ORR-OSI Activities Concerning Soviet ICBM Deployment

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70T00666R000100100017-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 29, 2003
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: February 18, 1960
• Content Type: MF

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18 FEB Sa
MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Research and Reports
THROUGH:
THROUGH:
FROM: Chief, Guided Missile Branch, D/I
SUBJECT: ORR-OSI Activities Concerning Soviet ICBM Deployment
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1. The attached paper (S-538) includes material prepared at
the oral request of the Assistant to the DD/I F- Ties
as a contribution to a briefing requested by the DCI on the ac 1v
of CIA and other intelligence agencies to date relative to Soviet
ICBM deployment. The inter-Agency aspects of the ORR-OSI activities,
such as participation in various comm t working groups on deploy-
3- 2 5X1
ment, were omit d in accordance wit instructions.
rnished directly
Two additional briefs were u
to and are not nc u in the attached material.
s 1 through 16 were forwarded in draft on 5 February
ti
on
2. Sec
in order to meet a DD/I deadline, and were discussed with
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These sections also were coordinated withi The General 25X1
Comments" section was prepared later forwarded; its
content, however, was discussed with I land is included 2 5X1
in the attachment principally as a ma er o record.
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Attachment
1 - Same as subject.
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ORR-OSI Activities Concerning Soviet ICBM Deployment
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General Comments
Although current estimates credit the USSR with an initial
operational capability (IOC) with ICBMs by 1 January 1960 and a
substantially growing capability through 1963-64+., U.S. intelli-
gence has not yet identified a single Soviet ICBM site in being
or in preparation and does not even have any firm knowledge of
the mode of deployment the USSR has adopted. The estimates
themselves continue to be controversial., since they are based
largely)
fragments of other information
subject to a wide variety of interpretations. The principal
element of controversy concerns whether the USSR is embarked on
an ICBM program which will provide an early and large-scale
military superiority, a more limited capability adequate for a
high level of deterrence., or a modest capability with the princi-
pal emphasis on space programs. This range of possibilities
implies a very different strategic relationship between the U.S.
and the USSR., as well as a different level of deployment activity
within the USSR, at present and in the future.
As is evident from the detailed review which follows., the
bulk of the DD/I activities to date relative to ICBM deployment
have been focused on stimulating and guiding collection activity
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by every available means. While the total collection effort has
been greatly expanded, it has not produced conclusive evidence of
any sites. This probably reflects a number of factors, including
the limited assets available, our inability to locate or describe
specific targets, and, possibly, the limited scope of the actual
Soviet program to the present time.
On the analytical side, apart from research in support of
collection, the DD/I effort has been and still is concentrated
to a large extent on the location and identification of one or
more sites from existing information, which consists almost
entirely of fragmentary, indirect and in some cases voluminous
data. Much of this information is subject to a variety of
interpretations, some of it involves serious data-handling
problems, in many instances it has no apparent or necessary
bearing on missile deployment, and none of it is immediately
identifiable with ICBM activity, as opposed to other missile or
space activity. As research has progressed, it has encompassed
bodies of data increasingly far removed from a direct relation-
ship to ICBM site identification. It is clear that even our
best quality material has not been fully exploited. It is not
possible, therefore, to conclude that currently available
evidence cannot yield positive identification of one or more
sites.
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The total DD/I analytical manpower allocated directly or
indirectly to the specific problem of ICBM deployment probably
full time research analysts. More- 25X1
over, it has only been since mid-1959 that ORR, for example, has
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tude of the Soviet ICBM threat lies in accelerated
analysts working exclusively on deployment of
the 15 or more Soviet missile systems believed to be operational
at the present time. This limitation of resources, the extremely
heavy demands for intelligence support of all kinds, and the
complexity of the problem have made it impossible to insure
systematic and comprehensive exploitation of all of the material
already available in the community, even with maximum reliance
upon work being done in otheragencies and components. On the
other hand, it is questionable whether a doubling or tripling of
the analytical resources applied to the problem would materially
improve the tate of progress in the next year or two.
In view of the foregoing, it is believed that the best
chance of obtaining early, conclusive information on the magni-
programs to collect direct evidence in the
USSR, and that the urgency of the problem justifies taking
materially greater risks than have so far been judged acceptable.
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1. ICBM Re-examination for First Iylland Panel
In connection with the deliberations of the Hyland Panel,
and the DCI'a late-1958 comprehensive re-examination of the then-
current ICBM estimate ORR prepared a study (Re-examination of the
Soviet ICBM Production and Deployment Program Considered in
NIE 11-5-58) CIA/RR MP-259, dated 24 October 1958) which assessed
the various kinds of activity which should have taken place or
have been in process, and the rates at which these should proceed,
if the USSR were engaged in an ICBM program of a pace and scale
consistent with estimated Soviet capabilities. This study examined
both the production and deployment aspects and attempted also to
assess the probability of detecting a large-scale Soviet program
at an early date, if such were in process. The study concluded
(with the concurrence of GMAIC) that a large-scale Soviet program
could probably get underway without detection, because in its
early build-up stages the total volume of observable ICBM-related
activity might not be identifiable against the broad and varied
general background of Soviet economic activity. Given current
collection assets, a high probability of detection of at least
the general magnitude and pace of such a program would occur only
when activity began to approach peak rates, that is, some 12 to
18 months after the beginning of serial production and achievement.
of an initial operational capability (IOC). Collectors were briefed
on the results of this study and were alerted to the significance of
detecting various kinds of activity in its early stages.
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2. ICBM Collection Guide
In early 1958 ORR prepared collection guidance material
on ICBM deployment which was incorporated in a joint ORR-0SI ICBM
guide,
issued in April 1958
(Draft Collection Planning Aid on the Soviet ICBM Program, CIA/RR
MP-223). 950 copies of this guide were issued. The deployment
portions of the guide discussed the alternative modes of deploy-
ment open to the Soviets, i.e., mobile or fixed and described the
kinds of information which might be indicative of ICBM deployment
activity.
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Missile Sites
In the middle of 1958 ORR undertook., at the request of
the systematic analysis and evaluation of the large
3. Systematic Survey and Evaluation of Reports of Ballistic
number of reports of Soviet ballistic missile launching sites
that had accumulated over the years. The original intention was
to isolate those areas or locations which appeared to warrant
collection. It was possible to
assign only one analyst to this very large task., and its completion
has proved to be far more difficult than had been anticipated,
despite full use of the estimates and judgments of both the Army
and USAF. A report is now in final draft and will shortly be
and made available to other groups in the com-
munity. The conclusion of this survey is
reports
on this topic, while legion, generally are so cryptic and non-
detailed that evaluation is virtually impossible unless there
is strong information from other sources which would confirm or
deny it independently. Although only a small number of the total
reports examined, were related to ICBM deployment, the latter were
not,, as a class,, materially different from others. This argues
that fortuitous circumstances or a genuine improvement in the
quality of such reporting probably will be required in order for
this type of information to materially affect the current status
of intelligence on ICBM deployment. Reports
0
do aid in focusing attention on cited locations or areas,
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but to date have not been sufficiently conclusive to stand alone.
Even when complemented by other information the results to date
have not been conclusive.
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4+. Polyarniy Ural Study
In late 1958 ORR initiated a comprehensive study of the
factors which might affect Soviet deployment of ICBMs in the
Polyarniy Ural area. The purpose was two-fold: (a) to provide
a detailed compendium of geographic-economic information for use
by analysts; and (b) to attempt to reach a more definitive con-
clusion as to the probability of ICBM deployment in the area,, by
considering
h the effort did not yield firm conclusions
on the latter, the geographic-economic data is being prepared for
publication as a research aid for guided missile intelligence
analysts.
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8. Compilation of Communications, Transportation, Construction
and Geodetic Activities in the Northern USSR
In mid-1959 ORR issued a comprehensive
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source-based research aid summarizing, in a text and on a series of
common base maps, known information on Soviet communication, trans-
portation, construction, geodetic, and certain other significant
activities in the northern half of the USSR. Although the work
originally was planned as an informal working aid for internal ORR
use in analysis of indirect information possibly related to ICBM
deployment, it was reproduced in quantity and made available
throughout the community because of the apparent utility to many
other components of having this kind of information in easily com-
parable form. It is planned to revise and up-date the maps during
the next few months.
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9. Possible Missile Deployment Sites
In March 1959 OSI prepared special guidance (RDA 8002)
indicating several suspect places in the USSR
where there were indications of possible ICBM deployment activity.
The requirement contained maps and suggested possible means of
collection.
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12. Probable Soviet Deployment Philosophy for the ICBM
For some time now the intelligence community has been
attempting to determine Soviet ICBM deployment concepts in order to
better analyze existing information and improve guidance to field
collectors. To date no firm determination has been made. OSI is
currently working on two formal studies on missile deployment
concepts for publication during 1960. These will review Soviet
and German missile deployment proposals., analyze known Soviet
deployment concepts in the light of recent intelligence information
and then estimate the most likely Soviet ICBM deployment philosophy.
Research and analysis along similar lines is also taking,place in
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14+. Costs and Inputs for Construction of Fixed Sites for
launching ICBMs in the USSR
ORR has in process a study of the possible involvement
of the Soviet construction industry in an assumed, illustrative
ICBM deployment program employing hard sites. This study examines
the limited evidence currently available which reflects construction
activities possibly related to long-range missile deployment.
view of the paucity of direct information, the major portion of
the report is focused on the capabilities of the Soviet construction
industry to support a large-scale ICBM fixed site program. In
addition to analyzing the cost and materials and manpower require-
ments of such a program, the study examines in detail the manner
in which the USSR would probably organize and carry out the program
and some of the activities which would have to take place.
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