JOURNAL - OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL TUESDAY - 29 JULY 1969

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP71B00364R000200010022-1
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RIPPUB
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S
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4
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 11, 2006
Sequence Number: 
22
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Publication Date: 
July 29, 1969
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NOTES
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Approved For Release 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000200010022-1 S .C E Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel Page 2 Tuesday - 29 July 1969 4. (Secret - JGO) Met with Representative Edward Hebert (D., La. who advised that he has received some questions from other members of the Louisiana delegation concerning the closeout of the air field at New Iberia, Louisiana. I advised Representative Hebert that it was my under- standing that GSA would be turning over the air field to the parish early this fall on schedule but that I would check the details and be back in touch with him. 5. (Confidential - JGO) Met with Mrs. Mary McLaughlin, Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, who advised the Committee does still need the transcripts of the Director's briefing of23 June on a daily basis. I also received from her a copy of the Committee's hearing schedule for this week. 6. (Confidential - JGO) Conversations with various Committee personnel after the Director's briefing of the House Armed Services Committee today indicated that the briefing was not only well received but considered by some as one of the most interesting and capable pre- sentations that has been given to the Committee. 7. (Secret - JMM) Accompanied the Director and Messrs. Duckett, Bruce Clark, Carver and to a briefing of the full House Armed Services Committee on the subject of Soviet and ChiCom military forces. See Memo for the Record and transcript. 8. (Secret - JMM) Briefed Robert Michaels, House Appropriations Committee staff, on the status of a long-standing defector case. Mr. Michaels showed no particular concern or curiosity. Briefed Mr. Michaels on recent developments regarding Sino-Soviet relations and the Soviet naval visit to Cuba. Mr. Michaels said he had in mind the Director's request for a date with Chairman Mahon but had been unable to confirm a time with the Chairman. SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000200010022-1 Approved For Release 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000200010022-1 SECRET Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel Tuesday - 29 July 1969 Page 3 25X1A 9. (Secret - JMM) Met with Senator J. W. Fulbright regarding his 17 July query to Secretary Laird concerning I reminded the Senator that Carl Duckett had briefed him on this on 7 May. He recalled the briefing and said he understood the sensitivity of the matter and would deal with it accordingly, but he could not remember what had spurred his inquiry or even the fact that he had signed the letter to Secretary Laird in this connection. He suggested I take the matter up with Carl Marcy, Chief of Staff of the_5en. te Foreign ,Relations Committee. I met with Carl Marcy and told him in very general terms of the nature and sensitivity of the project and asked his cooperation in protecting its security. He too was vague on the background of the Senator's query to Laird, but said he recalled that Fulbright had "gotten some inquiries 25X1A from somebody Marcy also recalled "having heard something about this" from Joe Wolf in the State Department. Marcy said he would look into it further and assured me that he would cooperate in maintaining the necessary security. Legislative Counsel cc: Ex/Dir- Compt n /TIT)(-.T Mr. Houston Mr. Goodwin DD/S DD /I DD/S&T OPPB EA/DDP SECRET q Approved For Release 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000200010022-1 25X1A Approved For Release 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000200010022-1 Approved For Release 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000200010022-1 HUMAN EVENTS Vtt4111 L)LI Approved For Release 2007IJ08/0 G - DP71 B00364R000200010022-1 qM F., dd ~, i . On a subject as important ?h 1 a By JOHN LOFTON s w et ier The fact that there really were no dif- might also be usable as a door stop, or not this country should or should ferences between the two was noted in not build a missile defense system, it is but because it might be doesn't in any sad to see opponents of the ro osed the New York Times, but one had to be way negate its capability as a first- Safcguard ABM haninn: the prop a pretty persistent reader t r:_A ?. ., :,. .-. o i h n t -- e uebate. The two chief obfuscators are Senators J. William Fulbright and Albert Gore. Unable to find any significant chinks in the armor of Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's arguments for the ABM, the senator from Arkansas and the senator from Tennessee have be- gun to play words-semantics-pick nits. e 20tn paragraph of their fro So h t i n - , page st av ng been shot down on these the ory, the Times reported: "While two points, it's back to the drawing' e Intelligence Board may have not board for Senators Fulbright and Gore, made any findings supporting the Laird And when they return with new charges, conclusions, committee members, when- as they most certainly will, it is to be pressed by reporters, acknowledged that hoped that they will eschew pettifoggery the board had not made any findings' on the ABM issue, because to indulge contradicting the Laird first-strike in such tactics on so crucial a subject. assessment." The Boston .Globe quoted Sen. Ful- bright himself admitting the same thin : g "My own feeling is that the conclusions The idea, you see, has been twofold: of the secretary are not based on the first, to spread the word that there are conclusions of the United States Intel major differences between Secretary ligence Board." Which is exactly the Laird's estimates of a Soviet first-strike point: The fact that Secretary Laird's capability and that of the top-level, evaluations of Soviet first-strike capabili- inter-agency body that coordinates Intel- ties are not based on the evaluations of ligence estimates, the United States In- ? the U.S. Intelligence Board is attribut- telligence Board; and, secondly, to try able not to a disagreement on in- and make appear as a major shift telligence information or interpretation Laird's recent statements that in addi- of that information, but rather to the tion to having a first-strike capability, fact that the U.S. Intelligence Board has the Soviet SS-9 missile could also have simply made no such evaluation! And a second-strike capability, to try and conclude from the board's % silence on the subject, two things being established, it Fuibrghthave done, ct~ as Gore and that there is a would then be a short hop, skip and a basic- disagreement, with,, Laird Is"assessu jump to a total discrediting of every- ment, is a mischievous non sequitur. thing Laird said in the past and -the case for the ABM would have been On the subject of the second- dealt the coup de grace. strike as well as the first-strike cap- Only a funny thing happened to Sen ators Gore and Fulbright on their way to discredit Secretary Laird: During the five-hour, closed-door grilling of Laird, accompanied by CIA Director Richard Helms, the anti-ABM forces were un- able to show any differences at all be- tween the secretary of defense and the U.S. Intelligence Board. A source inside the Foreign R l~- tionsCommittee says that cs~ite ri nfous ,_C.CQ,SS.~..g2S.1A7.tAahLgA_,._.~.,~._~b Curd-.and Hclts,,,_.ncit.her.Fulbright _W Gyre were able to. .establish any iscrepancics whatsoever between. _.tbe _LXQL (One senator who saw the press, stories the next day reporting on such differences, chuckled, and remarked to an assistant, "I wonder where the papers get this kind of stuff. It simply isn't true.") abilities of the Soviet super missile, the SS-9, Senators Gore and Ful- bright again muddy the water. Accusing Secretary Laird of com- pletely changing the meaning of first- strike capability because of his noting the additional capabilities of the SS-9, they seem unable to grasp the fact that one day a person can say a machine gun may be used to initiate a fusillade of bullets, and the next day that same person can say that that same gun may also be used to fire back after being fired on, and that there is no contradic- tion in the two statements. The SS-9 debate but to- endanger the~security ~ of this nation as well. Approved For Release 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000200010022-1