Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 14, 2002
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 20, 1969
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP71B00364R000100180044-0.pdf4.51 MB
Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 May 20, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE SECOND SUPPLEMEkTAL APPRO- PRIATION BILL, 1969 Mr. MA_ OISpeaker, I move that .the House resolve itself into the Com- mittee of the Whole House on the State of the 'Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 11400) making supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969, and for other purposes; and pending that motion, Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that general debate thereon be limited to not to ex- ceed 3 hours, the time to be equally divid- ed and controlled by the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. JONAS) and, myself. The SPEAKER.. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas? There was no objection. The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion offered by the genleman from Texas. The motion was agreed to. IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the con- sideration of the bill 1i.R. 11400, with Mr. HOLIFIELD in' the chair. The Clerk read the title of the bill. By unanimous consent, the first read- ing of the bill was dispensed with. The CHAIRMAN. Under the unani- mous-consent agreement, the gentleman from Texas (Mr, MAHOIc) will be recog- nized for 11/2 hours, and the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. JONAS) will be recognized for 11/2 hours. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas. Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 10 minutes. Mr. Chairman, we come to the con- sideration of the second supplemental appropriation bill for 1969, the first ma- jor appropriation bill for the 91st Con- gress. It deals with the : fiscal year 1969 insofar as the funds are concerned.. And It contains an important provision-an expenditure ceiling-with respect to fis- cal year 1970. I hope the items in the bill will be ex- plored by the Members and that the House will work its will. on this, bill. In the Committee on Appropriations, we think we have done the best we could, Out we make no claim of infallibility. We have cut the requests by some $581 mil- lion. If there are further reductions which are desired, Members of course, are free to offer the amendments to bring about the reductions. SUMMARY OF THE PENDING BILL We have reduced the budget estimates which were before us by about 13 per- cent. Most of . the items, and the bulk of the total requests before the committee were of a mandatory character and we had no practical option to recommend- ing approval of the necessary funds. We had to provide funds, for example, for pay increases which had been provided in previous legislation. It is an old refrain that Congress in 11 the regular appropriation bills reduces the annual iijoney measures and then early in the next session, restores the re- ductions which were made, and that therefore the ; reductions originally made result in no reductions at all. This is not correct. For example, in this bill less than 1 percent of the new funds pro- vided represent:,. a restoration of funds which were reduced last year. And the restorations--some ..S34 million-repre- sent about one--third of 1 percent of the approximately :512 billion cut last year in new funds requested for fiscal 1969. That, I think. is a rather good record. There are many, many items in the bill before us. and there is no way to be fully familiar with the contents of the bill other than to study the bill and the report, so I would commend to all a careful reading of the report on the bill. There are innumerable items represent- ing, I believe, practically every depart- ment and agency of the Government. The bill proposes new appropriations, or budget authority, in the sum of about $3,783,000,000. It is, as I said, about $581 million less than the budget requests, a cut of about 1; percent. Mr. Chairman, under leave to extend, I include, for purposes of elaboration, excerpts from ,he report summarizing the main features of the bill: SUMM.'LY OF THE BILL The bill is divided into five titles: I-Mili- tary operations ir=. Southeast Asia, II-Gen- eral supplementals (various), III-Increased pay costs, IV--Cooling on 1970 expenditures, and V-General provisions. The grand total of new budget (obliga- tional) authority recommended in the bill Is $3,783,212,768, ;1 reduction of about 13%, or $580,794,190, from the revised budget re- quests of $4,364,006,956 considered. In addition, under title II there are pro- posed increases of $82,500,000 in limitations on annual contract authorizations involving interest subsidies for homeownership and rental housing assistance and college hous- ing. 'The budget requests for these total $104,- 500,000, so there is a reduction of $22,000,000. Also, numerous provisions in the bill would release $82,766,000 held in reserve under the cutback provisions of Public Law 90-364. The amounts in the bill are within the overall totals of budget authority for 1969 shown in the administration's budget review released April 15th. That Is, they are well within the totals contemplated in that re- view. And they are also well below the sup- plemental provisions contemplated for fiscal 1969 in the budget last January. The January i'ndget projected fiscal 1989 budget authority supplementals of $4,813,- 000,000, inclusive of $198,000,000 dependent on legislation which Is not yet enacted. Of the remainder ($4,615,000,000), a total of $4,- 365,000,000 in new budget authority was sub- mitted to the House and considered in con- nection with the accompanying bill. An ad- ditional $221,000.000 in new budget author- ity requests for 1969-finalized after House Committee hearings were closed out-was submitted to the,, Senate (S. Doe. 91-18) for consideration in conn?ction with this bill. Thus the total of such budget authority re- quests now indicated L. $4,586,000,000, or, in round figures, $29,000,000 below the $4,615,- 000,000 mentioned above. This is the way the total picture stands on 1969 supplementals as of this date. It is a net result; the new administration re- viewed and revised many of the supple- mental requests submitted by the previous administration and m.4de a number of re- ductions. But as the totals now stand, in- creases submitted have offset all but $29,000,- 000 of the decreases from the January budget that were projected on April 15 (again, not counting the $308,000,000 that hinges on legislation), H 3829 Summary by titles Title I, Defense'rnilitary, includes $1,234,- 000,000 for military operations in Southeast Asia. This compares with the revised request of $1,496,900,000, a reduction of $262,900,- 000, or about 17 percent. Title II, for sundry general supplementals, includes $1,365,914,312, a reduction of $39,736,850, or just under 3% from the budget requests of $1,405,651,162 in new budget (obligational) authority. Some re- leases of reserves and other non-add pro- visions are involved. Increases of $82,500,- 000-a reduction of $22,000,000 from the re- quest-are also proposed in limitations on annual contract authorizations in certain interest subsidy programs in the housing field. The details are set forth under the various chapters in the committee report, but the great bulk of title II relates to items not subject to effective discretionary control In the annual bills. Some 83% or $1,132,000,000, of the total, for example, is involved in grants to states for public assistance; veterans compensation, medical, and other costs; un- employment compensation payments; mili- tary retired pay; and disaster relief. Title III, for increased pay costs, includes $1,183,298,454 in new budget (obligational) authority, an overall reduction of $278,157,- 340, or about 19 percent from the revised budget requests of $1,461,455,794. Release of $62,277,000 of P.L. 90-364 reserves is also involved, plus numerous transfers between appropriations to enable greater absorption of pay costs. These supplementals relate to unabsorbed portions of pay raises generally effective last July 1 that were not taken into account in the regular 1969 appropriations. The Executive Branch had combed the es- timates initially and the new administra- tion had also reexamined them. Since the estimates are for mandatory-type costs that have been running all fiscal year, the Com- mittee could not make drastic additional cuts all across the boards this late in the fiscal year without creating unacceptable dis- ruption to operations. Title IV, limitation on 1970 budget out- lays, proposes an overall ceiling on expendi- tures of the government during the fiscal .year 1970 that begins on July 1, 1969. The proposal is explained 4fl considerable detail beginning on page 118 of the report of the committee on the bill. Title V, general provisions, contains gen- eral provisions customarily carried. Approximate effect on 1969 expenditures- budget outlays It is the committee's tentative estimate that the reduction of $580,794,190 in new budget (obligational) authority requests, plus the relatively minor changes in re- quested transfers between appropriations, and reserve releases, will translate into a re- duction of approximately $464,000,000 in budget outlays previously projected for fiscal year 1969, by titles of the bill roughly as fol- lows: title I, $165,000,000; title II, $26,000,- 000; and title III, $273,000,000. The reduc- tions in the interest subsidy contract au- thorizations limitations Would not affect pro- jected 1969 outlays. The outlay effect of the remainder of the reduction in new budget authority and in- terest subsidy contract authorization limi- tations would be of some consideration in determining the impact of congressional ac- tions on fiscal 1970 budget outlays; perhaps to a minor extent, even on fiscal 1971 out- lays. I believe there will be a desire on the part of the House to discuss some of the military implications involved, and the war in Southeast Asia. Some may want to discuss the antiballistic missile pro- gram and other controversial or semi- Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 H 3830 Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0- CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE May 20, 1969 controverilal matters. We have agreed on the 3 hours In which to discuss these matters. ZSPENDITDU C$aPO PE}POSa1,--3'ms lv Mr. Chairman, I should like to claim your attention, if I may, at this time for the purpose of discussing a portion ofthe bill whici. appears on page 61. The re- port deals adequately with this proposal. It proposes an expenditure limitation-a spending ,eiling. I believe it Is important that all Members be familiar with the expenditure ceiling. I should like to read the ceiling which we propose to fix in this bill. Page 61 of the bill, title IV: Expenditures and net lending (budget out- lays) of the Federal Government during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970, shall not exceed $192,B0o,000,000: Provided, That whenever xtlon. or inaction, by the Con- gress on -equests for appropriations and other budgetary proposals varies from the President's recommendations' thereon, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall report to the President and to the Congress his estimate of the effect of such action or inaction orL expendiures and net lending, and the limitation set forth herein shall be cor- respondingly adjusted. Mr. Chairman, that is the ceiling pro- vision, subsection (a) of It. Subsection (b) is the reporting pro- vision, which I insert here for reference purposes:. (b) The Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall report periodically to the Presi- dent and .o the Congress on the operation of this sec-ion. The first such report shall be made at the end of the first month which be- gins after the date of approval of this Act; aubsequen: reports shall be made at the end of each calendar month during the first ses- sion of the Ninety-first Congress. and at the end of each calendar quarter thereafter. Mr. Chairman, under leave to extend, and before porceeding further, let me in- sert an excerpt from the report which briefly str.tes the nature of the proposi- tion: The committee has included a provision In the bill that would place an overall ceiling on budget expenditures during the fiscal year 1970 that begins on July 1, 1969. The pre- cise terini:iology is "Expenditures and net lending"-which, taken togethter, constitute "budget outlays". The amount specifically stated In the pro- vision, $192,900,000,000, is a beginning figure, not an ending figure. It is the revised pro- jection of 1970 budget outlays announced by the President on April 12 and summarized in the Review of the 1970 Budget released on April 15. That summary appears in the Con- gressional Record of April 16, 1969, at pages E2993-299t:. Coupled to the $192.9 billion figure is lan- guage providing-"' * ' That whenever ac- tion, or inaction, by the Congress on requests for appropriations and other budgetary pro- posals varies from the President's recommen- dations thereon, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall report to the President and to the Congress his estimate of the effect of such action or inaction on expenditures and net le;Iding, and the limitation set forth herein shall be correspondingly adjusted." In other words. Congress would work from the President's proposed total spending esti- mate. It would do so through its actions, or Its inactions, on requests for appropriations and other budget obligational authority and outlay prods in the various appropriation bills and certain other 'bills affecting the budget, The language would operate continuously to adjust the ceiling, as appropriate, to com- port with the estimated expenditure effect of specific congressional actions or inactions having budgetary impact. It is a flexible provision-but in terms oC aggregate spending, flexible only on the ac- tien of the Congress. not the Executive. It does not seek to declare something of the end from the beginning; It sets a begin- ning point against which Congress would work in deciding, through its various spend- ing actions, what the ultimate total should be, and supplies a mechanism for resetting the ceiling accordingly. Unlike last year's calling provision, it does not Impose an arbitrary broad-axe type ceil- ing cutback that would leave to the Execu- tive the allocation of any congressional ex- penditure reduction to specific agencies and programs. It would be the first ceiling ever to place directly in the hands of Congress the specific decision as to the maximum amount to be taken out of the Treasury for payment of the Government's bills in a given 12-month period, Mr. Chairman, we are at a moment when for the first time in the history of this Republic, Members of Congress are being called upon to vote on an expendi- ture ceiling which covers the entire Fed- eral Government. This kind of legislation has never been passed by the Congress during the history of the country. This Is an expenditure limitation which is all inclusive. It includes the Veterans' Administration. It Includes the Defense Department. It includes the war In Viet- nam. It includes interest on the national debt. It Includes all expenditures. Noth- ing is exempt. POTEN'rLAL SEDUCTION t3'FECT AND COMPARISON TO LAST TEAR'S CEIIiNe We have an expenditure limitation for fiscal year 1969 and we had an expendi- ture limitation of sorts in the prior year. But in the fiscal 1969 version we have a series of exceptions and exemptions. In- deed we exempted about $99 billion of fiscal 1969 currently estimated expend- itures. The Congress reduced expenditures by about $6 billion in the fiscal year ending on June 30. However, we did not reduce net expenditures of the Government sig- nificantly due to increases in exempted areas. In those areas where we had made exemptions, expenditure increases totaled approximately $6 billion. That offsetting Increase left a relatively slight net re- duction In the January 1968 budget esti- mate of expenditures for fiscal 1969. On the other hand, except for our action last year, expenditures would no doubt have increased by several billions. Mr. Chairman, at this point I include additional excerpts from the committee report comprising title IV of the pending bill with last year's ceiling and drawing attention to the reduction potential of the ceiling now proposed. It is a rigid ceiling; it cannot be exceeded except upon-action by the Congress. And as indicated above, the ceiling would decrease if congressional actions on the budget so provide. It lays the basis for potentially very sig- nificant retrenchment in expenditures. If such a ceiling had been adopted-and strictly adhered to-over the last many years, billions of expenditures would have been avoided. More specifically, taking all 14 budgets for the post-Korea fiscal years 1956 through 1966. the projected expenditure totals In the origi- nal annual budgets were cumulatively ex- ceeded by about $50 billion.-in 11 of the 14 years, the overruns aggregated $53.3 billion. In 3 years. there were underruns aggregating $3.5 billion. But overall for the 14 years, the government actually expended-for a variety of reasons--about $50 billion more than the sum total of what was projected in the origl- nal budgets. That averages to about $3.4 bil- lion a year. So the potential is great, if the ceiling is adopted and adhered to. Unlike the expenditure ceiling provisions enacted in the last session applicable to fiscal 1969, nothing would be exempt from the ceil- ing, Last year's ceiling provisions had a very significant Impact on government spending In fiscal 1969. They significantly restrained the growth of spending that undoubtedly would have otherwise occurred. And on the latest figures. it seems beyond reasonable de- bate that In the absence of the ceiling pro- visions, a much needed budget surplus for 1969 would not now be in prospect. Buteven with the ceiling and the $6 billion cutback Congress did not, by its actions, diminish the originally projected budget expenditure (out- lay) total of $186.1 billion. It did prevent that total from being ex- ceeded. And It -did restrain growth of spending. More specifically, Congress exempted 50%-$92.6 billion-of the $186.1 billion from the $6 billion cutback, and expressly permitted overruns to the extent determined necessary in the exempted programs. Those overruns were reestimated in the April 15 budget review at $6.1 billion. The overruns in exempted areas wiped out the $6 billion cutback in non-exempt areas. In its specific actions on the individual appropriation and other spending bills, Con- gress last year contributed roughly $3.7 to $3.9 billion (depending on variable calcula- tions) to the $6 billion overall cutback, leav- ing the remainder to be allocated by the Executive. The April 15 Review reflects a total cutback of $7.3 billion from the original es- timates for non-exempted areas, Offsetting this gross cutback are the $6.1 billion over- runs in exempted areas leaving a net esti- mated cutback, as of April 15 of $12 billion from the originally projected total. Thus the latest estimate of spending for 1969 is $184.9 billion, $1.2 billion less than the $186.1 billion projected In the original 1969 budget. But it should be noted that about $1.5 billion of the $7.3 billion reduc- tion now shown In non-exempted areas is not a cut in the more conventional sense, but rather financing adjustments because the Banks for Cooperatives, the Federal In- termediate Credit Banks, and the Federal National Mort sage Association secondary market operations, which were in the original $186.1 billion budget total, subsequently be- came 100', , privately owned and thus dropped from the Federal totals. Of course, the $7.3 billion reduction figure Is a composite of the specific congressional actions, the financing adjustments, actual curtailments of outlays, and administrative reestimates of expenditures-both up and down-in many items as conditions changed. There are signs that further reestimates up- ward in certain programs will substantially diminish the $7.3 billion figure and thus in turn the $1.2 billion figure. The ceiling proposed In this bill would af- ford opportunity for maximum flexibility within the overall total to meet, as fully as reasonably possible, changed and changing expenditure requirements In certain specific programs that cannot be foreseen with great precision. The new administration has vari- ously indicated that it intends to seek, on a continuing basis, economies in operations and to look for lower-priority areas when it needs room for increases within its stated policy of strict fiscal restraint. An aggregate ceiling would be facilitating in this regard- Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 May 20, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD HOUSE Of course, the President can seek supple- mental relief to meet necessary but unfore- seen and unavoidable outlay Increases which he finds cannot be accommodated within the overall total. Setting a beginning ceiling in this fashion should in no way discourage the Executive Branch from its continuing commitment- and responsibility-for seeking to conduct the day-to-day management of government programs at the very minimum cost con- sistent 'with the public necessities, refrain- ing from spending every dollar that can reasonably be saved. Constructive economy in public spending is not only a matter of leg- islative decision. It is also a matter of ad- ministration. The new administration has attached high priority to quality of per- formance in administering the government. Wasteful and needless expenditures often do not become to until funds are poorly managed. The primary burden of getting a dollar's value for every dollar justifiably ap- propriated to the purposes of government lies mainly with those who administer, not with those who legislate. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may require. Now, there was a good basis last year for exempting agencies, but let me say to you that there is, in my judgment, based on presently available informa- tion, no good basis for exempting agen- cies this year. Last year, we were cutting the estimate of expenditures by $6 bil- lion and therefore we did feel some ex- emptions were desired and these exemp- tions Were proposed. Then, of course, there were additional exemptions which were provided' later. Last year, we pro- posed a cut in the estimate of expendi- tures, but in title IV of the pending bill, we are not proposing any cut in the esti- mate of expenditures. So it makes no sense to exempt the Veterans' Adminis- tration, or the interest on the national debt, or any other item. It makes no sense to exempt anything in this bill, be- cause we are proposing an expenditure limitation or ceiling at the exact and precise limitations which have been esti- mated in the revised budget of the ad- ministration. The budget this year ought to be more accurate in many respects that it was in many previous years, because ordinarily a budget is put into shape to a very con- siderable extent in the fall of the year preceding the year for which it begins, that is, the following January 1. How- ever, we are now operating on an ex- penditure budget which was refined, re- designed, and reexamined since Janu- ary 20. It is more up to date and should be more trustworthy. The revised budget of the administration on which this pro- vision is based was submitted only a month ago. So I hope we will not at this time yield to the temptation of trying :to make any exemptions whatever. THE ARITHMETIC AND MECHANICS OF THE PhOPOSED CEILING Mr. Chairman, let me hasten to add- and I realize this is a dull subject, but It is very important and will become in- ereasingly more important-let me add that we will change this ceiling if we appropriate more money than was esti- mated for appropriation in the budget. In other words, if we increase appro- H3831 priations and spending through appro- the appropriation bills would translate into priations, then this will be translated to net downward adjustments to the $192.9 bile the ceiling and increase the ceiling. If lion figure. And in this general connection, this year we were to w we did last year some $38 billion of the appropriation budget requests are first subject to processing when we reduced the President's appro- through the various annual authorization priation budget by about $12 billion, that bills. would be translated inE o an expenditure In the area of proposed legislation for reduction amount not of $12 billion but into the amount that would be spent in the forthcoming year fiscal 1970. That might be half that stun or one-third of that sum or some other percentage. This ceiling is mandatory; It is inflex- ible; it is the law of the land from which the executive branch cannot escape. The executive branch will of course have the authority to make adjustments within various programs ane within those pro- grams accommodate to better manage- ment and so forth. The administration can come to Congress and say, "Our esti- mates which we made as to spending last April have proved. to be faulty and we would ask you to make certain adjust- ments to the ceiling." This would then be a matter for Congress to decide upon. So, if we increase appropriations for various programs, then the budget ceiling will go beyond $192.9 billion by whatever figure might be mandated by the increase. Mr. Chairman, so that the RECORD Will reflect more preciseiy how the ceiling would work, I include additional explora- tory excerpts from the committee report: THE ARITHMETIC AND MECHANICS OF THE C'.EIL I NG The ceiling begins by legitilating a net re- duction of $2,372,000,Oe10 in budget outlays projected for 1970 in the original (January) budget-from $1953 billion. down to the $192.9 billion April 16 revised projection of the present admin.istr:ation. But the gross ceiling reduction is $4.020,000,000; this was offset by $1.6 billion in the recent budget review by upward "c.orreetions" in several specific projections in me original budget. The $4 billion cutback in outlays includes $1.1 billion in defense. $1 billion for a modi- fication of the previously proposed $1.6 bil- lion increase in social security benefits, and $1.9 billion for prognuns ;,Stetting almost every Federal agency- In the April 15 review in which the $4 bil- lion cutback in outlays was projected the administration also proposed gross cutbacks of $5.5 billion ($4.2 bi)jion, net after the "correcting" adjustments of $1.3 billion) in appropriation and other budget obligational authority requests. $3 billion of this is in defense and $2.5 billion in all other areas of the budget. Budget bbligational author- ity (appropriations, er:,entially) is the tradi- tional basis on which appropriation and au- thorization bills are stated and voted on re- gardless of the year or years in which the funds are to be actually disbursed in the form of budget outlay:.. The gross total for new budget authority for 1970 in the January budget is $210.1 bil- lion, and in the April 15 revision, $206.9 bil- lion-including so-called permanent budget authority, such as interest, trust funds, etc., which does not actually appear in the annual bills. The Committee on Appropriations and sev- eral other committees have before them for consideration these revised appropriation re- quests and Other budgetary recommenda- tions for fiscal 1970. What Congress does in the bills dealing with there various budget authority proposals plus a handful of other proposals involving outlays but not budget authority basically determines what hap- pens to the $192.9 billion beginning ceiling in the accompanying bill. which the outlay budget includes specific sums, several have the effect of holding the outlay total lower than it otherwise would be. Several, of course, involve additional out- lays. For example, if Congress does not en- act the proposed postal rate increase, the outlay ceiling, according to the latest esti- mate available, would be adjusted upward by some $600 million. This is because postal revenues are counted as offsets to expendi- tures, not as budget receipts. If the budget proposal to authorize the Farmers Home Administration to make In- sured rather than direct operating loans is not enacted, the outlay ceiling, according to the budget, would be adjusted upward by $292 million. If the budget proposal for legislation to restrict public assistance medical. aid for patients in mental institutions to 120 days is not enacted, the outlay ceiling, accord- ing to the budget, would be adjusted upward by $126 million. Several legislative proposals designed to diminish budget outlays by the Veterans Ad- ministration are priced in the outlay total to save some $288 million in 1970. Failure of those, according to the budget figures, would be the basis for an equivalent upward adjust- ment in the ceiling. These four examples aggregate $1.3 billion. On the other hand, again for example, if the President's proposal for social security benefit increases is not enacted, the $600 million (of the original budget amount of $1.6 billion) in the revised budget outlay figure would not now be needed for that purpose, in which case the outlay ceiling would drop by $600 million. As to the mechanics for adjusting the ceil- ing, timeliness in accommodating govern- ment programs to congressional changes is essential to orderly administration. Congress will be processing budgetary recommenda- tions in many different bills, passing through various legislative stages over a period of sev- eral months-virtually all after the fiscal year begins. And it seems essential in the interest of consistency and otherwise to cen- ter responsibility in one place for at least tentative determination of congressional ac- tion impact. The Director of the Budget is probably in the best position to make such determina- tions. The monthly reports submitted by the Director under subsection (b) of the ceiling provision can be evaluated currently. They can be checked for consistency and reason- ableness with tentative estimates frequently made through the budget "scorekeeping" re- ports of the Joint Committee on Reduction of Federal Expenditures and with those of the Committees on Appropriations. Amendatory action can be taken-if that seems to be neces- sary in the circumstances. AUTHORIZATIONS AND APPROPRIATIONS: THE KEYS TO SPENDING CONTROL Mr. Chairman, for a long time, I fought along with others the so-called Bow amendment fixing a ceiling on ex- penditures, and I do not apologize for that. But, I have come to the conclusion that an expenditure ceiling can be mean- ingful, and that it will encourage greater focus of attention by Congress and the country and the press upon spending. But in embracing this idea of an expenditure ceiling as here proposed, I do not want us for any means to delude ourselves. The For example, net reductions made through and effective way to reduce Government Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 W2 Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE Ma 20, 1969 spending Is to hold the line on authoriza- deauthorized via the basic legislative route. which is not aimed at the administration time and appropriations. That is a lead Fiscally, the cumulative result is increasing itself, as the gentleman will agree. pipe cinch method of holding down Gov- demands on the Federal Treasury. element spending. It is the surest and in the long range sense as distinguished Mr. EVINS of Tennessee. Certainly. the safest. Ina limit on spending In a from any particular fiscal year. too much Mr. MAHON. We have set for the last the s year-and this would limit emphasis is attached to controlling growth couple of years limitations of sorts, but of government spending by applying the con- they have not been passed this early in sfending only for the fiscal year. i year, trol at the end of the spending process. It is the year as this one would be, and they w: deb begins on July 1-we do not more logically and effectively applicable at have been limitations predicated on cuts rescind the money, we do not recapture the authorization and appropriation stages. below the budget. Title IV of the pending the authority-we simply say that in Appropriations are not In order unless bill is quite a different matter. fiscal year 1970 you cannot spend more there is first a legislative authorization. No Mr. EVINS of Tennessee. If the gentle- than so much, but the funds which have funds can be withdrawn from the Treasury been appropriated In prior years will re- but in consequence of valid authority granted man will yield further, we are here set- been appropriated Inp prior years So b by the Congress to first create an obligation ting a flexible limitation at the very out- lin y all in behalf of the Government. That is the key set on the Congress, which can be re- means, the best way for us to achieve a to the situation. The most consistently ac- vised up or down, depending upon the reduction in the cost of Governemnt and curate barometer to future Spending levels actions of the Congress. effective control of Government spending is the dimensions of budget authority en- Mr. MAHON. That is correct. Is to quit authorizing and appropriating acted by the Congress to enter into obilga- I want to say this in defense of the al- so generously, tions on behalf of the Government. But, there are reasons other than Authorize something new or enlarge an ministration, or of any administration: those which I have stated for supporting obi g authority is almost ucertain tew It is o to predict In January or April precisely an expenditure limitation. Government follow. what m be Is growing bigger and more complex. Denial of authority to ob ay spent. It may be that ad- a subsequent 1-gate precludes administration will find that certain d- : ow, let me give this figure which may expenditure. justments cannot be made depending on shock some of the public, but which may Curtail the input of new appropriations the trend of events In the war, or other- not shock Members of Congress who are (and other forms of obligating authority) wise which might bring about a r niure aware of fiscal complexities. and spending will come sow. equire- L"f a Should today authority to obligate and the obit- lent for a change. oday appropriate all of gation inevitably will follow In due time. The administration of course would the money and grant all of the authority Once the obligation is made and the bill have the liberty, as It always does, to requested by the administration in the comes due, the check to pay it (the outlay) come before us with a supplemental- pending budget in fiscal 1970 on July 1 must also inevitably follow in due time. and the bill before us today is nothing the Government would have $431 billion FLEXIBILITY or vies Paorosm Cxn ma but a supplemental presented to us by available for expenditure. But it is not Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, will the the present administration, the Nixon now projected by the administration gentleman yield? administration. It Is a supplemental, and tbf,t more than $192.9 billion will be Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman we inevitably have to have supplemen- sMF.nt. So, in this expenditure ceiling for from Pennsylvania. tals at times though they must be avoided the first time in the history of the Nation Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, I direct wherever possible. we are undertaking to say, "Yes, we fix the gentleman's attention to the report Mr. EVINS of Tennessee. Would the the annual appropriations, but we are where It says that this will be the first gentleman point out further that this is going a step further this year and are ceiling ever to be placed directly in the a flexible ceiling-I mean, this is a flexi- going to fix the annual expenditures." hands of the Congress. This Is what the ble thing which can be revised up or While we have previously authorized all committee says in the report. down, depending upon the actions of the .the carryover funds Involved, we by this Mr. MAHON. Yes. It would be the first Congress. limitation fix the overall rate of spend- overall ceiling placed In the hands of the UNEXPENDED CARRYOVER BALANCES AND THE ing for a given year, namely fiscal year Cope and Congress can work its will, DIMENSIONS OP ANNUAL ACTIONS 1970. and what Congress can do today, of The gentleman further points :his limitation, this ceiling, has been course, It can modify tomorrow. his report to the unobligated and un fixed in such a way that it ought to be, Some have said that the ceiling ought expended carryovers. I believe this is it seas to me, palatable to the rank and to be inflexible on the Congress. If you very significant, as found on page 122 of file of the Members of the Congress. We make it a mandate on the executive, the report. It says: have drawn the limitation in such a way they ask, why not make It a mandate on For example, total unexpended carryover as to get, we hope, majority support. the Congress? There is no power on earth balances at the beginning of fiscal 1970 will Mr. Chairman, on the question of the to fix a ceiling or a limitation on expendi- approximate $226 billion- mo:st effective means of controlling tures on the Congress itself. What Con- That is, $226 billion of money unspent spending, I Include an additional excerpt gross can do today it can undo tomorrow. In carryovers from previous actions of from the report of the committee. It re- Mr. EVINS of Tennessee. Mr. Chair- the Congress: Sects a position long held In the cam- man, will the gentleman yield? mittee Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman Mr. . Mist glance This e226 billion fectly while there are some grounds for doubt from Tennessee. may at first glance seem to be perfectly that the outlay (bill-paying) stage of the Mr. EVINS of Tennessee. As the dis- outrageous and a reflection upon the fiscal process is the most logical or the most tinguished chairman of the Committee Cord ress in makes available such large effective point at which the Congress should on Appropriations has Slims that will be carried over in the pointed seek to control government spending, an out, and pipeline to the next fiscal year. over Al ceiling on outlays in a given year has as I understand the matter, we have set But much of this money is in social some usefulness as a short-run regulating a spending ceiling at $192.9 billion, security funds that have not been ex- devi.:e, especially when the economic and about $193 billion, which is exactly the pended. fiscal situations are under great stress as at Nixon budget, as a level. prea'nt, But there is room for great doubt We have set the ceil Much of it is in military procurement that such a ceiling can realistically be re- ins at this level, programs. gard5d as an effective long-run control re- which means spending cannot go beyond Much of it relates to space and atomic cedure. p this amount, but if Congress takes action energy and such things as I am about to As today Is the consequence of yesterday, to increase the appropriations, by being relate in this unexpended category. It so tomorrow is the consequence of today. a flexible ceiling, it goes up, or if the ranges over the whole Government, Legir lative authorizations are the seedbeds Congress falls to take action which is really. of Viture expenditure growth. Initial au- recommended in the budget it may go up For example, the Federal Deposit In- thorization of a program or project is the or down, according to what the Congress surance Corporation has about $3 billion, beginning point In the, legislative spending does. The committee has set the budget It is not, anticipated that this will be process. If the program or project, whatever at the Nixon level, but what may be the expended, but it is available for expendi- it mi.y be, is not authorized by the Congress, ultimate result will be dependent upon then no appropriation is In order. But the tore It is an unobligated carryover. facts are that virtually every year new pro- what Congress does in appropriations For example, the Congress passed a bill grants and projects are authorized, and old and In authorizations. granting riot insurance and flood insur- programs are often extended and expanded. Mr. MAHON. The gentleman Is cor- ance, and there are $500 million-a half Seldcm are existing programs and activities rest, But this is going to be a limitation billion dollar' -iriv 1 ed in this fund. Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000100180044-u Approved. For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 11 3833 May -26, -1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE In all probability they would not be ex- $107 billion. The remainder would be an bills. Interest on the debt and trust funds pended, but they are within the $226 expenditure avoided in subsequent years. are examples. ' But to put the picture in sharper focus, Several programs that do pass through billion. f I shall elaborate on that questionit must be noted that Congress does not the annual bill process involve mandated- a little further in my remarks. annually act on anyw;rere near the entire type expenditures fixed in basic law, which Mr. EVINS of Tennessee. Would the new budget authority teal. Some of it is in unless changed through legislation operate gentleman say that this is a 'moderate the form of requests and some of it is in as a practical limit on the discretionary limitation? Some have thought that it the form of estimates. Thoughly $66 billion, power to control them annually. Veterans is a very small limitation, and it should net, of the new budget authority total is pensions and public assistance matching go further. Would the gentleman char- estimated to go on the books in 1970 auto- grants are examples. acterize his amendment as a moderate matically-so-called permanent appropri- Payments for prior year contracts and ob- ations-under earlier ?aws, mainly trust ligations falling due cannot effectively be One? funds, interest on the debt, and several avoided. These run across the whole govern- Mr, MAHON. I would so characterize others. The other $139 -pillion goes through went. It, and I thank the gentleman. I would the annual bill process, -mostly the appro- There are a number of others. The Jan- say it is a moderate one. priation bills-but it involves projected ex- uary budget classifies some $98 billion, or It may be too firm for the Director of penditures, as to 1970, of roughly only $90 about half of the 1970 outlay budget, as the Bureau of the Budget. I can see why billion, more or less which means that Con- "relatively uncontrollable civilian outlays the Director may prefer not to have to gress, in the various annual bills, normally under present law." The figure for the April live with this amendment. But it will deals with new budget authority amounts 15 budget review under this classification help the Director of the Bureau of the that, in total, relate to less than half of the is $100 billion, meaning that better than - budget outlays projected for that same year. half of the outlay budget for the year is not, hold the line with the Govern As noted, more than half of budget outlays as a practical matter, subject to the normal ment agencies and Government depart- in.a given year now derive from carryover discretionary powers of appropriation with- ments. If he gets into difficulty that is balances and from. new budget authority out changes in the basic laws that more or in ally, manner unavoidable, he can seek that goes on the books automatically under less ordain them. relief from the Congress. - various permanent appropriation arrange- Similarly, though he ik the $n detail, There are also those who say it is ments enacted over tia years. does not exactly correspond, The size of the unexpended carryover pipe- cutback provision of the Revenue and Ex- It must that it has no teeth, line, of course, depenrfa on what is put in penditure Control Act last session, Congress .it t be pretty good since we have ve and what is taken out. Addition of more new exempted from the ceiling and from the cut- opposition from both sides. budget authority than ;s expended in a year back, programs involving about half of total ipeline. During fiscal 1970, outlays, in effect recognizing their relative Mr. Chairman, under leave granted, increases the pipeline-' I include further exploratory material based on the recent budget projections, the uncontrollability without changes in the from the committee report on the mat- total unexpended pipeline would Increase basic laws applicable or other compelling cir- ter of carryover balances. And in this from $226 billion to $237 billion, but all of cumstances giving rise to them. connection, I am inserting supplemen- the increase is more than accounted for in Looking at the matter in terms of increases tary statistical material: trust fund accumulations of balances. In rather than totals, about 75% of the outlay Federal funds, there Is a drop of $1 billion, increase, 1970 over 1969, projected in the UNEX ENDED csaavovxn BALANCVS Ai THE from $126 billion to $125 billion. Depend- January budget was in these so-called rela- DIMENSIONS OS ANNUAL ACTIONS ' ing on congressional as.cions, this could drop tively uncontrollable items. The proportion The proposed ceiling provision, being all- further. applicable to the $8 billion outlay increase, inclusive, covers expenditures in fiscal 1970 CONTROLLABLE VERSUS IIritONTROLLABLE 1970 over 1969, projected in the new admin- from budget authority to be newly granted EXPEN,t'Tuux5 istration's budget review is even greater. in this session; expenditures from so-called All expenditures are, of course, control- The outlay ceiling proposed by the com- mamanly from earlier la that flow auto- mittee for 1970, while rigid and all-encom- ttuxes s i from from unexpended la ; er expen f lable by controlled the by Congre Congress. -:r, All because they expenditures are flow passing, does not and cannot of course come uxpended carryover balances o of from laws enacted by Congress. But as a very to grips with these fundamentals of basic prior years. Very substantial portions of the laws. But by covering both controllable and $192.9 billion beginning ceiling figure spring practical matter, not x,11 are subject to ef- "uncontrollable" outlays, it will focus on the fective discretionary control through the from each of these three general sources of total, and keep it in focus. expenditure availability. normal annual budget and appropriations process. It will tend to force attention on possible For exa at h, total ng offisc $l a 1970 will carryover Very considerable expenditures arise from alternatives and substitutions when upward appro is at the beginning but $10 billion so-called permanent appropriations that do pressures are exerted on the ceiling. in social sity billion--about not pass through the annual appropriation It will keep the hands of Congress on It. and other othetrust funds s and nnd d in social security e $126 billion in Federal funds. But some $77 TABLE 8.-BALANCES or BUDGET AUTHORITY (FROM THE JANUARY 1969 BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970) billion of the $126 billion of Federal funds [In millions of dollars] will have been obligated for programs across the government but not yet actually paid out. The remaining $49 billion, not obligated and not expended, is in many accounts across the government; there is a comprehensive and informative special analysis of it in the January budget, Special Analysis Cl, pp. 78-93. But'of the $226 billion total beginning car- ryover, trust and federal funds combined, roughly $86 billion is projected for expendi- ture (disbursement, that is) in fiscal 1970, and roughly that amount is thus counted in the $192.9 billion ceiling figure. The re- mainder-some $138 billion after a small lapse amount-becomes part 'of the total unexpended carryover projected into the fol- lowing year, fiscal 1971. Roughly then, it can be seen that only about $107 billion of the newly projected outlay total for 1970($192.9 billion, less the $86 billion from carryovers) is estimated to come from the $205.9 billion new budget authority requested or estimated for that Same year of l O. Funds appropriated in a given year are 'expended partly in that year and partly in subsequent years because of long lead-times, construction time, and other factors. To put the relationship of budget authori- ty and outlays In some better focus by way of extreme illustration, If the whole $205 billion of new budget authority for '1970 failed, the expenditure outlay' reduction fn 1970, based on the budget, would be only Obli- Unobli- Obli- Department or other unst gated gated gated Funds appropriated to the Presi,lent: International financial instit,tions_______-_ 1,004 6,447 1,226 Military assistance----------------------- 2,114 2,764 1,804 Economic assistance__ - 3,790 860 3,685 Office of Economic Opportunity,,.. 1,140 6 982 Other_________________________345 112 645 Agriculture ------------------------------- 5,446 2,749 5,562 Commerce ----------------- .____..----------- 973 225 1,086 Defense-Military ---------------- _----------- 32,077 15,116 30,884 Defense-Civil------------------------- .------- 302 248 345 Health, Education, and Welfare--------------- 6,403 28,043 7, 820 Housing and Urban Development ---------------- 6,674 14,462 8,254 Interior_____________________________________ 845 609 947 Labor ---------------------------------------- 495 10,790 498 Transportation -------------- ________7,271 3,409 7,286 Treasury_____ __ __ ___ _ 102 26 103 Atomic Energy Commission-_ ___ 1,138 320 1,115 National Aeronautics and ;pacsAdmmitration__ 1,820 313 1,616 Veterans' Administration___-_ _ --- 1,034 8,139 1,030 Civil Service Commission---------------------- 642 17,690 701 Export-Import Bank-_ _ __ 2,367 3,749 2,996 Federal Deposit Insurance Corp __ __ __-- 248 6,340 257 Federal Home Loan Bank Board________ ______ 30 3,468 61 Railroad Retirement Board__- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 112 4,240 127 Other agencies______________ _------------ 2,195 4,740 2,306 Allowance_ _-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -for contingencies_ MEMORANDL;CA Federal funds ----- _-------- ____ 69,839 54,095 72,043 Trust funds -------- _-------------- _--------- 8,728 80,769 9,293 Less than $500,000. Note: Totals slightly revised in table that follows this table. Unobli- Obli. Unobli- Obli- Unobli- gated gated gated gated gated 6,427 1,591 6,633 1,880 6,633 468 2 1,737 2,393 1,767 2,193 , 690 3,248 391 3,364 622 8 1,018 - 5 1,207 0 111 563 -87 578 -18 2,680 6,464 2,111 6,869 2,177 258 1,241 209 1,254 122 829 14 32, 818 11,594 35,055 10,970 , 247 441 158 496 50 30, 778 8,669 35,729 8,908 42, 756 743 14 7, 050 13,495 8,076 12,139 , 612 1,141 359 1,175 234 11,919 478 12,709 656 13,680 4,154 8,531 4,679 9,070 5,102 24 87 25 94 22 385 1,563 56 1,486 ---------- 381 1,624 118 1,552 (I) 8 768 1,120 8, 341 1,181 8,3887 , 18,505 834 20, 522 981 21,936 2,687 3,638 2.387 4.585 1,026 6,590 3,697 33 4,033 17 4,447 4,375 130 4,525 137 4,596 6,804 2,494 1,985 7,694 1, 521 _______ 50 ---------- 200 142,142 86,844 139,238 93,597 145,616 54,988 77,410 49,090 83,301 44,986 87,154 9,434 90,148 10,278 100,630 Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 H 3834 Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 c vtvUHLbblONAL RE( BUDGET REVIEW OF APRIL 15, 1969-CHANGE IN UNEXPENDED BALANCES P n bllllonsj Federal funds ]ntregovern- Trust mental Federal funds transactions Total funds Intragovern- Trust mental funds transactions Total tines aided balance, June 30, 1968______________________ 1969 Bud t th if 127.0 96.4 -------------- 223.5 127.0 96.4 __------ ____-_ 223 5 ge au or lr..__? Expiring authority in 1969, et:--.--_----------- ____ L 'l 148.8 -1.2 53.3 -7.5 194.6 149.9 -7.! .-.?..__--?--- --&3 -1.2 53.3 -7.5 -7.1 ........... . . 195.7 -9 3 ou ou ays -_-------------- 148.2 43.0 -7.5 183.7 149.5 . . 42.9 -7.5 . 184.9 Estimated unexpended balance. June 30, 1969_______________ 1970 B d t h 126.5 99.6----- --.._.._ 11 126.2 99.8-------- 226.0 ge u aut ority.----.-- Expiring authorit in 1970 158.2 60.0 210.1 154.3 59.5 205.9 y , eta_ __________________?. L -1.7 __......------------- -1.7 -1.7 ...... _......... __.. - -1 7 ess oullays _________________ - 154.7 48.4 -7.9 195.3 153.8 47.1 -6.0 . 192.9 Estimated unexpended balance, June 30, 1970------ _-------- 128.3 110.9 .............. 239.2 125.0 112.2 .............. 237.2 BUDGET AUTHORITY jFiscal years, in binionsj 1968 1969 '1970 actual estimate estimate Avallable through current action by the Congress: Preriouny enacted------- ----- ------------------------?--.- --- $134.4 P 5128.9 rolosedin this budget------?---------------------------------------------- .._.. $134 4 To La r uested eq separately: For supplemental requirements under present law----------- U 4.5 . 0.1 pon enactment of proposed legistation--- . _ ......... ------------ ..... .. . .. Allo vanes: Civilian and military lay increase-_... .... 0.2 1.2 7 8 Contingencies . 0.4 Subtotal, available through current action by the Congress....- ...... 134.4 133.6 138 9 Available without current action by the Congress (permanent authorizations): Trust funds (existing [aw)------- ----------------------------- ---------- 47.8 53.5 . 59.1 Intceatonthepublic de 1. ..........................?-_-----.......---- 14.6 O 16.3 17.3 ther -------------------?----- -- - ....... 5.4 5.4 4,3 Deductio s for offsetting receipts: and intregovernmental transactions _.. - _ _. _ _ _ _ ..... - 6.7 -4.3 -4.5 ProGrietary receipts from the public.......--------- --------- .. ....... --4,7 --4.3 -4.5 Tctag budget a u t h o r i t y . _ _ _ .. _ . 190.6 195.8 205.9 ESTIMATED EXPENDITURES (BUDGET OUTLAYS) FISCAL YEARS 1969 AND 1970 Mr. Chairman, we have been referring to the beginning ceiling figure of $192.9 billior. representing budget outlays pro- jected by the administration in its budget review of April 15. I include a table based on figures in that review, showing a breakdown by departments and agencies of the $192.9 billion: T7.BLE 8,-BUDGET OUTLAYS, 1969 AND 1970 [In millions of dollars] 1969 1970 current revised estimate estimate Agriculture ---------------__- 8,409 7,197 CCC----------------------------- (5,492) (4,482) Commerce:..--_-.- ?------__---__. ___ 872 1,079 Defense-- military d military assst- a n i ance__ _ _______________________..? 78,400 77,903 Corps oftngineers_---_....._.._._-_-_ 1.192 1,159 Health, Ec "cation, and Welfare. .------- 46, 259 50,551 Trust funds______________________ (32,981) (35,324) Housing aid Urban Devetopmen,_____ 2,017 _ 2,823 Interior-- ---------------- -....... ' .. 689 830 ustice........ _____________.--_---- 517 730 Labor--- ___ ___ __ __ _______ 3,503 -- ---- - 3,690 Unemployment trust lands.. - - 2, 749) (2,866) Post Offcr..----------------------- -- 929 412 State---- -----------?------------- 434 428 Transportation ------------- 6,211 6,753 Treasury_ ........................... 16,603 17,559 tnteri st on the public debt-..------ (16,300) (17,300) Atomic Energy Commission__________ 2,451 2,504 General Si rvices Administration-------- 413 407 NASA- ..--_______................... 4,247 3,897 Veterans' 4dminlstration-------------- 7,719 7,'554 All other: Foreign economic assistance....... 1.925 1,760 Office of Economic Opportunity---.-1,880 1 870 Other agencies___________________ 5,136 , 6,538 TABLE 8.-BUDGET OUTLAYS, 1969 AND 1970-Continued I In millions of dollars] 1969 1970 current revised Agency estimate estimate Allowances for: Civilian and military pay increases-........... 2,800 Contingencies _.._.__ ______ __________ 200 go Undistributed intrantro vernment al Irans? actions---------------------------- -5,105 -5,745 -~ Total_________________ $4,9111 192,899 ee, in its wisdom , has acted , and I wou ld Note: Detail may not add due to rounding. like to say that if there is anyone for Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the whom I have a higher regard than the gentleman yielyield? chairman of the Appropriations Com- Mr. MAHON . I yield to the distin- mittee, I have not found him. But let me guished gentleman from South Carolina say this: We cannot approach it in the (Mr. RIVERS), chairman of the Commit- manner proposed with any degree of tee on Armed Services. accuracy. We cannot have all the pro- grams. SPENDING FROGRAfdb grains. I have enumerated unless we have sufficient funds. I am afraid we are going Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I wonder to come up short In our commitments to if the gentleman realizes that the Con- our own people, and to the security of gress is not acting-but that we are re- America and our commitments with acting. The gentleman knows, of course, whatever other friends we have, if we that whenever we get ready to reduce have any. expenditures, everybody looks to the I want the gentleman to know that military. I do not agree with this approach. We Now you have the terrible situation of should act on each program instead of the people assigning the worst sort of reacting to the entire budget. The Con- conduct and motives to the so-called stitution specifically provides that the military-industrial complex, I am sure one arm of our Government that has the the gentleman knows that on Mr. Mc- direct responsibility of the Congress is Namara's procurements for ships there the military. Yet we are neglecting this was a cost overrun and Secretary Pack- responsibility by provisions of the sort Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 and tells inc that it will be an overrun of $100 million. This morning and on Thursday we are trying to find out what caused an inac- curate estimate it is not all overrun- on the C-5A aircraft. There are a num- ber of factors involved. The gentleman knows as well as I do that thi C n s o guess has not got the courage to stand up here and stop some of these crazy pro- grams that we have, for instance, the Job Corps and the OEO and a lot of these things we are spending money on all over hell's half acre. But they will go to the military and cut them to smithereens. This is what it is coming to. We have inaccurate estimates all over the lot in the military and when you superimpose that on the escalation caused by the increased cost of living, our military is going to come up short and we are going to have half a defense. It would be far better to abolish cer- tain items for the military and come clean with the American people and say, "W d t e ono want you to have the Polaris program-we do not want you to have new bombers-even though the B-52's are 15 years old. We do not want you to modernize your navy yards. We do not want you to have a good merchant ma- rine program. We do not want you to go on with the new fighter needs that were denied us under the McNamara pro- grams. We do not want you to have a moon shot.." This is where these things are coming to. That is the weakness of provisions such as the one to which the gentleman referred. Why do we not cross each bridge at the time we come to it? Barr MAHON Th t h i a s w at we pro- pose to do. We will cross each bridge at th e time we come to it as each appro- priation bill is before us, or each bill from a legislative committee which mandates certain expenditures is be- fore us. Action on these bills will in effect maintain, or lower, or raise the expendi- ture ceiling. Mr. RIVERS. We probably hold longer hearings in our committee than any committee of the Congress. We have a number of subcommittees going now. They are trying their best to save money. The distinguished chairman's commit- t Approved For Release 2002/08/01 CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 May 20, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE proposed, and I am afraid it is a mis- take. Mr. MAHON. According to the esti- mates-and we are, for the time being, accepting the expenditure estimates of the administration-the military will expend about $78 billion this fiscal year and a similar amount for next year. The full amount so estimated for next year- fiscal 1970-is provided for in the pro- posed spending ceiling in the bill before us. If our military people, those with stars on their shoulders and those in civilian capacities, will run the Defense Depart- ment in a businesslike and efficient way, I would think ,that sums available and in prospect would be adequate. I would hope that the sums are more than adequate. One of the things that disturbs me is that there have been so many mistakes made by the military. This has tended to generate a lack of confidence. I grant that the problems have been of great magnitude and complexity. Let me say. that I have confidence in the military. I do not have unlimited con- fidence in their managerial ability. Mr: RIVERS. I do not know anybody who does. Mr. MAHON. Let me give an example. I joined in cutting the military budget $5 billion plus, last year. I am not beholden to any department of this Government. I want to make that clear. I am sure the gentleman from South Carolina shares this attitude completely. With respect to management, just think of the humiliation we suffered a few days ago when the Navy, through neglect, let a submarine in a Navy ship- yard go to the bottom. And what is that going to cost. us? _$25 million. Of course, if we are going to let the defense dollar go down the drain in any such irresponsible manner as that, it would not be possible to supply the military with adequate funds. ? I would say this: I have confidence in the administration and feel that expend- itures in the military area will not be cut without any regard to the welfare of the country. I am aware that the Secretary of Defense served on the Committee on Appropriations of the House and the De- fense Subcommittee for many years. I cannot think of him in a role of an appeaser or a nonspender when it comes to necessary defense expenditures. So I would, say, let us take the Pentagon at its word as a starting point on the amount of funds needed. When our hearings on Mdefense programs are completed we can reduce or increase the budget figure and the final figure, agreed upon by Congress and enacted Into, law will determine what can be spent in fiscal 1970. Now, before I yield to my good and dis- tinguished friend, my able colleague, let me say that.I believe in the ABM. I be- lieve in a strong military program. I de- plore the low estate in which the military finds Itself, I want to see confidence re- stored in this area. We need to have re- spect and to have reason to have respect for all departments and branches of Gov- ernment. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina. Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, the gen- tleman gave wings to the very things I was talking about. I do not wear any- body's collar either. I am looking for encomiums, and 1 do not get them around Washington, as the gentleman knows. I want to say this, that the military now has reached deplorable conditions. We have 60 percent of our fleet which is not fit to live on or in because someone budgeted too low. The chairman has not heard the last of t1re results of McNa- mara's systems anliiyjt crowd. We have not heard the last. of that. They are bringing disrespect rand derision on mili- tary men who have not made a decision over there since Mc: 'amara darkened the doors of the Pentagon. We have deficits coming up day in arni day out, day in and day out, over which the military men had no control. We cannot think we-can just put a hard, hidebound ceiling on any kind of restrictions and think we can let each tub sit on its botlsim. That is, in my opinion, a mistake. Mr. MAHON. There are some leaks in Government tubs and we are trying to close some of them. Mr. RIVERS. I d-) not deprecate the efforts of the chairman, but I am sure an enlisted man did nest puli the seacock on that submarine. It could have been sab- otaged. Mr. MAHON. I do not know who is responsible, but the Navy should find out who is responsible and see that he is adequately disciplircd. If they want to gain higher respect, this kind of action must be taken. Mr. RIVERS. I agree. We must re- store responsibility in the military-and then hold them responsible. And let me tell the chairman, e ?Ir committee is go- ing to investigate that incident and, for whatever it is worth, we are going to re- port to the Chairman on this. THE SO-CALLED PEACE DIVIDEND IN FEDERAL rL DS Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman. The chairman of the Armed Services Committee has made a statement which makes it appropriate at this time for me to discuss a further situation. Many of the programs and ships and weapons of the military are obsolete or are becoming obsolescent. There is no doubt of that. Large programs are go- ing to be necessary to outfit the Navy and the other services. with modern ships, aircraft, and other weapons. Defense spending is not going to toboggan down- ward when the war ends in Vietnam. There will be reductions but the costs will remain high. Military spending is going to have to remain high because survival is the first law of nations. It is iciescspabie that the military programs a_,-e going to remain high and we are going to have to sup- port them. That is one of the reasons we want a better job done by the mili- tary-by civilians and those in uni- form-in order that we may get more for the dollar. But those who are writing in the pa- pers and saying to their speeches, "Wait H 3835 until the war is over, and then we will have unlimited resources for all the so- cial programs," are too optimistic. Some seem to think that Secretary Finch will have all the money he wants for educa- tion, for health, and the poor, and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Devel- opment will have all the money he wants to for housing and related needs. That is incorrect, They are not going to have all the money they want. There is not enough money in the Nation to meet all these demands. Besides that, money is not the only answer in defense, and it is not the only answer in our social programs. I think it Is a little bit cruel for us to make state- ments which would lead the cities and the mayors and the poor and others to believe that when the war is over we will have unlimited funds for all purposes which may be desired. We just will not have that kind of money, and let us tell the people that now. Mr. SMITH of Iowa. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa. SUPPLEMENTALS FOR INTEREST SUBSIDY PROGRAMS Mr. SMITH of Iowa. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman said he does not want any exceptions to his limitations provision but, in fact, by not including some of the practices or programs under the limita- tion, there are exceptions. For example, there is no limit on the amount that they can obligate for interest subsidies. And now it is proposed, instead of having cur- rent expenditures within the fiscal year for a direct loan program and grants for college facilities, they will have a pro- gram to pay only $11 million this year and obligate us for $440 million, which does not show up in this year's budget. So in effect the limitation is no limita- tion so long as that is permitted, is it? Mr. MAHON. I wish the gentleman would let his own statement stand as he made it. I am not quite sure of the import of the statement. Mr. SMITH of Iowa. But it does not limit them from obligating us to pay for the next 35 years under these programs. Mr. MAHON. Oh, I see what the gen- tleman means and his point is well taken. I call the attention of the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. JONAS) to this matter. Under the housing programs there is a provision in the bill providing authority for $80 million for subsidies for 1 year. We provide a certain amount for 1 year, but when we do this we obligate ourselves for 40 years. I believe the gentleman from North Carolina has tabulated the total amount of money in these housing programs that will be mandated as a result of this bill if we pass it. Will the gentleman give that figure? Mr. JONAS. If the gentlemen will yield, it will be 40 times 80, and that is $3.2 billion we will be obligating the taxpayers to pay over the 40-year period. I remind the chairman that already in this fiscal year, we have provided $50 million for those two programs, so we have to add that to the $3.2 billion. You Approved for Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 H 3836 Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE May 20, 1969 will find in these two programs, sections 235 and 236 of the housing law as amended, we will be obligating the tax- payers of this country to the amount of $5.2 billion over the 40-year period. Mr. MAHON. About $5.2 billion. It looks ', ery minimal when one looks at the bill, rut when one looks at the costs which we are obligated to pay over 40 years it Is about $5.2 billion. Mr. JONAS. Mr. Chairman, gentleman yield further? Mr. MAHON. I yield. Mr. JONAS. This has been said, but needs to be emphasized. This spending limitation does not purport to remain in effect beyond next year. It is only for i year, is that not true? Mr. MAHON. It is only for 1 year. It might be for only 30 days, if we change it, but this is not proposed for more than 1 yea:-. Next year we can do something similar with respect to fiscal 1971 if we so determine. Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois. Mr. MICHEL. If I might make a fur- ther point with respect to the institutions of higher learning and their construction needs, there is $3.9 million in this bill for interest subsidy, which will construct $145 million worth of college facilities. If you do not want that, then just wipe out t:-ie interest subsidy. It all depends on hcw much we appropriate In this bill for tl.e Interest subsidy, as to where that ceilin goes. As he gentleman from North Carolina says, this is an expenditure ceiling for just the 1 year, not for 30 or 40 years. Mr SMITH of Iowa. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. 11?AHON. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa. Mr SMITH of Iowa. This illustrates my point very well. If they get the $3.9 million interest subsidy, they will with- hold the $150 million already appropri- ated for direct loans. That $150 million would be under the limitation, whereas the $3.9 million isall of the $145 million that shows up in the fiscal year. This is a big loophole. Mr. MICHEL. It is not a permanent loopl ole if you choose to use that word. It is effective only for this year. What we are saying is that since we a?- is such a bind, instead of a direct appropriation of $1.45 million for direct loans let us do it by the interest subsidy route, and finance the balance through the private sector. SCOPE OF PROPOSED EXPENDITURE CEILING FOR 1970 Mr. DE LA GARZA. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Texas. Mr. DE LA GARZA. I should like to com- mend the gentleman from Texas for a most interesting and enlightening state- ment. I should like to ask a question on a problem I have dealing with appropria- tions. An item in my district which was nec- essary was not included in the Nixon budg 3t. Under this limitation would It preclude the Nixon administration from amending the budget and providing an his views. The ceiling should help but item that is not In the present budget? holding down authorizations and appro- Mr. MAHON. There is nothing In this ?priations Is the surest way to cut spend- limitation that would preclude the Nixon administration from amending the budget and placing the item in it. There is nothing in this limitation which would preclude Congress from providing the funds for theunbudgeted items. So there is nothing inflexible Insofar as the gen- tleman's problem is concerned in the resolution now before_ us. Mr. BE LA GARZA. Therefore, if I un- derstand the gentleman correctly, the limitation goes only to the amount and the Congress can act independently or the executive can revise Its budget. Is that what the gentleman stated? Mr. MAHON. I think the point Is clear. Mr. DE LA GARZA. I thank the gen- tleman. Mr. ROGERS of Florida. Mr. Chair- man, will the gentleman yield? Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Florida. Mr. ROGERS of Florida. I do not think this is such a novel approach. The Con- gress considered it before and in effect we have done it before. Mr. MAHON. I believe we have never done it before. I will say to the gentle- man. Not quite. Mr. ROGERS of Florida. I think we have put a limitation in effect before when we put a limitation, for Instance, on the national debt. In effect, we said that there was a limitation on the bor- rowing budget. The gentleman will recall that the Hoover Commission recommended and this Congress debated the proposal that limitations on spending be placed upon each governmental department. In other words, taking the overall limitation which you are now proposing and breaking it down. The reason for the spending limitation was that the Con- gress could then control the expendi- ture budget, which we do not now control. All we can do here is appro- priate the money, and the executive controls the rate of expenditure. The Hoover Commission's proposal, which you are proposing to carry out now, was to put a limitation on what the Congress itself might control. It does not mean that you cannot vary that figure if con- ditions change which call for it. Congress can vary It. But it is a restraint on ad- ditional spending. It also advises the Congress, the way it was originally pro- posed, and if there were slippages, we could find out why there were, and if there were overages proposed, we could find out why. So it is not so novel. Mr. MAHON. The gentleman in effect is In favor of the limitation? Mr. ROGERS of Florida. I certainly am. And I think it should be done even more. We should do it on each depart- ment. I wish the chairman had agreed some years ago, along with some other members of the Committee on Appro- priations, to place expenditure limita- tions on Government departments be- cause we could have been doing it all these years and prevented a great deal of the wild spending that we have had. I thank the gentleman for yielding. Mr. MAHON. My friend is entitled to ing. No one can predict just what Con- gress will do, but I hope that the pro- posal here will be well supported by the House and by the other body. COMPARISON OF TITLE IV OF PENDING BILL WITH THE LEGISLATIVE BUDGET PROPOSAL IN THE 1946 REORGANIZATION ACT Mr. Chairman, in elaboration, may I add that the discussion recalls the efforts of the Congress, some 22 years ago, to en- act a legislative budget, an important and really key feature of which was to put a ceiling on Government spending. I think it might be useful to insert an analysis comparing that effort with title IV of the pending bill: By proposing a ceiling on the aggregate of government spending for fiscal 1970. title IV of the pending bill would secure something of what the framers of the legislative budget plan In the 1946 Reorganization Act had in mind, but which Congress in fact never accomplished. It would be useful to recall briefly what that plan was about, refer to the experiences in attempting to carry it out, and make some note of the similarities and dissimilarities between the provisions of the 1946 plan and title IV of the pending bill. THE 1946 LEGISLATIVE BUDGET PLAN The legislative budget plan was spelled out in the 1946 law, It is now a part of Rule XLSI of the Rules of the House, and reads as follows: "(a) The Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and the Com- mittee on Finance and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, or duly au- thorized subcommittees thereof, are author- ized and directed to meet jointly at the beginning of each regular session of Con- gress and after study and consultation, giving due consideration to the budget recommend- ations of the President, report to their re- spective Houses a legislative budget for the ensuing fiscal year, including the estimated over-all Federal receipts and expenditures for such year, Such report shall contain a recom- mendation for the maximum amount to be appropriated for expenditure in such year which shall include such an amount to be reserved for deficiencies as may be deemed necessary by such committees. If the esti- mated receipts exceed the estimated ex- penditures, -such report shall contain a recommendation for a reduction in the pub- lic, debt. Such report shall, be made by February 15. "(b) The report shall be accompanied by a concurrent resolution adopting such budget, and Axing the maximum amount to be appropriated for expenditure in such year. If the estimated expenditures exceed the estimated receipts, the concurrent resolu- tion shall Include a section substantially as follows: 'That it is the sense of the Congress that the public debt shall be Increased in an amount equal to the amount by which the estifnnted expenditures for the ensuing fiscal year exceed the estimated receipts, such amount being " In other words, the joint committee, after study of the budget and consultations other- wise. was 10 bring in, early In the session, a concurrent resolution proposing an expres- sion of the judgment of the Congress as to the probable budget revenuesfor the com- ing fiscal year and fixing a maximum budget expenditure goal for the year. There wsa nothing mandatory or compell- ing about any ceiling so fixed upon. It was not an enactment requiring approval of the President. Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 H 3537 May 20,.1969 _ CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE it was to be not a binding statute but only which Congress would work in its actions on establishments have prevented world war a target for the guidance of the Congress in the various spending bills. III, which was and is the great cata- processing the spending and revenue bills. The earlier "ceiling" was not really a ceiling strophic threat that has confronted us It was not directed to the Executive spend- because it was not enacted as a law and was since World War II. Our military have ing agencies, but only to the Congress. In its not binding on either Congress or the Exec- won their wars insofar as they were able individual actions in the appropriation and utive. Title IV would set a binding statutory to do a uwars the t eys and able the other spending' bills, and on the revenue ceiling. The ceiling figure, insofar as con-so all of f mstances concerned, is a begin- But whatever euThey have refle tedtgeat credit upon which cipes i could either hue to the dis- gressional ted by the ceiling ning, not decision is t lin implicitly suggested . this country and they have also shown thus es thus set, or or it could ignore the ceiling. figure Congress would wluc3 up setting, that managerial ability. In the first effort-ln 1 19447-tto put ut the plan would become a maximum on the he- Executive some considerable into effect, both Houses adopted a concurrent Branch, changeable cnly bar subsequent ac- It was Admiral Raborn who headed resolution. The House proposed an overall cut tion of Congress. That was not the case in this Polaris program. . In In leadership of $6 billion from projected fiscal 1948 budget the 1947 and 1948 efi eerts. Up program the e Polaris demonstrated expenditures. The Senate proposed a $4.5 bil- Unlike the earlier efforts which sought to pro am incomparable. lion reduction. The conferees did not resolve declare at the beginning teat h ess spthan ending a It was er who headed Adminral the differences and the resolution died in budget "should" be cat b not the dthe atomic sub- The conference. Thus no target ceiling was set. pre-determined, arbitrary amount but up marine development velo program. t has performed a The next year, Congress, on February 27, which was cast in such a way as not to en- 1948, did adopt sudh a concurrent resolution sure it, title IV would not impose any reduc- magnificent job in that field. with respect to fiscal 1949, setting-for it- tion in advance-either as a "goal" for Con- It was Gen. Ben Schriever who headed self-the goal of a $2.5 billion reduction' in gress or as a "ceiling" that would leave to the intercontinental ballistic missiles budgeted expenditures by expressing the Executive the allocation of an arbitrary cut program up p the to the Air Force. judgment, "based upon presently available to specific agencies and prugrams. the Many good jobs have be n done by our ing such fiscal year shall not exceed 37.2 bil- tide not to come fr but was powerless countless lion dollars * * *". ensure It, title IV, unlike the earlier efforts military and civilian leaders. We cannot Actual budget expenditures in fiscal 1949 "commands" that expenditures shall not look only at shortcomings. We must look were $40 billion; they exceeded the target by exceed a certain suns and carries the mecha- at the successes also, and we have rea- $2.8 billion, in effect wiping out the reduction nism to ensure the result. Of course, Con- son to be proud. goal of $2.5 billion. They exceeded the original grass can change tomorrow what it decides taken more time budget projection of $39.7 billion by some today, but that power, as to expenditures, Mrthan. I had Chairmaann, I have anticipated but I believe i $300 million. is reserved to Congress by title IV. In 1949, a move was made to set the date Unlike the earlier effort, nothing in title has given the members of the committee und for action on the legislative budget for fiscal IV calls on Congress so vote for a reduction- an opportunt programs pot which they 1950 back from February 15 to May 1. Noth- either as a ""goal" or a "ceiling"-below the questions about ing further happened. Nothing further has President's announced spending budget in are interested. UNEXPENDED CARRYOVER t3ALANCEs been done in direct response to the legislative advance of individ ial item consideration, budget plan. The mechanism is there to a;.djiist the initial Many post-mortems have been rendered ceiling figure--up or down-to comport with Mr. EVINS of Tennessee. Mr. Chair- on the experiment. It was said that the joint what Congress decides co each spending bill man, will the gentleman yield. committee of 102 members was unwieldy. and proposition. Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman It was said that the time limit of February Not unlike what the majority report- from Tennessee. 15 was too short. quoted above-said about final results under (Mr. EVINS of Tennessee asked and It was said that to name an expenditure the 1947 resolution "goal", what happens un- was given permission to revise and ex- reduction total in advance in the manner der title IV (which adopts the budget figure proposed approximated a court rendering a as a starting point)--. . "depends entirely tend his remarks.) verdict without evidence. It was said that to upon the final actic-n of the Congress upon Mr. EVINS of Tennessee. I alluded vote for a blanket reduction in advance of budget estimates, eidivid.ually and collec- aearlie to bater The nexptnre d carryov $226erillial- hearings and consideration of the individual tively". budget proposals was a vote to cut without Like the words. used in both the 1947 and I will ask if it is not correct that this knowing what is to be cut, how much is to be 1948 resolutions, title IV is "based upon out, or where the cut is to be made. presently available infornia.tion". The legis- $226 ante, if billion added to the unexpended Nixon carryover budget bal- al- new spending re- It was said that no legislative budget, lative budget effort was based on the initial lso based on the total of $431 logically premised, could precede a detailed p dget. tle IV theinew administration,initial bill on,owould not make athority for study of the estimate. availa The majority report accompanying the first Like the earlier s?ifQ]-tr=, title IV encom- Nixon billion budgeble app ~ ved raslfsube concurrent resolution submitted to the House passes expenditures ' rom unexpended care in February,t1947, suggesting the goal of a over balances of previous appropriations to mitted? $6 billion cutback, had this acknowledgment: well as expenditures from appropriations P Mr. MAHON. This is right. This $431 "of course, If the accompanying resolution be newly enacted to this session for fiscal bilion would be, technically, available be adopted there is no commitment as to any 1970. for expenditure in 1970. If we adopted reduction in specific items contained in the And unlike the noble but ineffective and budget. The resolution expresses an overall impractical plan of i946, title IV is a proposal the appropriation or obligational budget objective and its realization depends entirely logically based and practical of operation. proposed by the President, there would upon the final action of the Congress upon If adopted and adhered to, it will not only be about $431 billion available in fiscal budget estimates, individually and collec- focus on the total of government expendl- 1970. But this requires a. lot of under- tively." but will keep the hands of Congress on standing and analysis before it is Intel- y" the total. And the petea~tial for retrenchment ligible to the average citizen. It is a very THE 1946 PLAN AND TITLE IV-SIMILARITIES in expenditures is considerable. Complex matter. AND DISSIMILARITIES CONTRIBUTIONS; O5 ,vrn.IT4RY PROGRAMS AND Mr. EVINS of Tennessee. If the gen- There There ere t;iADERS ? e tleman will yield further, it is a very the a 1946 plan number an and title differences between There are are also some similarities. Now, Mr. Chairman, I wish to return flexible budget and it is not really put- Of course, title IV does not deal with the to a matter I men ,ioned earlier, which is ting a crimp on the Bureau of the Budget revenue side. The 1946 plan did. But Con- the business of military spending. the $192.9 billion spending figure is the grass knows what the revenue estimates of As I said in the colloquy with the gen- full amount projected by the Nixon the d be Branch up--dating the it tleman from South Carolina (Mr. Rlv- budget review. January should be itotedthat p-dat the ng 1ERs), I believe in military strength. I Mr. MAHON. I thank the gentleman bdgiews are needed; e ly believe we can negotiate with the Soviet for his contribution. budget review of President Nixon dealt only with appropriations and spending,' not with Union better if we have military strength. (Mr. BOW (at the request of Mr. revenues- The budget surplus of $5.8 billion I believe our main opponent in the world JONAS) was given permission to extend projected by President Nixon is subject to is not Korea or North Vietnam but the his remarks at this point in the RECORD.) revision on that account. Soviet Union and Red China. I think we Mr. BOW. Mr. Chairman, H.R. 11400 Perhaps the most basic difference between have to keep ourselves militarily strong. is the usual supplemental appropriation title IV and the spending ceiling in the I do not think we ought to permit those bill which we have each spring for those of 1947 and to succeed who are trying to destroy the items not provided for in our regular c48 is that 1948 is ttitle budget r IV wauld lions r a rigid e ceiling into law, whereas s the earlier resolu- Image of our civilian and uniformed mill- appropriations bills approved during the tions merely sought to set a goal against tary personnel. It is true our military preceding calendar year. Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 H 1E:838 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE May 20, 1969 O:eraii, I think this is a good bill. estimate of a year ago and farm price However, there are a few points that I The committee considered appropriation support outlays have risen $1.6 billion would like to make primarily by way of requests totaling $4.3 billion, and ap- above the original estimate of last year. emphasizing what the gentleman from proved appropriations of $3.8 billion, thus Of the $192.9 billion of proposed spend- Texas has said. Actually, this bill con- we cut almost $600 million below the re- Ing for fiscal 1970, some $106.3 billion tarns four separate titles. They will be quested amount. Moreover, the $4.3 bil- is in the relatively uncontrollable cate- discussed. undoubtedly, by the chairmen lion request was reduced some $250 mil- gory. That includes $81.1 billion for un- of the various subcommittees that han- lion by the Nixon administration under controllable civilian programs and $25.2 die those topics and by the ranking mi- the amounts requested in the Johnson billion for special Southeast Asia support. nority members who work with them. bud? et before we considered the request. Of the $81.1 billion for relatively uncon- In summary, it can be said that in this While I shall not repeat the detail pre- trollable civilian programs $49 billion is supplemental bill the committee con- sented by our distinguished chairman, for outlays in the social security and sidered budget requests amounting to the ? entleman from Texas (Mr. MAHON), public_ assistance programs. $4.364 billion, reduced that total re- I do want to point out that of the $3.8 Thus It seems to me that the admin- quest by $580,794,190, and recommend billicn provided $1.2 billion is for military Itration will have serious difficulty hold- to the House a bill providing for $3,- operations in Southeast Asia; $1.2 billion Ing expenditures in fiscal 1970 at $192.9 783,212,766, a reduction of 13 percent. is for pay increases resulting from the billion since there are no exemptions for Mr. Chairman, it is not unusual to Pay Act of last year; and the balance the uncontrollables such as the war in hear remarks to the effect that the of $1.4 billion is for a variety of programs Vietnam, interest on the public debt, and House Committee on Appropriations throughout the Government service. so forth. marched up the hill last year and cut Significant among the amounts pro- While It is true that expenditures may the budget by $14 billion and now it is video. are the funds requested by the ad- rise above or fall below the $192.9 bil- marching down the same hill and re- ministration to fight crime throughout lion ceiling depending upon action or in- storing nearly $4 billion of that cut. the United States. This effort to cope action by Congress on requests for appro- But, as the chairman has pointed out, with organized crime should be welcomed priations, the ceiling is indeed rigid and only about l percent of the funds con- by all law-abiding citizens. It is my hope leaves little leeway for unexpected tamed In this bill amount to restora- that substantial inroads can be made changes in budget outlays. tion of funds that were eliminated in by the Department of Justice and other As the ceiling is written in the bill it the regular bills last year. Investigatory and regulatory agencies in provides the following: The remaining part of the bill covers coping with the criminal problems which That whenever action, or inaction, by the mandatory Increases that have been face us. Congress on requests for appropriations and made necessary because of action taken Although each of the individual chap- other budgetary proposals varies from the by the Congress subsequent to the en- ters in the bill will be handled by the President's recommendation thereon, the aetment of the appropriation bills last zespeAive ranking Republican Members, Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall I do want to point out that this bill pro- h repo east to tthe o ofPtthe effect ofsucheaction eo year would like to discuss briefly the title vides for a spending limitation in fiscal Inaction on expenditures and net lending, of the bill which covers independent of- 1970 which will restrict budget expends- and the limitation act forth herein shall be flees, and with particular reference to tures to $192.9 billion. This $192.9 bil- correspondingly adjusted. the Department of Housing and Urban lion figure is some $4 billion below the If, for example. Congress fails to ap- Development, because that subject was adjus:ed amounts projected by the Johnson budget. prove the postal rate increase in the raised in the colloquy between the gen- As we all know, President Nixon bad amount of some $600 million, budget tleman from Texas and a member of the departments and ag enciees conduct expenditures will rise by that amount the committee. th eaepartm is and of enci financ conduct since postal receipts are treated as off- It is customary to read in the press needs earlier this year, and the President sets against spending. Similarly, the that Congress has been very remiss in was E,ble to reduce projected expendi- $192.9 billion c; illng will rise by $600 mil- looking after the problems of the cities; tures by the aforementioned $4 billion. lion since the postal rate proposal is ac- that we have neglected them and that we As all members of the Committee know. counted for In the expenditure total. have spent a lot of money on farm pro- for more t3 of years I have offered But, it also follows that where other un- grams and allowed the cities to grow up so-called ore than h Bow expenditure ears have offered Brecontrollable expenditures exceed current In slums and what-not. I believe at times for m amendment on most appropriation limitation budget estimates, then expenditures for such as these that it is appropriate to and dine it was most bills. pn a number controllable programs would have to be remind those who read the RECORD, and adopted of whiin some number cut below current estimates. who report on these deliberations-be- of w unanimously, he ptHouse, was never an- Mr. Chairman. I think this is a good cause it is not necessary to remind the proved by the Senate on an individual bill in terms of the reductions which we Members of the House, because I am prove dir by th bill. However, n ndi d year have made in obligational authority, and sure they are all familiar with the facts- app lat onin the Rev- I urge favorable action by the House on but to those who are not familiar with u such limitation was c Control Act of it. I am somewhat distressed, however, the facts, I believe they need to be re- senu and Expenditure Included and it has had the Contr of reduc- of by the rigid ceiling on spending since minded occasionally that Congress has 1968 1 rojected Federal effect o in the history clearly shows a wide variation been pretty generous in spending the g pre :,t fiscal year by some spending In cur billion. between actual expenditures and those taxpayers' money on urban problems, The provision before us which would projected In a budget document some 18 For example, we have been hearing a limit budget expenditures In fiscal 1970 months before the close of a given fis- lot this afternoon about unexpended bai- eal year. to $192.9 billion is much more rigid than there; and the budget does reflect that was the expenditure limitation of last Mr. JONAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield my- there will be on hand at the end of year because a number of budget ex- self 10 minutes. 1969 $226 billion in unexpended funds. penditure items wereexempted from the (Mr. JONAS asked and was given per- But I do not believe it has been men- provisions of the limitation last year. mission to revise and extend his re- tioned-and this is the most significant Expenditures in the current fiscal year marks.) part of that figure-that $139,238,000.000 for the war in Vietnam, expenditures for Mr. JONAS. Mr. Chairman, we have of that total is not even obligated. The Intere; t on the public debt, those for just listened to 50 minutes of what I be- total of $226 billion includes unspent and veterans benefits and compensation, and lieve to be as interesting a discussion of unobligated funds, but there Is approxi- so forth, were excluded from the limit budget problems that I have ever heard in mately $140 billion in the hands of the and their exemption had the effect of this Chamber. The gentleman from Texas executive branch of the Government in Increasing spending for exempted pro- has handled this subject In a masterful previously appropriated funds which have grams and in the so-called uncontrol- way and in my opinion has covered it ade- not even been obligated, or will not be lable tress by approximately $6 billion quately. Actually, I see no real reason why obligated at the end of fiscal 1969. above original estimates. I should extend the discussion, because I The Department of Housing and Urban For example, interest on the public doubt if I can add anything that he has Development has on hand-or will have debt Is up $1.1 billion above the original not already covered. at the end of this year-$20 billion of Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 May 20, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE previously, appropriated money which has not been spent. Some of'it has been obligated, but it will have $13.5 billion of unobligated funds at the end of this year. We have appropriated to that Depart- ment nearly. $1 billion since 1967-$948 million, to be exact, for the new model cities program, and very little of it has been spent. They announced nine grants a few months ago, and over the last week- end three more were announced. I do not know what causes the delay. I know it took the previous Secretary of Housing and Urban Development 7 months after he had all of the plans in to even select the first group of cities. So I do not 'believe Congress can be justly charged with any lack of a sense of urgency about these problems. I be- lieve much of the delay can be attributed to paper shuffling, foot dragging and bureaucracy in the department. Let me tell you in brief capsule form some of the programs Congress has funded for the aid of cities. Urban renewal is one of the important ones. Do you know that,through 1969 the Congress has provided HUD and-its predecessor with $4.6 billion for urban renewal? Through 1969 the Congress has provided nearly $3 billion public housing subsidies? Let me show you how the cost of the subsidy for public housing is increasing as the years go by. The total was $208 million in 1965. It went up_to $241 million in 1966. It went to $261 million in 1967. Then to $295 million in 1968. It went to $350 million, plus a $16 mil- lion supplemental or to $366 million in 1969. The 1970 budget calls for $473 million. New -public housing starts are sched- uled at 130,000 in 1970. We have the rent supplement program. We have the homeownership program, and we have, the rental subsidy program. We have the housing for the elderly and the rehabilitation program. We have the below-market interest program and we have the community facilities program; the open-space land programs. You name them-there are about 70 different programs in the Department of Housing and Urban Development be- ing funded by the Congress from funds extracted from all of the taxpayers of the United States-70 different programs operated by one Department of the Gov- ernment, in various aid to the cities. Yet we are accused of doing nothing. The truth of, the matter is, that we are spending about $3,0 billion a year on urban problems. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from North Carolina has expired, Mr. JONAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 5 additional minutes. Mr. Chairman, in a colloquy with the chairman earlier, I responded to the question as to what brancdilew programs we are funding in this supplemental and what they will cost-and I refer now to the programs under section 235, that is the homeownership program, a program under which. the Government will sub- sidize the interest fpr a homeowner who , g wishes to buy a house and cannot pay contract authority, we know how long We cannot just adopt this spending the Interest charges, that authority is to extend and the total limitation and then it back and rub- - - Approved The subsidy wi'l -amount to the in- terest which exceeds 1 percent. So if the current interest rate is 71/2 percent, the Government will subsidize it at no more than 61/2 percent. We put in the regular bill last year $25 million in cont~actsguthority for that program, and we are including in the supplemental an additional $40 million in contract authority; That is $65 mil- lion that is being voted this fiscal year for this new program which is just get- ting under way. That contract author- ity simply means that we give the de- partment authority to commit the Gov- ernment to spend $65 million a year on homeownership interest subsidies for 40 years-or $2.6 billion. There is a companion program under section 236, known as the rental hous- ing assistance pi-s-gram, which carried the same figure of $25 million in the regular bill and another $40 million in this supplemental. So under these two sections, these two new programs, in addition to public homing and in addi- tion to urban area and in addition to community facilities and in addition to all of these other programs-here are two additional programs that are going to cost-even if we do not ever give them another dime in future years-that are going to cost the taxpayers $5.2 billion. Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. JONAS. I weld to the chairman of the committee. Mr. MAHON. The gentleman is pursu- ing a very interesting aspect of Federal spending. I hope that he will place in the RECORD in connection with his re- marks, if the figures have been as- sembled-and I k. now the gentleman's subcommittee has asked for them-the continuing costs that are mandated by previous actions on all these various housing-type programs, rent supple- ments, and so forth. The reason I make this request is that there are those Rho feel that Congress is losing control of the purse. I think we are not losing cont?o1 of the purse at all. When we appropriate money, we expect it to be spent for the programs which we have endorsed. In the past we have not tried to fix a rate of expenditure of the funds which we have provided for vari- ous programs except to a limited degree, which we discussed ea=Tier. But if you approve a series of long-term programs and you grant the first down payment on a 40-year program, then for 40 years the Government is committed to that particular expenditure, because it is fixed by an action of the Congress. It is done by Congress. It is not a loss of control by Congress in the beginning, but we lock just that much more into the fixed and subsequently uncontrollable area of expenditure. I would like to have the gentleman's views on that matter. Mr. JONAS. I certainly agree with the chairman, ano- I believe he would agree with me that we ought to begin giving closer scrutiny to requests for contract authority. That is where the process begins. We cannot keep up with what is going on unless as we rant H 3839 amount that will be involved, because when we grant contract authority, what we do is to pile up mandatory appropria- tions over the period of the contract. Some of those contracts go for 35 years, most of them for 40 years. What we are doing here, in funding Sections 235 and 236, is a clear example of the mistake we make when we talk about appropriating $80 million when the cost of the program is $3.2 billion. Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. JONAS. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa. Mr. GROSS. Between the statements of the distinguished chairman of the committee and the distinguished gen- tleman from North Carolina, we are al- most drowned In figures concerning this bill, and it is proper that the chairman and the gentleman from North Caro- lina give us the figures contained in this bill. But let me see if I can get a small- sized handle on this big spending pro- posal in this way: This bill provides for a ceiling of $192,900,000,000, is that cor- rect? Mr. JONAS. That is correct. Mr. GROSS: What are the total esti- mated expenditures for this fiscal year? In other words, this bill would fix a ceil- ing of $192.9 billion for fiscal 1970. What will be the amount spent in this fiscal year which ends on June 30? Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. JONAS. I yield to the chairman of our committee. Mr. MAHON. The expenditure for this year will be about $185 billion. So, under the administration's expenditure pro- jection, expenditures would go up by $8 billion, 1970 over 1969, and appropria- tions would go up by about $10 billion. Mr. GROSS. The gentleman refers to the $192.9 billion. Does that include the expenditures that he is giving the House now for the present fiscal year? Does that include the $3.8 billion in this sup- plemental? Mr. MAHON. Yes; the $3.8 billion is all within these figures. Mr. GROSS. They definitely include the $3.8 billion in this supplemental? Mr. MAHON. The gentleman is cor- rect. Mr. JONAS. Mr. Chairman, I am glad the gentleman from Iowa made that point, because .I did not want to forget to remind the committee that if we adopt the recommendations of our committee with respect to the spending limitation, that will not be the end. We are going to have to. work hard on every single appropriation bill to make reductions, because otherwise any reductions that are made will have to be made by the executive branch of the Government. There are Members of this body who do not want to give him the discretion or authority to decide where cuts shall be made. So we reserve the right, if we do our duty and live up to our respon- sibility and do not abdicate to the Pres- ident the authority to make these cuts, to make the cuts in subsequent appro- priation bills for fiscal year 1970 as they H384 Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE May 20, 1969 berstamp all the appropriation bills, and we do not intend to do it, but we have to have some support on this floor. I have already heard rumors that ef- forts are going to be made to increase the Nixon budget. While the majority leader in the other body is making state- ments that spending should be reduced $10 billion below the Nixon budget. And, there are people on this side of the Capi- tol who are saying already that the spending cuts are too deep. I think it Is true, as it has been in all but 3 of the last 14 years, that spending has been underestimated by whoever was in the White House, and I think spending this year in the 1970 budget is under- estimated. I am sure it is underestimated in the interest on the national debt and in some other areas also. I agree with the Chairman that this Is not going to be any sweet pill for the administration to swallow. It is some- thing that the administration would like to avoid, I am sure. I certainly would not want to have to live under this limitation if I were the Executive or if I were his Director of the Bureau of the Budget, but they understand full well that they have the responsibility of trying their dead- level best to live up to these spending limitations, and they are going to have to live up to them unless Congress shoulc. unwisely I think exceed the bud- get requests on some appropriation bills. Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. JONAS. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa. Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I do so merely to make the point that I agree again with the gentleman from Texas (MT. MAHON) and the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. JONAS) that we cannot emphasize too strongly the necessity for watching the authorization bills as they come in. In that regard, I am not aware of a single authorization bill that has been approved so far in this session of Con- gress-.hat has not carried an increase in spending. Is the gentleman aware of an authorization bill that has not been in- creased? Mr. JONAS. I am aware of the fact that one adopted on the floor of this House a few days ago was substantially above the budget. Mr. GROSS. I do not know of a single one that has not provided for an In- creased outlay of money. Mr. JONAS, The gentleman from Iowa is correct. That is the first place to start. The second place to start is within the Appropriations Committee, and I think we are going to bring some substantial cuts here for the consideration of the House, and we are going to ask for the Members' cooperation as we undertake to make some substantial reductions this year. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Ln'scoMa). Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman, the need for supplemental appropriations for the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1969 has been recognized as needed and requited for many months. The Committee on Appropriations in their report dated July 19, 1968, No. 1735 on the Department of Defense ap- propriation bill for fiscal year 1969, dis- cussed the budgetary effect of the war In Vietnam and the possibility of added funds. The report stated: It is probable that the funds provided will not be entirely adequate through the end of the current fiscal year and that a supple- mental request will be made In the next sea- slon of Congress. This has been the case in the past several years. The committee In their report also in- formed the House that funds were not included for military or civilian pay in- creases which became effective July 1, 1968. The committee report when dis- cussing other fiscal considerations stated : In accordance with longstanding custom. this bill does not include funds for the mili- tary and civilian pay Increase for fiscal year 1969, which became effective this month. There will be. as has been the case in the past, a supplemental estimate presented to the next session of Congress covering such costs government-wide. On September 11, 1968. when the fiscal year 1969 bill was before the House of Representatives. I remarked on the need for added appropriations as follows: It should also be noted that the Depart- ment of Defense will require additional fiscal year 1969 funds in order to meet present re- quirements, particularly in Southeast Asia. A supplemental request will be required. This has been the case in the past several years. known increases already Indicate constimp- tion of certain specific ammunition items has greatly increased. Pbrce deployments al- ready approved are In excess of those upon which the budget was based. If the war con- tinues at the present rate of expenditure of material, other costs will rise. The military and civilian pay Increases which went into effect July 1, 1968, are not included In the budget now before the House. The additional new obligational au- thority recommended In this second sup- plemental appropriation bill for fiscal year 1969, H.R. 11400, now before the House, for the Department of Defense, In titles I, II, and III Is a net total of $2,312,068,000. These additional funds are required to support United States and our allies mili- tary operations in Southeast Asia. Funds are included for the pay of military per- sonnel, for operation and maintenance, and for procurement of items to replace combat losses. The total request also in- cludes funds for military and civilian pay Increases already implemented under provisions of previously enacted laws and mandatory increases in military retired pay. The supplemental budget estimates for fiscal year 1969 for the Department of Defense as proposed and transmitted to the Congress by President Johnson, Jan- uary 17, 1969 totaled $3,011,900,000. A reassessment by President Nixon's ad- ministration was completed in April and the revised estimate to Congress totaled $2,871,200,000 a reduction of $140,700,- 000. The Appropriations Subcommittee on the Department of Defense after de- voting considerable time to analyzing the request, recommended a further re- duction of $559,132,000. The $2,312,068,- 000 total recommended in this bill rep- resents a total decrease of $699,832,000 below the January 17, 1969 estimate. For title I the revised estimates for military operations in Southeast Asia totaled $1,496,900,000. The committee reduced this amount by $262,900,000 and recommends appropriations totaling $1,234,000,000. In title R the committee recommends appropriations totaling $226,050,000, a reduction of $23,632,000 below the revised request of $249,682,000. The largest part of the funds requested in this title, $175,- 000,000, is for "Retired pay, military." The requirement for additional funds results from increased benefits paid in accordance with cost of living allow- ancespreviously authorized by law. The balance of the appropriations in title II is funding for increased per diem costs for reservists in travel status based on a new law, Public Law 90-168, prem- ium pay and employee benefits for Na- tional Guard technicians, depot overhaul of Guard equipment and aircraft, and funds for training and other operational costs. Under title III there is recommended $852,018,000 for military and civilian pay increases. This is a reduction of $272,- 600.000 below the revised request. The subcommittee reduced all requests for funds to. meet increased pay costs as the requests were estimated on the total an- nual requirements which were based on first quarter obligations. Many of the estimates have been proven to be over- stated at this point in time. The gross amount recommended for the Department of Defense in this bill for military and civilian pay increases under titles I and II is $903,768,000. Of this amount $678,950,000 is for military pay and $224,818,000 is for civilian pay. The additional pay costs and added funds stem from the second phase com- parability pay adjustments effective last July 1. These increases were authorized in Public Law 90-206, the Federal Salary Act of 1967, and Public Law 90-207, in- creasing the basic pay for members of the uniformed services. The Appropriations Subcommittee on the Department of Defense spent con- siderable time in analyzing the request for the funds requested to be assured that only those additional funds actually required were recommended. We feel that the funds which are included in this bill are needed and the appropriation should be approved, MILITARY OPERATIONS IN souvass r ASIA President Johnson's budget for fiscal year 1969 submitted in January, 1968, proposed defense expenditures for sup- port of Vietnam operations in the amount of $25.8 billion. It was known during 1968 that figure was a low esti- mate. The present estimate for military oper- ations in Vietnam for fiscal year 1969 is $28.8 billion In expenditures. This amount includes the estimates submit- ted in connection with the pending bill. In January of this year the supple- mental requirement for fiscal year 1969 in support of military operations in Vietnam was estimated at $1.632 billion. The reassessment which the new admin- istration completed in April confirmed the validity of the requirement but re- duced the funds requested to $1.497 billion. The committee, in the bill before us, recommends $1.234 billion in funds for Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 May 20, 1969- Approved For Release 2002/08/01 ;: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 3 41 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE ployees chose to use the compensation route rather than choosing sick leave. But today that figure is practically re- versed to 57 percent of the employees using compensation rather than sick leave. In the area of higher education the first item of interest is that of interest subsidy grants in the amount of $3,- 920,000. This will initiate a new program of debt service grants authorized in the higher education amendments that we passed last year. That was Public Law 90-575, signed into law October 16, 1968. It re- places the same amount of direct Federal loans permitting a substantial reduction in Federal expenditures for fiscal years 1969 and 1970, as we pointed out earlier in our colloquy on the subject with the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. SMITH). The Federal Government in this program pays the difference between the 3-percent interest rate and the going rate-and incidentally, in the fiscal year 1970 budget there is an item for interest subsidy in the amount of $10,670,000, which will provide for an increase then of $6,750,000 for fiscal year 1970. Obvi- ously this manifests itself in a greater construction of facilities at our institu- tions of higher learning in the years to come. Incidentally, they told us in our hear- ings that there are applications on file for in excess of $200 million worth of construction. As I said, this $3.9 million will give us $145 million of construction this first year. Mr. JONAS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. MICHEL. I yield to the gentle- man from North Carolina. Mr. JONAS. I believe the gentleman is approximately correct. We have the same problem in our bill in our subcom- mittee in funding HUD's requests. It is a lot better, I believe, to provide assistance with interest payments than for the Federal Government to go into the money market and compete with business en- terprises and individuals for the available credit, and thus put our fiscal house more in disorder than is already the case. Mr. MICHEL. I believe the gentleman from North Carolina makes a good point. Of course, Congress so expressed itself when we passed this law in October of 1968 providing for this. I might say that this year we have about 6 million college students, and the projection is that in 1970 we will have 10 million students at our institutions of higher learning, so the need for the construction of facilities is paramount. There is also an item in here of $7,241,- 000. This is for the Federal City College, a direct payment, or a one-lump-sum payment to the Federal City College in the District of Columbia. This was the amount authorized in Public Law 90- 354 as a one-time lump-sum appropria- tion in lieu of a land grant for the Fed- eral City College in the District of Co- lumbia. We were told that this sum will at the moment be invested in Govern- ment bonds to realize a return of some $360,000 for the Federal City College of the District of Columbia to be used military operations is Southeast Asia We must welcome the effective as- which provides: sumption by South Vietnamese forces of tZZtons a larger share of combat operations for For additional personnel pay coets__ $239.5 certainly our overall national interests For operational support and mainte- do dictate that we begin reductions of nance of equipment ------------- 354.4 U.S. forces as soon is is feasible and For pr round' fo ient rce of ammunition that our forces not remain in substan- and ground equipment____ 640.1 tial number indefinitely if a negotiated Total -------------------- --- 1, 234. o settlement proves uriatt thable. These additional requirements result It is clear the administration requires These from factors re an events not the additional defense funds to meet our directly from when the and a ent 1969 commitment in Southeast Asia and other contemplated already incurred obligations as provided budget was when in bill First, in January 1968 the Communist this . Tet offensive required the deployment of Mr. C Chhairman, the committee has additional forces to Vietnam and re- itss every effort deleting unessential Soth quired increased support operations, tems and funds related ths operations as as well as additional equipment, ammunition, and east Asia military not other consumables. Losses sustained were correcting estimaiRs which were over- great and material had to be repaired or stated. The funds recommended are necessary replaced. Second, the seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo and other aggressive actions by the North Koreans resulted in the callup of Reserve Forces to meet the possible military threat, deployment of additional air and sea forces to the area, additional equip- ment, and other requirements. This request now before us does not provide for increases to our current force levels which are somewhat below the presently authorized deployment of 549,- The committee procurement recom- mendation provides equipment and con- sumables for American and Allied ground forces and also to upgrade our produc- tion base. More than 65 percent of the procurement funds-$419.5 million is for ammunition. The operation and maintenance ap- propriations require supplemental ap- propriations for Reserve callup and addi- tional deployment, maintenance of ma- terial, aircraft fuel and oil and increases and modernization of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam. Included in, this supplemental are additional funds for the modernization and upgrading of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces. This is a very significant part of this supplemental bill. President Nixon on Wednesday, May 14, said that the strengthening of the South Vietnamese forces has been speeded up and the President said: That time is approaching when South Vietnamese forces will be able to take over some of the fighting fronts now being manned by Americans. The funds in this bill will directly aid the speed up of the strengthening of the South Vietnamese forces. Significantly this bill as recommended b the committee includes a total of and should be appropriated. Mr. JONAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. MICHEL). (Mr. MICHEL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Chairman, there is a portion of this bill to which I would like to address myself, and it is that having to do with the Departments of Labor, Health, Education, and Welfare. This in- volves $700 million of the bill, broken down as follows: $35.9 million for the De- partment of Labor and $677 million for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The first item having to do with the Department of Labor is a $20 million item for unemployment compensation for Federal employees and ex-servicemen. The members of the committee will recall that earlier in the year we passed a supplemental in the amount of $36 mil- lion. This will be in addition to that in order to rectify those faulty estimates that were submitted to us at the begin- ning of fiscal year 1969. Then, too, there is also an item of $15.9 million for employees' compensation, claims and expenses. Now, both of these items are mandatory payments required by law. Both were seat up by the Nixon administration, because the previous estimates, as I said, were too low. Mr. Chairman, I think it should be borne in mind that compensation benefits paid to surviving children. are involved in this particular Rein. Back in 1966 when we amended the law we provided that full-time students could receive pay- ments until the age of 23; whereas, before they were cut off at the age of 18. We were told in our testimony that these pay- y $246.4 ments to these children average $110 a million in funds which are for purposes which will enable the South month or $1,320 per year per child. This Vietnamese to eventually defend them- is one of the factors which goes into this selves and thus to gain the opportunity increase. to determine their own future. Then, too, there is an item for the cost- Funds are included to procure for the of-living increase, and an increase in the South Vietnamese Armed Forces ammu- maximum monthly allowance from $525 nition and equipment such ' as armored to better than threi times that amount, cars, trucks, rifles, communications, and $1,600. That amount has led to many of electronic devices. Also included are our Federal employees choosing work- funds for South Vietnamese training, as men's compensation instead of sick well as general supplies, spare parts, leave. An injured employee has the transportation, and depot operations as- choice or option to use sick leave or re- sociated with the major end items pro- ceive compensation. Twelve years ago vided the South Vietnamese. only about 37 percent, of our injured em- Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 H 3842 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE -- May- 20, 1969 for salaries and other expenses of the adjustments have been made in the Carolina. May I add that In the regu- university. States and that is is a bona fide figure. lar hearings of the committee for fiscal I- might say, too, that over and above If you add this supplemental to what year 1970, volume 3, on the U.S. Forest this the Federal City College will also we have appropriated in the 1969 regu- Service, you will find an excellent discus- receive a share of the annual appro- lar bill of $3,051,900,000, you have a total sion between the U.B. Forest service and priation for land-grant colleges under amount of payments to States for public the committee on timber requirements the Bankhead-Jones Act, and that al- assistance for maintenance alone an ag- and the funds that need to be spent in I t t i l men o n fisca year 1970 will be ap - proxdmately $168,000, out of a total fig- ure of something like $12 million for the entire country. So here we are for fiscal year 1970 giving the District of Columbia a proportionate cut of the shares that normally go to the other 50 States. Then too under the second Morrill. Act the Federal City College would come in for another share of $50,000 out of the total allotment of $2,600,000 for the country. In the Item of the public health service, comprehensive health planning and serv- ices, there Is an item of $128,000 for Increased pay under Public Law 90-206 and 207. $9,600,000, the biggest item here, Is for a program to combat German measles, better known as Rubella, the 8-day type of measles. We have now been told that an effective vaccine has been developed and Is expected to be licensed Within the very near future. 'What we are doing here is actually a forward funding so that we will not have to wait to get this program underway until the normal appropriation bill can be massed later In the year. Incidentally, to give you some idea of the proportions of the problem here, there is expected to be another epedemic eJther this year or next year. if we look back to the last Rubella epedemic that we had in 1964, there were some 20,000 children born with defects. The testi- mony before our committee states that this will cost us in the end some $2.8 mlll:.on in medical costs without even considering the rehabilitation costs for these poor children, the 20,000 or more who were born with deformities of one kind or another as a result of that Ru- bells. epedemic in 1964. So It is a very worthwhile project and one which should go forward Immedi- ateb'. Then for District of Columbia medical facilities there is an item here of some $15 million. This is a portion of the amount authorized under Public Law 90-457 for grants and loans to construct hospitals and other medical facilities in the District of Columbia. The Item was included in the 1970 ap- propriation bill but we moved it forward here in this supplemental to enable hos- pitals In the District of Columbia to move ahead with their construction which is already underway. We have been told there are some very serious financial troubles among the vari- ous hospitals here in the District of Columbia. This is a very worthwhile item. The biggest item in this supplemental consists of HEW and has to do with grants to States for public assistance. This is a total of $651,546.000. This fig- ure merges together three appropria- tion requests-maintenance payments to States in the amount of $343,524,000 and this is $30 million under their request. Although we were told in the testimony that this is a legitimate figure now that - - -- -- The second item Is for medical assist- similar discussions with the Bureau of ante in this supplemental for $278,022,- Land Management and the Bureau of 000. Indian Affairs in our 1970 hearings. If you add that to the original appro- The funding in this supplemental bill, priation in 1969 of $2,118,300,000-we $610.000, Is just "a piece of adhesive have a total in this Item for the fiscal tape" to meet the total problem before year of 1969 of $2,396,322,000 or a grand us. I assure you the committee in its total in this fiscal year 1969 in grants to consideration and markup of the regular the States of $5,791,748,000. For the fis- 1970 bill intends to provide the maxi- cal year 1970-and hold on to your mum funds possible for the increased hats-it is going up again-the projec- production of timber. tions are that it will be $6600,000,000. Mr. JONAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield to The reasons they gave us for the in- the gentleman from Minnesota. creased payments are--end these are all (Mr. LANGEN asked and was given required b la th d f l y w- e e erra of the AFDC-that was pushed back as you will recall; the increased average pay- ments; the increases in the number of recipients; the increased use of inter- mediate care facilities; then finally the rising medical costs. So this is an astronomical figure that we are talking about here in these grants to the States for public assistance and something certainly has to be done to reorient this whole program or else we are going to have to shoot the moon in the future to come up with sufficient funds to cover these programs that have been authorized. Mr. ANDREWS of Alabama. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gen- tlewoman from Washington (Mrs. Hax- SaN). Mrs. HANSEN of Washington. Mr. Chairman, Inquiries have been made about chapter VI, the Interior and related agencies section of the supple- mental bill, particularly in regard to ad- ditional funding for the increased pro- duction of timber. There is $610,000 provided in chap- ter VI to accelerate timber production In the fiscal year 1969 on national forest and Indian lands as part of the national effort to increase the timber supply and thus ameliorate the current shortage which has contributed materially to the increased price of lumber. Of that amount, $150,000 is provided for the Bureau of Indian Affairs and $460,000 is for the U.S. Forest Service. It is estimated this will produce an addi- tional 75 million board feet from the BIA forests and an additional 270 mil- lion board feet from the U.S. Forest Service lands. Mr. JONAS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield? permission to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. LANGEN. Mr. Chairman, I take this brief time merely to call to the atten- tion of the House the items that are in the supplemental bill relating to the De- partment of Agriculture. There are just four items, each of which is demanded because of an emergency, or because of mandatory provisions which require the expenditures, which is the true purpose of the supplemental appropriation bill, in my estimation. The first item is a matter of $1,400,000, which is needed in order to combat a very serious outbreak of screw-worm in the Southwest part of the United States, which we were unable to forecast during the course of the regular appropriations for the fiscal year 1969. This amount of money has actually already been spent. The Director of the Bureau of the Budget has the authority to authorize these ex- penditures in order to meet the emer- gency, and for that reason they have to be reimbursed at this time. In addition, there is an item of $218,000 which is to meet the mandatory Federal contribution to the retirement fund for the State extension personnel. These payments are related to the increased funds provided by the Congress in the regular 1969 appropriation bill to place the extension jobs on a salary basis more comparable with other agricultural per- sonnel. Then there is an item of $7,500,000, which is necessary in order to meet the regular sugar beet payments, which Is a mandatory payment that must be made. The increased moneys become necessary because the crop last year was greater than the estimate. There l i are a so ncreased pay costs Mrs. HANSEN of Washington. I yield necessary to be paid. They total more to the gentleman from North Carolina. than approximately $28 million, but Mr. JONAS. I am very glad that the there is only $12,900,000 which is gentlewoman from Washington made $ by supplemental pns. that explanation, because the timber $10 appropriations. shortage, I am told, Is quite acute. It is Public Law million is 90 reserves, by , and another very appropriate that we open up these Public 84 reserves, and another lands for the scientific production of tim- ber. I am very glad indeed that the funds within the Department. record will show that these steps are Probably the most significant item being taken and that additional tim- within this supplemental appropriation ber will be made available. as it relates to the Agriculture Depart- Mrs. HANSEN of Washington. I thank ment is the transfer of $25 million out of the distinguished gentleman from North unobligated funds from the FHA direct `Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 Approved For Release 2002/08/01 CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 May 20, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE loan account to the emergency credit Although the committee is recom- revolving fund. This becomes necessary mending the approii7 iation of most of in order to meet the emergency needs this request, I think =t would be well to for credit. Some very unusual demands point out the rapidly increasing cost of have been placed upon this emergency the Cuban refugee program. In fiscal 1968, Congress appro)riated $49 million curr bthroug floods that have oc- for this program; in fiscal 1969, includ- throughout the Midwest, Min , ing this supplemental, this figure had nesota, North Illinois, i, Dakota, Sliforniaouthh Dakota, l increased to $70.7 million; and the com- thy riplaces. The sTdemands and several that mittee now has pending before it a re- are necessary ondsr to are keep such arm quest for fiscal 197(; of $87.3 million. t the oiler operations going g in during this mThis represents a.n_ increase of $38.3 ocal year. going during coming m million, or 78 percent. for the Cuban ref- fiscal year. ugee program in only 2 years. The Amer- In view of the fact that the Depart- ican people have been very generous with ment is out of money in this category this program through the years, and our now, it becomes most essential that these country has benefited from the influx of moneys are provided by a transfer from these energetic and enthusiastic immi- the direct loan account, and requiring grants. At the same time. we should be also that the ,account be repaid as the aware of these growing costs. In an ef- loans are repaid. fort to insure the Yrost' efficient opera- I am sure it will be provide much tion possible for this program, the com- needed relief to a great many farmers mittee has recommended a decrease of who otherwise, would find themselves in $153,000 from the request for new obli- economic distress were it not for this gational authority. It is expected that the appropriation. In conclusion, let Inc say that each of these items Is essential and necessary to the proper operation of the Department of, Agriculture. I can very heartily rec- ommend them to the House for approval. Mr. JONAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. SHRIVER). (Mr. SHRIVER asked and was given permission to revise and' extend his remarks.) Mr. SHRIVER. Mr. Chairman, as the ranking minority member on the Sub- committee on Foreign Operations, I sup- port and the minority members support administrators of this program can pro- gram these cutbacks to continue the ef- fectiveness of their coerations. Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Flor- ida (Mr. SIDES). (Mr. SIKES l and was given per- mission to revise vmd extend his re- marks.) Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, first let me touch on the immediate thrust of the military sector of this bill. It is designed to provide weapons and equipment to strengthen the South Vietnamese forces; to permit these forces to assume a great- er share of the burden of battle. This is The South Vietnamese ortant st im . p the committee's recommendation for mo supplemental appropriations for the forces are spaying greater capability and their battle effectiveness is much Cuban refugee program. The committee more encouraging. It would appear that recommends the appropriation of $2,- American forces wi l no longer have to 700,000 of the $2,853,000 requested carry such a great part of the conflict requested and significantly, the South Vietnamese new of $35,00 obligational of the $38,authority,000 in and the re- lease eas will be in stronger position to enforce transfers from the Revenue and Ex- peace when it comes. This is a very mean- penditure Control Act reserves. ingful change in the overall picture. The requested increase for this pro- As we consider overall additional ex- gram will fund the following activities: penditures for defense purposes, we find there is $1,254,000 for unanticipated ourselves buffeted by conflicting winds welfare costs of refugees resettled out- from many sources. There is a taxpayers' side the Miami area, due to the higher revolt against high levels of spending number of refugees requiring such as- by Government and of course the prin- 113843 ceivable that such carelessness in work- manship could have or would have been permitted. There is the usual flap about the dangers of chemical and biological weapons which always is good for col- umn after column of horror stories in the liberal elements of the press. What they do not print is that the Russians have seven or eight times our capability in this field, and that we could be dan- gerously exposed in time to a Russian attack with these weapons as an altern- ative to a nuclear confrontation. In the field of nuclear weapons, we can at least trade destructiveness. The question of the ABM has been greatly overplayed. It is a simple case of survival for our nuclear weapons ca- pability. I have felt that at least equal protection should have been provided for people in cities but apparently in an effort to negate the antivotes, the ad- ministration has cut back on the scope and purpose of the ABM. Both aspects should have been approved. In other words, we in America find ourselves completing the cycle we have seen on so many other occasions in our country. The commentators tell us that people are getting, tired of war-that they want it ended-and that they want no more involvement in foreign affairs. They are saying in effect that we want to retreat to the security of our own continent. All of this is more than a lit- tle disconcerting. I do not believe this fallacy is reflected in the thinking of the average American. I believe that a substantial majority of the American people know why we are fighting in Viet- nam. They want this war won. They do not want us walking away from Viet- nam with our tail between our legs, set- ting the tragic stage for another war when the Communists get ready for an- other takeover of territory and peoples. Our first mistake was in trying too hard to fight this war without incon- veniencing anyone-to fight it so that we could have both guns and butter. It is never possible to fight a war without inconveniencing someone. The fact of 35,000 being killed in a war which is not yet resolved attest to the fallacy of this approach in the Vietnamese conflict. The people should have been told why we were fighting. They should have been shown that it is in America's best inter- ests to fight now and win rather than to risk having all of the Pacific fall into Communist hands in the years to come. We should have been told that it is pa- triotic to wear the uniform, patriotic to be proud of the flag, patriotic to stand up for our country. Because this was not done, the antiwar crowd has had a field day, with the Communists happily at work stirring up anti-American senti- ment at every point. As a part of this pattern, attacks are now being leveled at our military leader- ship. Unfortunately, this too has always been a part of the American way of con- ducting its affairs. When those in uni- form are winning wars for us, they are our heroes. When we no longer need them, we pick them to pieces. The fact that many people now believe it is ad- ministration policy to get out of Vietnam regardless of the cost in strengthening sistance. The Federal Government has a cipal offender from the standpoint ofcolri3nitment to reimburse the various the number of d'd1ars involved Is the States for these welfare expenditures. military. This is an inevitable part of There is $755,000 for increased per- the inflation that we in Government pupil rates far Cuban children in the have helped to bui'd; have almost per- Dade County,Fla., school increased system. This mitted to get out of hand. The cost of increase is due to operating weapons and equipment is fantastically costs to the 15ade County system because high and the cost.; of development of a of higher teacher salaries and other new weapons system is even higher be- costs . These per-pupil rates will be cause of the unknown factors which are studied again when the committee con- encountered. There have been a series ofalders the fiscal 1970 budget requests. blunders, some of them colossal, which There is $844,000 for costs of transport- have shaken the faith of the people in ing refugees from Cuba to Miami. Last the military and indeed in Congress andyear, Congress included language in the the Government. There was the TFX- fiscal 1969 appropriation bill to fund this the F-ill series- which was to be Mr. expense from this account, instead of McNamara's great contribution and a the case in the past. It was hoped it cost about twice as much as had been at the time that these costs could be anticipated and, in some phases, has absorbed by the program, but this has been junked. Just a few days ago, a newnot occurred, thus these funds are neces- submarine sank at its dock while being sar5, fitted for service. It is absolutely incon- Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 H 3844 Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD = HOUSE May ' 20, 1969 the efforts of every person who seeks the eventual downfall of the American sys- tem of government. The uncertainty which is sweeping America is not confined to defense. It goes much broader. It involves the whole specs:lum of national security, and in this I include all of the unrest which is refle,,ted in the news media day after day acid which in too many instances is promoted by them. We here in the -House of Representa- tives have our responsibility. It has not changed because there is wholesale at- tack upon the military, or because there is concern about the cost of spending, or llecause people are tired of taxes. We have a responsibility to insure that those who fight our battles in Vietnam, under whatever orders they fight. receive inso- far as it is possible for us to do so, every single item that they need. We have the responsibility of demonstrating to the work. that we are determined that this Nation shall not, If we can avoid it, be- come defenseless in the years ahead. We have a reesponsibility to demonstrate that there is solidarity in Government. and that we will confront conununism everywhere with determination. Don't think for a moment that the Communists are not watching what is happening here on the floor of the House of Representa- tives today. Do not think for a moment that they are not noting loud and clear what we say and what we do. I do not think I need to remind those here today that ;re could, by responsible action, help set the stage to throw away in Paris what the uniformed services have fought for on the battlefields of Vietnam. We could throw away whatever chance is left for success in this long, terrible and costly struggle. These who say that America has lost the war or cannot win it, do our country a great disservice, for neither is true. By th-.4r steadfastness on the battlefield, America's fighting forces have brought the Communists to the point where they want peace. Now they are trying to achles e at the corlerence table what they could not achieve on the battlefield. More :han ever, there is reason for unity at home and for a show of strength for America in this body, which really speaks with the voice of the American people. One of the items of great interest is the ABM. The question of deployment of thL3 system should be resolved with- out further controversy. I hope the House will follow with me some comments from informed sources on the real function and the need for an ABM system. For instance there are those who urge con- tinuing research and development- and not deployment- The principal pur- pose of ABM under the present proposal is to offer protection, as needed, to our deterr,>nt forces. As Secretary Laird points out: Simply continuing research and develop- ment c?n the ABM without any initial de- ployment, would leave us with no option to provide defense to our deterrent on the schedu:e that might be required by the So- viet threat if we do not reach an agreement with the Soviets on limiting strategic forces, tem, there has been a substantial body of testimony supporting the effectiveness of this type of deployment. Dr. Harold Brown said in testifying be- fore the House Armed Services Commit- tee in 1967: Because our missile sites are small hard- ened targets, they are much easier to defend than cities. The exchange ratio Is favor- able to us for the defense of this type of target. Dr. Edward Teller said in a recent U.S. News & World Report interview: Twelve years ago it seemed that a missile defense was 30 times as expensive as an of- fense. Today the ratio is estimated at 3 to 1, although still in favor of offense. In some respects It is even estimated at 1 to 1. The main point is we don't really know. We can't find out except by actual deployment. In rebutting recent unfavorable com- ment on the feasibility of defending Minuteman sites against a heavy threat, Dr. Foster made the following comment: Various estimates of the cost of an Inter- ceptor including its assigned fraction and the radar andother systems costa have varied between $2.5 million and $7 million. The present cost to the U.S. and probably the Soviet Union for an offensive R/V is in ex- cess of $10 million. The advances which we expect In our forces over the next few years may reduce these to about $3 million... . In other words, the cost to attack and to defend in the 1970 time frame are roughly one to one, Moreover, those who are responsible for our national defense have said that now is the time to get on with the deploy- ment of the Safeguard system to defend our Minuteman sites. I agree. Secretary Laird said before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 21 of this year: We cannot delay the decision beyond this budget that we presented to this Congress, covering the program for fiscal year 1970. which begins on July 1. 1969, We must in. clude this deployment on two sites In this particular budget. He had earlier said: We have sufficient strength today In the combination of our strategic forces-our mis- siles, our bombers, and our Polaris capabil- ity-to respond to any attack that might be launched against the United States. As Secretary of Defense, it is my obligation and my Intention to keep it that way beyond any reasonable doubt. This Is what the ABM discussion is all about. And that is why we have no alternative but to protect our options to safeguard our deter- rent forces. If the Soviet threat turns out to be, as the evidence strongly indicates, an at- tempt to erode our deterrent capability, we must be in a position to convince them that a first strike would always involve unaccept- able risks. In addition, and again quoting Secre- tary Laird: Safeguard ... offers protection, as needed, of the entire country from a small attack, such as the kind of attack that could be pos- sibly delivered by the Chinese Communists during the decade of the 1970's or from an accidental launch. The estimate of our intelligence commu- nity is that the earliest the Red Chinese could have this kind of capacity would be in the 1972-73 time period, and the estimate is th t i th ti n a e me period of 1976 and beyond, Before and since Secretary McNamara first included defense of our strategic de- that the Iced Chinese could have the - and the capability to have 15 or more ore m rateie- terrent as an option of the Sentinel sys- apes. Dr. Edward Teller, in U.S. News & World Report, said: A small nuclear force such as they will have in a few years could wreak real havoc on an undefended United States. We might have to give in to Chinese demands affecting not only South Vietnam but also Taiwan and even Japan, rather than take the slightest risk of their not bluffing. In regard to the Sentinel system as a defense against the Chinese threat, Sec- retary McNamara stated July 1967: This austere defense could probably pre- clude damage In the 1970's almost entirely. Dr. Foster stated more recently-on May 12, 1969: The Safeguard system has been designed by competent people, and the best that are avail- able. Its design has been reviewed by outside experts. Those who do, In fact, study the aspects of the system that are within their area of technical expertise are convinced it will do what it is designed to do. There are some eminent scientists who, for one reason or other, claim it won't work. On that I'd like to say . that they have offered no problem which we have not long since ad- dressed and resolved." Finally Under Secretary stated on March 14, 1969: Locating sites away from major cities should make clear to the Soviet Union that the American defense is designed to preserve our deterrent-not to change the strategic balance. It has been suggested in some quarters that the administration has somehow misled Congress about its intentions in deploying the Safeguard system. I think it is useful to review the letter of the law here. The current authorizations for the ABM defense system for procurement, research and development and military construction for the Army read as follows: Public Law 90-500, for procurement: SEC. 101. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated during the fiscal year 1969 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, as authorized by law, in amounts as follows: ... For missiles: for the Army, $956,140,000. Public Law 90-500, Tor resarch and development: SEC. 201. Funds are hereby authorized to he appropriated during the fiscal year 1969 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for research, development, test, and evaluation, as authorized by law, in amounts as follows: For the Army, $1,611,900,000. Public Law 90-408, for military con- struction: SEC. 101. The Secretary of the Army may establish or develop military installations and facilities by acquiring, constructing, converting, rehabilitating, or installing per- manent or temporary public works, including site preparation, appurtenances, utilities, and equipment for the following projects: UNITED 9TArES ARMY AM DEFENSE COMMAND CONUS, var Ous locations: Operational and training facilities, maintenance facilities, supply facilities, medical facilities, adminis- trative facilities, troop housng, community facilities, utilities, and real estate, $227; 460,000, The defense and Military construction appropriation acts contain even broader language, Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 Approved For Release 2002/08/01 .CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 May 20, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL ACCORD-HOUSE Clearly both the Safeguard and Senti- nal systems fit under the language of the law. In fact, there is an understanding in the Congress and in the Defense Depart- ment that funds must be spent for the purposes for which they were authorized and appropriated. In the case of the. ABM system, the purpose for which they were authorized and appropriated was to provide a de- fense against ballistic missiles. To accuse the officials of this administration of bad faith for deploying the best balanced ABM they can design is simply to dis- regard the previous actions of Congress. Congress should not get into the busi- ness of trying to design the anti-ballistic- missile system either in its minute tech- nical details or in its tactical deployment configuration. These decisions should be left to defense planners. I suspect that much of the agreement we hear, includ- ing many of the technical arguments, are being put forth by people who are already over their head or who are not apprised of all the facts. Congress has in the past given rather broad authority for the construction of the ABM system. If it wishes to change this method of operation, it can do so when the additional funds which will be required for the deployment of phase I of the Safeguard system are authorized and appropriated for fiscal year 1970. There are other items of more than average importance which are likely to escape specific attention because they are not sensational and because there ap- pears to be no pressing need that they re- ceive other than casual consideration. Yet these may be of very great impor- tance. For instance, there is the problem of maintenance of real property facilities. The taxpayers should be very directly concerned with this problem. So should be the military officials. So it would seem would be the Congress. Nevertheless, this subject presents an increasingly aggravated picture which I want to discuss at this point. The Committee on Appropriations has for many years been urging that the mil- itary services properly and adequately maintain the extensive real property holdings within their jurisdictions. Some 15 years ago this interest was manifested in the appropriation of funds above the budget estimates for the then existing backlog of deferred mainten- ance. The committee found that much of this claimed deferred maintenance either did not rest on valid estimates or the need was subsequently ignored by the services and the practice of appro- priating over the budget for real property maintenance ceased. Indeed, during the ensuing several years it became apparent that moneys Justified to Congress for the mainten- ance- of real property facilities were be- ing diverted to other uses=in the absence of any restrictive law or legislative his- tory. Consequently in recent years, the committee has recommended, and Con- gress has agreed to, language in the a-p- propriation acts establishing floors or minimums in the amounts of money which must be devoted to real property maintenance. In the current Appropria- tion Act for the fiscal year 1969. for ex- ample, the language reads for the Navy: "of which not less than $155,600,000 shall be available only for maintenance of real property facil i ties." In the case of the Marine Corps the language reads similarly: "of which not less than $22,661,000 shall be available. only for the m.ainenance of real prop- erty facilities." House Document No. 91-50 proposed revisions reducing those amounts. Tes- timony in the hearings on the second supplemental appropriation bill indi- cated that reductions were made in the floors on real property maintenance based on "congressional intent." It ap- peared from the txstimony that this in- terpretation of congressional intent was based on the Revenue and Expenditure Control At of 1968 and its effect on Government expenditures generally. It would seem to me, Mr. Chairman, that we have here a situation of either ignoring, or violating, congressional in- tent by the militsry. I should like to point out that the Rev- enue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968 was enacted into law on June 28, 1968, Public Law 90-364. While its terms and conditions allowed some flexibility, some considerable flexibility in the exec- utive branch, there was not in connection with its enactment- at least to my knowledge --any discussion of an intent to cutback on the maintenance of real property facilities of the Department of Defense. Congress does not want these cutbacks. Now I should like to,point out that the appropriation bill for the Department of Defense for the kcal year 1969 was en- acted into,law by virtue of the signature of the President on 11 17, 1968, Public Law 90-580., The appropriation bill contains as. a matter of law the phrases which I have previously quoted. I do not believe it likely that the Depart- ment can find a -hred of evidence in the debate or in the committee reports on the defense appropriation bill indicating that the language of the law was intend- ed to be set aside by any assumed or presumed interpretation of congressional intent stepnming from the earlier en- actment of the l venue and Expenditure. Control Act of 1968, On the contrary, it could be presumed that the enactment of the floors on maintenance of real properties in specifie numbers and at a later date ,indicates the precise opposite, namely, that it is the intent that such an amount must inf.s.ct be expended for the purpose. It is clear that much of the difficulty that we encounter in Congress, in the academic world, and through all facets, of our society, stein from misinterpreta- tions of honestly presented sets of facts. It is further cleat that. in most instances, if not in all instances, those who so mis interpret do totally and completely es- cape any remonstrance, much less punishment, for their willful acts. Although I, do not wish to magnify the incident out of all proportion, it is safe to say that the taxpayers of the country will at some future date have to shoulder the burden of new construction 143845 prematurely or unnecessarily because of failure to adequately maintain facilities that are now in being. Certainly, some- one should be called to task for permit- ting such a situation to exist. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida has expired. Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 additional minutes to the gentleman from Florida. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida is recognized for 5 additional minutes. Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. SIKES. I yield to the gentleman from Texas. ANTI-BALLISTIC-MISSILE SYSTEM Mr. MAHON. The gentleman from Florida made reference to the anti- ballistic-missile program, The gentle- man is aware that in the fiscal year 1970 budget which is before Congress, but which is not under consideration in this bill, there is about $860 million for a continuation of the ABM program. In my opening remarks, I took the position that we should go forward with the ABM program. I would like to am- plify that by giving, in part, some of the reasons why we have been working on this program for years. The Soviet Union, our most formidable opponent, has a somewhat limited anti-ballistic-missile system deployed. It seems to me that it would be militarily and politically un- sound and indefensible for use not to undertake to have a defense against the intercontinental ballistic missiles of the Soviet Union and of Red China. My opinion is that we must proceed now with the anti-ballistic-missile pro- gram. It is my feeling that the Members of Congress, generally, will approve of this view, and -I am convinced that the American people will approve of this view. I do not believe the American people want to be completely defenseless with respect to the intercontinental bal- listic missiles of the Soviet Union or of Red China. This would be illogical while the Soviet Union 'is prgviding some de- fense for its people. Whether or not their system is very far advanced begs the question. Therefore we should undertake to provide--some. defense against the possibility of attack by intercontinental ballistic missiles of either nation. I believe the gentleman's opening re- marks should be read by all Members of Mr. SIKES. The gentleman from Texas has stated the situation precisely and he has stated it very well. We are trying to assure at this point that we can retaliate if the need should develop-we are seeking to insure for our country a capability which at least par- allels the development which has been proceeding on an ABM system within Russia for a number of years. I feel that the American people demand that this be done. I feel that their voice is not really being heard in the quarters where protests are raised against the ABM sys- It is my opinion that we would be making a most serious mistake if we should not proceed with at least the Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 - H 3846 Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE May '20, 1969 small ABM program that has now been proposed. Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, I would ask the gentleman further if an article in the U.S. News & World Report, by Dr. Teller, one of the great scientists of the country, and a discussion by Dr. Weisner, another great scientist, who are both very familiar with this problem, has been called to his attention. We are aware that there is much dis- cussicn of the ABM in the scientific com- munity, but as I see it this issue is one of jucgment, and that is not an issue to be settled by the scientists alone. I would hope ':hat those interested in this matter will probe deeply enough to understand what the fundamental issue is, and that is whether or not we shall let our chief opponent have a protection against our missllrs and have none ourselves against his. Mr. SI ES. The gentleman has stated the situation perfectly. Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. SIBS. I yield to the gentleman frgm California. Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman, I con- cur completely with the gentleman from' Florida and the gentleman from Texas in the need for the Safeguard ABM. I believe that It is absolutely necessary that yr a go ahead on this modified pro- gram as recommended by President Nixon. The decision of President Nixon an- nounced on March 14, 1969, calling for the deployment of the Safeguard anti- ballistic-missile system was made only after n searching and exhaustive analysis of the clearly emerging threat to the Nation and its people in the mid-1970's. All the available options and alternatives were thoroughly examined leading to the determination that Safeguard would pro- vide a beginning toward the best protec- tion against those threats. In the judgment of the President, and of others within the Government who are charged with the direct responsibility tar preserving our national security, the initial deploynltnt of Safeguard repre- sents the minimum action which must be taken now to preserve the credibility of our nuclear deterrent in the immedi- ate years ahead. The decision to deploy Safeguard is remarkable for the controversy which it has generated. Some members of the Congress and some persons within the scientific community have taken Issue with tie President's decision. They have been joined in their opposition by others who find in Safeguard an excellent op- portunity to give vent to their frustra- tions over the course of events in Viet- nam, thereby injecting an emotionalism into a debate which, because of its cri- tical importance to national security, should be governed only by rational and reasoned factual presentations. Becr.use the President is Commander in Chief of our military forces and, more than f.ny other one man charged with the awesome responsibility of providing for the national defense, many Members of Congress, in the exercise of their con- stitutional responsibilities, have normal- ly followed the practice of according great weight to such momentous deter- minations by the President. The Pres- ident has immediately at hand the most sensitive intelligence information upon which these vital decisions must be based. For my own part. I would have to be absolutely convinced that I was right and the President was wrong before I could, in good conscience, oppose him on a national security matter of this magnitude. Moreover, in cases where the issue might be described as somewhat doubtful, my conscience would dictate that such doubts be resolved in favor of the President's determination that his recommended action is necessary for our country's protection. This has been my position with respect to all Presidents, of either political party. It is obvious that all the people of the United States have a vital stake in the decision we make as to whether or not we should attempt a ballistic missile defense. It Is appropriate to determine the desires of the people. And I mean all the people-not just those with the resources to publish and circulate their views, nor Just those who participate in organized letter-writing campaigns to Congress. When President Nixon assumed office in January of this year, be inherited from his predecessor the beginnings of de- ployment of an ABM system, the Sen- tinel. The decision of President Johnson, announced in September 1967, to begin deployment had been endorsed by Con- gress in 1968 and funds had been pro- vided for a start on the system. Produc- tion of the various components of the system had been initiated, sites acquired, and, at some sites, work had commenced. The Nixon administration suspended work on Sentinel deployment while It conducted a broad and thorough review of the general problems of ballistic mis- sile defense including specifically the basic possible missions of such defenses and an analysis of the actual and poten- tial Soviet and Chinese nuclear threat capabilities to our cities and to our stra- tegic retaliatory capability. An important part of the review in- cluded an analysis of the many alter- native ways of accomplishing the bal- listic missile defense missions. The alter- natives examined included : First, not building any ballistic mis- sile defense at this time, maintaining the research and development program, and relying on improvements in our retalia- tory weapons to deter Soviet and Chinese attacks on our cities and strategic retal- iatory forces: Second, defending our strategic retal- iatory forces-our second-strike capa- bility-by hardening our missile silos and further dispersing of our bomber bases; and Third, several alternative ABM de- ployments, including: a "heavy" defense against Soviet nuclear attacks on our major cities, ballistic missile defense of our strategic retaliatory forces, the Sentinel defense against the expected Chinese threat and accidential attacks, a sea-based anti-ballistic-missile inter- cept system-SABMIS-and various combinations of these alternatives. Finally, the review included a careful evaluation of the technical and opera- tional feasibility of ballistic missile de- fense. systems based on current tech- nology and current intelligence. After a careful consideration of the alternatives, President Nixon reached the following conclusions: First, the con- cept on which the Sentinel program of the previous administration was based should be substantially modified; sec- ond, the ,safety of our country requires that we should proceed now with the development and construction of the new system in a carefully phased program; third, this program will be reviewed an- nually from the point of view of tech- nicial developments, the threat, and the diplomatic context including any talks on arms limitation. The Safeguard system has been de- signed so that its defensive intent is un- mistakable. It will be implemented not according to some fixed, theoretical schedule, but in a manner clearly re- lated to a periodic analysis of the threat. The Safeguard system provides for the phased protection of our land-based forces and the light, overall protection of population. This deployment will per- mit a shift of radar and missile sites away from major cities. Both the Nixon administration and the Johnson administration agree on the capabilities and limitations of the ARM system which technology permits us to deploy at the present time. Both administrations agree that our ABM system at its present stage of de- velopment cannot be expected, no mat- ter how deployed, to provide an effec- tive defense of all our Nation's popula- tion against a heavy nuclear attack. Both administrations agree that our ABM system does have the capability, in several types of deployment, of de= fending all our population against a light nuclear attack. Both administrations agree that our ABM system does have the capability of providing a strong, although not preclu- sive, defense of a specific target of lim- ited area against a heavy nuclear attack. This evaluation, concurred in by both administrations, is extremely important. It was not made lightly, nor by any one person, or by any persons specializing in one field. This is not just a weapon, but a weapon system. It consists of a number of components, including nu- clear warheads, which were and con- tinue to be designed and tested under- -ground by our nuclear physicists; mis- siles, which have been designed, con- structed, tested, repeatedly improved, and tested further; data processing equipment, which has also been built and tested; missile site radar, which has been built and tested; and perimeter ac- quisition radar, all the components of which have been tested. In addition, the system utilizes technology dealing with such diverse areas as component harden- ing and command and control. An evaluation of the ABM system is a complex matter, requiring the participa- tion of many specialists from various and sundry science and engineering Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 May 20f,-196 9 Approved For Release 2002/08/01 ;CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE 113847 When I speak ' F ?f 'a threat to our se- curity, I am not engaging in specula- tion about the intentions of any foreign power. As we ,h( have learned from the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, it is dan- gerous to base our policy on assumptions relating to intentions. Anyone who is not privy to deliberations in the Kremlin can hardly speak with assurance about Soviet intentions at the present time. Even certain knnwledr;e of present in- tentions would be a poor basis for judg- ing the intentions of those who may be in power in the Soviet Union 5 years or more from now. We would be darelict in our responsi- bility to the people if we failed to base our policies on an estimate. of the ca- pability that the Soviet Union or Com- munist China will have in the future if they continue on their present course and if we failed tcs take timely action to thwart that capability, Projecting into ,he future the current rate of construction and deployment of the SS-9, we arrive at a figure of 600 such ICBM's in operation in the Soviet Union -9 is equipped with by 1976. If each :3S- three independently aimed. warheads- a capacity which is technically feasible and on which the Soviet Union is work- ing-our force of 1,000 long-range Min- utemen would be in danger of annihila- tion from the 11,800 Soviet warheads. Let me quote Dr. John S, Foster, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, on this point: A missile system having a 20 percent failure rate and carrying 3 re-entry vehicles per missile, would requ re only 420 missiles to attack 1,000 silos. Jr the yield of each re- entry vehicle was a reasonable 5 megatons and the accuracy a reasonable 1/4 of a mile, about 951, of the silos could be destroyed. This would mean 50 of ti:e 1,000 Minutemen survive. Our present strategic offensive force includes, of courts?, not only land-based long-range missiles but missile-carrying- manned bombers and Polaris submarines. Can we not be rompiacent about the future, some may ask, since two of the three elements oh' our deterrent force would still be in existence after an SS-9 attack on Minuteman sites thereby en- abling us to inflict retaliatory devastation on an attacking nation? There are two answers to this ques- tion. First, if prudence had not required that we keep three elements in our de- terrent force, we `would not have devel- oped and mainta'nel three in the past. Our security is as ureu with three, The loss of one would leave us considerably less secure. We might get by with two, but that involves risks ghat we have been unwilling to take in the past. Further, we should remember that our bombers, even today, are to some degree vulner- able and that our submarines may be- come vulnerable in the future. We must now plan for our defense through the next decade. We Know that the Soviet Union is at work on, afractional orbital bombardment system and other weapons which could make both bombers and sub- marines vulnerable to attack in the fu- ture. To assume that both will continue to be safe from attack would be sheer folly. I do not want to overstate the case. In order to achieve, in fact, the capa- bility of eroding our assured destruction capability in the future, it will be neces- sary for the Sov iets to do a number of things, but all are things which they have demonstrated a competence to ac- complish. They would have to equip their SS-9 missiles with multiple, individually target reentry vehicles and improve their? accuracy. They would have to con- tinue to increase the number of such ICBM's deployed. They would have to continue their ambitious submarine pro- gram and possibly add a submerged launch missile utilizing a depressed tra- jectory., They could improve and deploy a more effective ABM system around their cities. The accomplishment of these improvements in forces, or combinations of these programs, on all of which they are now engaged, could create doubts of the effectiveness of our assured destruc- tion capability, provided we take no steps not already programed to prevent, or to prepare to prevent, such an erosion. Because the Chinese ICBM develop- ment program has not progressed as rap- idly as estimated a year or two ago, there has been a tendency to overlook this potential threat in the present debate on the ABM issue. Today, the intelli- gence community is indicating that the Chinese Communists may have an oper- ational ICBM within 3 to 4 years. If that happens; it will be incumbent on the United States to have an adequate pro- tective force. There are a number of factors which point out the need for Safeguard to counter this growing Chinese threat. Most of them have to do with demo- graphic factors. The United States has 63 percent of its population living in the 1,000 largest cities. The Chinese, on the other hand, have only 11 percent of their population living in China's 1,000 largest cities. One can conclude that the Chinese population is widely dispersed throughout her large land mass. Fur- thermore, as Mao Tse-tung has pointed out on numerous occasions, China, with its population of 800 million, could sur- vive even with a loss of 200 million peo- ple from a nuclear attack. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that our ability to deter Communist China with our stra- tegic offensive forces is considerably less certain than in the case of the Soviet Union, whose population is much more concentrated than China's. The population concentration factor has a vital bearing on our decision to proceed with the Safeguard program. The Chinese, with only a few, relatively crude ICBM's could inflict a great deal of damage on the United States. For the United States to retaliate against such a strike might require a greater portion of our deterrent force than we could safely commit. For, by responding to a Chinese provocation, we could leave our- selves naked to a Soviet attack. These reasons, I believe, point out that Safeguard is a good investment for pro- tecting against a possible Chinese at- tack as well as insuring the credibility of our deterrent against any possible So- viet attack. . The second question which we must ask to reach the decision about deploy- ing Safeguard has to do with its effec- fields, who base their evaluations on the results of the tests performed. This, how- ever, is the very type of careful evalua- tion which enabled the Johnson admin- istration and, thereafter, the Nixon ad- ministration to conclude that our ABM system would work, and would do the job proposed for it. Obviously, no one scientist, however learned, can credibly assume personally to evaluate the entirety of the system, particularly if he has not, been privy to the testing accomplished with the com- ponents of the system. An impressive number of :scientists, however, believe that it either will work or can be made to work. - The Johnson administration, based on an evaluation of the limitations and ca- pabilities of the ABM system, devised a proposed deployment to provide a defense of our cities against the potential Chi- nese Communist capability to launch a light nuclear attack in the mid-1970's. This is what the Sentinel system, as de- signed by the Johnson administration, would have done; and this Safeguard will continue to do. The preceding administration was also very much aware of the possibility that the Soviet Union might seek to develop a capacity to overwhelm our land-based missiles and bombers. It continued to watch the missile buildup in the Soviet Union, believing, however, as Secretary McNamara said in January 1968 that the growth of the Soviet ICBM force would decelerate instead of con- tinuing at a high rate. The Sentinel system of the Johnson administration has three purposes, ac- cording to Secretary Clifford: First, to "prevent a successful missile attack from China through the late 1970's." Second, to "limit damage from an accidental launch from any source." Third, to _"provide the option for in- creased defense of our Minuteman force, if necessary in the future." Safeguard will provide for the first two purposes as enumerated by Secre- tary Clifford, but most importantly, it also will provide for the defense of our Minuteman force which under Sentinel, had been only optional. Neither Secretary McNamara nor Sec- retary Clifford believed that the relative invulnerability of the missile forces of the United States was assured for the indefinite future. Both warned that ad- ditional steps might be required if that invulnerability was to be maintained in the 1970's. Just before leaving office, Sec- retary Clifford expressed his "increasing concern" about "the continuing rapid expansion of Soviet strategic offensive forces." He went on to warn that- We must continually re-examine the vari- ous ways in which the Soviets might seek to strengthen their strategic forces beyond what now seems probable, and take appropriate actions now to hedge against them. The decision on whether or not to de- ploy the Safeguard system,turns, it seems to me, on the answer to two questions: First. What is the nature of the threat which there is reason to believe will con- front our Nation in the mid-1970's? Second. Is Safeguard an effective way of coping with that threat? Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 H3848 Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE May- 20, 1969 tiveneess. Of all possible courses of action which we might take to guard against the potential threat of the mid-1970's, Safe- guard Is the most effective, the least costly, the least provocative. There is strong support among the most respected scientists who are famil- iar with all aspects of our ABM program for the conclusion that safeguard will provide effective protection to enough of our offensive force to make an attack upon that force unprofitable for any aggressor. Among the eminent scientists who have publicly expressed support for de- ployment of Safeguard are: Dr. Edward Tellei, Livermore Radiation Laboratory, recognized as one of the world's fore- most nuclear physicists: Dr. Eugene P. Wignor, Princeton University nuclear physicist, elected to the National Acad- emy of Sciences 1945. Atoms for Peace Award 1980, Nobel Prize for Physics, 1963; Dr. William Ci. McMillan, Univer- sity of California at Los Angeles, profes- sor of chemistry, noted specialist on strategic nuclear matters such as reentry vehicle vulnerability, penetration aids, nuclear weapons effects, and missile vulne::ability. If we could delay our decision on Safe- guard until we determine whether or not the Soviet Union continues to increase its capability to threaten our security- or whether success comes of negotiations to limit arms, r would be In favor of deferring the decision. Unfortunately, we cannot wait. It will require more than 4 yea:As to complete phase I of the Safe- guard system, the deployment of pro- tection for two missile sites in Montana and North Dakota. In the absence of authorization from Congress for fiscal year 1,970, the Defense Department would be required to stop the activity in which It has been engaged under authority granted last year. It would have to close down developmental production lines, discharge skilled personnel, and cease engineering on sites. If Congress then gave authority to proceed in the next year, the program would be delayed 2 years and the first two sites would not be In operation until 1976. Time would be lost in the search for personnel with the necessary skills and in the training of a :few force to begin the work anew. If we are not ready at the time a threat to our secur.ty comes into being, we w,ll be no better off than we would have been if we had done nothing at all. As Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird has said: Too little and too late has been the epitaph of mcre than one great nation in history. It mw:t not be ours. If, :.n fact, the decision to deploy Safe- guarc. imposed an obstacle to fruitful ne- gotiations toward arms limitation, this might well give us pause. But let us re- member that Premier Kosygin In 1967, speaking of the embryonic ABM system which the U.S.S.R. had already begun to deploy, said: I believe that defensive systems, which prevent attack, are not the cause of the arms race, but constitute F. factor preventing the death of people. Let us remember, too, that President Johnson's decision to deploy the Senti- nel system, instead of hampering nego- tiations, was followed 4 days later by a statement of the Soviet leaders that they were interested in beginning talks on arms restrictions. Safeguard is an inducement to arms limitation and a building block toward peace. We will go forward with talks on arms control with a better chance that these talks will result in effective agree- ments if it Is clear to all the world that the United States does not intend to stand Idly by while Its capacity to defend its people Is undermined. Indeed, an im- portant inducement toward agreement Is missing if the U.S.S.R. Is lead to be- lieve that we will unilaterally limit our defensive capacity. Safeguard is purely defensive. It is not an escalation of the arms race. It does not increase one whit the capacity of our country to inflict damage on any other nation. It is far more moderate step than the alternative some of its opponents propose--an increase In the size of our offensive missile force, or the reckless launching of our missiles upon a warn- ing, that may or may not be valid, that we are about to be attacked. Increasing our offensive forces would step up the arms race and might give Soviet leaders some plausible ground for fearing that we were seeking a first-strike capability. If the threat that may confront us In the mid-1970's fails to develop, whether because of international agreement on arms control or a change in the pace or character of the Soviet buildup, or for any other reason, Safeguard can be slowed down, altered, or abandoned al- together. Deployment is divided into phases so that our defensive precautions will match the threat and not become an overreaction to it. President Nixon clearly made these points in his announcement of his de- cision on Safeguard on March 14 of this year. He said: I have directed the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board-a non-partisan group of distinguished private citizens-to make a yearly assessment of the threat which will supplement our regular intelligence as- sessment. Each phase of the deployment will be reviewed to insure that we are doing as much as necessary but no more than that required by the threat existing at that time. Since our deployment is to be closely re- lated to the threat, it is subject to modifi- cation as the threat changes, either through negotiations or through unilateral actions by the Soviet Union or Communist China. To keep In perspective the decision which the Congress will be called on to make this year. It is important to keep in mind the phased program of deploy- ment that Is proposed. This year, we de- cide only whether to begin on phase I so that by 1974 we may have in being an antimissile defense of two of our missile sites. We do not commit our- selves to go beyond that, and the Con- gress will have ample opportunity to check on the progress of deployment and to reassess periodically the con- tinued need, for the system. If in fact Safeguard deprived us of re- sources needed to deal with our pressing domestic problems, that fact might give us pause. But Safeguard Is not short- changing any program designed to cure domestic Ills. The decision to deploy this system involves spending in fiscal year 1970 only $250 million more than would be spent if we limited ourselves to con- tinuing with research and development. But a decision to defer deployment would add $250 million to the total cost now es- timated for deployment. The expenditure proposed for deployment in the next fiscal year amounts to three-tenths of 1 per- cent of the outlays proposed for defense. It amounts to a little' more than one- tenth of i percent of proposed total Federal outlays. In its initial costs, it will be substantially less expensive than Sen- tinel would have been. The estimated expenditure for the total Safeguard program is in the neigh- borhood of $8 billion, including the war- heads. This expenditure would, of course, be made over the course of many years. It is unlikely that in any year Safeguard will demand spending that would equal even one-half of 1 percent of the budget. To my mind, the basic issue which the Safeguard proposal presents is the degree of risk to which we are willing to expose the American people. I am not inclined to gamble when the stakes are the survival of our Nation and the safety of its people. I would rather be wrong by providing a measure of defense that the future might show we did not need than be wrong by failing to provide the protection required. I hope that all Members of Congress, when they vote on Safeguard, are con- scious that they may well be voting on the survival of the United States. (Mr. LIPSCOMB asked and was given permission to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further? Mr. SIKES. I am happy to yield to the chairman of the committee. Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, there is the feeling on the part of many-and that includes myself-that if we move forward with our own ABM system, and we can move forward only at a certain rate of speed, that if we move forward with this program the likelihood will be enhanced that we can sit down at the conference table with the Soviet Union and arrive at some arms control agree- ment, not on disarmament, which I be- lieve is unobtainable, but some agreement for a limitation on armaments. But so long as the Soviet Union goes forward with the deployment of its ABM and we take no steps at all, we are placed in a position in this particular field of de- fense-and this is defense, and not of- fense-of dealing from a position of weakness. Mr. SIKES. It was after it was an- nounced that we in this country were go- ing ahead with the ABM system that the Soviets first agreed to hold a discussion on disarmament. This in itself is indica- tive of the validity of the statement the gentleman has just made: if we have a basis of strength from which to nego- tiate the Russians are much more in- terested in negotiating. There is no rea- son for them to negotiate if they have the field for themselves. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gen- tleman from Florida has again expired. Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 Approved For Release 2002/08/01': CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 May 20, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman 'from Florida 5 additional minutes. Mr. SIXES. I thank the gentleman for yielding the additional time. CANCELLATION OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS Mr. MASON. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, the com- mittee was advised yesterday of the cancellation of the procurement of the 'Cheyenne helicopter. It was canceled because it had not been possible for the contractor to solve the problems involved in developing this system. Of course, this program is subject to investigation by various appropriate committees. The Appropriation Committee intends to take a look at it. The military from time to time, in their sincere desire to provide superior Weapons programs attempt to stretch the state of the art. They undertake to do things which are highly desirable by way of weapons development, but some of these things are not within the state of the art and cannot be accomplished. Many years ago, we spent $1 billion on a nuclear-powered aircraft, and fi- nally we agreed that the state of the art had not progressed to where it was feasible to produce an acceptable plane of this type It is unfair and improper tc condemn those who try to stretch the state of the art in order to improve our weapons. They make great efforts to add to the Nation's protection and to the budgeting capability of our servicemen. Is It not understandable that in a stretching of the state of the art it is from time to time necessary to admit defeat? We are prone to call that "money down the drain," but if it is in the in- terest of trying to provide better defense it is not in the truest sense always money down the drain, Mr. SIKES. This is of course the only way we can perfect our weapons sys- tems. There must be trial and error. It is through this procedure that we have been able to develop the highly effective sys- tems that we have. Fortunately most of them have not encountered problems as Serious as the Cheyenne did. In the case of the Cheyenne, unfortu- nately, hopes did not work out. Defense officials were seeking to develop a more effective weapons capability in a fast helicopter. The helicopter is largely a defenseless aircraft and yet is has been tremendously useful and ,has filled an extremely important need in Vietnam. But it is highly vulnerable and the military were simply trying to provide a faster helicopter with an improved Weapons capability that would enable it to stand off enemy attack and to provide greater support for the troops on the ground. The thought was good. It would have been an extremely important develop- ment had It -worked out-end eventually 'it probably will work out. But in the effort to develop within a short time something that would be use- ful in the Vietnamese war, considerable Moneys were e*pended. It has not been possible to develop the capability that is needed and rather than to continue to i#pend money on top of this already costly program, the military has decided to cancel the Cheyf one. Mr. MAHON. L it not true that the object of producing the Cheyenne was an effort to makeour miiitary men more effective and to save the lives of Ameri- can soldiers in Vietnam? Mr. SIKES. Yes. the purpose is to save lives-that is the primary purpose. It would have reduced the vulnerability of the helicopter, which is a very important vehicle, and made it into a gun ship. Mr. MAHO'. 'Pursuing the matter further, reference was made today to the so-called Tli'X and the Navy version, the F-111B. Here was an effort to produce an air- plane which would be suitable for all of the services. The objective was highly desirable. A great effort was made to achieve it, but a: we look. back with 20/20 hindsight, a~7d I am sure the gen-, tleman from Florida would agree, it was a mistake to undertake to make the F-111 conform to the Navy's require- ments, which are in some ways quite dif- ferent from the Air Force requirements. Mr. SIKES. Yes, but we did not realize that at the time. The defense officials again felt that this was a way to save money. They made.. a very determined effort. The effort failed and we have to share in the blame because we financed what we thought would be a workable concept. Mr. DAVIS of 'Wisconsin. Mr. Chair- man, will the gentleman yield? Mr. SIKES. I yield to the distinguished gentleman. Mr. DAVIS of Wisconsin. I think all of us are indebted. tci the chairman of the committee and to the second ranking member of the defense subcommittee and the ranking minority member of the committee for this colloquy which is putting some of these things in the proper perspective, particularly with re- spect to the AEM system. I think this colloquy has made it clear that we do not, as a practical matter, have a choice be- tween the development of the ABM sys- tem on the one Y?and and some agree- ment or other limiting arms on the other. Quite to the contrary, if we were to unilaterally make the decision and announce to the world, as some of our colleagues would have us do, that we are not going to defend ourselves against the ICBM, we would. thereby destroy our capability of reaching any meaningful agreement with reference to either the ICBM or the ABM. Certainly, if we announce beforehand that we are not in a position to defend ourselves, and that we do not intend to be in a position to defend ourselves, then we would be going to the conference table with no cards at all. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida has expired. Mr. MAHON, Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 additional minuil s to the gentleman from Florida. Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I take this additional time, f?rst, to thank the dis- tinguished gentleirr-zn from Wisconsin for this contribution ,,khich is sound, logical and meaningful.. Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? 1-73849 Mr. SIKES. I yield to the gentleman. Mr. MAHON. It seems to make news to be against a major defense program, at this time the ABM, but it does not make iiewgto be in favor of providing this bar- rier against an attack which might come from China or from the Soviet Union. There has been so much talk in the country and so many news columns writ- ten in opposition to our building a de- fense system designed to help to protect the lives of American citizens and to avoid World War III, it occurs to me that it is well for the world to know that there are many-and in my opinion the overwhelming majority of people in this country who believe that this kind of protection, as imperfect as it may be, is something we must seek to attain. I wish to thank the gentleman and my colleagues for making reference to these matters. No one can convince me that the people of the United States want to be second best when it comes to self- defense. I do not think that we want our country to be second best, and I predict it will not be second best. I thank the gentleman for yielding. Mr. SIKES. Let me add that the de- ployment of the ABM system, which is now proposed, does not mean that we will have an imperfect system. We will have a system which has the benefit of years of research and development, and as deployment progresses, it will be pos- sible to build into it any improvements which the state of the art permits, to insure that we will have a fully work- able and an effective system. Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further? Mr. SIKES. I yield to the gentleman from Texas. Mr. MAHON. Is not one of the prin- cipal obectives of those of us who support the ABM to bring about a situation which will enable the United States and the Soviet Union-and other countries, we hope-to make some reduction in arms expenditures? That, after all, is our ob- jective. I would hope we can join to- gether in this effort and eventually through these procedures bring to a low- er figure the vast resources we have to provide for defense. Mr. SIKES. That is our objective. It is what we are working toward, and I believe it is a meaningful step in that direction. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. JoNAS) is recog- nized. Mr. JONAS. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time. I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 8 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. RYAN). (Mr, RYAN asked and was given per- mission to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, it is un- fortunate and regrettable that the sup- plemental appropriation bill before us lumps together funds which are neces- sary and essential for important domes- tic programs with a request, as set forth in title I, for some $1.2 billion for addi- tional support for military operations in Southeast Asia. Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180644-0 H 3850 Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE May 20, 1969 Once again we are faced with a choice of either approving the entire package recommended by the Appropriations Committee, and thereby allocating still more funds to the prosecution of the war in Vietnam, or having to vote against the entire supplemental appropriation bill. I regret that the Appropriations Com- mittee has put us in this situation again. There is strong and conscientious oppo- sition to continuing to fund the war, and Members should have an opportunity to vote separately on the $1.2 billion for milita y operations in Southeast Asia. When the bill is open for amendment under the 5-minute rule, I intend to of- fer an amendment to strike title I of this bill, in order to eliminate the $1.2 billion earmarked for Southeast Asian military operations. This would permit us to have an opportunity to vote on this question. However, of course, we know under the parliamentary procedure followed, there would be no opportunity for a rollcall vote. It my amendment does not prevail, then I intend to offer a motion to recom- mit if have the opportunity. I believe that as long as these funds remain in this bill, it should be defeated. I have pointed out that one-third is al- located for the prosecution of the war in Vietnam. We have already allocated for this fiscal year some $27 or $28 billion for the war in Vietnam. Now we are con- fronted again with another supplemen- tal request. Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. RYAN. I am happy to yield to the distinguished chairman of the com- mittee. . Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, one of the things that has been undertaken in this bill is to provide additional funds for the equipping of the South Vietna- mese military forces, so that a lesser ef- fort will be required by the U.S. forces. I believe that this portion of the plan- of transferring to the Government of South Vietnam a greater responsibility for fighting the war and maintaining the peace when the war comes to an end- probably would meet with the approval of the gentleman from New York. Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, I would appreciate it if the gentleman from Texas, the chairman of the committee, would spell out exactly how much of the funds in the bill is for equipping the forces.for South Vietnam. But it is clear also from the testimony, as I read it, that the supplemental provides funds for ap- proximately 17,400 more American serv- icemen than were planned originally in the fiscal year 1969. Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, in the Army procurement portion of the bill be- fore u:,, of the $640 million, there are $393.7 million for U.S. forces and $246.4 million for the South Vietnamese Armed Forces modernization and improvement program. So a quarter of a billion in this bill is for the improvement and modern- ization of the equipment of the South Vietnamese forces. It is this quarter bil- lion that the gentleman from Texas had in mind in propounding the inquiry of the gentleman. There are additional Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the explanation of the chairman. Never- theless, that does leave for U.S. Southeast Asian military operations approximately $1 billion-a little less perhaps. And It raises a further question about our over- all policy in Vietnam in relation to the forces of South Vietnam. In any event, let me point out that according to the testimony, on page 361, of General Taylor. the supplemental also provides funds for 17,400 more troops, that is U.S. troops, than had been originally intended. It also provides funds for a 50-percent increase in bombing by B-52's in South Vietnam. I should point out that in an- swering a question raised by the distin- guished gentleman from Alabama (Mr. ANaREws), General Crow said that the effect of the B-52 bombings was to make certain areas of South Vietnam look like the surface of the moon. The gentleman from Alabama then observed that the United States has used more bombs in Vietnam than in World War II and asked: I wonder how it is going to look when we get. through over there. Will it be habitable? (Hearings, p. 296). I think that Is a good question: Will it be habitable? Will anything be left? Or will we continue to destroy the country in order to save it? Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. RYAN. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Texas. Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, as the gentleman knows, this bill doesnot pro- vide funds to send additional American fighting men to South Vietnam. It pro- vides for the payment of the men who were sent over there as a result of the Tet offensive which caused us to in- crease our forces. It is not the Intent of this bill to increase our manpower In South Vietnam. Mr. RYAN. I understand the gentle- man's argument. The impact, neverthe- less, is to provide funds for a higher level of troops there than had been budgeted for fiscal year 1969. Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. RYAN. I yield to the gentleman from California. Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman, on the point the gentleman is making and the point the chairman of the Appropria- tions Committee made, the planned strength for U.S. forces in Southeast Asia has not been reached as yet, but the reason we are implementing funds in this supplemental bill is because the Tet of- fensive did extensive damage over there and made It necessary for us to commit more troops and more ammunition and other equipment. Then, the seizure of the U,S.S. Pueblo by Communist North Korea took place. It caused us to supplement our efforts In the Korean area. It was aggressive action by North Viet- nam and North Korea which made this supplemental which is before us neces- sary. We are Just supplying additional Mr. RYAN. I do not quite understand how funds for the Korean situation come under title I, which is entitled "Military Operations in Southeast Asia." Mr. LIPSCOMB. If the gentleman will yield, I will explain it. Mr. RYAN. I do not have sufficient time. Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman 2 more minutes. Mr. RYAN. I yield to the gentleman from California. Mr. LIPSCOMB. At the time of the Pueblo incident, the House of Repre- sentatives and the Senate, in the appro- priation bills, had included funds for Korea with funds for Southeast Asia. I might point out to the gentleman that there are South Korean troops who. are helping the United States and the South Vietnamese effort in South Viet- nam. Mr. RYAN. This supplemental appro- priation bill Is before us because of an underestimation of the cost of the war in Southeast Asia. Each year for the past 5 years Congress has been asked to ap- propriate supplemental money for the war in Vietnam. I have pointed out on each one of those occasions-in 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, and now 1969--that the only means the House has to change the Vietnam policy is to exercise the power of the purse. This bill presents us with another opportunity to vote on the conduct of the war. Since last May, when the Paris peace talks were started, over 12,000 American servicemen have been killed in this war. There is no end in sight. The only way that the Congress, if it feels that this war must be ended, as I do, can exercise any influence on the direction of our foreign policy In Southeast Asia, is to vote "No" to these funds. Therefore, I will offer an amendment under the 5-minute rule to strike title I. I hope it will have wide support so that we will be able to separate out the money for Southeast Asia military operations from the very essential funds contained in this bill for domestic programs. Almost one-third of this appropria- tion is for military operations in South- east Asia. H.R. 11400 provides total ap- propriations of $3,783,212,766. Of this, $1,234,000,000 or about 31 percent is al- located for Southeast Asia. This Is above and beyond an estimated $27.6 billion which Congress has already appropri- ated for Vietnam for fiscal year 1969. Although President Nixon said in his nationwide television address last Wed- nesday that he intends to seek a mutual withdrawal of American and North Vietnamese troops from South Vietnam, testimony from officials of the Depart- ment of Defense suggests an increase in the size and scope of our military opera- tion in Vietnam. The testimony of Gen. A. B. Taylor, director of the Army budget, reveals that approximately 17,- 400 more soldiers were deployed in Southeast Asia then were originally specified in the fiscal year 1969 budget. According to General Taylor, these troops were not sent as replacements but as additions to the existing force Gen- sums related to this procurement, such funds for those two aggressive actions by eral Taylor went on to say that addl- as $50 million for the transportation of the Communists. That is the purpose of tlonal troops would be deployed during equipment, and so forth. this supplemental, the next fiscal year. Hearings on second Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 Approved For Release 2002/08/01 CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 May 20, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE supplemental appropriations bill, 1969, page 361. For 5 years supplemental apbropria- tions bills have been used to escalate the war and to deepen our military commit- ment in Southeast Asia. Although the appropriations sought in this bill may not result in the dramatic escalation that has occurred in, thep ast, they will nonetheless be used to increase still further the killing and destruction that continues in Vietnam. Each year the costs of the war have been underestimated in the initial budget. This happened in 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, and now again in 1969. But each year the Congress has chosen to abdicate its responsibility to pass judg- ment on the war and has, instead, chan- neled more money into the quagmire in Southeast Asia. For 5 years now, the critics of the war in Vietnam have been urging that we pursue alternative policies In Southeast Asia. In 1964, I urged a specific strategy for the neutralization of Southeast Asia to avoid broadening the conflict. But the conflict was Broadened. In 1965, I argued against the Americanization of the war and against escalating our military com- mitment. But the war was Americanized and our commitment escalated. In 1966, I tried again to point to the policy alter- natives available to us. But the choice of continued escalation was made. In 1967, I called again for renewed diplomatic efforts and an end to the bombing in the north. But diplomacy was secondary to the continued attempt to impose a mili- tary solution. As I pointed out earlier in my remarks, the request for supplemental funds for Southeast Asian'military operations has been tied in to other appropriations for some vital domestic programs which I support and, in some cases, have even proposed. On January 30, I introduced an omrii- bus supplementary appropriation bill, HR, 5562, to fully fund several important programs established under the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968. Later, I reintroduced this legislation with 29 cosponsors-H.R. 7760, H.R. 7761. This legislation would provide supplementary appropriations to bring the section 235 homeownership program, the section 236 rental and cooperative housing program, the rent supplement program, the urban renewal program, and the urban renewal component of the model cities program to the full amount of funding authorized by Congress.' The bill before us today includes sup- plemental appropriations for three pro- grams-section 235, section 236, and low- rent public housing program. Both sec- tion 235 and section 236 would receive an additional $40 million for fiscal year 1969-which still leaves each program $10 million less than the amount author- ized by Congress. The low-rent public housing program-which remains the only effective way to reach low-income people in our larger cities-would receive an additional $7,168,000 for fiscal year 1968 and $16 million for fiscal year 1969 in contract authorization. While I all} pleased that the Appropri- ations Committee has recommended sup- plementary appropriations to these three programs, I am disappointed that the bill does not provide additional funds for the rent supplement program, the urban re- newal program, or the urban renewal sector of the model cities program. Each year the rent supplement program has been starved for funds; the current fiscal year is no exception. While the adminis- tration recommended $65 million for rent supplements for fiscal year 1969, Con- gress appropriated only $30 million. Sim- ilarly, urban renewal in model cities, al- though it was authorized to receive $500 million, has appropriated only $312 million. These programs must be funded to the full amount authorized by Congress if we are to mount an effective attack on the crisis in urban homing which con- fronts this Nation. As has been the case so often before, the appropriations pro- vided for Southeast Asian military operations in H.R. 11400 alone are greater than the amount which would be required to fully fund these vital housing programs. I am also disturbed that a request from the Department of Housing and Urban Development for an additional $2 mil- lion to carry out f.,.ir housing activities under title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 was denied by the committee. As Housing and Urban Development Sec- retary Romney stated in his testimony in support of this approoriation: "It is simply impossible to attain this goal (providing a decent home in a suitable liv- ing environment for every American family) without a major and -continuing effort in. pursuit of fair housing for every person in this country." (Pareentbesis added) (Hear- ings on Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1969, p. 570.) At present, the fair housing program has received only Y.2 million to carry on that effort from. Congress. If fair hous- ing is to be guaranteed in this country, we must allocate more resources to pur- suing that goal. No doubt the ar,-,ument will be made that, since the pending bill contains funds for several av:encies which require supplemental allocation:: for their oper- ations, as well as for programs, such as section 235 and section 236, it should be supported despite the title I appropria- tion for the war. I can not accept that argument, which ignore., two basic fac- tors. First, if the House refused to approve this bill as long as it contained war ap- propriations funds earmarked for mili- tary operations in Vietnam would be re- moved; and the or -ter parts of the bill would come back to the floor. Second, and mc)?-e basic, it must be recognized that vital domestic programs will not be funded adequately until the bloody and costly war in Vietnam is end- ed. So long as appropriations bills con- tinue to allocate one-third of our avail- able resources to Southeast Asian mili- tary operations--as this one does-our cities will continue to rot, and the social fabric of our Nation will continue to be ripped apart. We ,will never mount the concentrated attack on the multitude of domestic problems facing us-including housing, education, discrimination, and H 3851 pollution-so long as these programs re- ceive only leftover scale allocations. The solution of our domestic crisis, in other words, must be preceded by an end to the war in Vietnam. For 5 years the Congress has acqui- esced in a disastrous policy. Some 35,000 American servicemen have been killed, and many more wounded and crippled. The country which we supposedly set out to save today lies in chaos and ruin. For 5 long years the resources of this country have been poured into an ill-conceived war, only to see our policyrnakers return the next year with requests for still more funds. How long will this war go on? An- other year? Another 2 years? Another 3 years? If we are truly concerned with the con- tinuation of this war-after it was thoroughly and roundly repudiated in the elections of last year; if we are con- cerned that after 1 year of negotia- tions in Paris we have not achieved peace; if we are truly desirous of termi- nating the death and distruction which continue to be wreaked on a small and unhappy nation-then let us now call a halt to this war through the only power the House possesses: the power of the purse. Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I should like to state to the Members of the House that it is the purpose of the committee to have read the first paragraph of the bill, which deals with "Military person- nel, Army," lines 6 and 7 on page 2, and then I expect to move that the commit- tee rise. Of course, amendments will be in order, but I expect to be recognized by the chairman to move that the com- mittee rise, and then the amendment period would come tomorrow. I should like to say further that it is proposed on tomorrow before we begin further consideration of the bill, that the Rules Committee will offer a rule which will make in order the expendi- ture limitation, which is carried in title IV of the bill. So, if the rule is adopted-and, of course, we hope it will be adopted-we will proceed with the reading of the bill under the 5-minute rule. Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa. Mr. GROSS. The language that you would have read this afternoon, do I understand, goes to line 7 on page 2? Mr. MAHON. Yes. It would end at the figure $110 million in line 7 on page 2. Mr. GROSS. That includes no lan- guage, then, that is subject to a point of order? Mr. MAHON. No. Mr. GROSS. The rule waive points of order. Mr. MAHON. The rule is designed to protect against points of order only in title IV, which relates to the expenditure limitation. It will not protect any other part of the bill than the expenditure limitation. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gen- tleman from Texas has expired. All time has expired. The Clerk will read. The Clerk read as`follows: Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 H 3552 H.R. 11400 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of Amer ca in Congress assembled, That the fol- lowing sums are appropriated out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appro- priated, to supply supplemental approria- tions (this Act may be cited as the "Second Supp: emental Appropriations Act, 1089") for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969, and for other purposes, namely: TITLE I MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE-MILITARY MILITARY PERSONNEL MILrrARY PEasoNNEI.. ARMY For an additional amount for "Military personnel, Army", $110,000,000. Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise. The motion was agreed to. Ac--ordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. HOLIFIELD, Chairman of the Com- mittee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Com- mittee. having had under consideration the 3iii (H.R. 11400) making supple- mental appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969, and for other pur- pose::, had come to no resolution thereon. GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unan- imous consent that all Members speak- ing on the bill this afternoon may be permitted to revise and extend their re- mafts and that I may be permitted to revis3 and extend my remarks and insert certain tables and excerpts relating to the bill. T ..e SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas? There was no objection. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATOR AVI'EMPTING TO COVER UP FUENTES AFFAIR (Mr. PATMAN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and '. nclude extraneous matter.) Mr. PATMAN. Mr. Speaker, on April 26, Mr. Hilary Sandoval, Jr., the Administrator of the Small Business Administration, appeared before the Banking and Currency Committee to dis- cuss an SBA loan to a New York com- pany with alleged underworld ties. Shortly before the hearing, I received a te:egram from the Honorable HENRY B. GONZALEZ, a dis.inguished member of the committee, concerning "an alleged shakedown" of a small business loan ap- plicant by Mr. Albert Fuentes, special assii tart to Mr. Sandoval. The telegram follows: WASHINGTON, D.C., April 25, 1969. Hon. WaIGHT PATMAN, Wasl fngton, D.C.: Affidavits In my possession and on file with the Federal Bureau of Investigation show that there is reason to believe that Albert Fuentes, special assistant to the Administra- tor, Small Business Administration, has en- gaged in or attempted to engage in shake- Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE May 20, 1969 downs of SBA loan recipients. I have re- quested the administrator to suspend Fuentes pending full investigation and re- quest that you join In this action. I request that the committee under your able leader- ship investigate all loans either made or pending in Texas offices of SBA since Fuentes entered his position and that investigation be made particularly in the San Antonio area. Sincerely, HENRY B. GONZALEZ. Member of Congress. When Mr. Sandoval appeared before the committee, I asked him to look into the Fuentes situation and to report his finding to the committee. Mr. Sandoval agreed to this request: The transcript of the hearing clearly spells out what in- formation Mr. Sandoval was to provide. The transcript states: The CHAIRMAN. Now I will ask you to take this telegram and give me a report on Mr. Fuentes. You can do that, I assume? Mr. SANDOVAL. Yes, air. _ The CHAIRMAN. And also to give me all the information about the loans in the San Antonio area. Mr. SANDOVAL. Yes, air. The CHAmsAN. And if any of them pro- voke your thinking along the lines as not being regular. call them to our attention, Mr. SANDOVAL. Yes, W. Following Mr. Sandoval's appearance, I learned that SBA investigators had vis- ited the San Antonio SBA office and looked into the Fuentes situation. After allowing a reasonable length of time for the investigators' report to be forwarded to Washington, I wrote to Mr. Sandoval on May 12. The letter asks Mr. Sandoval not only to provide the Fuentes report but also to furnish the committee with a document that is extremely important to the committee's investigation of the New York loan to the alleged criminal con- trolled company. The letter follows: MAY 12, 1969. Mr. Hn.ARY SA inovAL, Jr., Administrator, Small Business Administra- tion, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. SANDOVAL: It has come to my attention that a memo dated January 6, 1967, from Mr. William Bowling to then Small Business Administration Administra- tor. Bernard Boutin, contains a great deal of background Information concerning SBA's involvement with A.N.R. Leasing Corpora- tion. This memo is of vital importance to the Committee's examination of the A.N.R. loans and because of this, it is imperative that the Committee be given a copy of the complete memo immediately. It Is my understanding that there may be a problem In releasing the memo in that it contains FBI and Justice Department in- formation. In this regard, it would be ap- preciated If you would take action to secure the release of the memo from the Justice Department and immediately forward It to the Committee. In addition, you will remember that dur- ing your appearance before the Committee on April 26th, I asked you to make a com- plete investigation of the charges made against Mr. Albert Fuentes. While I realize you have turned the matter over to the FBI, It is my understanding that SBA Investi- gators have been looking into Mr. Fuentes' relationship with the San Antonio office. Be- cause of the importance of this matter, it would be appreciated if you would Immedi- ately Inform the Committee as to the re- sults of your Investigation of this incident and also If any other loans involving alleged improper action on the part of Mr. Fuentes have been uncovered. Your earliest reply would be appreciated. Sincerely, WRIGHT PATMAN, Chairman. It is quite clear from even a most casual reading of the letter that two dif- ferent subjects are covered in the letter. The staff of the Banking and Currency Committee had been informed by SBA officials that the memo from Mr. Bowling to Mr. Boutin contained information from the FBI and Justice Department and that permission would have to be obtained from these departments to re- lease the memo. Because of this, my let- ter specifically asked Sandoval to take zction to secure release of the memo to the committee because of its important nature to our investigation. The last paragraph of the letter deals solely with Mr. Sandoval's promise to supply the committee with the report on the Fuentes case. It does not suggest that the Fuentes report, promised the committee by Mr. Sandoval, should be turned over to the Justice Department, nor does the letter make any reference to the Justice De- partment in connection with the Fuentes case. After the letter was sent to Mr. San- doval, a member of the Banking and Currency Committee staff called SBA to find out when the- Fuentes report would be made available. He was assured that the report would be In the committee office the following morning, along with some other material that the committee had requested. The following morning, SBA did send information concerning its lending activities in cases under study by the committee, but did not send the Fuentes report. The SBA official who brought the material to the committee stated that he did not have a copy of the Fuentes report but that he would call back to his office and make certain that the report was placed on his desk and that he would personally hand deliver the report that afternoon. Later in the day, still another SBA official reported to the committee staff that the committee would not be able to get a copy of the report that afternoon because, "I do not know where a copy of the report is and even if I did, I do not have authority to release it." He said that Mr. Sandoval was out of town and could not be reached. The fol- lowing day, several members of the Banking and Currency Committee staff attempted to obtain copies of the report but were unsuccessful. The reason given at that time for the report not being made available was that Mr. Sandoval was out of town and the report could not be released without his approval. When the committee staff attempted to locate Mr. Sandoval they were told by his office that- He is in New York but I don't know where to get in touch with him or exactly where he is, The following day, Mr. James Reed, congressional relations director for SBA, called the committee staff to state that the Fuentes report had been turned over to the Justice Department and would not be made available to the committee. Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0 WASHINC~T ON POST DATE 001 (01' _ PAGE pprove or Release 2002/08/01---C A=_ 180044-0 Improvement .Of Russian Missile Seen A-)dated Press U. S. military experts pre- diet Russia. will have a long- , mulli51e warhead mis, ale-with sal accuracy of one- qu ter of i rnile by the raid- 1970s. The mi.ile is the 5;5.9, Which Secretar - of Defense lin R. Laird said, last May 1. Gen. Alfred D,. der if the 9-afeguard ioi 'ballist v -missile defense m, in sUmonv_b arP a missile #nstallati tt s._ that time Laird per cent 'If the U.S. Minute- qan missyes could be de- ti~ed by a for"e of multiple fniteci. States wo .- re similar accuracy with its ri a warhead missiles. was lei were . accuracy of this 9 vas` so mentioned in House iel to Wednesday on the 21- 41 n m#-itai ary Procurement' firmed' Sr rvices Committee, aid.tht! Sviet missile earl de- .vea: a warhead "with great couracy." A efZls aid Russia's Aevel- Left of its weapons system one of the-main reastlia'the rnited States needs the ABM. "The SS-9 does not seem )gical un!,zsg III is designed as first str_ie capability," he aid. .Lei~tie C Arends(Rhl'i.) 11-publican obi the l( Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000100180044-0