THE ICBM THREAT FROM CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000300100024-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: August 7, 1967
• Content Type: OPEN

Approved For Release 2006/08/01: CIA-RDP70B00338R000300100024-8
A 3978 CONGR `,; : ,3NAL RECORD - APPENDIX August 7, 1967
ser In terms of money (nearly one million
dollars a month) but the fact that husbands
and children failed to come home from the
battle was costing him popularity at home.
In addition, the humiliation of being un-
able to defeat a backward army was too
much for the Egyptian dictator to endure.
He therefore decided to use a weapon long
outlawed by all the nations of the world,
poison gas! Soon Egyptian planes began
regular bombing runs against Yemeni vil-
lages. In January of this year, a raid on the
town of Ktaf in Northern Yemen, killed 170
people. In the first week of January alone,
the Royalists clamed that gas took the lives
of 493 Yemenis,
On February 15, another poison gas at-
tack was launched, this time against the
village of Beni Salamah In Southern Yemen.
The continued reports were so obviously
true that it led to debate in the British
Parliament where Prime Minister Wilson
declared that he had evidence "strongly sug-
gesting that poison gas had been used" in
Yemen.
On January 31 of this year, the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross took the
unusual step of announcing its "concern
over the alleged use of, poisonous gas", It
took the step despite lack of sufficient evi-
dence because It was so completely convinced
that the attacks had indeed occurred.
During this entire period the Cairo au-
thorities vehemently denied that gas had
been used by their troops. Despite this, the
reports continued and grew in intensity.
With the failure of any governmental agency
to take action, private individuals made it
their business to ascertain the truth or
falsity of the gas stories. A number of in-
dividuals visited the area and confirmed In
their minds that poison gas was indeed be-
ing used, They immediately sent private
petitions to the United Nations Committee
on Colonialism. Nothing more was heard of
these petitions.
On March 7, the United States and Great
Britain issued a blistering attack on the
Committee. Lord Caradon, the permanent
British delegate declared that a subcommit-
tee that screened petitions to the 24-nation
committee on colonialism had censored the
private petitions and refused to circulate
them to the committee because they were
critical of the United Arab Republic.
In an indignant statement, Richard John-
son, the United States representative de-
clared that there apparently existed a double
standard on the committee that permitted
circulation of petitions critical of Western
nations but not of Asian-Africans.
Despite this, no action was taken as the
Communist-Asian-African bloc consisting of
the Soviet Union, Syria, Iraq, India, Yugo-
slavia and Tanzania supported the sub-
committee's actions. The United Nations
failure to hear the charges was so blatant
that even the Saudian Arabian delegate,
Jamil M. Baroody, attacked Secretary Gen-
eral U Thant for refusing to do anything
about these charges or about the entire
Egyptian aggression in Yemen where over
100,000 persons had lost their lives.
But while the United Nations refused to
act, another international agency was quietly
going about getting clear and irrefutable
evidence.
The International Red Cross now sent a
team of doctors to the town of Gahar In
North Yemen following an appeal from the
inhabitants who claimed to have been gassed
on the morning of May 10, 1967. Their in-
vestigation was methodical and painstaking
and a secret report was issued. The Jewish
Press is in possession of this report.
The substance of the report follows:
The following statements were made by
the inhabitants who witnessed the incident:
1. Seventy-five persons died of poison gas
shorty after the raid.
They showed the following symptons:
shortness of breath, coughing, pink foam at
the mouth, general edema, especially the
face; no physical injuries.
2. The undersigned doctors examined the
four surviving victims and observed the
following:
Subjective symptoms: burning eyes and
trachea, internal thorax pain, extreme fa-
tigue, anorexia.
Objective symptoms: dry cough, negative
ausculation in two patients, sign of bron-
chitis in the other two, conjunctivitis, facial
edema, no traumatic lesions, tympanum
intact.
3. The undersigned doctors examined a
'corpse four clays after death and 12 hours
after burial.
Immediately, the common grave was
opened, and well before the corpses were
visible, there was a sweet penetrating smell
The bodies showed no traumatic lesions,
The skin was pink, Advanced and general
edema all over the body.
Examination of lungs: reddish-brown
throughout, enlargement, consistence and
fragility greatly increased, crepitation con-
siderably reduced.
The undersigned doctors draw the follow-
ing logical conclusions from their findings:
. , . The cause of death in the case of the
corpse examined was pulmonary edema. The
over-all consistency of the ICRC (Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross) medical
mission's findings shows that in all probabil-
ity this pulmonary edema was caused by
inhalation of toxic gas.
(Signed) RAYMOND JANIN,
ICRC Doctor-Delegate.
WILLY BRUTSCHIN,
Doctor-Delegate.
Signed at town Najran, May 18, 1967.
TFre I ISM Threat From China
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. GLENARD P. LIPSCOMMB
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, August 7, 1967
Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Speaker, there is
serious concern about Red China's grow-
ing nuclear weapons capability.
As a member of the House Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee I have felt
compelled to speak out about this prob-
lem, such as in my statement to the
House of Representatives June 13, 1967,
on the fiscal year 1968 Defense appro-
priation bill, to emphasize that we must
have action now to begin deployment of
an anti-ballistic-missile-ABM-system,
Funding to begin deployment of the
ABM system was provided in last year's
Defense appropriation bill, and addi-
tional funds for this purpose are pro-
vided in the Defense appropriation bill
currently pending in Congress. Secre-
tary of Defense McNamara has, however,
delayed ABM deployment.
The urgency of the situation has once
again been underscored in the report just
released by the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy. The Joint Committee
found that Communist China may have
a capability of attacking the United
States with nuclear missiles within sev-
eral years, possibly as early as 1970-71.
The Los Angeles Times, in a sobering
assessment of the Red Chinese ICBM
threat, calls for an immediate start on
construction of an anti-ballistic-missile
defense to counteract that threat. In
reaching this conclusion the Times
states that Secretary of Defense McNa-
mara's reasons for delay in construction
of antimissile system are overshadowed
by the rapid Chinese nuclear buildup.
Under leave to extend my remarks, I
submit this timely editorial for inclusion
in the RECORD, because I know the sub-
ject is of great importance to the Con-
gress and the entire Nation.
THE ICBM THREAT FROM CHINA
Based on information obtained from van?-
ous intelligence agencies of the U.S. govern-
ment, the Joint Congressional Atomic En-
ergy Committee now reports that Commu-
nist China may have the capability to fire
nuclear missiles at the United States within
three or four years' time.
Although the committee feels any Chinese
attack in the early 1970s would be of "a low
order of magnitude"-i.e., perhaps only two
or three nuclear missiles-there is still sub-
stantial cause for concern. As of now this
country does not possess an effective anti-
missile defense system. Even though a Chi-
nese attack would be "suicidal" in terms of
the destruction a U.S. nuclear response
would involve, the committee wisely does
not rule out the possibility of such an illogi-
cal move by Peking.
The committee report differs, if only se-
mantically, from the publicly expressed
views of Defense Secretary McNamara, who
believes that the Chinese will not have a
"significant" missile capability until the
mid-1970s.
The key word is, of course, significant, by
which McNamara presumably means an
ICBM force of 50 or 60 missiles. This belief
does not rule out the possession by China,
perhaps by the end of this decade, of an
embryonic missile force capable of striking
the United States.
There is one view, also expressed by Mc-
Namara, that the reliability of Chinese mis-
siles In the 1970s would not be great, thereby
reducing or even eliminating their military
value. There are also some China specialists
who argue that Peking wants a nuclear
arsenal only for defensive or deterrent pur-
poses, and for the great power status nuclear
weapons carry.
No one can say for sure that these opin-
ions are incorrect. But what must also be
kept in mind is that U.S. officials have con-
sistently erred in estimating the nuclear
potential of China-as earlier they did with
the Soviet Union. And, while China may be
essentially defense-minded, there have been
enough examples in Peking of what are, to
the Western mind, irrational behavior pat-
terns to preclude any positive judgments
about what the Chinese may or may not do.
Given these considerations, it is Impera-
tive that the United States prepare for the
worst. This means an immediate start on the
construction of an antimissile system cap-
able of counteracting a foreseeable Chinese
ICBM threat.
Preparatory work on such a system has
already been done, and.reportedly there are
funds in the defense budget directly tied to
production of a system. But McNamara has
hesitated before, despite congressional pres-
sure, to go ahead with even a limited anti-
missile defense.
There are many reasons for the defense
secretary's caution, including economic and
domestic political problems; for example,
what areas such a system would cover. Also,
the Administration is seeking agreement
with the Soviets to limit deployment of what
would be an extremely costly full-scale mis-
sile defense force.
These considerations, however, are over-
shadowed by the possible danger of a rapid
Chinese nuclear buildup. American security
requires a rapid start on deployment of a
missile defense system adequate to meet the
Approved For Release 2006/08/01 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300100024-8