U.S.-RUSSIA AE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000300090017-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 9, 2006
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: April 2, 1967
• Content Type: NSPR

-U P` A Poe r 2-4-f iC. (c" j
App For Releas%2006/01/ 0 :
? S.-nussia
By Chalmers M. Roberts
Washington Post Staff Writer
The United States and
the Soviet Union now are
embarked on negotiations
affecting the most sensitive
of military and psychologi-
cal relationships between
the world's two super-
powers.
These are the Moscow
talks on offensive and de-
fensive missiles, talks initi-
ated by the United States
because it discovered last
year that the Soviet Union
had begun deployment of
one and perhaps two new
anti-ballistic missile (ABM)
systems.
The issues involved are
loaded with potential politi-
cal dynamite for the 1968
presidential campaign. f
The Republicans already
have indicated a clear
awareness of this by pub-
lishing a National Commit-
tee pamphlet bearing this
label: "The Missile Defense
Question-Is LBJ Right?-
Russia Deploys Anti-Missile
Approv
News Analysis
Network; U.S. Refuses to
Keep Pace."
But even more is involved
than what Michigan's GOP
presidential prospect, Gov.
George Romney, has called
a possible "ABM gap."
There are those at both the
Pentagon and in the Con-
gress who fear the talks
could lead to abandonment
of a long-held principle:
That United States security
requires an overwhelming
weight of American nuclear
missile power compared to
that of the Soviet Union.
Currently the U n i t e d
States has a better than 3-to-
1 lead in land- and sea-based
intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs). As of last
Oct. 1, the figures were 1446
to 470, according to Defense
Secretary Robert S. McNa-
mara.
Exactly what President
Johnson and McNamara will
be prepared to do in the
talks has yet to be decided.
Washington is well aware
of its own internal disagree-
ments, and of the pressures
certain to be generated by
what f o r in e r President
Eisenhower once called the
"military- - industrial com-
plex." Washington also is
aware that the Soviet
Union's civilian leadership,
rated here as rather weak,
has to contend with conserv-
ative defense-minded mili-
tary l e a d e r s who battle
against every effort to pare
the Soviet defense budget.
If the American position
is not yet clear, the Soviet
position is becoming increas-
ingly evident. Soviet hopes
relate to, just those changes
in American strategic think-
ing that raise alarm bells
here at home.
From the Kremlin's view-
point, what is involved is
both psychological and mili-
tary. Any potential agree-
ment most likely would have
to consummate a much
cherished Soviet objective:
To force an admission from
the United States that the
Soviet Union is its equal in
the most critical of great
power terms, nuclear mili-
actual end to the 3-to-1
American missile advantage.
Both nations know that
the ICBM figures are far
from a complete measure of
raw power and that because
of differing defense needs
s n d attitudes num
viets hope for an agreed n .
that would materially alter`
the current ratio.
The way the negotiations
have gotten under way helps
make this evident.
After disclosing last Nov.
10 that the Soviets had be-
gun a new ABM deployment,
the Administration let it be
known it would try first for
an agreement with Moscow
before embarking on an
American ABM deployment.
On Jan. 26 In his annual
posture statement to Con-
gress McNamara argued, that
deployment of rival systems
would not, in the end, pro-
duce "any gain in real
.security for either side." He
estimated that a full scale
ABM deployment would cost
the United States around $40
billion over 10 years while
the Soviet Union would have
to spend at least $20 to $25
billion.
The next day President
Johnson wrote Soviet Pre-
mier Kosygin suggesting
talks on the ABM issue. Be-
fore he replied in March 1,
Kosygin said publicly in
London that ABMs were
purely defensive and hinted
clearly that Moscow would
require a link in any talks
with offensive missiles. He
did so in his letter and by
then the United States was
fully prepared to agree.
On March 23 American
Ambassador Llewellyn E.
Thompson met Soviet For-
eign Minister Andrei
Gromyko in Moscow to dis-
cuss the mechanics of the
talks. They agreed to begin
in Moscow but when Thomp-
son suggested that the first
order of business might be
to have experts sit down
together, Gnomyko gave no
direct response.
Instead the Soviet Union
let it be known that it was
up to the United States, as
for a mitfg ior, tf ilo anfirst.
tary strength.
JRrti
Thus the stage is set for
.=afty, tnths of. talk, not
.Just on freezing A)#M de-
ployment as the Unite d
States would like but also
on alterations in the basic
U.S.-U.S.S.R. missile power.
Already the Senate
that "it would,'
be unwise to permit these
negotiations to extend inter-
minably." If there is no
agreement, the committee
said in a report, the United
States should begin pro-
curement for ABM deploy-
ment.
In Washington optimists
aba\t .,an , breerxent are
solne working on the prob-_
lem who think it possible.
Some consider the talks a
critical point in any effort
to halt and turn down the
arms race. But everyone
realizes that time is press-
ing if agreement is to be
reached on such, a cornpli;
. ated,,And- highly sense e
rob1e n.
tT0 g%p6000300090017-8