SOVIET ANTIMISSILE SYSTEM SPURS NEW U.S. WEAPONS IMPROVED NUCLEAR WARHEADS DESIGNED TO PENETRATE WIDE DEFENSE NETWORK --MORE SWEEPING CHANGES SEEN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000300090086-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 9, 2006
• Sequence Number: 86
• Publication Date: May 2, 1967
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2006/01/30: CIA-RDP70600338R000300090086-2
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!*Aaf'. :4 _SUNDAY, NEW YORK T?IMES . 5/2/67
,82A0 177m.bisThque'r.NeNeZVokr17.1'NeY ClOTTS"
FAA,
Saga Antimissile System
purs New U.S.eapons
Improved Nuclear Warheads Designed
to Penetrate Wide Defense Network
?More Sweeping Changes Seen
By IIANSON W. BALDWIN
The annual report of the
Atomic Energy Commission,
issued a few days ago, men-
tioned a continuing modifica-
tion program for "some war-
heads," with the objective of
''further decreasing warhead
vulnerability, to nuclear environ-
ments generated by antiballis-
tic missile cotintermeasures.
The report's sober statementt
was regarded as an understate-i
ment of the intensive work be-
ing done to protect United'
States warheads and to assure a;
continuing capability to pene-
trate Soviet defenses.
But Um plOicity Of lieetirate
The development of new nu-
clear warheads . and major
.nges in. United States
technology are being ac-
celerated partly as a result of
the Soviet deployment of anti-
ballistic missile Installation.
.s.me officers who have
studied intelligence data about
the Russians' installations fear
that their defensive system may
be based on what one described
as the "za.pp" effect?such as
the ray gun in the comic strips
of high altitude nuclear ex-
plosions.
fle tremendous burst of
energy remilltifix from multi-
ton explosions in the information 'about effects of
rya, num of space could neu- high-altitude atomic explosions
.ir ? 1...? or destroy incoming war- and. the atmospheric nuclear
hertr.,. test ban that 'outlaws. such dc-
H. is for this reason that velopmental tests mean, in the
inpwly deigned missile war- words Of One: expert, that
head, wite improved electrical "there is just no way to know
leircuits hotter materials and if the solutions are valid."
l smile sw.elding ;against the neu-
.riertromagnetic and tiler-
Imai effects of a nuclear blast,
;are neing produ?Td.
The beginnings of an even
fractionally effective Soviet .an-
Continued on Paige 76, Column 1.
Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP70600338R000300090086-2
THE Nie,"..0?.K
Doployment of Soviet Antimissile Di=lL-c
Lieliolve
Continued From Page 1, col.
-,timissile system and the con-'
.eurrent development by the
United t,t,,ates and the Soviet
`? Union of what is known as
M. I. if. V.--multiple
godicci re-entry vehicles-1
reprei-ent, the experts say, such!
a. major lechnological advances
that reactions to them, by both
! powers, are inevitable.
These anti other new develop-
ment:, in ,oissile technology are,1
military officers believe, a "de-1
factor that will
force sw,-,4-ping strategic, po-
litti ad economic conse-
?
lueIa
Mar:, af these officers believe
that thyre is little likelihood
the Itus.aans will agree to halt
the e,cployment tit their anti-
, hal:;s cc missile system, much
less ta dismantle those installa-
l.lons already completed.
More Talks Likely
I They think it likely that Mos-
cow will prove quite agreeable
I co continued discussion of
Washington's; proposal that both
'powers refrain from deploying
' a ballistic missile defense sys-
? ..ern. But they do not expect
the Ru-sians to halt the de-
; velopmmii and deployment of
(hear s stem.
r .
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The New York Times
SOVIET NIISSILE DEFENSE: Dotted lines mark reported
The-, thus some worry locations of antimissile installations in Soviet Union.
that ,ir Aracted discussions
Feb. 5, 1567
I might :1 ,lay the start of a
; United 6tates defensive sys-
tem.
In any ease, they hold that
I recerrt technological develop-
ment-, in rocketry and elec-
: tronit5t have marked the end of
: an era and that to preserve
. strati: stability and to main-
tam tile uneasy balance of ter-
ror, or the capability of each
' power to devastate the other no
matter what the other does
first major developments are
. ,rthic.
Yt. Department of Defense
r.:-.).:cpt, that has tended to re-
st:- in technological innovation
in at i.c.: , ;_tic nuclear systems
dii.arin, tile last few years, the
-act that "if we don't build
,i., they won't," has been proved
invalid, officers think, by the
iet, missile defensive system
. and by reports of their work on
..Z multiple missile warheads, each
with individual guidance.
In other words, the experts
1 say, a whole new era of missile
technology is openiag, whether
we like it or not.
This military point of view
l..s been resisted so far by See-
re,...-...y ef Defense Robert S. Mc-
le .seis v,tho has approved
eeec , mini-tr.-tent of United
.:. tics et fc,.,sive capabilities but
liulds that a filissile defense
system is net worth the cost.
;I. He has said that the United
II States relnins, now and for the
sesc.1?? foreseeable future, the cape-
.
"'Unity te inflict "assured de-
struction" on the Soviet Union,
regardless of what the Soviet
Union does first.
United States apparently has a
considerable lead in strategic
weapons, but there is much un-
certainty about the capabilities
of the Soviet AICBM (anti-in-
tercontinental ballistic missile)
system. There is also an increas-
ing sense of urgency about the
need for more intensive tech-
nological development and the
production of new weapons.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
have unanimously recommended
the start of a missile defense
system partly on the basis, as
one of them said, that their re-
sponsibilities required them to
provide as much security as pos-
sible for the people and terri-
tory of the United States.
The debate in Congress, how-
ever, will be complicated, not
only by differing evaluations of
the Soviet defensive system but
also by many intangibles and
unknowns, particularly by our
lack of knowledge of the exact
effects of nuclear explosions in
thin atmosphere and in the
vacuum of space.
The intelligence community
ftself is divided about the ex-
tent, the nature and the poten-
tial effectiveness of the Soviet
missile defense system. There is
general agreement that the de-
ployment of an antiballistic mis-
sile system has started, but
there the agreement ends.
Most experts, though not all,
believe there is a clear-cut dif-
ference between new installa-
tions that have been seen and
photographed by reconnaissance
satellites around Moscow and
extensive installations in other
parts .of the Soviet Union.
The Moscow installations, it is
usually agreed, comprise part
issilc,s-
'Already in Hand'
??We have the technology al-
ev in band to counter any
fensive or defensive force
.inges the Soviet Union might
undertake in the foreseeable
future," he has said.
Many military officers par-
ticularly concerned about. the
vulnerablity of our warheads{
to nuclear el' s.?t; are not at all'
certain that ism is so.
. .
tem. Some of the launching
sites and radars are believed to
be operational or ready for fir-
ing now, but more sites are be-
ing built and the entire Moscow
system probably will not be
fully ready for six to 18 months.
The sharp differences of opin-
ion in the intelligence corn-
w iththe
United Stites is thought to be
mein' a coincidence.
There is considerable specula-
tion about the installations east
in Or Usls. Some think the
ri ft ui It Communist China may?
ha\c is 1 ivated their deploy-
mese: ,t'?ers, think these sites
ini7lit lie intended to guard
against a United States land-
bii,ed missile fired the wrong
way, or Southern'
Heinl.,ipliece and Southern
polar n.gion,s toward Soviet tar
gets rather than by the shortest
route Sc riis?.; the Nardi Atlantic.
that ncw installs bens of the
Tallinn system are still being
atilt, but there is no agree-,
merit as to what they are for.
So far. the Soviet missile di'-
ten--c- ',:ystent appears to he!
b!etril. unli1(,-. the United States:
7.\;ily-X. on a single long-range:
1115 'SIc. The United States sys-'
tam, stlil under development.:
compi'ises two missiles---a long-
range three-stage rocket namedI
the :l-lpartitn I foimerly called
the Zeit designed i interceptl
incomire4 missiles mil:side the
atmosphere and a second high-
speed miseile, the Sprint, in-
tended as a last-ditch defense
in the atmosphere.
The Soviet system i; believed
to be based on a long-range
modification of e. ineee mis-
sile, possibly the Cs nab or thei
Griffon, which have oeen shown!
ia Moscow r;irtidcs, ned to
:ntereept cutside the atmos-
phere.
Alarm Signals Sounded
The physical facts of all these
in:a:illations, which cannot be
hidden from the camera, are
among the reasons for the.
alarm signals in military cir-
cles.
Of even more concern to some
experts is our knowledge gap.
The details of exactly what
happens and the extent and
duration of the effects of a
multimegaton nuclear explo-
sion in the vacuum of space are
unknown.
The possibility of an electro-
magnetic, radioactive or ther-
mal defense again et ballistic
missiles has been theoretically
discussed and debated in the
Pentagon, ever since the global
effects of hisrh-altitude. out-of-
atmOsphere nuclear explosions
were first charted in the United
States Argus tests in the South
Atlantic in 1958.
Other United States tests in
the Pacific, notably the detona-
tion by the Soviet Union of a
huge 58-megaton nuclear de-
vice above Novaya Zemlya in
the Arctic in 1961 before the
atmospheric mielear test ban,
stimulated additional discus-
!mon and extrapolation.
The United States, as a result
of the development of huge war
iheads by the Soviet Union, re-
vised the electrical wiring cir-
? cuite to its missile silos to pro-
tect the wiring from being de-
: stroyed, burned .out or fused by
the electromagnetic and ther-
mal effects of a huge explosion
while the missiles were in their
launching tubes or in the first
stage of flight. Other modifica-
tions have been made to shield
the missiles, their computers
and guidance systems and the
warheads.
Nevertheless, the test that
have been made at h al-
titude of large-scale nucker ex-
plosions have demonstrat ed the
"sd(Y 5, 1967.
-mirs U.S. to Design Better Atomic Warheads
a of a kind of met-
al- iittre defense against
ete ie missiles. ?
In 0 soviet test in 1961,
ane el, le ,erb destroyed two
ee ,see, ,eisiles, A United
t es . in the Pacific of a
ete !en warhead neut ralized
ri )haltteleil hi a
11. miles above the
Ca I AO miles from the
expla,a
'Ph0 etiction or neutralize-
'cc of . ile warheads might
aeu,,eeiliehed by the tre-
e), eeei is pulse ef thermal
ey or heat di.,:serninated by
tla, explosion. It might also
be accomplished tiy one of
out ;, ng of neutrons in-
toils forms energy, such as
the new ? lux, or instantane-
cid( itt ay nuclear &tona-
l. '01 f 11 ? them
iie electromagnetic
? r ? ?' could have effects
,ant liehtning bolt.
in 1.11( -turn of space these
:ti1:131(stf: ocoming missile by
a defen . missile might not
bie ece. '. extend to great
ince as precise intercep-
ils nt.c believed to
have de ,ed an operational,
CI' Fes eeuse SO-megaton
warheac eh a booster rocket
of ereai , eer, cape isle of put-
cg the nead abeve the at-
67: P,Ilsel,Y ' fa
el Itiro(sl some
wle Ox-
-priartoft Sot clasSic defense sys-
,-..e 1 upon what is called
meepheric" rocket, or
ea, :se missile designed to
:Mei( ept incoming, missiles
shove the at mosphere.
A nue], r bur. -.t in this
e pace w aid extend
the? "kill' ,ne and crease the
"kill"ri, It would also have
the poteetiality of killing two
or more warheads with one
burst. It might even counter the
multiple individually guided
wai . envisaged for the
new Poseidon missile
en, . ? sr new United States
telligence Agency ranged ..n
one side with some minority
military support and the
Defense Intelligence AgencS,
ranged on the other with ma-
jority military support, concern
the tar more widespread instal-
lations in other parts of the
Soviet Union, known as the
Tallinn system (from the name:
of the Soviet city).
Launching sites and radars
of this system extend in a wide
arc across the northwestern
part of the Soviet Union, cover-
ing the missile window, or
angle of arc, through which
United States missiles, launched
from land bases, would have to
approach their targets.
But in addition to these ex-
tensive deployments, installa-
tions identified as being of the
Tallinn type have been dis-
covered east of the Ural Moun-
tains.
ThArn aro Alga ri,nnrfe. nf
installations in the southern
part of the Soviet Union in
position to defend against at-
tacks from the mediterranean
area.
System Called Crude
The Central Intelligence
Agency regards the Tallinn
system as a new type of ground-
to-air missile system, a develop-
ment of the SAM-2 and SAM-3
missiles for use against air-
craft or winged missiles that
fly in the atmosphere, not as an
antiballistic missile system.
Most of the intelligence com-
munity in the Pentagon believe
the Tallinn system represents
at least the initial deployment
of what they think is an anti-
ballistic missile system of a new
type.
There are supporting facts
and conjectures on both sides.
The Tallinn radar is regarded
by some experts as too crude
for use against ballistic mis-
siles. However, the fact that
the initial deployment of the
Tallinn system covered the most
important missile approaches to
the Soviet heartland from the
I. e. at this high point of the
evissee trajectory, the multiple *
warhyads of an inconeng rocket
would normally be meeparated, et
or ee in fairly close pr ,ximity?
they spread out materially when
they come into the atmosphere
..hat one burst might
destroy ti, al all.
mats ianeous Effects
As far as known, the effects1;
nil i'uch nuclear explosions in a -lc
vacuum are virtually instane 1 l
,
The exp. its point out that
"It works like zapp," one manl*
Id. "This is important be-
use you don't just put one iipAc
relax. You have to put upit
e often enough to catch,
rything in the range en-:k
lope at the time. This meanset
awful lot of stuff to blow';
ck in your face."
Experts agree that in the
alum of space, the radioac-!*
e and the thermal effects of a I*
emendous nuclear detonationi:
ie,ht extend for miles andee
a might blanket or shield Ft
)17-letabeead.etonation was at al:
-el enough altitude, the shock *
yes of the explosion would
?re minimal effect upon thee!
ed aabnodvethtehe raadtmi oaocsitlihveitreelz-le
life probably be carried to:
countries and gradually 1:
laminated around the world14,
with little fallout near the ex-,
plosion, as occurred in some of
the Soviet tests of their giant
nuclear weapons.
A major disadvantage to the,
defending country of such de-I
tonations is that. their radars
atinodn silsciyvslIP8
thems twt I e " d I) el" Ii tulv
blacked
out temporarily by the electro-
magnetic flux. The blackout
phenomenon might, however,
have global effects, which would
also affect the electronics sys-
tems of the attacking power.
The possibilities of such a de-
fense even though net fully
understood In detail, have al-
ready forced changes in design
in United States missile war-
heads, including protection of
the firing device that detonates
the warhead, and are fostering
intensive studies of new elec-
trical circuitry, new materials
and various methods of shield-
.
'Growing Concern'
Technology Week, a well-
informed technical magazine
that specializes in reporting de-
fense developments, said in its
Jan. 2 issue that "growing con-
cern over the vulnerability of
United States missiles to X-rays
from nuclear warheads of an-
timissile missiles is leading to
new specifications for ICBM
guidance -vstems
The article, by Rex Pay,
stated that "pulsed X-rays can
reproduce violent reinnions
within materials" and that
various types of reflective
coatings or shielding so far in
use would fail to halt the X-
rays disseminated by nuclear
explosions.
The attempts to protect the
warheads produce other prob-
lems, which, in turn, require
compensation. Shielding, or
specially protected circuits,
mean more weight and hence
less payload in the form of
atomic explosives; thus, more
warheads and more missiles'
would be required to achieve:
the cline expect ed results
against the same targets.
This upsetting factor in the
miseile riot:item is complicated
eiii) exit gecie ted he, ether do-
velopments in missile tech- ?
nology. 1
The Soviet Union, for instance,
has greatly increased her num-1
tier of effensive long-range mis-1
silee and is still emplacing therte
in hardened, or underground,
sites. Red China is fast develop-
ing a nuclear-tipped missile,
capability. The Soviet Union is:
reported to he busily engaged
as the United States is, in try-
ing to develop the difficult
science of multiple individually
guided re-entry vehicles.
Aga in:-.t fixed targets, unpro-
tected by an out-of-atmosphere
de', ir .v.' system, numer-
ous individually guided war-
heads, separating from one
booster before or just after re-
entry into the atmosphere and
progrunmet
I to follow different
terminal trajectories to one or
more targets, have more mathe-
nutter:al chance of penetrating
the eneniy's defenses and de-
stroying a single target or of
hitting multiple targets than
one warhead would.
Problems Multiplied
In fact, M. I. R. V. compli-
cate; and multiples the prob-
lems of the defense so greatly
that some military experts be-
lieve the threat must be met by
an increase in United States
land-based intercontinental bal-
listic missile launching sites or
by a missile defense system de-
signed specifically for the pro-
tection of American missile
silLo suggested are the de-
velopment of mobile surface
missiles, an increase in sea-
rifle-launched missiles, or a com-
bination of all these measure ?
Some observers believe that
the development by the Savi,-is
of a multiple individually
guided re-entry vehicle capa-
bility would make the current
United Steten lend.basee Lee,.
silt. ceropicx obsolete. Others,
argue that the guided re-entry
vehicle as well as the Soviet
AICBM system puts a much
higher priority on the develep-
ment of a new long-ranee
bomber and an across-the-board
program for new strategic de-
livery systems.
Thus, both the development
-of a ballistic missile defeese
'system and of the guided re-
-entry vehicle system are re-
girded, with some apprehension
in the Pentagon and elsewhere
in Washington, as basically
"destabilizing," in that either
or both would start a game of
technological musical chairs.
A high-altitude defense
against missiles following a nor-
inlet ballistic trajectory might
have to be met by equipping
the warheads with shielding or
other aids to help them pene-
trate enemy defenses, thus re-
ducing warhead payloads and
requiring more missiles. It
might also be met by ut g
bigger booster rockets or by ie-
veloping maneuverable missiics
or low-altitude bombers. Tao
guided re-entry vehicle systein
would also force some increase
in enemy missiles or the de-
velopment of new means of de-
livheercyhi
What
a l.
s inevitable technological
at to do about these trends,
w
are regarded by military
m
change, how much to do, and
how to do it are likely to he
major preoccupations of the
Pentagon high command for the
next five years. The decisions,
nearly all agree, will have major
military, economic and political
based and particularly subma- consequences.
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