facing up to the responsibility of advising the Executive on treatymaking, as well as registering their dissent or assent. Lest anyone may have forgotten the exact language in the Constitution, it is found in article II, section 2, clause 2 of our hallowed Constitution; and in dis- cussing the powers of the President and the powers of the Congress, I refer to that constitutional language, which reads-- Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, may we have order? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order. The Senator will suspend until the-Senate is in order. The Senator from South Dakota may proceed. Mr. MUNDT. The language reads as follows, under the heading "Powers of the President": He shall have Power, by and with the Ad- vice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur. In that connection, Mr. President, I was both impressed and intrigued by what I found in reading the CONGRES- SIONAL RECORD which arrived in our offices this morning, because there on pages 53580 and S3581 the majority leader had placed the texts of letters received, in the first instance, by the chairman of our Foreign Relations Com- mittee, the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], and signed by the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk; in the second in- stance, by our honored and respected majority leader [Mr. MANSFIELD], and signed by the Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, William B. Ma- comber, Jr., who has only very recently succeeded to that task, since his prede- cessor, Doug MacArthur, has gone off to assume ambassadorial duties; and in the third instance, another letter received by the majority leader, also signed by Wil- liam B. Macomber, Jr. The sum and substance of those letters is to the effect that the U.S. Senate should not, at this late hour, engage in its advisory function, The sum and sub- stance is that if we were to offer advice, and it were adopted now, it would delay the ratification of the treaty, or perhaps jeopardize it altogether, S 3739 Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. MUNDT. Surely. Mr. MANSFIELD. I am sure that the administration would be delighted to re- ceive any advice from the Senate. It has received it quite often from the dis- tinguished Senator from South Dakota as well as from the Senator from Mon- tana now speaking, and also from other Members of this body. But the Senator from South Dakota must keep in mind-and I am sure he does-that this convention was initi- ated by the United States. It was initi- ated because we thought it was in our best interests to bave such a convention. It is not a question of setting up con- sulates, because the President already has the authority to set up consulates. Mr. MUNDT. I agree. Mr. MANSFIELD. It is a question primarily of furnishing protection to the 18,000 Americans who now visit the Soviet Union every year. If reservations are attached, it is my belief that the con- vention will not be ratified by the Soviet Union. That means that Americans who visit the Soviet Union will continue to be subject to Soviet law, just as Soviet citizens-tourists, that is-who visit the United States-and they number under 900 a year-are now subject to American law which includes the'rights guaranteed every person in this country under the Constitution, which insure that Soviet citizens receive prompt and speedy at- tention to their situation. If the convention is not ratified, be- cause of reservations and other mat- ters which prevent its ratification by the Soviet Union, the 18,000 or more Amer- icans who travel in the Soviet Union will remain subject to the laws of the U.S.S.R. They can now be held incommunicado for nine months or more, and our am- bassadorial staffs can have great dif- ficulty in gaining access to them and furnishing all assistance possible to them, Advice is one thing, but attaching reservations is another. I would hope that the Senator from South Dakota and the Senate as a whole will keep these factors I have mentioned in mind. Mr. MUNDT. The Senator from Mon- tana has, correctly expressed the con- sensus of the purport of the letters in the RECORD, to which I have just invited at- tention. He is precisely correct in em- phasizing, once again, as it is empha- sized in the letters, that the main purpose of the convention is to protect Americans who may be traveling in Russia. But the Senator does not come to grips with the question: Of what conceivable use is it for the Senate, with respect to any treaty, to offer advice, if it is not in terms of a reservation or in terms of an amendment? It is the world's greatest exercise in futility to offer advice con- cerning what may happen under a treaty. The terms of a treaty determine what will happen, and it is not possible to create legislative history even to alter that, as can be done with respect to an ordinary legislative matter. Our advice must be incorporated in the treaty by reservation or amendment or it is both futile and meaningless. Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 S 3740 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE br. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield? Mr. MUNDT. Surely. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, there are different kinds of advice; and I believe that I can recognize advice which is intended to kill a treaty. It is my belief-I may be mistaken- that the Senator from South Dakota Is opposed to this convention in practically any form in which it could be ratified- perhaps not In any form, although I am unable to conceive of any at the moment. If he could have reservations attached, he could go home to the folks in Huron and Winner and say, "This is what I did: I strengthened the treaty." Mir. MUNDT. That is what I want to do. Mr. MANSFIELD. But he would have to tell them also that there was no treaty; that his reservations had killed it. Mir. MUNDT. That is a speculation which the Senator from Montana has a right to engage in. it will be the burden of my argument to say that this is a good-faith amend- ment to test the good faith of the Soviets from the standpoint of wanting a rap- prochement, in which case I think they would be happy to accept the reservation. Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator has been diligent in his opposition to this treaty. I know his motives are sincere. I know that he feels as he does because of his convictions. But I point out that while the Senate has the right to give advice, and should, we ought to take into consideration the responsibility of the executive branch. The work which has gone into this convention began, may I say, under Eisenhower, and I believe the genesis can be found in the kitchen debate be- tween Khrushchev and Nixon in Mos- cow: It was carried forward by Kennedy and Is now being brought before the Senate by President Johnson. In the last session, I was worried about bringing this treaty to the floor of the Senate. And while there are organiza- tions in this country which claim credit for stopping such action last year, the fact is that the majority leader, the Senator from Montana, personally was disinclined to bring the convention be- fore the Senate because of what he feared might be the ultimate result. Perhaps it was a mistake in judgment on my part. Mfr. MUNDT. I think the judgment of the Senator was excellent. Mr. MANSFIELD. That is open to question, but at least this year we will face up to it, win, lose, or draw. I hope-and the Senator has been most cooperative-that we can bring this mat- ter to a head this week. I have asked every Democratic Senator to come back and stay until this matter is finished, and I assume that the same thing has been done on the Republican side. The Senator has kindly consented to a limitation on debate on his reserva- tions, for which I am deeply grateful, and the Senator from Maine [Mrs. SMITH] has kindly consented to a limi- tation on her executive understanding. I would hope that this matter could be faced up to and that we can make our arguments and explain our differ- ences on the floor and that, in some way, the final issue could be met and that this matter, which has been before us for 3 years now could be settled this week. Mr. MUNDT. As the Senator knows- and I have told him privately, and I do not mind stating it publicly-the Sen- ator from South Dakota has no inten- tion of engaging in dilatory tactics. Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator Is always accommodating and I know that he has no such intention. Mr. MUNDT. The Senator from South Dakota has no Intention of filibustering and no intention of upsetting any pro- gram that the leadership has for a rea- sonable amount of debate and for fixing a time certain for this momentous and historic vote which will accommodate as many Senators as possible. I am glad that the majority leader recognizes, with the Senator from South Dakota, that we have responsibilities as Senators to offer advice. Let us then be practical about this, If that is a constitutional right, if that Is a constitutional duty, when and where can the Senate offer any meaningful ad- vice except when the treaty is before It, unless we accept the followup fact that this is the time and now is the hour to offer whatever advice we feel is mean- ingful and significant? We would otherwise have to accept the fact that by precedent this constitutional prerogative has been eliminated. I do not think it should be, and I do not think it has been. On numerous occasions in the past, earlier Senators, who were perhaps sturdier than our generation of Senators, have written In reservations, have writ- ten Into treaties their advice at the time the treaty was*up for consideration. That does not mean that they killed the treaty. If the reservations are ob- noxious to the other side and are up- setting to the purposes of the other side, there might have to be renegotiation. However, if they are acceptable, if they are good faith amendments--as this one is---and are incorporated in the treaty by negotiations, there would perhaps just be acquiescence on the part of the other parties to the treaty. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi- dent, will the Senator yield? Mr. MUNDT, I yield. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi- dent, as far as this Senator is concerned, my mind is not closed. I could vote either way on the reservation or the treaty. I believe the same thing would be true with respect to the present Presiding Officer, the distinguished Sena- tor from Georgia [Mr. TALrdtiocE), who offered an amendment the other day to try to clear up the thing that troubled him the most about the treaty. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from South Dakota has expired. Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I yield myself an additional 15 minutes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota is recognized for an additional 15 minutes. March 14, 1967 M::?. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi- dent, as the Senator well knows, there is a very popular television program en- titled "The FBI." On every second or there", televised program of that show, the general theme is that there are Soviet agents in our country that are engaged in an espionage program and have mur- dered people and have tried to carry out their devious schemes. We are told that the p ngram is based upon actual facts and that such facts have actually happened in this country. Mr. MUNDT. At least 28 times in the last several years we have had to send Russian agents in their diplomatic serv- ice back to Russia because they were caught in espionage activities. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. If some Rus- sian happened to be working in a con- sulate in this country and kidnaped or murdered someone, it would be very dif- ficult; for me, having voted for the treaty, to explain to the people in Louisiana why I voted to allow that fellow to go around killing Americans and be punished by being sent home with nothing more than the ?tccolade of the Russian people. I think the amendment would prob- ably carry if enough Senstors were pres- ent to hear the debate. I am told that therm is no such provision in any treaty with any other country. We were told in committee that this was a much better deal for us than for the Soviet Union. I cannot understand what our interest is in going around mur- dering their citizens, but if the commit- tee Minks it is a better deal for us than it is for the Soviets, then r would assume that it is in this treaty because our Gov- ernment asked for it. And if that is what it is doing here, I should think the Russians would be happy to have it taken out. Mr. MUNDT. May I clear up for the Senator exactly how this immunity clause crept into the treaty. What the Senator from Montana said is correct. This treaty had its genesis and suggestion from the Eisenhower ad- ministration. But I call attention to two important documented facts of history. In the first place, when the Eisenhower administration made that suggestion to Russia, we were not at war in Vietnam, and the Russians were not supplying every sophisticated weapon that was kill- ing every American boy killed by such devices in the entire war in Vietnam. So we a,,e in an altogether different climate now. There is no relationship now to that earlier situation. The other fact is-and no member of the committee will dispute this, because it is in black and white in the hearings- that the Eisenhower proposal was for the estatlishment of consu`ates and the working out of confrontation and noti- fication, with no reference whatsoever to this entirely unprecedented oonces- sion of immunity. The Soviets, according to the testi- mony In the record, Insisted on this total imnmunity clause as a condition precedent, before they signed the treaty. Let us not be deluded about that. Whether it works to their benefit or to ours can be a matter of debate, but there is no question that the immunity clause Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 March 14, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE was written in because the Soviets said it had to go in or there would be no treaty. What the Senator says is cor- rect, because the Soviets have put it in. If the janitor in the consular office es- tablished in Chicago-assuming that they establish one there-murders the ' President's wife, all you can do, as the distinguished present occupant of the Chair, the Senator from Georgia [Mr. TALMADGE], said the other day, is to bid him a fond farewell as you ship him back to the U.S.S.R.-not for punish- ment, but perhaps for praise. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. As I under- stand, nothing in this treaty would give the 10,000 or 20,000 Americans visiting the Soviet Union any right to murder somebody there and come back home soot free. Mr. MUNDT. All it does is to give our consular officers the right to commit murder, with the same immunity. We do not send them there with murderous intentions, nor are they sent there as trained spies. Secretary of State Rusk has said that we can discuss this treaty with the un- derstanding that every Soviet consular official coming here will be a trained member of the KGB, their secret police system. He was not trying to delude us. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. MUNDT. I believe I can antici- pate what the Senator is going to say. Secretary Rusk said-and J. Edgar Hoover agreed-that we can cope with that situation given the necessary FBI agents. Mr. MANSFIELD. Does the Senator from South Dakota, if he follows his argument to its logical conclusion, as- sume that all the `Americans in the U.S. consulate in the Soviet Union will be diplomats? Mr. MUNDT. If history has the un- happy habit of repeating itself, which it frequently does, I am afraid that a sur- prisingly large number of them will be diplomats, untrained in the kind of ac- tivities in which the KGB officers will engage in America. Mr. MANSFIELD. I do not wish to engage in an argument on this partic- ular phase of the subject, but I am sure that the Senator is well aware of what I mean. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi- dent, will the Senator yield? Mr. MUNDT. I yield. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Frankly, I would like to vote for the treaty, pro- vided some of the doubts I have about this matter could be cleared up. If not, I might be compelled to vote against ratification of the treaty. If what we are told on television is correct, the FBI authorizes the programs about the FBI, in which Russian agents go around murdering American citizens and kidnaping people and engaging in all sorts of acts of extortion to force pa- triotic citizens to yield security informa- tion to Soviet spies. Would the Senator not find it a rather high price to pay for a small amount of expanded tourist service in the Soviet Union, the first time they murder a dignified and outstand- ing American citizen, without any re- course against the murderer? Mr. MUNDT. I am sure that the Sen- ator from Louisiana must be as curious as I am as to why we acquiesced to this immunity clause. The record stands eloquently silent, with respect to wit- nesses from the State Department, as to why that clause is in the treaty and what possible good it can do for the United States. On pages S3580 and S3581 of yester- day's RECORD are printed the letters from the State Department, in support of the treaty. Not one sentence can be found in those letters in which the immunity clause is mentioned. They say the pur- pose of the treaty is to protect American travelers. However, American travelers do not get any protection whatsoever from the immunity clause. It does not apply to them; only to consular officers. Actually, these travelers get very Little protection of any kind. All they get is the right to have the consular office notified that they are in jail. Then, within a limited number of days, they have a right to talk to a con- sular officer, who comes in to verify the fact they are in jail and who attempts to find out why. Nothing beyond that. Nothing about guaranteeing the Amer- ican a free trial. Nothing at all guaran- teeing him his release. A treaty to protect Americans? That is what an American wants when he is in trouble. When he is in trouble, he wants to talk to a lawyer and to have a free trial and a fair trial, and a chance to express himself. He is not so much concerned about having a conversation through the bars of a prison cage with a consular officer, but that is all he gets by this treaty. Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. MUNDT. I yield. Mr, HRUSKA. Does the Senator mean to tell the Senate that that roan could still be held for 9 months, pend- ing the completion of the investigation of the charges made against him? Mr. MUNDT. I mean to tell the Sen- ate that that man could be held for 9 years, if it is in conformity with Russian law. Anyone who reads this provision will be as astounded as I was, This is all they promise; this is what they say we will get: the right to be notified and the right to converse with a consular officer. Only that and nothing more. It would have been a much more sig- nificant treaty and one much easier to vote for if they had gone a step further and said that an American citizen in Russia shall have a right to a fair trial. But it does not say that. This point should be established in the RECORD. Even a quick reading of the wording of the treaty establishes that. Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. MUNDT. I yield. Mr. MILLER. May I say to the Sen- ator from Louisiana that I propose to vote for the pending reservation, but f must be fair about this. I wish to ex- press my view on the point that the Senator from Louisiana has raised. S 3741 If, for example, a murder should be committed by one of their consular offi- cials in this country, and if he should re- turn to Russia without anything but a goodby from us, my guess would be that we might well decide to call off the es- tablishment of any more consulates and to close those already established. Mr. MUNDT. It would take 6 months to do so. Mr. MILLER. It is too bad that one person must die in order for that to be done, but that need not be repeated. On the other hand, if one of our citi- zens in Russia is involved in a similar situation, nothing in the present Russian scheme of doing business, as I under- stand, would prevent them from charg- ing our citizen with a trumped-up mur- der charge; and in their jurisprudential system it is difficult to say what would happen. But the American citizen could be put away for a long time. So, with a view to preventing that from happening to our own citizens, I understand the immunity clause was put in. I recognize that arguments can be made on both sides of this matter, but I desired to respond to the Senator from Louisiana and to tell him how I have evaluated this part of this treaty. Mr. MUNDT. The immunity clause was put in for the protection of Russian consular officials. If the Russians decide to pick up, on a trumped-up charge, one of these 18,000 Americans traveling for pleasure or for profit, they can hold him forever. All they need do is agree to let him have a conversation now and then with his consular officer. The immunity does not run to the average citizen. It runs only to the consular official of the two countries. Mr. MILLER. I accept the interpreta- tion of the Senator from South Dakota. The Senator is correct. But if one of our consular officers in, Russia is involved, he is assured that there will not be trumped-up charges made against him which might cause him to serve a long time in a Soviet prison. I believe that a degree of assur- ance is provided to our potential consular officials on this point. .I should like to return to the point made by the distinguished majority leader, when he stated that it is his opinion that if this reservation were adopted, the treaty would not be ratified by the Soviet Union. As the Senator from South Dakota has pointed out, everybody is entitled to his opinion. But I wish the Senator from Montana would give us the benefit of the reasons why he is of that opinion. I do not necessarily share that opinion. Perhaps other Senators do not share it. I should like to know what reasons the Senator from Montana has for the opinion that if this reservation is adopted, the treaty is gone. I do not know why that would necessarily follow. This is, in fact, an open-skies reserva- tion. Why should we prejudge the leaders of the Soviet Union by saying be- cause we would like to have an open- skies policy adopted, therefore we ratify this treaty subject to that understand- Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 5342 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE March 14, 1967 ing. If the Soviet Union is not going to agree to this because they do not want an open-skies policy, a question is raised as to whether or not this Is the time to ratify this particular treaty. I believe that most of us in the Senate have long favored an open-sky policy. This policy goes back to the Eisenhower days. We are saying we ratify the treaty but that it would not take effect until we have an open-sky policy over there. If 1 were to vote against the convention I would, perhaps, be subject to criticism for abandoning an open-sky policy which has long been supported as the policy of our country. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. MUNDT. I would be happy to yield. However, I would like to have a little lend-lease arrangement In order to get additional time. I am going to run out of time. Mr. MANSFIELD. Surely. Mr. MUNDT. I thank the Senator. Mr. MANSFIELD. I do not know what the Senator from Iowa means when he refers to the pending reservation as an open-sky reservation. That has nothing to do with It. He asked for my opinion about this convention. I am for it because it Is in the interest of the United States far more than it is in The interest of the Soviet Union. I am for it because this convention was under- taken at our initiative, and, may I say to my friend from Iowa, under a Repub- licari President whom we revere and re- spect. I am for it because It gives added pro- tection to Americans who may be travel- ing in the Soviet Union, Had we had a convention like this, perhaps Mr. New- como Mott might be alive today, and perhaps other Americans would not have had to go through the travail which was thei_ s because they had no protection, no access to a consular or diplomatic of- ficial and, therefore, were in effect help- less; certainly so in comparison with the rights which we, under our laws and our Constitution, give Soviet citizens in this country who are not in the diplomatic corps. Those are the reasons why I am in fa- vor of this convention: I am interested in protecting Americans who travel in a closed society. For the life of me I can- not understand why every Member of this body is not interested In giving those Americans the kind of protection which this convention will allow. Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator from South Dakota has the floor, The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair has been advised that the time has been allotted. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, we yield 15 minutes from the time on this side. Mr. MILLER. I understand the rea- son:s for the treaty having been proposed. In fact, during his brief absence I pointed out to the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONGI one of the very reasons which the Senator from Montana has just pointed out. I pointed it out because I am in support of the reservation pending and I felt at the same time I should give the Senator from Louisiana the benefit of my reason for the treaty with respect to his problem. My real question was not the reason of the Senator from Montana for being In favor of the treaty, but the reasons why he felt that if this reservation were adopted the treaty would not be ratified by the Soviet Union. The Senator ex- pressed his opinion on that, Many Sen- ators feel that way. I am not sure I feel that way. Mr. MANSFIELD. Does the Senator mean to say that he is not in favor of pro- tecting Americans in a closed society? Mr. MILLER. No. The Senate Is not sure he shares the opinion of the Senator from Montana that the mere adoption of the reservation would be the end of the treaty. The Senator from Montana so sta fed. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Lair. MILLER, I yield. Mr. MANSFIELD. As far as I am con- cerned, if any citizen of the State of Mon- tana travels in the Soviet Union for any purpose whatever, I want him to be given every possible protection that this con- vention calls for; and not only citizens of Montana, but every citizen of the United States. That is what this con- vention basically would do, It does not call for the creation bf con- sulates because consulates can be created now by the President. Basically this treaty calls for the protection of Ameri- can citizens traveling in the Soviet Union, in that closed society. The Senator does not want our people to be subject to Soviet law, to be held in- communicado for 9 months or more, and not to have access to our diplomatic personnel. Of course he does not, and neither do I. Returning to the question raised by my distinguished friend from Iowa [Mr. MILLER] I wish to read, with the per- mission of the Senator from South Dakota, a letter which I received today from the Secretary of State relative to this particular reservation. THE SECEETASY OF STATE, Washington, March 14, 1967. Han. MICHAEL J. MANSFIELD, U.S. Senate. DEAR SENATOR MANSFIELD; In response to your inquiry, I am pleased to give my views regarding a reservation proposed to the US- USSR Consular Convention now before the Senate. This reservation would provide that Ameri- can consular officers in the Soviet Union should have the "same right to free ex- pression" In Russia as a Soviet consular officer would have in the United States. In addition, it would stipulate that there would be "no- limit on the number of American newsmen" in Russia. The Consular Convention is an instrument regulating the status and functions of con- sular personnel, It would destroy its use- fulness for that important purpose if we at- tempted to use it as a vehicle for re-making So-Aet society, however desirable it seems to us that steps should be taken in the USSR to make it a free society. I share the con- cern for reducing and eliminating barriers to the free expression and circulation of ideas. However, it is my strongly held judg- ment that this cannot be done by means of reservations to the Consular Convention. The immediate consequence of an effort to do so in this way would be to kill the Convention. Piea;;e do not hesitate to call on me if I can provide any further information or assistance. Sincerely, DEAN RUSK. I wsh to point out that today, in the Soviet, Union, there are 21 accredited American correspondents, and I under- stand that there will soon be a 22d. Conversely, in the United States today, there are 22 accredited Soviet cor- respondents. Are we going to tell the Soviet Union how many American cor- respondents they must take into their country, and, in return, is the Soviet Unlor going to tell us? Of course not. Mr. MUNDT. I wish to comment a little bit in response to this latest letter from the Secretary of State. Mr. MANSFIELD. I have more, too. Mr. MUNDT, I would not doubt it. We have had a blizzard of them lately. I live in blizzard country, as does the Senator from Montana, and we know how to operate in a blizzard. One must move early so as not to get smothered by a blizzard. I believe the letters are now four in number. Mr. MANSFIELD. Speaking of letters, this is not the first blizzard of letters en- countered during this treaty's considera- tion. Mr MUNDT. No, but It is one of the biggest. I must say that. I s:zall comment on what the Secre- tary of State said. I admire him greatly. The record will show that I have done a better job in supporting his policies from this side of the aisle than have some of the colleagues of the distin- guished majority leader from his side of the aisle. I speak about tam as one who listened to his logic and who has sup- ported him when I thought he was correct. The first statement he makes is that there should not be incorporated any reservations in this treaty which would tend to direct activities of consular offi- cials or tend to make a free society from a closed society. We have already in- corpc.rated something that is significant and unprecedented in that connection when we incorporated the immunity provision. That has never been there be- fore, and if we are going to go that far and acquiesce and appease the Russians, I see not reason why we should not get a little bit of something incorporated in the treaty which will protect the rights, the authority, and the fur:ctioning of our consular officers who go there not to com- mit murder, but to try to show the American picture to the Soviet populace. We are asked to give them this un- precedented freedom with immunity which includes espionage, rape, murder, and sabotage. Our consular officers should have the right to express them- selves publicly just as the Soviet am- bass'tdorlal people in consular offices have the right to express themselves in this country. Tl-e second phase of the Secretary's letter-and I do not blame the Secretary of State for this, and probably letter No. 5 will correct It-but he dealt with the wrong copy of the reservation. I sus- pect that is not his fault, but mine. Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 March 14, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 3743 Mr. MANSFIELD, It is probably mine, but- Mr. MUNDT. No, it is in his letter, but I plead guilty, I think he has been so busy writing letters that he has not had time to read the RECORD. Mr. MANSFIELD, Not at all. This was in response to an inquiry from me. I was under the impression that the Senator was offering his free press reser- vation, or whatever he calls it. Mr. MUNDT. That is correct, but let me say it was an error on my part. The first printed version of my reservation did not contain the final clause. The Senate now has before it the corrected and complete version, to which the Sec- retary's letter did not relate. The first clause of the reservation is now before us, and reads as follows: . not to impose or enforce any limita- tion on the number of United States citi- zens permitted to be in the Soviet Union at any time as representatives of the United States press which would effectively reduce it below the number of Soviet press repre- sentatives entering the United States. He ignored, however, the second clause-and I do not criticize him for that because, as I say, there was an error in the language in the first reservation. However, he avoided entirely the most significant part of the reservation now before us which reads as follows: Or to impose upon them any conditions of travel or objective reporting which do not prevail for Soviet press representatives with- in the United States. ' Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator from South Dakota yield right there? The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr, BAYH in the chair). Does the Senator from South Dakota yield to the Senator from Montana? Mr. MUNDT. I think the Senator will agree that the Secretary's letter does not respond to that clause in the reservation, Of course I am now happy to yield to the Senator from Montana. Mr. MANSFIELD. Am I to under- stand from what the Senator seems to imply, that representatives of the Soviet press in this country have "carte blanche" to travel to any part of this country? Mr. MUNDT. I did not say that. I said that we should have the same right to travel over there that they have to travel here. While it is not "carte blanche," there is a whale of a lot of lati- tude as to what Russian journalists en- joy here. Mr. MANSFIELD. It seems to me I recall that some of our press representa- tives have traveled to various parts of Asiatic Russia. They have traveled to places such as Alma-Ata. They have traveled in the maritime provinces, al- though not, in recent years, to Vladivos. tok, They have traveled in the areas which used to be known as Russian Turkestan, They have gone down into some of the Asiatic emirates such as Bukhara and Samarkand, along the southern rim of Asiatic Russia. Mr. MUNDT. So far as I know-and I desire to be corrected by the majority leader if I am wrong-if he has the facts to correct me, the Soviet press has the complete right to go anywhere in this country which does not involve areas connected with our national security. Mr. MANSFIELD. I have a statement here which I should like to read, with the Senator's permission. Mr. MUNDT. Surely. I would be happy to listen to it. Mr. MANSFIELD. We impose travel restrictions and controls on Soviet press representatives which are comparable to those placed on our press representatives in the Soviet Union. Mr. MUNDT. Yes, we put them on as a quid pro quo, as a protest, but not be- cause we originated them here. Mr. MANSFIELD. Does not the Sen- ator think that we should operate on a quid pro quo basis? Mr. MUNDT. Yes, and it should be in- corporated in the reservation, so that it will be determined not by the Russian formula, but by the American formula. Mr. MANSFIELD, Does not the Sen- ator think that the formula is being de- termined by the Department of State in this respect? Mr. MUNDT, I do not. I think that the Russians have moved in and said that certain areas over there are off- bounds, and then, as a belated protest, we make some manifestation of the same kind over here. Mr. MANSFIELD. I do not think that it is always so one-sided. I think there are occasions when we have undertaken the initiative and the Russians have re- acted in kind. I think, although I can- not state this accurately, that the Rus- sians have done so more often than we have. Mr. MUNDT. I think that is right. Mr. President, I invite the attention of my Republican colleagues in the Senate to the fact that a curious phenomenon presents itself to me, as I am sure it must to them. I allude to the fact that when- ever the present administration has a real, sticky problem where it is not quite sure of itself and feels it is running con- trary to the cross-currents of American public opinion, this administration as- serts, "This thing originated under the Eisenhower administration." Mr. MANSFIELD. It did. Mr. MUNDT. For a long time they tried to say that our war in Vietnam originated under the Eisenhower admin- istration. Finally, Mr. Eisenhower spoke out and said, that at the time he left office, that there were less than 500 Americans in Vietnam, that none of them was engaged in any belligerent activi- ties, that there were only two casualties in Vietnam during the entire Eisenhower administration, and both were caused by traffic accidents. Mr. MANSFIELD. Will the Senator from South Dakota yield? Mr. MUNDT. In just a second. Thus, I point out that, rightfully or wrong-' fully-and I have supported President Johnson in his war efforts-I think it is a little bit unfortunate that whenever, the administration gets itself into a real, tough situation, they try to put the blame on Eisenhower. As I pointed out earlier, when we did initiate these consular conversations, they were initiated under Eisenhower. They were initiated during the time we were not at war, we were not involved in fighting in Vietnam. Certainly, our boys were not being killed then by weapons being supplied by the Soviet Union, whom we are now asked to embrace in this treaty. I think these are undis- putable facts which should be'placed in the record. Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. President, the Senator does not mean to imply that the Senator from Montana, who now is ad- dressing him, ever made any such re- mark about President Eisenhower, impli- cating him in our present difficulties- Mr. MUNDT. No sir, I do not, but I point out that it has been made by mem- bers of the administration, of which the distinguished Senator from Montana is an important member. However, he can- not be held responsible for every state- ment made by every member of his ad- ministration. Mr. MANSFIELD. But the Senator from Montana does say and does reiter- ate, and the Senator from South Dakota agrees with the statement, that Presi- dent Eisenhower and his Vice President, Richard Nixon, were both responsible for the initiation of this convention now be- fore us. I think that is a matter of fact and I believe they should be given credit. Mr. MUNDT. There is no argument about that, but let us put the whole story in the record. That was done before the war-a war which we are now fight- ing and in which we are deeply involved, and the ramifications of which, in rela- tionship to this treaty, comprise the main reason why the Senator from South Dakota is opposting the treaty so vig- orously. it should also be, said-and the Sen- ator from Montana will not dispute this because I think he was in the commit- tee room when the Secretary of State testified to this effect-that the im- munity provisions were not included in the Eisenhower proposal. They came at the insistence of the Soviets, long after the conversations had been negotiated and when they were moving toward finality. Mr. MANSFIELD. I would not deny that. As a matter of fact, we agreed to do what the Soviets requested. They did not insist. So far as the immunity provisions are concerned, we agreed be- cause we thought it was in our interest, too; but may I now get back to some- thing else, so long as President Eisen- hower's name has been brought in. If the Senator will turn to page 134 of the hearings on the Consular Convention with the Soviet Union, he will find there a statement made by President Eisen- hower, dated February 2, 1967, which reads as follows: Replying to questions concerning my opin- ion as to the value of a Consular Convention with the U.S.S.R., I cite these items from the record: At the Geneva Summit Conference in 1955 I pointed out to the Soviet Leaders that there existed unnecessary restrictions on the flow between us of ideas and I suggest that the barriers which now impede opportunities of people to travel anywhere in the world for peaceful, friendly purposes, be lowered. In July of 1969 Vice President Nixon touched on this subject with Mr, Kozloz, Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 S 3744 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE March 14, 1967 Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union, and Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr, President, will The first reservation which we will vote suggested that the United States establish a the Senator yield? consulate in Leningrad wtih the Soviets es- on gees, as the Secretary of State stated tablishing one In New York. Mr' '? I3ield? In his letter to the distinguished majority When Chairman Khrushchev visited me at Mr. MANSFIELD. I started to make leader, to a subject which is beyond the Camp David In September 1959, Secretary of a statement, but it looks as though I scope of the Consular Convention and State Herter renewed this proposal to For- am giving It bit by bit. Part of the opens up an entirely new field for nego- eign Minister Gromyko and also suggested statement was that we already distrib- tiation. that a Consular Convention be negotiated. ute to the Soviet press, through our em- We approve the proposition that the Such a convention was complete and signed bassy in that country, press releases United States 'representatives of the In 1964. which contain announcements of U.S. press in the Soviet Union be equal In I have not changed my belief that such a convention Is In our national interest; that policy. We distribute such announce- number to the Soviet press representa- it will not impair our national security; that ments in Moscow, and the Soviet Em- tion in the United States. We desire it should enlarge our opoprtunities to learn bassy distributes such announcements that they shall have as free access to more about the Soviet people, and that It Is in Washington. Distribution, of course, areas of the parts of the Soviet Union as necessary to assure better protection for the does not guarantee publication, but the Sovie, representatives have here. But many thousands of Americans who visit the reservation proposed by the distin- the reservation deals with the question Soviet Union each year. r uished Senator from South Dakota does of information which would be properly I believe that the distinguished Sena- not represent its publication but only its the subject of new negotiations with the tor from Kentucky [Mr. COOPERI was the distribution, Soviet Union. The reservation simply one who raised the question and brought Is that a correct statement? sidesteps the subject matter and the it to the attention of the committee. I Mr. MUNDT. The Senator is correct. merit,'i of the convention before us-a do not know whether the distinguished If that Is the right of the embassy, it convention which I believe is beneficial Senator from South Dakota was in the should be the same right for consular of- to our country-and Is an Indirect way room at that time or not. I was not firers. How in the world does the Sena- of striking down the convention, there, because I had to be elsewhere. tor logically argue that what we are I may not have an opportunity to Mr. MUNDT. I was not present at asking for, which is something which is speak again on the second reservation the time either, but I read the hearings, provided in the diplomatic relations, proposed by the senior Senator from One of the witnesses I could bring Into would kill the treaty if extended to the South Dakota, but the same principle is this Chamber-if I could-would be Mr, consular officers? involved. Dwight Eisenhower, who said he believed Mr. MANSFIELD, Because this Is The second reservation proposes that it was necessary to remove some restric- only part of the reservation offered by the Consular Convention will not come tions on the flow of ideas. My free- the distinguished Senator, and he knows into effect until the war in Vietnam is press, free-movement good-faith reser- it. over. Now every one of us wants an end vation, as it is involved in executive res- Mr. MUNDT, That is correct, and the to the war- ervation No. 1, is a step which moves in other part is more significant. Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, if the that direction. Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator will yield, because he is speak- Mr. PROUTY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? ing about my reservation, it says until Senator yield? Mr. MUNDT. I yield, the war there is over or until the Com- Mr. MUNDT. I yield. Mr. COOPER. I must return to a wander in Chief, President Johnson, can The PRESIDING OFFICER. The committee which has been meeting all advise the Senate that it is not being time of the Senator from South Dakota day. prolonged solely because the Soviets are has expired. Mr. MUNDT. Does the Senator rise to supplying arms. Mr MUNDT. I yield myself 5 min- ask a question or to make a statement? Mr. COOPER. I accept the correction: utes. I want to know whether he Is for or either that the war is over or that the Mr. PROUTY. I am a little uncertain against the reservation, so I can know Soviet Union has ceased to supply arms. as to the meaning or effectiveness of the who should yield the Senator time. I was speaking to the purp)se of his res- first provision in the Senator's proposal. Mr. COOPER. I am against the res- ervatic.n. It states, "To permit the distribution to ervation. That the war may be trought to an the Soviet press," and so on and so forth. Mr. MUNDT. Without losing the honori.ble end is the hope o-' all of us, and We recognized that the Soviet Union is floor, I yield so the Senator from Mon- the hope of the American people. But a closed society. It also has a censored tans may yield time to the Senator from the real question Is whether the adoption press. It will accept press releases which Kentucky. of the reservation would have any effect it wishes to accept, and It will ignore Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield 5 minutes at all upon bringing the war to a close or others, It seems to me that there Is no or such additional time as the Senator shortening it. I do not think so, and I requirement in this first provision that may need. do not believe that the Senate thinks so. this must be carried out. Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I want- Neither do I believe that the ratifica- Mr. MUNDT. That is correct. There ed an opportunity to speak against the tion of the convention will lessen Soviet are no guarantees that any of these pro- proposed reservations before i return to assistance. Then shall we say from emo- visions will be complied with. That is a committee which Is sitting, and of tion, that we will forever foreclose agree- why I say it is a good-faith reservation, which I am a member, ments with the Soviet Union of value to If the Soviets comply with them, well First, I should like to say to the Sena- the United States and not affecting our and good. If they do not, if they insist tor from South Dakota [Mr. MUNDT] security? Or shall we undertake steps on having one set of rules for us and that the adoption of either of his reser- which in time may help avoid the kind of another for them, and Insist on a dou- vations would change the contractual confrontation that we have now in Viet- ble standard of morality, we can. If we relationship which has been established nam' consider the provocation serious enough, by this convention and would require its I would not be so optimi:;tic as to say take action to abrogate the treaty. renegotiation. that this convention will have any im- This certainly should be Inherent in Before these reservations were pro- mediae: influence on the .soviet Union. any :good-faith treaty involving consul- posed, the debate thus far has been di- emotions, the second reservation, asserted agbased ainst on ar officers. We think they should have rected to the merits of the convention kind could be against any l y, the same right of access to Information before us. Objections to the convention, Union. kind Union. A function ions with the Soviet and the same right of expression In one such as the fear of espionage, the immu- he fnc initiated by the fxecign pansy, country as in another. The Senator nity dl the Executive or provision, the most-favored-nation the a &dvice of the Senate, is to explore, e, from South Dakota is just plumb tired clause, are upon the merits of the con- to find out if steps can be taken to lessen of further appeasement, and of just giv- vention. I have spoken on these issues tension;, which inexorably, over the ing in to the Russians every time on the in support of the convention. years, have brought us basis.that, if we do not do this, they will But the Senator's reservations Intro- ion with the Soviet Union er confronta- not go along, duce new propositions, which have This Consular Conventions is a small Mr. PROUTY. I wanted to clarify the nothing to do with the substance or pur- step, but it Is a step helpful to the United matter. poses of the Consular Convention. States. Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 March 14, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE I simply wish to state again the rea- sons which lead me to oppose the reser- vations: First, because they have nothing at all to do with the merits of the con- vention; second, because I believe they are a method of indirectly killing this convention; and, third, because I think they appeal solely to emotion and have no possible effect on ending the war. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, could we have an accounting from the chronicler as to how the time has elapsed so far? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota has 79 min- utes, and the Senator from Arkansas has 73 minutes. Mr. MUNDT. Remaining, or ex- h,,msted? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Re- maining. Mr. MUNDT. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, I have promised. to yield to some of the others who support the reservation and oppose the treaty, but I do wish to wrap up one phase of this argument before yielding. As I said at the beginning, on the mat- ter of these reservations we have two issues before us. The first is, Does the Senate really believe that it should have the constitutional power today, so fre- quently exercised by our great predeces- sors in the past, to advise before we con- sent to a treaty? The second issue is, Do these particular reservations have merit? Do they ex- press the sentiment of the Senate? Do they comport with the convictions of a majority of Senators, or do they not? I have not started to discuss the sec- ond aspect, the merits of the reservation, because I should like to establish, at least from the standpoint and position of the Senator from South Dakota, that the Senate has altogether too frequently in recent years neglected its power of advice; and that if we accept the state- ments on pages 53580 and S3581, con- tained in the first flurry of letters which we have received from the Department of State on the subject-three of them, all nestled there together-then we ac- cept the doctrine of this administration, that they do not believe that Senators should ever tinker with a treaty. They can talk about it, they can write letters, they can give advice, but may not in- corporate their advice in a reservation or an amendment. Every. Senator, and I believe every schoolchild, for that matter, knows that this is the only kind of advice we can give which is meaningful, which is sig- nificant, which is effective. I submit that we should consider that fact long and hard, as this generation of Senators, with responsibility for maintaining the constitutional prerogatives of this august body, before we knuckle under to the argument that- In treaty making, all the Senate can do is consent or dissent; that advice constitu- tional provision was for the historians. They just put that in as sort of extra verbiage at the writing of the Constitution in Philadelphia. Mr. President, many, many times in our history the Senate has exercised this prerogative of meaningful advice fear- lessly, unaffected by arm twisting or im- portunity, or blizzards of letters. Sen- ators have stood on their own rights, in their constitutional capacity, and have said, "We have the right to advise, and we will write our advice in the treaty, where it counts." Think of the Connally reservation, and the reservation involving the World Court. Those seven little words that Tom Connally of Texas insisted that we put into that reservation remain there today. It must have served America well, because it has never been removed. It was written by a Senate that had the stamina to act on its own constitutional rights, instead of yielding to the seduc- tive call: You can say anything you want to, you can pass advice resolutions, you can have expressions of the sense of the Senate, but don't put your advice where it counts--in the treaty as a reservation or as an amend- ment. I submit that the Senate ought to de- cide whether we have some advice func- tion in connection with treatymaking, or whether we do not. Either we are going to timidly and weakly foresake our con- stitutional prerogative, or we are going to stand up and exercise. it. Whether specific reservations are wise or unwise is a matter of debate. There, certainly, we have a right to disagree; but we should not disagree about our right to offer them, and to have a vote on them, and to have them adopted, and we should not be frightened away from our responsibility by people whose guess-no better than ours-is that if' we make a reservation, we kill the treaty. That is one man's individual specula- tion, Mr. President, and it seems to me it is a great confession of failure. on the part of the State Department to say: Look, if you put a reservation in, we cannot argue very well; we go in half beaten when we start. We have been playing the part of appeasers so long we cannot now function as successful advocates. Do not charge us with another job; we know in advance we are go- ing to fail. I wish we had a State Department that had more confidence in its advocacy and its abilities than that. I submit that :it is unconscionable to say that we should not consider reservations because the State Department indicates that they have not the ability or the aptitude to carry out the wishes of the Senate and the people of America, in trying to bring about a new meeting of minds on treaty issues which are in controversy. Mr. President, I understand that the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. HANSEN] would like to have me yield him some time, or is it the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. HRUSKA] ? Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me? Mr. MUNDT. The Senator from South Dakota yields 10 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Iowa. Mr. MILLER. I thank the Senator from South Dakota.. Mr. President, the pending reservation to the counselor treaty with the Soviet Union provides that there will be no exchange of instruments-in other S 3745 words, that the treaty will not take ef- fect-until the Soviet Union has agreed to two conditions, namely: First, that the United States be al- lowed to distribute to the Soviet press announcements of U.S. public policy, both foreign and domestic, and answers to any criticism of such policy contained in the Soviet press; and, Second, that the Soviet Union remove restrictions on the number of U.S. press representatives permitted in that count try so long as that number does not ex- ceed the number of Soviet press representatives entering the United States; further, that there shall be no restriction of expression or movement imposed upon our American press corps representatives in Russia which do not prevail for Russian press representatives in the United States. It will thus be seen that adoption of this reservation will not require renegoti- ation of the treaty with the Soviet Union, as would be the case of an amendment to the treaty, and that the only thing affected would be the time the treaty would become operative. Once the So- viet Union agrees to the two actions specified, the treaty would go into effect. The net effect of such an agreement- by the Soviet Union would be that the open skies policy advanced by Presi- dent Eisenhower would be substantially achieved. It is true that the agreement to merely permit distribution of press announcements to the Soviet press would not necessarily mean that they would be printed for the peoples of the Soviet Union to read or hear. However, if there were a calculated effort by the Soviet Union to suppress such press announce- ments, there would be ways and means found to let the peoples of the Soviet Union know that the announcements had been furnished the Soviet press and that these announcements had been sup- pressed. Naturally this would cause the peoples to become suspicious of the Soviet press-as some of them already are- and, in the long run, the government would find itself losing support of the peoples who want to read these an- nouncements. It is, therefore, more likely that a substantial number of these press announcements would, in fact, be published. I do not know of anyone in the Senate who does not wish to see better relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, At the same time, the tensions which have existed between our two gov- ernments have been perpetuated because of the failure of the government of the Soviet Union to open its skies so that its peoples may know the facts-all of the facts, and not just those facts or distor- tions which some government censor sees fit to have printed. It was this realiza- tion which prompted advancement of the open-skies.policy. Implementation of that policy has been too long delayed. Now, with the proposal for the United States and the Soviet Union to enter for the first time in recent history into a bilateral treaty, it would seem that now is the time to obtain some action in pursuance of that policy. The Consular Treaty, as now drafted, does not even scratch the sur- Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 S3746 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 14, 1967 fare as far as this policy is concerned. I thank my colleague for yielding. The result of our firm stand is evident. IL has been heralded as a step in easing Mr. MUNDT. I thank the Senator We heard this story spelled out by the tensions between our two Governments, from Iowa for his very Informative and valiant President of the Philippines bur, even assuming that it is In fact such persuasive contribution, when he was in this country. He a step, the step is so minute as to make I now yield 5 minutes to the distin- pointed out to us that when the people it questionable when one considers the guished Senator from California [Mr. of southeast Asia realized that America negative aspects of the treaty. The llm- MURPHY I. was serious about protecting the small ited nuclear test ban treaty was her- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The nations from aggression, from being aided as a step in easing tensions, but Senator from California is recognized overrun, and from having this atheistic the record, since Its ratification, hndl- fcr 5 minutes, ideology imed upon , rates that the tensions have increased, Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I con- began to takehearrt, to have them new hope.ey rather than decreased. Moreover, the gratulate the distinguished Senator from If you look deeply enough into our in- test ban treaty was multilateral, not bi- Iowa for pointing out the effect that ternational problem in France, you will lateral. this measure would have an the open find that one of the basic reasons for The leaders of the Soviet Union are skies policy. this quite aware that their agreement to the I have listened to the debate for many Gaulle ermany was stated by Charles de two points of this reservation would ease days. t years ago: tensions between our Governnnnents. Ac- . It seems from time to time that Mir valiant friends the Americans have tnsi b f they our vernd ente Ac- we get far afield from the actual facts suggested a knife with which I may defend involv in easing tensions, there should be no dif- free pre' when we talk in terms of a blaerdf, that has neither a handle nor a ficulty in their msuch an agree- free press. blade. meant. In smaking this reservation an agree- It is within the . ecolle~tion of this Why? Because he felt left out of the inset. do short, ho would be to what really tout the on Senator that was one of the original control of the use of atomic weapons; would do of the Soviet really test ee If the conditions agreed to by President Roose- and he did not believe that, if the neces- unU, ion. I velt when he first recognized the Soviet sity arose, we would come to the protec- SavSrocet U Unioton t the hets the treaty test, he n wf as can a Government. That condition, along tion of France. He doubted our pledge. meaningful meaningful step in the easing of ten- with other conditions-most of which This was the basis of the problem, going If the test is not met, then we were never carried out-were agreed to. back some years. should not delude ourselves Into thinking We are now talking in terms of how thee The PRESIDING OFFICER. The that the treaty will serve to ease tensions. the the people press Is In Russia and how how much time of the Senator has expired. If anything, It could promote more ten- I can tthere the Senator e permitted to know. lions by causing the leaders of the Soviet tell that I know M. MUNDT. I yield 2 additional stuns yo conclude tthe of something about the original cultural minutes to the Senator from California. Union riot to conclude that a United d States exchange Mn MURPHY. The Senator from for an particular) interested the policy. pressing We sent to Russia a motion picture Kentucky has said that the ratification In other words, Mr. President, let which they selected. It was called of this treaty will have no effect on the those who vote rd pending reserve- Grapcs of Wrath." That picture de- war. On the contrary. Many fail to tion be ho under e on this this pendi n. A "}Ia picted, as we know, the unfortunate comprehend why we are contracting tote e misimpr" stories of people in the Dust Bowl. The with Russia when at this very moment, repudiation of our open- vote will lb be a It interpreted by Russians selected this picture as one of the Russians supply North Vietnam will be the epdecs of the Soviet Union. My col- the first that they would like to show, with the tools of war used against leagues who are thinking of voting They then wrote their own forward our forces. I am afraid that the gains le agues this reservation may Console In which they said that the Grapes of and advances that have been made in themselves anst this s saying they have no such Weather depicted the highest scale in the last year and a half or two years but their they love not not the social system In America. This was will be for naught. The, tensions that intention: but the tof the lead- ri t obviously an attempt to propagandize we speak of in the Senate will be noth- grs g to o govern t the thinking h - dishonestly. I recognize that happened ling as compared with the tensions that of the Soviet Union, nor If the this reser- a number of years ago. will build up through southeast Asia- era vanda which rhich will ch will POUT out I am told from time to Lime that the in Pakistan, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, is . C say to my colleagues: "Are you for character. and conditions have changed. Indonesia, and clear across to the an open to my policy? If you are, then However, every time I look for concrete Philippines, if our commitment is not you,- aye vote is cy essential. It you are solid ground to convince myself that clear. That is why the President o; the you, tay vote is and again you there has been change, I do not find it. Philippines came to this country. He is h If ot, the the vote no, and do of not the r United be I wonder really how much change concerned. ri States finds its positions distorted or there has been? We are the beacon and defender of misrepresented In the Soviet press." A few moments ago the distinguished freedom, We are in a position now to Many people who have visited the So- Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] deal not from the standpoint of appease- viet Union report that the average per- said: -What result will this have on the ment. We have done so, In my memory, son living in the Soviet Union is not a war in Vietnam? for 30 years, and It seems that our hardworking, peaceloving, and inclined will have on the war in Vietnam, The modate, the more the opposition de- to be friendly toward the people of the United States made It crystal clear at mancts and asks for. United States, These people in the So- the very outset that we were going to I say that this is the !ime--I believe viet Union Crave accurate, factual War- pursue a firm policy designed to preserve this truly, and I agree completely with neat on about the United States. If a policy of self-determination as laid the Senator from South Dakota-when their Government would agree to the down by President Truman, President America should say that for once we will points in this reservation, the opportu- Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and now make the conditions. We will say that nitle?s for Improved relations with the President Johnson. I think that pos- this agreement will be a completely two- people themselves would be immcasur_ sibly the war in Vietnam might never way street-and please aid that it does ably enhanced. Most of us in the Sen- ha"e occurred if it had not been for the turn out to be a two-way street. But ate have from time to time approved Russians. The nations in southeast it mast be on quid pro quo; it must be people-to-people programs which bring Asia were afraid. They are weak na- on as even basis. And we must not our people into contact with these Lions. They stood alone, and until we people, and it would seem to follow that came in in force, we had been adver- under any circumstances allow our those who have approved such a policy tisc?d by China as a "paper tiger." valiant allies in southeast Asia to sus- wou:d support this reservation, so that The countries of southeast Asia were poet for one moment that we have such a policy would be given an even told, "America will not answer aggres- changed our determination, as expressed pn'eater opportunity to become effective. slur; they will not defend you." Many time and time again by the President of I hope that this reservation will be doubted whether we would. And our the United States, to resist aggression supported, and I shall most certainly counterpropaganda, for some reason or and to preserve the right of self-deter- vote for it. other never seemed to get our story over. mination. Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 March 14, 1967 -CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 3747 This is a poker game, you might say, but it is a very important one, and at the present time we should stand pat. The suggestion of the distinguished Senator from South Dakota is a good one. It will strengthen this treaty and make it more palatable, and certainly will continue to give hope to our valiant allies that America has not changed its policy, that we are still determined that the free nations of the world shall have the right to determine their own policy for the future. I thank the distinguished Senator from South Dakota. Mr. MUNDT. I thank the Senator from California for his very helpful re- marks, for his valiant support, and espe- cially for moving this debate back on tar- get, which was essential because of the colloquy engaged in by the Senator from Kentucky, who spoke about espionage, immunities, and the number of coil- sulates. As anyone who has followed this de- bate in the RECORD or in the newspapers must by now realize, the main focus of opposition on the part of those of us opposing ratification of the treaty has to do with the protection of Americans. But we believe that we should give more heed to the protection of 500,000 Ameri- cans in South Vietnam than to the 9 Americans, on the average, who get into trouble while visiting Russia, It is a rather startling comparison. If 18,000 people are fortunate enough to have the wherewithal, the means, and the time to travel in Russia-and I am glad they can do so-and if 9 of them get in trouble, we should try to protect them. You can read the letters from the State Department in the RECORD and you can see that that is all that is con- templated-to try to protect those who get in trouble. The fellow who does not get in trouble does not have to be pro- tected. Nine of them get in trouble an- nually, so we are going to protect them- a curious kind of protection by the way which provides that they can notify their relatives and the State Department that they are in the hoosegow, and the con- sular officer can come in for a visit. However, when it can be demonstrated, as I for one believe, that by doing that you lessen the protection of 500,000 young Americans who are not traveling in Vietnam for pleasure or profit-who do not have the good fortune to visit Russia but have the misfortune to be up to their navels in the slime and the mud of the boondocks of Vietnam, fighting for freedom-you have to balance in your own mind, before you vote, just which group of Americans you are interested in protecting, because there is a contra. diction there. When you enhance this protection for the one group, you reduce it for the other. We had better examine the relation- ship of this treaty to East-West trade and the rest of the program, before we finally vote. Mr. President, I am happy to yield such time as he may desire to the dis- tinguished Senator from Wyoming. Mr. HANSEN. I appreciate the cour- tesy of the Senator from South Dakota in permitting me the opportunity to speak briefly on this subject. I am deeply concerned about the con- sular treaty, because, in my judgment, it represents one of the most important votes that I will cast in he Senate. I hope that I may arrive at the correct de- cision. It will be a difficult decision to come to, because I realize that on both sides 6f the aisle are Senators equally as sincere as am I, who are examining their consciences and attempting to de- termine how best to advance the inter- ests of our great country and to protect its citizens. Much has been said about our con- cern for the 18,000 Americans in the Soviet Union and our interest in at- tempting to protect them. The Senator from South Dakota has pointed out that all of the 18,000 Americans who were in Russia last year were there of their own volition. Undoubtedly, a number were members of the business community, who were attempting to advance their own personal economic interests. Nev- ertheless, I subscribe to the opinion, held almost universally in this country, that we should protect our citizens wherever they may be. However, I do not believe that we can separate, on the one hand, a consideration of the ratification of the consular treaty with, on the other hand, the overall impact such ratification may have on the war in Vietnam. In this context, I should like to read from the January 16, 1967, issue of Bar- ron's magazine: Last October the President held out the prospect of a whole network of bridges to the Red countries, including the Soviet Union: "Our task is to achieve a reconcilia- tion with the East-a shift from coexist- ence to peaceful engagement. We seek healthy economic and cultural relations with the Communist states." Specifically, he an- nounced: 1) clearance for the Export-Import Bank to guarantee commercial credits for Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Bul- garia; 2) the Bank's readiness to finance ex- port of American equipment to a large So- viet auto plant which Italian Fiat will build; 3) imminent decontrol of certain commodi- ties for sale to East Europe. Six days later some 400 items previously barred from export to the Soviet bloc with- out special license-including metal manu- factures, machinery and chemical products- were expunged from the Commerce Depart- ment's Commodity Control List. We all know that only a few years ago, 47 percent of the labor force of Soviet Russia was tied down on the farms of that country to provide the food and fiber required by the Soviet people. Compare that with the situation in our country. At that same time, only 8 per- cent of our labor force was involved in providing what we required in this country. Eight percent of our American labor force not only did this job; they produced more than we could consume, adding to our surpluses. I contend that if we assign the proper priorities to this treaty consideration, which I think is our first responsibility as Senators, it must be to consider it in the light of our overall world Involve- ment at the present time. To my mind, there can be no question that the early conclusion of the war in Vietnam is our number one concern. I submit that anything we do which will strengthen Soviet Russia will make that country better able to supply war materiel to the Vietcong and to the North Vietnamese people, and will mili- tate against the best interests of this country. I believe we cannot ignore the fact that if we make it safer and make it more easy for Americans to travel in the Soviet Union, we may reasonably expect more businessmen from the United States to go to Soviet Russia, and to other satellite countries, as well, to enter into business contracts with those nations to provide the people behind the Iron Cur- tain with goods and services and prod- ucts that will relieve them of the re- sponsibility.they presently have, and en- able them, thereby, to make a greater contribution to our enemy in Vietnam. I am concerned about the 18,000 Amer- icans in Soviet Russia. I am concerned, despite the fact that they have gone there of their own choice. But I am more concerned with the fact that we have be- tween 415,000 and 500,000 Americans in Vietnam who, for the most part, are not there of their own volition, but are there to protect our country and to support our flag. That we should consider the care and better protection of 18,000 American tourists, when that effort runs counter to more complete protection of our service- men in Vietnam, goes against my grain, Mr. President, I do not know yet how I shall vote on all of the reservations, on all of the understandings, or on the con- sular treaty itself, but I must say that if I can judge the temper of the people of my State correctly-and I came through a campaign there'only last fall-I am certain of one thing: The people of Wyoming are more interested in bring- ing the war in Vietnam to a satisfactory conclusion as quickly as possible than they are in anything else. I hope that the time will soon come when that con- flict has been resolved satisfactorily in the interests of this country; that we may then further display our good inten- tions to all of the world, including Soviet Russia, to say to them, "We will build these bridges, we will demonstrate our concern for humanity wherever it may be; we will try to contribute to the rea- sonable realization of the aspirations of peace everywhere, and we will work for peace." But I cannot believe on the basis of what I now know that the ratifi- cation of this treaty by the Senate, and the attendant acts that are sure to fol- low will advance the interests of this country. Rather, I think they will make more difficult our task in Vietnam. I thank-the Senator. (At this point Mr. HOLLINGS took the chair.) Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. HANSON. I yield. Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, first I wish to congratulate the Senator on a powerful presentation of the basic issues involved in this discussion. Certainly the Senator's argument is sound and persuasive with respect to the 18,000 Americans traveling annually in Russia voluntarily, because of their good Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 S 3748 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE fortune or ample means, so that seeking pleasure or seeking profit they are privi- leged to be there; and to compare them in this fifth year of the war, as he has done, with the 500,000 Americans in Vietnam, who are there not because they prefer to be there, who are not there be- cause of pleasure or profit, and who are not there because they have the where- withal to be there, but because it is their responsibility as men in uniform to go where the Commander In Chief sends them. I would hope that we might com- pare another statistic. If we accept the word of he State De- partment, between 81z and 9 percent of those who go to Russia annually get in trouble. Let us say that the figure is nine out of 18.000. The figure speaks well for the good behavior of Americans, and it does not speak too badly for the attitude of the Russians in arresting people unnecessarily. I suspect that a larger proportion of American tourists traveling in the States would get In trouble, Let us, however, use the figure of nine. We are asked to take this venture into the deep blue yonder with an unprece- dented treaty to give the nine people what some believe to be protection, which to me is not protection at all since it does not go to the cause of release or freedom, but simply goes to the right of notification and consultation. We should be aware of the fact that against those nine who get in trouble in Russia every year, more than nine American boys are dying In Vietnam every day solely because of the arms sup- plied by Soviet Russia. Perhaps we do not think enough about that statistic. Perhaps we do not think about that com- parison. Maybe we should now be thinking about those servicemen we should be trying to protect instead of spending weeks, and almost months, de- bating a treaty which, at best, cannot do much for many. We might be better off, in my opinion, debating various alterna- tives confronting us and trying to bring this war to a quicker end successfully, in- stead of doing something which in his heart every Senator knows is but to give encouragement and a greater opportu- nity to the Soviets to send their torrents of arms, as they are now doing, to Viet- nam to prolong the war. I salute the Senator from Wyoming for bringing this point to our attention so graphically. I now yield to the distinguished Sena- tor from Nebraska, a coauthor of the pending reservation. ,Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, it was with much interest that I listened to the majority leader advance his position re- garding the scope of the powers and du- ties of the Senate with respect to treaty- making. advice and consent, according to the Macomber letter, is, apparently, "Yes" or "No." That does not comport with the history of the Senate in its consideration of treaties. Nor was this limited area for action ever contemplated to be the Senate role. In fact, until the last few days before the Constitution was agreed upon, it was proposed that the Senate would enter into treaties; the President was to have carried them out. That is borne out by the history of the tr'eatymaking power, section 2, clause 2, of article II of the Constitution, dealing with the executive department. I refer to volume 39 of the Constitution of the United States of America annotated. Clause 2 reads: 'r shall have power, by and with the ad- vice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provide twu-thirds of the Senators pr"sent COnCUr. No one disputes the fact that it is for the President to negotiate treaties. The negotiation of treaties is an Executive monopoly. But the Senate has several options mailable in performing the functions delegated it by the Constitution. It may consent unconditionally to a pro- posed treaty, it may refuse its consent, or it may stipulate the conditions in the form of amendments to the treaty or of re.;ervations to the act of ratification. The distinction between these last two alternatives is simply that an amend- ment, if accepted by the President and the other party or parties to the treaty, change it for all parties, while reserva- tions limit only the obligations of the United States thereunder. The act of ratification for the United States is the President's act, but he may not ratify unless the Senate has con- rented to it by the required two-thirds of the Senators present, which signifies two- thirds of a quorum. Otherwise the con- sent rendered would not be that of the Senate as organized under the Constitu- ticn to do business. Conversely, the President may decide to abandon the negotiation, if dissatisfied with amendments affixed by the Senate to a proposed treaty or with the reserva- tions stipulated by it to ratification. He is entirely free to do so. Most of what I have just said is set forth in Volume 39 of the Constitution of the United States annotated. A num- ber of authorities are cited there to support that Interpretation and descrip- tion of the practice. The statement of any member of the Department of State that the adoption of any particular reservation would re- sult in killing the convention is a specu- lation to which he is entitled, if he so chooses, However, it Is an area for his speculation only. It is not his province to advise or consent. We can also imagine that Members of this body should be somewhat constrained regard- ing the wisdom of entering into a treaty which, in their solemn judgment, they think would be harmful and detrimental to the position of this country and to the safety and freedom of its citizens. The Senator from South Dakota has stated the premise very well. When we get, emotional about 18,000 people travel- ing, in the Soviet Union and say that we want to extend them every protection possible, we should also have some con- sideration for the 500,000 boys who will shortly, or before the end of this war, very likely be engaged In battle in Viet- nam, the continuance of which is made passible by the other party, on the enemy ?Aare,, 14, 1967 side contributing weapons to the war; namely, the U.S.S.R. Accordingly, I believe that in that con- text, what we are doing here is proper. Certainly, the reservation is good. It is quite an observation to make, in the letter from Mr. Macomber, that this reservation would destroy the Consular Convention. His letter parallels the let- ter signed by the Secretary of State which was read on the floor this after- noon for the first time, that- The Consular Convention is an instrument regulating the status and functions of con- sular nersonnel. It would destroy its useful- ness for that important purpose if we at- tempted to use it as a veh cle for remaking Soviet society, however desirable It seems to us steps should be ta'cen in the USSR to m:eke it a free society. So, what are we to do" Must we cast the treaty in such a fash;on that the So- viet Union will want it? We are charged with making concessions. We are told that we are supposed tc accommodate. We must refrain from provocative ac- tion:. and give a monopoly on all of these actions to the other side. Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Nebraska yield at that poin :? Mr. HRUSKA. I do not believe in it. I do not believe that we should let this opportunity go by without speaking up for the substance of the reservation which the Senator from South Dakota has drafted and which he now advocates. I am happy to yield to the Senator from South Dakota. Mr. MUNDT. The Senator is a distin- guished lawyer and a constitutional stu- dent He is also a member of the Com- mittee on the Judiciary. I am, therefore, happy indeed to listen to his analysis of the constitutional function of the Senate as intended by our constitutional fathers in connection with treatymaking. If we accept the doctrine contained in the three State Department letters, it would be applicable to any treaty, at any time, and would mean that from here on in, ticatymaking would be exclusively an executive function, that the Senate could assent or dissent but, from the stand- point of providing meaningful advice, that constitutional right would be denied to us. I tiinkthat the Senator has read into the ItECORD some important documenta- tion -.n that connection, and I thank him for ii. Let me ask this ques,ion about the point to which he alluded at the end, when he quoted from the Macomber let- ter, to the effect that the treaty deals with the functioning of consular offices. What; could deal more directly with the functioning of consular offices than the proposed reservation in which the dis- tinguished Senator from Nebraska and I have joined. which would guarantee on both sides of the water the same rights of action, movement, contact, and re- porting, and which would guarantee to their press attaches and other represen- tatives of the press the same freedom of movement, the same freedom of expres- sion, the same freedom from being ban- ished from the country if they said some- Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 16rch 14, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE thing which the government .did not like, grant them, to the Russians over here. on both sides of the water? We simply cannot see why the Depart- It seems to me that if we are going to ment of State insists on having it dif- extend the unprecedented function of the ferent standard of morality for our peo- right to murder, steal, and sabotage with pie over there, when we- can put that complete immunity, it certainly is not provision in this treaty, where it will fit novel or startling that we should also ask like a glove fits a hand. This is par- for these normal procedures incorporated ticularly so when we are cranking into in our reservation to be incorporated in other parts of the treaty, for the first the treaty which would guarantee recip- time in American history, complete; im- rocal action on both sides of the water. Mr. HRUSKA. If it is true, as has been said, that there is reciprocity as to the number of press representatives we have in the Soviet Union as compared with those who are here, and if it is true that there are no greater restric- tions on travel on the part of our press representatives there than there is on their press representatives here; if this is all true, would not adoption of this reser- vation be a reasonable ground for the Soviet Union to say, "We want no part of it. It is true that we are granting reci- procity in numbers and travel but you have put it in the reservation and, there- fore, we do not want any part oi; the Consular Treaty"? Mr. MUNDT. The Senator states the issue very well. It is incomprehensible to me how the State Department can have it both ways, arguing in the one in- stance that we are going to get this now and the Soviet Union has just got to op- erate on that basis; and arguing on the other hand that if we put this reserva- tion in the treaty, if it is insisted upon, it will be a device for killing the treaty and that the Soviet Union will then re- ject the whole treaty. The Department of State is perfectly proper in arguing one point or the other, but when it con- stantly contradicts itself in its view- points, it seems to me it simply demon- strates the flimsiness of the whole at- tack upon our. reservation. Obviously the State Department cannot have it both ways. Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator from South Dakota yield? Mr. MUNDT. I yield. Mr. LAUSCHE. I have not been able to listen to all the arguments made on behalf of the reservation. Do I correctly understand that the purpose of the res- ervation is to establish an agreement under which the freedom of the press that will be allowed Russian newsmen and diplomatic attaches in the United States must also be given to our newsmen and our attaches in our con- sular offices in the Soviet Union? Mr. MUNDT. Precisely. No more and no less; just as the provisions of the con- sular treaty provide an exact quid pro quo in the consular offices under both flags. We see no reason to treat news- men any differently from the rest of our Americans over there. Mr. LAUSCHE. The rest of the res- ervation provides that while the United States will allow Russian newsmen and attaches in consular offices all the free- dom allowed in the United States as to written and oral expressions, the United States should also be given that same right within Russia; is that not correct? Mr. MUNDT. The Senator is exactly correct. We have granted those permis- sions, and I am sure will continue to munity. Mr. LAUSCHE, In other words, un- less the reservation is adopted, we are saying to Russia, "You can come to the United States with your consular officers and enjoy all the freedoms of the press and speech," while we will be yielding to restrictions in the exercise of those qualities of speaking and writing. Mr. MUNDT. Not only that, but the Senate is now being called upon, in a roll call vote, to extend this advice, and the State Department will also be saying that we are advising that no reciprocity be created on these matters between the two countries. So we will be accessories to an agreement of appeasement if we accept this Consular Convention without reservation. Mr. LAUSCHE. The next is a simple question, and it may answer itself as I put the question. What is the justice and propriety of allowing the attaches and publicity agents of the Russian con- sular offices in the United States to ex- ercise full freedom of speech and writing while we agree to be restricted by the practices of the Communist dictatorship in Russia in what our consular attaches and publicity men might say to the Rus- sian people? Mr. MUNDT. Certainly, I can see no justice in it. I do not know how it oc- curred. I suspect that our negotiators at the treaty negotiating table simply did not have the determination and, the drive and the positive convictions to in- sist upon this quid pro quo, on the basis, as the writing in the letters which have been referred to has shown, that we do not have the capacity or persuasive power to get the Soviet Union to agree. I gather this is what must have occurred at the conference table earlier, from what they send us in their letter writing now. Mr. LAUSCHE. The reservation of- fered by Senators MUNDT, DOMINICK, and HRUSKA provides that the treaty shall be approved subject to the understanding that the Union of Soviet Socialist Re- publics shall agree: (1) to permit the distribution to the Soviet press or any segment thereof by United States diplomatic and consular offi- cers of announcements of United States pub- lie policy, both foreign and domestic, and answers to any criticism of such policy con- tained in the Soviet press. Is that the first condition? Mr. MUNDT. That is exactly the. first clause of our reservation. Mr. LAUSCHE. In other words, the authors of the reservation ask that the U.S. officers be permitted to tell the Russian people our position at the same time that the Russians are permitted to us the privilege of free speech and free press in the United States to either con- demn our policies or attempt to destroy them? S 3749 Mr. MUNDT. The Senator is exactly right. It calls for complete reciprocity on both sides of the water. Mr. LAUSCHE. It is more than rec- iprocity. It is equality of the applica- tion of the right of free speech. Mr. MUNDT. I think that is a better word-equality of rights and privileges on both sides of the water. Mr. LAUSCHE. The second condition of the reservation is that the Russians shall agree "not to impose or enforce any limitation on the number of U.S. citizens permitted to be in the Soviet Union at any time as representatives of the U.S. press which would effectively reduce them below the number of Soviet press representatives entering the United States." Is it the purpose of this second con- dition to establish an equality in the right of sending press representatives to Russia by, the United States and by Rus- sia to the United States? Mr. MUNDT. Yes. Of course, the Senator did not conclude the clause, which also contains the words "or to impose upon them any conditions of travel or objective reporting which do not prevail for Soviet press representa- tives within the United States." Mr. LAUSCHE. That is the last clause. Mr. MUNDT. Yes. Mr. LAUSCHE. That it shall also agree to objective reporting, and not impose on them conditions which do not prevail for Soviet press representatives within the United States. Mr. MUNDT. That is correct. Mr. LAUSCHE. The substance of what the three Senators whose names I have mentioned are trying to do is give the United States the same opportunity, through free press and free speech, to reach the Russian people, in telling them of our economy and our social progress, as we give to the Russians, through our constitutional rights, the right to tell our people what they have done and allow them to tell what is wrong with our sys- tem of government, Mr. MUNDT. The Senator summa- rizes the purpose of our reservation with complete and total cogency. He is totally right. Mr. LAUSCHE. Free speech has been the primary argument in most of the cases that have gone to the Supreme Court. Free speech is blessed above every other right in the United States. Mr. MUNDT.. That is correct. Mr. LAUSCHE. The reservation of- fered by Senators MUNDT, DoMINICK, and HRUSKA deals with free speech, and noth- ing else. Am I correct? Mr. MUNDT. That is correct-free speech and free movement. Mr. LAUSCHE. It is anomalous that we talk about the right of free speech as being the primary right under our Con- stitution, and yet when we attempt to ask the Russians to give our attaches and diplomats the right of free speech, just as we give it to their representatives, in this country a howl is raised against the proposal. Mr. MUNDT. I thank the Senator very much for a significant and helpful cbntribution. Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 83750 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE Mr. President, I should like first to in- quire how much time remains, and then ask for the attention of the majority leader to see whether we are nearing the end of the debate. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota has 22 min- utes remaining; the Senator from Ar- kansas has 63 minutes. Mr. MUNDT. I reserve the remainder of my time, because we have consumed most of our time. I shall wait until we hear what the other side has to say. Mr. SPARKMAN, Mr. President. I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MoRsEl. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President. will the Senator yield, first? Mr. SPARKMAN. I yield. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, how much time does the Senator have left? Mr. MUNDT. Twenty-two minutes. Mr. MANSFIELD. Does the Senator intend to use all his time? Mr. MUNDT. Depending on what the other side says, we are prepared to sum- marize in 10 or 15 minutes. Mr. MANSFIELD. After we hear from the Senator from Oregon and the Senator from Pennsylvania, I think we shall be prepared to yield back the time. Mr. SPARKMAN. That is a possi- bility. Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, as we consider reservations to the Consular Convention, I would like to call the at- tention of Members of the Senate to an editorial in the March 10 New York Times and point particularly to three points made in the editorial. The first point made by the Times editorial is that- When the Senate adds amendments or re;ervatlons to a treaty, It is unilaterally changing the terms of a settled bargain. The practical effect of such action is really to reopen the negotiations and force the e h?!r party or parties to re-examine their pie- iously offered approval. Throughoutthis debate there has been the implication that Russia Is very anx- ious for the consummation of this treaty, That is not the case. This treaty is the result of U.S. initiatives. Russia will take the position that she entered into a bargain with our negotiators, and she is willing to go through with that bar- Pain, but If we want to attempt to re- write the treaty, that is the end of the bargain; we will be the losers, and not Russia. The second point, made succinctly and directly in the Times, is that- 'the reservations proposed by the treaty's foes are irrelevant and unquestionably of- fered in hopes of making that agreement unacceptable to the Soviet Union. Finally, the Times editorial observes that- The Consular Convention, which would benefit this country much more than It would Russia, deserves approval or defeat on its own merits. It should not be sand- bagged by parliamentary trickery. I think the use of the word "trickery" in the editorial is most unfortunate. I think the statement would have been true if they had said "parliamentary tac- ties," But, Mr. President, one never knows what motivations are, you have to be clairvoyant to know motivations. However, the editorial is correct with respect to the fact that there is a great deal of parliamentary tactic involved in the offering of these reservations. I ask unanimous consent to have the full text of the Times editorial, entitled "Treatrles and the Senate." Inserted in the RECORD at this point, There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: TREATIES AND THE SENATE Proposals in the Senate this week that rev.ervations be attached to both the space treaty and the Soviet-American consular convention resurrect an old, recurrent and de tructive constitutional problem. It was George Washington who first had to wrestle with the dilemma created for a President when the Senate approves a treaty conditionally. Amendments and reserva- tions added during Senate consideration of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919-20 played a key role In Woodrow Wilson's great defeat on the League of Nations. A treaty is a contract negotiated by the executive branch with the government of oue or more other countries. In the process there is normally hard bargaining and the final result usually represents a compromise in which everyone has made concessions. Ttus when the Senate adds amendments or reservations to a treaty, it is unilaterally changing the terms of a settled bargain. The practical effect of such action is really to reopen the negotiations and force the other party or parties to re-examine their previ- ously offered approval. Every time the Senate exercises this priv- ilege, it necessarily casts doubt upon the credibility of the President and his repre- sentatives, and weakens the bargaining power of the United States In the international arena. The Senate's power to do this is ur_quesdoned, but It is equally unquestion- able that this power is best used only to express the gravest of concerns, especially in a period of crisis such as is posed by the Vietnam war and efforts to end It. Senator Gore's complaints about the fuzzi- ness of some of the space treaty's language have considerable warrant, but the problems Involved are scarcely weighty enough to en- danger the treaty Itself-and the historic benefits it promises-through the adoption of formal Senate reservations. On the consular convention, the reserva- tions proposed by the treaty's foes are ir- relevant and unquestionably offered in hopes of making that agreement unacceptable to the Soviet Union. The tactics Senator Mundt and his allies are adopting amount to confession that they cannot halt two- thirds approval of the convention as It spends, and must therefore resort to sub- terfuges. A victory for this maneuver would give Moscow an opportunity to accuse the United states of bad faith and thus cast a dark shadow over the negotiations now In prog- ress on other Imperative Issues. The con- sular convention, which would benefit this rcuntry much more than it would Russia, deserves approval or defeat on Its own merits. It should not be sandbagged by parliamen- tary trickery. Yesterday's initial votes on the treaty provided basis for optimism that It will not be. Mr. MORSE. I shall also ask unani- mous consent to have printed in the RECORD three other stories from the Washington Post. The first is a column by Marquis Childs which appeared in the March 13 issue of the newspaper, entitled "Treaty Fight Threatens Detente." Mr. Childs observes that- M1ar?ch 14, 1967 Implied In the Mundt reservation. if the Intent Is sincere and not merely a maneu- ver to kill the treaty, is the belief that it can be a lever to compel tIe Soviets to stop their aid to North Vietnam and get the North Vietnamese to the peace table. It cook under no circumstances have that re- sult, The second Washington Post story to be included in the RECORD appeared In the March 12 issue under the headline: "United States, Russian Moves Show 'Mutual Restraint'." The article is by Murrey Marder. He notes that by al- lowing Buel Ray Wortham to leave the Soviet Union the Sovie .s have broken a precedent and have thus shown a wil- lingness to follow a policy of what might be called mutual example, mutual pru- dence or mutual restraint designed, as is tee consular convention we are con- sidering, to dispose of unnecessary irri- taticns and to avoid confrontation on minor disputes. The third story I would like to insert In the RECORD is from the March 13 is- sue of the Washington Post. It needs no explanation, for the headline tells the whole story in one sentence: "Right- wing Triggers Paper Blizzard To Smother Consular Pact." Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent to have printed in the RECORD, at the conclusion of my remarks, the three stories from the March 12 and 13, 1967, issues of the Washington Post to which I have referred. The PRESIDING OFFICER. With- out objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibits 1, 2, and 3.) Mr. MORSE. The articles I have just asked to have printed In the RECORD, constitute, in broad outline, the frame- work of my opposition to the reserva- tions and my support of the treaty. Throughout this debate there has run, on the part of the proponents of the reservations, and particularly of the one now pending, an irrelevant argument; namely, the argument that "We ought to adopt this reservation because Russia is aiding the North Vietnamese in South Vietnam." If there was ever an irrelevancy, that is it. Does anyone really think that our turning down this treaty, or adopting a reservation that will assure its non- acceptability, will save the life of one single American boy in Vietnam? Mr. President, I thougat that what we were trying to do, in par,, outside of any connection with this treaty, was to try to work out a basis for negotiation, ever.tually, with the Russians and other countries, so that we can finally reach a negotiated settlement of the shocking, unjustifiable war into which we have sent, without the slightest justification, these American boys to be killed. They would not be killed if we did not have them over there. If we are really Interested in saving those boys-and I am--I say, "Bring them home." But it Is inaccurate to assume, or imply, that the negotiation of this treaty is going to kill more of them. I submit there is no cause-to-effect relationship for that argument whatsoever. Mr. President, we are following a course of American occupation in south- east Asia, and continuing to follow a course of American escalation of the Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 March 14, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE war, although the President is trying to tell us he is not escalating it. We are escalating it today; and every day and every hour of the escalation, we are kill- ing increasing numbers of American boys, on the theory, I suppose, that we will continue to do that until we kill enough of the enemy so that finally we may force a surrender, if China and Russia do not come in. I thought, Mr. President, that what we were sincerely trying to do was to explore all the possibilities of finding a basis for negotiation, in order to bring to an end this war. But if we think we are going to do it, and have peace, on the basis of American bilateral negotiations, we could not be more mistaken. For when peace is established over there, it will be a peace established through multilateral intervention, not unilateral dictation by the United States to the enemy. Truce, yes. Surrender, yes. I think we can force those two things. But that will not give us any peace. It will only mean that we are going to kill American boys in Asia, in my judgment on a much larger scale, when it breaks out again in 10, 15, or 25 years. So I say that if we are really inter- ested in trying to establish a world order where we shall have some chance of working out negotiable arrangements with Russia in the future, we should not vote to add a provision to a treaty with Russia on a consular matter, which has nothing to do with the war, making it inoperative until Russia stops giving any aid to North Vietnam and the Vietcong. Anyone who thinks that is going to stop the aid could not be more mistaken. In fact, as we drive ourselves further from Russia, and isolate ourselves further, we shall increase the tensions and misun- derstandings, and we will end up killing more American boys rather than saving them, as we continue ' to defend the in- excusable war activity of the United States in an area of the world where we never should have been involved in the first place. So, Mr. President, in the interest of our trying to improve the chances of reach- ing a negotiable relationship with Rus- sia, I shall vote against the reservation of the Senator from South Dakota. The main argument that is used over and over again, which he has tried to bring into this debate-the argument that if we approve of this treaty on the basis that it is being presented, we are letting down the boys in South Vietnam, is completely irrelevant. I again say most respectfully, respect- ing the sincere views of those who hold views contrary to mine, that the Amer- ican boys are being killed because we are furnishing the money to the President and supporting a wrong foreign policy. That is what kills them. If we stop giving the money to the President, he will have to stop the killing. EXHIBIT 1 [From the Washington Post, Mar. 13, 1967] TREATY FIGHT THREATENS DETENTE (By Marquis Childs) It is entirely possible that the first small steps toward a slackening of the cold war can be blocked. Powerful forces motivated by fear, suspicion, the built-in interests of the arms makers and a genuine concern that any move toward closer relations with the Communist bloc can help to undermine American forces in Vietnam are hard at work. One of these steps is the Consular Treaty with the Soviet Union. That a step so small can raise even the slightest doubt and suspicion, however generated by the profes- sional cold-war warriors, is an indicator of the trouble ahead for more meaningful steps in the future, For the treaty which provides a framework for enlarging at some future date the diplomatic exchange between the two powers has a symbolic rather than a real value. That is the point Sen. Thruston Morton (R-Ky.) has consistently hammered away at in his determined effort to line up at least two thirds of the 36 Republicans in the Senate. He has been confident of perhaps 26 or 28 votes for ratification, which would have provided the necessary margin. The prediction was for a comfortable total of 67 or 66, which with some absentees would have been enough. But there are more ways than one to skin a cat and kill a treaty. Sensing defeat on an outright vote, the diehards are trying to gain their end by the amendment and reservation route. Sen. Karl Mundt (R.-S.D.) calls for a reservation providing that the treaty shall not come into effect until one or both of two conditions are met; first, that the Presi- dent advise Congress that there is no longer a need for United States forces in Vietnam; second, that the Senate be assured that furnishing war materiel to North Vietnam is not delaying or preventing the return of American troops from Vietnam. This ties the treaty to the deeply emotional issue of a half-million Americans pinned down in Vietnam and the fact that Red China and the Soviet Union provides the sinews of war. It was designed to look like an out for those who might want to vote for ratification and yet get in the clear on Vietnam. But again Morton has been unequivocal. A vote for such a reservation-really for any substantive reservation or amendment--is a vote to kill the treaty. It would have to be renegotiated and this the Soviets would refuse to do. The United States had de- layed action.for nearly three years since the treaty was first agreed to. In this first small effort at bridge-building with Eastern Europe there are many contra- dictions. Implied in the Mundt reservation, if the intent is sincere and not merely a maneuver to kill the treaty, is the belief that it can be a lever to compel the Soviets to stop their aid to North Vietnam and get the North Vietnamese to the peace table. It could under no circumstances have that re- sult. Morton and others who have worked so hard for ratification see this as putting the cart before the horse. If small steps such as the Consular Treaty can be taken, in com- ing months Moscow will be more willing to help bring about a settlement in Vietnam. There is no guarantee of this, yet it is at least a probability. Much of the opposition to the treaty in the debate in the Senate has been a rehash of past frictions and old quarrels. Sen. Thomas J. Dodd (D-Conn.) went back to the coldest days of the cold war in 1948 to retell the case of Madame Oksana Kosenkina who defected from the Soviet consulate in New York and was gravely injured when she leaped from a window to escape her captors. While Dodd's office insists that only his own staffers helped prepare the speech, it has the stamp of Julien Sourwine of the Internal Security subcommittee, which is Dodd's pri- vate preserve. As with all such international obligations self-interest must be the primary consider. ation. The hope of stopping yet another and 53751 fantastically costly round In the nuclear arms race is the self-interest in this instance. And time is running out. For the Soviet Union the obvious self-interest is to strengthen ties with the West as the threat of conflict with Red China grows. The blame if failure overwhelms this first step will be widely disputed. Morton and other Republicans who have worked hard for ratification believe the Johnson Admin- istration has not done nearly enough to bring around the waverers on the Demo- cratic side. But, however murky the areas of blame, the consequences will be clear enough. Doom for this symbolic action will spell doom for the other and larger meas- ures that can abate the spiraling arms race. EXHIBIT 2 [From the Washington Post, Mar. 12, 19671 UNITED STATES, RUSSIAN MOVES SHOW "MUTUAL RESTRAINT" (By Murrey Marder) Within 24 hours the United States and the Soviet Union have displayed the dual policy of restraint that cushions their tensions in the Vietnamese war. Washington passed up an opportunity it would have leaped upon with zest just a few years back: To parade the defecting daughter of.dic- tator Josef Stalin in the citadel of capi- talism as a prize acquisition of the Cold War. Instead, with diplomatic delicacy, Svetlana Stalina has been turned over to the most discreet hosts for political asylum, neutral Switzerland. Unless the Soviet Union for reasons not now discernible to American officials chooses to make a major international incident of .her case, the United States intends to treat it with discretion. Moscow has demonstrated its own restraint in a lesser affair that had its own quotient of international irritability. By alowing Buel Ray Wortham of North Little Rock, Ark., to go free with a $5555 fine instead of a three- year labor camp sentence, the Soviet Union broke a precedent too. Speculation abroad that there was a direct cause-and-effect relationship between the two cases was totally dismissed by American officials. They pointed out that Wortham's release has been "in the cards" for weeks, if not months before Miss Stalina's appearance. But what does tie together these two cases and others like them, is that they do repre- sent a very significant, but unwritten, policy being carried out on an ad hoc basis by the two nations. The Russians, back in the day of Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev, named it "a policy of mutual example." Secretary of State Dean Rusk sometimes calls it a policy of "mutual prudence," or "mutual restraint." No one, In Moscow or Washington, knows what the actual limits are on this imprecise policy, nor how long it will last-or even exactly when it will work and when it will not work, It could blow apart tomorrow. In fact, just as the United States and the Soviet Union were each showing unusual courtesy to each other's interests in the Svetlana and Wortham cases, each probably had a wary eye on what was happening just then in Vietnam. The United States was engaged in a round of air attacks on North Vietnam's biggest steel fabricating plant. North Vietnam, highly dependent on the Soviet Union for its sophisticated war equipment, is likely to invoke those attacks as greater justification for the Kremlin to supply it with more powerful weapons of defense, The Soviet Union, as the most powerful Communist nation in the world, cannot, even if it wanted to do so, easily shrug off such demands from a fellow Marxist nation and still maintain its claim to Communist leader- Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 S 3752 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE ship. At its heels, Communist China is con- stantly challenging that claim. At any stage of the upward spiral of war in Vietnam, there is the danger, despite the most exceptional restraint on either aide, of a rriscalculation. United States experts can never be absolutely certain just what acts of military Intensification on their side may precipitate more direct Soviet involvement in the war. The Russians can never be sure what the United States may do next to en- tangle Soviet prestige Inextricably in the consequences, Intentionally or accidentally. In groping through this dilemnma, some- what like two blind men trying to find their way across an unmarked minefield, Washing- ton and Moscow have each eased into an unprecedented, although Irregular, level of restraint In their non-Vietnamese relation- ships. It is not a matter of total trust, or the end of suspicion, or anything of that sort, but simply self-interest on both sides. As one ranking American official put It symbolically last week, "We know that If the Russians see any gold nuggets lying around, they're going to pick them up." What he meant was that the Russians, In continuing East-West competition, will take any golden targets of opportunity It finds. So. undoubtedly, will the United States, he might have added, But what Moscow and Washington are doing 1s disposing of unnecessary irritations, avoiding confrontations on minor disputes. Eac3 nation is making Its International points, where it chooses, but without extra Inflammation. The United States, did so just last week when it arrested and prose- cuted the skipper of a Soviet fishing vessel for entering U.S. territorial waters off Alaska, but let him off with a $6,000 fine. If the United States had chosen to parade Stalin's daughter as an East-West prize, for example, it might easily have risked freezing up the international atmosphere. The U.S.- Soviet Consular Treaty Is pending on the Senate floor; the Outer Space Treaty is just behind it; a treaty to ban the spread of nu- clear weapons is dangling in Geneva, and possible U.S.-Soviet negotiations to limit the arms race are at stake. By American diplomatic reckoning, the re- quired course of action pointed unmistak- ably toward restraint. President Johnson readily agreed. EXHIIIrr 3 (From the Washington Post, Mar. 13, 19871 RIGHTWINO TRIGGERS PAPER BLIZZARD To SMOTHER CONSULAR PACT (By J. Y. Smith) If the Senate ratifies the U.S.-Soviet con- sular treaty this week, It will do so despite one of the largest and most vehement right- wing mail campaigns in recent years. A defeat of the pact would mark virtually the only major success of the lobbyists of the far right in blocking efforts to Improve So- viet-American relations. The treaty's proponents are cautiously op- timistic. Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said in a telephone interview that "it is unconceivable to me that we would be so petty as to turn this treaty down." '[The crunch may come by Wednesday, when a "reservation" to the treaty proposed by Sen. Karl E. Mundt (R-S.D.) 1s expected to come up for a vote, The reservation says that the treaty would go Into effect only when the President advises Congress that American troops are no longer needed In Vietnam, or that their return to the United States no longer is being hindered by Soviet aid :o the Vietnamese Communists. WOULD KILL THE TREATY If passed, the Mundt proposal would ef- fectively kill the pact. It is almost Incon- ceivable that the Soviets would ratify it with that proviso. Opposition to the treaty in the Senate de- rives from the traditionally conservative and isolationist South and Midwest. It also comes from Southern California and cities such as Detroit and Chicago which have large populations with close ties to the so- called "captive" nations of Eastern Europe. Sen. Thruaton B. Morton of Kentucky has been one of the principal movers and shakers In rounding up Republican support for the treaty. Other backers include Sen. Everett MCKinley Dirksen, the Senate Minority Leader, and Sen. Charles Percy (R-Ili.). Thus the foes of the pact Include Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), Sen. George Miurphy (R-Calif.), Sen. Frank J. Lausche (U-Ohio) and Sen. Herman Talmadge (D- Ga.). Despite the appeal of the Mundt reserva- tion, though, observers noted that a similar blocking rider offered last week by Talmadge was defeated 53 to 28. The campaign against the treaty has been led by the Washington-based Liberty Lobby, an organization set up in 1955 "for the pur- pose of reversing the dangerous trend toward socialization internally and to defeat the insidious effort to weaken our resistance to international communism." Others are the Manion Forum, the Dan Smoot Report, the United Republicans of America, the National Review and the Mothers of American Servicemen of South Pasadena, Calif. The Liberty Lobby's techniques for gen- erating mail to Congress are direct In the way a T-54 tank Is direct, but some of the most obvious forms of propaganda are avoided. For example, the Lobby eschews mimeographed form letters on the ground they lack credibility. HOOVER IN A WHITE SUIT On the other hand, it has made progress in the anti-consular campaign with a 18- panel comic strip entitled "The Communists Next Door." J. Edgar Hoover, a critic of the pa;-t. Is depicted in a white suit. A mus- tachioed State Department supporter of the treaty wears his hair plastered down with greasy kid stuff. An earnest young legislative assistant In the cartoon tells it to his Senator this way: "The most obvious danger from the treaty Is provision for 'diplomatic immunity.' Treaty opponents point out that to give Soviet personnel complete immunity from arrest is to invite an Increase in Red es- pionage ... even sabotage . . . since the treaty forbids inspection of any baggage or equipment brought in as 'diplomatic pouch.' ' The impact of this on Liberty Lobby's mailing list-the organization claims 170,000 members--can be seen in the following letter to a Senator who is one of the treaty's main su.)porters: "The most obvious danger from the treaty Is provision for 'diplomatic immunity.' Treaty opponents point out that to give So-net personnel complete immunity from arrest is to invite an Increase In Red espionage . . , even sabotage The writer is identified by his letterhead as the president of a machinery company in Green Bay. Wis. The comic strip tries to make a sabotage case by saying that "atomic demolition mu- nitions" could be smuggled into American cities in Soviet diplomatic pouches. It does no mention the fact that the almost 500 Soviet diplomats already stationed In the United States theoretically could do the same thing. Neither does it touch on the fact that U.S. consular personnel in the Soviet Union also would have diplomatic immunity and also would be immune from arrest. Despite all this, according to one leading Senate Democratic supporter of the pact, March 14, 1967 the mail campaign has had almost no meas- urable effect except among those lawmakers who were opposed to the treaty anyway. Morton has been threatened by one writer with the delivery of one live rattlesnake if he vote u for the consular pact. Another writer said: "If we are ten to one against the treaty, then we-not you -are at fault if you vote against it." Morton's mail has been running 100 to 1 against the agreement. The Senator says he'll Ignore the mail and vote for it anyway. Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Pennsylvania. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator from Pennsylvania :s recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Alabama. While I agree with the analysis of the reservation just made by the Senator from Oregon and enjoyed what he said, I should like to confine my comments to the subject matter of the reservation which has a certain tone of plausibility about it. It is that we should not ratify this treaty until the Soviet Union per- mits the distribution to the Soviet press of announcements cone, 'rning the U.S. public policy and the answer to any criti- cism of such policy contained in the Soviet press, and it would further require the Soviet Union to refrain from limiting the number of representatives of the U.S. press who go to Russia to write about conditions there. The purpose of the reservation, in other words, is to impose freedom of the press upon the Soviet Union. This seems to Ire to be somewhat silly. We are not going to have the slightest impact on es- tablishing in the Soviet Union the Bill of Rights contained in the first 10 amend- ments of the Constitution of the United States, and it is ridiculous to think that we ever could. We are dealing with &. closed society. We do not like a closed society merely because it is closed. However, we live in a world of reality and not in a dream world. It is difficult for me to believe that groan and mature men with some under- standing of the facts of international life today would be so naive a:; to suggest that we can persuade the Soviet Union to establish freedom of the press within the bour.daries of their own country by pro- posing such a matter in this treaty. This is so naive that one is almost im- pelled to speculate on the motivation of those who propose thi; unduly naive amendment, I ?+m not hl the business of speculating on the motivation of my colleagues, and I do not intend to do so this afternoon. AL I will say is that the inevitable ef- fect of passing this reservation would be to kill the treaty and perhaps, just per- haps, that is what the proponents of the reservation would like to see done. Mi'. President, I yield back the re- mair.der of my time. M-'. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I yield 8 minutes to the Ser ator from Utah [Mr. Moss]. The PRESIDING O'FICER. The Sen- ator from Utah is recognized for 8 min- utes. Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, it is un- questionably in our national interest to Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 March 14, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ---r SENATE 53753 ratify the Consular Treaty. The U.S. The convention itself Is not needed to sible adverse effect to our national in- Senate should take this action, and we provide for the opening of new consul- terest has been thoroughly explored and should take it without reservations or ates. That can already be done. This, aired. The benefits far outweigh any understandings. treaty contemplates possibly one addi- dangers, We should ratify it now with- What is at issue is a more stable world. tional consulate to be established in each out further delay and put it into effect The treaty presents an opportunity to country, and some 10 or 15 additionaaf immediately. improve the machinery through which Soviet personnel to be admitted in addi-. The proposed reservations or even the we handle certain official business with tion to the 400 already in this country understanding would, in my opinion, kill the Soviet Union. We can grasp this op- with diplomatic immunity, but it does the treaty. Therefore, I will vote against portunity without endangering our own guarantee rights for Americans in the reservations or understandings, and I future or our own security. It would be U.S.S.R. Some of the mail I have re?? will vote for the treaty. foolish to pass It by. It could help propel ceived has insisted this would make it Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I re- us toward peace. Primarily, we need the treaty to give greater protection to Americans travel- ing in the Soviet Union. At the present time, an American can be held incommu- nicado up to 9 months during an inves- tigation of criminal charges lodged against him, and the Soviet Union does not have to notify U.S. authorities. If the treaty were in effect, the Soviet Union would have to notify U.S. author- ities immediately, and these officials would have the right to visit the Amer- ican citizen being held within 4 days of his arrest, and on a continuing basis thereafter. The small number of Soviet citizens now traveling in the United States already have such protection un- der our democratic system, but the more than 18,000 Americans who now go to the Soviet Union annually have no such pro- tection. We learned recently what the absence of a Consular Treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States meant when two young Americans, Craddock M. Gil- more, of Salt Lake City, Utah, and Buel Ray Wortham, of Little Rock, Ark., were arrested on charges of currency black marketing, with the additional charge of the theft of a souvenir bear from a Russian hotel against Wortham. The men were arrested on October 1 of last year. It was 6 days before the U.S. Embassy in Moscow was notified that the Americans were being detained, possible for Soviet consular officials to quest the yeas and nays, bring small atomic weapons in the United The yeas and nays were ordered. States-that, to use the exact phrase in Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I one of my letters, "atomic bombs up to yield 5 minutes to the Senator from one-half kiloton in size" could be smug- Maine [Mr. MUSKIE]. gled in through "diplomatic pouch." I Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, in a can only point out that Soviet diplomatic newsletter to my constituents dated officials in this country have had the March 4, 1967, I stated the reasons why privilege of diplomatic immunity since I will support ratification of the Consu- the opening of the Soviet Embassy in Jar Treaty. Washington in 1934, and there is no I ask unanimous consent that the text evidence that they have ever misused of that newsletter be printed in the REC- these privileges to bring into this coun- ORD at this point. try weapons detrimental to the national There being no objection, the news- security of the United States, f letter was ordered to be printed in the Now, I am not presuming to say that RECORD, as follows: no Soviet consular official brought into DEAR FRisN~os: While we wrestle with the this country under this treaty, or under problem of Vietnam, we should try to avoid any other agreement with the Soviet becoming so involved in the debate over the Union, will never become a security prob- conflict that we ignore or distort the oppor- lem to us. But we can cancel the Con- tunities for more peaceful forms of competi- sular Treaty any time.on a month's no- tion with Communist countries. Nowhere tice. And we can expel any Soviet ern- has this danger been more apparent than in ployee who is guilty of offensive conduct. the debate over the consular Treaty between the United States and Russia. And we have in the Federal Bureau of In the past few weeks, what should have Investigation the best internal security been a relatively innocuous policy decision- agency in the world, Surely, a handful initiated, incidentally, by President Eisen- of additional Soviet citizens would not hower-has become a major issue in the strain too greatly the vast and well o:r- Senate. ganized facilities of the FBI. Judging from my mail,.many Americans I have been chagrined, as I know many misunderstand the Treaty. Their major ob- jection seems to be a fear of increased esplon- of my colleagues have, by the blitz Of age by members of Russian consulates in this frenzied mail against this treaty ill- country. spired by several of our rightwing lob- The fact is that the Treaty would not re- bies. I regret that some of our sincere quire the opening of a single consulate here and patriotic citizens have been led to or in Russia. What the Treaty would do is enable mem- believe that ratification of thi tr t ea y s and where. It was 5 days later before would admit a horde of Soviet spies with hers of our Moscow Embassy staff to give the first U.S. consular officer was allowed suitcases filled with bombs. I regret comfort and encouragement to touring Amer- to visit them. A second visit was not per- that these citizens have had an oppor- icans arrested or detained by Russian author- ground and even then hies. It also would set protective ground mitted representatives October o the 28, and even then tunity to read . and hear only one side rules for an exchange of consulates if at some prlk with tither U.S. of the argument on the treaty-that time in the future, we decide it is to our could not in talklit with either of the the two- they have had no way of getting perspec- advantage to do so, they wnot charges s r confinement-about against them. tive on it. I wish we had a better system The Treaty would require the Russians, to the lit of getting all the facts to our people. notify our Embassy personnel within three It will take too much time to chronicle Mr. President, this treaty has actually days of the dEm etention of an American, and would enable b to each request for a visit to the boys, and been in the making for many years. It American four Y Pysso of f the al a rest, and the various denials. Nor will I go through was talked about in 1933, when we first visit with within him on a regular thereafter, and the details of the trials of both, and of reestablished relations with Russia, and Presently under Sovietllaw, any tourst or the release and fining of Gilmore fol- President Eisenhower proposed at the Russian citizen can be arrested and held for lowing the December trial, and the 1955 Geneva Summit Conference that nine months, and sometimes longer, for in- final release and fining of Wortham only "concrete steps" be taken to lower the vestigation. In the cases involving Ameri- last week, barriers which now Impede the opportu- cans, our Embassy frequently is not notified The point of the matter is that the nities for people to travel anywhere in of the detentions for weeks, if ever. Even when boys and their families and the commu- the world. Secretary of State Christian are notified, we have no rights of visitation. nities and States in which they live were Herter discussed the treaty in 1959 at What this means to a detained American subject to great tensions and anxieties Camp David with Soviet Foreign Minis- Is prolonged isolation in a Russian prison because of the uncertainty surrounding ter Gromyko. Formal negotiations with neither hope of seeing another Ameri- the treatment of the American citizens began in Moscow in 1963, and after 8 can nor knowledge that his country knows under Soviet law, and that some of this months of hard negotiations, the con- or care of his imprisonment, could have been alleviated had the Con- vention was signed on June 1, 1964, and The Importance of the Treaty grows each the number be visit Russia. From sular Treaty been in effect. As more and submitted to the Senate by President 1962 to as more more American citizens go to the Soviet Johnson on June 12, 1964. The Corm- eling in Russia increased 50 percent to 18,000. Union in the years ahead to try to get mittee on Foreign Relations has twice Since 1964, more than 20 Americans have a better understanding of the people and held hearings on it, and reported it to been arrested or detained in Russia. One, their philosophy and to see how they this Congress by a favorable vote of 15 Newcomb Mott, died mysteriously at Russian live, there are likely to be other Incidents, to 4. It has now been debated in hands under these circumstances. and we must be sure that we have done the Senate for almost a week. Russian tourists in America, numbering what we could to give our citizens all We have examined it carefully in all about 900 a year, already have the Treaty's protections in our open society without the the protection possible. of its aspects, I am sure that any pos- Treaty. Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 S 3754 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 14, 1967 With the Treaty, Americans In the Soviet Commitments without reductions or COm- igreements or arrangements of mutual b?ne- Union would have more rights than any Rus- pensating advantages to her? It to both sides and to the world. sian citizen now possesses In his homeland. An affirmative answer would have to But a change in the atmosphere and in The notification and visitation provisions be based upon an assumption that the t inphasia is not a reversal of purpose. 1M1r. of the Treaty are Its most compelling fea- Rhrushchev himself he.s said that there can tures. However, its ground rules for con- treaty, in its present form, holds greater be no coexistence in the field of Ideology. In sular exchanges also are Important because advantages to the Soviet Union than for iuidition, there are still major areas of ten- the opening of a single consulate in each us and the further assumption that she e.fon and conflict, from Berlin to Cuba to country Is contemplated, even though no would concede the first assumption. :southeast Asia. The United States -end the formal proposals have been made or are un- Neither assumption is valid. Soviet Union still have wholly different con- der consideration. At best, therefore, we could expect not cepts of the world, its freedom, its future. Under the Treaty, the exchange of con- acquiescence, but the opening up of an We still have wholly different views on the sulates would be the subject of careful ne- so-called wars of liberation and the use of gotiation on a strict quid-pro-quo basis. For enlarged area of disagreement, moving subversion. And so long as these basic dif- Instance, if an American consulate in Russia us away from the limited agreement we ferences continue, the,., cannot and should had a staff of 10 persons, the Soviets would are considering, and with pretty dim not be concealed. They set limits to the pos- be limited to the same number for their prospects for an enlarged agreement. sibilities of agreement: ; and they will give consulate here. The history of negotiations with the rise to further crises, large and small, in the Normally, a consulate would have 10 to 15 Soviet Union since World War II is that months and years ahe?d, both in the areas officers, and neither Attorney General agreements come slowly, that they are cf direct confrontation-Germany and the Ramsey Clark nor FBI Director J. Edgar limited, and that progress, when it is our control ouuld In area.,; Involve us where e,;e areas such Hoover regard this number as a problem which the FBI could not deal with effectively achieved at all, conies with small steps, as Africa and Asia and the Middle East. and efficiently. There are now 452 Russian not large ones. In times such as the: e, therefore, there is diplomatic personnel In the United States. Mr. President, each of us can suggest nothing Inconsistent in signing an atmos- The Treaty provides additional limitations other problems we would like to see re- pheric nuclear test ban, on the one hand, rod safeguards: solved by the treaty. Each of us could and testing underground on the other; about 1. We would have the right to screen Rus- wish that this one document might wipe being willing to sell to the Soviets our sur- ;ian personnel before agreeing to their as- away all the tensions, the frustrations, plus wheat while refusing to sell strategic .;ignment to our country; items; about probing their interest in a joint 2. We could prohibit Russian consular and the dangers of the cold war. Each lunar landing while making a major effort officers from traveling to sensitive areas in of us, I am sure, knows that no such to master this new environment; or about he United States; single step is possible. exploring the possibilities of disarmament 3. We could expel the Russian officers If And so, Mr. President, we have the while maintaining our stockpile of arms. they proved undesirable: question whether, confronted by that F)r all of these moves, vnd all of these ele- 4. We could close a Soviet consulate when- reality, we should, in the words of Presi- meats of American policy and Allied policy ever we wished; and dent Kennedy, "Take each step we can toward the Soviet Union, are directed at a 5. We could cancel the Treaty on six single, comprehensive goal-namely, con- months' notice, safely take." vinclng the Soviet leaders that it is danger Clearly. the Treaty represents concessions I think we should. I think this treaty ous for them to engage in direct or indirect by the Russian Government which we have is such a step. I think that to insist on aggression, futile for them to attempt to sought and which are regarded as being to a greater step as our price for agreement impose their will and their system on other (,ur advantage. will endanger the prospect for the unwilling people, and beneficial to them, as For these reasons. I have supported Senate limited agreement represented by this well as to the world, to join in the achieve- approval of the Treaty. It is another step in treaty, meat of a genuine and enforceable peace. cur search for a detente In the Cold War. It Historians report that in 1914. with most Is one justifiable means of neutralizing the On October 19, 1963, Mr. President, in of the world already plunged in war, Prince strains In American-Russian relations caused an address at the University of Maine, Billow, the former German Chancellor, said by the hot war in Vietnam. It Is a small but President Kennedy spoke on "The mean- to the then Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, important step in search of a lasting peace, ing of the test ban treaty." His advice on "flow did it all happen?" And Bethman- And when I think of these small but some. that occasion is appropriate to the de- Huliweg replied, "Ali, if cnly one knew." My times difficult steps, I remember President cision before us. I ask unanimous con- fe:low Americans, if this planet is ever rav- I_ennedy speaking at the Convocation at the aged by nuclear war, If 300 million Ameri- Ke ersity_ of Maine in October, io sent that excerpts from that address be cans, Russians and Europeans are wiped out printed in the RECORD at this point. by a sixty-minute nuclear exchange, if the hard, Whi the road t ... peace 1thand Is There being no objection, the excerpts pl'.iable survivors of that devastation can take and each step pitfalls, tep that no and reason full full not of to traps we can were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, then endure the ensunl; fire, poison, chaos and catastrophe, I do not want one of those asfolloWs. survivors to ask another, "How did it all One year ago this coming week, the United happen?" and to receive he incredible reply, EDMUND S. MUSKr . States and the world were gripped with a "Ali, if only one knew." Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, the first somber prospect of a military confrontation Therefore, while maintaining our readiness between the two great nuclear powers. The for war, let us exhaust every avenue for question which confronts us is this: IS American people have good reason to recall willing- help, , clear the treaty in its present form, as level- with pride their conduct throughout that peace. taLet us lk, if talk alk always will make and our otr sad - aped in negotiations extending over Sev- harrowing week. For they neither dissolved nne:ssos to to fight, s re- eral years, in our national interest? in panic nor rushed headlong Into reckless solve to be fi,hP fight we must. Let t u own victims, odestiny I believe it is, for the reasons stated oelitgerence. Well aware of the risks of re- ous history, the c , masters, controlling not our the destiny in my newsletter. slatance, they nevertheless refused to tolerate ' without giving way to blind suspicion and l l ace nuc ear weapons emotion.... I believe the proposed commitments the Soviets attempt to p on our part are limited, acceptable, and -n this hemisphere, but recognized at the same time that our preparations for the use The PR properly safeguarded. of force necessarily require a simultaneous I believe the proposed commitments on search for fair and peaceful solutions.. , . the part of the Soviet Union are advan- A year ago it would have been easy to as- rages and protections of substance to mime that all-out war was inevitable, that American citizens traveling in the Soviet any agreement with the Soviets was impos- Union. [.ible, and that an unlimited arms race was I believe that the treaty In its present unavoidable. Today it Is equally easy for form is in the national Interest, notwith- some assume that the Co War is over, that all l outstanding issues bet between the 50- standing the fact that other differences viets and our country can be quickly and and disputes between the United States satisfactorily settled, and that we shall now algid the Soviet Union are not resolved have, in the words of the Psalmist, an "abun- 1)y it. dance of peace so long as the moon en- The second question which confronts ciureth." 11, is this: Is it realistic to expect that The fact of the matter Is, of course, that the Soviet Union would agree to adds- neither view Is correct. We have, It Is true, roads some progress on a long journey. We tional commitments on her part Involy- have achieved new opportunities which we ing no additional commitments on our cannot afford to waste. We have concluded part? Or to agree to a reduction in our with the Soviets a few limited, enforceable ESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MONTOYA in the chair). The time of the Senator has expired. Mr. SPARKMAN. I yield 2 additional minutes to the Senator from Maine. Mr. MUSKIE. I should like to read the following excerpt from that address: In times such as these, therefore, there Is nothing inconsistent in signing an atmos- pheric nuclear test ban, on the one hand, and testing underground on the other; about being willing to sell to the Soviets our sur- plus wheat while refusing to sell strategic Items; about probing their interest in a joint lunar landing while making a major effort to master this new environment; or about exploring the possibilttie; of disarmament while maintaining our stockpile of arms. For all of these moves, and all of these elements of American policy and A!Iied policy toward Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1 March 14, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 3755 the Soviet Union, are directed at a single, to advise the State Department that we rope by the Russians during and after comprehensive goal-namely, convincing the feel our consular officers and representa- World War II. By trade, tourism, and Soviet leaders that it is dangerous for them tives of the press should have on the diplomacy, new bridges have been built to engage in direct or indirect aggression, Russian side exactly the same rights, into the East. We have an opportunity futile for them to attempt to impose their will privileges and protections their people now to penetrate that curtain in still their and beneficial eneficial system on other unwilling to them, as well as to have on the American side? If we be- another way; namely, through the pen - people, eople, and the world, to join in the achievement of a lieve that, we should vote "yes," and if ing Consular Treaty. genuine and enforceable peace. we do not believe that, we should vote It is in our national interest to ratify Historians report that in 1914, with most of