COMMENTS ON IG REQUIREMENTS STUDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00501R000100050003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2001
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 1, 1967
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2001/07/26 : CIA-RDP70B00501R000100050003-7
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy Director for Scit,r,c ' and
Teciznoloily
SUBJECT : Comments on IG Requirements Stir iy
As has been stated by others, we feel that the
survey recognizes the problems and deficiencies in the
present system but only proposes half measures. The genera
,rust of the IG recommendations is to inflate the importance
of CGS but without proposing any real change in its mission
and functions.
2. We have examined the obvious possibilities or
a major s '.,,.ft in the CGS role, such as complete centra.ization
or com2_ete decentralization. While these ideas are in many
ways atzactive, it is probably unrealistic to expect their
implementation against the natural opposition of various
Agency elements. However, we do feel that the DDS&T shouid
strongly urge the following changes in the CGS mission:
a. Divest OGS of responsibility for requirements
for data exploitation.
b. Divest CGS of responsibilities for requirements
for intelligence collection by photographic and electronic
sensors.
3. The rationale for these two suggestions is simply treat
there already exist satisfactory mechanisms for keeping the
books on technical exploitation and collection requirements .
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NPIC and NSA have their own bookkeepers and there is no
need for CGS in the data exploitation loop. Similarly, COMOR
should serve as broker for photographic requirements while
SPINT.Staff could do the same for electronic collection re-
.quirements. CGS is not needed in either area.
4. Comments on specific recommendations in the IG
study are given below. Those recommendations which are
not cited are those which we have no comments on.
#5 - In basic agreement, although it should
be recognized that for critical problems exceptions
would have to be made.
#8 - Agree, but only if CGS mission is limited
to human source requirements.
#13 - We think that in most cases preparation
of a collection guide is a waste of time.
414 - We doubt whether this is useful.
#15 - This idea has merit, but why couldn't the
data be furnished directly to FMSAC and OSI without
going through CGS?
#16 - Not necessary if we get CGS out of the
SIGINT business as suggested above.
#17 - This is not a problem in the missile and
space field.
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X20 -This is unnecessary in the light of our
recommendation to get CGS out of the SIGINT business.
=23 - The DDS&T/DDI "Recce" meeting held 25X1A
weekly prior to the COMOR meeting serve$ this function.
DAVID S. BRANDWEIN
Director
Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center
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