STATEMENT OF REP. GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MAY 4, 1967

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70S00385R000200010020-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2000
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: May 4, 1967
• Content Type: TRANS

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"a OM iE OFFICE OF: FOR RELEASE:
REP. GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB MAY 4, 1967
24TH DISTRICT - CALIFORNIA
2245 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BLDG.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20515
STATFANIENT OF REP. GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB
IN THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
MAY 4, 1967
PROPOSAL FOR U.S. HELP ON SOVIET-FIAT AUTO FACTORY SHOULD BE REJECTED
Mr. Speaker, citizens across the nation are genuinely concerned about the pro-
posal for the U.S. to help equip and finance the Soviet-Fiat automobile factory.
Of all the unpromising, unlikely places in the world for the United States,to
provide technological and financial assistance, the most improbable should be the
Soviet Union. And of all the industries in the Soviet Union, among the last candi-
dates for assistance should be their machine tool and related industries for this
is the heart of the Soviet industrial defense strenh.
Nevertheless, the Administration last October announced that the United States
is prepared to finance through the'Export-Import Bank the export of a large amount
of modern, precision American machine tools which would be used to equip an auto-
motive factory the Fiat Company of Italy has contracted to construct in the Soviet
Union. Upwards of $50 million-of U.S.-built machine tools may be involved.
It seems inconceivable that it could be seriously proposed that the United
States at this time should assist in any way in building up.the automotive industry
in the Soviet Union.
The products of existing Soviet automotive factories can be found in trouble
spots throughout the world and notably in the war zone of Southeast Asia.. Trucks
and other automotive products are among the significant war goods supplied to Hanoi
by the Soviets and the Eastern Europeans. Such vehicles help to convey and transport
Communist forces, ammunition, weapons, and other war.goods in Southeast Asia.
To '?.0K00~(' according to U2D
testimony presented in the-Defense Appropriations Hearings, we have destroyed or
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1/
damaged over 9000 trucks in North Vietnam. Thousands more remain. The threat posed
by Soviet- and Eastern European-built vehicles and other equipment must be measured
in terms of American lives lost as well as in millions upon millions, of dollars
expended.
While there had been earlier press reports about the deal, the official announce-
ment of the role proposed for America in building the Soviet automotive factory came on
October 7, 1966. The President on that date made a sudden trip to New York where,
in a major policy address, he announced that "the Export-Import Bank is prepared to
finance American exports for the Soviet-Italian Fiat auto plant."
The proposal that export licenses should be granted to authorize the shipment of
American machine tools for the Soviet-Fiat plant and that the Export-Import Bank
should finance the export of this equipment to the Soviet Union in my view was un-
sound last fall and it is unsound today. As I stated to the House of Representatives
on October 17, 1966, the President received incredibly poor advice in making that
proposal.
In the intervening time, an effort has been mounted to put across the idea to
the Congress and to the public that the proposed Fiat deal is in the best interest
of the United States.
This effort has been characterized by an assortment of claims, statements, con-
jectures, inferences, and so forth, many of which it appears have been deliberately
designed to becloud the true issues involved. The basic purpose of the effort is
clear however: The intent is to smooth the way for the Fiat deal to go through
without going into any more detail than absolutely necessary.
Shortly after the President's October 7, 1966 announcement, the House Foreign
Affairs Subcommittee on Europe held a special hearing to discuss with representatives
of the executive departments, U.S. policy on East-West relations as reflected in the
President's speech. Among other things, the Subcommittee at that hearing on October 18
attempted to learn d ai1
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finance any part of it, who made recommendations to the President on such policies, and
so forth. But their attempts appeared to be in vain as witnesses from the Departments
of State and Commerce apparently did not satisfactorily answer the questions posed.
The Chairman, the disting utshed Congresswoman from New York [Mrs. Kelly] said at the
time:
"If you take all of the reasons that you gave, gentlemen, they still
don't add up to a satisfactory answer to our questions." 3/
Last December four members of the Subcommittee on International Trade of the
House Committee on Banking and Currency travelled to Italy and several Eastern
European countries. In Italy on December 7, 1966 the Subcommittee Members conferred
with various individuals who are dealing with the Soviets in the proposed Fiat auto-
motive transaction. On December 17, they conferred in the Soviet Union with the
Soviet Communist officials who expect to be the beneficiaries of the proposed trans-
A subcommittee print issued by the Subcommittee on International Trade on March 1,
1967, contains the Subcommittee report on the proposed Soviet-Fiat auto plant. The
apparent purpose of the report is to assemble various materials-and quotes in support
of the Administration's proposal.
The report tells us, for example, that the following remark was made by Secretary
of State Rusk last October:
"It is the judgment of the Defense Department, shared by General
Wheeler of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that a loan that would in-
duce the Soviet Union to devote greater resources to the pro-
duction of consumer goods at the expense of applying these re-
sources to military purposes is in our national interest." 4/
The report indicates that this statement by Secretary Rusk is included to make
it "clear to Members of Congress that the Department of Defense is on record as
favoring the loan by the Eximbank for Fiat."
In view of the claim attributed to Secretary Rusk, I made inquiry of General
Wheeler on March 3, 1967 asking the General to furnish me with any information now
available to hi6I 2 dgI% % ~2~Q1a/~6thel pD~tO~SmOpo~tRBB k loan 0would induce
 the Sovie6 flcY$rd&ofiM2g a0 05/Oesources to Ot1~e0 p$rod000 1 o 00 consumer goods at
the expense of applying these resources to military purposes.
Just as suspected, General Wheeler's reply of March 24, 1967 did not furnish in-
formation which to me gives any such evidence. General Wheeler did state his belief
as follows:
"I do not believe that the Soviets would divert resources from a
military program which they regard as vital to any program to
benefit the Soviet consumer." 5/
Meanwhile, the platitude-filled statements continue to be bandied around by
Administration spokesmen such as this statement made March 2, 1967 by Anthony N.
Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs:
(construction of the.Soviet Fiat factory] in itself represents
a sizable allocation of resources for peaceful uses, but more
will follow to provide the roads, service stations, repair
facilities, and the like to keep the cars running. ...This
growing attention to consumer needs is a heartening develop-
ment in the Communist countries, one that we welcome and
should support through trade." 6/
Those thoughts echo similar comments offered by Acting Secretary of Commerce
Trowbridge, who on November 2, 1966 as Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Domestic
and International Business, said:
"The President's decision to provide for Export-Import bank
financing of American machine tools and other products for
the Fiat automobile plant in the U.S.S.R. is a good example
of how we will offer our cooperation on projects designed
to improve the well-being of their people. We support
their allocation of resources to expand consumer-oriented
industries." 7/
The International Trade Subcommittee report contains additional enlightening
information about the campaign underway to gain acceptance for the Fiat deal. It
recites, for example, that last October'Administration spokesmen sought to convince
individual Members of the House, unidentified in the report, that "the Fiat deal
would support the increased emphasis which the USSR is putting on using its resources
8/
to produce consumer goods."
Such wishful thinking actually runs counter to'findings contained in a Central
Intelligence Agency report which the Subcommitt 1
~~10~~~38R~OOis March 1 report.
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 -?Claims-that'if the Soviet-Fiat factory is built it will cause the Soviets to in-
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vest extensively in tertiary auto otive investments - whic means c
service stations, repair facilities and the like - are refuted by the CIA report
which states:
"The USSR will almost certainly have no desire and little need
to duplicate in the foreseeable future the heavy tertiary in-
vestments that have been fostered by the automobile in Western
Europe and the United States." 9/
The CIA report points out that the Soviet program is to produce cars for the
Communist leaders, not the people. It states:
"Essentially, the new Soviet program is designed to produce
automobiles for the bureaucratic and managerial elite, not
for the average citizen." 10/
Furthermore, it is the CIA evaluation that the announced Soviet plans to increase
automotive production will not divert resources from their defense or space programs:
"...announced plans are not so grandiose as to require a signifi-
cant alteration in traditional Soviet economic priorities, and
would leave military and space programs unimpaired.." [emphasis
added] 11
There is little doubt that
if the Soviets were required to design and build
machine tools and equipment which closely approximate those they seek from abroad in
the Fiat deal then they would probably have to use engineers, technicians and capital
goods which. otherwise could be employed in programs related to Soviet military and
space endeavors. I asked the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, General
Joseph F. Carroll, about this and by letter of April 25, 1967, he responded:
"It is true that, if engineering and production.resources were
allocated to the design and fabrication of such machine tools
and equipment, the resources would have to be taken from other
programs, either military or civilian. In the past the Soviet
Union has given priority to military programs over civil programs,
and it is believed that -- barring a major change in Soviet
policy -- this practice will continue." 12/
Note that General Carroll confirms that the Soviets would have to divert resources
from their other programs if they were required to undertake the automotive project
with their own resources.
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In other words, to whatever extent the U.S. or any other nation provides. capital
goods to the Soviets, the Soviet leadership would be permitted to continue its tradi-
tional practice of allocating their own resources to military programs.
Neither General Carroll nor any other responsible official of a U.S. intelligence
agency has ever, to my knowledge, claimed that there is evidence of a major change
in Soviet policy. In other words, Soviet priorities in the Soviet industrial empire
continue to go to military programs.
In spite of this we have witnessed a band of Administration spokesmen, apparently
ignoring evaluations of the intelligence agencies, touring the country and giving the
impression to the American public, to trade and business groups,'and to communications
media that the Soviet-Fiat deal will mean less Soviet tanks and more-emphasis on
consumer needs.
SHIPMENT OF MACHINE TOOLS SHOULD BE DENIED
I would like at this time to cite some reasons why in my opinion the Export-
Import Bank credits and the machine tools should be denied the Soviets.
Detente Non-Existent
One rationale advanced by Administration spokesmen for shipping and financing
American machine tools to the Soviets is their claim in seeing in the present situa-
tion a detente. But that is a claim with little basis in fact. The highest ranking
member of this nation's armed forces, General Wheeler, told all Americans last
February 26:
"...if history is any teacher, 1 see no particular reason to
view the present situation as a detente. ...It is a question
of'prudence in protecting the security interests of this
country." 13/
Basic Soviet Plans Remain Unchanged
The leaders of the organization which controls the Soviet industrial empire
traditionally have planned for the production of a relatively small number of passenger
automobiles. That is still true today of the current Soviet leaders.
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The current Soviet Communist Party leaders approved of the ans of the State
Planning Commission (GOSPLAN) which.calls for the production of an estimated 230,000
passenger automobiles in 1967. The Central Intelligence Agency estimates that over
14/
12% of those will be a jeep-type vehicle, the GAZ 69.
The CIA also estimates that 23% of all Soviet passenger automobiles produced in
1967, a total of 54,000, will be exported. Furthermore, according to the CIA esti-
mates, that figure will increase to 250,000'automobiles exported by the USSR by
15/
1974. Significantly, 1974 is the year when the proposed Fiat plant is scheduled
to be in full production.
The ordinary Soviet citizens are today deprived of an automobile not because of
any action which they, or you, or I have taken.. They are denied an automobile because
Soviet leaders have decreed, that they not be permitted one.
Everyone who gives serious thought to the workings of the Soviet Union understands
full well that the Soviet industrial empire could right now, today, increase its out-
put of commercial-type vehicles. ?
But even if American financial assistance were granted and machine tools were
exported to build the Soviet-Fiat plant, the CIA evaluation states:
"It seems certain that, within the next decade at least, the Soviet
leadership not only has no plans to mass produce automobiles in
imitation of the West, but would strenously resist internal
pressure to do so. Although the USSR may some day join the circle
of nations that provide automobiles for the average citizen, that
day is not now in sight." 16/
In other words, the Communist leaders' plans for automobiles are basically to use
them for rewarding the Soviet Communist Party elite and for exports and related
purposes, not for the average citizen. The Communista9 plans are designed to make
the Communist Party more efficient in its communications and travel needs and better
equipped to achieve its political goals.
Importance of Machine Tools to Defense Industries
The following are some of the machine tools desired by the Soviets for use in
the Fiat-constructed plant in the USSR: Numerically-controlled machines for die-
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 sinking; Approve or Fzleae machines for
mechanical operations, such as transfer lines; boring, grinding, broaching machines;
high production machines for ring bevel gear production; boring and honing machines;
numerically-controlled profile checking equipment; automatic lathes; high production
machine tools for splined shaft production, hub production and transmission sliding.
sleeve production; transfer lines for the machining of differential gear carrier and
gear housing; transfer lines for pistons.
A study prepared for the Joint Economic Committee which was published in the
Committee's report, "New Directions in the Soviet Economy, Part II-A," in July 1966
states that:
"..,.the Soviet industrial defense establishment has grown at
the rate more than twice.that of the Soviet economy; that by
1963 it was in absolute terms about as large or larger than
that of the United States..." 17/
If four years ago the Soviet industrial defense establishment was as large or
larger than our own, then how big is it today? And what kind of advice has been pro-
vided which results in decisions that could help the Soviet industrial defense estab-
lishment grow even more?
The Soviets know what they want when they ask for machine tools but I have the
distinct impression that there are many others who are not completely aware of the
importance of machine tools to the economy and military strength of a nation.
A machine tool is the only machine which is capable of reproducing itself. It
is a power-driven machine which is used to shape or form metal by cutting, by impact,
by pressure, by electrical techniques, or by a combination of those procedures.
The Piachine and Tool Blue Book for January 1967 declares:
"Every item used, worn, or eaten by the military is directly or
indirectly an end result of machine tools." 18/
That same reference tells us that more than half of the total U.S. machine tool
shipments in 1965 went to defense and defense related industries.
19/
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 The A r%v0ebc Faptr %~a OQ /cQ56 q e9 2DtP s0tQ0 rJR00g2(#1$O?Ons
a e and Commerce
have "just reviewed current and critical military programs requiring stepped-up
production of machine tools, and the types of machines that are so vital to this
military procurement." It contains a listing of the specific machine tools which are
critical and vital to the United-States military for the procurement of such things
as ordnance, helicopters, missiles, and jet engines. Here is part of that list:
Ordnance: "The machine tools needed [for ordnance production] are
automatic chucking machines, automatic screw machines, numerically-
controlled automatic milling machines, special heavy-duty vertical
multi-spindle drilling machines with special fixtures, large
hydraulic presses, and transfer machines or transfer-type machines.
"Helicopters: The critical items here are transmission gears and
air foil blades.
"The machine tools needed are bevel gear generating machines,
smaller size horizontal boring machines, numerically-controlled
jig boring machines, and routing-type milling equipment.
"Missiles: The machine tools needed for nissile production are
'elephant-type' vertical and horizontal boring and milling
machines, and vertical turret lathes with or without numerical
controls.
"Jet Engines: This program is calling for the earliest possible
delivery of additional machine tools.
"Machine tools are also being required in increasing numbers by
many industries which indirectly support the defense establish-
ment. It is estimated that over fifty percent of present machine
tool output is flowing to defense and defense supporting
industries." 20/
One could not say that all of the machine tool items and equipment which the
Soviets are seeking from the United States, or which are manufactured in Europe by
subsidiaries or licensees of American manufacturers; are in all1cases identical to
those which are today so critical and vital to our own defense needs. But there
seems to be a remarkable similarity.
This is not the first time over recent years that the USSR has attempted to
obtain advanced automotive building. equipment from the United States or that the
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 question of A eronvfdl ar Raln~ 00o?/22/OsGlg I RpelOSo( 0l8 02$ lRg2RIs been brought
into sharp focus.
Early in 1961 export licenses that had originally been granted authorizing the
shipment of machine tools to the USSR for the production of cars and trucks.were
cancelled following an expression of opinion by the Department of Defense that the
receipt of the equipment would contribute to the Soviet military and economic warfare
potential.
The machine tools involved then were a transfer type nachine to make V-UL cylinder
blocks and a transfer type machine to machine V-8 motor heads. The authorization
also covered six 8-spindle gear hobbing machines. Their total value was $6.1 million.
In that case the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs, haydn Williams, said that the technology contained in those transfer
machines produced in the United States was the most advanced in the world and that:
The products of these transfer type machine tools are clearly
of military value." 21/
The Department of Defense position was that the products of the $6.1 million in
automotive building equipment would clearly be of military value. Why should there
now be any difference as to the military significance of automotive building equip-
ment? In view of present Soviet policy, including its heavy commitment toward aiding
Communist aggression in Vietnam, our policy should tie more stringent, and not softer.
Importance of Commercial-Type Vehicles for Military Purposes
Lven assuming that only passenger or commercial-type vehicles were to be pro-
duced by the Soviets. in the Fiat-constructed plant, would these vehicles contribute
to the military establishment of the Soviet Union?
Perhaps the practices of our own Department of Defense can best give us the
answer to that question. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Installations and Logistics informed me on March 24, 1967 in response to my inquiry
that the United States Department of Defense proposes to purchase 32,353 passenger
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cars, station wagons and other commercial-type vehicles in the fiscal year which
begins July 1, 1967.
In a letter to me dated :?iarch 24 the Department states that:
"All of the vehicles shoi?m are procured for the purpose of pro-
viding transportation of supplies, equipment or personnel which
contribute to the national security of the United States." 22/
Obviously vehicles of all kinds are of great importance to the support and oper,
tions of military forces. Secretary of Defense McNamara showed his recognition of
this fact on February 21, 1967. Regarding the case of enemy military forces denied
the use of wheeled vehicles in South Vietnam the Secretary of Defense said:
"This is a tremendous limitation upon their warmaking
capabilities." 23/
The Export Control Act declares that it is the policy of the United States ':to
exercise the necessary vigilance over exports from the standpoint of their signifi-
cance to the national security of the United States." The Act is completely clear
too in emphasizing that both the military and economic significance of exports must
be considered in finding that the "unrestricted export of materials without regard
to their potential military and economic significance may adversely affect the
United States."
Who would deny that elementary prudence dictates that the intelligence agencies
of the Department of Defense must be consulted before determination is made that.
a commodity has no "potential military and economic significance?"
On January 17, 1967 I made public four letters which unequivocally state that
the Defense Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Army, iiavy?
and the Air Force had not-been consulted when hundreds of items were removed from
24/
the Lxport Control List.
Yet the International Trade Subcommittee report expresses confidence in the prc
cedures used by the Department of Commerce and assures us "that Commerce would
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weigh .a variety of factors before taking action on [machine tools that can be used
25/
for strategic purposes]." And to attest to this display of confidence, the report,
of all things, quotes from an October 20, 1966 Department of Commerce letter wherein
the Director of the Office of Export Control enumerates some of the agencies of this
government which participate in the formulation of export control policies. I call
to your attention the fact that in the Department of Commerce letter, as quoted in
26/
the Subcommittee report, there is no specific reference to "Intelligence Community"
or "Intelligence Agencies."
Incomplete Information Available
It appears that only a partial insight is being permitted as to what machine
tools in total the Soviets actually hope to acquire from the United States. A
detailed list of the machine tools including "both the types of tools desired and
the U.S. companies most likely to be in a position to supply them" was not included
in the International Trade Subcommittee report but was purposely excluded "for
business reasons" because "publication might upset normal commercial relationships."
27/
To study the matter thoroughly, of course, would require a detailed and complete
list of the machine tools which the Soviets desire to get from us. In such matters
the national security and welfare of the United States must be paramount to all other
considerations. It is not conceivable to me how anyone could give greater weight and
importance to business and commercial considerations rather than to the national
security and welfare of. the United States.
Also it is difficult to see how anyone at this date could consider our involve-
ment in helping to equip a Soviet automotive factory as a "normal commerical
relationship."
,SU; u1ARY
America should not at this time assist in any way in the building of the automotiv
industry of the Soviet Union. history teaches that the present situation cannot be
viewed as a detente.
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There are those who have voiced platitudes and claims in attempts to smooth the
way for the Fiat deal to go through. But wishful thinking must not be substituted
for reasoned and reasonable caution.
The Soviet Communist Party leadership continues to control and. to command
all facets of the Soviet industrial empire. The Soviet leaders exercise their control
over Soviet industry by granting their approval to plans worked out by GOSPLA1J. The
announced current . and. future plans of GOSPLAN do not significantly differ from
traditional plans which heavily favor military programs at the expense of consumer
Soviet military programs are geared to the output of the Soviet industrial
defense establishment and machine tools are the heart of any industrial defense
establishment.. The Soviet'industrial defense establishment is huge; it is. possibly
as large or larger than that of the United States. But the Soviet industrial defense
establishment does not have the quantity of quality machine tools as does that of the
United States.
Soviet planners hope to import machine tools which incorporate advanced technology.
Soviet planners say they intend to increase automobile production by receiving outside
financial assistance and by importing machine tools. of advanced design. If the Soviet
planners hopes are realized in this respect, then their military and space programs
will remain unimpaired. In any event official United States intelligence evaluations
are that the Soviet leaders, do not plan to provide automobiles for the average
Soviet citizen.
Soviet, planners intend to increase the production of passenger cars in order to
reward and provide incentives to the Communist Party elite. They also intend to
increase the number of cars produced for export. Moreover, passenger cars and other
commercial-type vehicles are important for military purposes; they do contribute to
the national security.
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The Export Control Act is very explicit on the point that both the economic and
military significance of materials must be weighed in determining whether they may
be exported.
It is difficult if not impossible to view the Soviet-Fiat deal as a normal
commercial transaction and complete information on the deal has not yet been dis-
closed by the Soviets.
The International Trade Subcommittee report tells us "that U.S. machine tool
technology may play a larger role in the proposed auto plant than had been forecast
earlier."ZZ It explains this by saying that in addition to the direct purchases
from the U.S. the Soviets want-to lay hold of machine tools which are manufactured in
Europe under license arrangements with American firms. Little by little the full
measure of Soviet deceit in this grandiose scheme unfolds. We are told that a letter
from the Italian middlemen was received on February 1, 1967 which contains this
"The final cost of said machine tools and equipment items is
contingent upon the decisions of the Soviet agencies handling
the actual purchase orders." 29/
That one sentence alone should give all of us cause to question what this Fiat
deal is all about. The American people know full well what the final cost of machine
tools is in the hands of the Communists. And over 9,000 Americans have thus far paid
that final price in Southeast Asia.
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FOOTNOTES .
hearings on Supplemental Defense Appropriations for 1967, page 90. General Earl G.
Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, testimony on February 21, 1967.
2/ Made before the National Conference of Editorial Writers at New York, N. Y. The
Washington Post of October 8, 1966 said that President Johnson so suddenly accepted
the invitation to make the "major policy speech" that "the impromptu arrangements
nearly produced a comedy of errors.. .the first word that Nr. Johnson was even
considering attending came at 2:30 p.m. [October 6)..."
.3/ hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
October 18, 1966, page 66, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST-WEST-RELATIONS.
4/ A Report for the Subcommittee on International Trade, Committee on Banking and
Currency, House of Representatives, March 1, 1967, THL FIAT-SOVIET AUTO PLANT
AND COMMUNIST ECONOMIC REFORMS, page 41.
5/ Letter, March 24, 1967, General Earl G. Wheeler to Hep. Glenard P. Lipscomb.
6/ Address March 2, 1967 by Anthony M. Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs, made before the Chicago Automobile Trade show luncheon,
Chicago, Illinois.
7/ Address November 2, 1966 by Alexander B. Trowbridge, then Assistant Secretary for
Domestic and. International Business, U.S. Department of Commerce, prepared for
delivery at the International Trade Session, National' Foreign Trade Convention,
New York City.
8/ TUB FIAT-SOVIET AUTO PLANT, page'42.
9/ Ibis, page 26.
10/ Ibid, page 11.
11/ Ibid.
12/ Letter, April 25, 1.967, Lt. General Joseph F. Carroll to Rep. Glenard P. Lipscomb.
13/ "Meet the Press," NBC television and radio program of February 26, 1967 with
General Earl G. Wheeler as guest.
14/.THE FIAT-SOVIET AUTO PLANT, page 13.
15/ Ibid, page 19.
16/ Ibid, page 11.
17/ "Comparative Progress in Technology, Productivity, and Economic Efficiency: USSR
versus U.S.A.," page 233.
18/ Machine and Tool Blue Book, JanuaYy 1967, page 122.
19/ Ibid, page 130.
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20/ Ibid, pages 131, 132.
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21/ Letter, February 23, 1961, Haydn Williams, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs) to Rep. Glenard P. Lipscomb.
22/ Letter, 1 larch 24, 1967, Major General Allen T. Stanwix-liay, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense (iiateriel) to Rep. Glenard P. Lipscomb.
23/ Hearings on Supplemental Defense Appropriations for 1967, page 90. Secretary
of Defense Robert S. ldc;lamara, testimony on February 21, 1967.
24/ Congressional Record, January 17, 1967, page 11257.
25/ THE FIAT-SOVIET AUTO PLANT, page 2.
26/ Ibid.
? 27/ Ibid, page 5.
28/ Ibid, page 3.
29/ Ibid.
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