MAN'S ROLE IN DYNA-SOAR FLIGHT

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CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7
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91
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December 20, 2016
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May 8, 2007
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1
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August 28, 1962
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Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 AWE ""Z7/N" C'OM P,JNJ' NUMBER _ D2-80726 UNCLASSIFIED TITLE Man's Role in Dyna-Soar Flight y: Arthur Murray -Manager, Hypersonic Crew Integration MODEL NO. 620A CONTRACT NOAF33(657)-7132 ISSUE NO. ISSUED TO CLASSIFIED TITLE (STATE CLASSIFICATION) ---SPECIAL LIMITATIONS ON ASTIA DISTRIBUTION ASTIA may distribute this report to requesting agencies subject to their security agreement, approved fields of interest, and the following: UNLIMITED-To all agencies of the Department of Defense and their contractors. n LIMITED-To U. S. Military organizations only. This report may be distributed to nonmilitary agencies not approved above subject to Boeing approval of each request. NOTE: the LIMITED category may be checked only because of actual or potential patent, proprietary, ethical, or similar implications. Z3 62- PREPARED BY ERVISED BY~ am 1 4',J'L_J - V - SUP SU APPROVED BY, CLASS. & DISTR. APPROVED BY RELIABILITY APPROVAL . Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Page 1.0 FOREWORD INTRODUCTION 1.1 Purpose 1.2 Scope 1.3 Applicability 1.4 Authority 1.5 Participation 5 DS-0 22-101 AGENDA - MEMBERS, CONSULTANTS AND OBSERVERS R&D Program Objectives DS-022-111 Features of Dyna-Soar Program 8 DS-022-186 Man's Role in Dyna-Soar Research System 9 DS-022-194 Pilot's Role in Dyna-Soar 10 DS-022-192 Effect of Pilot and Redundance 11 DS-022-191 Effect of Pilot and Redundancy 12 DS-022-199 Dyna-Soar Flight Control System 13 DS-022-207 Dyna-Soar Flight Control System 14 DS-022-190 The Pilot Contributes to Mission Success 15 DS-022-189 Example of Specific Pilot Action 16 DS-022-187 Example of Specific Pilot Action 17 DS-022-185 Example of Specific Pilot Action 18 DS-022-184 Specific Actions Pilot Can Take 19 DS-022-180 Potential Effect of Pilot and Redundancy 20 DS-022-198 Trends Demonstrated (Missile and Aircraft Projects) 21 DS-022-90 B-52 Air-Launch and Transport 23 DS-022-188 Manned Booster Considerations 24 DS-022-200 Influence of Man on Booster Design 25 DS-022-204 On-Board Countdown Role 26 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 CONTENTS (Cont.) Page DS-022-203 Pilot Countdown Role 27 DS-022-202 Pilot Countdown Role (Cont.) 28 DS-022-173 Pilot's Role 29 DS-022-196 Advantages 30 DS-022-75 Altitude History Boost Acceleration 31 DS-012-59R1 Pilot Vibration Level versus Estimated Human Tolerance 32 DS-022-92R1 Escape from Pad 33 DS-022-201 Boost Control Regions 34 DS-022-206 Boost Pilot Control - Wind Profile 35 DS-022-208 Pilot Control During Boost - Typical Simulator Trace 36 DS-022-106R2 Once-Around Trajectory and Global Range 37 DS-022-195 Pilot Role in the Test Program 38 DS-022-86 Ion Sheath 39 DS-022-88 Effect of L/D on Range 40 DS-022-197 Energy Management 41 DS-022-95 Dyna-Soar Landing 42 D2-80726 ii Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 APPENDIXES Page Appendix A (Backup to DS-022-101) R&D Program Objectives 43 Appendix B (Backup to DS-022-186) Some Relative Merits of Manned 46 versus Unmanned Dyna-Soar Weapon System Appendix C (Backup to DS-022-192) Redundant Systems and Pilot-in- 50 the-loop Aspects of all X-15 Flights Appendix D (Backup to DS-022-198) Analysis of Individual Bomarc 52 Flights - Success Summary Relationships -Actual versus Expected Success for "Pilot Controlled" Flights Appendix E (Backup to DS-022-198) Effect of Redundancy plus Pilot- 56 in-the-loop Appendix F (Backup to DS-022-198) Cost for Automation 59 Appendix G (Backup to DS-022-198) Flight Research Center Manned 60 Rocket Flight Study Appendix H (Backup to DS-022-192) Detailed History - Redundant 68 Systems and Pilot-in-the-loop Aspects for all X-15 Free Flights Appendix I (Backup to DS-022-198) Effect of Redundancy plus Pilot- 87 in-the-loop Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 FOREWORD MAN'S ROLE IN DYNA-SOAR FLIGHT FOR BIOASTRONAUTICS PANEL OF SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD ARTHUR MURRAY MANAGER -HYPERSONIC CREW INTEGRATION SEATTLE -FEBRUARY 21, 1962 The information in this document represents the philosophy of The Boeing Company on the usefulness of man in general and a pilot in particular in the Dyna-Soar system. This consistent piloted aspect of the orbital glider has been one of the basic and firm Air Force ground rules on which the project has been conducted under the direction of the Dyna-Soar System Program Office of the Aeronautical Systems Division. The use of man in recent research flight projects, and his inclusion in the very early planning stages of Dyna-Soar could be, and was, predicated mainly on tradition, intuition, and supposition. The principal supposi- tion required was as to the functional value of piloted versus automatic operation in an orbital system. There is a growing body of opinion, which was evident at the time of Commander Shepherd's and Captain V. Grissom's Mercury/Redstone flights, and which tended to solidify upon Colonel John Glenn's successful Mercury/ Atlas orbital flight, to the effect that the requirement for man in space has been adequately validated especially in those cases where a degree of flexibility is required. This presentation accepts man as a required and validated element of a flexible return from orbit system which will maneuver to a selected landing point. This material does not justify "why man in space? " It does show how he is used by the Dyna-Soar designer to simplify systems, reduce costs, or improve operational research reliability. The effect of the concrete experiences encountered on missile projects (Regulus and Bomarc), supersonic aircraft (F8U, F100), hypersonic aircraft (X-1, X-2 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 FOREWORD (Cont) and X-15), and Mercury experience are projected to the planned Dyna-Soar mission. Mr. Murray's past experience as a research rocket aircraft pilot and present responsibility for management of crew integration were used to select areas of emphasis. Due to the personal interest and concern of Mr. A. M. Johnston, Program Manager, in the integration of the crew to Dyna-Soar, project engineering and staff effort in this area is so widespread that individual acknowledgement of all contributors would be difficult. However, recognition of the inputs of the follow- ing Boeing Aero -Space Division personnel is made: Mr. N. L. Krisberg, Chief, Technical Staff -General technical philosophy Dr. Y. A. Yoler, Staff Engineering -Space Projects -Staff philosophy Mr. R. R. Rotelli, Assistant Senior Project Engineer -Critique of project inputs Dr. R. Y. Walker, Staff Assistant Human Engineering -Time line analysis Mr. L. R. Mason, Dyna-Soar Flight Technology Unit Chief, Mr. G. Dragseth, Air Vehicle Stability and Control Supervisor and Mr. A. H. Lee, Dyna-Soar Flight Control Supervisor -Stability characteristics, flight control task, glider/booster simulation Mr. R. G. Christensen, Section Head, System PD and Evaluation Section - Manned booster consideration Mr. T. K. Jones, Unit Chief, Reliability and Safety Unit -Safety implications Mr. S. Howland, Acting Supervisor, Reliability Requirements and Status Assessment Group -Safety and reliability considerations Mr. T. R. Waddleton, Supervisor, Space and Research Systems -Use of man during test Mr. F. E. Woods, Staff Engineer, Test Technology Staff -Bomarc and Minuteman experience Mr. L. A. Perro, Supervisor, Test Control Equipment Design -Role of pilot during countdown Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 FOREWORD (Cont) Acknowledgment is made of the contributions on the following individuals in the areas of missile and high-performance jet and rocket aircraft projects. Mr. Paul F. Bikle, Director NASA High Speed Flight Station, Edwards, Calif. --Research aircraft philosophy Mr. DeBeeler, Deputy Director NASA High Speed Flight Station, Edwards, Calif. -Research aircraft philosophy Messrs. J. Walker, J. B. McKay, and V. Horton, NASA High Speed Flight Station -X-15 and Jet/Rocket aircraft experience Messrs. G. Matranga, J. Gibbons, and V. Horton, NASA High Speed Flight Station -X-15 and Jet/Rocket aircraft experience Mr. D. G. Starkey, Chance Vought Aircraft Corporation -Regulus, F8U experience Mr. J. Wesesky, Flight Test Engineering Section AFFTC, Edwards, Calif. - History of X-15 flights Mr. R. Nagle, Flight Test Engineering Section AFFTC, Edwards, Calif. --- History of X-15 flights The information presented is current to the date of February 21, 1962. D2-80726 3 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 1.1 Purpose This document records information conveyed during a briefing pre- pared for and given to the Bioastronautics Panel of the Scientific Advisory Board on the subject of the use of man in Dyna-Soar. 1.2 Scope The information herein delineates the conceptual integration of man (as a pilot) to Dyna-Soar. Material consists of reductions of the charts used during the meeting. The charts were constructed to summarize internal studies and discussions of project design and staff support engineering, reliability, integration, and bioastronautics groups which contributed to the evolution of the present Dyna-Soar configuration. The principal points elaborated upon over and above those quoted by the charts are highlighted and detailed on the individual charts. In accord with discussions with panel members, the related background data from which these comments were evolved, along with a complete definition of assumptions made, are documented. 1.3 Applicability The material represents philosophy, design concepts, and a glider- booster configuration as it existed at the time of the Seattle meeting. It is not expected that the philosophy and concept will change materially. Data emanating from related aircraft/missile projects and the glider design itself is changing daily. It should be noted that it is not there- fore intended to keep the document updated particularly in regard to those items dependent upon detailed glider design data. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 1.4 Authority The briefing of the Scientific Advisory Board was accomplished as delineated by United States Air Force teletype. The gathering of the background and supporting data has been accom- plished in response to Scientific Advisory Board letter of April 23, 1962 to A. M. Johnston from L. D. Carlson (Chairman). 1.5 Participation The attendees of the Bioastronautics Panel meeting, the Boeing participants, and the agenda are shown in the succeeding section. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 AGENDA AEROMEDICAL AND BIOSCIENCES PANEL SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD Visit to Boeing -February 21, 1962 Wednesday, February 21, 1962 9:00 Introduction to Boeing 9:20 Dyna-Soar Program and Progress Film 10:35 Refreshment Break N. L. Krisberg 10:50 Man's Role and Operation in Dyna-Soar A. Murray 11:00 Applications of Bioastronautics to Dyna-Soar R. Y. Walker System 11:15 Engineering Design Considerations for a Manned System such as Dyna-Soar (a) Cockpit design, displays, ejection seat, survival equipment, etc. (b) Vehicle environment system 11:45 Dyna-Soar Mockup Tour B. Hamlin R. Shepherd Simulator Operation 12:45 Transportation to BSRL 1:00 Luncheon - BSRL 1:55 Return to 2. 01 Building 2:00 Bioastronautics in General 2:30 Tour of Bioastronautics Laboratories MEMBERS, CONSULTANTS, Professor L. D. Carlson (Chairman) Dr. R. F. Buchan Dr. C. M. McDonnel Dr. Frank Princi Dr. B. M. Wagner Dr. Stuart Bondurant Dr. K. S. Lion Dr. John Marbarger Dr. L. M. Petterson Brig. Gen. Don Flinkinger Mr. C. L. Arnold A. Murray E. Kangas F. W. Zuppe G. Hollingsworth F. W. Zuppe R. H. Lowry R. H. Lowry Dr. Jessee Orlansky Col. Carl Houghton Col. Clyde Gasser Mr. Donald Almy Dr. A. W. Hetherington Dr. Edwin Vail Sqd. Leader John C. Henry Maj. Arthur W. Kidder, Jr. Mr. E. O. Berdahl Capt. H. L. Bitter Col. Randel Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 ? DEMONSTRATE PILOTED MANEUVERING RE-ENTRY FROM ORBIT WITH CON- VENTIONAL GLIDE LANDING AT PRECISE LANDING SITE + LATHER RESEARCH DATA FOR ADVANCED RE-ENTRY FROM ORBITAL FLIGHT DESIGN FOR CONTROLLED LIFTING EXPLORE FULL POTENTIAL OF PILOT On the subject of man's role in Dyna-Soar we find that man has always had a role in space. This has been true since the inception of Dr. Saenger's pre-World War II thinking on space flight and the trans-Atlantic skip bomber proposal to the German General Staff. It has been true of 1950-1957 United States studies such as Bomi, Brass Bell, etc. It was true of the 1957 Industry Competitive Studies that led to Dyna-Soar. In Dyna-Soar, the role of man results from the objectives of the project. The details of these objectives may be examined in the light of contractual state- ments such as: Program Objectives Dyna-Soar Approach System Design Objectives Test System Objectives System Design Requirements and Test System Requirements These are included as Appendix A. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 S ;-I PACE TO AIRPORT . t F P ILO T' GHC I E FROM UNIQUE FEATURE "RETURN MEN AND MATERIAL ONLY PILOTED MANEUVERABLE RE-ENTRY PROGRAM IN FREE WORLD These features are unique to the Dyna-Soar Program. They are incorporated in the design in response to contractual statements and are being translated into actual hardware. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 F F~~ F k F~ ? y F ?,~ ? 3 j ~ i ~ ~? 1# CAPABILITY J~N K #gi 9??~ ?: # y ~ ~ ~ a }fit ~y9~ '~i~ ~~~~~~~a#'~~y~ga~~~~;~~?kp~ ~E~ ~ ~'~~S 1 3 # ? 3 ; F ? h AT 't jc~9 F#7 x??Lys~ 9' lF :?, ;__: F _ ~F FL t>.~ h HF A N:: q c t c # ?F # 5S? 10 UlG WE 13 li, C., CM ~1wwS~~~ 5{'' F E'' F) F 33??xy9 # ~~~t.~Yi 3sL3 ~ E 3 See Appendix B for details of the role described by these 11 points. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 PILOT COMPLEMENTS CAPABI LITY OF LIFTING AND MANEUVERABLE GLIDER CORRIDOR EXPLORATION - 2 LIMITING FUNCTIONS ALTER TEST PLANS LANDING PILOT AUGMENTS CONCEPTS OF REDUNDANCY AND BACKUP SYSTEMS THROUGH OBSERVATION EVALUATION JUDGEMENT ACTION! PILOT TESTS MANS VALUE IN POSSIBLE FUTURE 7 SmihMS These elements are significant to the use of a man in Dyna-Soar. D2-80726 10 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 MISSION SUCCESS -FREE-FLIGHT: PHASE AED ON ANALYSIS OF FLIGHT .DATA I I i S CCE S I 1 1 ICI PARTIAL SUCCESS 0 JMSS ALT RN I I N SUCCESS 0 i RF+UEIY ONLY 1 TOTAL 22 18 .. ............................................... . TED IN DAMAGE (REPAII ED ON LANDING The subject of how man should be used in space and space-type aircraft has been of continuing interest to the Government and to industry. The Air Force Flight Test Center has examined the results of a series of 40 X-15 flights. An explana- tion of the ground rules under which the study was conducted is covered by AFFTC letter to The Boeing Company (subject: "Redundant System and Pilot-in-the-Loop Aspects of all X-15 Flights") and is included as Appendix C. The individual detailed data from which the study was made is included verbatim as Appendix H. The results of the study have been summarized in the chart above. It is significant that, as indicated by the column on the far right, no piloted airplanes have been lost. Reading toward the left along the column of airplane losses we may see the increasingly degraded effect on a research program from elimination of the pilot and dual or emergency systems. It can also be seen that neither the pilot nor dual systems alone are sufficient to eliminate these potential losses. The best results come from use of a pilot with adequate dual or emergency systems with which to work. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-R?P70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 X-15 - PRELAUNCH PHASE ANALOGOUS TO FIRST- STAGE BOOST EXCEPT RECOVERABLE & RECALLABLE 71 LAUNCH ATT E M PTS NO PILOT PILOT NO PIL it'' .........:........................ SINGLE SINGLE DUAL SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM Such a great amount of difficulty was encountered in getting the X-15 to the point of the 40 launches that it was decided to examine the prelaunch phase. The analysis indicated that an appreciable improvement in mission success re- sulted from use of a pilot and dual systems even under the relatively well con- trolled phase prior to launch. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 MODES OF OPERATION ? MANUAL -DIRECT ? MANUAL-AUGMENTED (FIXED GAIN) ? MANUAL-AUGMENTED (ADAPTIVE) ? AUTOMATIC Manual Direct-In the manual direct mode, pilot inputs are translated directly into control surface movement through the electrical-hydraulic flight control components. This is the electro-hydraulic equivalent of WWI and II cable and pulley systems with the inclusion of a ratio changer. In this mode, there is no augmentation and the pilot alone copes with the natural stability of the glider, modulates excursions, and applies a human "gain" based on his background of flight experience. Manual Augmented (Fixed Gain) -In this mode, pilot inputs are transmitted electrically and hydraulically to the flight control surfaces after being modulated by a pilot-selected and pre-established amount of fixed gain from the adaptive system. Simultaneously, and irrespective of pilot inputs, the basic airframe aerodynamic stability characteristics are improved by the augmentation feature that reduces short period oscillations. Manual Augmented (Adaptive Gain) - Pilot inputs in this mode are again trans- mitted electrically and hydraulically to the control surfaces and the glider control surface motions and resulting maneuvers are modulated by an adaptive system. By continuously sensing its output against its input, the adaptive system varies its own gain to cope with the considerable change in stability of the glider. This change occurs when a lifting body undergoes the transition from orbital velocity to conventional landing speeds. Concurrently, the augmentation effect of the sys- tem attenuates short-period glider oscillations. Automatic - In this mode, the pilot makes no inputs whatsoever and the adaptive control system of the glider responds automatically to the signals generated by the Inertial Guidance System only. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 MODES OF OPERATION MEDIUM IItLOW PILOTS GAIN SELECTOR RATE GYRO MANUAL- DIRECT ? MANUAL-AUGMENTED (ADAPTIVE) ? MANUAL-AUGMENTED(FIXED GAl N" ? AUTOMATIC COMPEN- SATION VARIABLE GAIN ELEMENT .? ................?...?..... M- D MAN. DIR. TRIM iI DIRECT AUGMENTED G A I N SELECTOR REACTION CONTROLS AERODYNAMIC CONTROLS The concept of these four optional modes of operation available to the pilot may be visualized by examination of the major elements of equipment that make up the flight control system indicated above. The equipment above the dotted line, from the Inertial Guidance System (IGS) through to the reaction/aerodynamic and vector controls, is essentially a conven- tional missile-type system and yields automatic control. The elements added below the line, and the manual direct trim, yield the three additional modes, each of which utilize the pilot-in-the-loop. These modes give the pilot the wherewithal to carry out the actions dictated by his judgement. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 T T ICI, CASE OF `Q IPMENT I AILURE . ? > T . FAIL REACTION t NT OL. LU 1 3OS I Nt UT 71 (N RAIN OF REACTION -CONT U I # T S -+ U ' I 'AILED SYSTEM ALT R -ENT SLI H ~. f U H. ''s`y'^ z 3 4 s" -MP^ ILA R' "GpE ~iL !I i Lid GLIDER LOST PL.A iNED MII I N I- ArtTE R NATE "NA +1IC PRESSUI I One of the instances where use is made of the pilot is illustrated by a Boeing simulator study in which runs were accomplished assuming a failed reaction control valve. For a "q" or dynamic pressure of 0 psf to 5 psf, reaction control is required to recover the glider (and pilot). From 5 psf to 10 psf, a situation exists where, on occasion, a re-entry can be safely made. Above 10 psf, aerodynamic pres- sure is usually adequate. Note that with a valve failure at boost burnout (less than 1 psf "q"), the glider would be lost if on automatic flight. In these simulations the pilot switched to an alternate mission that would have used considerably less fuel and saved the glider. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 ENT U1 XP>CT p fPENDITURE `O Ofd R- ENTRY DETERMINE THAT DESTINATION IS INAC SSI BL STEER FOR AI_T> RNAT COURSE RESULTt PI! . T' PRESENCE LI ER SAVED RL DATA RECOVERED AUTt . SYSTE ACTIO CONTINUE TO NEAP }} t R IN L ? T NAT'1C ~. ANC NOT REACH IT. PI T :T ON This is another example in the use of the pilot where an unexpected situation is encountered. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 TOF TO V H ICLE ,BI -AKUP AV J UNSTABLE :F?REGI INSTABILITY "IG...:. }=F R I EXTENT IIIIIIRENT, LOSS Q E I Lw.F:I T:E S T,.: FLU UNEXPECTED STABILIT R 3 1 '4144 9 T II CONTINUE! ACTION PROGRAMMED TEST REGION Q NT NUE `RO RAI M 1= ' AREA ,I AM E I GSLEM AREA DEFINED R;? BUIE- KFU4 DATA ODT/U E1 , GUDER #?3. RECD ERE ; >IGC T WHEN D~? 3 I:,.3 f F r IN I ED REGIMES Of oW Experience with stability systems to date indicates this type of problem is likely to be a persistent one. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 E E : :NON ATASTR H P ! . CO TINU E' OR C R CSC,!! N.I ICI LOT ACT`I ON f ETECT FAILURE B COMPARISON WITH , P I I IM ""DA "A OBTAINED 1 EATI R CH N CE CAF RECOVER'I NG?? This is another example of specific pilot action that is taken in the case of a system malfunction. SURVIVAL ? AND REACHIN .LAIIDI> IT> LT I PR GI AM TO ENSURE VI I+ L '. IM T U M TS, PERSONA OBSERVATIONS, ATTEMPT TC LAND WITH AID OF G t ,s N D! ESULT IC FAI.U DURING GLIDE ACTION : FLIGHT T3 STRUCTUR? co: N TAGS' AT W I GIN G Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 ALTER TEST PLAN IF IT THREATENS SAFETY OF VEHICLE PE FOR 'ADDITI }NAL TEST TO PROBE PROBLEM AREAS ACQ I tE SUBJECTIVE DATA TET FAILED SYSTEMS AND SELECT ALTERNATE NCREASEI VALUE OF DATA OBTAINED INCREASED CHANCE OF MISSION SUCCESS In summary, Dyna-Soar simulator studies and analysis indicate that the pilot can be used very effectively. In some cases his use so increases the predicted chance of mission success as to make it worthwhile to consider elimination of unmanned orbital launches. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 BOMARC (60 ATTEMPTS) NO PILOT SINGLE PILOT ONLY DUAL ONLY PILOT AND DUAL SYSTEM MISSION SUCCESSES 26 34 30 51 ALTERNATE MISSION 0 1 0 7 TOTAL 26 35 30 58 AIRPLANES LOST 34 2 MINUTEMAN {4 ATTEMPTS) MISSION SUCCESSES 1 1 3 3 ALTERNATE MISSION 0 1 0 1 TOTAL 1 2 3 4 AIRPLANES LOST 3 2 1 0 The assumption was made that space, weight, and system design was such as to permit installation of a cockpit and pertinent manned-type dual systems. It was also assumed that the resulting craft would fly at the original altitude/velocity combination. The results have been summarized in terms of the effect of the trade-off of pilot, and single and dual systems on mission success. The end effect of considering a pilot with a dual system versus a missile with only a single system may be seen by comparing the estimated airplanes lost. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 o,..ed, For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 SYSTEM X-15 BOMARC BOMARC MINUTEMAN MERCURY REGULUS JET AIRCFT. ROCKET AIRC1 NQ SUC CESS SAVED BY PILOT DS SLIG HTS REQ COST FOR FL'TS NQ PILOT ] WITH MISSIONS A/C PILOT NO PILO AUTOMAT. %LOST 0) 40 55 83 95 100 18.5 31 200 167 51 82 87 87 19.2 35 262 60 43 85 94 94 I8.7 41 354 4 25 75 100 100 6 66 50 21.6 27 139 784 81 29 29 21 22 62 1000 66 995 27 139 61 89 30 185 The results of the independent interpretation of their own actual flight data by government and industry agencies is summarized. These independent studies, when applied to Dyna-Soar, agree fairly closely as to the number of piloted flights required to attain 18 recoveries. Increased flights would be required for attaining 18 flights unmanned. The important point illustrated here by these unrelated projects is the trend illustrated by the data rather than the exact numerical values. Based on the assumption that Dyna-Soar experience will parallel that in the pertinent rocket- research, jet aircraft, or missile project, the number of Dyna-Soar flights required for unmanned attainment may be deduced. X-15 Experience -If Dyna-Soar experience parallels the X-15 experience, the use of the pilot is to save the 12. 5 flights that would be required if the Dyna-Soar were unmanned. (As before, the detailed data from which these inferences were drawn, is included in Appendices C, H, and I.) Bomarc Experience - The detailed data on 167 flights from which the Bomarc trends were obtained are included as Appendix D. The material analyzed includes the entire flight experience from Sept. 1952 through June 30, 1961. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 TRENDS DEMONSTRATED -Missile and Aircraft Projects (Cont.) Mercury Experience - Data on the Mercury program was supplied by Mr. Showberry, Mercury Operations, NASA Space Task Group, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, 11 July 1961. Regulus-F8U Experience - Comparative data on 784 Regulus flights versus F8U experience was obtained from Chance Vought Aircraft Report E8R-11707 "Manned vs. Unmanned Vehicle, a comparison of" by D. G. Starkey, 19 September 1958. Supplemental data on the results from the first 100 Regulus flights was also obtained from D. G. Starkey and is included as Appendix E. Jet Aircraft and Rocket Aircraft Experience - For assumptions and ground rules see material as extracted from NASA Flight Research Center Investigation of 1000 Jet Aircraft and 190 Rocket Aircraft Flights. NASA-FRC letter of August 9, 1960 to Commander ARDC, Attn: Mr. T. J. Keating, Subject: "Flight Research Center Manned Rocket Flight Study" from Paul F. Bikle, Director. This has been included as Appendix G. Summary -Effect of Redundancy + Pilot-in-the-Loop - detailed data is included as Appendix I. A noteworthy use of the Dyna-Soar pilot is the elimination of the hardware costs associated with unmanned operation. The cost estimate is defined in Appendix D. It covers op the costs of gliders and booster airframes consumed and excludes the cost of developing and qualifying the automatic system itself. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 The Dyna-Soar system during the air-launch phase resembles previous research aircraft in that a "carrier" or "mother" aircraft is used to carry the glider aloft. In another respect the Dyna-Soar is quite unlike previous research aircraft in that following the air-launch phase a man will be operating a glider in conjunction with a powerful booster. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 The combination of a glider with a booster has a large effect on the considerations that must be weighed in arriving at an optimum amalgamation and trade-off of manned aircraft and missile characteristics. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 STRUCTURAL CRITERIA HAVE BEEN I IODIFIED PILOT WILL REPLACE SOME AUTOMATIC FUNCTIONS ? PILOT WILL ADD TO MALFUNCTION DETECTION CAPABILITY LOAD RECOVERY CEILING MAY FORCE ESCAPE ROCI ET! USEFUL PAYLOAD DECREASED BY HIGH ROUST DYNAMIC PRESSURE ? MALFUNCTION DETECTION SYSTEMS REQUIRED ? SEARCH AND RESCUE MAY DICTATE LOCATION AND AZIMUTH OF LAUNCH These are some of the items that were influenced by manned considerations. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 T-95 TEST INSTRUMENTATION SUBSYSTEM T-93 REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM, DYNAMIC T-85 ACCESSORY POWER UNITS GLIDER ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM GLIDER HYDRAULIC POWER SYSTEM ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM T-75 GLIDER AERO SURFACE CONTROL SYSTEM, DYNAMIC T-60 AERO SURFACES TRIMMING One of the contributions from the use of man in Dyna-Soar becomes noticeable during countdown.. The pilot is assumed to enter the cockpit of the glider at T-97 (i. e. , 97 minutes prior to launch). Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 T-30 COCKPIT PRESSURE CHECK T-12 ARM ABORT S SEPARATION SYSTEM T-14. PILOT AERO SURFACE CONTROL SYSTEM T-18 REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM CONFIDENCE COMMUNICATIONS TRACKING SUBSYSTEM T-26 PI LCT- BOOSTt R FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM COMMUNICATIONS & TRACKING SUBSYSTEM OPEN LOOP T-10 RECORDERS CAMERAS By T-30 the count has progressed to the point of the cockpit pressure check. The flight control. systems of the booster and the glider reaction and aerodynamic controls are checked as in the practice with conventional aircraft. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 T-4 VERIFY: SECONDARY POWER O M t. TRACKI N SERVICING FLIGHT CONTROLS MECHANICAL PRIMARY GUIDANCE ORDNANCE COCKPIT TEST INSTRUMENTATION PI LOT T-(EC) VERIFY UMBILICAL HATCH "HOLD-GO" SWITCH TO "GO" Final verification takes place at T-4. A last-minute visual scan of the instrument panel is accomplished. After T-3 seconds, launching is accomplished from the blockhouse. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 45 THRU T-O PROBLEM: WHAT WILL THE PILOT CONTRIBUTE FROM T-45 IHRU T-0 ? GIVEN: 1.02-6909-2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 2.D2-80045 GCOE PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS RESULT: THE PILOT WILL PERFORM END-TO-END FLIGHT READINESS TESTS 9 TESTS ON PILOT CONTROLS FASTER, EASIER, SIMPLER THAN CAN AUTOMATIC EQUIPMENT These features of the pilot's role in the T-45 to T-0 area have emerged from the examination of the countdown. His role was assessed against the system as it existed. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 GCOE WILL BE DISCONNECTED AT T-40 RESULTING IN REDUCED RFI PROBLEMS ELIMINATION OF GCOE INDUCED ABORTS 3. REDUCE UMBILICLE SIZE GCOE 6.LC & M EQUIPMENT WILL BE SIMPLER DUE TO PILOTS ABILITY TO 11. OBSERVE EVALUATE 3 DECIDE 4. CONTROL These advantages appeared to accrue from the use of the pilot during countdown. They permitted a reduction in glider weight and reduced what would have been the costs associated with full automatic checkout equipment. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Z 0 4 3 JtD, 2 1 - fit) I 3 4 5 6 7 8 TIME IN MINUTES At the completion of the countdown, and after launch, the pilot operates in a transverse "g" or acceleration environment. It may be seen that the total acceleration launch stress is less than that already encountered in the actual Mercury launches and the simulated launch aborts. D2-80726 31 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 ACCELERATION ` POWER .05 SPECTRAL DENSITY op- q2/ cPs .002 .001 ESTIMATED HUMAN TOLERANCE TO RANDOM VIBRATION 10 20 50 100 200 5 FREQUENCY-CPS Coincident with acceleration, the pilot is exposed to a vibration field. This vibration is induced by the anticipated exhaust characteristics of the Titan III. Although higher than that of the Titan II, the Titan III vibration characteris- tics are estimated to be within human tolerance. At one point the anticipated vibration is closer to the human tolerance than we would like and action is being taken to institute a greater margin. D2-80726 32 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 LOW AIRSPEED PULL THROUGH An abort system is included to facilitate escape during the launch operation and orbit injection. These abort conditions have been flown by use of an F5D at the NASA-FRC Edwards, which was modified to the windshield visibility condition expected for Dyna-Soar. The W/S and L/D characteristics of the F5D resemble those of the Dyna-Soar closely enough to assess the abort landing situation. No difficulty was encountered in making these landings. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 %-"=- W-111"", REGION 111111, \ -----_{ BURN OUT Jf^ 111/I \ /'2ND STAGE TIP-OVER MANEUVER STAGING / MA'( q AND WIND SHEAR REGION J INITIAL ROLL ~ AND TIP-OVER RELATIVE VELOCITY Simulator assessment has been made of the ability of the pilot to control the Step I air vehicle during boost. The more difficult or critical areas are shaded on the chart. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 (FIN 4 DIHEDRAL EFFECT N /FLORIDA 3-AXES PILOTING TASK ? PITCH-OVER PROGRAM ` PITCH WIND AVI DYNE WIND ? SIDE WIND C ~/a ADS EXCEEDANCE) . ROLL-YAW COUPLING VELOCITY-FPS, O 100 200 3OO In addition to the tip-over or pitch-control task, the pilot was confronted with a wind problem. The most severe wind case was assumed to be encountered in every boost mission. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 if POS..( RECOVERY BURNOUT jC-ABORT (MDS) LIMITS The effectiveness of the pilot to exercise control during these conditions may be judged from examination of a typical simulator trace. It was judged that the boost control task was no great problem during the fixed- base simulation program. A better verification for this preliminary conclusion can be gained from the results of the dynamic simulation on the NADC Johnsville centrifuge scheduled for the 28 May-16 June 1962 period. It should be noted that these conclusions will be only as valid as the closeness with which the actual booster used in flight duplicates the characteristics assumed for the simulator. ABORT YEW STAGING LIMITS LIMITS Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 CAPE r-SNI SAN SNIP, PRETORIA RANGE FROM CAPE CANAVERAL (NMI.) JETTISON TRANSITI BOOST BURNOUT LANDING At the conclusion of the boost phase the pilot is used continuously during the orbital phase. A typical Cape Canaveral to Edwards Air Force Base ground path and altitude plot is depicted. Variations, particularly in altitude or in angle of attack, are being intensively studied to select the combination that will give the best com- bination of data. acquisition and safety. ON PT ARGUCLLO, SNIPS Q REGION OF HIGH AERODYNAMIC HEATING Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 --.-__..___--FLIGHT TIME IMPROVED QUALITY & QUANTITY OF DATA CONDUCTS TEST MANEUVERS EVALUATES SYSTEM RESPONSE DURING FLIGHT MODIFIES ENSUING MANEUVERS ACCORDINGLY OPERATES AUXILIARY TEST EQUIPMENT PROVIDES DATA REPORTING INCREASED MISSION RELIABILITY PROVIDES MISSION ALTERATION CAPABILITY PROVIDES RELIABLE MEANS OF GLIDER RECOVERY } - .... PROVIDES PRIMARY CONTROL PROVIDES PRIMARY NAVIGATION (TERMINAL LANDING SITE) ALLOWS BACK-UP NAVIGATION (ORBIT & RE-ENTRY) PROVIDES MALFUNCTION CORRECTION CAPABILITY PERMITS GROUND-TO-AIR DATA LINK (22) ASSUMES RANGE SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY (AFTER BOOST) (I ) RECOVERY FROM FAILURE DURING BOOST (2) LOCAL MALFUNCTION CORRECTION ONLY A time line analysis was made of the use of the pilot loading during the total mission. It may be seen that the pilot is used to give flexibility, reliability, and the advantages of on-the-spot decision making. His use as a backup to the automatic or normal systems can be noted. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 One of the elements that must be more intensively evaluated for its effect on future research or military systems is the ion sheath as existing at projected Dyna-Soar flight levels. The ability of the pilot to see through the ion sheath is of great significance to use of backup attitude control or navigation systems that use the horizon or the ground as a point of reference. The effect of the ion sheath on communications places demands on data trans- mission in particular. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 6 4 2 0 2 1 6 LATERAL RANGE 1000 NO. One of the salient features of the design is the rather extensive longitudinal and lateral range afforded by the maneuverability of the glider. D2-80726 40 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 RE-ENTRY & LANDING To use the pilot to best advantage in his flexible and decision-making capability, the attainability of selected landing sites is computed on-board and displayed to the pilot. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 After the atmospheric re-entry is completed and the glider has reached the area of the landing field, man is used to accomplish a manual landing. In this final phase, man is used to effect the landing from his vantage point in the cockpit. Reliability and cost studies indicate his use yields a distinct advantage when compared to an automatic landing system. After landing, the debriefing of the man is used to give immediate qualitative data on occurrences during flight that may not have been instrumented for. These comments, along with the recorded data, will be used to correct the design of this and future space vehicles or to alter subsequent flight plans as appropriate. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Appendix A Backup to DS-022-101 R & D PROGRAM OBJECTIVES Statement of Work 620A-62-2 Early attainment of piloted orbital flight Provide piloted, maneuverable gliders and associated support equipment for the conduct of flight testing in the hypersonic and orbital flight regimes to include: Gathering of research data to solve design problems of controlled, lift- ing re-entry from orbital flight Demonstrate piloted, maneuvering re-entry and effect a conventional landing; at a preselected landing site The testing of vehicle equipments and exploration of man's functions in space Following successful orbital demonstration, to provide the capability for quick exploitation of technological advances through future tests Dyna-Soar Approach The program objectives will be attained by adapting the Dyna-Soar piloted winged body re-entry glider, initially designed under the Dyna-Soar Step I Program, for launch into orbit by the Titan III-C Booster. Maximum exploitation will be made of resources, experience, and knowledge now available. Initial flight test of the piloted glider, air launched from a B-52, will be made at Edwards Air Force Base to demonstrate low supersonic, transonic, and sub- sonic flight and landing capabilities, operation of subsystems, and to conduct pilot indoctrination. Subsequently, ground launch flights with the Titan III-C Booster will be conducted at AFMTC. Orbital flights are planned for landing at Edwards Air Force Base. The principal features of this program are: (1) a piloted spacecraft with lifting re-entry to provide maneuverability, low decelerations, a relatively wide flight corridor during re-entry, and the capability of landing with a conventional tangential landing at a preselected site; (2) man integrated into the system to exploit man's capability. System Design Objectives Specific system design objectives are specified in the Dyna-Soar System Speci- fication, Document ASNR-62-4, and include: Demonstration of successful boost from Cape Canaveral, orbital flight, re-entry and landing at Edwards AFB, with basic glider reusable for additional flights. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Acquisition during boost, orbital flight, re-entry and landing at Edwards of sys- tem development and research data measurements per flight from telemetry and on-board recording. System design for inherent pilot safety Reliability goal of the Dyna-Soar air vehicle (glider/transition/booster) of 95% for prelaunched checkout and countdown and 85% for flight. Design with no significant differences in airborne systems between the unmanned and piloted vehicles for those items critical to reliability and pilot safety. Minimum change to the Dyna-Soar glider designed during the Step I program to adapt it to the Titan III-C Booster for orbital flights. Retention in the orbital glider of the payload capability inherent in the Step I design. Test System O_bjeectives Development testing Energy management systems Exploration Maximum heating regions Safe limits of glider performance Structural heating and loads Stability and control Energy management during re-entry Evaluation System Performance Environmental characteristics Degree of maneuverability and range variation Performance limits and tolerances for controlled landings. Acquisition Data measurement Demonstration Piloted glider maneuverability during orbit and re-entry Capability of man Orbital and hypersonic flight regime Control of a maneuverable orbital vehicle Control during boost Long range flight management functions Effect conventional landing Potential applications usefulness Provide increased capability Piloted in-flight control and management Make decisions and take action in unusual situations Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 System Design. Requirements Communications and tracking Air to ground, ground to air, air to air Voice Command Beacon (rescue) Real time data Tracking acquisition Tracking beacon Guidance Auto trajectory - lift off to beginning of landing Abort trajectory steering commands Inertial displays Pilot manual control -normal trajectories to initial approach Backup information Re-entry with failed primary guidance system Malfunction detection Attitude information Control during landing Safety Test Instrumentation System Human Engineering Reliability Test System ]Etecjuirements System requirements to be met Orbital velocities Air vehicle configuration Piloted medium L/D glider Transition section Global missions Test data and operational experience Orbital and re-entry flight regimes Evaluation of performance versus objectives Air launch flights Air launch and ground launch Training Simulation Data reduction Maintenance D2-80726 45 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Appendix B Backup to DS-022 -186 SOME RELATIVE MERITS OF MANNED VS. UNMANNED DYNA-SOAR WEAPON SYSTEM 1. DECISION MAKING CAPABILITY A. Manned System A rapid and accurate decision-making capability is provided by "on the spot" assessment of the situation by a trained observer. This capability is a continuous function as the on-board observer is in constant and direct contact with events requiring man-made decisions. B. Unmanned System Assessment of the situation by trained observers on the ground must necessarily await the receipt of relevant data that is avail- able only when the glider is within range of a data acquisition station. This data, unlike that which can be made directly avail- able to the on-board observer, is subject to inaccuracies im- posed by data conditioning, transmission, reception and relay, processing and recording. II. COMMAND CONTROL CAPABILITY (Quick Reaction Capability) A. Manned System An immediate and positive command control capability is pro- vided. An on-board observer can initiate command control inputs to vehicle subsystems or payload subsystems in immediate reaction to observed conditions. B. Unmanned System Unprogrammed command control can be exercised only when the vehicle is within range of ground stations having a command control transmission capability. Additional equipment is re- quired in the vehicle to provide verification to the ground that the command control transmission has been received and acted upon. III. DETERMINATION-OF VEHICLE AND PAYLOAD STATUS A. Manned System An onboard observer can rapidly and continually assess the gross operational status of vehicle and payload subsystems to determine capability to perform all or part of the mission. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 B. Unmanned System Determination of vehicle and payload operational status on the ground requires the transmission of relevent data to the ground and the processing of this data by complex ground equipment. IV. POST-LAUNCH CHANGES IN MISSION PLAN A. Manned System Post-launch changes in mission plan can be fed into the vehicle and payload subsystems via ground to air voice instructions to the on-board observer. B. Unmanned System The mission program or plan depends on predetermined programs inserted into the subsystems prior to launch. V. PAYLOAD REDUNDANCY A. Manned System An on-board observer can augment certain payload functions or assume some payload functions in the event of payload subsystem breakdowns. B. Unmanned System In the event of payload subsystem failure, unless redundant subsystems are used, the entire mission can be a wasted effort. VI. MISSION DATA REDUNDANCY A. Manned System Mission data available from subsystems can be verified by in- formation from the on-board observer through the media of air to ground voice and postflight debriefing. B. Unmanned System Ground analysis is dependent upon only automatically acquired data. VII. MISSION DATA AUGMENTATION A. Manned System An on-board observer possesses the capability to acquire data of broad scope, either by intuition and judgment or by in-flight interrogation and instructions from ground personnel. B. Unmanned System Data acquisition is limited by the capability designed into the subsystems (black boxes). Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 VIII. RECOVERY OF ON-BOARD PAYLOAD DATA A. Manned System Piloted re-entry increases the probability of recovering the original on-board payload data. Pilot has capability for maneuvering the glider to meet unforeseen or abnormal situa- tions and can choose primary or alternate landing sites. In the event of a catastrophic situation, the pilot can relay observed mission data to the ground by voice. B. Unmanned System Glider control is limited to prelaunch inserted programs and range limitations of ground control equipment. On-board origi- nal data records are more subject to loss or damage. IX. ACCOMPLISHMENT OF MISSION DETAILS A. Manned System An on-board observer can optimize the gathering of mission data by providing direct adjustment or control of payload subsystems. Based on gross mission requirements, the observer serves as a vernier controller. B. Unmanned System Adjustment or control of subsystems from the ground is a re- mote step function process, limited by equipment design capabilities. X. SUBSYSTEM COMPLEXITY A. Manned System An. on-board observer is considered to be a general-purpose sub- system with a general-purpose compute capability to store data and analyze events. Less complexity in airborne and ground supporting subsystem equipment is required if the airborne ob- server assumes some of the subsystem functions. B. Unmanned System Subsystems designed to perform all functions required are necessarily complex with attendant reliability problems. XI. EARLY MISSION TERMINATION AND RECOVERY A. Manned System On pilot decision, return from orbit can be made from any point because of the availability of pilot decision and inherent vehicle maneuverability. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 ]3. Unmanned System An unmanned system is committed to mission termination based on on-board programming and the availability of geographically opportune ground command sites. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Appendix C Backup to DS-022-192 HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE FLIGHT TEST CENTER AIR FORCE SYSTEMS COMMAND UNITED STATES AIR FORCE EDWARDS AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA Redundant Systems and Pilot-in-the-Loop Aspects of All X-15 Flights AFPR, TBC, Seattle, Washington The Boeing Company ATTN: Mr. T. K. Jones Seattle, Washington 1. In accordance with agreements reached on 16 and 17 September 1961 among Mr. T. K. Jones of The Boeing Company, Mr. Hodapp of the Dyna- Soar SPO, Mr. J. L. Wesesky and Mr. R. G. Nagel of the AFFTC, the attached information will provide the necessary information on redundant (or back-up) systems and pilot-in-the-loop aspects for all forty X-15 free flights conducted to date. It is understood that this information will be com- bined by The Boeing Company with similar studies conducted on other manned and unmanned aerospace systems. It is further understood that this assimi- lated information will subsequently be provided to the Dyna-Soar SPO to assist that organization in justifying the benefits of redundant or back-up systems and the necessity for pilot-in-the-loop for Dyna-Soar. 2. In addition to the forty X-15 free flights covered in the attached material there have been thirty-one "no-launch" X-15 flights conducted to date; that is, on each of these thirty-one flights difficulties arose after B-52/,K-15 mated take-off which forced flight cancellation prior to X-15 launch from the B-52 carrier aircraft. Effort in the current study by the AFFTC has been concen- trated on the X-15 free flights, so the short time available has not permitted similar documentation of the "no-launch" flights. However, the study can be extended to the X-15 "no-launch" flights in the near future if there is a require- ment for this information. The attached "X-15 Flight Record" (Attachment 1) lists all seventy-one X--15 flights to date in chronological order to show the distribution of "free" and "no-launch" flights. 3. Development of the X-15 hardware requires some explanation for clari- fication of the malfunctions shown in this study. The initial landing gear was proven inadequate and required modification to sustain landing loads of piloted flight. Design requirements of the landing gear for an automatic landing sys- tem are not known and their effect neglected in this study. The ballistic con- trol system (reaction control) has not been developed to date, though it has not hindered the program since there have been no requirements on the flights performed thus far. The inertial guidance system, providing attitude, velocity, and altitude information to the pilot, has not performed satisfactorily. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 The early flights with the XLR-11 engines required attitude information only while relying on the air data system and ground call-out for accurate velocity and altitude. Hence the inertial system (stable platform) was not noted as a malfunction except where the attitude system failed as well. Later flight required removal of the nose boom, destroying the value of the air data. sys- tem. Reliance on the inertial system was required for these flights and hence malfunctions of the inertial computation are noted in the study. 4. For purposes of comparison in this study it has been assumed that un- piloted X-15 flights could be performed using existing X-15 subsystems by adding necessary autopilot and remote control functions. It is recognized that the subsystems for an unpiloted vehicle would be designed according to different criteria than those designed for piloted flight; thus a true compari- son from the designer's viewpoint is difficult to make. Overall program results, however, in terms of flights per calendar time and data return per flight are considered valid comparisons. 2 ATTCH 1. X-15 Flight Record (4 copies) 2. Detailed History -Redundant Sys & Pilot-in-the -Loop Aspects for All X-15 Free Flights, dtd 20 Sep 61 (4 copies) Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Appendix D Backup for DS-?022-198 - 167 Bomarc Flights Analysis of [ndividual Bomarc Flights Success Summary Relationships Actual vs. Expected Success for "Pilot Controlled" Flights Total BOMARC flights (Sept. 1952 -June 30, 1961) 167 Successes (85 to 100%) *85 Partial Successes (25 to 85%) 62 Unsuccessful (Less than 25%) 20 Expected Flight Success for "Pilot Controlled" Flights ccesses 137 S u Partial Successes Unsuccessful Basic assumptions: 1. Pilot replaces flight control and hydraulics systems. 2. Pilot has voice communication channel as auxiliary. 3. Pilot can override target seeker. 4. Pilot can control ramjets. 5. Aircraft can make second attack. Possible reasons for disagreement on flight improvement: Assumption 3: It was assumed that all Century-series fighters include target seekers as integral and essential portions of the fire control equipment. The seeker must therefore be operational for a successful mission. Assumption 4: Ramjet events occur with great rapidity, and automatic control is utilized. It may be doubtful for pilot control to do other than to degrade ramjet performance. Assumption 5: Because of the high speed, the aircraft turning radius is very large, and considerable time would be required to make a second attack. The usefulness of assuming a second attack may be questioned. * For this study, this number assumes flights of 624-21 and Y-18 were successful. Previously these two flights were downgraded to "Partial successes" because of loss of data prior to interception. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Expected Flight Improvement for "Pilot Controlled" Flights Missile No. System Responsible Nature of Problem Expected Improvement Change Block II June -Sept. 19 53 623-3 F/C Hardover elevator P to S Block IIIA Aug. 1954-July 1955 623-7 F/C Hardover elevator. 623-12 F/C Misaligned yaw rate gyro- oscillations destroyed rudder. Block IIIB Feb. -July 1956 623-14 F/C Oscillations in roll and yaw. P to S 623-17 T/S Internal lock-on precluded target acquisition. P to S Block IVB July 19 57 -Jan. 19 58 624-7 B/N Dest. Extraneous destruct signal triggered destruct. P to S 624-10 R/J Ramjet blowout -apparent early Mach cut-in. P to S 624-12 C/S No response to missile azimuth heading commands. P to S 624-13 C/S Delayed response to dive command. P to S 624-14 WCE Radar errors led to mis- positioning. P to S Block IVC Mar. -- Aug. 1958 624-17 R/J One engine did not go to rich limit. P to S 624-18 T/S Did not lock-on to available target. P to S 624-25 * S = Success, F/C Yaw rate channel out. P = Partial Success, U = Unsuccessful U to S Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 16XY Aug. 19 58 -April 19 59 XY-3 C/C Short circuit in C/C provided pitch-down command. U to P XY-16 C/S Premature dive. P to S XY-12 C/C Stable platform drifted, missile off course. P to S 200AY-1 Jan. -April 1959 Y-21 T/S Acquired cloud. P to S Y-29 WCE Computer programming error -off course. P to S Y-28 T/S Antenna rate loop malfunctioned. P to S Y-37 WCE and B/N Lost track and overshot target. P to S Y-30 C/S Dive timer ran down early. P to S 200AY-2 June-Oct. 1959 Y-24 C/S Late dive. P to S Y-41 C/S Azimuth control malfunctioned. P to S Y-44 C/S Erroneous launch azimuth - destroyed. U to S Y-43 F/C Loss of damping signals. U to S Contractor Review Feb. -Aug. 1960 -6248 F/C Instability in roll or yaw. P to S -6260 T/S Antenna lost track-slewed to stops. P to S -6258 C/S Did not dive on command. P to S -6263 F/C Erroneous azimuth heading. U to S -6944 Processing Error in aligning C/C. P to S Category III Jan. 1961 - Present -1938 F/C Off course -destroyed. U to S -6964 WCE Commands not acceptable. P to S -6947 WCE Commands not acceptable. P to S -1951 C/S Did not dive on command. P to S 631- Block I May 1959-April 1960 631-2 R/J Lean limit blowout. P to S 631-3 R/J Blowout, angle of attack. P to S 631-4 R/J Blowout, drop in fuel flow. P to S 631-6 R/B Roll bulkhead servovalve failed. P to S 631-8 F/C Mach servo failed. U to S D2-80726 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 631- Block II April 1960 -Present 631-12 C/S Radio frequency interference. P to S 631-13 C/S Radio frequency interference. P to S 631-15 F/C Erroneous launch heading - destroyed. U to S 631-20 WCE, C/S Data link incompatibility. P to S 631-18 T/S Did not lock-on (small target) P to S 631-17 T/S Improper test point termination P to S 631-24 T/S Continuous false detections. P to S 631-25 F/C Surface effectiveness servo malfunctioned. P to S 631-28 T/S Loss of lock-on, reorientation of antenna. P to S 631-30 T/S Satisfactory flight - downgraded for objectives. P to S 631-29 T/S Loss of lock-on, reorientation of antenna. P to S 631-32 WCE Erroneous target height inputs. P to S IM-99B Cat. IX Jan. 1961 -Present B-2 T/S or F/C Erroneous guidance. P to S B-11 T/S Did not lock-on to accessible target. P to S Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Appendix E Backup to DS-022_1.98 - Regulus I Flights EFFECT OF REDUNDANCY + PILOT-IN-THE -LOOP First 100 Regulus Flig is At the request of A. K. Murray of Boeing, D. R. Starkey of Chance Vought has completed an analysis of the first 100 Regulus flights based on archive data. In examining data from the archives, it was found that in these 100 flights there were 15 (unintentional) early expenditures or failures resulting in complete loss of the missile. The resulting success rate was found to be . 85. This was achieved by having well-trained contractor personnel, advice of Engineering per- sonnel well-versed in the design, manufacture, and qualification testing of the equipment, close control which could be extended by the contractor in-house, government furnishing of duplicate chase planes, etc. It should be noted that in turning the missile over for Navy operation, the relia- bility for the year of 1954 dropped to .69. This average of .69 was made up from a . 59 success rate for ship-based launches, and . 79 for land-based launches. By training Navy personnel and Chance Vought technical advice, average success rate had increased to . 77 by 1955 and . 85 for 1956. The detailed data which fol- lows on the 100 Regulus flights follows the same ground rules as were used for preparing the 784 flight analysis; that is, it was estimated the pilot would be aboard with suitable displays and airplane controls and there would be no redun- dant systems. Again it was noted that the success rate for operational use with trained personnel did not quite duplicate or come up to the success rate achieved by the contractor during the development program. The summary of the first 100 flights shows that of the 15 losses, 9 could have been saved by having a pilot aboard and 2 additional could probably have been saved by pilot aboard. To eliminate controversy we're considering that 9 only rather than 11 could have been saved. Contrasting Regulus (unmanned) flights with manned F8U flights, it was seen that during the first 100 flights of the F8U only one aircraft was lost and this was caused by structural failure which it is believed would have happened to the manned or unmanned vehicle. Tm" Arthur Murray A Murray/mj D2-80726 56 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Page One Summary of the following data indicates that of 15 losses experienced during the first 100 Regulus flights, inclusion of a pilot would have saved 9 vehicles as indicated by the asterisk. * 1. After normal take-off, the stabilization system failed during climb. The missile entered a steepening turn and crashed nose down and inverted. Pilot could have saved the vehicle. 15. Missile was lost during let-down due to failure of the control system caused by circuit malfunction. Missile entered a dive and did not pull out. Nor- mally a pilot would be expected to save the vehicle from this type of loss. However, it is not absolutely certain that the pilot's manual control inputs would have by-passed the malfunctioning component. Not considered as a "save" to eliminate controversy. 18. The hydraulic system malfunctioned during climb. It's possible that a pilot might have saved the vehicle if a hand pump had been available. Since the inclusion of a hand pump of this type is not necessarily standard procedure, there is some question as to whether a pilot could have saved the vehicle. Therefore, to eliminate controversy, this is presented as a loss that the pilot would not have prevented. * 22. Missile was lost during inbound turn because of weak control signal and radio command interference. The pilot probably could have eliminated the need to destruct the vehicle. * 30. Low-altitude assault pass under Navy flight control. Vehicle could have been saved by pilot operating a normal manual fuel selector. 36. The booster did not eject; therefore, the climb bias remained engaged. This vehicle could not have been saved by the pilot. 38. Booster rocket ejection fitting failed to operate; did not eject. Vehicle stalled on approach. Pilot may have been able to save the vehicle. Not counted as a possible "save" to eliminate controversy. * 39. No command control caused the loss of the vehicle. Lack of either chase airplane or ground system signals permitted the vehicle to crash. A pilot would have continued to fly. 46. Left booster fired 6 seconds after right. Thrust misalignment caused the vehicle to describe an erratic path terminated by the fuselage and elevator striking the lake bed. This could not have been saved by having a pilot aboard. * 52. Flight termination command inadvertently activated by ground crew. This destruct system would not have been in a manned vehicle. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Page Two * 63. Following launch, hard-over nose-down signal was generated due to loss of pitch reference. Missile struck the water nose low and was destroyed with- out burning. Pilot could have saved this one. * 68. The missile began to roll 7 minutes after take-off. Handing over control of the missile from one remote system to another was not effective. The mis- sile was lost in the transfer. A pilot aboard would have taken over. * 77. Pitch oscillation developed in the Sperry climb control during the approach phase of flight. The landing sequence operated early. Gear came down too soon, and the combination caused the airplane to crash on approach. A pilot would have saved the vehicle by eliminating the pitch oscillation and delaying the extension of the gear to a more favorable time. 90. Left main gear failed to extend during approach; the missile cart-wheeled on touch-down. The pilot would not have saved this vehicle. * 91. The TROUNCE I decoder malfunctioned 1 hour and 20 minutes after launch. Need for a decoder would have been eliminated by pilot. * In analyzing the Regulus data from the first 100 flights, the Chance Vought ground rule of "pilot + single system - (no redundancy)" was followed with a projected success rate for manned flight of 94 percent. ** The pronounced improvement afforded by including the pilot and then giving the pilot more tools to work with, i. e. , redundancy, is illustrated by the pilot + redundancy success rate of 98 percent. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Appendix F Backup for DS-022-198 Cost for Automation Delta cost does not include range and communication network for automatic control system (SAGE or equivalent) Unit Cost/flight = $15. 4 million (booster hardware consumed only) Base flight quantity in all cases = 18 For example: X-15 experience would indicate that 31 DS flights would be required to accomplish 18 missions. X-15 experience = 31 DS flights desired = 18 Flights = 13 x 15.4 = 200.2 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Appendix G Backup to DS-022-198 N A T I O N A L A E R O N A U T I C S A N D S P A C E ADMINISTRATION FLIGHT RESEARCH CENTER SOX 273, EDWARDS, CALIFORNIA CLw ,'oAO L-211I TWX: `DWA DS CM. 7)47 August 9, 1960 From: NASA Flight Research Center Commander Air Research and Development Command Wright Air Development Division Directorate of Systems Management Wright-Patterson Air Force Base Dayton, Ohio Attention: Mr. T. J. Keating, Ass't Chief, Dyna-Soar Engineering Office Subject: Flight Research Center Manned Rocket Flight Study Ref: VVADD letter to FRC, dated 6/14/60, jt/38109 1. In response to the request of the reference letter, the results of an investigation of the Flight Research Center's manned rocket flights and incidents encountered are enclosed along with the Flight Research Center's comments. 2. The Flight Research Center trusts the information and comments will be useful in evaluating the role of man as an integral part of an aircraft control system and in the preparation of your paper "What Price Man?" Paul F. Bikle Director Enclosure (1) Summary JG/TFB:fhs TAT DEB Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 FLIGHT RESEARCH CENTER MANNED ROCKET FLIGHT STUDY SUMMARY A study of NACA-NASA manned rocket flights and the number and types of incidents encountered in connection with the flights was made at the request of Mr. T. J. Keating, Assistant Chief, Dyna-Soar Engineering Office, WADD. The purpose of the study was to provide some statistical-type data on manned rocket flight to aid in determining the value of using a human pilot as an integral part of a rocket-aircraft: control system. A total of 190 NACA-NASA manned rocket flights were studied. During these flights., 84 incidents were experienced. Thirty-four of the incidents, or approximately 18 percent of the flights investigated were serious enough that loss of the aircraft could have resulted. The data compiled, although not necessarily complete or 100-percent correct, are considered accurate enough to indicate the trends and the percentage of incidents encountered. A summary of these flights is shown in Table I. The individual flight tabulation from which Table I was de- rived will be forwarded on request. From this investigation and from the Flight Research Center's manned rocket-flight experience, the FRC firmly believes that a human pilot should be considered a necessary complement to a flight control system to obtain the greatest reliability, versatility, and mission accomplishments. Two pilots at this research center are experienced rocket pilots, one with 46 rocket powered flights and the other with 30 rocket powered flights. Their thoughts on manned versus unmanned vehicles are especially appropriate, since they have been sub- jected to many of the inflight incidents previously described. Their comments and the pilot's role in flight research are attached. Your attention is also called to a paper presented at the ARS semiannual meeting of May 9-12, 1960, entitled, "The Pilot's Contribution to Mission Reliability on the X-15 Program, " by James R. Drake, which discusses the pilot's contributions as a servomechanism and a programmer and considers his effect on vehicle reliability and weight. From a similar investigation of 1, 000 research and support-type NASA jet-aircraft flights (see Table IJ . 151, or approximately 15 percent, experienced serious incidents. A comparison of rocket flights with jet flights indicates that the percent of serious incidents occurring in rocket flight is not appreciably greater than that encountered in research and support jet flights. However, it should be pointed out that a comparison of this nature is somewhat compromised because of the increased emphasis on top-quality maintenance and proper opera- tion of rocket vehicle systems as opposed to the routine maintenance performed on the jet aircraft. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 The flight data and pilot's notes on rocket flights performed by agencies other than NASA were not complete enough to warrant an investigation of these flights; however, available Air Force and contractor flight records are noted in Table I, but were not used in compiling statistical data (except for the X-15). Flights that were scheduled as glide flights only, those which were aborted be- fore drop, or those on which the rocket airplane was intentionally jettisoned due to an emergency from the carrier airplane were not included in compiling sta- tistical data.. One such aircraft was lost by NASA when the rocket aircraft experienced an explosion prior to planned launch. The pilot was able, with the help of the crew of the carrier airplane, to climb into the bomb bay before jettison. On another attempted rocket flight, the pilot of the rocket airplane decided to abort the flight just prior to launch because of improper operation of the propellant- pressurization system. Simultaneously, the propeller governor system of the number 4 engine of the carrier airplane failed. The pilot of the carrier airplane jettisoned the rocket airplane with the pilot aboard. The rocket pilot success- fully jettisoned all rocket propellant and landed the airplane without further inci- dent. The number 4 propeller subsequently broke away and passed through the carrier airplane in the bomb-bay area where the rocket airplane is normally sus- pended. The carrier airplane was landed successfully, although it was badly damaged. As mentioned previously, of the 190 NACA-NASA rocket flights investigated, there were 84 flights in which an incident was experienced. These incidents are further classified into serious (*) or minor (-) incidents as follows: Serious incident (*) is any incident which, assuming an automatically con- trolled vehicle, could cause loss of the aircraft: Examples: 1. Loss of aircraft stability due to design inadequacy (a) CNQ = 0 (b) Etc. 2. Loss of propulsion 3. Systems failure (a) Control (b) Guidance (c) Etc. 4. Complete radio and/or telemetry failure. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Minor incident (-) is any incident which affects the flight but does not necessarily place the vehicle in jeopardy. Examples: 1. Incorrect fuel-gage indication 2. Circuit breaker popping in flight 3. Intermittent radio operation 4. System malfunction (a) (b) (c) (d) Afterburner Landing gear Pressurization Etc. 5. Drag-chute malfunction 6. Flight instrument inoperative or incorrect 7. Improper engine operation Note: On several flights, one or more rocket chambers failed to fire. In conjunction with the rocket flights, 1, 000 research and support jet- aircraft flights were investigated. The individual data for each flight recorded is available and may be obtained if desired. A summary of these flights is pre- sented in Table II. The following facts, opinions, and comments were developed from. the in- vestigation of the 190 rocket and 1, 000 jet-aircraft NASA flights. The Flight Research Center firmly believes that a human pilot should be considered an integral component of a flight control system. The human operator provides a capability for immediate evaluation and modification of the flight plan or for a successful abort during any phase of the flight. Questionable flight re- gimes are sensed by the pilot as they are encountered, and previous flight ex- perience in regions of close proximity gives him the capability of avoiding disas- trous penetrations into these areas. A pilot can often recognize problems before they occur, evaluate problems as they occur, and take the best corrective action to accomplish the mission or recover the aircraft. A pilot contributes more than his visual sense to the success of a mission. Pilots use senses such as hearing and touch to warn of impending trouble in tur- bines, engines, hydraulic and pressurization systems, instruments, and acces- sories. Aircraft have been saved because a pilot recognized the presence of an electrical fire, through smell, and took corrective action or returned for an emergency landing. In research flying, the pilot is considered even more important to the success of a mission, since the very nature of research flying implies approaches and penetrations of unknown regions of flight. Unpredicted airplane motions have been encountered during these penetrations and, in most cases, some technique D2-80726 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 of recovery has been used by the pilot which resulted in the recovery of the air- plane. Examples of these unpredicted airplane motions are abrupt trim changes, pitch-up, roll-coupling, tumbling, dutch roll, aileron reversal, and directional divergence. Some of the recovery techniques used were not in keeping with standard procedure or doctrine, but were resorted to after other methods failed. Simple recovery techniques learned through experience, such as neutralizing controls, reducing velocity, or changing altitude, have enabled pilots to save many airplanes. Programing automatic control systems to effect nonstandard recoveries is possible only with excessive complexity, if at all. Until each aircraft component that can affect the success of a mission can be considered 100-percent reliable, the pilot is a necessary complement to a flight control system. To achieve 100-percent reliability would entail excessive costs in design and component replacement. The Flight Research Center is fully aware that some flight aborts occurred because of pilot error or malfunctions of pilot support systems such as oxygen or cabin pressurization systems; however, the FRC firmly believes that the ad- vantages of using a human pilot as an integral component of a flight control sys- tem outweigh the disadvantages. John Gibbons Aeronautical Research Engineer Milton 0. Thompson Aeronautical Research Pilot Victor Horton Aeronautical Research Engineer Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 TABLE I ROCKET AND ROCKET-JET FLIGHT SUMMARY ACFT NASA USAF NAVY USMC DOUGLAS BELL NAA TOTAL X-1 #1 0 49 X-1 #2 50 1 X-1 A 14 1 20 X-1 B 15 8 4 X-1 E 26 0 X-2 #1 0 13 D-558-H #143 1 0 19 D-558-11 #144 69 1 6 5 D-558-II #145 39 2 5 7 X-1.5 #670 6 0 X-15 #671 0 0 2 9 Total Flights 207 + 94 + 25 + 10 + 7 + 18 + 1.1 372 Total Flights Investigated 179 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 + I1 - 190 Total Incidents 81 + 3 _ 84 % Incidents 45. 3% 27.3% Serious Incidents 32 + 2 = 34 % Serious Incidents 17.9% Minor Incidents 49 Total Aircraft lost 1 (D 2 3 0 0 0 2 4 0 Aircraft Lost in 0 1. 0 0 0 1 0 Flight Pilots Lost 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 *Definition of Serious and Minor Incidents for the purpose of this summary is defined on page 3. NOTES: 1 (X-1-A) Explosion in LOX tank of X-1A prior to drop, X-1A jettisoned 2 (X-1-D) Explosion in LOX tank of X-1D at low altitude during ^ettison prior to drop. 3 (X-2) Lost in flight after pilot separated escape capsule following extreme aircraft gyrations. 4 (X-1-3) Explosion in LOX tank of X-1-3 during LOX jettison on ground after aborted flight. 5 (X-2) Explosion in LOX tank of X-2 during systems check; airplane and pilot lost. D2-80726 65 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 TABLE II JET AIRCRAFT FLIGHT SUMMARY Aircraft Total Flights Total Research Total Incidents Serious Minor F-100A #778 262 1.39 63 1O 53 F-1000 #717 53 13 27 8 19 F-104A #734 94 81 24 9 15 F-104A #749 81 70 9 3 6 F-104A #961 139 130 68 43 25 F-104B #303 30 20 16 10 6 F-107A #120 41 41 17 1O 7 D-558-I#142 78 78 23 14 9 X-3 #892 24 24 10 3 7 X-4 #667 76 76 36 15 21. X-5 #838 122 122 43 26 17 1000 795 336 151 185 Total Flights Investigated 1000 Total Incidents 336 % Incidents 33.6% * Serious Incidents 151 % Serious Incidents 15.1% Minor Incidents 185 Total Aircraft 1 Lost Total Pilots Lost 1 *Definition of Serious and Minor incidents for the purpose of this paper is defined on p age 3. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 PILOT'S ROLE IN FLIGHT RESEARCH The knowledge obtained from any research program is a direct function of the number of parameters measured. In any conceivable data-gathering system installed in a vehicle, there are some unrecorded parameters which can be quali- tatively measured by the pilot. In addition, the pilot provides a means of expand- ing on, interpreting, or correlating the recorded information to give a more complete and meaningful report to the flight results. The argument that additional expense of money and weight are involved when a pilot is provided for is some- what mitigated by the saving of money and time when a vehicle is recovered by pilot action. In the initial approach to a vehicle design in which a pilot is to be included, more effort is devoted to reliability and safety. This shows up in the later phases of the program in greater mission success as a result of concen- trated effort to insure proper operation of a vehicle component or data system. Some vehicles have been designed to use automatic systems but have been modi- fied. to include a pilot monitor. This concept compromises both the automatic system and the pilot in many ways and both are penalized in unanticipated situa- tions and control capability. The pilot is required to analyze the severity of an emergency and decide to override the automatic system without previous feel for the problem and without full knowledge of the manner in which the situation is deteriorating. Inclusion of the pilot in the control loop at all times is desirable so that correc- tive action, when required, can be initiated by the pilot, using cues obtained during normal flight and early phases of a divergence, while the automatic por- tion of the system (similar to an airplane three-axis damper) is accomplishing the routine flight requirements. Joseph Walker Aeronautical Research Pilot John B. McKay Aeronautical Research Pilot JW/JBMcK:fhs Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/04: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Appendix H Backup to DS-022-192 - DETAILED HISTORY - REDUNDANT SYSTEMS AND PILOT-IN-THE-LOOP ASPECTS FOR ALL X-15 FREE FLIGHTS 20 September 1961 Flight Type Problem Corrective Redundant or Emergency Pilot-In-The-Loop Effect Result If No. or Failure Action System Effect Completed Alter- Saved Completed Alter- Saved No Redundancy or Planned nate Hard- Planned nate Hard- Emergency Back- Mission Miss. ware Mission- Miss. ware up 1-1-5 1. Pitch SAS 1. Pilot made X malfunction corrective con- P + R prior to launch trol inputs. & design defi- ciencies, re- sulting in flight control oscil- lation just before landing. 2. Landing gear 2. No cor- and structural rective act- damage. ion in flights 2-1-3 1. Upper engine 1. No correc- governor failure tive action on resulting in fuel flights* pump rupture and fire. 2. Nose landing 2. No corrective gear door damage. action on flights* (*Post flight repair and redesign accomplished) Cancellation of X-15 launch if no manual direct control mode as backup to aug- mented mode. No Pilot-In- The-Loop Cancellation of X-15 launch, or probable loss of X-15 via crash on landing if SAS malfunction were not detected prior to launch. Effect Symbols Keys X- Effect(s) of flight's most detrimental item(s). 0- Effect that would have been contributed by item had the flight not been affected by other more detrimental items. Weighting Factor Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Flight Type Problem No. or Failure 2-2-6 1. SAS roll damper failed at launch. 2-3-9 _. Explosion in lower engine on start, result- ing in fire and extensive dam- age in aft end of X-15. 2. Fuselage failure on land- ing-severe buckling aft of cockpit. 3. SAS roll damper failed at launch, and failed again in flight after reset. Corrective Redundant or Emergency Action System Effect Pilot-in-the-Loop Effect Result If Completed Planned Mission avail-subse- P + R quently limited roll inputs. 1. Pilot attempted roll SAS reset to no 1. Pilot shut down engines, jettisoned propellants and made emergency landing at alternate landing site. 2. Repair and re- design subsequent to flight-failure due to structural defici- ency and heavy, nose-high landing. P+R 3. Pilot attempted 0 roll SAS reset to no avail-subsequently limited roll control inputs. Weighting Factor Alter- Saved Completed Alter- Saved No Redundancy nate Hard- Planned nate Hard- or Emergency Miss. ware Mission Miss. ware Backup X Certain loss of X-15 if no manual direct control mode P + R as backup to aug- mented mode. SAS monitor channel provided necessary fail-safety to pre- vent hard-over con- P trol signal. No Pilot- in-the-Loop Definite control ability problems and certain loss of X-15. Loss of X-15. Pilot provided extreme flexi- bility commen- surate with dras- tically altered flight require- ments. Possible loss of X-15; pilot landed A/C under abnormal weight conditions and without roll damping. 0 Certain loss of X-15 if no manual direct control mode as back-up to augmented mode. SAS monitor channel provided necessary fail-safety to pre- vent hard-over con- trol signal. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Definite control- lability problems and certain loss of X-15. Approved For Release 2007/05/08j: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Flight Type Problem Corrective Redundant or Emergency No. or Failure Action System Effect Completed Alter- Saved Completed Alter- Saved No Redundancy Planned nate Hard- Planned nate Hard- or Emergency Mission Miss. ware Mission Miss. ware Backup 1-2-7 1. Moderate 1. Repeated x stability and con- pilot control trol problems due inputs to dampen P + H to failed SAS oscillations. SAS pitch damper, pitch failure not annunciated to pilot. X Certain loss of X-15 if no manual direct control mode as back-up to augmented mode. 2-4-1 1. Cooling sys- 1. Pilot intro- X tem deficient duced ram air in prior to launch. lieu of continuing P + R primary cooling saved system operation, abort 2. Hydraulic 2. Pilot monitored system #1 over- closely and allowed pressurized on continued operation start of APU #1 when #1 hydraulic prior to launch. pressures came back down to normal in 5 seconds. 3. Nose landing 3. Repair and re- gear bottomed out design subsequent because strut not to flight. No cor- fully pressurized rective action in prior to landing. flight. saved N/A P and abort heat. Cancellation of X-15 launch. Possible cancellation of X-15 launch via automatic or monitor cut-out. Weighting Factor No Pilot- in-the-Loop Certain loss of control and result- ant loss of X-15. X* Probable equipment Possible equipment and passenger over-and passenger over- heat. Cancellation of X-15 launch. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/081: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Flight Type Problem No. or Failure 2-5-12 1. Pitch and roll SAS failure on #1 APU start and pitch SAS failure at jettison check prior to launch. 2. Primary launch mechan- ism failed. 3. Upper engine failed to start at launch due to in- adequate prime. 4. Upper engine automatic shut- down 220 sec. after launch. Lower engine continued to operate. 5. Damage to L. H. landing gear bungee. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Corrective Action 1. Pilot reset SAS after cock- pit instrument and ground moni- tor check in both instances. 2. Successfully P - R used emergency 0 launch system actuated by B-52 pilot, 3. Pilot reset P - R controls, allowed time for adequate prime while gliding, and restarted engine. 4. Pilot tried engine restarts to no avail, so immedi- ately altered flight path drastically to avoid exceeding glide distance to landing site. 5. Repair subsequent to flight. No correc- tive action in flight. Redundant or Emergency System Effect Pilot-in-the-Loop Effect Completed Planned Mission Alter- Saved Completed Alter- Saved No Redundancy nate Hard- Planned hate Hard- or Emergency Miss. ware Mission Miss. ware Backup saved abort saved abort launch and pos- sible hazardous X-15 hang-up on B-52 pylon. 0 Pump cavitation and failure, and explosive ignition (if no malfunction safe engine con- trols). X X Unstable engine combustion and probable damage (if no malfunction safe engine con- trols) . Weighting Factor No Pilot- in-the-Loop X-15 launch would have been cancelled unless remote SAS reset capability were provided (pre- launch only). Cancelled X-15 launch and possible hazardous X-15 hang-up on B-52 pylon- (Note: B-52 pilot was in loop at this point.) Certain loss of X-15 unless an additional control and guidance capability were in- cluded to effect altered flight profile and land- ing under nonnormal conditions. Certain loss of X-15 unless an additional control and guidance capability were in- cluded to effect altered flight profile and land- ing under nonnormal conditions. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Flight Type Problem Corrective Redundant or Emergency No. or Failure Action System Effect P and abort Completed Alter- Saved Completed Alter- Saved No Redundancy Planned nate Hard- Planned nate Hard- or Emergency Mission Miss. ware Mission Miss. ware Backup 2-6-13 1. SAS roll 1. Pilot reset X oll a ..ps_r trip -out upe,,.rs. damper roll dampers. on high roll rates after launch. 1-3-8 1. External 1. Pilot started B-52 power to #1 APU early to X-15 radio failed check radio on prior to launch, internal power- found problem. 0 2. SAS roll trip- 2. Pilot reset out 2 min. before roll channel. launch. 3. Upper engine 3. Pilot reset failed to start at controls. Allowed launch due to in- time for reprime adequate prime. made one unsuc- cessful restart attempt, reset again and allowed more time for adequate reprime while gliding, and finally restarted engine. X-15. Sec roll monitor channel provided fail- safety to prevent hard-over control signal. Probable cancel- lation on X-15 launch due to in- ability to make check-emergency X-15 battery pro- vided backup while APU #1 being turned on and loaded. X X Turbopump pump cavitation and fail- ure, and explosive ignition (if no mal- function safe engine controls). Weighting Factor No Pilot- in-the-Loop Loss of roll stability augmentation, result- ing in certain loss of X-15. Probable cancellation of X-15 launch due to uncertainty of radio status. Cancelled X-15 launch unless remote SAS reset capability were provided (prelaunch only) . Certain loss of X-15 unless an additional control and guidance capability were included to effect altered flight profile and landing under nonnormal con- ditions. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08 CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Flight Type Problem No. or Failure 1-3-5 (Cont.) 4. Inertial guid- ance system was completely inop- erative. 5. X-15 subsys- tems were not in spec. at planned launch point. 2-7-15 NONE 2-8-16 NONE 1-4-9 1. All SAS chan- nels tripped out at B-52 to X-15 power transfer. 2. Hydraulic leak in #2 control line of lower rud- der actuator. 1-5-10 1. Hydraulic leak in #2 supply line of upper rudder actuator. Corrective Redundant or Emergency Action System Effect Completed Planned Mission 4. Air data sys- 0 tem and alternate attitude indicator served as back- ups. 5. B-52/X-15 made 10 min. circle while pilot monitored cockpit gauges, re- cycled subsystems controls and assessed all systems ready for launch. Launch was accomplished at planned launch location on 2nd pass. 1. Pilot successfully reset all SAS channels. 2. Repaired subsequent X to flight. #1 hydraulic system provided neces- sary redundancy. No correction in flight. 1. Repaired subse- X quent to flight. #1 hydraulic system pro- vided necessary redun- dancy. No correction in flight. Pilot-in-the-Loop Effect Result If Alter- Saved Completed Alter- Saved No Redundancy nate Hard- Planned nate Hard- or Emergency Miss, ware Mission Miss, ware Backup 0 saved abort Cancelled X-15 launch. On higher performance mis- sion IGS is firm requirement. X saved abort Possible loss of yaw control and subsequent loss of X-15. Possible loss of yaw control and subsequent loss of X-15. Weighting Factor No Pilot- in-the-Loop Cancelled X-15 launch unless suitable backup auto or remote guidance system provided. Cancelled X-15 launch. Cancellation of X-15 launch unless remote SAS reset capability was provided (pre- launched only). None -pilot unaware 1/2 of leak. None -pilot unaware 1/2 of leak. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/09: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Flight Type Problem No. or Failure 1-6-11 1. All SAS chan- nels tripped out when X-15 gener- ators loaded before launch. 2. SAS roll damper monitor channel failed at launch and on high roll inputs. Corrective Redundant or Emergency Action System Effect Pilot-in-the-Loop Effect Result If 1. Pilot imme- diately reset all SAS channel s. 2. Pilot attempted to reset roll damp- ers in each case. Completed Planned Mission 3. Lower ventral 3. Pilot lowered failed to jettison landing gear, which on primary jet- actuated an emer- tison command. gency jettison mechanism. 1-7-12 1. Inertial guid- ance system was completely inoperative. 2. Radio com- munication with X-15 was inter- mittent and "hashy" on pri- mary antenna. 1. Air data system X and alternate atti- tude served as back- 2. Pilot switched X to alternate an- tenna, and radio communication im- proved considerably. Alter- Saved Completed Alter- Saved No Redundancy nate Hard- Planned nate Hard- or Emergency Miss, ware Mission Miss, ware Backup X* avoid abort Weighting Factor No Pilot- in-the-Loop X-15 launch would have been cancelled unless remote SAS reset capa- bility were provided (prelaunch only) . In this case re- Fail-safe features re- dundancy effect of quired for pilot safety the fail-safe SAS would not be operating roll monitor chan- for unpiloted flights; nel was a detriment, thus this failure would as the monitor chan-have been averted. nel (not the working channel) failed. In this case X-15 N/A would have landed with lower ventral attached, which means ventral would contact ground before land- ing gear, thus inflic- ting extensive damage to X-15. Cancelled X-15 Cancelled X-15 launch launch. On higher unless suitable backup performance flights auto or remote guidance IGS is firm req't. system provided. Communication N/A with pilot would have proved un- acceptable and X-15 launch would have been cancelled. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Flight Type Problem No. or Failure 1-7-12 3. Homing indi- (cont.) cator was in- operative. 1-8-13 1. All SAS channels tripped- out when X-15 generators were loaded before launch. 2. No ground-to- X-15 radio com- munication during most of ascending and early descend- ing parts of flight. Corrective Action 3. Pilot headed X-15 on basis of ground radio calls regarding radar track. 1. Pilot immedi- ately reset all SAS channels. Redundant or Emergency Pilot-In-The-Loop Effect Result If System Effect Completed Alter- Saved Completed Alter- Saved No Redundancy or No Pilot- Planned nate Hard- Planned nate Hard- Emergency Back- In-The- Mission Miss. ware Mission Miss. ware up Loop Possible erroneous Possible erroneous heading and loss of heading and loss of /C A/C 'Mess alternate control system pro- vided. 2. Pilot had to x rely upon air- borne instruments and make necessary compensations. have been cancelled unless remote SAS reset capability were provided (pre- launch only). No guidance infor- If inertial guidance mation for pilot. system had been devel- oped, a normal un- X-15 would have piloted flight could been lost. have been accomplished. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Weighting Factor Approved For Release 2007/05/0 Detailed History - X-15 Free Flights (Cont. ) Flight Type Problem Corrective No. or Failure Action Redundant or Emergency Systems Effect Pilot-In-The-Loop Effect Completed Alter- Saved Completed Alter- Saved Planned nate Hard- Planned nate Hard- Miss. Miss. ware Mission Miss. ware 2-9-18 1. Two reaction 1. Pilot observed X 1/2 Saved Abort X 1/2 control rockets this and switched failed to shut off off the faulty re- during prelaunch action control sys- check when controls tem, leaving the returned to neutral. other redundant system on. 2. Severe SAS- induced control surface oscilla- tions - one cycle just before landing & many cycles af- ter landing. 1-9-17 1. LOX jettison valve failed to open after engine shutdown. 2. Pilot stopped post-landing oscillations by turning SAS off. 2. None. Engine shutdown on LOX exhaustion, so no significant LOX quantity left on board to jettison. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Result If No Redundant or No Pilot-In- Emergency The-Loop Back-Up Had this been a Cancellation of high altitude flight, X-15 launch or the flight would have if the failed open been canceled ui, if launch had oc- curred, insuffi- cient control au- thority would have been avail- able to the pilot at low q. rocket had not been detected, APU & reaction control fuel would have pro- bably been depleted before completion of the mission, result- ing in loss of the X-15. X N, 'A Possible structural damage to X-15 after landing. Weighting Factor Approved For Release 2007/05/0 Detailed History-X-15 Free Flights (Cont.) Flight Type Problem No. or Failure Corrective Action 1-11-21 1. LOX fill valve leaked during flight - called out by chase pilot. 1-12-23 1. Inertial Guid- ance System had gross errors in altitude, total velocity and ver- tical velocity data both before and after launch. 1-13-24 1. Complete engine failure at initiation of first turn after approximately 150 secs. of powered flight due to spur- ious power supply interruption. 1-14-27 1. Partial umbili- cal disconnect dur- ing B-52 takeoff causing: a) IGS to go into inertial mode. b) Failure of the B-52/X-15 inter- com system. None -- chase pilot monitored leak until X-15 launch. 1. Pilot used back-up sources of altitude and velocity data - namely, pres- sure instruments and ground radar call-out. 1. Unsuccessful restart attempt. Pilot flew opti- mum glide return to base and per- formed successful landing. Redundant or Emergency System Effect Pilot-In-The-Loop Effect Completed Alter- Saved Completed Alter- Saved No Redundancy Planned nate Hard- Planned nate Hard- or Emergency Mission Miss. ware Mission Miss. ware Back-Up N/A Cancellation of X-15 launch. Note: On higher performance X-15 flights inertial altitude and velocity data will be firm req't. a) Alternate sources X of altitude and velocity data were used. (ground- radar, pressure in- struments) b) X-15/B-52 communi- X cations performed on UHF radio. Cancellation of X-15 launch. Cancellation of x-15 launch. No Pilot-In The-Loop Assuming that the IGS would provide guidance information direct- ly to the control system for the un- piloted case, the launch would have been cancelled. Certain loss of X-15 unless an additional control and guidance capability were in- cluded to effect altered flight profile and landing under non- normal conditions. Cancellation of X-15 launch. (Refer to flt. 1-12-23) Weighting Factor Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08; CIA-RDP70BOO584ROO0200050001-7 Flight Type Problem No. Or Failure 1-15-28 (NONE) 1-16-29 (NONE) 2-10-21 1. LN2 supply valve for cock- pit pressuriza- tion and equip- ment cooling froze shut prior to launch. 2. X-15 and B-52 intercom failed. 1-17-30 1. Lower engine shut-down during first turn after approximately 155 secs. of powered flight due to spur- ious power supply interruptions. Corrective Redundant or Emergency Action System Effect Pilot-In-The-Loop Effect Result If N/A N/A Completed Planned Mission 1. Pilot called for X hold at 7 min. before planned Launch. Pilot changed cooling modes to subject valve to warm air and thaw it. Valve thawed and launch occurred 20 min. later on 3rd pass over planned launch location. 2. X-15 and B-52 X crew continued flt. by communicating via UHF. 1. Pilot reset lower engine circuit breaker and performed suc- cessful re-start of the engine. Alter- Saved Completed Alter- Saved No Redundancy nate Hard- Planned nate Hard- or Emergency Miss. ware Mission Miss. ware Back-Up N/A N/A Cancellation of X-15 launch. (Alternate cooling mode and flexi- bility of pilot con- trol over pressuri- zation and cooling system provided necessary emer- gency back-up to primary mode.) Cancellation of X-15 launch. Weighting Factor No Pilot-In- The-Loop N/A N/A Cancellation of X-15 launch. Inability to reset circuit breaker and re-start engine would have resulted in certain loss of X-15 unless an additional control and guidance capability were included to effect altered flight profile and landing under non-normal conditions. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70BOO584ROO0200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/081: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Detailed History - X-15 Free Flights (Cont.) Flight Type Problem Corrective No. or Failure Action 2-11-22 1. One reaction con-1. Pilot observed trol rocket exhaus- this and switched ted raw fuel and off the faulty re- would not shut action control sys- completely off tem, leaving the when controls re- other (redundant) turned to neutral. system on. 1-18-31 1. One engine 1. Alternate flight chamber could profile was flown not be ignited. with 7 chambers op- erating. Redundant or Emergency System Effect Pilot-In-The-Loop Effect Result If Completed Alter- Saved Completed Alter- Saved Non Redundancy of Planned nate Hard- Planned nate Hard- Emergency Back- Mission Miss. ware Mission Miss. Hard Up Had this been a high altitude flight, the flight would have been canceled without the reaction con- trols redundancy, or had launch occurred, insuf- ficient low q con- trol would have resulted. No Pilot- In-The- Loop Concellation of X-15 launch or, if leak not de- tected and launch had been made, APU and reaction control fuel may have been depleted, resulting in loss of the X-15. Possible loss of X-15 due to in- stability to accom- plish the alternate mission with an unpiloted system. Weighting Factor Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/ : CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Detailed History -X-15 Free Flights (Cont. ) Flight Type Problem No. or Failure _ Corrective Action 2-12-23 1. An automatic malfunction shut- down of the (XLR99) engine occurred on the first of 2 planned manual shutdown restart cycles. 2. One reaction control rocket stuck open after postlaunch ac- tuation when con- trols returned to neutral. 1-19-32 None 1-20-35 None 1-21-36 None 2-13-26 None 1. Pilot recycled iue controls, eng-- reprimed and ob- tained satisfactory engine restart on 2nd attempt. In this process pilot made considerable alter- ation to planned flight profile. 2. Pilot made quick test of reaction controls to check A/C re- action response and then shutoff both systems to prevent loss of fuel. N/A N/A N/A N/A Redundant or Emergency System Effect Completed Alter- Saved Planned nate Hard- Mission Miss. ware Pilot-In-The-Loop Effect Result If Completed Alter- Planned nate Mission Miss. Saved No Redundancy or Hard- Emergency Back- ware Up X Hazardous XLR99 engine occurrence. (Auto malfunction shutdown system protected against undetermined haz- ardous condition in start sequence). N/A N/A N/A N/A No Pilot- In-The- Loop Certain loss of X-15 unless an additional control and guidance capa- bility were in- cluded to effect altered flight profile and landing under non-normal conditions. Depletion or partial depletion of reaction control and APU fuel due to nondetection of leak and no correct- ive capability without pilot. Possible loss of the X-15 would have resulted. N/A N/A N/A N/A Weighting Factor Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/(I8 : CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Appendix H Backup to DS-022-192 Detailed History -X-15 Free Flights (Cont. ) Flight Type Problem No. Fail~_,-- 2-14-28 1. Engine shut- down on first start attempt due to intermittent fire switch. 2. Cockpit pres- surization and cooling malfunc- tion prior to launch. 3. Structural vibration en- countered dur- ing re-entry - sustained by SAS. Corrective Redundant or Emergency Pilot-In-The-Loop Effect Action System Effect Completed Planned Mission 1. Pilot reset engine reprimed, restarted engine and made minor necessary alter- ations to the flight plan to reach in- tended flight goals. 2. Pilot recycled controls several times and success- fully cleared the problem prior to launch. 3. Pilot reduced pitch and yaw damper gains causing vibration to stop after approximately 30 seconds. Alter- Saved Completed Alter- Saved nate Hard- Planned nate Hard- Miss. ware Mission Miss. ware No Redundancy or No Pilot- 1r-Emergency Back- The-Loop Up X X N/A X X N/A Weighting Factor Certain loss of X-15 unless an additional control and guidance capa- bility is included to effect altered flight profile and landing under non- normal conditions and at remote location. Probable cancelled launch due to in- ability to cycle heat and vent controls and correct problem. Inability to lower gain settings would have resulted in sustained continuous vibration throughout remainder of flight and probable major structural damage and loss of X-15. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/0 : CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Appendix H Backup to DS-022-192 Flight Type Problem No. .,r =- e Corrective Redundant or Emergency Action System Effect Completed Planned Mission 2-14-28 4. Stopwatch in (Cont.) cockpit reading 4 seconds ahead of actual burning time. 2-15-29 1. Automalfunc- tion shutdown of the XLR99 engine immediately fol- lowing launch. 2. SAS pitch channel tripped out at final en- gine shutdown to failure in the SAS pitch gain selector switch. 4. Pilot recog- X nized difference between prime and backup timing, analyzed situation to determine which was correct, and shutdown engine on ground time callout. 1. Pilot reset X engine controls, reprimed engine system while gliding, accom- plished success- ful engine restart, and made neces- sary control inputs to arrive at same powered flight pro- file and points as planned. 2. Pilot reset SAS X pitch channel after quickly assessing system status. Pilot-In-The-Loop Effect Result If Alter- Saved Completed Alter- Saved No Redundancy or nate Hard- Planned nate Hard- Emergency Back- Miss. ware Mission Miss. ware up Early engine shut- down would have resulted in less performance than expected resulting in an alternate mission profile. X Hazardous XLR99 engine occurrence. (Auto malfunction shutdown system protected against undetermined hazardous condition in start sequence). No Pilot-In- The-Loop Certain loss of X-15 unless addi- tional control and guidance capa- bility were in- cluded to effect altered flight profile and landing under non-normal conditions and at remote location. X Certain loss of Definite controll- X-15 if no manual ability problems direct control and certain loss made as backup of the X-15. to augmented mode. SAS monitor channel provided necessary fail-safety to pre- vent hard-over control signal. Weighting Factor Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05108: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Appendix H Backup to DS-022-192 Flight Type Problem Corrective Redundant or Emergency No. or Failure Action System Effect Completed Alter- Saved Planned nate Hard- Mission Miss. ware 2-15-29 3. Partial cabin 3. Pilot's pres- X (Cont.) pressurization sure suit inflated saved failure one min- and maintained pilot ute after engine proper pilot shutdown. environment. 4. inertial alti- 4. Pilot refer- X tude data was enced other forms grossly in error. of flight data - namely ground radar call-out, pressure instru- ments (air data system), and other flight para- meters from inertial data. 5. Stopwatch in Pilot recognized X cockpit read 9 difference between sec. ahead of prime and backup actual burning timing, analyzed time. situation to deter- mine which was correct, and shut down engine on ground time callout. Pilot-In-The-Loop Effect Result If Completed Alter- Saved No Redundancy or Planned nate Hard- Emergency Back- No Pilot-In- Mission Miss. ware LIP The-Loop The pilot's pres- N/A sure suit provided necessary emer- gency backup with- out which pilot would have been incapa- citated and X-15 lost. Canceled X-15 Canceled X-15 launch. On higher launch unless performance mis- suitable back- sion good IGS data up auto or remote is firm req't. guidance system provided. Early engine shut- N/A down would have resulted in less performance than expected, thus resulting in an alternate mission profile. Weighting Factor Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/081: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Appendix H Backup to DS-022-192 Flight Type Problem Corrective Redundant or Emergency No. or Failure Action System Effect Completed Alter- Saved Planned nate Hard- Mission miss. ware 2-16-31 1. Pitch-roll 1. Roll damper X SAS malfunction reset, pitch at launch. damper could not be reset. 2. Stop watch 2. Pilot used X in cockpit failed ground time to operate. callouts to ac- complish de- sired flight profile. 3. Partial cabin 3. Pilots pres- X pressurization sure suit inflated failure after and maintained engine shutdown. proper pilot environment. 2-17-33 1. Partial cabin 1. Pilots pres- X pressurization sure suit inflated failure during and maintained powered X-15 proper pilot climb. environment. Pilot-In-The-Loop Effect Result If Completed Alter Saved No Redundancy or Planned nate Hard- Emergency Back- No Pilot-In- Mission Miss. ware Up X Certain loss of Definite control- X-15 if no manual lability problems direct control mode and certain loss as backup to aug- of X-15. mented mode. SAS monitor channel provided fail- safety to prevent hard-over control signal. A less accurate N/A flight profile would have re- sulted if time backup were not provided and IGS or radar values were used. Certain loss of N/A, except X-15 due to in- incapacitation of capacitation of passenger, if any. pilot exposed to adverse environment. Certain loss of N/A, except X-15 due to in- incapacitation of capacitation of passenger, if any. pilot exposed to adverse environment. Weighting Factor Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08 CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Appendix H Backup to DS-022-192 Flight Type Problem Corrective Redundant or Emergency No. or Failure Action System, Effect Pilot -L-The -Loop Effect Completed Alter- Saved Completed Planned nate Hard- Planned Mission Miss. ware Mission 1-22-37 1. X-15 launch 1. Launch oc- switch malfunc- curred after tion. pilot recycled switch several times. 2. Partial cabin 2. Pilot's pres- X pressurization sure suit inflated failure after and maintained engine shutdown. proper pilot environment. 2-18-34 1. APU #2 be- 1. Pilot made 0 came inoperative successful APU at 1. 5 min. before restart and re- scheduled launch loaded #2 gen- due to an apparent erators in time control or valve to continue with intermittency. launch only 1 min. behind schedule. Alter- Saved No Redundancy or nate Hard- Emergency Back- Miss. ware up Certain loss of X-15 due to inca- pacitation of pilot exposed to adverse environment. Probable cancel- lation of X-15 launch without APU redundancy B-52 power would have been required before single APU restart could have been attempted. Planned launch point would have been exceeded, and successful launch on 2nd pass would be very marginal. Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Weighting Factor No Pilot-In- The -Loop N/A (B-52 back- up launch pro- visions would have been reverted to). N/A except inca- pacitation of passenger, if any. Cancellations of 1/2 X-15 launch. APLT could not be re- started nor genera- tor reloaded re- motely. X-15, un- piloted or not, would not be launched with- out benefit of capa- city of both APU's as required to com- plete a full-blown mission. Approved For Release 2007/05/08 CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Appendix H Backup to DS-022-192 Detailed History-X-15 Free Flights (Cont.) Flight Type Problem No. or F , 1. Corrective Redundant or Emergency Action System Effect Completed Planned Mission 2-18-34 2. Engine fuel (Cont.) inlet pressure dropped below minimum opera- ting limit, as indicated by warning light and cockpit fuel line pressure gauge. 2. Pilot throttled engine back from 100% to 50% thrust to decrease pres- sure drop in the fuel feed line. The engine fuel inlet pressure rose to acceptable opera- ting value. Pilot eased throttle up to 75% thrust and observed no decay in fuel inlet pres- sure. Pilot then made necessary alterations to the flight plan to ap- proach same powered flight pro- file goals as planned. Pilot-In-The-Loop Effect Result If Alter- Saved Completed Alter- Saved No Redundancy or nate Hard- Planned nate Hard- Emergency Back- Miss. ware Mission Miss. ware up X X Malfunction de- tection and warn- ing function of engine low fuel inlet pressure light/gage pre- vented probable loss of X-15 due to in-flight fire/ explosion or pre- mature engine shutdown upon chamber burn- through. No Pilot-In- The-Loop Probable loss of X-15 due to in- flight fire/explo- sion upon chamber burn-through or due to premature engine shutdown upon malfunction detection or cham- ber burn-through, unless an additional control and guidance capability were in- cluded to effect al- tered flight profile and landing under non-normal condi- tions at a remote location. Weighting Factor Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7 Approved For Release 2007/05/08 :CIA-R DP70B00584R000200050001-7 Appendix I Backup to DS-022-198 Cost for Automation SYSTEM TOTAL FLIGHTS WITHOU T PILOT WITH PILOT LOST MISSIONS SAV D LOST ACFT. SAVED DYN T A-SOAR FL O COMPLE IGHTS REQ TE 18 MISSI UIRED ONS SUC CESS ACFT . LOST SUC CESS ALT. MISSION T OTAL ACFT . LOST E PILOT LO BY PILOT CA SE I CA SE II No. F suc R suc No. F ` No N 200.2 X-15 40 22 55 suc 16 40 . 33 83 o. 6 No. 39 97.5 No. 0 0 95 100 Pilot 18.5 No Pilot 31 Pilot 21.6 No Pilot 37 262.0 Bomarc 167 85 51 82 49 137 82 19 156 ___ i o0.5 o.o d7 87 19.2 35 22.6 43 I I 351.0 Bomarc 60 26 43 34 57 51 85 7 58 96.5 2 3.3 94 94 18.7 41 22 51 Minuteman 4 1 25 3 75 3 i5 1 4 100 0 0 100 100 13.v.0 Mercur 6 4 66 I I 5 i 83 21.6 27 62.3 Regulus' 784 632 81 152 19 676 6ifi 86 108 14 29 29 21.0 22 F61: 32,761 32 :39.0 Jet Aircraft 1.000 664 66 151 15 1 99.5 27 165.0 Rocket Acft. 116/190 61 34/190 is 2/372 5 89 30 F X 15 R Regulus (1st flights) F suc 100 100 85 859 85 85 15 15 15 15 94 98 94 98 94 98 94 98 6 2 6 2 60 87 60 87 19.2 18.4 21.2 21.2 = cr - Additional Flights Required for Automation. Additional F = 18 suc 4U suc F suc Floss Case I - Assume Data is comparable to Dysa-Soar Air Vehicle Case D-Assume Data is comparable to Dyna-Soar Glider. Booster Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7