JOSEPH ALSOP NEW SOVIET ORBITAL WEAPON COULD BE U.S. CITY-DESTROYER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000300110033-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 9, 2006
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: November 8, 1967
• Content Type: NSPR

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Appro~vecVFor Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300110033-7
Joseph Alsop
New Soviet Orbital Weapon
Could Be U.S. City-Destroyer
THERE WAS a lot of food strategic airfields (presum-
for thought in Secretary of ing the airplanes are not air-
Defense McNamara's cool borne already) or other soft
announcement that the So- targets like cities. The possi-
viets were building some- bility that it is really an
thing exquisitely entitled, in anti-city weapon was not
the best Pentagonese, a
"Fractional Orbiting Bom-
bardment System," alias
FOBS.
pointed out by the Defense
Secretary, but it exists,
quite clearly. Even so, why
did the Soviets go to the
To begin with, the re- extra bother and expense
sponse,to the announcement when they already have
quite astonishingly demon- very good ICBMs?, ` strafed the extraordinary Here, the answer is cu
double standard (or one riots indeed.. The Soviets.ev-
might say, the highly devel- idently expected the United
oped practice of double- States to install a full anti-
think) that prevails in this ballistic missile system, in-
country today. Here were stead of the much attacked
the Soviets, after all, going "thin" system that is being
at least halfway towards installed (which will give no
breaking their promise to defense against Soviet, mis-
put no bombs in outer siles, but will offer protec-
space. tion from Chinese lunacy).
But was there the kind of The proof of this Soviet
chorus of , outrage about expectation is simple. The
estimating the strength of
their defense against the de-
terrent.
In the McNamara Penta
gon, to be sure, forecasts of
Soviet weapons development
have been remarkably, accu?
rate, on balance; and in the
McNamara Pentagon, above
all, U.S. planning is bases
on the ever-present possibili
ty that the Soviets will ex
ceed the forecasts.
Yet this strange FOBS un?
derlines, once again, a really
crucial fact. The Soviets do
not do their defense plan-
ning, measure weapons like
their ABM, or use the kind
of defense analysis that Mc-
Namara does. So. a poten-
tial Soviet miscalculat~'P'
must always be ,Zu d
against. .
wicked people stepping up only advantages of FOBS
the arms race, that greeted derive from the low orbit.
the announcement of Amer- This makes FOBS immune
ica's "thin" deployment of to detection of take-off by
anti-ballistic missiles? Why the existing - Soviet- and
of,, course not! And was American, long-range radar
the miracle of detective-in- systems, and it also makes
telligence behind the Mc- FOBS immune to . intercep-
Namara a n n o u n c e m e n t tion` by ABMs of the Soviet
greeted with a chorus of type.
praise, to balance the con- It is not immune to inter-
stant attacks on our intelli- ception by the "Sprint'; el.e-
gence services? Why of anent of the American ABM,
course not! but this would only happen
Those who ask such silly very close to home. More
questions probably ought to important, FOBS will not be
go stand in a corner, 'in fact. immune to detection at
Meanwhile the real story of take-off, or very soon after
FOBS, which hardly came take-off, by the new.Ameri-
through in McNamara's can "over-the-horizon" radar
characteristic Rand-style system.
presentation, is also !in- THIS NEW SYSTEM. is al-
menely interesting and in- ready being installed to sup-
The the existing
an-ICBM thing made itself into a low simply BMEWS radars. In, a few.
.
orbit satellite, which is built . months, when installation of
to hurl aw ahead at a cho- . the "over-the-horizon" ra-
sen target from a pre-set dars will be completed,
point on the orbit round the FOBS will therefore lose its
n
th
h
e s
ort-
tage-
globe. The first question 'main adva
co, (erning it is whether, the ' ness of warning o,fattack.
di
OB
s-
S is not a
i t really wiIl be "fraction- Hence F
tout bombs-"ii full orbit in' the sense that it strongly
has not'bee'ilruly violated, underlines the Soviet deter
even 1! tti"e ?spirlt of that mination to go forward with
agreeni ` t has-''been a bit the arms race., The United'
bruised. States is denounced for
0~.., being determined not to lose
-R is that the that race, but if there is
intelligence is complete one, losing is always the
enough, so that the word greatest danger. And this
"fr#ctional represents no leads, in turn, to the final
mere hopeful assumption. question raised by FOBS,
That being the hard evi which concerns the peculiar
de}tce, however, why on micrometry - of doom prac-
earth.have the Soviets both- ticed in the McNamara Pen-
ered to develop this much tagon to measure adequacy
more expensive and. less ef-..of detereece,
ficlent kind of satellite- The point is that a deter-
ICbM? For FOBS - carries, rent is never as good as you
lest warhead and 'has a'much `think it is. A deterrent, in
bigger mar'
gn of,targpf er- truth, 'is only as-good as the
ror'than"a normal ICBM. other side thinks it is. And
As such, FOBS cannot be no 'deterrent will deter if
relied' on to attack l~ r ened the other side i c 1
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will only be useful to attack deterrent itself, or by over-