ABM: THE DYNAMICS OF A NATIONAL DECISION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000300110052-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 9, 2006
• Sequence Number: 52
• Publication Date: December 5, 1967
• Content Type: OPEN

December 5, 1 Ati proved Fce~e 3f 1i3Wt I P gAQMPR000300110052-6 S17895----
THE GOLD STANDARD
Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, when-
ever the subject of the gold standard
is raised as a topic of conversation, in-
variably a great deal of misinformation
is presented. The Washington Post on
Sunday, December 3, 1967, published an
article entitled, "It's Just a Lot of Bul-
lion," by Mr. Harvey H. Segal, that
clearly sets forth the facts concerning
the value of gol -and the role played by
the Internatio 1 Monetary Fund.
In light of the current discussions
about our alance-of-payments deficit
and the re nt devaluation of the pound
sterling, I believe that Senators will find
the articl most interesting and`inforrha-
I ask 1 nanimous consent that it be
printed in the RECORD.
There b king no objection, the article
was ordered, to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
IT'S JUST _A LOT OF BULLION
(By Harvgy H. Segal)
The gold rush-fraxitig buying of gold in
the expectation that its price would rise as
the devaluation of the dolla- followed that
of the pound-has all but subsided on mar-
kets all over the world. But the fundamental
problems of gold and its relationship to`tbe
dollar are unresolved, and they will surface-
again in the foreseeable future, undermin-
ing confidence and subjecting the interna-
tional monetary system to new shocks.
Modern history records a progressive weak-
ening of the link between gold and money, a
part of the general shift from commodities-
gold, silver and copper-to more sophisticated
forms of representative money such as bank
notes and checking account deposits.
Before 1914 there was a close and obvious
link, virtually an identity, between gold and
money. Gold coins formed an important part
of the national money supplies. Bank notes in
advanced countries were freely convertible to
gold and their issues tended to be limited by
the gold reserves held in national treasuries
and central banks.
GOLD EXPANDS
Inflows of -goldresulting from export sur-
pluses or investment by foreigners permitted
an expansion of the money supply with sub-
sequent rises in the levels of employment and
prices. Gold losses tended to depress em-
ployment and price levels.
Under that classical gold standard, which
France's President de Gaulle wants to revive,
gold was the principal monetary reserve, the
medium for settling debts among nations.
And the banks-both central banks and
private banks-maintained fixed exchange
rates by converting national currencies into
gold and gold into national curencies.
Because of inflation and other disturbances
that followed in the wake of World War 1,
most countries in the 1920s began to supple-
ment their gold reserves with holdings of
widely acceptable foreign currencies, prin-
cipally sterling. The practice of holding for-
eign exchange as reserves gave rise to the
"gold exchange standard." Under it the link
between the growth of domestic money sup-
plies and gold reserves was greatly loosened.
But general convertibility between gold and
national currencies was the rule.
The Great Depression sounded the death
knell of gold convertibility, at least so far
as ordinary citizens were concerned. After
1930, there was a headlong abandonment of
domestic convertibility as countries sought to
avert the sharp monetary contractions and
price deflations that would have followed
from maintaining the old parities between
gold and and domestic currencies. In some
instances, notably in this country, there was
severe deflation in spite of the devaluation,
that is, the reduction of the gold content of
the currency unit and the correlative in-
crease in the price of gold.
During the 1930s, domestic gold stocks were
recommended by many national governments
and used for official transactions, especially
to intervene in the foreign,,exahange markets
through exchange stabilization'7uis. The
object of those operations was to peg'\or fix
exchange rates and by so doing to prevent
a country from gaining a competitive edge in
international trade by virtue of a fall in the
exchange value of its currency.
United States citizens were compelled to
surrender all gold coin and bullion in 1933,
and under the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, the
dollar was officially devaluated. Its gold con-
tent was reduced from 25.8 grains of gold (.9
fine) to a little less than 15.3 grains. That
action raised the official price-the price at
which the Treasury is willing to buy and sell
gold-from $20.67 to $35 per troy ounce,
where it has remained ever since.
A new stage in the evolution of gold began
with the operation of the International Mon-
etary Fund in 1946, a year when the econo-
mies of Europe were prostrate as a result of
World War II. The architects of the IMF
sought to avert the beggar-my-neighbor pol-
icies-the restrictions on imports and the
competitive devaluations that drastically re-
duced the volume of international trade in
the 1930s. The rules which they laid down
and the dominant position of the United
States economy in a war-torn world led to
the establishment of a dollar-gold exchange
`standard.
Under the IMF Agreement, member coun-
tries, 4ich ultimately included all those
outside th Communist bloc except Switzer-
land, were gitwo options.
They could ui*l rtake, through official in-
tervention in the eign exchange markets,
to maintain the par v tue of the currency, as
expressed in terms of dol'1 s, within margins
of plus and minus 1 per ce) . Or they could
undertake to buy and sell g kd freely, con-
ducting the transactions within.,, margins of
plus and minus 1 per cent of tl'e gold par
Value of their currencies. In the case of the
United States, that would be betweerr,,$34.65
and $35.35 an ounce.
The only country which opted to buy and
sell gold freely was the United States, and
the reason is not hard to uncover. We then
held more than 70 per cent of the non-Com-
munist world's stock of monetary gold and
the dollar was virtually the only currency
that commanded the food and industrial
materials needed for economic reconstruc-
tion. As a result, the world was placed on a
dollar-gold standard. The dollar was pegged
to gold and all other currencies were pegged
to the dollar.
In the course of the postwar reconstruc-
tion, the United States acted as the world's
banker. Through the Marshall Plan, the pro-
grams to aid underdeveloped countries and
through private investment, nearly $200 bil-
lion went overseas in the shape of loans,
grants and equity purchases. The dollar be-
came the vehicle by which most of the world's
international trade was transacted and it
also became the most important reserve cur-
rency.
Of $71 billion in official monetary reserves-
gold, foreign exchange and IMF credit-re-
ported last June, dollars accounted for more
than $16.3 billion, or 23 per cent. Sterling,
the other reserve currency, comprised. less
than 9 percent.
PERSISTENT DEFICITS
Since 1948 the United States has incurred
persistent balance-of-payments deficits be-
cause it spends, lends, gives away and in-
vests more in foreign countries than it re-
ceives from them. Had the foreign recipients
of payments from the United States been
willing to hold dollars without limit, there
would be no gold convertibility problem.. But
that is hardly the case.
A few years ago the Johnson Administra-
tion, in one of those fits of delusion to which
public relations men are susceptible, coined
the slogan "The dollar is as good as gold!"
But foreign central bankers, whose institu-
tions ultimately receive surplus dollars from
private banks, don't believe it.
Partly through fear of devaluation, partly
through a desire to impose a balance-of-pay-
ments discipline on this country and partly
for purely political reasons, as in the case
of France, other governments have been
steadily buying Treasury gold with their
dollars.
In 1949, this country's gold stock reached
a peak of nearly $24.6 billion. Today, it is
down to less than $12.5 billion. And the out-
standing liabilities against that reserve, the
dollars in the hands of foreign central banks
and private businesses, amount to some $31
billion. Western European gold holdings
gained at the expense of the United States,
In 1958,-Western Europe held only $9.2 bil-
lion, or less than 24 per cent of the total,
but by mid-1967 its holdings had risen to
$19.1 billion, more than 47 per cent of the
non-Communist world total of $40.5 billion.
Can the dilemma of dollar-gold converti-
bility be solved without precipitating a great
panic? Yes, but it is necessary to separate
the spurious solutions from those which are
really viable.
If the supply of monetary gold could be
greatly expanded and somehow channeled to
Ft. Knox, our troubles would be over. But
that golden dream will never become a
reality. Because of the fixed price and the
squeeze on South African mining profits, gold
production is growing very slowly. Moreover,
private absorption, the large industrial de-
mand and the smaller demands of hoarders
has diminished the stock of monetary gold
since 1965.
DE GAULLE AND HISTORY
President de Gaulle would solve the prob-
lem by doubling the dollar price of gold and
reviving the pre-1914 gold standard by
eliminating foreign exchange-that is, dol-
lars-as an international monetary reserve.
Domestic money supplies and levels of
prices,, income and employment would be
determined by swings in the balance-of-
payments and movements of gold. Few
authorities, in France or elsewhere, are will-
ing to set the clock back in that fashion,
Is a solution offered by the plan for
creating "paper gold"-Special -Drawing
Rights-that was just adopted at the Rio de
Janeiro meeting of the IMF? The answer
is that the SDR scheme, while it would pro-
vide for the creation of reserves, affords no
specific. protection to the United States gold
stock. None of the countries which want to
exchange dollars for gold would be obliged
to accept SDRs.
Assuming that the balance-of-payments
deficits continue, the United States-after
freeing t e $10 billion of gold that is held as
a "covey' against Federal Reserve notes-
could let the goldstock run out. Indeed, some
economists suggest that we announce to the
world that once it is gone, we will never agree
to buy it back at $35 an ounce.
But taken alone, that might be an empty
threat so long as the U.S. balance of payments
deficits continue. Moreover, every dollar of
gold that the United States loses reduces
the world's monetary reserves by a dollar.
When the French or the Spanish convert,
they substitute gold for dollars in their re-
serves. But there is no substitution in the
case of the United States whose reserves are
held in gold.
But suppose that the gold-dollar link were
severed? Suppose the United States refused
to buy and sell gold freely and opted-as it
can under the IMF rules-only to support the
dollar in our foreign exchange markets?
Other countries would have to decide
whether to peg the dollar rates in their
foreign exchange markets or permit them to
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fluctuate, either freely or within limits. Then
the task of deciding what role gold is to play
in the international monetary system could
be assigned to the IMF, the only body capable
of p ovidin a meaningful solution.
ABM: THE DYNAMICS OF A
NATIONAL DECISION
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed in
the RECORD the text of my remarks at
New York University on November 6,
1967. I delivered these remarks as the
opening lecture of this year's Moskowitz
Lecture Series. I consider it both an
honor and a.pleasure to have been asked
to initiate the lecture series this year.
Dr. Charles J. Hitch, vice president of
the University of California, and Dr.
Arthur F. Burns, John Bates Clark, pro-
fessor of Economics at Columbia Uni-
versity and former Chairman of Presi-
dent Eisenhower's Council of Economic
Advisers, also participated in the
Moskowitz Lecture Series this year.
The Charles C. Moskowitz Lectures
were initiated at New York University in
1961. "The Defense Sector and the
American Economy" was chosen as the
overall theme of the lectures this year.
In view of the gratifying reception ac-
corded to my speech, entitled "ABM:
The Dynamics of a National Decision," I
thought it would be useful to make it
easily available to those of my colleagues
who have shown a special interest in the
ABM question, which continues to weigh
so heavily before our Nation.
There being no objection, the remarks
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
ABM: THE DYNAMICS OF A NATIONAL DECISION
(Remarks of Senator JACOB K. JAVITS, at New
York University, November 6, 1967)
On September 18, in a truly remarkable
speech, Defense Secretary McNamara an-
nounced the Administration's decision to
deploy a "thin" anti-ballistic missile de-
fense against a potential threat from com-
munist China. This decision was one of the
most complex, and portentous in its rami-
fications, of any that has been made in the
past decade. The decision has implications
which impinge, directly or indirectly, on
every important aspect of our national life.
A study of the dynamics of this decision is
very instructive,
First I wish to comment on what I con-
sider to be the inadequacy of the national
debate which preceded the ABM decision.
Ostensibly, one might attribute the inade-
quacies of the debate to the complexity of
the technical considerations involved in an
antiballistic missile system. There is no doubt
that most Americans are intimidated by the
language of science and technology.
However, As I followed, and later reviewed
the ABM debate, I was struck by the fact
that there was relatively little dispute over
purely technical questions. By contrast, how-
ever, there was very earnest dispute over a
wide spectrum of the most fundamental pol-
icy considerations which were involved in
the ABM decision.
While pressures were exerted from many
quarters during the ABM debate, it is clear
that the decision-making process was
throughout dominated by Secretary Mc-
Namara. Indeed, we owe him a debt of na-
tional gratitude for having forced a shift
in the focus of the ABM debate away from
essentially technical considerations and for
having forcefully brought to public atten-
tion the fundamental policy considerations
involved in the ABM decision.
There were pressures from many qu.arters
during the ADM debate. One might assume
that many of these pressures came from
what is called the "military-Industrial com-
plex." After all, there are, potentially at least,
tens of billions of dollars worth of contracts
involved in building an ABM system. How-
ever,. I have not discovered any discernible
efforts by the great defense contracting cor
porations to Influence the ABM debate or its
outcome. This is not always true of national
debates and decisions on defense questions,
as you all know.
Having made that statement, I wish to
modify it in one respect. It was President
Eisenhower, In his farewell address to the
nation, who brought to public attention the
dangers posed by the "military-industrial
complex". As President Eisenhower used the
term, he was talking about something much
more expansive and ramified than the narrow
world of defense-contractor lobbyists who
abound in Washington and who have come
to be thought of in the public mind as being
the "military-industrial complex". .
In the wider sense that President Eisen-
hower used the phrase-to include en-
trenched elements in the military estab-
lishment itself and in its vast dependent in-
tellectual establishment sustained by gov-
ernment contract-the "military-industrial
complex" was active in the ABM debate and
did seek manfully to determine its outcome.
There is nothing improper about this. In
fact, that is just the plain duty of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
I spoke earlier of the technical complexity
of an ABM system, and of how this tends to
inhibit participation in debate by those who
do not have a technical background. I think
that this is a very real danger.
In his farewell address President Eisen-
hower also warned of the "... danger that
public policy could itself become the captive
of a scientific-technological elite." Largely
because of Secretary McNamara's alertness
and zeal, this did not happen in the present
case of the ABM decision. The danger was
definitely present, however and will be pres-
ent again in future decisions on the ABM
system. I will give you a very graphic
example.
Dr. Harold M. Agnew, head of the Weapons
Division of the AEC's Los Alamos Scientific
Laboratory, made a speech to the Air Force
Association on March 16, in San Francisco.
Dr. Agnew's speech is an open attack on
Secretary McNamara's general conduct and
specifically of his views on the ABM question.
It is a pure example of the expression of the
view of the "scientific-technological elite"
which President Eisenhower warned us of,
and I commend to you a study of its full text.
For illustrative purposes, I will just quote one
sentence. After taking Secretary McNamara
to task for his entire strategic philosophy and
his opposition to a Soviet-oriented ABM
system, Dr. Agnew says:
"I believe the lack of true understanding
of science and technology of many of our
policy makers, and what I consider the sub-
stitution of wishful thinking, is very danger-
ous, and could become more and more
serious."
In my judgment, Dr. Agnew's knowledge of
science and technology is most useful and
essential to us. The problem is the tendency
of this elite to get out of their field, to think
they have equal expertise and authority on
broad matters of public policy. And most
troublesome is their recurring efforts to have
basic policy questions decided on the basis of
technological factors where they are expert
but which are inadequate criteria for judg-
ing basic questions of national goals and
values.
I would like to turn now to some of the
differences between Secretary McNamara and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff which emerged in
the course of the ABM debate. The Joint
Chiefs understood their role in this debate.
But a close study of the record shows that
some fundamental differences exist between
the Secretary of Defense and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff with regard to our relation-
ship to the Soviet Union. Secretary McNa-
mare believes that it is both possible and
essential to achieve an understanding with
the Soviets to stabilize the "balance of ter-
ror" which keeps the peace. He is passionately
concerned over avoiding a new round of the
arms race, and believes that accurate com-
munication of intention is a crucial factor.
I quote a brief passage of his San Francisco
speech as example:
They could not read our intentions with
any greater accuracy than we could read
theirs. And thus the result has been that we
have both built up our forces to a point
that far exceeds a credible second-strike
capability against the forces we each started
with."
The alternative which he poses to an un-
derstanding on strategic weapons Is "both
the Soviets and ourselves would be forced
to continue on a foolish and reckless course
The time has come for us both to realize
that, and to act reasonably. It is clearly in
our mutual Interest to do so."
The approach of the Joint Chiefs Is quite
different. Their view, as reflected in General
Wheeler's statement to Congress, is based
on the traditional concept of an adversary
relationship with the Soviet Union and con-
trasts sharply with the innovative thinking
of McNamara. An illustrative example is the
following quote from General Wheeler's
statement: - -
"We do not pretend to be able to predict
with certainty just how the Soviets will re-
act. We do know from experience the high
price they must pay to overcome a deployed
U.S. ABM system."
The record also shows that the civilian
Defense Secretary and the uniformed Joint
Chiefs have very different assessments of the
diplomatic leverage provided by nuclear
weapons. Secretary McNamara says:
"Unlike any other era in military history,
today a substantial numerical superiority
of weapons does not effectively translate into
political control, or diplomatic leverage."
General Wheeler has a quite different view:
at the time of Cuba, the strategic
nuclear balance was such that the' Soviets
did not have an exploitable capability, be-
cause of our vastly superior nuclear strength.
And to bring this forward Into the present
context, it's also the view of the Joint Chiefs
that regardless of anyone's views about the
situation in Vietnam, we think it quite clear
that we would have had even more hesitation
in deploying our forces there, had the stra-
tegic nuclear balance not been In our favor."
I think it would be instructive at this
point to juxtapose another set of quotes.
The question at issue involves judgments as
to the allocation of resources. While the ini-
tial cost of our "thin" ABM defense will be
around $4 billion, it is common knowledge
that further refinements could lead to ex-
penditures of at least $40 to $50 billion for a
"heavy" defense system. Secretary McNa-
mara's view is succinct:
"I know of nothiing we could do today
that would waste more of our resources or
add more to our risks."
By way of contrast, the Chairman of the
House Armed Services Committee expressed
the following view:
"We are an affluent nation ... we are now
right at $750 billion GNP; and responsible
people tell us it is headed for a trillion. So
we can afford it. Why not have the two or
them, and keep the Soviets off balance ...?"
The most shockingly neglected aspect of
the ABM debate has been what is ultimately
the basic issue-the allocation of national
resources. The magitude of potential costs
is very great-$50 billion, and a lot more if
a civilian fall-out shelter program were
added on. Expenditures of this order of mag-
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nitude could have profound warping effects that we have not heard the President's views
on the total pattern of our national life. It of the very fundamental subtsantive con-
is essential that public men, both in and out siderations involved in the ABM controversy.
of government,, join the continuing debate However, this line of inquiry does not lead
over the need and justification for an anti- us very far. Let us turn instead to the ra-
ballistic missile defense. Now is the time tionale which is now being expounded with
when we need the views and judgments of regard to Communist China as a reason why
our nation's best minds. Later, when we we need a $5 billion "thin" ABM defense.
might be irrevocably tied to the ABM roller In a major follow-up speech on October 6,
coaster, their post-mortem dissent will be Assistant Defense- Secretary Warnke ad-
of little value. dressed himself to this and other issues not
If there is any lesson we should have gone into by Secretary McNamara in his
learned from our Vietnam experience it is earlier San Francisco speech.
the danger of not taking a long look down Among other things, Mr. Warnke argues
the rand ahead before we commit ourselves
to something. In Vietnam, Initial small ex-
penditures and periodic increments that were
modest at first have now snowballed into a
$30 billion per year affair. We find ourselves
faced with a high cost in human life and
misery and inflationary threats, while our
urgent urban needs are not adequately met.
The lessons of Vietnam in this regard are
applicable to the ABM debate and I repeat
my earnest exhortation that this whole mat-
ter be given the closest scrutiny now by the
men whose views are respected in all areas of
national endeavor.
Decisions regarding national security are
perhaps the most difficult of all decisions.
We live in a very complicated and dangerous
world. An atmosphere of insecurity prevails
everywhere. But there is no such thing as
absolute security, and security certainly is
not solely or even primarily a question of
weapons systems. Maximum security is de-
rived from the optimum balance and quality
of national life. Secretary McNamara had
some pertinent things to say in this regard in
a speech he gave in Montreal in May of 1966:
"A nation can reach the point at which
it does not buy more security for itself sim-
ply by buying more military hardware-we
are at that point. The decisive factor for a
powerful nation-already adequately armed-
Is the character of its relationships with the
world."
At this point I cannot resist quoting the
opposing view of Dr. Agnew, the Los Alamos
Weapons Division chief :
"I would argue that there are few nations
whom we should worry about as far as world
opinion is concerned. These are only the na-
tions with whom we are engaged in com-
petition and who may have the military and
economic strength to materially affect what
we are doing."
I think the Important point Is that all of
us have a real competence and a real con-
tribution to make when the broad questions
of national security are involved. The weap-
ons cultists notwithstanding, the quality of
our schools, the physical and mental health
of our population, the social justice barom-
eters of our big cities-are all factors which
determine our national security.
While most of the ABM debate has been
concerned with our relations with the Soviet
Union, the ABM system finally decided on
is oriented against Communist China. In his
San Francisco speech McNamara said there
were "marginal grounds" for concluding that
the deployment of a China-oriented system
would be "prudent".
This Is neither a very enthusiastic nor a
very convincing line of argument and the
suspicion persists that the decision to, proceed
with a "thin" ABM deployment was attri-
butable in fact to other considerations than
Peking's nuclear capability and potential.
James Reston of the New York Times has
dubbed the ABM "the anti-Republican Mis-
that our anti-China ABM will reinforce Pres-
ident Johnson's 1963 pledge to protect non-
nuclear states against Chinese nuclear black-
mail and thus make it easier for Asian na-
tions to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Mr. Warnke's reasoning is ingenious but
dubious in its accuracy. For Instance, on
October 1 an Indian Foreign Ministry publi-
cation had the folowing to say:
"The Government of India's decision not to
sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
stands intact in spite of big power pressure
. The question of guarantees by the United
States and the Soviet Union either jointly
or Individually has been dismissed as un-
workable."
There are several passages in Mr. Warnke's
remarks concerning Communist China which
merit close attention because of their wider
implications for U.S. policy. Parenthetically,
it is most unfortunate that Secretary Rusk,
who has recently conjured up the frightening
image of "a billion Chinese on the Main-
land, armed with nuclear weapons", has not
given us his views of Mr. Warnke's assess-
ment which follows:
"We see no reason to conclude that the
Chinese are any less cautious than the rulers
of other nations that have nuclear weapons
Indeed the Chinese have shown a dispo-
sition to act cautiously, and to avoid any
military clash with the United States that
could lead to nuclear war.
Following on the heels of this most inter-
esting assessment Peking's policy-orientation,
Mr. Warnke goes on to state:
"In deploying this system, we seek to em-
phasize the present unique disparity in
strategic nuclear capability between the U.S.
and China and to extend well into the future
the credibility of our option for a nuclear
response.
He also affirms that our ABM deployment
will end ". . . any uncertainty as to whether
or not the United States would act to prevent
the Chinese from gaining any political or
military advantage from their nuclear
forces."
Implicit in Mr. Warnke's exposition of
policy is an apparent assumption that the
Soviet Union would not honor Its defense
treaty commitments to Peking in the event
of a U.S. nuclear strike at the Mainland. I
think this point requires a definite clarifica-
tion and I intend to seek one from both Sec-
retary Rusk and Secretary McNamara.
Administration spokesmen have been
largely silent on the impact of the ABM
decision on our relations with our NATO
allies, and there is evidence that this very
important aspect of the decision was not
given sufficient consideration.
According to press reports, our ABM
decision has been received with skepticism
.
,
ea
ers were
We'. I will not deny that there has been unnecessarily ruffled by a lack of consultation
a partisan dimension to this entire issue with on an important issue, at a time when the
both Democrats and Republicans maneuver- whole Alliance is passing through an in-
ing for party advantage in a pre-election year, ternal crisis of confidence. According to a
and Mr. Reston may well be correct when he Washington Post survey the only NATO
accuses the President of "... not dealing capital that took heart from our ABM
with the problems before him but with the decision was Paris, and that for reasons which
politics of the problems" in making his ABM are not necessarily helpful to our national in-
decision. In any event, it is most unfortunate terests. The Post reports that the French are
and disfavor In most NATO capitals. Two of
our closest Allies, Canada, and the U.K. have
publicly deplored the McNamara announce-
ment
At a minimum
NATO f
th
having a "field day" with the "disquiet caused
by the American decision" and see it as "a
new vindication for their policy of disen-
gagement from the Atlantic Alliance."
It is not by intention tonight to offer de-
nnitive answers to the many profound ques-
tions which have been raised in the course
of this review of the dynamics of an impor-
tant national decision. Rather, I have tried to
suggest the scope and the implications of the
issues which are involved. There are others
too which I have not even sketched in this
brief tour d'horison. If it does accomplish
anything, I think this review dramatises the
inadequacy of the national debate of the
ramifications of opting for an anti-ballistic
missile defense. It is clear, however, that only
the initial round of debate has been con-
cluded. The proponents of a full-blown
"heavy" ABM defense against the Soviet
Union have been denied victory on this round
by Secretary McNamara's adamancy and by
his compromise action in agreeing to a thin
anti-Chinese ABM deployment. But we are
now experiencing but a brief hiatus before
the battle is renewed.
It is imperative therefore that the full
weight of all elements and all points of
view in our society be mobilized to partici-
pate proportionately in the next round of
debate. It is only in this way that we can be
assured of a truly national decision which
reflects the true balance of our national in-
terests.
The basic issues have now surfaced. They
need further clarification and refinement,
and much much more searching exploration.
As one Senator, I shall do my utmost to. assure
that we have a real national debate before
we move any further down the road to a
Ruck Rogers world of missiles and counter
missiles where fatalities are counted in the
"megadeaths". Concurrently, I shall do my
utmost to insure that the proper issues are
debated and that decisions are not camou-
flaged by illustory technical jargon intended
to intimidate or exclude the layman from the
decision making process. It is in this aspect
of the challenge that our universities can
play their most vital role. I entreat you to
join in this defense of the national interest.
CONCLUSION OF MORNING
BUSINESS
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
further morning business? If there be no
further morning business, morning busi-
ness is closed.
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY ED-
UCATION AMENDMENTS ACT OF
1967
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the unfinished
business be laid before the Senate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will state the bill by title.
The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R.
7819) to strengthen and improve pro-
grams of assistance for elementary and
secondary education by extending au-
thority for allocation of funds to be
used for education of Indian children
and children in overseas dependents
schools of the Department of Defense,
by extending and amending the National
Teacher Corps program, by providing
assistance for comprehensive educa-
tional planning, and by improving pro-
grams of education for the handicapped;
to improve authority for assistance in
schools in federally impacted areas and
areas suffering a major disaster; and for
other purposes.
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 S17898 Approved For gg@& ?,OR b P1DPPfiOM00030011@kf"ber 5, 1' 66"7
. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, the Senate will proceed to its
consideration.
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the bill.
CALL OF THE ROLL
Mr. MORSE. Mr.-President, I suggest
the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The bill clerk called the roll, and the
following Senators answered to their
names:
[No. 372 Leg.]
Aiken
Gruening
Mondale
Anderson
Hansen
Monroney
Baker
Harris
Montoya
Bartlett
Hart
Morse
Bayh
Hartke
Mundt
Bennett
Hatfield
Murphy
Bible
Hayden
Muskie
Boggs
Hickenlooper
Nelson
Brewster
Hill
Pastore
Brooke
Holland
Pearson
Burdick
Hruska
Pell
Byrd, Va.
Jackson
Percy
Byrd, W. Va.
Javits
Proxmire
Cannon
N.C.
Jordan
Randolph
Carlson
,
Kennedy, Mass. Smathers
Case
Kennedy, N.Y.
Smith
Church
Kuchel
Spong
Clark
Lausche
Stennis
Cotton
Curtis
Long, La.
Talmadge
Dirksen
Magnuson
Thurmond
Dominick
Mansfield
Tower
Eastland
McClellan
Tydings
Ervin
McGee
Williams, N.J.
Fannin
McGovern
Williams, Del.
Fong
McIntyre
Yarborough
Gore
Metcalf
Young, N. Dak.
Griffin
Miller
Young, Ohio
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I an-
nounce that the Senator from Louisiana
[Mr. ELLENDER], the Senator from South
Carolina [Mr. HOLLINGS], the Senator
from Hawaii [Mr. INOUYE], the Senator
from Utah [Mr. Moss], and the Senator
from Connecticut [Mr. RIBICOFF] are
absent on official business.
I also announce that the Senator from
Connecticut [Mr. DODD], the Senator
from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], the
Senator from Minnesota [Mr. Mc-
CARTHY], the Senator from Georgia [Mr.
RUSSELL], and the Senator from Ala-
bama [Mr. SPARKMAN] are necessarily
absent.
Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the
Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT],
the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. Coo-
PER], and the Senator from Idaho [Mr.
JORDAN] are absent on official business.
The Senator from Vermont '[Mr.
PROUTY] is absent because of illness.
The Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr.
SCOTT] is necessarily absent.
The Senator from Kentucky [Mr.
MORTON] is absent to attend the funeral
of a friend.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quo-
rum is present.
COMMITTEE MEETING DURING
SENATE SESSION
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, I 'ask unanimous consent that the
Subcommittee on Public Buildings and
Grounds of the Committee on Public
Works be authorized to meet during the
session of the Senate today.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
SENATOR KUCHEL ADDRESSES
CALTECH YMCA
Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, I had the
honor to speak on the campus of the
California Institute of Technology, at
the invitation of the Caltech Young
Men's Christian Association, last Novem-
ber 30. I ask unanimous consent that a
portion of my comments be printed at
this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the address
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows :
FACING THE GHETTO: BRINKMANSHIP OR
COMMITMENT?
(Partial text of address by U.S. Senator
THOMAS H. KUCHEL, at the invitation of the
Caltech Young Men's Christian Associa-
tion, Beckman Auditorium, California In-
stitute of Technology, Pasadena, Calif.,
November 30, 1967)
Ralph Waldo Emerson, poet-essayist of the
century past, on one occasion observed: "It
needs a whole society to give the symmetry
we seek." In facing the sprawling, spreading,
urgent plight of the American city, especially
the isolated, racial ghetto with its exaggera-
tion of every city problem, we do indeed
need a whole society, if our unique form of
society is to survive and flourish, and fulfill
the symmetrical American dream.
Long before Emerson, a Greek of the 6th
Century B.C., Alcaeus, said of Athens: Not
houses finely roofed or the stones of walls
well-builded, nay nor canals and dockyards,
make the city, but men able to use their
opportunity."
Today we look at the city and the many
men who use their opportunity and use it
well. Focus for a moment on what we have
come to call the American ghetto. It sits in
the core of the city, and it contains many men
who do not use opportunity because, in
large measure, they enjoy little opportunity
to use. It is this ghetto and its people which
we seek to explore this evening. We will go
in, and try to determine where we are. We
will try to find a way out, and decide where
we are going.
Much has been written about brinkman-
ship in foreign affairs over the years: How
John Foster Dulles raised it to a fine art con-
fronting the Soviet Union in the middle and
late 1950's under President Eisenhower, fac-
ing down the cold war enemy at .the very
brink of possible conflict; how the late Pres-
ident Kennedy practiced it at the Cuban
missile crisis.
I would like to suggest tonight that we are
witnessing brinkmanship in our Nation's
cities. We are on the verge of a broad-fronted
commitment against the blight and poverty
of the ghetto.. We need now to take that one
step in many sectors which will involve all of
us: government, those in the business com-
munity, you theoreticians and activists in
colleges and universities, 'men and women
from organized labor, those outside the
ghetto, and perhaps most important, those
inside the ghetto themselves. The step should
be taken with a sense of common purpose.
We should commit ourselves because there
is a human need for us to do so. No other
reason should be necessary. But for those
who are particularly hard to convince, let
me point out that there is one faction in
today's ghetto which is practicing a brink-
manship of its own. I refer, of course, to the
incendiaries who have set people and prop-
erty aflame, with both words and deeds, over
the past three years. They threaten that "The
Fire Next Time" will engulf the entire United
States. Newsweek talks of an "increasing ap-
petite for confrontation," as it pours its re-
sources into searching out a way to help the
ghetto and to avoid such confrontation. An
Oxford-educated Negro from Watts asks
Walter Lippmann on Public Broadcasting
Laboratory if perhaps a "confrontation" isn't
the way to educate America to the anguish
of the ghetto. Lippmann said, "No," inciden-
tally, warning of the "backlash you will
reap."
I say there is not only no need for this
armed confrontation, but that it would do
both the ghetto, and the America it should
belong to, irrevocable harm. I believe social
balance and a way out-for the ghetto resi-
dent and for the alienated taxpayer or back-
lasher-can be and should be provided as an
alternative to a massive confrontation.
Indeed, I think our ghetto moves should
be made very much within the framework of
the laws of our time and the order of our
society. Uprisings and riots can be put down
by the agencies of law enforcement, and
without the vigilantes who seem to yearn to
repress their fellow citizens. But any massive
revolution, and the inevitable, repressive
crush of response, would also destroy our
present society and would set back, by dec-
ades, what racial and economic progress have
actually come in recent years.
Promises have been made by one genera-
tion. I believe that generation should keep
them. But much of the energy and most of
the meaningful work to translate the prom-
ises into effective action, must come from
the younger, emerging generation of thinkers
and doers. Already, the front-line troops of
the war on poverty are young people who
have made a commitment with themselves.
When I read that a VISTA volunteer con-
templates sleeping in a New England jail
because the United States Congress delays
appropriating the interim funds to keep her
poverty program and her living allowance
going while we debate details, I am not very
proud. On the other hand, when I see a vast
segment of our young population withdraw-
ing from the daily struggle with the world
and becoming social iconoclasts, the supreme
flowery isolationists of urban America, I am
not very encouraged either. This is a time for
commitment, not holding action or retreat,
and we must appeal to youth for an alliance
of action and purpose with his neighbor.
Similarly, any generation must back youth
with financial resources and good faith.
Consider the age of the average inhabitant
among the 30,000 in Watts. I am told a re-
cently completed survey put the age at 14
years. That single fact is distressing in its
implications of large family units in poverty.
But it is hopeful in terms of having time on
the side of rehabilitation. More than any-
thing else, that very,young average age is a
supreme argument for youth outside the
ghetto to begin learning what the ghetto is
all about. It is the problem of tomorrow's
citizen far more than it is today's.
That is why I am particularly pleased to
try to make common cause with a university
audience tonight. I am convinced there is
an untapped reservoir of youth still to be-
come involved, which can match the many
who have already recognized the task to be
done in the cities of the United States.
Let us explore for a moment what I call
the "mathematics of concern." Hopefully,
some figures can demonstrate to the tech-
nology-oriented why it is they who should
see the problem of the disadvantaged in the
central city as something which at least in
part involves them, like it or not.
One of the premises here is that the prob-
lem we face in the ghetto, as a part of the
central city, is primarily the problem of the
minority population, and, beyond that,
chiefly the problem of America's Negroes.
There is, to be sure, a sizeable Latin Ameri-
can ghetto in many large cities, usually Mex-
ican or Puerto Rican in origin. That presence
is getting special attention, in such legisla-
tion as the Bilingual Education Act, which I
am proud to say I co-sponsored, to ease the
transition from native Spanish to English
language education.
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