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March 27, 1969
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Approved E8q p 8RAJ05 7C rRDgppQ9,64R000300090002-4 S 4237 4 rriG`29, 1969 site to success in employment, housing, ABM CAN HELP ARMS CONTROL these two propositions are not in conflict NEGOTIATIONS and, in fact, are mutually supporting. education, and health. It is my view that just as the world would Because the existence of hungry Amer- Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, as the be a far better place if nuclear weapons had icans represents a strain on the self- Senate is aware, the Committee on not been technologically possible, so it would respect of the Nation, we must act im- Armed Services, under the chairman- be a better world if neither MIRV's nor ABM's were technologically feasible. Unfor- mn mediately to end this stigma. Because ship of the distinguished Senator from ABM's ly they are feasible. malalnutrit rition is such a stubborn link in Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), conducted tunate It is also my view that the U.S.-U.S.S.R. we to the poverty cycle, a au et work the g great public hearings last week on the anti- relationship is not symmetrical. The Soviet break this link. Because of the great ballistic-missile defense system. These Union has professed to be on the political return resulting from a small investment hearings were held in connection with offensive in respect to the non-communist in health and nutrition programs, we the yearly legislation authorizing funds world. The West During the years when the sive f and enable hungry people to make the contributions of productive citizens. Be- cause the real costs of our inaction are a high infant mortality rate, birth dis- eases, physical disabilities and a short- ened life expectancy, our action is long overdue. Because we can expect that an individual who is hungry will be listless, apathetic, distrustful, frustrated, and alienated, we must act before the in- justice of hunger in this rich land pro- duces social unrest and chaos. Michael Harrington asserted in his troubling book, "Another America," that there are two Americas: one made up of the middle and upper classes and "an- other" America of the poor and the in- digent. The middle and upper classes are comfortably sheltered and are rarely '"'~ A.,.,e-i; ? indige hi h c highways w They have their modern - conveniently by-pass the ghetto areas. ask unanimous consent that it be printed They have their suburbs which neatly in the RECORD. avoid the migrant farm areas. And they There being no objection, the state- have their immaculate high rise apart- ment was ordered to be printed in the ments and shopping centers which have RECORD, as follows: clearly forced the relocation of shacks. STATEMENT BSOEE THE U S. ,ATE HONORABLE PAUL COMMITTEE Ni ON But how long can the existence of 22 million poor be systematically denied? ARMED SERVICE, APRIL 22, 1969 Mr. President, the solution cannot be Mr. Chairman: It is a privilege to appear found by turning away to a more pleas- again before this Committee on a matter of ant question. We can no longer tolerate national importance, the ABM issue. My first involvement with the nuclear "another America" if we are to be a question was in 1945. At that time, as Vice strong and healty county. Freedom de- Chairman of the U.S. Strategic Bombing pends on free people, but hunger and Survey, I was charged with the supervision conducted a suof scientists and rvey of the ffects of the nu- n now to end the bond- age unlessowe will keep 1 r weapons used at Hiroshima and Naga- c ea DEATH OF REPRESENTATIVE ROB- ERT A. EVERETT, OF TENNESSEE Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, the 91st Congress lost an outstanding Mem- ber in the passing of Robert A. Everett on January 26, 1969. The middle South, the area he knew and loved so well, will miss him, for he epitomized public service and the cause of good government in its finest sense. He visited me in my Senate office On January 4. It was the last time I was to see and talk with him. Even then, his zest for life made a deep impression on me. His congressional service had its mark of greatness: concern for the disabled veterans, flood control from Minnesota to Louisiana, cotton research-and the tireless, devoted service to the needs of constituents will long be remembered. I shall remember his smiling face, booming voice, counsel, and good fellow- ship. To his wonderful mother I extend my deep and heartfelt sympathy. It was that which he sought for others. that which he found, and that which he shared as he made his way to God. . en for fiscal year 1970 for the procurement litical d United States was the only nation to possess of aircraft, missiles, ships, and research nuclear weapons, we offered to share them and development. with other nations under the Baruch plan. On April 22, Hon. Paul H. Nitze, former That plan was rejected by the Soviet gov- Deputy Secretary of Defense and now ernment. At no time was our monopoly of chairman of the advisory council at the nuclear weapons a threat to the integrity of Johns Hopkins School of Advanced In- other e reverse not one nho which believes that ternational Studies, expressed to the eveye d on in held a So-m committee the view that in negotiations viet vied Union is situation, nuclear wepaons, have h have had with the Soviet Union on the limitation thnopoly on e same result. and control of offensive and defensive once the Soviet Union developed a sub- weapon systems, the executive branch stantial nuclear force it became evident that has the best chance of arriving at an the relationship between us could develop agreement satisfactory to the United in a more, or in a less, dangerous manner States if Congress approves the ad- dep a df on the the United study ministration's request for authorization impact of teed. In In the e 1958 foreign yoon to and appropriation for the ABM Safe- which I referred earlier, we emphasized the guard system. desirability of striving for a U.S. deployment I commend Mr. Nitze's opening state- which contributed to the stability of the ment before the Armed Services Com- nuclear relationship rather than to insta- l this could be done by l saki. In 1949 I participated in the reevaluation of U.S. policy which followed on the first testing of a nuclear device by the Soviet Union. In 1958 I was one of the co-authors of a study entitled ,The Impact of Technology on Foreign Policy," done at the request of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In 1961 and 1962 I participated in the work of the Executive Branch on the Berlin and Cuban missile crises. In 1963 I was among those involved in the successful effort to arrive at a limited In 1967 I participated with rvar. melon` in the development of the Sentinel Program. . dominance in land based ICBM's and sub- In 1968 I testified before the Senate For- marine based missiles, as well as long-range eign Relations Committee in favor of the nu- bombers. This . fact, coupled with local clear non-proliferation treaty. superiority in the immediate vicinity of Cuba Since January 20th of this year I have on the part of the United States, enabled been enjoying the freedom of a private citi- President Kennedy to take a firm position zen. in the Cuban missile crisis and caused Chair- I wish today to support two propositions: man Khrushchev to withdraw. The first, is negotiations into promptly by the Executive Brancwith the States i has continued stocperfectt its second Soviet Union on the limitation and con- strike deterrent capabilities. The U.S.S.R. trol of offensive and defensive nuclear wea- has, however, changed its declaratory policy; pons systems. The second is that the Con- that policy has no longer been characterized gress support the request of the Executive by threats and unsubstantiated claims of Branch for Fiscal Year 1970 authorization technological progress. The Soviet Union's and appropriation in the amount of $490 action policy, however, has been to increase million Total Obligation Authority for in- greatly its efforts in the nuclear field. The vestment in the Safeguard system. I believe result has been to change the situation from eve bility. We be developing mobile, dispersed or hardened systems which would not be excessively vul- nerable to a first, or a pre-emptive, strike. This program was subsequently carried out with the deployment of the Polaris system, hardened Minuteman ICBM's and dispersed or air alert bombers. I find it useful to look at the U.S.-Soviet nuclear relationship since 1957 in two dis- tinct time periods. The first period was that from 1957, the year in which the Soviet Un- ion launched Sputnik, to 1962, the year of the Cuban missile crisis. The second period is that from the Cuban missile crisis to the present time. During the first period the United States was deeply concerned that Soviet technology had in some important respects over-leaped that of the West. Great efforts were made, with the full support of the scientific community, to develop rap- idly the secure second strike nuclear de- terrent capabilities to which I earlier referred. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, relied more on claims of technological prog- ress and a wide ranging series of threats of nuclear destruction against other nations. Their actual deployment of ICBM's as op- 5 mecum and ntermediate range 1missiles lar~_y _, d rected.__,aga nst, Europe,. Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 Aril , .1969 Approved FLa6%Wn f A~5/J7Ee DPgg 0 jM4R000300090002-4 seem paltry indeed if mis-steps in the So- viet-American strategic relationship should lead to a breakdown in stable nuclear deter- rence. I say this not to dramatize my remarks but to stress the necessity for a proper perspective on relations between Moscow and Washington. Our preoccupation with Viet- nam, however justifiable, must not lead us to neglect the impending issues between the United States and Russia. We must over- come the familiar tendency for the urgent to displace the important. We have reached a unique juncture in the arms race between ourselves and the Soviets. We face a crisis in the dual sense conveyed by the Chinese symbol for the that term, a symbol suggesting a condition of both dan- ger and opportunity. A combination of political and technolo- gical developments has brought us to an un- precedented situation. It is now clear that the great powers will either devise ways of limiting the growth of nuclear arsenals or they will plunge ahead into a costly and dangerous competition in strategic weapons with unforeseeable consequences for the peace and stability of the world. There have been previous escalations of the arms race, to be sure, but not quite like the one now looming. For the first time both sides have expressed serious interest in seek- ing to limit additional deployments of strate- gic forces. The leaders of the Soviet Union have now come to recognize what respon- sible officials in this country have long de- clared, that there can be no winner in a nuclear war and that a rampant arms race will leave both countries much poorer but also less secure. Whatever else may be said of Nikita Khrushchev, he brought essential realism to the Soviet Government when he abandoned the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the inevitability of war between Capitalism and Communism. Furthermore, the prelude to the present dialogue has seen substantial achievements in more limited realms of arms control. The Partial Nuclear Test Ban, the Treaty pro- hibiting deployment of weapons of mass de- struction in outer space, the Non-Prolifera- tion Treaty, the "hot line arrangement", and other measures of restraint have shown that the Soviet Union and the United States can carve out significant areas of agreement in such difficult and delicate areas. These are historic accomplishments. They augur well for further efforts to find mutually accept- able means of insuring both nations' secu- rity. Of equal importance is the fact that the last few years have seen the evolution, through a combination of U.S. restraint and continued growth in Soviet missile forces, of a kind of rough strategic equality between the two sides. The most astute students of Soviet behavior have welcomed this devel- opment, because of the evident reluctance of the Soviets to enter wide-ranging arms limitation arrangements so long as they were militarily inferior. A central factor in the less heated strategic atmosphere which has emerged during the nineteen sixties has been the rapid advance of the technology of surveillance. Both ma- jor powers, but especially the United States, have devised unusually effective means for observing and monitoring the strategic in- ventories of the other side. Rising confidence in these techniques for determining force levels in the Soviet Union has permitted the United States to avoid repeating the massive over-expansion of offensive weapons in which it engaged in the early sixties. These new technologies have also afforded hope that compliance with certain arms con- trol agreements could be verified without the kind of local inspection to which the Soviet Union has consistently objected. It has seemed possible that we might escape that cycle of suspicion which Roswell Gilpatric once characterized by saying that "the So- viets are forced to react to what they know we are doing in response to what we think they are doing." These were some of the trends which began to give a degree of assurance that the balance of terror might become less delicate, and that meaningful arms control was more than merely conceivable. Unfortunately, other trends have been at work to frustrate these hopes. Contrary to widespread opinion, deploy- ment of anti-ballistic missile systems is by no means the most significant of these trends. In fact, while ABM is hardly a trivial matter,* it is clearly a subordinate part of the larger strategic problem. The more sinister elements in the situation, the ones which pose the gravest threats to the stability of the strategic balance and to the possibility of effective arms limitations, are pending in- novations in the offensive forces of both sides. Developments now under way on both sides raise the likelihood that the level of offensive weaponry available to the Soviet Union and the United States will rise rapidly in the next few years. I refer, of course, to the multiple warhead technology on which both the United States and the Soviet Union are working. The so- called MIRV concept, in which a number of independently targetable warheads are mounted on a single launcher, is undoubtedly the most disturbing breakthrough in strate- gic weapons since the advent of intercon- tinental ballistic missiles. Not only does it mean that a given rocket force may be modi- fled to throw several times as many war- heads, but it creates what could be insur- mountable problems for inspection of an arms control agreement. Together with the possible development of mobile land-based missiles, a technology of special interest to the Soviet Union, the de- ployment of MIRV systems would open large opportunities for evasion of any arms agree- ment which did not provide for extensive, on-site inspection. Disagreements over in- spection of that kind have always been a major barrier to successful negotiations. But, if MIRV is actually deployed by either side, it will be virtually impossible to rely ex- clusively on the means of national verifica- tion which otherwise might be adequate to monitor a freeze on strategic forces. What this means is that the present oppor- S 4239 such an exchange would not involve the widespread intrusion required by more elab- orate schemes, an agreement might be facili- tated. An exchange of this kind could be invaluable in providing experience in mutual observation and could help lay the founda- tions of trust which will be essential if more extensive inspection arrangements are to be accepted. Obviously, any suspension of operational tests of MIRV is at best a stop-gap. It can only buy time for more elaborate arrange- ments to be negotiated. A ban on MIRV tests, as a means of impeding deployment of such dangerous systems, can only stand if both parties respect it and if they promptly move forward on a number of other agree- _ ments. For example, such a suspension must be conditional upon mutual limitation of ABM deployment and an understanding on the total number and size of strategic launchers which both sides will have. If ABM defenses for cities were deployed without limitation, or if the number of delivery ve- hicles continued to grow much beyond the present levels, there would be irresistible pressure to proceed with MIRV either as a penetration device or as a means of multi- plying retaliatory capacity in general. But an initial suspension of MIRV tests could be the critical lever on the arms race. By curbing the immediate need for deploy- ment of both new offensive systems and ABM, it could create an environment for success in the more detailed and elaborate arms control discussions which must follow. I believe there is a growing appreciation of the perils of further delay in the proposed arms talks and the need for prompt and bold action to initiate them. Secretary Rogers struck a heartening note when he announced that the talks should begin in the next two or three months. If they are not begun quickly, mankind's technological capacity will once more have outstripped its political capacity to build a safer and more rational world. The President's proposal to deploy a modi- fied ABM system must, of course, be evalu- ated in this larger context. And in that con- text I believe it should be seen for what it is, a dependent variable. I have voted against every appropriation for ABM deployment. I remain skeptical. the Armed Services Committee I am In tunity for strategic arms control is highly perishable. Indeed, it is measured in months, developing the most intensive interrogation It now appears that, however justified they. I can concerning the so-called Safeguard sys- tem. There are a great many technical, po- lt i n pos- last Administration may have fe poning the arms negotiations with the Soviet Union, however outraged we and our allies may have been over Soviet ruthlessness in Czechoslovakia, the delay in the arms talks has been most adverse to their chances for success. That sober view is based on the conclusion that, if MIRV is not controlled prior to de- ployment, it will probably not be controlled at all. And if MIRV is not controlled, other limitations will be even more difficult to achieve t1 tan otherwise. In my judgment the most urgent task is to limit further operational testing of multiple warhead missiles. Once testing of these pro- vocative systems is completed, it will be un- likely that either side will believe the other is not deploying them. On the other hand, there are several major factors suggesting the desirability and feasi- bility of controlling test activity of this kind. First of all, without extensive tests it is doubtful that either side would have suf- ficient confidence in these complex systems to deploy them heavily. Secondly, unlike a ban on deployment, an understanding to forego operational tests of this kind lends itself to verification by the kinds of surveil- lance capabilities which both sides already possess. In addition, there is much to be said for seeking an exchange of observers at the small number of facilities where such full-scale tests could be conducted. Since litieal and strategic questions which would have to be answered satisfactorily before I could consider supporting deployment at this time. Yet I believe it is vital that the President have a fair hearing for his recommendation before the Congress and the country exercise their responsibility to pass judgment. This is a matter in which we need to muster the most balanced and objective view of which we are capable. I find it distressing that the President's recommendation was caught up in a flood of 'opinions and emotions related to the earlier Sentinel proposal. The ABM discussion had already acquired such momentum that it has been difficult to examine the new recom- mendation strictly on its merits. The result has been as Meg Greenfield so well por- trayed it in the Was131ngton Post, "a ragged non-debate on the ABM." If the nation is to make the hard decision which this ques- tion deserves, it will have to examine what the President has in fact proposed-not what others say he has proposed, not what his predecessor proposed, not hat some wish he had proposed. In particular it just will not do to have this matter descend, into a narrow political contest, in which either partisan or per- sonal advantage becomes a consideration. Whatever others may imply, I do not for a moment believe such factors influenced the Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 S4240 Approved For Rel I - B00 648000300090002-4 A - SENATE April 79, 19.69 President's decision. In fact, had they done so, he had every incentive to postpone or re- ject an ABM deployment. I am utterly con- fident that Mr. Nixon did not make his pro- posal on this basis. Those who charge that the President's decision was politically in- spired reveal more about their own motives than about his. Nor will it do merely to ignore the poten- tial vulnerabilities which intense technolog- ical competition may create for strategic forces. Some observers have blithely pro- posed that the simplest and most effective way to deal with a potential threat to Min- uteman would be to adept a "launch on warning" policy. That is, if the radar screens showed what appeared to be an attack the Minuteman force should be fired in a valley. Apart from the technical uncertainties of such a scheme, this Ill-conceived proposal completely ignores the requirements of stable deterrence. The entire effort of the past decade has been to construct secure second-strike forces which did not have to be launched on warning. It has been recog- nized by both the United States and the So- viet Union that the creation of such hair- trigger forces is a sure recipe for heightened tensions and fears, and for increasing the propensity to nuclear war at times of extreme crisis. I urge those who have been attracted to such a proposal to consider the implica- tions of what they are suggesting. I, for one, do not propose to replace a strategy of ques- tionable wisdom with one of obvious lunacy. My plea today is that we get our priorities straight. The over-riding strategic problem of our time is to limit the multiplication of offensive weapons which increase the chance that a nuclear exchange might actually be initiated, not so much through a calculated first strike out of the blue as through a pre- emptive strike generated by fears that mul- tiple warhead technology and other devices might be used to destroy or defeat a coun- try's retaliatory capability. As I have stressed, the next few months are especially critical and the problem of controlling further de- velopment and deployment of multiple war- head technology is especially vital. Only by pressing forward urgently with strategic arms control efforts to deal with these prob- lems will we find a lasting means of pre- venting or limiting ABM deployment. The risks of an uncontrolled arms race are frightening to contemplate. They in- clude not only increased danger of a nuclear holocaust, though that is ample reason to seek to curb this deadly competition; but the profound dangers of continued neglect of social needs in this country and else- where. Even a small fraction of the nearly 200 billion dollars which the world is spend- ing on armaments could make an Inestima- ble contribution to relieving hunger, rebuild- ing cities, educating children, and to per- forming all the other humane missions which are now desperately starved for re- sources. Unless we can begin to reduce in- ternational tensions and to substitute pro- grams of security through negotiation for the elusive quest for security through com- petition, the prospects for meeting the hu- man needs of this planet are dim indeed. These, then, are the real stakes In the de- cisions we and the Soviets face in the com- ing months. More than at any time in the postwar period, it may be possible for us and the Soviets, acting together, to choose the risks we will bear; to ease the strains on our societies by reducing the burdens and hazards of unending strategic competition. The moment is opportune, and the oppor- tunity is too precious to lose. CONSUMER PROTT, CTION$ Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, a re- cent issue of the CWA News, the official national newspaper of the Communica- tions Workers of America, AFL-CIO, contained a comprehensive roundup of consumer protections that this Congress must face up to. Interest in these issues is widespread-and it should be, for they directly affect every citizen. I ask unani- mous consent that the article, entitled "Let the Buyer Be Protected," be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: LET THE BUYER 13E PROTECTED (NoTE.-The beginning of 1869 brought a new President, a new Congress and presuma- bly new attitudes in many corners of the U.S. But the nation's interest in one old thought-consumer protection-was height- ening. (Almost certainly, the old axiom of Caveat Emptor, "Let the Buyer Beware," will be re- moved from American usage. Aroused U.S. citizens will not suffer much more abuse. (Action may not be swift. But as long as pressure Is kept on via public exposure, ac- tion will come. (The last days of 1968 brought two exam- ples of the kind of commentary that will keep the pressure on: (Betty Furness, President Johnson's ad- viser on consumer affairs, wrapped up her work with a parting blast at manufacturers' warranties, which she described as "more garbage than guaranty." She also decried the apparent attitude of President-elect Nixon, who, "in effect said he felt consumer protec- tion should go back to each of the Federal agencies. In theory, that's a marvelous idea, but in practice that isn't the way it works." ("Nader's Raiders," a group of seven young lawyers assembled by Ralph Nader, a guiding light in exploration of consumer protection, released a study made last summer of the Federal Trade Commission. It amounted to a scathing denunciation of the FTC and Its chairman Paul Rand Dixon in such terms as "inept" and "anachronistic." Such charges as "cronyism" have been refuted by Dixon, but even if the truth lies somewhere between, the report still has the effect of focusing at- tention on consumers' needs. (While support of consumer protections is wholly predictable from such sources as Betty Furness and Ralph Nader, support also came from surprising sources, such as George R. Vila, chairman and president of Uniroyal Inc. - (Implying that industry was getting what it deserved, Vila laid part of the blame on intensive TV and other advertising. As a re- sult, Vila said, "Theconsumer-already suf- fering from a sense of alienation-is con- stantly bombarded by 72 fiercely competing advertising claims. Is it any wonder he winds up with a feeling of hostility and suspicion? ("We cannot ignore what is happening," Vila concluded. "We care not to merely con- front it with blind resistance. Consumerism will not disappear.") TAX REFORM Perhaps fundamental to the whole ques- tion of the U.S. consumers' needs is the right to an equitable tax structure which leaves the U.S. working men and women paying their fair share-but only their fair share- of the costs of operating the Federal, state, and local governments. The benefits from a redistribution of the tax load are many and obvious. First, a fair redistribution would leave the working man more money. Second, the increased revenue when previous freeloaders assumed their fair share would provide the kind of expanded services the working man has aright to ex- pect, aifthe way from highways to low-in- terest housing loans. But, unfortunately, the U.S. tax system is not equitably distributed. Even the National Observer, a weekly newspaper published by the Wall Street Journal-credentials that hardly qualify the Observer as a friend of the working man-has gotten on the bandwagon, citing these glaring examples. of inequity: -A wealthy widow with an annual income of $1.5 million in interest from tax exempt municipal and state bonds pays nothing in federal income tax-in fact, she doesn't even file a return. Yet her gardener, who makes $5,000 a year, must pay $350 in income taxes. -An apartment building owner has earned $7.5 million in personal income in the past seven years. This should put him in the 70 percent tax bracket, or about $5 million in- come taxes. But by carefully using the "fast depreciation" loophole, he paid only $800,- 000 over the seven years. That's the same rate, 11 percent, paid by a man with a $10,000 a year income and two children. -A man purchased $10,000 worth of stock, which he kept until his death, when it was worth $100,000. It passes to his heir and there will be no income tax-then or ever--on the $90,000 in capital gains. That case history of a loophole was cited by Rep. Henry Reuss (D- Wis.), who estimates that $2.5 billion is lost in Federal income taxeseach year because of failure to tax inherited gains. Other examples are legion. Some of the foremost examples of tax loopholes feature depletion allowances an oil and other minerals, exemptions for charitable deduc- tions and tax-free "non-profit" foundations. The charitable cotributions can be expertly employed. For instance, one aspect of the Federal law provides that if In 8 of the previ- ous 10 years a person's charitable contribu- tions plus his federal income tax payments add up to 90 percent of his taxable income, he can deduct an unlimited amount for con- tributions to charity in the present year. The tax-free state and local government bonds may be the most galling to the work- ing man of all the tax loopholes. Originally intended to help state and local governments provide schools and other public services, studies by the AFL-CIO reveal that in many instances, "This federal subsidy has been perverted into a tax loophole promoting plant piracy, enticing runaway shops when many communities used tax-free bonds to build plants for private use and private profit," Obviously, the plugging of just a few of the more glaring loopholes would allow raising of the current $600 per dependent exemption to $1,000. AUTO INSURANCE One of the hottest items in the current con- sumer cauldron is the issue of inordinate rates paid by U.S. drivers for often inade- quate amounts of automobile insurance pro- tection. For the long run, the issue evolves arounc the Keeton-O'Connell plan. Strongly en- dorsed by the CWA Executive Board wher it was first introduced, the Keeton-O'Connel: plan calls for the elimination of the lon? and costly process of establishing blame in auto accident cases with losses of under $10,000. Devised by two young law proles. sore, the plan would revolutionize the whole concept of auto insurance-and drasticalll reduce costs to the consumer. Meanwhile, such groups as the Ohio State AFL-CIO have come up with some startlin? inadequacies in current protections. For in- stance, the Ohio A71,-CIO study shows that auto insurance rates have risen a startling 25.8 percent in the past three years. That compares with an - over-all increase in the state's economy (consumer price index) of barely 11 percent. And what are auto owners getting for the Increased premiums? Not. much, according to the AFL-CIO find- ings in Ohio,. - A December report revealed case after case of policy holders being canceled without ap- parent cause, then being re-classified as high Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 April 29, 1969 mppl vvcu S 4249 a greater tax: loss than the depletion allowance. "It's another example of the oil companies finding a crack in the tax laws and widening it until it reaches the proportions of a chasm." TIGHTER TAX LAWS FAVORED A majority of 300 top corporation execu- tives surveyed by a leading business maga- zine favor closing of loopholes in the na- tion's federal income tax laws. Results of the survey-published this month by "Dun's Review Magazine," showed that most business leaders favor: Reducing tax shelters such as the 27%2 % oil depletion allowance. A closer look at some of the exemptions currently enjoyed by tax-free foundations. Eliminating some deductions now used by individuals and a lowering of the over-all tax rate. Taxing at least half the income of every individual-regardless of the source of the income. Commenting on the poll, the magazine stated: "Amid this swelling bipartisan support for an overhaul of the tax laws, perhaps the most surprising aspect of the survey of busi- ness leaders is the growing sentiment It dis- closes for reducing the availability of tax shelters." On. FIRMS LOST BATTLE, WON WAR WASHINGTON.-The government tried to plug a petroleum industry income tax loop- hole back in 1958 and the big loser was the U.S. Treasury. The reason: In a successful legal battle to close one loophole, worth a few million dollars to oil- men, the government opened another loop- hole worth an estimated billion dollars or more to the same oilmen. Looking back on the legal proceedings, a Capitol Hill tax expert says: "It is the most expensive victory the gov- ernment ever won." The unusuaa victory came in a decision handed down April 14, 1958, by the U.S. Supreme Court in a case known as the P. G. Lake Case. For the oil industry; it was a landmark decision that opened the door to a billion dollar tax dodge through the use of carved out production payments. The issue then before the court was this: Should the proceeds of a production pay- ment be taxed at the low capital gains rate of 25% or at the ordinary income tax rates that ranged up to 91 %? Until 1958, lower courts and the U.S. Tax Court had held that the sale of a carved out production payment constituted the transfer of a capital asset. Using this interpretation of a production payment, the lower courts said the, proceeds from the transaction should be taxed as a capital gains. The Lake case was a consolidation of five separate cases, four involving oil production payments and one dealing with sulphur. The lower courts had sustained the tax- payer's argument that the production pay- ment represnted the sale of a capital asset and thereby the lower tax rate. In appealing the case to the Supreme Court, the government contended that the payments were merely an assignment of fu- ture income subject to taxation as ordinary income and not capital gains. The Supreme Court upheld the govern- ment, moving The New York Times to report the following day: .,The Supreme Court held unanimously that payments for rights to future oil profits are taxable as ordinary income, not as capi- tal, gains. "The ruling was a blow to what has become a widespread practice in the oil industry, so- called 'in-oil payments: "Forty-three cases are pending before the Internal Revenue Service and officials have said 'many millions' in tax revenue, are at stake. "In the government's view, the disputed practice was a way to anticipate future in- come and avoid paying full income tax on it." As a result of the court's decision, the production payment device has been used by the oilmen not to "avoid paying full income tax"-but to avoid paying any income tax, as explained. The decision paved the way for an oil com- pany to create self-induced paper losses that may be used to reduce or eliminate the in- come tax payments of not only the oil com- pany but its subsidiaries. In the Lake case, the legal issues considered by the Supreme Court were quite narrow and did not involve the propriety, of selling pro- duction payments to reduce taxes. But the Tax Court, other lower courts and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) all have issued similar opinions on techniques em- ployed to lower income taxes. Typical is a decision handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, which states: "The legal right of the taxpayer to decrease the amount of his taxes, or altogether to avoid them by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted. "If, upon careful scrutiny, the transaction has real substance and is not a sham, it mat- ters not whether the taxpayer's aim was 'to avoid taxes or to regenerate the world' . . In private rulings, the IRS has expressed the same opinion on production payments, saying they, are proper as long as there is a bona fide transaction. There is nothing new about the sale of carved out production payments-only the purpose of the transaction has changed over the years. The use of production payments in the .petroleum industry dates back to the turn of the century-years before the United States had an income tax. At that time, a wildcat oil operator would grant a production payment to a landowner in exchange for the right to drill on his property. This concept later was expanded and the wildcatters gave the production payments to drilling companies-instead of cash-for their services. The final refinement came In the last few years when tax experts found a way to reduce and often eliminate an oil or minerals com- pany's federal income tax liability through the sale of a production payment. ABM NEEDED TO PROTECT U.S. DETERRENT Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, as Senators know, the Committee on Armed Services, under the able chairmanship of the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), held 2 days of public hearings last week on the proposed anti-ballistic- missile defense system. The hearings were held in connection with the yearly legislation authorizing funds for fiscal year 1970 for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, ships, and research and de- velopment. On April 22 the distinguished scientist, Dr. William G. McMillan, professor of chemistry at the University of California at Los Angeles and noted specialist on such strategic nuclear matters as re- entry vehicle vulnerability, penetration aids, nuclear weapons effects and missile vulnerability, expressed to the committee his views in support of early deployment of the Safeguard ABM system as an es- sential part of maintaining the viability and credibility of our strategic deterrent. I wish to commend to the attention of this body Dr. McMillan's opening state- ment given before the Armed Services Committee and ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the state- nient was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: STATEMENT BY DR. WILLIAM G. MCMILLAN, BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COM- MITTEE, APRIL 22, I969 Mr. Chairman, and members of the Com- mittee, your invitation has provided me a welcome opportunity to offer my views on the issue of ballistic missile defense. Since this is my first 'appearance before your committee, I thought I should begin by sketching my technical background and ex- perience. BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE I received my doctorate at Columbia Uni- versity during World War II in that hybrid field known as chemical physics. Immediately thereafter I joined the Columbia University branch of the Manhattan Project as a mem- ber of the Chemistry Division, where we were deeply involved in the design of the gaseous diffusion plant for the production of Use. After the war, I spent a year as a Guggenheim Postdoctoral Fellow in theoretical physics at the University of Chicago. In 1947 I joined the faculty of the Department of Chemistry at UCLA, where latterly I served six years as Department Chairman. I have also taught at Harvard and Columbia Universities. During the 50's I served as consultant to the Engineering Department of Brookhaven National Laboratory and to the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory in Livermore. Since 1954 I have been a part-time member of the Physics Department of the Rand Corproation, where my work has been concerned primarily with such strategic nuclear matters as re- entry vehicle vulnerability, penetration aids, underground nuclear testing and test detec- tion, nuclear weapon effects and missile vulnerability. In mid-1981 in anticipation of the Soviet abrogation of the nuclear test moratorium I was charged with forming the Scientific Advisory Group on Effects to advise the Di- rector of Defense Research and Engineering and the Defense Atomic Support Agency. This group played a large role in designing the U.S. nuclear test programs aimed at ex- ploring many of the strategic nuclear prob- lems mentioned above. In 1963 I was asked to chair a study group on missile vulnerability for DDR&E, the Air Force and the Navy. This group, which is still in existence, greatly extended our un- derstanding of missile vulnerability and sponsored far-reaching changes in the de- sign of our strategic missiles. With the support of DDR&E and the Ad- vanced Research Projects Agency, I founded in 1984 the Defense Science Seminar aimed at getting new young scientific talent in the Defense advisory business. This seminar ran for three successive summers, with a total attendance of about 120 individuals. In 1965 I helped establish the Defense Intelligence Agency Scientific Advisory Committee, which I have since served as Vice Chairman. Also in 1965 I chaired a study for the JCS, on the technical-military implications of possible extensions of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. In 1966 I participated In a related study for the Arms Control and Disarma- ment Agency. Most recently from October 1966 through December 1968, I served in Viet Nam as Science Advisor to COMUSMACV. THE THREAT As Mr. Nitze so ably described, the intran- sigence of the Soviet Union after World War II left us no alternative to the development of a strong nuclear deterrent. The hope that the Soviets would join with us under the Baruch plan for sharing the great potential of the nuclear age was shattered with the Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 S 4250 Approved For Rele,%URESSiONALI R COR1D - SENATE 00090002-4 Apr ill 29, 1.969 first Soviet atomic explosion in 1949. Simi- larly the national debate over the decision to develop thermonuclear devices was punc- tuated emphatically by the first Soviet thermonuclear explosion in 1953. Our policy of nuclear deterrence, which came to maturity under President Eisen- hower, has I believe seed us well. There are, however, two curriillt Soviet develop- ments that threaten the survivability and credibility of our deterrent: their ballistic missile defense systems; and their counter- force efforts. For-.some years I have followed closely the growth of the Soviet ABM systems. By my reckoning there have been three systems in- volved: the first, partially deployed around Leningrad and then apparently abandoned; the second, deployed around Moscow and now approaching operational status; and the third or Tallinn system, very extensively de- ployed throughout the Soviet Union, and which appears to me likely to have a con- siderable ABM potential. I find very unpersuasive the argument that the Soviets are building in the Tallinn devel- opment yet another SAM antiaircraft system to the neglect of a defensive system aimed at what they must surely regard as the more current threat of ICBM's and SLBM's. By the counterforce effort I refer to the current Soviet development of multiple war- heads for their SS-9 missile. To me the evi- dence as I understand it points very strongly, If not unequivocally, towards a MIRV-i.e., a multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle-system designed against the U.S. land-based Minuteman system. To impart some feeling for the strength of my conviction on these two Intelligence issues, I would strongly support spending a substantial fraction of our Defense budget to assure that neither of these Soviet de- velopments be allowed to degrate our strate- gic deterrent. Put differently, I am most certainly not willing to gamble the survival of our Min- uteman force that such an interpretation Is wrong. In addition to the question of capability, Intelligence must concern itself with the question of iritent. Here the writing of such high-level Soviet military planners as Mar- shal Sokolovsky abound with references to the need for a preemptive strategic first- strike capability. They tell themselves they must develop it, and now we see that .de- velopment in progress. How much more no- tification do we need? In this focussing on the survivability of Minuteman one often encounters the rebut- tal-"Well, there is always Polaris." This seems to me a hazardous position. The whole point of the mix of strategic weapons sys- tems-Minuteman Polaris, Poseidon, 3352 Bombers-is to have such diversification that our deterrent could never be totally negated. I am sure that if we are willing to write off Minuteman as a component of our deterrent forces, we would not have any dif- ficulty inducing the Soviets then to focus their full counterforce genius against our submarine and bomber forces. In fact, I fully expect there has already been long es- tablished a Soviet group charged with de- veloping specific means of countering such element of our deterrent. To them, Polaris may not look like 600 missiles, or 8,000 war- heads if given a ten-fold MIRV multiplica- tion, but rather as only 41 boats to be neu- tralized. Certainly we know the Soviets are engaged in large-scale ASW developments. And our 600 B-52 bombers may be viewed as a much smaller number of airfields to be attacked-for which th may think their Fractional Orbital Borardment System (FOBS) is well suited. Turning to the Chinese Peoples Republic it is no secret that their progress in the de velopment of atomic ld thermonuclear weapons has been spectacularly rapid. While their missile program has been less spectac- ular, there can be little doubt that they are striving to achieve an ICBM capability. Now who will those ICBM's be aimed at? It should be a sobering thought that no Ohl- nese ICBM's would be necessary if only the Soviet Union were their target. As to intent of the CPR, we have the won- derfully-candid statement of Marshall Lin Piao, Minister of Defense, in September of 1965. This document developed the theme that the U.S. nuclear capability is a paper tiger, and "cannot save U.S imperialism from its doom." It also laid out a blueprint for what Marshall Lin euphemistically termed "peoples wars of national libera- tion," a blue-print that is being followed by the North Vietnamese in their invasion of South Viet Nam. Thus while I had no part even as an ad- visor in the Sentinel deployment decision, which occurred while I was on overseas as- signment, it did seem to me a prudent move to anticipate a CPR ICBM threat. TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY It has been argued that even if there were a sound military requirement for the Safe- guard ABM System it wouldn't work anyway. The technical reasons adduced for this view include: 1. It is too complicated. 2. There is insufficient reaction time for human decision-making. 3. It was designed for another purpose ("thin" defense of cities against a CPR attack) and is thus unsuited for the defense of Minuteman. 4. The radars can be blacked out. 5. Cheap and simple decoys can saturate the defense. Before commenting on these points I must emphasize that I have no special expertise in the engineering of either missiles or radar- although I have studied Professor Panofsky's excellent book on Electromagnetic Theory. But we have all seen some other fairly com- plicated systems built by our aerospace in- dustrial complex that work, and work well; for example, the Explorer, Surveyor and Mariner space shots, topped by the magnifi- cent performance of the Christmas round- the-moon Apollo excursion. The use of solid state electronic components, which were in- vented only a few short years ago, has made possible a vast improvement in reliability. It would, of course, be folly to expect no difficulties, no start-up bugs in any new sys- tem. But both the Spartan and Sprint mis- siles have been successfully flown many times. At Kwajalein there has been con- structed a Missile Site Radar (MSR) that will soon be tested in operational launches, and somewhat later in actual ICBM reentry- vehicle intercepts. Already in operation are numerous phased-array radars employing the same basic principles as the Perimeter Ac- quisition Radar (PAR). The computer re- quired is well within the state of the art. The nuclear warheads are either already de- veloped or can be tested underground. In other words there is a justifiably high con- fidence that each and every component is completely feasible. The short time In which an ABM system must react is indeed a severe problem. But it seems to me far better to place that burden upon a defensive system which would not trigger a nuclear exchange, rather than upon our ICBM's which certainly would If they had to be launched on warning. Since the new Safeguard deployment has brought into question the rationale behind the original Sentinel deployment, I believe it may be useful to quote an important part that seems to have been overlooked in Sec- retary McNamara's San Francisco address on 18 September 1967. Ile said, "Further, the Chinese-oriented ABM de- ployment would enable us to add-as a con- current benefit-a further defense of our Minuteman sites against Soviet attack, which means that at a modest cost we would in fact be adding even greater effectiveness to our offensive missile force and avoiding a much more costly expansion of that force." This, statement Is, of course, borne out by the proposed Sentinel deployment, in which 4-face MSR's along with complements of both Spartan and Sprint missiles were to be collocated at both Grand Forks and Malm- strom, the same two Minuteman bases to be given priority protection under the Safe- guard proposal. In other words, the difference between the two deployments is more one of emphasis than of kind. Of course, many other approaches to hard- point defense have been examined, but precious-perhaps even critical-years would be lost in starting over at this point. A blackout attack, like that of a direct attack upon the radars-the eyes and ears of the ABM system-is of course a possible enemy option, but is neither simple, guar- anteed to work nor cheap in ICBM's and nuclear warheads. To be sure, any defensive system can be burned through with enough concentration by the offense, but this ab- sorbs time that would upset a concerted at- tack, and absorbs warheads that could have caused great casualties elsewhere. Any nation, like the CPR, who can produce ICBM's and nuclear warheads can of course also develop penetration aids-given time. In my view we can only hope to buy time, time to give our political colleagues and their foreign counterparts an opportunity to real- ize a workable arms control agreement based upon mutual concern,- mutual restraint and mutual dedication. ALTERNATIVE COURSES In his San Francisco speech, Secretary Mc- Namara made clear that intensive consider- ation was being given to others means of protecting our land-based deterrent: mobil- ity, super-hardening, etc. It Is strange to find some of those individuals who most strongly oppose ABM deployment because of the risk of escalating the arms race now advocating proliferation of our Minuteman system to assure its survivability. In previous hearings of this Congress some have even suggested launching the Minute- man force on warning as a tenable course, or undertaking a preemptive strike against the CPR if their ICBM threat becomes intoler- able. I want to go on record as unalterably op- posed to any intentional action-or in- tentional lack of action-that would maneu- ver the United States into such a position that only a strike-first option remained. INTERNATIONAL OVERTONES One of the most often expressed argu- ments against ABM is that it will inaugurate a new cycle of escalation in the arms race. Some of this fear may have been allayed by the reorientation of Safeguard to the defense of our deterrent forces. But it is noteworthy that the Soviets first formally announced their interest in arms limitation shortly after the U.S. decision was reached to deploy the Sentinel System. The Safeguard deployment in no way reduces the deterrence inherent in the Soviet retaliatory capability. That the Soviets understand the desirability and in- nocuousness of such a defense Is Illustrated by Premiur Kosygin's declaration that their ABM system is a threat to no nation and doesnot contribute to an arms race. Personally I should be sorry to see even the thin city defense permanently rejected. I be- lieve such a defense might serve to dampen an unwelcome CPR adventurousness, and thus to maintain for us a wider class of options and more room for political maneu- ver. Finally. I believe the maintenance of the credibility of our deterrent-to which Safe- guard would contribute-is absolutely essen- tial in our relations with NATO and our other allies around the world, Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 pit 29, 1969 Approved CFbfGVM(3"?05f&t 6-BDgfM64R000300090002-4 S4251 CONCLUSION There are two additional reasons, which may even be the strongest of all for an early deployment of the Safeguard system. First, a review of the Soviet ABM programs indi- cates that they have for a number of years been gaining operational experience from ac- tually deployed systems, whereas we have not. We can ill afford to allow an important gap to develop in the learning process concerning such an important capability. Second, it is only through the actual deployment of the major system elements that we can learn with certainty how to cope with the problems that will surely arise in command, control, communications and the inter-action and internetting of the radars with each other and with the rest of the system. I believe that the great majority of the American people, with their down-to-earth commonsense, are having as great a difficulty as I am in swallowing the sophisticated argu- ments that conclude it is somehow bad to defend ourselves. I simply do not understand why it is provocative for the U.S. to deploy an A13M system as we are here considering today, but not provocative of the Soviet Union to have already deployed two ABM systems; nor why it would be provocative of us to defend our Minuteman forces against a developing Soviet preemptive first-strike capability, whereas it is not provocative of the Soviets to develop that destabilizing capability. We are told, in effect, to stop our provocative action of punching the Soviets on their fist with our eye. I sincerely hope that such an inverted Alice-In-Wonderland view of the world will not be allowed to prevail. In summary, I support the early deploy- ment of the Safeguard system as an essential part of maintaining the viability and credi- bility of our strategic deterrent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. INDUSTRY MAKING MAJOR EFFORT IN POLLUTION CONTROL Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, the pollution of our air and water is accepted as one of the major problems facing the United States today. The growth of our population and the resulting increasing in the industry and services necessary to sustain it has made the control of pollution more essential than ever before. In recent years, en- lightened industry has joined with all levels of government in an effort to return our environment to a state of cleanliness and purity. In the space of 5 years air pollution control expenditures by the Federal Government have jumped from $4.1 mil- lion to $91 million. This year the Govern- ment plans to spend $133 million. A beginning has been made, Mr. Presi- dent, but we have considerably more to do. Yes; much to do. American industry recognizes the need to continue antipollution work and has itself made constructive contributions to the campaign in both talent and money. The very nature of the business makes the American steel industry deeply in- volved in pollution problems, and there are notable examples of success in reduc- ing the amount of waste material loosed in the atmosphere and streams. Our steel industry last year spent $222 million to improve air and water quality, almost evenly divided between the two. This was in addition to expenditures in the preceding 16 years totaling $600 million. Steel spokesmen affirm that the job in reducing pollution is going forward. They are dedicated to continue high-level spending on antipollution projects. There are many outstanding examples of new techniques and revolutionary methods being applied to the. problems of combatting pollution of the air and water. In our State of West Virginia, for ex- ample, a new $100 million plant at Weir- ton Steel Co. has been called the "mill of the future," combining in a new facility many modem antipollution devices in addition to modern steel-producing equipment. And a new electric power plant near Moundsville, W. Va., the Mitchell plant owned by American Electric Power Co., has a stack 1,206 feet tall to carry waste gases high into the atmosphere and away from the ground. This is approximately three times as tall as the average. The electric power industry as a whole spent $98 million to abate pollution in 1967. During the same year, the chemical industry was spending $87 million, petroleum $47 million and coal $18 mil- lion fighting these problems in their own spheres. So, while we may sometimes think that little is being done to purify our environment, there is ample proof that industry, as well as government, is mak- ing a determined effort to create and keep clean air and water in America. S. 1717-A BILL TO INCREASE THE INCOME TAX EXEMPTION, SUP- PORTED BY JACK BOSTICK, VICE PRESIDENT OF INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, recently I introduced a bill, S. 1717, to increase the personal income tax ex- emption from $600 to $1,200. As I said at the time I introduced by bill, I feel that we have waited far too long to take such action. Recently, I received a letter from my good friend Jack Bostick, vice president of the International Association of Fire Fighters. Mr. Bostick is a fellow Texan and lives in Fort Worth, Tex. He en- closed with his letter a resolution which was recently adopted by the IAFF in convention. Because the resolution per- tains "to the spirit, if not the letter" of my bill, I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the resolu- tion was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: RESOLUTION No. 86 Re increase in exemption for dependents from $600 to $1800 for each dependent for income tax purposes. Whereas in the past number of years the cost of living has risen steadily and in many instances wages have not kept pace with the rapid rise, and Whereas for the above reason the cost of supporting a family and dependents has in- creased greatly, and Whereas the present $600.00 exemption for a dependent is no longer a realistic figure: Therefore be it Resolved,. That the International Associa- tion of Fire Fighters strive for Federal legis- lation to increase the $600.00 exemption for a dependent to an $1800.00 exemption for each dependent for income tax purposes; and be it further Resolved, That the International Associa- tion of Fire Fighters solicit the aid of all organized labor and pursue this legislation with a united front. Submitted by: Local Union No. 344, De- troit Fire Fighter Association, Earl I., Sanders, Secretary. SENATOR NELSON FIGHTS FOR TIGHTER TRUTH IN PACKAGING STANDARDS Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, an editorial published in the May issue of Wisconsin's nationally known the Pro- gressive magazine, edited by Morris Ru- bin, tells of the frustrations and confu- sion confronting the housewife in per- forming her routine but important task of shopping for the family groceries. In 1966, Congress passed the Truth in Packaging Act, aimed at removing de- ceptively packaged products from the supermarkets. However, consumer stud- ies conducted before and after enact- ment of this law have proved that the Truth-in Packaging Act has not accom- plished all that it set out to do. Our distinguished colleague and my fellow Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. NELSON), has long been a vigorous spokesman for the consumer. We are all familiar with his outstanding achieve- ments in investigating the high costs of prescription drugs and in assuring the highest safety standards in automobiles and automobile tires. Now Senator NEL- SON has introduced an amendment to the 1966 Fair Packaging and Labeling Act which would require the price per unit to be placed on the label of con- sumer commodities, including food, household goods, drugs and cosmetics. The Progressive's editorial is just one of the many voices urging Congress to take action on this important legislation, S. 1424. I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: CHEAPER BY THE POUND Three years ago this spring-before Con- gress enacted the "truth-in-packaging" bill- we reported in these columns on an Eastern Michigan University survey involving thirty- three college-educated housewives who were turned loose in a supermarket with identical shopping lists. Confronted by a staggering variety of sizes and deceptive labeling of gro- cery and household goods, these shoppers were misled into spending an average of $10 for purchases that could have been made for $8.90. Food industry lobbyists successfully persuaded Congress to pass only a diluted truth-in-packaging law in 1966. As a result, confusion still reigns in packaging. Senator Gaylord Nelson, Wisconsin Democrat, recent- ly pointed out that "consumers today still must be mathematicians before they can se- lect the best bargain from among the vast variety of odd-sized packages on the mar- ket." He cited two consumer tests conducted in California, one before and one after the Federal law was enacted. In a 1962 test five college-educated housewives were asked to buy a total of seventy items at the lowest unit costs. The women made thirty-four in- correct choices and thirty-six correct ones. Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 --r Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 April 25, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE MILITARY VALVE AND POLITICAL COST This, in effect, scathing criticism of Mc- Namara aroused to his defence his fellow- rationalist McGeorge Bundy, who had by then left the White House to become Presi- dent of the Ford Foundation. He, too, had now become doubtful of the effectiveness of military measures, however well executed, in a limited war. He took the Committee to task: "Nothing is less reliable than the un- supported opinion of men who are urging the value of their own chosen instrument- in this case military force. We must not be surprised, and still less persuaded, when gen- erals and admirals recommend additional military action-what do we expect them to recommend?" He warned that careful judgment was re- quired between military value and political costs. The ideologists continued to hold fast, but the rationalists had had second thoughts. As McGeorge Bundy now con- fessed, "Grey is the colour of truth." On September 29, the President revealed in San Antonio his new negotiating formula, which by then was already in the hands of Hanoi. Just before Christmas General Westmore- land, the U.S. Commander in Vietnam, and Ellsworth Bunker, the Ambassador in Saigon, returned to the U.S. to sprinkle some op- timism into everybody's ears. They both talked about "light at the end of the tun- nel," but many suspected that Johnson was using them to set the right mood and tone for the Presidential election year of 1968. And, in fact, It had been clear for some time that the war had become a stalemate. The word was resented in the Johnson Ad- ministration, but until the Tet offensive be- gan in February, 1968, its use was accurate. The Tet offensive caught the U.S. forces off guard and proved how vulnerable they still were; but their counter-offensive, so to say, restored the stalemate It did not restore, though, the lost confitfence in the political and military assessments from Saigon. THE ABM Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the ABM debate symbolizes and encompasses more than a weapons' system. The de- velopment of technology as applied to missile systems and other implements of war affect our chances for disarmament and tend to distort domestic priorities. They have great implications not only in the military field but in the fields of industry, labor, the universities, and politics and all these factors can be, and have been, without any prior determina- tion and without any deliberate intent, developed into a partnership of enormous proportions. Mr. President, I have nothing but the greatest respect for the military. I think they are doing their job with integrity, dedication, and patriotism. I have great respect for industry in this country. They are seeking business and achieving it. Sometimes I think perhaps they go to undue lengths. I have great respect for labor, too, but labor too often finds desirable the jobs which missile installa- tions and other systems make available, the work pays well and often carries a good deal of overtime. The universities have also been bene- fiting for some time. The latest figure I have indicates that last year, educational and nonprofit institutions earned $772 million in research contracts-$16 mil- lion more than in 1967. For example, with no intention of im- pugning any university, but rather to note their excellence, I note from pub- lished news sources that the Massachu- setts Institute of Technology is in 10th place in this field, with $119 million in Defense research contracts, and that the Johns Hopkins University, for example, is in 22d place with $57,600,000. As far as the politics is concerned there are many of us in this Chamber, myself included, who must share a part S 4057 of the responsibility, and a part of any blame, because when it comes to getting defense installations, missile or other- wise, for our States and into our areas, none of us have been shrinking violets. I think that ought to be made clear. So what has developed along with the technological developments over the past two decades, is a military-industrial- labor-academic-political combination, and that development simply cannot be gainsaid. To come back to the main theme of my remarks, I would note that the Penta- gon's allegation, in defense of the ABM- Safeguard-system, is, in my opinion, predicated on its belief that the Soviet Union is developing a. first strike capacity and that almost all our land-based mis- siles or at least a sizable portion of them would be destroyed on that basis. It is well to reiterate and to emphasize that the second strike capacity is only in part predicated on the reaction of our land-based missiles and that we have, in addition, 41 Polaris submarines with 656 nuclear missiles and 646 nuclear armed strategic Air Force bombers. At this point, I ask to have printed in the RECORD a table showing the increase from 1963 through 1968 on the part of the United States and the U.S.S.R. of ICBM-intercontinental ballistic mis- sile-SLBM--sea-launched ballistic mis- sile-and total missiles from these two systems. In addition, I would like on the same basis to include the number of in- tercontinental bombers. All this is public information. There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: United States U.S.S.R. United States U.S.S.R. United States U.S.S.R. United States U.S.S.R. United States U.S.S.R. United States U.S.S.R. 0 ICBM launchers_________________ 514 100 834 200 854 270 934 340 1,054 720 1,054 905 SLBM launchers--------------- 160 90 416 120 496 120 512 130 656 30 656 45 Total missiles ------------- 674 190 1,250 320 1,350 390 1,446 470 1,710 750 1,710 945 Intercontinental bombers--------- 1,300 155 1,100 155 935 155 680 155 697 155 646 150 Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question? Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the Sena- tor from Arkansas. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, with regard to this table, I merely wish to say that while the Senator has included, in the table which he has just asked to be inserted, I think, a very complete and very good table of the nuclear weapons, this by no means exhausts the capacity of this country to destroy any enemy or any antagonist, because we have enor- mous capacity in the field of chemical and bacteriological warfare agents, suffi- cient at least to duplicate the destructive capacity represented by the figures in the table the Senator has inserted. I wish only to make the point that this table, with all of its impressive figures, by no means tells the whole story. The Rus- sians, as do we, have, in addition, the further capacity to decimate populations. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the distinguished chairman of the Commit- tee on Foreign Relations, the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT), is cor- rect. And may I say that I have not even given all the information at my disposal relative to the number of warheads and the like, but I shall do so now. It is my understanding, subject to veri- fication, that in 1963 the approximate number of nuclear warheads was 7,844 for the United States and 755 for the Soviet Union and that by 1968 the figure was 6,556 for the United States and 3,295 for the Soviet Union. I say that subject to verification; but I have a pretty good idea that what I have just stated is fact, and can well be proved. Another aspect of the development, or in some instances, lack of development, of missiles is indicated by the fact that approximately $23 billion has been ex- pended on missile systems planned, pro- duced, deployed, and abandoned. Of that figure about $4.1 billion was spent on missiles which were abandoned in the research and development stage. I shall ask to have printed in the RECORD a list of major missile projects terminated during the past 16 years and not deployed; but before doing so, I wish to give full credit to the distinguished senior Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON), who placed these figures in the RECORD on March 7, and thereby made them available to the rest of us. I now ask unanimous consent that the list of terminated projects be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, asp follows: Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 pp S 4058 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE April .25x 1969 Project Year started Year canceled Army: Hermes ______ Dart'---------- Loki---- Terrier, land based----. Plato ------------------ Mauler _______ 1944, 19527 1948 1951 1 951 .- 1960 194 I958 1956 1956 198 1965 Total Army-------------? -----__- Sparrow I__ 1945 1958 Regulus 1955 1958 Petrel 1945 1957 Corvus. ___-------~_-- 1954 1960 Eagle------ 1959 1961 Meteor 1945 1954 Sparrow 1945 1957 Rigel 1943 1953 Dove 1949 1955 Triton 1948 1957 Oriole___________ 1947 1953 Typhon--- ------------ 1958 1964 Total Navy------------------- Air Force: Navaho ________________ 1954 1957 Snark. 1947 1962 GAM-63 Rascal_________ 1946 1958 GAM-87 Skybolt________ Talos, land based------- 1960 19 1963 Mobile Minuteman------ 59 1962 Q-4 Drone_____________ SM-72 Goose___________ 1954 1959 GAM-67 Crossbow ----- 1957 1958 MMRBM 1962 1964 Funds invested (millions) 44.0 21.9 18.6 18. 5 200.0 399.4 195.6 144.4 87.2 80.0 53.0 52.6 52.0 38.0 33.7 19.4 12.5 225.0 t S e ysm. 679.6 677.4 Third. A year from now, we should 446.0 know as a result of diplomatic initiatives 440, o as well as further research on the ABM i 8: 4 whether there Is a sound basis for going 7as ahead with the building of an ABM Sys 74;6 tem or for setting it aside entirely. In 65.4 Total Air Force__________________ ________ 2,774.6 Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the following table shows the total invest- ment for missile systems which have been deployed but are no longer de- ployed. These two sets of figures add up to a total of $23,053 billion: [Cost in millions] Army: Nike-Ajax ----------------------- $2,256 Entac (Antitank missile) -------- 50 Redstone --------------- - ------- 586 Lacrosse ------------------------ 347 Corporal ----------------z- --- 534 Jupiter -------------------------- 327 Total Army ---------- ------ 4, 100 Polaris Al------------------.... Regulus ------------------ Total Navy _________________ Air Force: Houndog A ---------------------- Atlas D, E, F----------------- Titan I - -- - - ----- --? Bomarc A - -- - ?_ - Mace A Jupiter ------------------ Thor ---- - ---- -- - 1,132 413 255 5,208 3.415 1,405 328 498 1,415 race which could cost tens of billions of made crystal clear by so authoritative a dollars; and in view of the fact that there voice as that of the majority leader. are alternatives both of diplomacy and Mr. MANSFIELD Mr. President, I weapons technology which have yet to appreciate the remarks of the distin- be considered, it seems to me that it is i gu s h e d senior Senato f N rro mew Yrk. o high time to put first things first. But I think he gives the Senator from First. I would suggest that on the basis Montana too much credit. of a number of Soviet diplomatic probes I not only appreciate what the Senator over the past several months suggesting had to say, but I also agree with him. a readiness to go forward on an arms There are two sides to this question, may- limitation or freeze, a diplomatic reac- be the proponents are right. tion should be tried on our part which It i s a matter of jud en mt It g i .s a might lead to the setting of a time cer- matter of searching our consciences to tain in the first part of June for nego- try to find the truth on the basis of the tiations to begin in earnest between the best evidence available, and arriving at Soviet Union and the United States. a judgment. development should be continued on the ABM system to determine more clearly the prospects of resolving the technical problems which have raised serious doubts about the effectiveness of this anti the State Department have not yet provided the Senate with persuasive grounds for going ahead with the de- ployment of the ABM at this time. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I associate myself with the conclusions of the distinguished majority leader, the Senator from Montana. In presenting these facts to the Senate and to the pub- lic, he has rendered a great service. I hope that his suggestions will be taken most seriously. I honor the President for being re- sponsible for a review of this system. I appreciate that he made a decided change in the system which he In- herited-the Sentinel. He faced up to his responsibility of exercising his best judgment on the basis of the facts. And what he has done, we in our individual capacities will have to do as well. It is a part of our responsi- bility as Senators from sovereign States. I hope that recognition will be given to the fact that probes have been made by the Soviet Union and that the President himself, as well as the Secretary of State, have indicated that thereIs a very strong possibility that talks will get underway either late this spring or early this summer. We need only refer to Secretary Rogers' latest press conference. I am somewhat disturbed at the ques- tion of -priority. I think the key word is "balance"; that we must balance our foreign policy and our defense expend- itures, on the one hand, with our do- mestic problems and needs on the other. If we can achieve a balance on that basis, we shall all be further ahead than I congratulate the Senator on his fine we would be if we were to place too much statement. emphasis on the use of the word "prior- Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Senator. ity" in one field or the other. Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the If we were to become the strongest Senator yield? nation in the world and were to spend noted' with deep interest the views of the ournea and our society were disrupted, __ . . authoritative authoritative and have been-well borne uneasiness were to spread throughout out under the auspices of the Senator the land, of what good would it be? from Arkansas and the Senator from That is why we cannot give either of Tennessee both in the principal com- these factors a priority but rather , , , mittee and in the subcommittee. ought to treat them, in effect, as a dual- I appreciate the feeling of the Presi- ity That is why we must, in accommo- dent of the United States upon this mat- dation with the President and the exec- ter. But I think one thing needs to be utive branch, work to try to obtain a bal.. made very clear-and I know the Sen- ance. We must face up to these matters ator from Montana will agree-that which are difficult, but which cannot be there i t s no Grand one whit less feeling about avoided. Plus missile total---------------- systems terminated be- 18, 886 the security and future of our country in The matter must be considered, as the ............... e- sore deployment - the heart of the Senator from Montana, distinguished Senator has already said, 4,167 the Senator from Arkansas, and myself on a nonpartisan?basis. Total ----------------------- 23,053 than there is in the heart of the most it will do neither party any good to ardent advocate of the Safeguard or anti- win a victory in this or in any other area In view of the fact that the estimated ballistic-missile system. cost of the Safeguard system will in- There is no partisanship In this mat- the country is the loser: crease considerably above the present ter. I took this position before. The Sen- the I tone have with behnwhich espe the cially plea debate sed with approximate $8 billion--$G, billion plus ator from Arkansas, the Senator from ABM has developed in the a on tot for acquisition, construction,. cilddeploy Montana, and the Senator from Ken- only this year but also but last year. Ire, avt merit and $2 billion plus for'.fesearch,and tucky (Mr. COOPER) also took this posi- also with par- development-that there ar rave ques- tion before President Nixon was even ~~ been pleased with sthe ta ldin of pare tions about the reliability oj the system; considered for the nomination of the part of the the undand the u the that, inherent in the Safeguard proposal, Presidency of the United States. branch bra of t of he our rrsireespp and onsibility and utiur is the start of a new phase of the arms I hope that these two factors may be our Y reciprocal understanding. A roved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 it 25, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I am grateful to the distinguished majority leader. FOUR-STAR SCAPEGOATS Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD an editorial entitled "Four-Star Scapegoats," pub- lished in the Wall Street Journal of April 24, 1969. There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: The "military-industrial complex" has become an increasingly fashionable bogey- man, and indeed the notion is spreading that the generals have created nearly all our national ills, by running up defense spend- ing and involving us in Vietnam. These prob- lems are certainly serious, but making the generals scapegoats for them obscures the actual lessons to be learned. The international climate being what it is, the garrison state remains a real enough long-term danger, though it ought to be plain that at the moment military influence is not burgeoning but plummeting. This long-run danger surely will not be solved by turning military officers into a pariah class, as much as that would please those intolerants whose personality clashes with the military one. The danger requires a far more sober diagnosis, and this would find that many of the present complaints should be directed not at the generals but at their civilian superiors. We tend to agree, for example, with the complaints that the Pentagon budget is swollen. But it tells us nothing to observe that the officers press for more funds for their department; in this they are no differ- ent from any bureaucrat anywhere. Indeed, the same people who think the generals mali- cious for requesting large funds would find it quite remiss if, say, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare failed to make similar demands for his concerns. Choosing among competing budget de- mands is the responsibility of civilians, in the Pentagon, at the White House and In Congress. Part of the current problem seems to be that In the ballyhoo about "scientific" management of the Pentagon, the old-fash- ioned unscientific Budget Bureau review was relaxed. More generally, it needs to be rec- ognized that the problem of fat in the budget is due less to the generals' greed than to a want of competence or will in civilian re- view. Much the same thing is true In Vietnam, There is plenty of room to criticize the gen- erals' incoherent answer to the problems of limited war, but many of the most decisive mistakes were made by civilians. Take the failure to understand the esca- lation of our commitment implicit in sup- porting the coup against Ngo Dinh Diem. After we had implicated ourselves in over- throwing the established anti-Communist government, we could not with any grace walk away without a real effort to salvage the resulting chaos. Reasons of both honor and international credibility left us vastly more committed than before, and it was almost solely the work of civilians. Or take the fateful decision to have both guns and butter, made in 1965 when the U.S. part of the ground fighting started in earnest, It was a civilian-and in no small part po- litical-decislon to avoid mobilization, to build the armed forces gradually, to expand the bombing of North Vietnam at a meas- ured rate, to commit the ground units piece- meal. All of this is In direct contradiction to the thrust of military wisdom. And if the generals did favor defeating the Communists, the little public record available also sug- gests they favored means more commensu- rate with that goal, The point is not that the generals neces- sarily should have been given everything they wanted. The point is that the civilians de- cided to do the job on the cheap. They would have been wiser to listen when the generals told them what means their goal required, then to face the choice between allocating the necessary means or cutting the goal to fit more modest means. This discord between means and goals is in a phrase the source of our misery in Vietnam, and primary re- sponsibility for it rests not on military shoulders but civilian ones. Blaming the generals for these problems maligns a dedicated and upstanding group of public servants. More than that, it obscures the actual problem with the military-indus- trial complex itself. For the real long-term danger is that the garrison state will evolve through precisely the type of failing that led to fat in the budget and trouble In Vietnam. For the foreseeable future an effective mili- tary force will remain absolutely essential to national survival. An effective force de- pends on generals who think and act like generals. If they worry about funds for de- fense and Communist advances in Asia, it is because that is what we pay them to worry about. That the nation needs people to worry about such things certainly does release potentially dangerous forces that need to be controlled. The military's responsibility for controlling them is passive, to avoid political involvement, and our officer corps has a splendid tradition in that regard. The more difficult task of active control is essen- tially a civilian responsibility, and the modern world makes it a terrible responsi- bility. But make no mistake, civilian control depends squarely on the will and wisdom of civilian leaders. This simple but crucial understanding gets lost in the emotional anti-militarism grow- ing increasingly prevalent. What gets lost, that is, is the first truth about the actual menace of a military-industrial complex-the danger is not that the generals will grab but that the civilians will default. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, while I do not agree with some of the observa- tions which are contained in the editorial, I certainly agree that it is a mistake to vent our frustrations on the Nation's military leaders. Like the rest of us, these leaders are trying to do their job for the Nation, with such wisdom and ability and special skills which they possess. In particular, I am in agreement with the article's basic thesis. It is evident that civilian authority has been remiss in exercising adequate control over the mili- tary budget and for initiating foreign policies which result, in the end, in major military commitments. It is the responsi- bility of the President and his civilian agents and of Congress to exercise judicious mangement over the military establishment of the Nation. Together, it is our responsibility to decide carefully what to spend for military functions and for what purpose. If, indeed, as the article suggests, we were to wake up one morning and find ourselves living in a garrison state, the fault would lie not so much with the military but with the civilian au- thorities who had abdicated their respon- sibilities and permitted thereby the ero- sion of their constitutional responsi- bilities. S4059 ADDRESS BY SENATOR MUSKIE AT BROWN UNIVERSITY Mr. HART. Mr. President, I commend to Senators and the public at large the penetrating remarks by the able junior Senator from Maine (Mr. MusxIE) at Brown University, Providence, R.I., on April 10, 1969. As we debate the ABM question, and indeed the whole philosophy of piling of military might on military might, we would all do well to consider this thoughtful message from our respected colleague. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: REMARKS BY SENATOR EDMUND S. MUSKIE AT BROWN UNIVERSITY, PROVIDENCE, R.I., APSIL lo, 1969 For the last several years we have become frustrated by the despair in our cities and the neglect of urban problems.. But we have re- assured ourselves constantly that new pro- grams would be initiated and more funds would be available as soon as the Vietnam War was over. Several months ago I first said that I thought this assumption was unjustified. Already, the pressure from the military has mounted, and the President has recommend- ed the deployment of the anti-ballistic mis- sile system. At the end of the Vietnam War-Defense spending will not decrease automatically. Our national priorities will not be adjusted automatically. And the domestic needs that demand a massive commitment of funds and energy will not be met automatically. The decisions that the Administration, the Congress, and the people make in the next several months are not merely decisions for 1969, they are decisions for the Seventies, These are not merely decisions about the best kind of weapons for us to have, they are decisions about the kind of society we want to have. And these are not merely decisions which. will determine the strength of our deterrence to nuclear attack, These are decisions whiefi will determine the strength of the world's resistance to nuclear destruction. These decisions will not wait until the end of the Vietnam War. They are being made now, And If they are going to reflect any com- mitment to peace, to a sane defense policy, and to a just life for all Americans, they must be made on the basis of new thinking and new priorities. Since achieving the role of a major power early in this century, our burdens of leader- ship have grown. For our own security and the security of the world, this country can never withdraw from its central responsi- bility for the preservation of peace. However, this is a responsibility which we derive not from our military strength alone, or from a desire to exert undue influence on the lives of other nations, but from our su- perior size and our economic and techno- logical strength. It is not a responsibility we can avoid, but it is one which we can abuse. Because this responsibility is so easily abused, yet so unavoidable, the ways in which we choose to meet it must be care- fully attuned to our national goals. Our goal is not military domination, but peace for ourselves and the rest of the world. Our goal is not to equip each nation with the capacity to annihilate its neighbors, but to enable the peoples of all nations to exist in a world free of hunger, poverty, and ig- norance, Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 S 6202 Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 9, 1969 Gurney McGee Smith Hansen McGovern Sparkman Harris Miller Spong Hartke Mondale Stennis Hatfield Montoya Stevens Holland Mundt Symington Hruska Muskie Talmadge Jackson Packwood Thurmond Jordan, N.C. Pearson Tower Jordan, Idaho Proxmire Tydings Kennedy Randolph Williams, N.J. Long Russell Williams, Del. Magnuson Saxbe Yarborough Mathias Schweiker Young, N. Dak. McClellan Scott NAYS-3 McCarthy Nelson Young, Ohio ANSWERED "PRESENT"-1 Fulbright NOT VOTING-22 Church Hollings Murphy Cook Hughes Pastore Cranston Inouye Pell Fong Javits Percy Goldwater Mansfield Prouty Gore McIntyre Ribicoff Gravel Metcalf Hart Moss The PRESIDING OFFICER. Two- thirds of the Senators present and voting having voted in the affirmative, the nomination is confirmed. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the President be immediately notified of the con- firmation of this nomination. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate re- turn to the consideration of legislative business. There being no objection, the Senate resumed the consideration of legislative business. ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL THURSDAY, JUNE 12, 1969 AT 11 A.M. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, when the Sen- ate completes its business today, it stand in adjournment until 11 ?a.m. on Thurs- day next. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SENATOR DODD Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that on Thursday, after the completion of the period for the transaction of routine morning business, the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. DODD) be recognized for not more than 1 hour. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. AUTHORIZATION FOR SECRETARY OF THE SENATE TO RECEIVE MESSAGES DURING ADJOURMENT Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that during the ad- 3ournment of the Senate from the close of business today until 11 a.m. on Thursday next, the Secretary of the Senate be authorized to receive messages from the President of the United States and the House of Representatives, and that they may be appropriately referred. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. AUTHORIZATION FOR COMMITTEES TO FILE REPORTS DURING AD- JOURNMENT Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that during the same period all committees be authorized to file reports, together with individual, minority, or supplemental views. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. AUTHORIZATION FOR PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE TO SIGN DULY ENROLLED BILLS Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the President of the Senate be authorized to sign duly enrolled bills until June 12, 1969. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I wish to ask the distinguished acting majority leader whether or not there will be some business on Thursday. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, on Thursday, after disposition of routine morning business, and after the address by the Senator from Connecticut, the Senate will proceed to the consideration of S. 1708, the bill to amend title I of the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965. We expect to have at least one rollcall vote on that legislation. There- after the Senate will go over until Mon- day next. NOMINATION OF CARL J. GILBERT TO BE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS-RE- FERRAL OF NOMINATION Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, there is a matter on the calendar about which I have just had a discussion with the distinguished chairman of the Commit- tee on Finance. I wish to propound a unanimous-consent request with regard to one of the nominations on the Execu- tive Calendar. After consulting with the distinguished Senator from Louisiana, I ask unanimous consent that the nomination of Hon. Carl J. Gilbert, of Massachusetts, to be a Spe- cial Representative for Trade Negotia- ations, with the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, be referred to the Committee on Finance" with instructions to report back the nomination within 30 days. After consultation with the Parlia- mentarian this referral, or unanimous- consent request, will not affect the origi- nal jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Relations to appoinments of this nature but does constitute a special case which will give the Committee on Finance an opportunity to hear this nomination. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Arkansas? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. SYSTEM Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, on the subject of the recommended anti-ballis- tic-missile system, I wish to make two additional points. First, with respect to the remarks of the distinguished senior Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) today I think it is clear under the circumstances that there is a substantial controversy over the deployment of the Safeguard system or any anti-ballistic-missile sys- tem in the defense of the United States. I think it is unfortunate that in some quarters it has become a highly emo- tional matter. That has not been the case with the distinguished senior Senator from Missouri. I think he might join with me in stating that is so on some occasions. Mr, SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. BAKER. I yield. Mr. SYMINGTON. I do join with the Senator in that regard. Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, the only two points I would like to make at this late hour as follows: One, the dis- tinguished senior Senator from Missouri pointed out in a previous interview, as I said earlier today, that if a certain chart were released by the Defense Depart- ment it is possible that the argument over the deployment of the ABM system might be over. Clearly, he has seen that chart, as I have. I think it is clear the argument is not over. I think it is clear that there continues to be a substantial controversy, and it is clear that there is a substantial controversy in philosophy over what is best and proper for the de- fense of the United States. I respect those who oppose the system. I personally support deployment of the system. I make this last point. One of the arguments advanced in opposition to de- ployment of the ABM system is that the response of the Soviet Union might be to deploy a greater number of offensive missiles so that it might overwhelm the new ABM. As far as I know, no one claims that Safeguard or any ABM sys- tem is infallible or that it can entirely protect the United States against attack by an aggressor. On the other hand, I think we are all trying to do the best we can in the defense of this country. It is important to this debate that it now appears, and I have been informed, that the time has come when it is cheaper to build and deploy ABM Sprints than to deploy additional Minutemen. The time is at hand when it will be cheaper for us to build a component of a defensive system, an ABM Sprint, and its propor- tionate share of the radar cost, than it is for the Russians to build an offensive weapon to try to counter it. We are all concerned with the cost of defense. We are all concerned most with defense as . an abstract quality of necessity for this country. I believe those two points, how- ever, are significant in this colloquy. Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. BAKER. I yield. Mr. SYMINGTON. I appreciate the position of the distinguished Senator from Tennessee. It is not with respect to Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 Approved For ON R~I~aftj%`'1RL/CjE BDP R000300090002-4 S 6203 ~ June 9, 1969 C ~ people like him, however, that I am anx- time we always must think of the cost cent of the "p.s.i." of a minuteman base. ious for the chart`to be declassified. The, exchange ratio; that is, the cost to the The Spartan missile would never have able Senator from Tennessee has been Russians to build a weapon to overcome been designed to defend a missile base esign a on lrecord being in favor of the de- wour eapons as cost of area defense against the Chinese att ck. tern for o of f this Sentinel/Safeguard sys- Therefore the Sprint is the basic missile tern fsome time. The Senator from of an offensive deterrent. Missouri is against deployment, although I believe that in the case of the chart incident to the functioning of defense of I am for further research and develop- which the distinguished senior Senator the Minuteman base by the Safeguard ment; therefore, the release of the chart, from Missouri and I have both exam- system. in my opinion, would not affect his opin- ined, by now virtually every aspect of it The Sprint is not a rifle. It has to be ion any more than mine. But the people is known in this RECORD with one excep- guided, and the way it is guided is by long- people of i the tion, who should decide ad are the by, the USpMilitary Establish- ange-PAR-radar, ad but nthehe raisal that United short- convinced y p own States, I own mind d that, hat, if this chart hart were m wre- meet, by the Department of Defense, of range-MSR-radar. Actually, the Spar- leased, it would show those people that the number of warheads that would have tan also has to be guided by the MSR. such a very small addition of Soviet to be delivered by the Russians in order Therefore, it is fair to say that if a SS-9's would be necessary to nullify this to overwhelm our Minuteman as pro- radar with a p.s.i. of less than 10 per- planned deployment of Safeguard, that tected by the Safeguard system. cent of the Minuteman site is knocked the people would be unwilling to pay this I believe that that information should out by, say, the SS-11's, of which the high price for this deployment. not be declassified. It has nothing to do Soviets have hundreds, then any SS-9 If we would have more information re- with the argument except in this sense: extrapolation would not make any dif- leased in favor of those opposed to the Is the investment in Safeguard so great ference, because the Sprints themselves system as against what is being released and our advantage so slight that we would be worthless. by those for the system, I believe it would should not undertake it? That is the second component part of be more in the democratic process. I say My reply to that is: My information the Safeguard system. this without the slightest criticism of the is that now Safeguard is cheaper to By all odds, the most complicated as- distinguished Senator from Tennessee, build than the offensive deterrent, and pect of the Safeguard system is the for whom I have respect and admiration. that Safeguard is cheaper to build than third component, the computer; in fact, Previously I have protested informa- the Russian offensive deployment that two of the world's foremost authorities com tion being declassified in apparent effort would be required to overcome it. on hpstiosay problems that have not even to support those who favor deployment If that is the case, I believe there is of this system. abundant demonstration of the desira- been worked out in theory. We all know This morning, we have another illus- bility of turning this Nation to a defen- the computer itself has not yet been tration of this problem-an article sive strategy instead of exclusively an of- completed. When you consider the num- fensive one. ber of hours and months and years ex- written front by page of William the Beecher, New Mr. SYMINGTON. Well, Mr. Presi- pended on a launch to the moon, where York Times, the ork dent, the one sure way to resolve this each operation is carefully watched by who says: discussion is to release the chart. Let some of our foremost engineers and The analysis, rby in iintelligence that multiple the the chart speak for itself. scientists, as against GI's handling a warheads Pentagon pprimarly, suggests the Russians I did not mean to get into a colloquy system all around the United States, if now to may be capable of being ng guided the to three With respect to the ABM system this completely deployed by phase a sys- scattered targets and powerful enough to de- afternoon, and am only doing so be- tem which would have to operate instan- stroy hardened missile silos. cause my position on this matter was taneously and automatically, in a mat- That statement, Mr. President, de- referred to earlier in the day. ter of seconds, you can realize why some Glares that the Soviets today are testing But I would leave an additional of us have grave apprehension about the MIRVS-not MRVS but MIRVS. Mr. thought with my colleagues this after- wisdom of deploying this system at this Beecher is a responsible newspaper man, noon: Having spent -many years in the time. therefore, must have been given this in- defense part of our Government, and Mr. President, someone recently said formation by someone in the Depart- many years before that in the electron- to me, "We thought you were one of us." ment of Defense. I would add that ad- ics industry, in private business, there I thereupon looked up what I have ditional information was declassified in are three basic aspects I know are perti- worked for and voted for, in the interest nent to this ABM system: of the security of the United States, this the thrust of Mr. First is the missile itself. I put in the since I came into Government. The total the story t Mr. believe that Beecher. I do ri ot RECORD some time back a list of the $23 of the defense budgets is $953 billion; and 's is BBeecher of story , thent. billion and $50 million in missiles which because, for the first time, I oppose a If it is not true, American ct people should will de- has been spent on missiles later aban- weapons system I consider unadvisable, used, else Arapeople taxes doned for one reason or another. We all I am not "one of us." What is the logic in what- national again tgree t further taxes for know, as was so well illustrated in that; especially as I want to do what- given all the security u facts. without first being North Dakota last summer, that even ever is necessary for the security of my given all we have been working on for country. I r. BAKER. E co I than for yielding. years, end up in test failure. There are varying opinions about from AKri thank my colleague Next the radar. The radar incident to whether this cold car is becoming relevant Missouri for his important and the Sentinel, Safeguard system is a great warmer; but I am confident every Amer- demarks. deal more complicated than the missile; ican would agree that, when Mr. Stalin I would point out, points however, coMr. st Pre s- in fact, the vulnerability of the radar was alive, the cold war aspect of our for- import n that, p he eout, cost is this itself could well be the core of the weak- eign relations was far more serious than importar aspect of defense, and in tness of this entire system. today. Then there was a monolithic approachr , probably actually have We have had open testimony that the structure behind the Iron Curtain, and a approached, probably for the first time "psi" of the radar was less than 10 per- man running things whom we all know to history, a efensive whee it is and of cent of the "psi" of the Minuteman base. was interested in taking over the world. m and all of My colleague from Louisiana (Mr. That is far from true today. to build a defensive system e that goes - it the p than is to build its counter- LONG) asked me what "psi" means. That In 1950 the total budget for the Mili- port in n th the offensive n ve build on arsenal, is a "per square inch" measurement- tary Establishment of the United pet ffensivapons build a naa comparable to B.t.u.'s-British thermal States-Army, Navy, Air Force, and Ma- Minuteman put han to b unit-for heat. In effect, it refers to the rine Corps-was $13.8 billion. Minuteman and pufor it in its silo, to and amount of concrete around a base or site. I remember meeting the late great build an than fens st a fee the in an effort This is a summary. President Eisenhower, in the Pentagon to overcome o an weapon in an eff to our defensive system. We have had open testimony before building. He was here to testify before We are talking about great sums of the Armed Services Committee that the the Appropriations Committee, whose money, Mr. President, but at the same "p.s.i." of the radar is less than 10 per- chairman at that time was Senator Mc- Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 -June 9, 1969 Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 ' CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE S 6205 had to use nuclear weapons, we would hope we did not have to use strategic weapons to destroy the enemy's cities, but that we could achieve our purpose by using tactical nuclear weapons on the field of battle, to keep his army, with huge amounts of manpower, from over- whelming ours. We can find a lot of ways to save money in the military budget. There are things we can do without. I have always been convinced that we did not need all those troops over there in Europe, that we could get by with one division as well as five. I believe the Senator from Missouri shares that view. If we brought them back, I would favor putting them back in civilian life, or putting them on a re- serve status, so as to save the large amounts of money they are costing us, and eliminate that tremendous drain on our balance of payments. But here we have a fundamental ques- tion of whether this Nation should ever be in a position that we are confronted with another nuclear power which is building a nuclear defense against our nuclear weapons, and have no defense against their weapons. Mr. President, I am not familiar with all the technical problems involved in building a nuclear defense. I do recall that when I was debating the space sat- ellite bill some years ago, I was making the point that we ought to realize the magnitude of the grant we were giving this space satellite company, because it would be within the capability of some- one, within a few years, to broadcast from those satellites out there programs that could be seen all the way around the world. The Senator from Missouri at that time made a speech explaining how dif- ficult and complicated it would be, and how there was no way to be sure that at any time in the foreseeable future that would be practicable. Well, we are seeing the programs from the satellites. now. Of course, they are not being beamed independently from up there, but it is demonstrated that we can put the signal up there and relay it back, put power behind what we receive back here, and televise it from coast to coast, thus achieving the same result. Some companies are working on what they think will be a breakthrough to give an 80-to-1 yield on atomic energy, for the purposes of providing commercial power. If we do that, we will be having batteries, in a few years, that would make it possible to broadcast directly from a satellite a signal strong enough to be seen by half the world at one time. Things that seemed impossible or un- thinkable a few years ago are becoming old hat nowadays. I recently bought the latest version of color television, the one recommended by the salesman in the store. There are devices in that instrument that cause it to correct itself against various atmospheric and needed ad- justments to change from one situation or another. They are built into the set. The picture changes automatically with- out one knowing why it happens. It just happens. A person turns on the set and waits a moment and it will adjust itself. How they did it I have no idea. However, if one puts enough good minds to work on it, those things can be done. We ought to hope that all of the money we spend on the missile defense will be wasted. We ought to hope that it will never be necessary to employ the missile defense to shoot down enemy missiles aimed at our country. However, we should not sit here and say, "It can't be done." In the past, it has been the other way around. If we were to sit here and say, "Why, it can't succeed. Don't try it," we would find that while we were saying this, the Soviet Union might very well go ahead to develop a missile defense which would put us at their mercy. It would be a tragedy to sit here while Red China went ahead at a tremendous sacrifice to their people to find the re- sources with which to develop missiles and a missile defense to confront us with an attack against which we had no de- fense, while Red China could defend itself. We cannot risk that. To borrow a phrase that the Senator from Missouri used when he came here in about 1953, "It does not do you much good to be the richest man in the graveyard." We should have a defense with which to protect ourselves. We should have a defense second to none. I am not too worried about our abil- ity to afford things. If we take the na- tional debt and the national income and make one single calculation to put them in terms of constant dollars, we find that all of our fears about the na- tional debt and how much the Nation is spending tend to diminish. We would find in terms of constant dollars, whether in terms of 1868 or 1948 dollars, that if we put it on the basis of what a dollar will buy and project it either forward or backward to see what the comparative situation is, we are as well able to afford a missile defense now as we have been at any time in the past. It has been pointed out to me that our national debt in relation to our gross national product-and particularly if one looks at it in terms of the part held not by the Federal Government itself, but by the people and companies outside of the Federal Government-it is less than when we entered World War II. And we are much bigger and stronger now. However, we need to make that kind of a correction to understand the relative strength of our Nation and its ability to afford something today com- pared to its ability to afford something many years ago. Something has been said about our gold outflow. Our main difficulty with that, in my judgment, has been the fact that we too long continued to follow policies we followed at a time when we wanted the other fellow to build up his gold reserve at our expense. We con- tinued to follow it long after the situa- tion no longer justifies it. We continue to follow trade and aid policies which were founded on the basic assumption that we need to help the other fellow improve his position whether he cooperates with us or not. Many of those policies are still in effect today although the circumstances have long since changed. We consider the possibility of building a successful missile defense, we should also keep in mind that many things have been done in the past such as the building of the first atomic bomb and the first hydrogen bomb which others said could not be done. Many things have been done in space which others said could not be done. Unfortunately, in the space area, be- cause of our failure to pursue our ob- 'jectives relentlessly, we let the Soviet Union get there first. We are now be- ginning to overcome the lead of the Soviet Union that existed at one time. Perhaps we will be the first nation to land a man on the moon. However, if we permit ourselves to be pessimists and say that it cannot be done and that we cannot delploy a successful missile defense system, to the point that we never even try to build one, then as- suredly our enemy will have it first. MESSAGE, FROM THE HOUSE A message from the House of Repre- sentatives by Mr. Bartlett, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had agreed to the concurrent res- olution (S. Con, Res. 29) to correct the enrollment of Senate Joint Resolution 35. The message also announced that the House had agreed to the amendment of the Senate to the resolution (H. Con. Res. 192) to reprint a brochure entitled "How Our Laws Are Made." The message further announced that the House had agreed to the amend- ments of the Senate to the resolution (H. Con. Res. 162) authorizing the printing of the book, "Our American Govern- ment," as a House document. ENROLLED BILL SIGNED The message also announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the enrolled bill (H.R. 3480) for the relief of the New Bedford Storage Warehouse Co. CAMPUS. UNREST-SURFACE IM- PRESSIONS AND ROOT CAUSES Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, as the Nation breathes a sigh of relief to mark the close of an academic year marked by disorders and violence-a sigh once re- served for the passing of summer from our tormented and strife-torn cities-it is well to reflect on the events of the last year. Many questions were raised in our academic communities which will not soon be answered. Why do the students raise such profound hell? How did they get that way? Who are they? What do they represent? What do they want? When will it all end? I do not have all the answers. I doubt that anyone does. However, the questions cannot be ignored, for while only a few Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 S 6216 Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 12, 1969 LIMITATION ON STATEMENTS DUR- ING TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that statements in relation to the transaction of routine morning business be limited to 3 minutes. The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob- jection, it is so ordered. ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL MONDAY, JUNE 16, 1969 Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the conclu- sion of business today, the Senate stand in adjournment until Monday, June 16, 1969, at 12 o'clock noon. The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob- jection, it is so ordered. EXECUTIVE SESSION Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate go into executive session to consider the nominations on the Executive Calendar, commencing with "New Reports." There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to the consideration of execu- tive business. The VICE PRESIDENT. The nomina- tions on the Executive Calendar will be stated, as requested by the Senator from Massachusetts. The assistant legislative clerk read the nominations of Ambassadors, as fol- lows: Robert H. McBride, of the District of Co- lumbia, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Mexico. Richard Funkhouser, of New Jersey, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotenti- ary of the United States of America to the Gabon Republic. 0. McMurtrie Godley, of the District of Columbia, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Kingdom of Laos. J. William Middendorf iI, of Connecticut, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipo- tentiary of the United States of America to the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The VICE PRESIDENT.- Without ob- jection the nominations are confirmed. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT The assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of Lane Dwinell, of New Hampshire, to be an Assistant Admin- istrator of the Agency for International Development. The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob- jection, the nomination is considered and confirmed. PEACE CORPS The assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of Thomas J. Houser, of Illi- nois, to be Deputy Director of the Peace Corps. Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, on be- half of my colleague from Illinois (Mr. PERCY), I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a statement by him relative to the nomination of Thomas J. Houser to be Deputy Director of the Peace Corps. There being no objection, the state- ment was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: STATEMENT BY SENATOR PERCY The nomination of W. Thomas J. Houser to be Deputy Director of the Peace Corps is now before the Senate. I enthusiastically recommend that the Senate confirm the nomination. - It has been my privilege to know Tom Houser for many years, and I deeply believe that he is just the kind of man we so urgently need in public service today.. Mr. Houser received his degree of Bachelor of Arts in political science from Hanover College, Hanover, Indiana. Subsequently, he earned a law degree at Northwestern Uni- versity Law School -and attended John Hop- kins University School of Advanced Inter- national Studies. As Commerce Counsel for the Burlington Railroad, in Chicago, he gained widespread respect from the business community and the legal profession. alike. He has been active in Illinois political life, bringing to his work a deep commitment to progressive and enlightened government. Fol- lowing my election to the Senate, he served as my chief counsel in Chicago for a year. Now he is prepared to relinquish an out- standing law practice in Chicago to serve the Peace Corps and the Nation. The country is most fortunate in having Joseph Blatchford as Director of the Peace Corps. He needs-and wants-a deputy who is a competent aidministrator and a practical idealist-a man who works well with people as well as with ideas, a man who believes in the program and in the Director to whom he reports. Thomas Houser is just such a man. He has won the confidence of the Ad- ministration; and I know that in time, he will earn the confidence of Congress and of the country. So it is without reservation or qualifica- tion that I endorse the nomination of Thomas J. Houser to be Deputy Director of the Peace Corps. The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob- jection,.the nomination is considered and confirmed. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the President be immediately notified of the confirma- tion of these nominations. The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob- jection, it is so ordered. LEGISLATIVE SESSION Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I move that the Senate resume the consideration of legislative business. The motion was agreed to, and the Senate resumed the consideration of legislative business. PROTECTION OF DISABILITY EVAL- UATION IN EFFECT FOR 20 OR MORE YEARS Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate pro- ceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 208, H.R. 4622. The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will be stated by title. The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (11.R. 4622) to amend section 110 of title 38, United States Code, to insure preservation of all disability compensa- tion evaluations in effect for 20 or more years. The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there ob- jection to the present consideration of the bill? There being no objection, the bill was considered, ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an excerpt from the report (No. 91-219), explaining the purposes of the bill. There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: EXPLANATION OF BILL By law, compensation is paid to veterans who suffer disabling conditions as a result of military service. As the name implies, the purpose of the payments is to compensate the veteran for the average economic loss re- sulting from the disease or injury sustained during his military service. Thus compensa- tion payments are based not on need, but on the degree of disability of the veteran. On the basis of a medical evaluation, the veteran's disability is rated between 10 percent and 100 percent (total disability). Under present law, monthly compensation rates for disabilities incurred in time of war range from $23 for veterans with a 10-percent disabling condi- tion to $400 for totally disabled veterans. Higher compensation payments are au- thorized for certain very serious disabilities; for example, a blind veteran requiring reg- ular aid and attendance receives $550 in monthly compensation. The law also provides for additional com- pensation payments for the loss or loss of use of certain specified limbs or organs. For ex- ample, a veteran who lost an arm in wartime military service would receive $47 monthly in addition to his basic disability compensation. In 1954, the Congress enacted a law (Pub- lic Law 311, ssd Congress) which guaranteed that a veteran rated as totally disabled for 20 or more years could not have this rating re- duced thereafter unless fraud could be shown. Ten years later, another law was enacted (Public Law 88-445) which prevented the re- duction of any disability rating of 10 to 90 percent which had been in effect for 20 or more years. Because the law speaks of preserving the "percentage" of disability, however, the high- er payments to totally disabled veterans and the additional compensation payments for a specific anatomical loss or loss of use are not presently included with the guarantee pro- vision. Thus; for example, the Veterans' Ad- ministration could decide that a $47 award for loss of use of a foot, even though received for more than 20 years, was no longer payable because the foot was now usable. This bill, which the Committee on Finance approves, without amendment, would pre- serve higher or additional compensation pay- ments received for 20 or more years in the same way as disability ratings are preserved under present law. The cost of the bill is nominal. COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING SENATE SESSION Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. president, I ask unanimous consent that all committees be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today. The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob- jection, it is so =95M THE CASE OF THE SECRET CHART Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, ear- lier this week the distinguished junior Senator from Tennessee and the dis- Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364ROO0300090002-4 i Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 United States of America r A-AL Toug ..11610nal Record PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 91" CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION WASHINGTON, THURSDAY, JUNE 12, 1969 Senate The Senate met at 11 ?'clock am., and was called to order by the Vice President. The Chaplain, the Reverend Edward L. R. Elson, D.D., offered the following prayer: 0 Thou whom no man bath seen, th givest freely of Thyself, order what is dis- ordered in our lives, bring our minds to Thy truth, our conscience to Thy law, our hearts to Thy love, and our souls to fellowship with all mankind. Enable us to hear Thy voice, and hearing it make answer with humble trust and willing obedience. Brood over our troubled world that Thy grace may penetrate all men's hearts until the old refrain, "Peace on earth among men of good Silk" Is the song and the desire of all natlnns. In the Great Redeemer's name. Amen. THE JOURNAL Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Mon- day, June 9, 1969. be dispensed with. The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob- jection, it is so ordered. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT RECEIVED DURING ADJOURN- MENT (H. DOC. NO. 91-126) Under authority of the order of the Senate of June 9, 1969, the Secretary of the Senate on June 11, 1969, received a message from the President of the United States. THE VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair lays before the Senate a message from the President of the United States-trans- mitting the Second Annual Report of the National Advisory Council on Eco- nomic Opportunity. Without objection the message will be printed in the RECORD, without being read, and ap- propriately referred. The message was referred to the Coin- mittee on Ir, tblic Wel as 1W I follows: To the Co ess of the United States: I tr ffift herewith the Second An- nual port of the National Advisory Co oil on Economic Opportunity. MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT RECEIVED DURING ADJOURNMENT Under authority of the order of the Senate of June 9, 1969, the Secretary of the Senate, on June 11, 1969, received propriate is received on June 11, EXECUTIVE REPORTS O MITTEE SUBMITTED ADJOURNMENT Under authority of the order of Senate of June 9, 1969, the folio' favorable executive reports of nomina tions were submitted: On June 10, 1969: By Mr. Fursaxoxr, from the Committee on Foreign Relations: Robert H. McBride, of the District of Columbia, a Foreign Service officer of the clash of career minister to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of- the United States of America to Mexico; Richard Funkhouser, of New Jersey, a Foreig.. Service officer of class 1, to be Ambas- sador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of 0. McMurtrie Godley, of the Distric of Columbia, a Foreign" Service officer o the class of career minister, to., be Amb ador Extraordinary and Plenlpote of the United States of America to the Kingdom of Laos; J. William Middendorf II, of Connecticut, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Pleni- potentiary of the United States of America to the Kingdom of the Netherlands; Lane Dwinell, of New Hampshire, to be an Assistant Administrator of the Agency for International Development; and Tho>as J. Rouser, of Illinois, to be Deputy Director of the Peace Corps. No. 97 REPORT OF A COMMITTEE SUB- MITTED DURING ADJOURNMENT Under authority of the Senate of Feb- ruary 7, 1969, the following report of a committee was received on June 11, 1969: By Mr. BYRD of West Virginia, from the Committee on Appropriations, with amend- ments: H.R. 11400. An act making supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending June -30, 1089, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 91-228). MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE RE- CEIVED DURING ADJOURN- MENT-ENROLLED JOINT RESO- LUTION SIGNED Under authority of the order of the Senate of June 9, 1969, the Secretary of the Senate received a message from the House of Representatives which an- nounced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 35) to provide for the appointment of Thomas J. Watson, Jr., as Citizen Regent of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution, and it was signed by the Vice President. ENROLLED BILL SIGNED DURING ADJOURNMENT Under authority of the order of the 1Senate of June 9, 1969, the Vice Presi- dent announced that on Wednesday, June 11, 1969, he had signed the bill (H.R. 3480) for the relief of the New Bedford Storage Warehouse Co., which had previously been signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. ENROLLED JOINT RESOLUTION PRESENTED The Secretary of the Senate reported that on June 11, 1969, he presented to the President of the United States the enrolled Joint resolution (S.J. Res. 35) to provide for the appointment of Thomas J. Watson, Jr., as Citizen Re- gent of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution. - Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 .'d%-.__ Approved June 12, 1969 tinguished junior Senator from Colorado expressed disagreement with my belief that the publication of a certain classi- fied chart presented by the Defense De- partment to the Senate Armed Services Committee would go a long way toward letting the public make up its own mind about this costly new venture into na- tional defense weaponry. Because there is this difference, and because much of the information con- tained on the chart is already a matter of"public record, I would again urge that this chart be made public. I ask unanimous consent that an edi- torial on this subject, published in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch of last Sunday, June 8, entitled, "Case of the Secret Chart," be printed at this point in the RECORD. There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: CASE OF THE SECRET CHART Senator Symington carries exceptional weight in the ABM debate because he knows the thickets of the Pentagon bureaucracy, and the behavior of its bureaucrats, so well. Drawing upon that intimate acquaintance, the he has hurled another deadly harpoon at case for deploying Safeguard by challenging the Pentagon, to publish a "classified" chart which it has been using to bolster its argu- ment. If the charts exposed to public view, he says, the argument will be over, for every- one can then see that Safeguard will not ac- complish its alleged mission of "protecting our Minuteman deterrent." As could have been predicted, the Senator's initiative soon brought out from others enough unofficial information about the classified chart to permit deductions about it. Evidently its purpose is to show that if the Soviets continue building their SS-9 mis- siles at the present rate, and if we now im- mediately deploy Safeguard, then at a cer- tain point in 1975, assuming a Soviet attack on our Minuteman, the antimissile system will protect enough Minutemen to permit a retaliatory blow. Ergo, the deterrent will be protected. But reportedly the chart also shows some- thing else. It shows that if the Soviets with- hold their attack in mid-1975, but go on /0,WCC%&~RDPEN51MR64R000300090002-4 S 6217 NATIONALCOMMITMENTS- SENATE RESOLUTION 85 Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, I would like to speak briefly in support of Sen- ate Resolution 85. After studying the report of the Com- mittee on Foreign Relations, I am con- vinced that the Senate should reassert its constitutional duties in regard to the "national commitments" of this coun- try. It has only been in this century that the role of the Senate in making com- mitments involving our Armed Forces has become obscure. During the period from 1789 to 1900 there was .no question that article I of the Constitution vested the war making power with Congress. The President was simply the director of our Armed Forces with the power and authority to com- mit our forces in defense of the United States in the event of a sudden attack. There was equally no question that, although the President was given the power in article II of the Constitution to make treaties, his action required the consent of the Senate. Since then, con- siderable confusion has arisen in regard to the respective roles of Congress and the President in making commitments with foreign countries. While Senate Resolution 85 will not have the force and effect of law, it will serve very useful purposes. First, it will make it clear to the President that the Senate will expect to exercise the author- ity given to it under article I. Second, it will place all foreign countries on no- tice that any commitment not passed upon by the Senate, may well have no binding force. The resolution is nonpartisan-hav- ing been approved by the Foreign Rela- tions Committee by a vote of 11 to 1--- and is not aimed at any particular ad- ministration, past or present. When an executive commitment seeks to obligate this Nation, such a commit- ment should be submitted regularly for Senate or congressional approval, as the case may be, before it becomes binding and effective. Otherwise, our system of checks and balances, written into the Constitution is not being allowed to func- tion as intended. arrest of all campus demonstrators who resort to violence. Those belligerent gun- toting Cornell "students" should have been expelled forthwith. Also, they should have been arrested for disorderly con- duct and threatening violence. I agree with Father Hesburgh, president of Notre Dame University. He said: Any group that substitutes force for ra- tional persuasion, be it violent or non-vio- lent, will be given fifteen minutes of medi- tation to cease and desist ... if there is not then within five minutes a movement to cease and desist, students will be notified of ex- pulsion from this community and the law will deal with them as non-students. We must, however, have complete sym- pathy with the views of the majority of students who know that the colleges and universities of this country have not kept pace with the times in this fast-moving space age of change and challenge. The establishment should realize that as Washington Irving wrote: Change is inevitable and brings with it a surprising amount of relief. Unfortunately, three of five trustees in the Nation believe that speakers invited to address their students should be screened before being allowed on the campus. A majority even believe that all faculty members should be required to swear to a loyalty oath as a condition for employment as instructor or professor. This, despite the fact that no Member of the U.S. Congress is required to swear to such an oath. - Peculiarly also, nearly a majority of present college trustees state that college students demonstrating against any pro- fessor or against university policy should be disciplined or expelled even though such demonstration is entirely nonvio- lent. Such trustees would do well to re- read the Bill of Rights to the Constitu- tion of our country. The facts are that only a very few, pos- sibly 2 percent, of the trustees of Ameri- can universities have read any books or journals on higher education. It has been the rule of the establishment in the past that there has been no mutual discussion and determination between students, trustees and faculty members on goals and purposes. I propose that in every college in our country some junior and senior students and faculty members should be selected to membership of boards of trustees to help govern their own universities. I have made that proposal in my State of Ohio and I have made speeches in the Senate for more than 6 weeks in that connection. I am very pleased to note that Princeton University has followed the suggestion and has elected two stu- dents to serve on its board of trustees. Now a small college in Ohio leads the way. Most universities in our country have not basically changed their policies and their courses of study at any time in the last generation. Unfortunately, this is the result of colleges and univer- sities being run by trustees who are highly respected, but most of whom are millionaires selected because they and their wealthy friends can contribute financially to the universities of which they are trustees. They suffer no pain building SS-9s Instead, then within a few months they will have the capacity to satu- rate Safeguard defenses so thoroughly that ? our Minuteman deterrent will not be pro- tected. In other words, even if the intricate electronics of Safeguard work to perfection, which many qualified scientists doubt, the system would afford only a few months' "pro- tection" from a nuclear attack. Of course everybody knows what the script calls for. Long before mid-1975, the Pentagon would undoubtedly go to Congress with the alarming news of a forthcoming Safeguard gap, and the public would be told that na- tsnal security imperatively demanded an enormous expansion of the antimissile sys- tem. This is, quite obviously, the true mission of Safeguard-to serve as the first stage of an unlimited escalation of the nuclear arms race, guaranteeing juicy contracts and mili- tary proliferation and cold war psychosis far Into the future. The Pentagon has long been accustomed to scaring Congress and the public into provid- ing unlimited weaponry funds by darkly referring to horrendous military secrets which cannot be told. Senator Symington deserves the public's thanks for putting a neat, round hole in these tactics as applied to the ABM. - If Safeguard cannot be justified on the basis of public information and common sense, it cannot be justified at all. OHIO COLLEGE LEADS THE WAY Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, college students demonstrating peace- ably or violently, complaining against archaic policies, denouncing the estab- lishment governed by trustees, who were graduates 20, 30, and 40 years ago, and demanding that college courses which have not been changed in more than 20 years be brought up to date, have a point. In fact, it is becoming crystal clear to any thoughtful person searching for answers that university trustees and stu- dents have become further apart in the past 20 years. There is real reason for demonstrations by college students. The old order, or establishment, must accept change voluntarily else it may be changed violently. Very definitely, I do not condone vio- lence. I favor immediate expulsion and Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 June 24, 1969 Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 H 50~~ CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE lution making the termination date De- cember 31, 1969-just to be on the safe side? I think that comes nearer to being right than October 31. You will note that we paid no attention whatever to the Re- organization Act and its date of July 31 each year for the termination of Con- gress. Would the gentleman agree with me that Congress ought to take action to- ward abolishing that July 31 date, for it is utterly meaningless? Mr. MAHON. It needs to be studied very carefully. But I would not think we ought to extend the expiration of the pending resolution beyond October 31. section 201, to which the gentleman re- fers, will be blunted or wholly obliterated. Mr. ROGERS of Colorado. Of course, that will depend on what is agreed on in. conference. I trust the conferees on the part of the House will recognize the inconsistencies that may have developed and that this will be eliminated from our system. . The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ALBERT). The time of the gentleman from Colorado has expired. Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I move to strike out the last word. (Mr. GROSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, let me ask an of the com- h i h d rm a e c the distinguis mittee what happens under the proposed because, when we go home, we want to resolution to the Members' pay increase, be able to point with pride to our achieve- nd I l i since the housekeeping committee has not acted on this question? What happens to this salary grab of February of this year, so far as the Members are concerned? Will Members be paid at the old rate or will they be paid at the new rate? Mr. MAHON. I believe that when the photograph, so to speak, of the status quo is %ken on the night of June 30 at 12 o'clock, it will disclose that Members are now drawing pay at the new rate and that this would obtain during the fiscal year 1970 until action to the con- trary is taken. I believe that is a fair interpretation. Mr. BOW. Mr. Speaker, will the gen- tleman yield? Mr. GROSS. I yield to the gentleman. Mr. BOW. It would seem to me that the House took care of that situation for fiscal 1969 last week, last Tuesday, under the resolution we passed taking care of the pay for the post office and others. And I think that Members will be paid at the increased pay rate under this resolution. Mr. GROSS. If I may ask the chair- man, what is so magical about the date of October 31, 1969, the termination date of this resolution? Mr. MAHON. Someone just facetiously said that that is the day after Halloween. Mr. GROSS. I would say to the gentle- man that it would be more appropriate to relate it to April Fools Day. Mr. MAHON. I would call the gentle- man's attention page 1 of the report in regard to th matter. The report states: The time period covered by the accompany- ing resolution is limited to the four-month period, July 1-October 31, 1969. Anything hort'er than that is judged to be unrealistic, b ally since the membership is proceeding tie announced plan of a mid-August elttentng beyond Labor Day, and the fort r fact f~lsat large segments of the budget have dt been authorized by the Congress. Al31 er ''continuing resolution will have to be sought Just prior to October 31 if we do not complete the appropriation bills by that dale. laut I hope sincerely, and I , choose the word "hope" with care, that we may not need another continuing resolution. Mr. GROSS. The gentleman says he hopes sincerely, and I sincerely hope that he is right. But would the gentleman be amenable to an amendment to the reso- This gives us an objective. I am sure Congress will industriously work toward, passing the legislation and doing its job e, a s ments, on both sides of the a hope we will be able to do that. I think we have done a fair job so far as this session is concerned, and we can do a better job as we move along. Mr. GROSS. From the lack of prog- ress made so far in this session of Con- gress, would we have any right to point with pride to the enormous amount of work done here? I doubt that anyone can go out with a straight face and point with pride to the work done by this ses- sion of Congress thus far, and half of this year is already gone. Mr. MAHON. The gentleman would probably agree with the gentleman from Texas that virtue does not always reside in passing legislation. Often there is virtue in not passing legislation. Mr. GROSS. But in the end do we not wind up by passing it, to our sorrow most of the time, even if we long delay action? We wind up passing it anyway. Mr. MAHON. Some of it, including this measure, is necessary for the on- going operations of the Government, as the gentleman knows. The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. AL- BERT). The question is on the engross- ment and third reading of the joint reso- lution. The joint resolution was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The ques- tion is on passage of the joint resolution. The joint resolution was passed. A motion to reconsider was laid on the table. GENERAL LEAVE Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unan- imous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and insert pertinent extractions in regard to the continuing resolution. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas? There was no objection. Members may have 5 legislative days in which to extend their remarks on Senate Concurrent Resolution 17. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Colorado? There was no objection. TO EXTEND THE TIME FOR THE MAKING OF A FINAL REPORT BY THE COMMISSION TO STUDY MORTGAGE INTEREST RATES Mr. TEAGUE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent for the immedi- ate consideration of the Senate joint resolution (S.J. Res. 123) to extend the time for the making of a final report by the Commission To Study Mortgage In- terest Rates. The Clerk read the title of the Senate joint resolution. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentle- man from Texas? There was no objection. The Clerk read the Senate joint res- olution, as follows: S.J. RES. 123 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That sec- tion 4(g) of the Act of May, 7, 1968 (Public Law 90-301) is amended by striking out "The Commission may make an interim report not later than April 1, 1969, and shall make a final report of its study and recommenda- tions not later than July 1, 1969," and in- serting in lieu thereof the following: "The Commission shall make an interim report not later than July 1, 1969, and shall make a final report of its study and recommenda- tions not later than August 1, 1969,". The Senate joint resolution was or- dered to be read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a mo- tion to reconsider Taslaid n the table. AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE ATOMIC ENERGY COM- MISSION FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 448 and ask for its immediate consideration. The Clerk read the resolution, as fol- lows: H. RES. 448 Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 12167) to authorize appropriations to the Atomic Energy Oommission in accordance with section 261 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and for other purposes. After general debate, which shall be confined to the bill and shall continue not to exceed two hours, to be equally divided and con- trolled by the chairman and ranking minor- ity member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the bill shall be read for amendment under the five-minute rule. At the conclusion of the consideration of the bill for amendment, the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted, and the previous question shall be considered as ordered on, the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to reeommlt. GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND ON SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLU- TION 17 Mr. ROGERS of Colorado. Mr. Speak- er, I ask unanimous consent that all Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 H 5090 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE June 24, 1969 The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gen- described the authorization as one of the tleman from California Is recognized for most austere that has been reported by 1 hour. the committee in recent years. Since it Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 min- has been my privilege to serve on that utes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Committee, as well as on the Rules Com- ANDERSON) pending which I yield myself mittee, I can add to what the gentleman such time as I may consume. has said: The conviction that because of Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 448 the very searching scrutiny that Was provides an open rule with 2 hours of given the budget estimates by the Joint general debate for consideration of H.R. Committee on Atomic Energy, reductions 12167 to authorize appropriations for the have been made where they should have Atomic Energy Comftiission for fiscal been made and in a very few places-as year 1970. will be indicated I am sure under time The bill authorizes an appropriation authorized by the rule-the committee in the total amount of $2,454,284,000- has recommended some increases. They $1,973,282,000 for opercting expenses and are increases that are not really very $481,002,000 for plant and capital equip- significant in total amount, and yet I ment, think it will be shown they are very sig- The authorization request submitted niflcant as far as the impact they will by the Atomic Energy: Commission in- have on such programs as those dealing eluded $1,963,800,000 for operating ex- with the civilian atomic energy power penses and $484,252,000 for plant and and those programs dealing with Plow- capital equipment, a. total request of share, or the peaceful uses of atomic $2,448,052,000. The request was a 6.5- energy. percent reduction front the authorization Mr. Speaker, I concur in what the gen- for fiscal year 1969. tleman from California has said and rec- Generally, the Conu ission's authori- ommend adoption of the rule. zation request reflects estimated costs in Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of two broad categories of effort; namely, my time. military and civilian applications. Mili- Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I move the tary applications primarily include the previous question on the resolution. nuclear weapons and naval propulsion The previous question was ordered. reactors programs, ani& portions of sev- The resolution was agreed to. eral other programs such as special nu- A motion to reconsider was laid on clear materials and sEcurity investiga- the table. tions. Approximately 53 percent of the Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I move authorization request is attributable to that the House resolve itself into the the military applications. The civilian Committee of the Whole House on the applications of atomic energy comprise State of the Union for the consideration about 47 percent of the total request. of the bill (H.R. 12167) to authorize ap- The authorization requests are exclu- propriations to the Atomic Energy Com- sive of certain adjustments such as rove- mission in accordance with section 261 nues received and cost of work for others of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as which must be considered in calculating amended, and for other purposes. the net authorization. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The ques- The Joint Committee recommended tion is on the motion offered by the gen- both increases and decreases in the au- tleman from California (Mr. HOLIFIELD). thorizations for many "gf the AEC pro- The motion was agreed to. grams. This was done to provide for a The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. AL- higher level of effort on several of the BERT). The Chair designates as Chair- high-priority programs. The recom- man of the Committee of the Whole the mended authorization for fiscal year 1970 gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Mr. GROSS. Would the gentleman give is about two-tenths of 1 percent more BURKE), and the Chair requests that the us the figure for the actual appropria-. than the amount requested. gentleman from' California (Mr. SISK) tions for last year for the purposes of Mr. Speaker, I urge, the adoption of temporarily assume the chair. this agency? House Resolution 448 in order that H.R. IN THE COMMITTEE of TIC WHOLE Mr. HOLIFIELD. I will supply that 12167 may be considered. Accordingly the House resolved itself figure. I do not have it at hand at the (Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois asked and into the Committee of the Whole House moment. was given permission to revise and ex- on the State of the Union for the con- Mr. GROSS. What was the figure the tend his remarks.) sideration of the bill (H.R. 12167) with gentleman gave with respect to the Nixon Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. the Chairman pro tempore (Mr. SISK) budget? Speaker, I yield myself such time as I in the chair. Mr. HOLIFIELD. The figure I gave may consume. _ The Clerk read the title of the bill. was $6.2 million more than the Nixon read by the distinguished gentleman 1 hour, and the gentleman from Califor- man, out IL is stuff $1[14 million less than thr from California, but I -would point out nia (Mr. HOSMER) will be recognized for last year's authorization. I will give this is only two-tenths of 1 percent more 1 hour. appropriation figure. The staff will pro- that in than the amount requested by President The Chair recognizes the gentleman vide ( Mr. H OS just a moment. e) the appropria Nixon, and it is $164 Million less than from California (Mr. HOLIFIELD). tion figure ffigura in inzER fa debate.) the amount authorized to. the Atomic En- Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I ergy Commission last yew. yield myself 15 minutes. Mr. GROSS. I thank the to gentleman. Mr. I30LTFIELI~. As to the balance When the distinguis~yhed gentleman Mr. Chairman, before I start ,explain- between military and civilian applica- from California (Mr. 21OLIFIELD) , the ing the bill, I would like to say that our tions of atomic energy, approximately 53 chairman of the committee, appeared purpose today is not to take the 2 hours percent of the recommended authoriza- the other day before the Rules Commit- unless it is called for by the action of the tion is for military uses, and the remain- tee and asked for a rule on this bill, he Members of the House. We are present- ing 47 percent for civilian uses. I might Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 ing to the Committee today a bill which has had several months of intense scru- tiny. We have resolved all differences between the members and have come to a point of unanimity In presenting this bill to the House. So we are not in con- troversy on any item in the bill. Members are aware we were delayed in the consideration of this bill about 21,4 or 3 months because the Johnson budget which came up to the Hill on January 16 was recalled by the new administration, and we received the revised budget on April 15. So outside of our staff studies and our study of the whole subject mat- ter we started our hearings right after April 15, and we continued them until we had all of our witnesses testify. Therefore, the authorization bill was de- layed for a month or so because of the late receipt of the final approved bill by the Bureau of the Budget. This bill would authorize appropria- tions to the AEC totaling $2,454,284,000 for both operating expenses and plant and capital equipment funds for the fis- cal year 1970. For comparative purposes I might note that the recommended amount is $64 million less than the amount requested in the budget sub- mitted by President Johnson on Janu- ary 15. It is $6.2 million, or two-tenths of 1 percent, more than the amount re- quested in the budget submitted by Pres- ident Nixon on April 15. But, most sig- nificantly, it is about $164 million less than the amount authorized to the AEC in the fiscal year 1969, and this in spite of the fact that we have had an increase in the need for military expenditures. We have absorbed those military ex- penditures in the bill and we have of course had to reduce some civilian ap- plications in order to do that. Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. HOLIFIELD. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Iowa. Mr. GROSS. The gentleman stated what was authorized for last year? Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 H 5091 June 24, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE say that just a few years ago it was pre- which will generate more nuclear fuel Soviets have now an advantage of about dominantly military, but during the past than it consumes during operation, thus 230 submarines. few years we have been able to bring providing this Nation with a virtually However, the most startling informa- into existence many new uses for atomic limitless supply of energy. I cannot over- tion relates to the Soviets' vigorous build- energy in the civilian application field, emphasize the benefits which this Na- ing program. They have a capability of completed sevenoofhtheirr have already one and we are ushing ahead on this be- tion will cause there is great promise and in fact velopment ofv this from technology, successful de- es. For eing. la ato realization from civilian uses of might In twodothersa ease neitherofswhich sonstthataescapemebour Navy hasno atom mic energy y at this time. both large volves truction KOCH. Mr. Chairman, will the wh ch hold great importance tothu an- planned. Thus, all availablcon e evidence in- Mr. Mr. HOyield for a question? , the gentleman committee these pro_ Soviets that have a ballistic amissile sub- s vote Mr. HOLIFIELD. I yield to the gentle- fity unds to the budget ha One od to man from New York. moneys to plantable radioisotope heat source power United States. Mor over, it is that also be- Mr. used KOCH. for MIRV any the these ABM? p HOLIFIELD. These moneys are converter for powering a heart pump. lieved that the Soviets will add about Mr. be ur far . to their not to be used ent of If a radioisotope-powered heart device 70 research and can be developed it wll be of inestimable fleet by e1974, whereas teaUnited States the ABM. Theyfaret fordeploy development in weapon requirements value to heart surgeons and the thous- will add but 26. I believe the seriousness further under det furnished the committee by the se, heart disease, The committee has recom- scored bytspeakersfiwho will follow me don there through the Department t of f Defense, back through the halls of should like a moment to call pl ym is money in here for the de- AEmen Cdbudgetito initiate de a the I ig to do Of the ABM. This has noth- the attention of the Members to the fact matter of this device. in g a with the subject whether the Congress will ll or will not The committee has also recommended that beginning in World War II Hitler er- had sunk and he submarines 56 ons appr modes,000 Abut and mill ions and hundreds of mil ions of continuation increasofe the $750 Mr, ove the HOLIh KOCH. How o and ea On the MI Safeguard ?system. unit minimum Mr. KOLI Habout the MIRV MIRY , we nevertheless important, food irradiation tons of shipping right off our coast with and have e research development for mss- program, through which it is believed those 56 submarines. sile warheads. Missile warheads for all that the feasibility and safety of pre- Now, today the Soviets have 375 sub- of our missiles; the missile warheads serving food by low dose radiation will marines to our 143, almost three times that are on Minuteman, the missile war- be established. in a world which knows as much as we have, And if we would get into any kind which heads that are Poseidon, the Sprint, Spar- turns of this program more t anijustify we needed submarine warfare, we would tan, that would be Spe- be at a disadvantage of about 3 to 1 at tam, , and SRAM. . The research h and dd de- this investment. velopment in that field is applicable to If we could produce refrigeration in this time, with the Soviets. to take e Mr. Mr. all of the missile development of the ofathefoods and if wercould d velopra gentlema yield for aaquestioirman, would the United States. Mr. KOCH. I thank the substitute for the expensive refrigeration Mr. HOLIFIELD. I will be glad to yield gentleman, Included d in the civilian category ry is equipment which is needed in tropical to the gentleman from New York. $121 million for the operational costs countries and substitute radiation, which Mr. KOCH. Mr. Chairman,' I thank and $234 million for plant and capital kills bacteria in the food itself and there- the gentleman for yielding. looking through own the equipment for the high energy physics prevents shment .It will enable report to try and find out formmiyttee program, for which the AEC has been mendous accompli m designated by the President as executive fish that are caught in the ocean, for information what is involved with re- g of $136 milliond with that agent on behalf of the entire Federal instance, b refrigeration. You there to ABM and MIRV, I Establishment. Establishment. ands of miles without Turning to the provisions of the bill can see what this would mean in bring- respect to the ABM covering research, I would like to testing. tsection 101(a) of H.R. 12167 would ing ,protein into the from the seacoato it would also development, authorize whether we could 0appropriations of $1,973,282,- nations, for "Operating expenses" of the be a great boon to the fish industry of ascertain what the amounts are with pect to the esting AEC. page you 3 the Joint Commit- our recommended inc ease countries. $4 mil- also suggest botthe gent emanthis: that tee's repmmit You will find a summary ary of lion for the naval nuclear propulsion those of us who are opposed to the MIRV the committee's recommended gare not talking about deployment, but zation and subprograms. for the AEC's A more major or programs dst anr for w thatt b important t p ogramszto are talking about testing, and therefore and onA detailed dis- $125,855,000. I need hardly point out to would we not, by supporting this bill and ff each these areas wtlitle be $ foounund in the report t section entitled this body that it has been primarily supporting funds for the testing of "Committee Comments," beginning on through the efforts of Congress that this MIRY, have already then. made a com- page 6. As you will note from the refer- Nation has developed its superior nu- mitment which we are not willing at this enced table, the committee has recom- clear submarine capability. The Joint time to do? mended decreasing the funding for some Committee believes that particular vigi- Mr. HOLIFIELD. The gentleman of programs while increasing others in an lance must be exercised if we are to main- course can make up his own mind as to effort to provide the necessary funds to tain that superiority. As indicated in a what he is willing to do, but I will answer maintain AEC's higher priority programs special committee print issued yesterday, the first question by saying that I find at a viable level. If any Members have copies of which are available in the it impossible to say precisely how much any questions, I will be happy to respond Chamber, there is considerable cause for research and development would go to- to them. concern over the significant progress the ward MIR.V, toward those warheads that Let me point out the major areas Soviets are making in submarine devel- go on the Minuteman, the Poseidon and which have been affected by the Joint opment and construction. the Scram, and for Safeguard, which Committee's actions. The more signifi- For example, according to unclassified the Congress has authorized, because in cant increases recommended by the com- information, the Soviets now have a force the research and development and test- mittee were for the civilian power reac- of 375 submarines, all of which were ing of warheads you are crossing the tor program, $7.3 million; the naval nu- built following World War II, including technological border from one missile clear propulsion program, $4 million; at least 65 nuclear submarines. to another. and the AEC's Plowshare program, $10.5 In comparison, the United States has Therefore I would say it will be very million. 143 submarines, of which 82 are nuclear difficult to take out of this whole re- The AEC's civilian power reactor pro- and 61 are diesel. Most of the diesel- search and development on nuclear war- gram is primarily directed toward the powered submarines, I might mention, heads and bombs that part you would development of the breeder reactor are of World War II vintage. Thus the use in a MIRV warhead. Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 June 24, 19 69 Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE 115093 within the joint committee that studied it. A tremendous number of scientists were involved. Among them were J. Robert Oppenheimer, chairman, Center for Advanced Studies, Princeton, N.J.; James B. Conant, president of Harvard University; Lee DuBridge, president of the California Institute of Technology; Enrico Fermi, of the University of Chi- cago; I. I. Rabi, of Columbia University; Hartley Rowe, vice president of the United Fruit Co.; Cyril Smith, director of the Institute for the Study of Mate- rials, University of Chicago; Oliver E. Buckley, president, Bell Telephone Co., and others. They said, "Do not make the hydrogen bomb. Do not do it. If we do not do it, the Russians will not do it." I was chairman of the subcommittee that studied the subject, with the gen- tleman from Illinois (Mr.. PRICE) and other Members of the House at that time, and a Member of the Senate. We came back from a study in the fall of 1949 with the deep conviction that we had to find out if the hydrogen weap- on could be made. We had very little evidence at that time that the Russians were working on it, but we made this recommendation against the advice of all these famous people, including three people-a majority-on the Atomic En- ergy Commission, who said, "Do not do this. Do not make the hydrogen bomb. If we do not do it, the Russians will not." The AEC's prestigious General Ad- visory Committee was saying the same thing. As a result of our recommendation, in Januaxy 1950, President Truman ini- tiated the hydrogen bomb project on a crash basis. Nineteen months later we proved its feasibility and successfully ex- ploded a hydrogen device. Ten months later-I want to empha- size that-10 months later the Soviets exploded a hydrogen weapon. That was in August 1953. Now, who was right and who was wrong? This Congress said that we had to protect the United States. We could not wait for the Russians to give us some kind of mythical agreement, which they might or might not fulfill. We in this Congress decided that we had to pro- tect the United States, and we took the step against the advice of some of the greatest scientists in the United States at that time. We were right and these great scientists, who were all right in their own disciplines, who were experts in their certain fields-they may be great physicists or great in some other field- but when they get into the field of judg- ment on these things which we have to deal with in this Congress, they are about as naive as some other people I could mention. Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. HOLIFIELD. I yield to the gen- tleman from Oklahoma. Mr. EDMONDSON. I thank the chair- man for yielding, and I thank him for refreshing the memories of a lot of us in this House about the history of the hy- drogen bomb development. The chair- man has, I think; made"the Point very, very clear that a continuation of the testing and research and development program is absolutely essential if we are going to be in a position to make any kind of agreement or a deal with the So- viet Union regarding deployment. It takes two to make a deal and or- dinarily we have to have something to give on both sides. We know the Soviet Union is going ahead now with testing of a MIRV capability, and for us to stand still and not develop that capability is going to put us in a position where we have nothing to offer the Soviet Union that is of really demonstrable value to them if we reach the point, which is still in the realm of speculation, of sitting down and negotiating an agreement. It is easier to negotiate from strength than from weakness-and the Soviet will never negotiate an agreement or keep an agreement with a nation that is not dealing from strength. That is their history and that is the record. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California (Mr. HOLI- FIELD) has expired. Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman from California (Mr. HOLIFIELD) an additional minute. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman from California (Mr. HOLIFIELD) yield? Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from California (Mr. HOSMER). Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, the fig- ures that were requested by the gentle- man from Iowa (Mr. GROSS) are the fol- lowing: Fiscal year 1969 appropriations to the Atomic Energy Commission were $2,570,874,000. The authorization sought by legislation before us today is $116,- 590,000 less than that; namely the sum of $2,454,284,000. Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for furnishing those figures. The bill then, is substan- tially less than the appropriation of last year. Mr. HOSMER. It certainly is. Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman. The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Hos- MER). (Mr. HOSMER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure for me to rise with the distin- guished chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and to join him in urg- ing passage of H.R. 12167. I believe that Mr. HOLIFIELD has ef- fectively conveyed to you the spirit in which the Joint Committee reviewed the Atomic Energy Commission's authoriza- tion request for fiscal year 1970. Every effort has been made to wring the maxi- mum out of each dollar which the. Joint Committee has recommended for au- thorization. As a result, the Joint Com- mittee was able to report out a bill which is approximately $164 million less than the authorization for fiscal year 1969 notwithstanding the inclusion in this bill of an aditional authorization of $217 mil- lion for the 200-billion-electron-volt ac- celerator as requested by both the John- son and Nixon administrations. The to- tal authorization recommended for fiscal 1970 represents a 6.2 percent overall re- duction from fiscal year 1969 despite the obvious increase in the cost of doing busi- ness. Approximately 37 percent of the AEC budget is for the nuclear weapons pro- gram, which entails production and sur- veillance of, research and development on, and the testing of nuclear weapons. The administration requested $828,300,- 000 in operating expenses for this pro- gram in fiscal 1970 and the committee has recommended approval of the en- tire amount. As noted in the committee report at page 10, the AEC weapons pro- gram for fiscal 1970 reflects a sizable in- crease in combined production require- ments for numerous complicated weap- ons systems, such as the Poseidon, Min- uteman, and short range attack mis- sile-SRAM. This workload is the most formidable ever undertaken by the AEC production complex. As the committee report notes, the recommended authorization for the weapons program includes $135 million associated with the AEC's responsibili- ties in connection with the ABM pro- gram. This $135 million is devoted entire- ly to research and development and test- ing of nuclear warheads to be employed in the ABM system. Accordingly, this amount. of money will be required re- gardless of the decision made in this fis- cal year on deployment of the Safeguard system. With respect to another AEC program associated with the military uses of atomic energy-the naval propulsion program-the committee has recom- mended approval of $125,855,000 for fis- cal 1970 operating costs. This represents a recommended increase of $4 million over the funds included in the Presi- dent's budget request. This increase par- tially restores a reduction of funds for development work on improved nuclear submarine propulsion plants made dur- ing the administration's budget review process. These additional funds will en- able the Commission to proceed with its advanced development program for nu- clear propulsion reactors. The other program which.I should like to specifically mention is the Plowshare- civilian applications of nuclear explo- sives-program. You will note that the Joint Committee has increased the re- quested authorization by $10.5 million to a total operating fund authorization of $25 million. The committee feels very strongly that the $25 million, level is the minimum necessary to meet our domestic commitments and to fulfill the obliga- tions we will be assuming internationally. The commitments of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Interoceanic Canal Study Commission call for four more cratering projects before the Canal Com- mission submits its report in December 1970. Funds for only one of these were included in the administration's budget. The Joint Committee is recommending authorization of sufficient funds to com- plete one more of these experiments in fiscal 1970. The credibility of our international commitments as embodied in the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, particularly ar- ticle V, demands that we proceed to de- velop the technology to enable us to make available to the nonnuclear signatories Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 H 5094 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE June 24, 1969 of that treaty the benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explo- sions. If the intent of that treaty is to be realized, those nations must be assured that they will suffer no economic detri- ment by relinquishing the right to de- velop or acquire nuclear capabilities and such assurances will` only result from a demonstrative endeavor by the nuclear powers to fulfill their obligations. If there are any questions about the bill or the accompanying report thereon, I shall be very happy to respond. As noted by the gentleman from Cali- fornia, Chairman HOLIFIELD, H.R. 12167 has been reported by the Joint Commit- tee without dissent. I am confident that the bill which the Joint Committee has recommended to the Congress is sound and I believe that it warrants your favor- able consideration. Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. EDMONDSON) such time as he may con- sume. (Mr. EDMONDSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Chairman, I support this. bill and believe it is essential to the security of our country and con- tinued development of our naval defense forces. The bill before you provides the follow- ing amounts to be applied in developing nuclear propulsion plants for submarines and surface warships: $125,855,000 in operating expenses for research and de- velopment; $9,550,000 for capital equip- ment; and $4,400,000 for modifications to the expended core facility in Idaho, for a total of $139,805,000. The amount recommended for fiscal 1970 operating expenses includes restora- tion of $4,000,000 in operating -funds which had been deleted from the AEC request during the administration's re- view of the budget. Such restoration will permit the most important of the desired work on advanced development of naval propulsion reactors to move ahead. This effort involves a wide range of reactors from the high-powered, long fuel life plants for the two-reactor aircraft car- rier to the advanced, high-performance submarine propulsion plants. There are two distinct facets of this development program. One involves an advanced test core to ascertain the long- range effects of irradiation on materials. The other is development of a completely unique core concept applicable to both submarine and surface vessels. These ac- tivities of course involve classified data. The available declassified information is published in the Joint Committee print, "Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, 1969," at pages 18 and 19 and 28 to 31. STATUS OF U.S., NAVAL NUCLEAR REACTORS The committee conducted its annual, in-depth review of the naval nuclear power program in April. As indicated in the record of these hearings and in the committee's report, there is reason for considerable concern, _over the, U.B. nu- clear submarine proahm relative fo the Soviets both as to technology and pro- duction. The committee has summarized the situation in both of these respects on pages 12 and 13 of its-report, and Chair- man HOLIFIELD reviewed the figures in his remarks. While this country seems to be apply- ing the brakes to our nuclear submarine program the Soviets are rapidly accel- erating theirs. Not only do the Soviets have a much larger total submarine force-375 versus 143 for the United States-but the current emphasis being placed on nuclear submarines by the So- viets is estimated to place them ahead of us in about 18 months. The same situa- tion exists relative to advanced technol- ogy. The addition of the $4,000,000 to the budget recommended by the committee is intended to reverse the trend at least in the field of advanced technology. POLARIS SUBMARINES The committee report, on page 12, also covers the phenomenal advances the So- viets are making in building ballistic mis- sile submarines-a present capacity to produce one a month. It is estimated that, since we are not building any more Polaris submarines, the Soviets will take the lead in this area also in the early 1970's. The Polaris fleet is, of course, our most invulnerable strategic weapons force. A number of Members of Congress have been asking how long we can depend on keeping this force safe from a massive attack. The question is, can we depend indefinitely on the invulnerability of the Polaris submarines? In response to that question, I should like to quote Admiral Rickover's com- ment of this question as It appears on page 132 of the hearing print I men- tioned a few moments ago: Let me first say that based on the best evidence available, I believe that today our Polaris submarines are safe from a massive, neutralizing blow. Further, I am not aware of any valid information indicating that the Soviets possess a means to track and destroy our Polaris submarines which they are on station. However, there is no assurance that this situation will prevail for long. There is, in fact, evidence that the Soviets are actively engaged in a determined effort to acquire the capability to neutralize or destroy our Polaris force. They have de- veloped and they continue to develop faster and quieter submarines. They are experi- menting in all phases of submarine and antisubmarine warfare-we are not. In fact, during the past year alone they have de- veloped several new types of nuclear sub- marines; we have developed only one new type in 10 years. It Is clear that a major ob- jective of their naval programs is to in- validate our own Polaris system. Any doubt that exists on this point serves to emphasize the importance of increasing our efforts in the advanced submarine program to preserve that in- vulnerability of our Polaris type sub- marines. Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON). (Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Chair- nwi I call attention to the fact that un- derthe authorization provided for in this bill, the Atomic Energy Commission is of course the executive agent for the whole Federal Establishment with respect to our high energy nuclear physics pro- gram. Iam pleased to note that by this legislation we have completed the au- thorization of approximate $217 million as the necessary funds to complete the funding for the 200-billion-electron-volt accelerator project which is going to be located in western Illinois. I should point out, I believe, that the State of Illinois has gone ahead with its commitment to do some things in con- nection with that project. They com- mitted themselves to provide, first of all the site of 6,800 acres of farm lands lying just beyond metropolitan Chicago, nec- essary to locate this new facility, I am proud to say that Illinois has now virtually fulfilled its commitment to the project. At a cost of some $26 million the State has acquired this site and has deeded the land to the Federal Govern- ment. There have been other areas where they have made important progress as well. Some 14 communities in the vicinity of the project, with a total population of almost 400,000, have enacted open-hous- ing ordinances. In addition, the city of Chicago, which is of course Only about 25 miles from the site, has passed the ordinance. These were commitments made by the State and by authorities of the State of Illinois at the time the decision was made to locate the project in our State, and I am proud those commitments have been kept. I want to say in conclusion that I support this legislation. I concur with what the chairman said earlier on the floor, as one who has suggested openly and continues to suggest the desirability of our President taking the initiative of proposing a moratorium on MIRY test- ing. I see nothing inconsistent between that position and the position we take in this bill, that until such time as the ex- ecutive branch has made that decision we have to continue to provide the re- search and development capability to maintain the defenses of our country. My mind goes back to the time when we adopted the partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which I believe most of us on this committee, if not all of us, sup- ported at that time. A very Important element in the decision to support that treaty was the decision that at the same time certain basic safeguards would be maintained, and among them the ability to maintain a readiness to resume test- ing if there were a breach or a violation of the treaty. We have maintained our national laboratories and we have main- tained our research and development ca- pability in that regard. Even so, when we get to talking about this particular weapons system, I believe we have to draw a distinction between the research and development capability and the political system which has to be made at the level of the President him- self as to whether or not a mutual mora- torium should be called for with respect to the flight testing of this weapons system. Mr. HQLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentI man j+ield? Mr. ANDERSON -of Illinois. I am happy to yield to the distinguished gen- tleman from California. Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 -June 24, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE Mr. HOLIFIELD. Is it not true in re- spect to research and development on any kind of device that one has to test it in order to know whether the theories are working out or not? In other words, testing is a part of the development of the device. In the case of the multiple warhead for reentry, we cannot test a nuclear weapon coming Into the atmosphere be- cause of our treaty which from exploding anything like that in the atmosphere, but we can, under the treaty, test those warheads underground, where they do not vent any radiation beyond our national boundaries, and we can test dummies of the same size, shape, and weight inside the nose cone of a mis- sile and determine how they act. This is what we are talking about when we talk about testing. We are testing, ac- tually, dummies in this instance, but of the same size, shape, and weight as the nuclear components of the multiple war- head, what they would be if we were really using them in warfare. Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Yes. I quite agree with the gentleman from Califor- nia. I believe this Is compatible with and is a part of the whole research and de- velopment function of Government. Cer- tainly we cannot just try to carve out or divorce that particular feature from the research and development capability we have sought to give the Commission by the funding in this bill. I just want to repeat that urging, as I do, the President to pursue what he him- self referred to as constructive proposal on the part of those Members of the Sen- ate who recently filed a resolution uring a mutual moratorium, I think it would be the height of folly for us to consider any unilateral suspension and unilateral cessation by stripping ourselves of the capability to continue the research and development and testing function. So, in support of what I spoke of earlier, I do not want to confuse that with the notion that I think this bill is one that ought to have the support of the Members of this body. Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. DUNCAN) as much time as he may con- sume. (Mr. DUNCAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his re- marks.) [Mr. DUNCAN addressed the Commit- tee. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.] (Mr. PRICE of Illinois (at the request of Mr. HOLIFIELD) was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.) Mr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Chair- man, as chairman of the Joint Subcom- mittee on Research, Development, and Radiation, I have a special interest in that section of the bill before you dealing with the 200 billion-electron-volt accel- erator. More than 4 years ago the Subcom- mittee on Research, Development, and Radiation held a week-long series of hearings covering the entire field of high energy physics. Those hearings stressed the relationship and importance of high energy physics to the scientific leader- ship of this nation. Central to those hearings was a full-scale review of a high energy physics national policy report from the executive branch requested by the Joint Committee. It had become in- creasingly clear to the committee dur- ing the 1960's that an overall national policy in high energy physics was im- perative for the guidance of the Con- gress and the taxpayers.- The requested report was transmitted to the Congress by the President in January 1965. The single most important recommendation in that policy report, and one on which the subcommittee spent a considerable amount of time during those hearings more than 4 years ago, concerned the extension of proton energy. The specific recommendation called for-construction of a high-energy proton accelerator of approximately 200 billion electron volts in accordance with technical specifica- tions developed by LRL, to be operated as a national facility. This machine should be authorized for design in fiscal year 1967, and for construction in fiscal year 1968. It should be pointed out that an earlier panel report-Ramsey_ panel, 1963- made to the President's Science Advisory Committee and to the AEC's General Ad- visory Committee had a similar recom- mendation as the next most important step to be taken in the field of high- energy physics. It should also be pointed out that an extensive design study on such a machine had been underway at the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory dur- ing the years 1963 to 1965. The years 1965 and 1966 were spent on a -vigorous nationwide search for the most appropriate location possible in the United States for such an important basic research facility as the 200 billion- electron-volt accelerator laboratory. Af- ter some 99 meetings on this matter the Atomic Energy Commission, advised by a special committee of the National Acad- emy of Sciences, selected a site in Du- Page and Kane Counties, Ill., some 25 miles west of Chicago. In the President's fiscal year 1968 budget request for project authorization it-developed that the project scope had been curtailed for budgetary reasons. My subcommittee held hearings and re- viewed in detail the proposed reduced scope and management of this project. The subcommittee and the full Joint Committee not only concluded that the accelerator should not be reduced in its initial scope but also that considera- tion should be given to building into the machine the possibility of going to much higher energies at some later date. That year Congress authorized and ap- propriated $7,333,000 for design of the project. During its authorization hearings for fiscal year 1969 the committee was most pleased to hear from the Laboratory Di- rector, Dr. R. R. Wilson, that he and his key staff had not only managed to de- sign the machine to reach its original intensity goal of 3 x .1018 protons per pulse but also had incorporated an op- tion to go to a higher energy than 200 billion electron volts at some later date. And Dr. Wilson and his staff had ac- complished all this within the budgetary guidelines laid down by the executive H 5095 branch--some $60 million less than the original cost estimate without the option of higher energy. In the budget submitted last year ex- traordinary efforts were made to reduce both project obligations and project costs for that year. A minimum construction program restricted to key starts that bore directly on Dr. Wilson's construc- tion time table was proposed. Such a minimum program required commit- ments of approximately $25,000,000. This additional amount was authorized but actual appropriations were only $12,074,- 000. At this time all available funds have been committed. The laboratory director and his staff are now awaiting fiscal year 1970 appropriations in order to return to their construction schedule, which calls for an initial beam to be available in July 1972. This is an exceedingly complex and technical national research facility. No machine in this energy range, nor with the novel and innovative features de- signed by Dr. Wilson and staff, has ever been built. More than 2 years ago the U.S.S.R. succeeded in bringing into op- eration the Serpukhov accelerator. This proton accelerator quickly reached an energy of 84 billion electron volts. The highest energy machine in the United States is the alternating gradient syn- chrotron at the Brookhaven National Laboratory, on Long Island, with an en- ergy of 33 billion electron volts. The U.S.S.R. will continue to have the high- est energy machine in the world until the 200-billion-electron-volt machine be- comes operational. It is therefore very significant to note that any substantial reduction in the appropriations for fiscal year 1970 will serve to extend the dura- tion of the U.S.S.R.'s advantage in the frontier science of high energy physics- the field of science concerning itself with the most fundamental laws governing the constitution of matter and the ele- mentary particles of which all matter is constituted. Also most important are the adverse effects that continued piecemeal author- ization and inadequate appropriations have on the efficient and economically planned construction schedule as well as the morale and cohesiveness of the pres- ent laboratory staff. A loss of the skilled team now assembled at the site would inevitably strike a severe blow to the entire project. This staff has already very vividly shown its potential. At pres- sent, construction of the laboratory is solely dependent upon the dollars avail- able, as contrasted to a schedule utiliz- ing the most efficient marshalling of the laboratory staff and its contractors. Con- tinued inadequate funding would very probably disrupt the well planned con- struction schedule and result in a sub- stantial cost overrun. The key staff-the 75 or so accelerator physicists and engineers that have been assembled under Dr. Wilson's leader- ship-are critical to the success of this project. They are among the very best in their fields and represent an impor- tant national asset. They have been at- tracted to this project because of the challenge it represents and because the planned schedule is a fast and efficient one that will bring the machine into op- Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B0.0364R000300090002-4 Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE June 24, 1969 eration at the earliest possible moment, period, the basis of all modern computer with the maximum impact in the scien- circuits had its origin in the circuits de- tific world. Loss of these people, or a veloped for particle detection devices. At loss of morale due to a considerably the present time the techniques being de- lengthened schedule, will have a serious veloped for pattern recognition in con- impact on the quality of the accelerator nection with the analyses of high- Second rate scientists ad engineers build second rate facilities, and do it very expen- sively. As indicated earlier the 200-billion- electron-volt machine is a highly com- plex scientific instrument actually com- prised of four acceerati rs that succes- sively bring the accelerated particles up to the desired energy. The design and construction schedules are closely inter- locked with, one another. Therefore the initiation and completion of many phases of the project are completely de- pendent on earlier phases. A continuous balance must be struck among the three major phases of the project-design, construction and procurement of long- lead time components. The Joint Committee is impressed with the significant progress that has been made on this project despite a history of budgetary stringency and reductions. The committee feels that further budg- etary restraints will affect the schedule and our international position vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. in this important basic re- search field. The committee is also of the opinion that further budgetary reductions will serve to increase the total cost, result in the loss of key personnel and ultimately reduce the quality of the important re- search that should be possible with this machine. The committee held its hear- ings on the national policy for high-en- ergy physics in March 19t5-more than 4 years ago. This project-- -the most im- portant recommendation contained in that polity-is to be a national facility and requires a national commitment. The Joint Committee believes strongly that full authorization this year is es- sential and that appropriations in the order of the amount requested in the President's fiscal year 1970 budget should be made if the success of this project is to be assured. There are fundamental questions in physics today that can only be answered by the very high energy and the high intensity that will become available from this machine. For example, a question that has plagued physicists in recent years is the host of new subnuclear particles that have been discovered, at times seemingly without order in a field where order is generally an underlying principle. With the capabilities of this machine it will be possible to search for an elementary set of building blocks that may form the basis for all matter and life. Some tremendous advancements that have been made in this country are di- rectly attributable to of associated with accelerators. In the late 1930's, for ex- ample, work on acceler8r research re- sulted in large advancegln the develop- ment of high-powered transmitting tubes which were basic to the develop- ment of radar and continue to be an in- tegral part of radar systems. In this time energy-physics research data are finding application in biomedical work, and in air and space surveillance activities. More- over, certain accelerators are currently being used for medical treatment and for the irradiation of food to increase its shelflife. Mr. Chairman, high-energy physics is important to education, it produces a quantity of highly talented scientists, and it contributes profoundly to modern tech- nology. For these reasons I heartily en- dorse the fiscal year 1970 high-energy- physics program recommended to you by the Joint Committee and, in particu- lar, the full authorization of the 200 Bev national accelerator which the colnmit- tee has recommended. Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 12167 and in doing so wish to speak on a portion of the AEC authorization bill in which I have a par- ticular interest. I refer to that segment of the physical research program known as controlled thermonuclear research. There is little doubt in my mind that this research program holds as much promise for the future as did splitting the atom under controlled conditions in that first atomic pile under the west stands of Stagg Field in Chicago on December 2, 1942. If the controlled fusion process can be harnessed for the production of electric energy-and qualified scientists believe it can be so harnessed-this Nation and the world will have a virtually limitless source of power. Moreover, if thermonu- clear energy is put to this beneficial use, we shall have not only the most abun- dant source of power ever known to man, extractable from ordinary water, but the least environmentally offensive source. Significant scientific advances have al- ready been made, especially very recent- ly, In the area of plasma density and confinement time by scientists both in this country and in the Soviet Union. This involves plasma, completely ion- ized gas, at millions of degrees centi- grade. However, much remains to be ac- complished before our Nation's vast ca- pacity to consume electrical energy will have this source of power upon which to rely. In 1965 the Joint Committee asked the AEC to commission a comprehensive study of this entire program in order to establish goals and ascertain the prob- abilities of practical accomplishments. An AEC select review committee, com- prised of eminent scientists from within and without Government, made a search ing inquiry into the entire program. In its comprehensive technical report the select committee recommended that the manpower resources, particularly scien- tists and engineers, be doubled within 5 years in order to assure the influx of vigorous and imaginative thought. Shortly thereafter, the AEC issued a policy and action paper on the control- led fusion program which thoroughly discussed the state of the art, the options for progress and the need for applica- tion of greater resources. That paper noted that the accomplishment of the ascertainable goals would require a net annual increase in operating funds of approximately 15 percent over a 5-year period plus an annual requirement for major device fabrication of $3 to $4 million. Under that formula the fund- ing for this program in fiscal 1970 should be at a level of over $40 million. The bill before you recommends authorization of $27,800,000-more than $12 million be- low that level. This is an area of endeavor in which the Nation can ill afford the luxury of less than a sustained effort. The Joint Committee has exercised restraint in recognition of the total budgetary sit- uation. The recommended authorization of $27.8 million is the amount consid- ered to be an absolute minimum neces- sary to maintain this program at the proper level of effort to sustain the mo- mentum generated by recent successes. I wish I could be supporting an even greater authorization for this program, but, mindful of the limitations of the national budget, I can only heartily en- dorse this portion of the authorization as reported. Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Chairman, today I cast my vote against the bill author- izing an appropriation of $2.5 billion for the Atomic Energy Commission. I vote with knowledge that the programs to be funded by this appropriation may well have merit and may well be justified. The merit of these programs, whatever they are, are far outshadowed, however, by the urgent need for the Federal Govern- ment to apply its resources to the prob- lems of our cities and the problems of the poor. I believe we have failed to establish rational national priorities. Therefore, I cannot place my stamp of approval on an authorization of $2.5 billion, $828 Mil- lion of which is to be devoted to the pro- duction of nuclear weaponry, while' the urgent need for funds for our cities is being ignored. As a candidate for the Democratic nomination for the mayor of the city of New York, I have for 6 months observed with painful intensity` the problems of New York City, problems most of which are national in cause and origin, and not of our city's design or creation, but problems which nevertheless typify the dilemma of all our major cities. Mr. Chairman, I must report to you that New York City is strangling; that well-conceived programs to revive our cities are being starved for funds; that unless we in Congress carefully examine our current pattern of allocating avail- able national resources, we can expect only an increase in the mounting hatreds and bitterness now building, escallation in the frightful polarization now taking place between groups of people within the city. Congress must recognize its respon- sibility for this frightening situation. Through gross mistakein tflejstbu- tion of our resourdes, we'ave~co i tee mightily to the disintegration of our cities. Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 June 24, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE H 5097 I know that New York City does have manned earth orbital missions, the fact the talent, the knowledge, and the pro- remains that no mission has as yet been grams to solve the problems with which approved by Congress. it is struggling. As I said on June 10, the testimony What our city does not have are the from the past several years in the House resources. Committee on Science and Astronautics The time has come for us to examine makes it perfectly clear that the NERVA all of our programs-marginal, desirable, program is, at least as far as NASA is and indispensible-programs for national concerned related to the promotion of works, transportation and programs for our cities-for the purpose of establish- ing a sound and sane system of national priorities. Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, the bill be- fore us (H.R. 12167) would authorize the appropriation of $2,454,284,000 to the Atomic Energy Commission for the fiscal year 1970. This amount, which is recom- mended by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, is $64,318,000 less than the authorization requested by AEC in its original budget request, but $6,232,- 000 more than its revised request of $2,448,052,000. Certain areas of this bill are of special concern. Let me discuss each of these areas separately. First, under the category of weapons, $135 million has been recommended by the committee for "research, develop- ment, and testing of ABM compo- nents"-committee report, page 10. The report notet: What the AEC will have purchased with the construction and equipment funds pro- vided through fifical year 1970 are capability and capacity. In addition to the clear intent of the report, the debate and legislative history on the floor should clearly indicate that approval of this authorization does not in any way infer approval by the House of deployment of the Sentinel ABM sys- tem. A decision on whether or not to ap- prove the administration's recommenda- tion that the Sentinel anti-ballistic-mis- sile system be deployed will come before the House at a later date, at which time I would hope it will be possible to obtain a separate vote on that issue. A second area of concern is $26,900,000 which the committee has recommended for the final phases of the development of the NERVA I engine. I have on several occasions pointed out to this body the ill-advisability of pro- ceeding with the NERVA program, for which NASA-despite its determination to proceed with research and develop- ment-has yet to define a mission, let alone ask the House to approve a mission. During the debate on the NASA au- thorization billion June 10, I cautioned the House: Before authorizing more money for this program, at least we should be aware of what NASA intends for the future. The report of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on H.R. 12167 reinforces my belief that a mission must be defined and submitted to Congress. On page 15 of the report, the committee noted that it continued "to be concerned that no mission has yet been planned for the nuclear rocket," While the committee suggested possible missions for the nu- clear rocket, including manned and un- manned lunar missions, unmanned deep space missions, and manned or un- glamorous and costly manned space flight, specifically a manned mission to Mars. Its purpose is interplanetary travel. While such a mission may not have been approved by Congress as yet, we should 'recognize that further invest- ments in the NERVA program will -in- crease the pressure to approve whatever purpose NASA ultimately determines for the program. For as investments in the program mount, NASA will argue that, if the investments are not to be wasted, we must proceed with whatever mission NASA advocates. Such a mission may, however, entail spending billions of additional dollars on a program of dubious national priority. The NERVA program,, which is expected to ultimately cost some $2 billion, is the forerunner of a manned Mars mission which I estimated last year would cost perhaps as much as $200 billion into the 1980's. Given the potential of the NERVA program for increased cost over the next few years, it is doubly important that Congress establish a rational allocation of our resources between our domestic so- cial needs and the space program. Be- yond that, we must set priorities within the space program itself. This means ob- jectives must be stated and a balance established between manned and un- manned space flights. Project 70-6-d, accelerator improvements, When the costs of a manned Mars Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Berkeley, mission may be as much as $200 billion- California, $680,000. $200 billion which will be vitally needed Project 70-6-e, accelerator improvements, Accelerator Center, Cali- in such domestic areas as housing, edu- foStanford $640,000. cation, and the abatement of pollution Project ,000. in our air and water-should Congress medium and low energy physics, Improvements , quietly allow the pressure to build for the Project 70-6-g, modification c to Heavy Ion adoption of such a goal? I think not. And Linear Accelerator, Lawrence Radiation Lab- yet, as we pour more and more money oratory, Berkeley, California, $2,650,000, into a program for which no mission has (7) ADMINISTRATIVE.-Project 70-7-a, com- been approved, that Is precisely what puter building, AEC Headquarters, German- Project 70-1-b, bedrock waste storage (AE and site selection drilling only), Savannah River, South Carolina, $1,300,000 Project 70-1-c, waste encapsulation and storage facilities (AE only), Richland, Wash- ington, $1,200,000. Project 70-1-d, contaminated water con- trol facilities, Savannah River, South Caro- lina, $1,500,000. Project 70-1-e, equipment test facility, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, $5,700,000. - (2) SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS.- Project 70-2-a, rebuilding of gaseous dif- fusion plant cooling tower, Portsmouth, Ohio, $1,000,000. Project 70-2-b, improvement of gaseous diffusion plant electrical distribution sys- tems, Paducah, Kentucky, $1,700,000. (3) ATOMIC WEAPONS.-Project 70-3-a, weapons production, development and test installations, $10,000,000. (4) REACTOR DEVELOPMENT.- Project 70-4-a, high temperature sodium facility, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Rich- land, Washington, $6,300,000. Project 70-4-b, research and development test plans, Project Rover, Los Alamos Scien- tific Laboratory, New Mexico, and Nevada Test Site, Nevada, $1,000,000. Project 70-4-c, modifications and altera- tions to expended core facility, National Re- actor Testing Station, Idaho, $4,400,000. Project 70-4-d, modifications to reactors, $1,000,000. (5) REACTOR DEVELOPMENT.-Project 70-5- a, conversion of heating plant to natural gas, Argonne National Laboratory, Illinois, $560,- 000. (6) PHYSICAL RESEARCH.- Project 70-6-a, accelerator improvements, zero gradient synchrotron, Argonne National Laboratory, Illinois, $650,000. Project 70-6-b, accelerator and reactor additions and modifications, Brookhaven Na- tional Laboratory, New York, $700,000. Project 70-6-c, accelerator improvements, Cambridge and Princeton accelerators, $200, (8 HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I (9) CAPITAL EQUIPMENT.- Acqui ition and have no further requests for time. fabrication to capital equipment not related Mr. HOSMER. I have no further re- to construction, $172,525,000. quests for time, Mr. Chairman. SEC. 102. LIMrrATIONS.-(a) The Commis- The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read. sion is authorized to start any project set The Clerk read as follows: forth in subsections 101(b) (1), (3), (4), and Be it enacted by the Senate and House of (6) only if the currently estimated cost of Representatives of the United States of that project does not exceed by more than America in Congress assembled, 25 per centum the estimated cost set forth SEC. 101. There is hereby authorized to be for that project. appropriated to the Atomic Energy Com- (b) The Commission is authorized to start mission in accordance with the provisions of any project set forth in subsection 101(b) section 261 of the Atomic Energy Act of (2), (5), and (7) only if the currently esti- 1954; as amended: mated cost of that project does not exceed (a) For "Operating expenses", $1,973,282,- by more than 10 per centum the estimated 000, not to exceed $121,000,000 in operating cost set forth for that project. costs for the High Energy Physics program (c) The Commission is authorized to start category. a project under subsection 101(b) (8) only (b) For "Plant and capital equipment", if it is in accordance with the following: including construction, acquisition, or modi- (1) The maximum currently estimated fication of facilities, including land acquisi- cost of any project shall be $500,000 and the tion; and acquisition and fabrication of maximum currently estimated cost of any capital equipment not related to construc- building included in such project shall be tion, a sum of dollars equal to the total of $100,000 provided that the building cost lim- the following: station may be exceeded if the Commission (1) SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS.- determines that it is necessary in the interest Project 70-1-a, waste storage tanks and of efficiency and economy. tank farm waste handling systems, Rich- (2) The total cost of all projects under- land, Washington, $10,000,000, taken under subsection 101(b) (8) shall not Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 H 5098 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --HOUSE June 24, 1969- exceed the estimated cost set forth in that in the gas-cooling area. Indeed today in- frank. We have spent on research and subsection by more than 10 per centum. dustry has taken up the gas-cooling ap- development several hundred million SEC. 103. The Commission is authorized to proach at Peach Bottom, in, Pennsyl- dollars over the period of the atomic corn- pe Commission rform construction design services for any construction yania, where there is a producing gas- energy program. In some cases the conl- project h whenever (1) such construction been in- cooled reactor, I think with a 50,000-kilo- mittee itself has stopped projects when (1) such construtructtion ion prote h project cluded in a proposed authorization bill watt capacity, on a commercial utility we thought we h'ad'all the scientific in- transmitted to the Congress by the Commis- line which was built as a part of the formation that we could get out of the sion and (2) the commission determines demonstration program in which the project. We did not let the project run on; that the project is of such urgency that con- AEC participated. As a follow-on to when we got to the end of what we struction of the project should be initiated Peach Bottom, at Fort St. Vrain, in Colo- thought was the end of advanced tech- promptly upon enactment of legislation ap- redo, the Public Service Co. of Colorado, nology in that project then we stopped p SECEC. 104. When funds so for specified in cooperation with the General Atomics the project. In many instances the tech- priation in an appro- priation Act, transfers of amounts between Corp., and with the AEC, is building a nological information and development "Operating expenses" and "Plant and capital large production powerline station on of the reactor in such a case which we equipment" may be made as provided in such this principle. had stopped was then used in another appropriation Act. Mr. HALL. I thank the gentleman for reactor which eventually brought out a SEC. 106. AMENDMENT OF PRIOR YEAR AcT. - that part of the information which he successful reactor. Section 101(b) of Public Law 90-56, as volunteered. I think he anticipated my Mr. HALL. The gentleman in the well amended, is further ameMed by striking subsection (4) thereof the figure "$32,- second question, about the Fort %t. Vrain fully understands the advantages of re- from 833,0 accelera- 33,000" for project 68-4-f, 200-Bev aleraprojector, indeed, all of the power re- search and development, testing and tor, Du Page and Kane Counties near Chi- actor demonstration program projects. evaluation; as well as advantages from cago, Illinois, and substituting therefor the The Fort St. Vrain project,-according to so-called fallout. However, would this figure "$250,000,000." the committee's own report, encountered same explanation that the gentleman SEC. 106. LIQUID METAL FAST BREEDER RE- considerable problems, and the commit- has - given, apply to the Malibu nuclear ACTOR DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM-PROJECT tee has been asked by the joint com- plant which the committee has recom- DEFINITION PHASE.-(a) The Commission is mission to keep it advised on a timely mended- hereby authorized to conduct the Project Br basis of the status of these efforts toward The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gen- Breeeder Definition Breeder Metal Fast tor r Demonstration a iProgram, a reconfiguration of that project. Is that tleman has expired. der Reactor Phase under cooperative arrangements with reactor not true? (By unanimous consent, Mr. HALL was manufacturers and others, in accordance Mr. HOSMER. That is true. allowed to proceed for 3 additional with the criteria heretofore submitted to Mr. HALL. But my original question, minutes). the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Mr. Chairman, goes back to the status Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, as I started without regard to the provisions of section of the experimental gas-cooled reactor to say, would the same explanation given 169 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as that was a part of the TVA authorization by the gentleman apply to the coopera- tions th, for au thm on of a $7, 0,000 and built on contract by Union Carbide tive power reactor demonstration pro- 101 m of ount this c7,000,000 is included Act. and TVA at Oak Ridge. I believe, if you grams? At least three out of the five men- is u eded in in in the section e amount discontinued mcommittee report have wbeen Sec. 107. The Commission is authorized to will search the records, you will find that tioned iin the ere appoint persons as employees to positions in it was never completed. modifi thin for cause, the first the Atomic Energy Commission without re- I would like to know how much money not or properthese ly rly thought t out ut intthesand gard to the provisions of section 201 of Pub- we put into that out of the taxpayers' place; lac Law 90-364, and such positions shah not pockets before it was thrown overboard, benefactors have not been able to bear betaken into cooyidsrutidn in determining as so many of these cooperative projects their portion of the matching funds. 1 of that oumbers of section ormployees bn numbers o oef vacancies subsection svbsa ( un)- and power reactor demonstrations are report, is the same general explanation n applicable to these power reactor deco- der subsection (b) of that section. being thrown overboard. apapplicable to these toter reactor that we, HOLIFIELD (during the reading). I want it understood that I am in favor onstration acceptable plans not coming that e, of this bill. I believe in atomic energy .% pfound to ass? " Mr. Chairman, I ask urialered as read , consent I think it is here to stay. I believe the Mr. HOLIFIELD. Let me say to the that the bill be considered committee has brought in a good report. printed in the RECORD, and open to Certainly it is forthright and honest, but gentleman that in 1962 and 1963 the amendment at any point. I believe that the Members and the tax- committee authorized two reactors in The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to California. One was the so-called Malibu the request of the gentleman from Cali- payers need an answer to some of these plant, and one was for the Southern forma? questions. California Edison Co. There was no objection. Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, if the Mr. HALL. Is that the same one as the Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I move to gentleman will yield, I do not personally Bolsa Island project? strike the last word. recall that the TVA was a partner in any Mr. HOLIFIELD. That was a later Mr. Chairman, I hope that I shall not cooperative gas-cooled reactor. The AEC project. take the full 5 minutes. I know the need has had some experiments on its own, HALL. But the Bolsa Island proj- today, expediting the business of the House and at the present time the TVA is actu- Mr. ect Mr through. L. Btoday, but I have two general sets of ally buying a 2,000-megawatt nuclear concern about which I believe more gen- reactor for its system, but these are Mr. HOLIFIELD. The Bolsa Island eral information is needed and I know I neither gas-cooled or in cooperation with project did not proceed because of the would like to have, in addition to that the AEC. Perhaps the chairman of the escalation of prices. But let me get back which Is in the committee report. committee will recollect something that I to the question. First of all I would like to know the have not in connection with this. The gentleman will find an explana- status of or what happened to the experi- Mr. HALL. The gentleman may be tion on page 34 of the report. mental gas-cooled reactor which we built right on the details, technically; as to Mr. HALL. I will say to the gentleman at Oak Ridge. whether it was to furnish power to the that I have read the report thoroughly,. Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, will the TVA under contract or was being built Mr. HOLIFIELD. Yes, I am sure you gentleman yield? experimentally and TVA was to bene- have. Mr. HALL. I am glad to yield to the fit from the power therefrom. I am not The Southern California Edison Co. is gentleman from California. knowledgeable enough to speak au- producing electricity from its nuclear re- Mr. HOSMER. Which reactor is the thoritatively and from memory in this actor and it is the most advanced plant gentleman talking about? area, but I think I do know that toward now on the line in the United States. Mr. HALL. The EG0R. the end of the completion for this type The engineers and scientists believe it Mr. HOSMER. The experimental gas reactor that it was stopped. will be competitive with other types of cooling program? IvtrHOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, if the fossil fuel and other types of electrical Mr. HALL. That is right. gentleman will yield, there was a reactor, generating plants. Mr. HOSMER. As I recollect it, that I might say, at Oak Ridge, but this was In the case of the Malibu plant, they a site, local au- experiment served its stated the feasibility of further activity a bit of money on that. I am going to be thorizatio l trouble foin getting r the site. Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 H 5099 June 24, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE So there will never be any money to But I do think it is clear that there is cost about $10 million each. The Poseidon build on that one. a real problem here-both of escalation missiles are expected to cost between $7 That was announced in the past, the and of foreclosing the option of negoti- and $10 million each. It will also cost time when they could avail themselves ating an enforceable limitation on about $80 million to overhaul and con- of that particular cooperative venture MIRV deployment. vert each of the 31 Polaris nuclear sub- because it was to help develop the tech- At the appropriate time I will be cir- marines to carry, the large Poseidon mis- nology which has now been developed. culating among my Democratic col- siles. Thus total MIRV costs may be on Therefore, they are not at this time eli- leagues the substance of the Brooke res- the order of $10 to $15 billion, without gible for any help. olution. The reason I am doing this is, including research and development As I stated before, the Los Angeles I feel that this is the most effective way costs. Water and Power Department could not to dramatize the concern that all of In the current fiscal year 1970 budget get the siting because of local govern- us have about this expensive and very there is $2,074,000,000 for the Minuteman mental opposition. critical weapons development. III and Poseidon programs. This is more Mr. HALL. I commend the committee Some of us feel that we ought to take than twice the amounts in the budget on its oversight and review of these proj- the initiative. I personally would hope for the Safeguard ABM. ects and continuing to classify and nui- that we could do that. I think it is es- The Poseidon and Minuteman III lify them where there will be no addi- sential that we come to grips with the MIRV's both employ a bus concept. This tional civilian or military fallout, where MIRV issue and the separate resolution means that one propulsion and guidance the arrangements cannot be completed. that has already been introduced by mechanism directs all of the individual I will ask the gentleman finally, Has Senator CRANSTON and Senator BROOKE warheads carried by the missiles. After the Commission completed the Sefor re- in the other body. the main missile boosters have cut off, actor satisfactorily, in northwest Arkan- MIRV MORATORIUM the propulsion unit on the bus makes sas near Fayetteville? Are you happy Mr. Chairman, we are today engaging minute adjustments in speed and direc- with it? in the first dialog in the House of Rep- tion, and after each of these adjust- Mr. HOLIFIELD. No. This reactor is resentatives on the critical issue of the ments releases another warhead, direct- being completed by partnership between development and deployment of multiple ing it to a different target. the Federal Government and 17 pri- independently targeted reentry vehicles. The Soviet Union is at the present time vately owned utilities, also a German This discussion comes at a crucial testing at least two different concepts concern is participating in the venture. time-a time when the President and the employing multiple warheads. In one This is considered to be one of the most National Security Council are preparing concept, three warheads each in the 5- advanced reactors for the purpose of im- the American position for the upcoming megaton range can be delivered in a proving this breeding factor that I spoke strategic arms limitation talks with the pattern. Intelligence data available in the of sometime ago. We are learning a great Soviet Union, and at a moment when United States has not conclusively deter- deal from it at the present time. We are time is fast running out on our chances mined whether these warheads are in.- continuing to learn. of ever being able to have an enforceable dependently targetable or whether they I would say that that plant should arms control agreement limiting MIRV's. are merely multiple warheads like the operate for another two or three years I would like to state at the outset that ones we have had on our Polaris missiles to get the advance technology we need it is my firm conviction that the United since 1962 which deliver three warheads in that field. States should at this time halt all testing in a fixed shotgun-like pattern. President Mr. HALL. I will ask the gentleman of our MIRV system, and that further Nixon indicated last week, however, that one final question. testing should be deferred at least until even if the Soviet warheads are not inde- Cari he, as chairman of this commit- the arms limitation talks begin, and pendently targetable, he regards them as tee which has oversight and review func- longer if the Soviets refrain from testing a threat to our ICBM's because the pat- tion of the Atomic Energy Commission, their multiple warhead systems. And in tern of the Soviet warheads is much like assure me that we are closing these ex- any event the United States should the layout of our Minuteman fields. perimental and cooperative civilian dem- strongly press for mutual moratorium on The second Soviet concept being tested onstration reactor projects down on time, MIRV's in these talks. involves the delivery of a string of up in order to still get the greatest fallout i recognize that not all Members of to 10 warheads. Each of these warheads from the technical evaluation and yet this body share this conviction. More- would land in a separate location, but not waste the taxpayers' money in order ever, I recognize that not all Members of they would not be capable of being inde- to continue at the insistance of a local this body are as familiar with the MIRY pendently targeted. concern? issues as they would like to be. Accord- THE STRATEGIC SITUATION Mr. HOLIFIELD. I believe that is true. ingly, I would like to take a few minutes MIRV's have at least two strategic The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Mc- to outline the issues as I see them, and roles. MIRV's can increase the number CULLOCH) is on our committee and we to explain the reasons underlying my of targets which can be struck by a given had a research reactor in his district conclusions. missile launcher force. And MIRV's can which much to our regret we decided THE STATE OF THE ART increase the probability that an enemy needed to be shut down, and notwith- At the outset it is important to under- ABM will be penetrated. standing the fact that it was in the gen- stand how very far along in MIRV devel- MIRV's will affect the strategic bal- tleman's district, he finally agreed it opment we are, and to understand what ance only if one side perceives the MIRV should be closed down, and we did close it is that we know about Soviet develop- warheads of the other to be either so it down. ments in this area. large, or so accurate, or so numerous, as We will continue to watch carefully all The United States has present plans to to be able to destroy a significant portion research and cevelopment and we will use MIRV's on two types of missiles- of its land-based ICBM's in a first strike, not allow any experimental device to the Minuteman III land-based ICBM's and thereby threaten the credibility of continue beyond the point of what giving and the Poseidon submarine-based mis- its deterrent. us a good scientific return. siles. These plans call for the deployment Thus the crucial question with regard Mr. HALL. I thank the gentleman. of MIRV's on 500 out of 1,054 of our to the MIRV is whether one side sees its Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Chairman, I move ICBM's and on 496 of the 656 missiles adversary's MIRV as a hard target- to strike out the last word. on our nuclear submarines. The Minute- ICBM-killer. If so that side may per- (Mr. COHELAN asked and was given man III is a new last stage which will be ceive a threat to its deterrent and may permission to revise and extend his re- fitted. on the existing missile launchers have to take steps to maintain its as- marks.) for the Minuteman force. The Minute- sured destruction capability. Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Chairman, I have a man III will carry one to three warheads The U.S. Defense Department and the detailed discussion on the MIRV pro- and is assumed to contain sophisticated President have seen the possible Soviet gram which I think is of overwhelming penetration aids like chaff and decoys. deployment of large numbers of SS-9 concern to all of us. I will not have a The Poseidon will carry 10 to 15 war- ICBM's with MIRV's as potential hard chance in the time allocated to get into heads, and can apparently also carry target killers and not as mere ABM it all because I have some questions i penetration aids. penetrators. Accordingly, the admini- would like to direct to the chairman. Minuteman III missiles are expected to stration has perceived a threat to the Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 June 24, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE H 5101 Yet at this time we have no intelli- our national security, as well as making man, as far as testing underground is genre estimate which indicates that the possible a better use of our national concerned, that is not the matter that Soviet Union will have such a city de- resources. we who are in favor of suspending flight fense ABM deployed in 1971 when the But as I understand it-having had a tests have in mind. We are not concerned first U.S. MIRV's will become operation- conversation with the distinguished with underground tests. al. In fact, the lead time for city defense chairman of the Joint-Committee-there The, CHAIRMAN. The time of the ABM deployment is considerably longer is nothing in this legislation which pur- gentleman from New York has expired. than the lead time for MIRV deploy- ports to make any decisions with regard (By unanimous request, Mr. BINGHAM ment. Thus, we could actually wait un- to either of these questions. was allowed to proceed for an additional til there was firm evidence of a Soviet I have also discussed the matter of the minute.) nationwide ABM before we put MIRV's ABM part of it with Senator GORE of the Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, it is on our missiles. other body, and he assured me he had not the underground testing we are con- These leadtime differentials, and the agreed to the Joint Committee's report on cerned about. It is the flight tests which fact that the U.S. MIRV deployment is that basis. The report specifically states are under the control of DOD, as I under- scheduled for several years in advance that the funds requested for ABM would stand it, that would indicate to the So- of the threat it is said to meet, indicate be needed whether or not we decide to viets that at a certain point we have that we could tolerate a few months de- proceed with deployment of the ABM developed an operational MIRV. that is lay in MIRV development with no loss safeguard system. I assume that the same what we are concerned about. in security. is true with regard to the MIRV. I understand this legislation does not CONCLUSION May I ask the gentleman, the chair- make any decision with respect to Thus, Mr. Chairman, with MIRV devel- man of the Joint Committee, whether I whether those tests should be continued opment we face another costly escalation am correct in my understanding that this or not. Is that correct? in the arms race which will not contrib- legislation before us does not, if passed, Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, again ute to the increased security of either constitute any decision by this body with I will have to repeat what I said to the side. Moreover, this development will regard to the desirability of proceeding gentleman, and I am trying to phrase my make a nuclear first strike strategy con- with the deployment of the ABM safe- words carefully. siderably more attractive than it is now. guard system. Testing of the missile with the com- These awesome prospects can be avoid Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, that ponent dummy parts has occurred in the ed if we can get a mutual moratorium is my understanding, that the money in past 2 or 3 years. It is occurring on MIRV testing and deployment with this bill is for research and development now and will continue to occur, and at a the Soviet Union. Whether we can work of all type warheads and has nothing to specific time when the tests are consid- out such a moratorium depends in part do with deployment. ered to be successful, it will be assumed on not going too far in our MIRV test- Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I thank then that there would be a utilization ing. Since deferring these tests for a few the gentleman. of it by putting nuclear components in months would not jeopardize the nation- Would I be correct in my understand- the warheads of our Minuteman and al security, and might actually contrib- ing that the same is true with regard to Poseidon or any other missile we thought ute to that security should an agreement the question of the testing of the MIRV it was adaptable to. be reached, I strongly urge the mem- weapons, that that decision is presently Mr. BINGHAM. I understand that, Mr. bers of this body to advocate and sup- in the hands of the President and the De Chairman. What I am concerned about port a halt on U.S. MIRV development fense Department, and there is nothing is that we not come to a point later in pending the commencement of the SALT in this legislation to indicate a decision the session when perhaps somebody de- talks and continuing thereafter so long one way or another on that? bating a resolution such as the gentle- as the Soviet Union refrains from test- Mr. HOLIFIELD. That is my under- man from California (Mr. COHELAN) is ing its multiple warheads, and in any standing, with this qualification, that talking about, or my resolution, might event pressing for a mutual moratorium the research and development and test- run into the argument, "Oh, no; we de- on MIRV development in these talks. ing of warheads that has been going on- cided that question when we passed the The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gen- as the gentleman knows-since 1945, AEC authorization bill." tleman has expired. continues. I want to be sure we will not be fore- Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I move In the case of these different types of closed from debating that when the time to strike the last word. warheads, the scientific technology used comes by reason of the fact that we pass (Mr. BINGHAM asked and was given in one warhead is applicable to the other. this legislation. permission to revise and extend his When it comes to testing the nuclear Mr. HOLIFIELD. I am sure the gentle- remarks.) warhead for Minuteman or Poseidon, or man will be given that opportunity under Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I re- if there should be a MIRV type, the nu- the rules of the House. I will be happy gret that the general debate was so ab- clear warheads are tested underground to discuss that matter with him at that breviated that I was not present to hear and are not tested in flight. time. the previous discussion between the Mr. BINGHAM. I thank the gentle- chairman of the Joint Committee and However, there are flights in which man. my colleague, the gentleman from New dummy components of what we would Mr. Chafr- York (Mr. KocH). call a multiple reentry vehicle would be Mrman, . I move to strike N of rithelinaisois. Mr. h in-requisite First, I would like to say that I share tested by the flight of missiles. We are woods. very intensively the concern that my col- continuously testing missile flights to ber of league, the gentleman from California, Kwajalein Island from the U.S. air base Mr. HARSHA. Mr. Chairman, I make has expressed with regard to the further at Vandenburg. There have been in the the point of order that a quorum is not testing of MIRV weapons. Some weeks past multiple entry vehicle tests both by present. ago I introduced a resolution in the the United States and the Soviet Union. The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will count, House, which now has 29 cosponsors. I This is nothing new, but they have always one hundred and fifteen Members are regret that the gentleman from Cali- been dummy components and not the present, a quorum. fornia prefers the form of resolution real thing. The gentleman from Illinois, (Mr. that was introduced in the other body Mr. BINGHAM. I thank the chairman. ANDERSON) is recognized for 5 minutes. by Senator BROOKE. But that is his privi- In passing, I might say it was my un- (Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois asked and lege. I do not know that there is any derstanding from testimony of the De- was given permission to revise and ex- enormous difference between the two. In fense Secretary Mr. Packard and testi- tend his remarks.) any event, I think it is of great impor- mony we heard coming from Secretary Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Chair- tance that the disarmament talks-the Laird that tests conducted by the Soviet man, I have listened with great care and SALT talks-proceed with the utmost Union have been, as far as is apparent, great interest as well to the remarks both ur 'ing, and there is no doubt that a mu- of MRV's, multiple reentry vehicles, and of the gentleman from California (Mr. tual freeze on the development of the not MIRVs multiple independently tar- COHELAN) and of the gentleman who MIRV weapon, as well as on the deploy- getable reentry vehicles. just addressed the Committee, the gen- ment of the ABM, would be helpful to I would like to explain to the gentle- tleman from New York (Mr. BINGHAM). Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 June 24, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE H 5103 ought to be willing to try to take the the President to follow up the remarks fact, feel forced to proceed with its own'. initiative and make such an attempt; made at his press conference by pro- MIRV. And since anti-ballistic missiles are', the logical strategic response to MIRY, the even though the chances are not very posing to the Soviets that we both cease question on the ABM would not be whether bright In that regard. MIRY testing as of July 31 and that the to deploy the current Safeguard proposal, Mr. Chairman, last Thursday evening moratorium continue for the duration but whether ABMs could be held to any-. President Nixon held a press conference of the talks. I think both we and the thing like the Safeguard's limited size. in which he discussed a wide range of Soviets are extremely apprehensive Now, the United States is confidena ce iw, subjects. Of particular interest to me about the Pandora's box which would be months the key away from independent operational guidance technology, was his announcement that he intended opened by MIRV and that we both re- though the is not testing multiple warheads to begin strategic arms limitation talks alize, in the President's words, "that a large enough to be especially useful in at- with the Soviet Union around the first moratorium could be mutually beneficial tacking the Soviet's hardened retaliatory mis- part of August, subject, of course, to So- to us." silos. The Soviets apparently are testing mul- viet acceptance of this invitation. Mr. Chairman, for these reasons, I have. tiple warheads of this counterforce size, but I think the President is to be com- decided to introduce in this body, a red- their independent guidance capability seems mended for sensing the urgency of these olution identical to the one introduced much rtg e the U.S. future. do to stop the in the Stop the talks and for rejecting any further de- in that other body by Senator BROOKE, Soviet tests the Umanifestly can lay in their commencement. I would calling upon the President to propose to national interest. The U.S. MIRV would be hope that the Soviet Union will agree to the Soviet Union an immediate and mu- absolutely necessary only if the Soviets de- the the July 31 target date so that we tual moratorium on MIRV flight tests. I ployed a large city-defense ABM system, a may begin substantive discussions on intend to circulate this resolution among project with a long lead time allowing the checking the dangerous arms spiral. my colleagues on this side of the aisle U.S. to pick up MIRV development. Thus, mutual lose and a V test sugrreat deal Last week, before this body, I expressed and urge them to cosponsor it with me. the gain from a little my concern over the delay in arms talks At the same time, the gentleman from to That is not to say the soviets would non. and over the development of MIRV mis- California (Mr. CoxEIaN) will be cir- essarily feel they would suffer from such a riles,. the multiple independently target- culating the same resolution among his limitation, for no doubt they would prefer able reentry vehicles that both we and colleagues on the other side of the aisle that the U.S. does not deploy MIRV. Since the Soviets are contemplating deploying. for the same purposes. I would ask that their interest in arms talks probably stems I expressed the belief that we should all the Members of this body study the from a desire to limit strategic spending, agi they would presumably forced e to the advan the - seriously consider proposing to the Rus- resolution carefully, consider its merits also, sians an immediate and mutual mora- and its urgency, and join us in expressing tageeau. Thus there is c lean some chance torium on MIRV flight tests pending a our concern over this crucial issue. the Soviets would agree to a test moratorium formal agreement at the conference Mr. Chairman, at this point in the REC- provided it is offered to them before they table. ORD, I wish to include certain editorials- feel the U.S. has perfected its own technology. I am disturbed by the fact that if a and articles pertaining to this proposal In endorsing a mutual test suspension and its halt in these tests is not called soon, it and I call these to the attention of my commending ident Senator Nixon Brook's ac tvitydi that may be too late to work out an agreement colleagues. behalf (P es ds this demons of the MIRV acceptable to either side. MIRV would The articles follow: heoblem. The same logi leads to the next introduce a warhead counting problem [From the Wall St Journal, June 20, step, approaching the Soviets immediately, that could only be checked by onsite in- tree while a mutual test suspension remains in spections, something neither side is likely Ma. NixoN on MIRV the realm of possibility. to agree to. In addition, MIRV would President Nixon says his Administration is - signal a new escalation in the arms race considering a joint Soviet-American mora- [From the New York Times, June 20, 1969] that would not only involve great costs torium on tests of multiple warhead missiles, MR. Nixon AND Mnrv but would imperil the delicate balance of but rules out any unilateral suspension on No decision Richard Nixon will face as terror being maintained by both sides, our part. Good enough, but we hope the President is likely to be more momentous U.S. sounds out the Soviets on some sort of than the decision he faces within the next The technology of MIRV is such that informal moratorium in advance of the arms few days on the proposal to suspend the the greater it is perfected in accuracy, talks that may start later this summer. flight-testing of MIRV multiple-warhead the more provocative it becomes as a When combined with missiles of appro- missiles. Mr. Nixon yesterday described this potential first strike weapon capable of priate size and accuracy, a MIRV (multiple proposal as "constructive" and said he would knocking out hardened missile targets. independently targetable reentry vehicles) favor it if the Soviet Union would agree to The introduction of MIRV will con- capability could be used for a nuclear first do the same. But his attack on a "unilateral" sequently put both us and the Russians strike taking out much of the opponent's suspension (of tests only the United States is in a constant state of fear over both the retaliatory force. Yet the posture of mutual now conducting) and his statement that deterrence, the bedrock of whatever sta- this move must be part of an arms control capabilities and intentions of the other bility a nuclear World can hope to find, de- agreement (which may take years to negoti- Side. pends more than anything else on each side's ate) confuse the issue. I was, therefore, encouraged by Presi- confidence that its retaliatory forces are se- Immediate suspension of MIRV tests is es- dent Nixon's reference last Thursday to cure from any such attack. MIRV technology sential to keep the door open for a strategic a mutual moratorium on MIRV flight threatens that confidence, and thus directly arms agreement with the Soviet Union that tests as "a very constructive proposal." threatens nuclear stability. - would freeze the existing nuclear balance, The President went on to say that the President Nixon's remarks recognize the head off further escalation of the missile administration is "considering the pas- special importance of multiple warheads in race and assure security to both sides. Con- suggesting a MIRV test moratorium as part tinned testing for even a few more weeks sibility of a moratorium on tests as part of the arms control agreement. Such an threatens to take the world past a point of of any arms control agreement." I think agreement, though, is likely to take years of no return into an expensive and dangerous the President was correct in ruling Out negotiation. The time during which the new round in the missile race. It promises a a "unilateral stopping of tests on our President's suggestion of a MIRV test mora- five-fold multiplication of nuclear delivery part." This would be unwise and a fool- torium remains feasible is measured in vehicles in the American strategic missile ish risk that we could not afford to take. months at best. forces-from 1,700 to about 8,000, an expan- I have proposed a mutual moratorium A limitation on MIRV seems conceivable sion that the Soviet Union would doubtless and I was pleased with the President's only while it remains in the test flight state, match. Even if limits on Soviet and Ameri- comment: when both we and the Soviets can easily can missile strength were later to be set at monitor the other's efforts. Once operational these higher levels, an era of nuclear nervous- Only in the event that the Soviet Union confidence is gained, any limitation could be ness would be almost sure to replace the pres- and we could agree that a moratorium could enforced only through detailed on-site in- ent situation of stable mutual deterrence. be mutually beneficial to us, would we be spection of missiles, a possibility that flies The bipartisan resolution introduced this able to agree to do so. in the face of the Soviet's historic opposition week by Senator Brooke . of Massachusetts However, I wish to reiterate my belief to any inspection of that kind. and 40 other Senators urging the President that a MIRV test moratorium cannot Once MIRV is operational, each side would to seek an immediate moratorium with the await a formal agreement at the SALT be forced to assume the other had deployed Soviet Union indicates a growing realization await conference. al must head off this SALT it. This would not absolutely preclude arms in Congress that MIRV testing is now the es- limitation, but it would force the nuclear main governor on the arms race. It is more calation now before either side is capable race up to its next plateau in spending and urgent than the issues that have dominated of deploying the weapon. I would urge warhead proliferation. Each side would in the missile debate in recent months, such as Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP7 4R000300090002-4 51?~ June 24, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Authoritative officials speak of a formula dividually and will be far more accurate briefer and asked if he had really intended under which both sides would freeze the than any previous or existing warhead. They to let MIRV out of the bag. Everyone agreed number of offensive missile sites and move will be far better suited for destruction of to delete the reference to the new weapon Into "thin" antiballistic missile systems. hardened enemy missile sites than any ex- syste was almost two more years before MIRV "That would, in effect, be disarmament," in isting missile warheads." the view of one Pentagon expert. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird implied surfaced publicly. But it was overshadowed A more modest step, as some see it, would the same thing when he told Congress In in the strategic weapons debate by the ABM. be a mere mutual freeze on the number of March of this year that he planned to spend MIRV's development as a "city-busting" delivery vehicles, or buses. "If they freeze $12.5 million to improve the Poseidon guid- weapon is now continuing on a schedule their. delivery vehicles they can MIRV UP ance system and thereby make it more effec- that calls for the first warheads to be in- to the kazoo and they would have no first - tive against "hardened" targets, meaning stalled on two nuclear submarines in Janu- strike," an official said, missile silos. ary, 1971. If the development is carried out This means, however, that each side would Statements of this kind have alarmed as planned it will cost, according to present have to make the worst assumptions about many scientists, such as Wolfgang Panofsky, estimates, about $17 billion-$7 billion for how much megatonnage lies in the silos of the Stanford physicist who was a member of Poseidon, $10tbereoareor Minucleartemanswers an III. to the prospective enemy. the President's Science Advisory Committee present It could still be a prescription for further from 1959 to 1964 and chairman of its panel where the Rasl Ruthey ssians stand MIRV 9 velop- arms stockpiling by both the Soviet Union on defense. ment. three huge wyr a tested the re SS-9bl five and United States. "They (such statements) are essentially with P y As with all of the scenarios on nuclear threatening to the Soviets," Panofsky said, megatons each. Whether these were guided war and its probabilities, MIRV has created ,and are technically wrong .. . From warheads or simply gravity bombs, such as deep divisions in both the scientific and Po- Laird's -statement the Russians could not the Polaris A-3 missile has carried since 1962, litical communities in the United.States. It help but draw the worst possible judgment is uncertain. plan- (about MIRV) . My own view is that this But no expert disputes the possibility that suggests to ners are seeking a a some "h"t Afirst-mstrikeerican" war capabiliity generation of MIRV is not a first-strike the Russians could quickly bring their MIRV Hers ar technology breast of the United States. against the Soviet Union. It suggests to threat to the Russians. The verbiage that has abreast then t than the Mboth sides rsenals would sucker for gadgets, that it will buy any new technical side." s today weapon that comes along, irrespective of The "technical side," however, continues increase possesses approximately enormously. The United d States today need. It suggests to still others that the to bother MIRV critics such as Dr. Leonard about 1100 for the arsenal arms control. Maryland. There may be, Rodburg Bsays, limi- ut there could Union raised MIRVing, the wh s in t The view from the Pentagon on these is- tations on MIRV's accuracy today. could be the no 8 8766 ofarheads delivery vehicles- sues is both reassuring and confusing. It is is no scientific barrier to far greater accu- based on the promise that security is, in racy in the relatively near future, he believes. the Russian arsenal coraised to to 5150. effect, found in insecurity, that the best The work of such guidance experts as Dr. Pentagon of not disturbing the present time. The molt the hedge against a nuclear war is, in Robert Charles Draper of the Massachusetts Intl- reasoning it that, both sid still would be McNamara's words, "the certainty of suicide tute of Technology may make it possible left ring is arstrike capability, to the aggressor." That is what is meant by fairly soon to put a small MIRV warhead al- Disarmament proponents are less sanguine. the "balance of terror." most "on the silo door", Rodburg says. "With see MI Disarmament r development as simply That balance, the Pentagon maintains, that kind of accuracy," he said, "you could They another useless step ve the "mad momen- two be upset by the United States in only destroy a silo with a satchel charge." another the arms epc in a step that, If men- two ways-an infallible system of defense Whatever the implications of the Penta- t um" would divert , al step needlessly h- (ABM) protecting the country from sui- gon's conflicting descriptions of MIRV'- mis- wIng eapons that neither side requires. cide" or an infallible system of offense to sion, the present policy is to stress the lim- _ destroy virtually all Soviet weapons in a itations of the weapon. Dr. Roland Herbst, From Time magazine, June 27, 1969] sneak attack. the Defense Department's deputy director of ARMS CONTROL: THE CRITICAL MOMENT MIRV has been called, by its critics, the research, said last week that pinpoint accu- forerunner to that kind of "first-strike" Of- racy for MIRV may be achieved "at some (Nara.-The central fact today in the con- fensive system. But the Defense Department time in the future" but it is "not In the frontation between the United States and rejects the argument. neighborhood at this moment." the Soviet Union is that progress in tech- The main reason offered is that MIRV's Military pressure to develop MIRV began nology has made it both necessary and pos- warheads are too small and too inaccurate as early as 196'2. Defense Secretary Robert S. sible to place restraints on the nuclear-arms for use against Russian missile silos. The McNamara at first said "no" to the new weap- race. The technological stars and planets are MIRV "bus" to be installed on the new Min- on. His reasoning was that the United States now in favorable conjunction-and they will uteman III missile, according to Defense of- could 'already kill as many targets as it not stay that way for long.) ficials, will carry from two to three 200- wanted to without going into MIRV deploy- Last week, after months of delay, the U.S. kiloton warheads. The "bus" on the new ment. Government began to act on that warning Poseidon submarine missile will carry up to But at that time there were also military from William C. Foster, head of the Arms 15 warheads of about 50 kilotons each (the intelligence readings that the Russians were Control and Disarmament Agency in the Hiroshima bomb was 20 kilotons.) building an ABM system around Moscow. It Johnson Administration. For the first time, In order for a 200-kiloton warhead to have turned out afterwards that what intelligence President Nixon's National Security Coun- a 70-per cent chance of knocking out a silo, originally proclaimed to be ABM defenses cil devoted a full session to defining the ne- It would have to land no farther than 200 were actually anti-aircraft installations to gotiating positions that the U.S. will take yards away; a 50-kiloton warhead would guard against advanced American bombers when it discusses possible limits on nuclear have to land no more than 140 yards away. that McNamara never deployed. weapons with the Soviet Union. A second This kind of accuracy, says the Pentagon, The Pentagon debated two alternatives to Security Council meeting is scheduled for is not possible today nor in the foreseeable the Soviet ABM. One was the use of penetra- this week. The President also announced future; the best that can be done now is to tion aids such as chaff and decoys for offen- that, if the Soviets agree on time and place, guide a warhead to within about 440 yards of sive missiles. The second was MIRV. SALT-the long-awaited strategic arms lim- its target. The first course was dropped on grounds ttation talks-will begin between July 31 That is close enough to kill a target--a that effective radar could distinguish in- and Aug. 15. silo, for example-when large weapons are coming warheads from decoys and shoot them 'UPSET BALANCE used, such as the 1-megaton warheads cur- down-an argument that, Ironically, oppo- rently risks that William Foster describes installed in Minuteman and Polaris. nents of the U.S. ABM used and Pentagon The are real. Central to them is a frighteninc new But it is too far away for smaller warheads scientists dismissed. MIRV proved highly at- e MIRV, for "multiple inde- Thus, be effective. tractive to the military. weapon re-entry "multiple vehicle.- more targetable, Thus, MIRV's only present usefulness, its It promised a capability to hit more tar- pendently called than the antiballistic rues" promoters insist, would be against "soft" gets without violating McNamara's self-im- MIRV, , threatens even even m to upset the uneasy bclmi- targets such as cities. posed freeze on the number of delivery ve- sile, i the th and uneasy U.S.S.R. There is general, although not unanimous, hicles. "MIRV was the best route to num- deterrence that have achieved. It may alsS sat off a domestic agreement in the scientific community that bers," was one Pentagon spokesman's h way of debate that d. td may al surpass a fervor the domestic ac- this description of MIRV's limitations is es- putting it. re bat that dispute. sentially correct. And so, in an atmosphere of supersecrecy, But the Pentagon itself has cast doubt on the Defense Department began developing Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are al- this presumption by the conflicting state- MIRV. No one mentioned the awesome ready testing multiple missile launchers, al- mente it has issued. Although it now insists acronym publicly until 1965 when a Penta- though the U.S. is believed to have a wide that IkII~ G is ineii~e'uive ago fist silos, it took gon official made reference to it at a press lead. The Pentagon argues for continuing precisely the opposite view in January, 1968 background session, the tests, and for development of MIRV, on when it put out a statement saying that Pentagon newsmen were so astonished at the grounds that the U.S. system is nearly "each new MIRV warhead will be aimed in- the disclosure that they went back to their operational and stopping tests would simply -Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 ? 6 Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 June 24, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE H 5107 by the Kennedy administration. During the period of 1958 to 1961, representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union met in Geneva to work out ways and means of developing a nuclear test ban agreement. However, while these negotiations were in progress the Soviets on August 30, 1961, suddenly announced that they were resuming atmospheric nuclear testing. On September 1, 1961, they began their test series, thus breaking the informal moratorium. The Soviet Union conducted a series of approximately 50 atmospheric nuclear tests with a total yield of about 120 megatons in the atmosphere. The largest test was a terror weapon of approximately 60 megatons-equiva- lent to 60 million tons of TNT-deto- nated on October 31, 1961, despite a res- olution adopted on October 27, 1961, by the United Nations appealing to the Soviet Union to refrain from carrying out such a test. It was just a year later that the Soviet Union brought the world to the brink of nuclear war when it placed offensive nuclear weapons in Cuba. At that time President Kennedy said : This action also contradicts the repeated assurances of Soviet spokesmen, both pub- licly and privately delivered, that. the arms buildup in Cuba would retain its original defensive character, and that the Soviet Un- ?ion had no need or desire to station strategic missiles on the territory of any other nation. And that quotation comes from Presi- dent Kennedy's statement made on Oc- tober 22, 1962. Past Soviet words and actions have not always coincided, whether we re- member their invasion of tiny Finland before World War II, or last August, when they invaded helpless Czechoslo- vakia. History is replete with examples of na- tions that have attempted to negotiate or have sought to appease aggressors from their position of weakness. I, for one, agree we should negotiate with the Soviet Union at any time and at any place. But I strongly oppose unilat- eral disarmament in the hope, and what I consider the vain hope, that the Soviet Union will not repeat the pattern that it has repeated over all the years we have tried to reach some kind of peaceful agreement through international con- ferences. Mr. CEDERBERG. I want to compli- }nent the gentleman in the well, the gen- tleman from California, for the state- ment he is making. It is a statement in the best long-term interests of the United States. I join him in his remarks. Mr. HOLIFIELD. I thank the gentle- man. Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. IOLIFIELD. I yield to the gentle- man. Mr. COHELAN. While, as I have indi- cated, I favor the principle of the Brooke resolution, I personally would go fur- ther on the theory that we can afford the time. I would ask the distinguished gentleman the following questions: Do you not agree that the MIRV's are justified by our defense planners as a means of securing penetration of ABM defenses? Is not that basically the thrust of it? Mr. HOLIFIELD. Will the gentleman repeat his question? Mr. COHELAN. My question is, Do you agree that our MIRV's are justified by our defense planners as a means of as- suring penetration of ABM defenses? Mr. HOLIFIELD. That is the Soviet ABM defenses? Mr. COHELAN. Yes. Mr. HOLIFIELD. I think that might very well be one reason. But there are a number of reasons. If you have a multiple warhead-that is, multiple parts in the warhead-let us say three or five or seven or whatever the number might be-you gain the ad- vantage of a spray shot that you have with a shotgun as against a rifle shot. A rifle shot is concentrated. There are other advantages but that would be one advantage. Mr. COHELAN. But the gentleman would agree that in the literature this is one of the primary purposes for de- veloping the MIRV; that is, to penetrate ABM defenses. Is this not one of its primary purposes in keeping the stra- tegic balance? Mr. HOLIFIELD. Yes. It would be use- ful if there is an ABM system in being in the Soviet Union. Yes, it would be useful. But I also say that the Soviets are testing multiple warheads, and for us to deny ourselves the same privilege and the same right to keep up with the Soviet advances in technology, I think is nothing less than suicidal. Mr. COHELAN. Is it not true in terms of their particular defenses that our intelligence does not permit us to come to the conclusion that they have any- thing there that we cannot handle at the present time? The point being that we can afford a little time because of the seriousness of this virtual quantum jump in weapons development. Would the gen- tleman say that that would be reason- able? Mr. HOLIFIELD. I am not willing to concede that we should stop in our re- search and development and that we can afford that time, as the gentleman says. To deny ourselves anything-I do not concede that that is for the benefit of the security of the United States. They can stop this tomorrow if in the disarmament negotiations they come in and say, "Let us stop this." We can sit down and say, "All right, we will stop." They can do that with respect to nu- clear weapons. They can also atop the development of nuclear submarines that they are turning out at the rate of one per month and we are turning out at the rate of 11/2 a year. Mr. COHELAN. Would the gentleman agree that our research is several years ahead of theirs? Mr. HOLIFIELD. I will not speculate how far they have gone or how far we are ahead of them. At one time I can remember when we had the atomic monopoly and many said it would be 10 years before the Soviets got an atomic bomb. They got it just 4 years later. They exploded one in Au- gust 1949. We exploded our first device in 1945. In the late 1940's and early 1950's there were many who said we should not develop a hydrogen bomb. In 1953 the Soviets exploded a hydrogen bomb. Ob- viously they were working on it for some time. I do not know what they may be work- ing on. I have some ideas. Some of them I can express and some I cannot because of their classification. But I am not will- ing to say that the Soviets are fools and that their trained scientists are not ca- pable of making just as good weapons as we make. They certainly made long-range mis- siles with 5,000- and 6,000-mile ranges, and they exploded a 60-megaton weapon. We never exploded anything anywhere near that large. I am not saying we could not. I know that we could. But I am not willing to compromise the strength of the United States on the basis of what the Soviets might or might not do. (On request of Mr. COHELAN, and by unanimous consent, Mr. HOLIFIELD was allowed to proceed for 2 additional min- utes.) Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Chairman, if the distinguished chairman of the commit- tee will yield again, does the chairman not now feel that this is a momentous breakthrough in the arms race? Mr. HOLIFIELD. It is an important breakthrough, but not any more than the nuclear submarine or the hydrogen bomb or any other major advance in weapons systems. Mr. COHELAN. You do not feel that this is in any way going to destabilize the strategic balance? Mr. HOLIFIELD. I certainly do not, no more than I think the ABM would destabilize, because they already have 67 ABM's around Moscow. They have several hundred additional in the Tal- linn system, and you can guess what that constitutes. I am saying they have in existence devices such as the multiple reentry vehicle. I do not know what de- gree of sophistication they have achieved. I do not think anyone else in the United States knows. And neither do they know the sophistication of our weapons. Mr. COHELAN. Let me ask one final question, to which I think I know the answer. As the distinguished chairman of this committee, would you favor a mutual moratorium in which both the United States and the Soviet Union would halt MIRV testing and deploy- ment? Mr. HOLIFIELD. Yes, and not only MIRV testing, but nuclear submarine building, plane building, and all other forms of warfare-if we could get a genuine mutual agreement to disarm, coupled with on-site inspection, so that we would know we were not being played for suckers. But as long as we have not been able to get mutual inspection, I say we cannot go on Soviet promises, because history has shown they have not always kept their promises. Mr. KOCH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. I actually had not intended to partic- ipate in the debate but merely to listed. Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 H 5108 Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE June 24, 1969 I was intrigued by the presentation of the distinguished chairman of the Joint Committee and his response to several questions. I, at first, believed and was worried that passage of this bill, which Includes a sum of money to be used for the testing of MIRV, would in some way be a decision made by this Congress on a matter that is so momentous that it ought not be the subject of an hour or less debate, but rather be the subject of a comprehensive debate. That it is a con- troversial subject is apparent by the fact that at this point there axe several pend- ing resolutions concerned with the test- ing of MIRV. There is the Bingham resolution, the Cohelan resolution, and the Brooke resolution,. all of which Indicate the Con- cern of Members of both Houses that the question of whether or not we should proceed with the MIRV be given further consideration. I was reassured on that point by the colloquy which took place between my colleague, JONATHAN BING- HAM, and the distinguished chairman, when it was made clear ?hat passage of this bill did not in any way foreclose the real debate on MIRV which is yet to come, and I -am now reassured that we are not backing into something unin- tentionally. I would assume, as I am sure everyone else in the House does, that when a mo- mentous decision invoo'dng billions of dollars and the escalation of the arms race would be undertaken, that it would be undertaken in a knowing way, in a concrete way, that is to say, at a time when everybody would know what they were doing. When the distinguished Chairman said he did not believe in uni- lateral disarmament, I think he spoke for every Member of this House. I do not think there is any Member in this House who believes in unilateral disarmament. The real question, and the one that is not going to be debated in 5 minutes by this Member or any other Member, is, are we doing something which will prevent mu- tual disarmament when we proceed with the testing of MIRV? There is at least a considerable body of opinion which be- lieves that the testing of MIRV might be irreversible in its consequences, and there are many of us who want to reflect on that and want to have, considered dis- cussions with respect to it before we make such a decision. The fact that the Chair- man made very clear that this House will have an opportunity to make that decision at a later time and in a more deliberate way reassures me, and I thank him for that reassurance. (Mr. HOSMER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the necessary number of words. Mr. Chairman, I think this is about the end of the debate. I would like to bring forth a few facts, amongst which is the so-called MIRV is not sotie strange new weapon that suddenly ,developed from nowhere. It is no more lAaii an ordinary progression in refinement of the origtflal missiles we developed ih a rather crude and unsophisticated state, which are gradually being improved, as is normal with any weapons system throughout the history of man. All of which is nor- mal and expected and anticipated. MIRV is not any unbalancing shocker, as many would have us believe. It is no surprise to anyone familiar with defense or nu- clear strategy. The question has been raised as to whether or not the MIRV is a first-strike weapon. On that let us just look at what deterrence is. It is a capability to strike back devastatingly if somebody else starts something and nobody is going to start something unless he has a clear first-strike capability to eliminate his victim's capability to strike back. MIRV or no MIRV makes no difference in this regard. A multiple warhead missile is no more or no less a first-strike weapon than a single warhead missile. Total cumulative relative strategic power de- termines the first-strike issue. As a matter of fact, one of the gentle- men who is quite often quoted on this subject, that is Wolfgang Panofsky, says the only first strike danger about MIRV is the talk that is going around about it being a first-strike weapon, when in fact it is no such thing and probably never can be. Now if I may proceed, the converse of MIRV, of course, is simply going to a larger number of missiles with single warheads, which the Soviet Union has been doing up to the present time. But they have also been developing a MIRV capability-and let me assure Members of that and let me assure Members also, that no one can assure Congress the Soviet Union is not developing such a capability. It has been revealed they have conducted multiple intercontinen- tal ballistic missile warhead tests. They have dropped them in the Pacific. By the pattern of the fall of these warheads we cannot tell whether these were un- guided or individually guided warheads simply because individually guided re- entry vehicles can be programed to fall in a random pattern so that their guided or unguided feature will never be dis- closed. - With this kind of capability for decep- tion in mind, I want to advise the gentle- men who have been endorsing the mora- torium idea, that there is a pitfall in it they apparently overlook in-so-far-as MIRV is concerned. We cannot tell what the other side is doing, and particularly we cannot tell what they are doing so long-so long, gentlemen-as these in- dividual warheads are inside a nose cone of a single missile. If we want to make sense'in this area, we must limit or put a moratorium on the number of delivery vehicles-which is something we can check on-and not something which is inside those missiles, the warheads to wit, which we cannot check on. Otherwise, we may be walking into a trap. Many of us were around here in the old days, when we had the Limited Test Ban Treaty to contend with. We found out that during those negotiations and our forbearance from nuclear test- ing was taken by the Soviets as nothing more than an opportu, to rep~arefgr.. T Ie t s e llnd the a ever of a gentle- man's agreement not to test. Let me say this: This Nation today might not be a free nation except for the activities carried on by two men in this Chamber today-Chairman HOLIFIELD and Representative PRICE. They were the men who in the days of the H-bomb argument helped this Nation resist the temptation to disarm itself by a uni- laterial decision to forgo development of the H-bomb. Incidentally, every single one of the arguments being made today against MIRV were made by the oppo- nents of the H-bomb a decade ago. It is all the same--all the same, tired old arguments are being dragged out-only the players have changed. If it were not for Congressman HOLIFIELD and Con- gressman PRICE and their persuasiveness in behalf of the defense of this Nation, we would not have got the H-bomb just months earlier than on that shocking day the Soviets burst theirs on the world. It was as shocking a day almost, I remind Members, as that day on which sputnik orbited around, the world-when the Soviet Union again surprised us with their capability to develop hardware of sophistication equal to ours. I suggest that the Members of this body look to real experts who know atomic weapons and understand nuclear strategy-experts like Congressmen HOLIFIELD and PRICE-for advice in these vital defense matters. I respectfully suggest that some people new on the scene, have not forgotten the lessons of the past. They just never were around to learn them in the first place. Therefore they are neither reliable prophets nor knowledgeable advisers. Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask unanimous consent that all debate cease in 5 minutes. We have discussed this thoroughly. This MIRV and ABM deployment situation is not exactly in the bill. It is something to come in the bill from the Armed Services Committee later on. While it is interest- ing, we have a $14 billion appropriation bill in the wings waiting to come on, with the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. EviNs) and his committee. Unless there is a strong feeling we should have ex- tended debate, I ask unanimous consent that all debate cease in 5 minutes. The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California? There was no objection. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York (Mr. LOWENsTEIN) is recog- nized. Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield to no one in my respect for the gentleman from California and the gentleman from Illinois. That, of course, is not at issue. I am curious about one thing. What is the ob- jection to the resolution proposed by Senator BROOKE and cosponsors by 39 other Members of the Senate on the question of the testing and development of MIRV? Of course we are not now debating MIRV specifically, but If we could agree on that very constructive and sensible resolution, we could proceed in general rapper on this matter. That would be a Yaliiy, unepect, turn of events, it seems to ne. Is there disagreement about the pro- posal of Senator BROOKE, in which he has been joined by so many of his colleagues Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 June 24, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE H 5100 of both parties? I hear whispers here about the judgment-even about the con- cern for their country-of some Mem- bers of this House who have raised ques- tions about MIRV. Does anyone doubt the judgment or the concern for the future of this country of these .40 Sen- tors as well? Could we not undertake to conduct the discussion about this matter without drifting off into silly innuen- does? In there anything in the Brooke resolu- tion that is objectionable to anyone here? If so, may we hear what, so we can con- sider any objections on their merits? Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. LOWENSTEIN. I yield to the gen- tleman from California. Mr. HOSMER. This whole business of a moratorium is a negotiating tool in connection with the SALT talks, the strategic arms limitation talks, proposed for August between the United States and the U.S.S.R. The moratorium idea is a negotiating tool which should be in the hands of the administration, but should not be thrust in its hands by ac- tion of Congress, an action not requested of Congress by the administration. It is to be carefully noted that this negotia- tion tool, even in administration hands proved to be useless and dangerous in connection with the limited test ban talks. For this reason, that is, previous failure, no use of it since has been at- tempted. It was not used in the case of the outer space treaty talks or in the case of the nonproliferation treaty talks, nor is it being used in connection with the current talks on barring weapons of mass destruction on the ocean bottoms. Those who now want precipitously to legislate a moratorium ought to reflect a little on the weakness of the reed on which they seek to lean. That, in short, is my objection on the merits. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York (Mr. BINGHAM) is recognized. Mr BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to make a couple of things clear. First, I too believe in the deterrent theory. It is our deterrent which assures the security of this country, and I cer- tainly do not want to do anything to interfere with our maintenance of an effective deterrent. But I do not believe either the ABM or the MIRV are needed for that purpose. Second, with regard to the remarks made by the distinguished chairman of the Joint Committee, I certainly do not believe we should proceed on the as- sumption that the Soviets are nice peo- ple, that they are easy to deal with, or that they have good motives. I have no such illusions. But I do believe we can achieve agreement with them on mat- ters that are of mutual interest to us, as we did in the case of the Test Ban Treaty and as we did in the case of the Nonproliferation Treaty. I hope I am correct in saying the distinguished chair- man is in agreement We did the right thing in pressing for, bath those treaties and that we are better off for having both those treaties. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Missouri (Mr. HALL) is recognized. Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I have heard some statements here that are of ques- tionable basis in fact and certainly not germane to this debate. It is a matter of record that we started the research and development in the au- thorizing Committee on Armed Services at least 3 years before there was any evi- dence of the opponent's anti-ballistic- missile capability or intent. Second, while negotiations might be worthwhile, after one is thrice rebuffed one begins to realize it "takes two to Tango." Any American knows if you get in bed with a rattlesnake you expect to get bit. I am for this bill the way it is. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York (Mr. PODELL) is recognized. Mr. PODELL. Mr. Chairman I would like to associate myself with the remarks of the gentleman from New York (Mr. BINGHAM) regarding funds for the pro- posed MIRV system of weapons. It is growing increasingly obvious that this system is the rebirth of the Hydra of old Greek mythology. A many-headed ICBM would replace single-warhead missiles we now possess in such numbers. At one stroke ICBM's on both sides would rise from single threats to multiple ones to each party. Instead of a single warhead, there will be from three to 10 under each nosecone. Such a weapon is unwarranted at this time. We must weigh our options carefully. At this time there is no pressing need for such a conversion of our major weapons systems by MIRV installation. As of to- day, there is a slim chance that meaning- ful disarmament may be made reality through effective inspection by spy-in- the-sky satellites. These are now so sophisticated that they are able, from their Polar orbits, to delineate individual telephone lines. Therefore, they would be able to provide a meaningful system of inspection if. some disarmament was at- tempted under existing conditions. However, if each power was able to lift the nosecone from each missile and replace its single warhead with from three to 10 individually targeted war- heads, the best spying system available or projected would have no way of find- ing out or ascertaining how many war- heads comprised the other side's capa- bility. A terrifying element would be in- jected instantly into the geopolitical equation of each power. Was the other side attaining a first strike capacity? Only an element of doubt is necessary. The arms race and its insane momentum takes over from there. Once the ques- tion exists, the other side must take im- mediate steps to match it. Hence, a new escalation to the arms race confronts us, and the mad roller coaster ride down- hill toward inevitable destruction goes even faster. We are all captives on the same roller coaster. For these reasons, I believe my col- league's points are exceptionally well made. There is no reason why we must at this point swiftly begin to MIRV our missiles, complete testing of the concept or appropriate money for warhead de- velopment or production. We already can kill our opponents many times over. If this system is developed, we shall be able to kill them a few more times over. Hurrah. It is wisdom of a far-seeing sort as well as the essence of moderation of hold off on procurement, development, and test- ing of this weapon. I concur with my col- league in his excellent effort to avoid this latest move toward frustration of final hopes for disarmament. The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises. Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. BURL of Massachusetts, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under con- sideration the bill (H.R. 12167) to au- thorize appropriations to the Atomic Energy Commission in accordance with section 261 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended and for other purposes, pursuant to House Resolution 448, he re- ported the bill back to the House. The SPEAKER. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill. The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time. The SPEAKER. The question is on the passage of the bill. The question was taken; and Speaker announced that the ayes peared to have it. the ap- Mr. HARSHA. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present. The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present. The Doorkeeper will close the doors, the Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members, and the Clerk will call the roll. The question was taken; and there were-yeas 406, nays 3, not voting 23, as follows: [Roll No. 871 YEAS--406 Abbitt Bow Clawson, Del Abernethy Brademas Clay Adair Brasco Cleveland Adams Bray Cohelan Addabbo Brinkley Collier Albert Brock Collins Alexander Brooks Colmer Anderson, Broomfield Conable Calif. Brotzman Conte Anderson, Dl. Brown, Mich. Corbett Anderson, Brown, Ohio Corman Tenn. Broyhill, N.C. Coughlin Andrews, Ala. Broyhill, Va. Cowger Andrews, Buchanan Cramer N. Dak. Burke, Fla. Culver Annunzio Burke, Mass. Cunningham Arends Burleson, Tex. Daddario Ashbrook Burlison, Mo. Daniel, Va. Ashley Burton, Calif. Daniels, N.J. Aspinall Bush Davis, Ga. Ayres Button Davis, Wis. Baring Byrne, Pa. Dawson Barrett Byrnes, Wis. de is Garza Beall, Md. Cabell Delaney Belcher Caffery Dellenback Bell, Calif. Cahill Denney Bennett Camp Dennis Berry Carter Dent Betts Casey Derwinski Devill Cederberg Devine Biaggi Celler Dickinson Biester Chamberlain Diggs Bingham Chappell Dingell Blackburn Chisholm Donohue Blanton Clancy Dorn Boggs Clark Dowdy Boland Clausen, Downing Bolling Don H Dulski Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 H 5110 Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE June 24, 1969 Duncan King Reid, N.Y. Dwyer Kleppe Reifel Eckhardt Koch Reuss Edmondson Kuykendall Rhodes Edwards, Ala. Kyl Riegle Edwards, Calif. Kyros Rivers Edwards, La, Landgrebe Roberts Ellberg Landrum Robison Erlenborn Langen ltodino Esch Latta Rogers, Colo. Eshleman Leggett Rogers, Fla. Evans, Colo. Lennon Ronan Evins, Tenn. Lipscomb Rooney, N.Y. Fallon . Lloyd Rooney, Pa. Farbstein Long, La. Rosenthal Fascell Long, Md. Feighan Lowenstein Roth Findley Lujan Roudebush Fish Lukens ituppe, Fisher McCarthy Ruth Flood McClory ityan Flowers McCloskey St Germain Flynt McClure Fit. Onge Foley McCulloch Sandman Ford, Gerald R. McDade E;rhadeberg Ford, McDonald, Scherle William D. Mich. Schneebeli Foreman McEwen t-s chwengel Fountain McFall Scott Fraser McKneelly S:ebelius Frelinghuysen McMillan Shipley Frey MacGregor :ihriver Friedel Madden Sikes Fulton, Pa. Mahon Sisk Fulton, Tenn. Mailliard Skubitz Fuqua Mann Slack Galiflanakis Marsh Smith, Calif. Garmatz Martin nith, Iowa Gaydos Mathias Smith, N.Y. Gettys Matsunaga Snyder Giaimo May Springer Gibbons Mayne Stafford Gilbert Meeds Staggers Goldwater Meskill Stanton Gonzalez Michel Steed Goodling Mikva Steiger, Ariz. Gray Miller, Calif. Stelger, Wis. Green, Oreg. Miller, Ohio Stephens Green, Pa. Minish Stokes Griffin Mink Stratton Griffiths Minshall Stubblefield Gross Mize Sullivan Grover Mizell Symington Gubser Mollohan Taft Glide Monagan 'raleott Hagan Montgomery Taylor Haley Moorhead Teague, Calif. Hall Morgan . Teague, Tex. Halpern Morse Thompson, Ga. Hamilton Morton Thomson, Wis. Hammer- Mosher Tiernan --- schmidt More Tunney Hanley Murphy, Ill. Udall Hanna Murphy, N.Y. znlman Hansen, Idaho Myers Utt Hansen, Wash. Natcher Van Deerlin Harsha Nelsen VanderJagt Harvey Nichols Vanik Hastings Nix Vigorito Hawkins Obey W aggonner Hays O'Konski Waldie Hechier, W. Va. Olsen Wampler Heckler, Mass. O'Neal, Ga. Watkins Helstoski O'Neill, Mass, Watson Henderson Ottinger Watts Hicks Passman Weicker Hogan Patman Whalen Holifield Patten Whalley Horton Pelly White Hosmer Pepper Whitehurat Howard Perkins Whitten Hull Pettis Widnall Hungate Philbin Wiggins Hunt Pickle Williams Hutchinson Pike Wilson, Bob Ichord Pirnie Wilson, Jacobs Podell Charles H. Jarman Poff Winn Joelson Pollock Wold Johnson, Calif. Preyer, N.C. Wright Johnson, Pa. Price, Ill. Wyatt Jonas Price, Tex. Wydler Jones, Ala. Pucineki Wylie Jones, N.C. Quie Wyman Jones, Tenn,. Quillen Yates Karth Railsback Patron Kastenmeler Randall Young Kazen Rarick Zablocki Kee Rees Zion Keith Reid, III. Zwsch NAYS-3 Conyers Saylor NOT VOTING-23 Blatnik Kluezynski Pryor, Ark. Brown, Calif. Macdonald, Purcell Burton, Utah Mass. Roybal Carey Mille Satterfield Gallagher Nedzi Stuckey Hathaway O'Hara Thompson, N.J. Hebert Poage Wolff Kirwan Powell So the bill was passed. The Clerk announced the following pairs: Mr. Hebert with Mr. Pryor of Arkansas. Mr. Kirwan with Mr. Burton of Utah. Mr. Carey with Mr. Gallagher. Mr. Satterfield with Mr. Roybal. Mr. Mills with Mr. Wolff. Mr. Brown of California with Mr. czynski. Mr. Stuckey with Mr. Blatnik. Mr. Macdonald of Massachusetts with Mr. Nedzi. Mr. Purcell with Mr. O'Hara. Mr. Hathaway with Mr. Powell. The result of the vote was announced as above recorded. The doors were opened. A motion to reconsider the table. GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to extend their remarks on the bill just passed. Thet SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California? There was no objection. Mrs. MAY. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 87 I am recorded as not voting. I was present and voted "yea." I ask unan- imous consent that the permanent RECORD be corrected accordingly. The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Washington? There was no objection. INDEPENDENT OFFICES AND DE- PARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT APPRO- PRIATIONS, 1970 Mr. BOLLING. Mr. Speaker, by direc- tion of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 449 and ask for its immediate consideration. The Clerk read the resolution, as fol- lows: H. Rxs. 449 Resolved, That during the consideration of the bill (H.R. 12307) making appropria- tions for sundry independent executive bu- reaus, boards, commissions, corporations, agencies, offices, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970, and for other purposes, all points -of order against the provisions contained under the follow- ing headings are hereby waived: "Appa- lachian Regional Development Programs" beginning qp page 3 line 22 through gage 4 line 3; "rndepencrent $ces- ppalachiaa Regional Commission" beginning on page 4, line 15 through page 4, line 21; "National Aeroautics and Space Administration" be- ginning on page 21, line 13, through page 23, line 3; and "National Science Founda- tion" beginning on page 23, line 5, through page 25, line 2. The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Missouri (Mr. BOLLING) Is recognized for I hour. Mr. BOLLING. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 minutes to the gentleman from Califor- nia (Mr. SMITH) and pending that I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, the three specific waivers of points of order are necessary because the items on which the waivers are given or proposed by this resolution have not been authorized by law. I explained this to the House during the colloquy between the majority and minority leaders last Thursday. The items are, as anyone who listened to the reading of theresolution knows, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the National Sci- enceFoundation, and a part of the Ap- palachian development programs. The waiver makes it passible for Members of the House to work their will on the specific provisionsof the appropriation, and the Committee on Rules felt that- it was ,wiser to handle the matter in this fashion rather than permitting a situa- tion to develop in which the Senate al- most surely would add the items on the Senate side when the matter came up, and the only participation of the House would be in conference, and on the con- ference report. Therefore the Committee on Rules rec- ommends the waiver on these three points of order. I urge the adoption of the resolution. Mr. SMITH of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may con- sume. (Mr. SMITH of California asked and was given permission to revise and ex- tend his remarks.) Mr. SMITH of California. Mr. Speaker, I concur in and agree with the remarks made by the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. BOLLING) In explanation of House Resolution 449, and urge the adoption of the resolution. Mr. BOLLING. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Cali- fornia (Mr.-MILLER). (Mr MILLER of California asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, last July the President signed into law a bill which originated- in the Committee on Science and Astronautics and which was the culmination of 31/2 years of work. This is Public Law 90-407 which revised and streamlined the or- ganic act of the National Science Foun- dation. That law contains a provision requir- ing annual authorization of the Foun- dation's budget from this point forward. It was a provision not sought by this committee. It was added in the Senate and agreed to in conference. When the conference report came be- fore the House on June 27, 1968, no Member of the House raised any objec- tion to--the authorization provision or any other part of the bill. The only dis- cussion was between the distinguished Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 S 6871 June. 20, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE MILE STI7 RESERVATI NITHOUT c CT BOOK OS SIN ety full partnership in o ermru~lixliery of wilother l be ABM SUPPORTE an appropriate fo measures which recognize the new Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, a great Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, as the awareness,' idealism, and talents of our verbal battle has raged in the Senate for vote on the Safeguard ABM system young citizens. many weeks over the merits of the anti- draws near, it becomes increasingly im- It is particularly critical that we afford ballistic-missile system proposal. portant for each Senator to inform him- our young people the opportunity to seek While some observers have called this self fully on this critical issue. answers, to express their views, and to a battle for headlines, and because of In recent months we have received a use their influence in the development of numerous publications on the issue have deluge of material on both sides of the our national -and t they want do also termed the controversy "the battle question. Unfortunately, much of this wa to in at o do y and and they want to do it of books," I am aware of the deep-rooted material tends to be colored by the views youth can p and effective tmanner. That misgivings some Senators have about the of the author, whether it be a prominent can participate-and partscipat- wisdom of the Safeguard proposal. scientist opposing deployment or the d a a conhe politi mampa g s of 1968. Nationwide polls have indicated that Department of Defense trying to justify Those the politcal ovNows is nut the American people by a substantial it. lo k back Now is not majority favor the deployment of the For a fair, lucid, and factual presen- Those ntfor us ns are suffici young a to look band praise Safeguard proposal in the interest of the tation of the basic facts about the Safe- young people for their persevering national security, and a vast majority guard system and an excellent summary e,our responsibility bring ing youth is the to do have an opinion on whether an ABM of the best arguments for and against efforts. the Rather, renew discussion, ff formulation, and in implemen- ystem is in the best interest of the se- deployment, I commend to the attention dnfr policies. and iworth curity of the people. of Senators, particularly those who have is- ompl hme is a worthy _ It is time we heard from the experts not yet made up their minds on the is- tatn objet of our fit our rive. Republic. accomplishment will bens- whose whole concern is the protection sue, the Democratic study group fact fit our life and property in these United book entitled "ABM." The Democratic My suppd. to this prbelief oposal those States. One such organization is the study group booklet provides all the basic ally the age It i s 1 to 21 that those Civil Defense Association of Wyoming. information one requires to come to an of discharging age group the ri t 21 are capable The Wyoming Association on May 15, informed judgment on deploying the intelligent ent and the right conscientious ote in an 1969, approved unanimously a resolution Safeguard systems, in addition to a bib- And cri manner. supporting the Safeguard proposal liography for further study of material And a democracy thrives w when its base ase ,without reservation." From personal available from the CONGRESSIONAL brought into the and adocratic persons are knowledge, I categorically assert that RECORD. It has been praised by Repre-dem aghon the ideal for whi we c. Full the motives of this association cannot be sentatives who support and those who participatio accomplished he iden gimpugned. Oppose the Safeguard system. I have strive. Rt to to te this in giving i women the right ig vote, in eliminating I ask unanimous consent to have found the booklet most useful. the poll tax, in passing the Voting Rights printed in the RECORD the complete text Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- Act, and in other measures. Now is the of the resolution adopted by the Civil sent book the Democratic study group by time to further extend our base by af- Defense Association of Wyoming. the book entitled study gin the for full participation. tion was ordered to be printed in the HousRD. Seven percent of our population is in RECORD, as follows: There being no objection, the study the age group of 18 to 21. These approxi- RESOLUTION-APPROVED UNANIMOUSLY BY THE mately, 13 million persons are actually CIVIL DEFENSE ASSOCIATION OF WYOMING, was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, adults in our society. They are in the MAY 15, 1969 as follows: education process; they have jobs. And Whereas Civil Defense is concerned with ABM-DEMOCRATIC STUDY GROUP, U.S. HOUSE for the most part, they can marry, buy the protection of life and property under OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1969 insurance, sign wills, and are treated as any condition; and: I. INTRODUCTION adults in the courts of law and are Whereas the National posture for the pro- This DSG Fact Book is designed to pro- tection of all citizens should be the concern vide Members of Congress with a basic un- ry. Armed Forces to defend d of all elected officials at all levels of govern- derstanding of the proposed SAFEGUARD the t sir c into persons participate t in t e Pe Our young ment, and: ABM system, a history of anti-ballistic mis- VISTA, the Peace Corps, in Whereas the proposed Anti-Ballistic Mis- sile development and the ARM debate, and VISSTAs TA, and the community action and sile System would provide the best known a fair and factual exposition of the argu- today able programs. I feel the youth of protection from a nuclear threat of an aggres- ments for and against SAFEGUARD today are better educated and more sor nation, and: deployment. aware. And, more importantly, I think Whereas the National Fallout Shelter Pro- The controversy over the proposal to de- our young people possess a greater social gram is the primary and only element of Civil ploy an anti-ballistic missile system is cer- conscience; are more perplexed by the Defense planning and programming for the tain to rank as one of the key issues of the injustices which exist in the world; and protection of the population from nuclear 91st Congress. In addition to the immediate are more anxious to rectify these ills. accident or attack, and: defense and foreign policy considerations in- The future, in large part, belongs to Whereas time is the most limited com- volved, the ABM debate has other ramifica- youth. It is imperative that they have modity during periods of international ten- tions as well. It has helped stimulate a critical examination of national commit- the opportunity to help set the course of sion Now therefore be it resolved that the Civil ments and the size of the defense establish- that future. ment needed to fulfill these commitments, My estimate of young people is high. It without Defense Association of Wyoming supports and it is expected to produce closer Congres reservation President Richard M. continues to grow. I feel that our youth Nixon's proposed Anti-Ballistic Missile Sys- sional scrutiny SAFEGUARD of future authorization defense bills are cur proposals. is equal to the challenges of today and tem, and encourages the Congressional dele- tomorrow. They will aid in bringing into gation from the State of Wyoming and all rently being considered by both the House being a better world than those of past other states in Region Six, Office of Civil and Senate Armed Services Committees. The Defense, to assist in bringing this protec- first vote on the issue, however, is expected generations have been able at create. tion to the population of the United States to come in the Senate. If authorization is Mr. President, I facet that voting age at the earliest possible date, and: approved, funds for SAFEGUARD will be in- by the House M M se one embers. . But t I the believe report so Be It further resolved that this resolution eluded in both the Department of Defense by (DOD) and Atomic Energy Commission strongly in this proposition that I have fens e se Counci Councilto the through its United Region States Six repre- Civil r e- (AEC) appropriation bills later in the year. se commented at length. It is gratifying sentatives meeting at Joplin, Missouri, on 17. . II HOW SAFEGUARD WORKS AND WHAT IT that our colleagues determined that the 1s, and 19 June 1969, begging that body to WILL COST recommendation for a lower voting age endorse this action in support of President An anti-ballistic missile (ABM) is a mis- should be one of their key recommen- Nixon and his proposed national defense sile armed with a warhead designed to de- 4atlons. effort. stroy an enemy incoming intercontinental Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 June 20, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE November 1966. Secretary McNamara an- pounces that the Soviet Union has begun deployment of the Galosh (Nike-Zeus- type) ABM defense system around Moscow. December 1986. China detonates its second hydrogen bomb. Congress approves $167.9 for ABM procure- ment without the request of the Secretary of Defense. January 1967. President Johnson declares that no U.S. ABM deployment will be made until completion of arms control negotia- tions with the Soviet Union, and requests discussions for control of ABMs. Defense Secretary McNamara, in his de- fense posture statement, presents a detailed argument against deployment of a complete, Soviet-oriented ABM system: "It is a virtual certainty that the Soviets will act to main- tain their deterrent, which casts grave doubts on the deploying of the NIKE X system for the protection of our cities against the heavy, sophisticated missile attack that they could launch in the 1970s." General Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expresses disagreement with the McNamara position and recommends a "measure of defense" for the country. The JCS recommends a two stage deployment plan: (a) $9.9 BILLION to provide 25 cities with ABM defense; (b) $19.4 BILLION to add 25 more cities and thicken Sprint defense. February 1967. The Soviet Union an- nounces that it has developed an ABM sys- tem capable of protecting it against attack. Dr. John Foster, then as now DOD Direc- tor of Research and Engineering, says: "As a matter of technical judgment I believe that these larger (ABM) deployments carry with them technical risks. The likelihood of large and sophisticated attacks with the de- ployment of significant U.S. defense increases .the technical uncertainty of the defense system. June 1967. The House Appropriations Com- mittee report on the DOD appropriations bill for FY 1968 states: "It would appear that the initiation of deployment of 'light' or `thin' defense, now, may very well be a most useful first step toward whatever level of ballistic missile defense ultimately ap- pears necessary." At the Glassboro Conference President Johnson declares his hope to work with the Soviet Union in limiting development of strategic nuclear weapons, including ABM systems. Summer 1967. The FY 1968 military budget, containing a total of $782.9 million for anti-ballistic missiles, is approved by the 90th Congress. Of these funds, $297.6 mil- lion are allocated for ABM procurement, $421.3 million for ABM research and develop- ment, and $64 million for ABM construc- tion. Of this amount, $366 million is speci- field for the Sentinel system, an allocation that President Johnson requested in antici- pation of a decision to deploy. Heated controversy over the question of ABM deployment develops in Congressional debate over appropriations for FY 1968. September 1967. Secretary McNamara out- lines the futility of erecting a Soviet-oriented ABM but announces that "there are margi- nal grounds for concluding that a light de- ployment against this possibility (a U.S.- Chinese nuclear clash) is prudent." Intelli. gence estimates a Chinese nuclear capability of 20-30 ICBMs by 1975. 'November 1967. DOD announces that the ABM system to be deployed (named Sen- tinel) is a thin configuration of the Nike X system, and identifies the first ten areas to be surveyed as possible site locations. March 1968. President Johnson says the Setinel program is of the highest national priority, kp"r'il 196$. In opening debate on the DOD appropriations bill for FY 1969 the Senate rejects, by a vote of 28-31, an amendment to delay deployment of the ABM until certified as "practicable" by the Secretary of Defense. June 1968. The Senate rejects by a vote of 34-52 an amendment to delay ABM con- struction funds for one year. Foreign Minister Gromyko announces So- viet willingness to engage in talks with the United States about strategic arms limita- tions: "The Soviet Union is ready to enter an exchange of opinions ... (on) the mutual limitation and later 'reduction of strategic weapons, both offensive and defensive, in- cluding anti-ballistic missiles." The House of Representatives rejects an amendment to the Defense Appropriations Act for FY 1969 to delete acquisitions of property and construction of related ABM facilities 37-106, on a teller vote. August 1968. A Senate amendment to de- lete all funds for ABM construction is re- jected 27-46. The Soviet inavasion of Czechoslovakia serves to jeopardize proposed arms control talks and stimulates pressure for ABM de- ployment in the U.S. September 1968. Secretary Clifford directs that Sentinel be exempted from the expendi- tures reduction program. October 1968. The Senate rejects, by a 25-45 vote, a proposal to delay construction of SENTINEL for one year. December 1968. Citizen opposition to pro- posed sites at Boston, Chicago, and Seattle becomes vocal. January 1969. Secretary Clifford in his re- port accompanying the DOD FY 1970 budget request concludes: . even if the Soviets attempt to match us in numbers of strategic missiles we shall continue to have, as far into the future as we can now discern, a very. substantial qualitative lead and a distinct superiority in the numbers of deliverable weapons and the overall combat effectiveness of our strategic offensive forces." President Nixon takes office and initiates a DOD review of strategic offensive and de- fensive priorities. February 1969: President Nixon on the 6th says: "I do not buy the assumption that the ABM was simply for the purpose of protect- ing ourselves against attack from Commu- nist China." On the 13th Secretary Laird stresses the priority of a Chinese-oriented ABM: "I am more concerned about that defense (against the Chinese threat) than I am about any other kind of defense at the present time." On the 20th Secretary Laird says that an ABM system is necessary because the Soviet Union is deploying a "sophisticated new ABM system." March 1969. At at press conference on March 14 President Nixon announces deploy- ment of a modified Sentinel, to be called Safeguard, because: "The Soviet Union has engaged in a buildup of its strategic forces larger than was envisaged in 1967." On the 20th Secretary Laird reverses his earlier position and says the Soviet Union is not deploying a "third generation" ABM sys- tem around Moscow but is only testing such an improved system. The following day Secretary Laird says the Soviet Union is "going for a first-strike cap- ability, and there is no question about it." On the 27th Secretary Laird submits his amendments to the FY 1969 supplemental and FY 1970 DOD budget to the House Armed Services Committee and requests $900 mil- lion for Safeguard procurement and con- struction. In addition to this, $330 million from FY 1969 could be carried over to FY 1970 for Safeguard costs. Secretary Laird estimates the total cost of the system at $6-$7 billion, an increase of $500 million to $1.5 billion over the Johnson Adminis- tration request. In the report accompany- ing his requests, Secretary Laird says Safe- guard deployment is necessary because "the option of safeguarding our deterrent forces against this potential threat (the Soviet S 6873 threat) cannot be preserved by research and development alone." April 1969. Following Secretary Laird's "first-strike" remark, a controversy develops within the Administration over Soviet capa- bilities and intentions. Secretary Rogers at a press conference on the 7th seems to con- tradict Secretary Laird: `. insofar as whether they (the Soviets) are doing it (de- ploying the SS-9) . with the intention of actually having a first strike, I don't believe that." Spokesmen for the Administration con- tradict Secretary Laird's statement on the necessity for going beyond the research and development stage. On the 15th, Vice Presi- dent Agnew characterizes SAFEGUARD as "really just a rather small research and de- velopment project, with two test sites, at Minuteman bases." Two weeks later, Deputy Secretary Packard echoes Agnew and calls SAFEGUARD "really a prototype deploy- ment-a kind of research and develop- ment." Doubt begins to arise over Secretary Laird's estimate of the Soviet threat. Former Deputy Secretary Nitze, testifying on behalf of SAFEGUARD before the Senate Armed Services Committee, declines to endorse Sec- retary Laird's view that the Soviet Union is working toward a first-strike capability. CIA Directai' Helms, testifying before a closed session of the Foreign Relations Com- mittee, reportedly characterizes the Soviet threat as the same that faced the previous Administration. Public and Congressional controversy con- tinues. Governor William Guy of North Dakota, slated to receive one of the first two SAFEGUARD sites, announces his unquali- fied opposition to the project and concludes "our Nation is being swept along by con- trived hysteria to keep the pipeline of the defense industries full." Administration and opposition head-counters agree that the de- cision in the Senate will hinge on how six uncommitted Senators divide on the issue. May 1969. It is learned that the total cost of the SAFEGUARD system as announced by Secretary Laird and Deputy Secretary Pack- ard ($6-$7 billion) does not include the costs of the nuclear warheads. The warheads are in the AEC budget and will add at least $1.2 billion to the original estimate. Later in the month the Defense Marketing Survey, a McGraw-Hill service for defense contractors, concludes DOD costs for SAFE- GUARD will be $12.2 billion. On the 9th, Governor Forrest Anderson of Montana, site of one of the first two SAFE- GUARD installations, states: "I have con- cluded that the proposed ABM system-called SAFEGUARD-would not be in the best in- terest of Montana and I seriously question whether the system would enhance our na- tional defense posture." On the 10th, Rear Admiral Levering Smith, Director of Strategic Systems Projects for the Navy questions Secretary Laird's evaluation of the future vulnerability of the Polaris submarine deterrent: "I am quite positive that the new generation of Russian subma- rines that are getting close to operational status, that are now being tested, will not be able to follow our Polaris submarines." Ad- miral Smith also denys that the Soviet Union has new anti-submarine warfare methods, such as superior sonar or a satellite detection capability, that would make the Polaris fleet vulnerable. On the 12th, Dr. John Foster, DOD Director of Research and Engineering, upgrades the possible SS-9 threat as stated by Secretary Laird and Packard (500) to 600 by 1975. He takes heated issue with those scientists who question SAFEGUARD's reliability. May 1969. On the 13th, Deputy Secretary Packard reverses an earlier position and says that SENTINEL monies are being used for production of SAFEGUARD missiles and Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 June 20, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE many countries would be tempted to acquire nuclear missiles. Con No. This action-reaction reasoning will only lead to further escalation of the arms race; the U.S. currently has the capability in of- fensive weapons to easily overcome Galosh, which is deployed only around Moscow. Former Secretary of Defense Clifford said in 1968 that Galosh resembles "the Nike-Zeus system which we abandoned years ago because of its limited effective- ness." We do not need to react to a Soviet ABM system by building one of our own, par- ticularly as the Soviets have slowed down, If not actually halted, their deployment ef- forts because of technical difficulties sci- entists say our system will have. As for the Tallinn system, which has in the past been used to justify a U.S. ABM, current intelligence shows it to be a very thin Nike-Hercules anti-aircraft defense. Is Safeguard reliable? Yes. DOD states that all of the components will work and the system as a whole will work. Spartan and Sprint have both been flown. PAR is a variant of a radar in exist- ence and a prototype MSR is being tested. The complex computer systems required to operate these components are feasible and have been demonstrated in Apollo. The problems confronting Safeguard are no more insurmountable than those con- fronting the development of the hydrogen bomb. Con No. The scientific community is almost unani- mous in questioning Safeguard's reliabil- ity. Safeguard has the most elaborate, sophisticated, dynamic combination of rock- etry, radars, computers, electronics, and other technology ever proposed; moreover, it can never be tested as a system. With regard to the missiles, Spartan and Sprint have a probability of failure of 34% to 59%, thereby requiring at least 3 missiles to achieve 97 percent probability of destroy- ing an incoming warhead. As far as the radars are concerned, statis- tically there is a 72% chance that one or more radars will be out of service at any par- ticular time In a system of 12 MSRs. The re- maining 11 are subject to blackout, which even proponents admit has not been over- come. The MSR is ten times as vulnerable to overpressure as the silos it is defending and will therefore be targeted first because its destruction destroys the entire installation. In the case of the computers, it is debat- able whether a program could ever be written to deal with the various forms of attack that can be anticipated. Moreover, the entire command and control network upon which the system depends is as vulnerable as any of its components. The hydrogen bomb analogy in specious; the scientific issue over the H-bomb was whether a specific design concept could in theory be developed into a workable weapon. The questions surrounding Safeguard are not theoretrical but practical and technologi- cal. Will penetration devices render Safeguard ineffective? Pro No. Penetration devices other than real or dummy warheads of the same size and weight as the real one will fall behind or burn up in the atmosphere and expose the real warhead to Sprint. By forcing an opponent t0 use penetration devices of weight equal to the weight of a warhead one cuts down the weight of the destructive payload each ICBM can deliver, forcing him t6 achieve almost pinpoint ac- curacy if his target Is a hardened Minute- man. Yes. Against Spartan, the following penetra- tion devices could be employed: 1. Decoys and chaff clouds, which need not survive re-entry to fool Spartan. 2. Active radar jamming. 3. The defense radar, particularly the PAR, can be blacked out with precursor nuclear explosions. In heavy, well-timed attack the defense's radars could even be blacked out by the defense's own nuclear explosions. Against Sprint, an attacker could send several warheads in the same missile and rapidly exhaust the supply of Sprints at a particular installation. Will Safeguard be obsolete by the time it is operational? Pro No. SAFEGUARD is expected to be effective well into the 1980s against the threats it is designed to counter. Careful study has pro- vided- reasonable assurance that the system can evolve to handle future penetration aids developed by China or the Soviet Union, SAFEGUARD, which will be deployed in phases, takes into account the development of new weapons technology. Neither China nor any other nation new to the nuclear missile field can leapfrog de- cades of development of highly sophisticated weapons systems. Yes. By the time SAFEGUARD is even partially operational, in 1973, the Chinese will have developed penetration devices, thus render- ing the system Ineffective against them. It is already obsolete against the Soviet pene- tration capability, should they choose to de- ploy it. While the defense may be able to develop more sophisticated technology which could offset some of the penetration devices, the offense Is capable of the same thing. All SAFEGUARD will do is to escalate this tech- nological buildup into a never-ending spiral. Is SAFEGUARD necessary to meet the Chinese threat? Pro Yes. While the Chinese nuclear program has slipped recently, it is anticipated that by 1975 they could have 20-30 ICBMs. Because the Chinese are more unpredictable than the Soviets, they may make an irrational attack despite such a small force. There is also the possibility that the Chi- nese might, in the absence of an offsetting U.S. defensive capability, be able to exploit a limited strategic offensive capability for purposes of nuclear blackmail to the detri- ment of the U.S. Interest, in Asia. It seems both imprudent and unreasonable for the U.S. and the Soviet Union to be com- pletely without protection against any coun- try with less nuclear power, such as China, If both countries have no defensive systems, any country with ten missiles is a super- power-it can destroy ten large cities. Con No, Our deterrent power would certainly pre- vent the Chinese from launching an attack, the Chinese could penetrate the city-defense aspects of SAFEGUARD in any event, and there is no basis for assuming China would commit national suicide by launching an at- tack on the U.S. We have deterred the Soviet Union's very powerful nuclear missile force for many years. There is no need for a system to deter a Chinese nuclear capability that is 1/10 of the Soviets and %0 of our own. The Chinese need to deploy only a small number of ICBMs in order to penetrate S 6875 SAFEGUARD and attack our cities. It is much more likely that the Chinese are de- veloping ICBMs to be in a position to deter us-something they cannot do now. As for being irrational, despite verbal sup- port, China has done no more than the So- viet Union in rendering open aggressive support for foreign insurgencies and much less in risking nuclear retaliation on behalf of such insurgencies. If China is determined to attack us, there are more effective meth- ods than ICBMs. A nuclear weapon could be smuggled aboard a neutral ship or a bio- logical weapon carried In a suitcase, for example. If one were to concede the possibility of blackmail, it would be more likely that China would target her ICBMs against U.S. missile bases on China's periphery or against the cities of our allies than against the con- tinental United States. Will Safeguard defend the United States against accidentally launched ICBMs? Yes. One cannot eliminate completely the pos- sibility of an- accidental launch in a world where thousands of missiles are ready to be launched on a moment's notice. If such an accident occurred, even a thin ABM system is likely to work well since there would presumably be only one, or at most a few, missiles to destroy. It could repay the entire cost of the mis- sile system several times over if one accident were prevented. No. Unless SAFEGUARD is expanded beyond the Administration's current request, it could only defend against such an accident were the missile launched at one of the two Minuteman sites currently scheduled for de- ployment, and then not until 1973. Accidental launch should be controlled in- stead by an agreement with the Soviet Union on the installation of self-destruct mecha- nisms so that accidentally launched missiles can be destroyed in flight. Should this be impossible, defense against accidental launch could be obtained at a fraction the cost of SAFEGUARD by deploying a few Spartans and unprotected radars designed for this purpose. Will Safeguard erode Presidential control over the launch of nuclear weapons? Pro No. While specific details of the decision-mak- ing process must remain classified, the deci- sion to fire will completely reflect the author- ity of the President. While the decision to launch must be made in a short period of time, the decision to arm the warhead of the missile can be made after the missile has been fired. Yes. The time from verification to decision to fire would not be more than a few minutes if there is to be any chance of a successful intercept. The President is therefore given only the opportunity to ratify what the com- puters say is inevitable, and cannot weigh evidence or consult with advisors, particu- larly if at the moment of attack he is away from the National Command Authority in Washington, D.C. Most proponents of the system maintain that it will not work unless the launch process is begun at the moment of detection. In the case of an accidental launch, the necessity to activate the system with no delay would be even more urgent. Does SafeGuard give the U.S. an extra option? Pro Yes. Instead of having to resort to our retalia- tory force in case of attack, SAFEGUARD would give us the option of sending up anti- Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4 June 20, 1969Approved R000300090002-4 'A FC% S6877 ident had SAFEGUARD and considered it an extra option in the event of attack, an op- ponent might come to the conclusion that he would use it and not launch our retalia- tory capability and thereby be tempted into a first strike. SAFEGUARD, like NIKE ZEUS, will be obsolete by the time it is deployed. While research and development on ballistic mis- sile defense should continue at the Kwa- jalein island facility, the decision to deploy should be deferred until the conclusion of arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. Out national security requires that we give highest priority to bringing the nu- clear arms race under control. VI. SELECTED LIST OF SAFEGUARD AND OPPONENTS Pro Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski, Columbia University, political scientist. Dr. Lee Dubridge, Science Advisor to Pres- ident Nixon. Dr. Freeman Dyson, Princeton University, nuclear physicist. Dr. Richard Foster, former Director of Strategic Studies, Stanford Research Insti- tute, strategic analyst. Dr. Richard Latter, Rand Corporation, nu- clear physicist. Dr. Philip Mosley, Director of the Euro- pean Institute, Columbia University, po- litical scientist. Dr. Frederick Seitz, President of the Na- tional Academy of Sciences, nuclear physi- cist. Dr. Edward Teller, founding Director of the Livermore Laboratories, nuclear physicist. Dr. Alvin Weinberg, Director of the Oak Ridge Laboratories, nuclear physicist. Dr. Eugene Wigner, Princeton University, nuclear physicist. Con Dr. Jerome Weisner, a former Science Ad- visor to President Kennedy and Johnson, Provost of MIT. Dr. George Kistiakowsky, former Science Advisor to President Eisenhower,. chemist. Dr. Donald Hornig, former Science Advisor to President Johnson, physicist. Professor Marshall Shulman, Director, Russian Institute, Columbia University, po- litical scientists. Dr. Herbert York, former DOD Director of Research and Engineering, nuclear physicist. Dr. Donald Hornig, former Science Advisor to President Eisenhower, Chairman of the Board of MIT. Professor Allen Whiting, Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan political scientist. Dr. George Rathjens, Director of Weapons Systems Evaluation, Institute for Defense Analysis, strategic analyst. Dr. Wolfgang Panofsky, Director, High- Energy Physics Laboratory, Stanford, nuclear physicist. Dr. Jack Ruina, former Director of Ad- vanced Research Projects Agency, DOD. VII. GLOSSARY ABM (anti-ballistic missile).-A missile, or Combination of missiles, radar, and com- puters designed to intercept and destroy in- coming missiles before they reach their In- tended targets. binatton of opponents, at any time during PAR (perimeter acquisition radar) .-A the course of a strategic nuclear exchange, long-range detection radar designed to de- even after absorbing a surprise first strike. tect incoming missiles at a range of 1,000- AMSA (advanced manned strategic air- 2,000 miles and track them until they come craft).-A Mach II-plus aircraft designed to into the range of the MSR. launch a nuclear missile along a flat tra- Penetration aids.-Devices such as decoys, jectory to avoid an opponent's defensive sys- chaff, radar jamming, and precursor nuclear tem, explosions used to assist the offense in over- Blackout.-The temporary disabling of de- whelming the defensive ABM system. fensive radar by Ionizing the air at about 45 Polaris.-The basic U.S. submarine- miles altitude with the beta radiation of a launched missile, with a range of approxi- nuclear explosion. This radiation and the mately 2,800 miles. 16 Polaris missiles are fireball itself cause reflection or absorption carried on each of 41 Polaris submarines. of radar waves for a ten minute period there- Poseidon.-A U,S. submarine-launched by screening the incoming missiles from the missile, scheduled to replace Polaris mis- defense. siles on 31 of the 41 Polaris submarines and Damage limitation.-The ability to reduce to carry up to ten independently targeted the damage of a nuclear attack by deploy- warheads. ing ABMs to defend cities and/or targeting Re-entry vehicle.-That part of an ICBM offensive missiles on an opponent's missiles that separates from the launching stages and silos. carries the warhead(s) along a ballistic tra- Deterrence.-A defense strategy that de- jectory outside the atmosphere and then back pends on each side having the ability to in- into the atmosphere, where it then continues flict unacceptable damage on the other after to target. absorbing a surprise first strike. Reprogram capability.-A system in which First strike capability.-The ability to an offensive missile signals its launch-con- launch a nuclear attack upon an opponent trol point if it has launched its re-entry vehi- without receiving an unacceptable loss in cle properly thereby allowing the offense to return. program a backup missile if something has FOBS (fractional orbit bombardment sys- gone wrong. tem).-A nuclear delivery system intended to Sambis (sea-based anti-ballistic missile in- deliver its warhead to a target on a trajectory tercept system).-A concept proposed for fu- about 100 miles above the earth rather than tore development by the U.S., involving a along a ballistic trajectory outside the network of anti-ballistic missiles on surface atmosphere, in order to avoid defensive radar. and/or submarine vessels. A fractionally orbited missile carries a smaller SS-9.-A large (20-25 megaton), reportedly payload and is less accurate than an ICBM. inaccurate, Soviet missile, also capable of de- Galosh.-A Soviet ABM system comparable livering a number of smaller yield warheads to the NIKE ZEUS, comprising 67 missiles on and capable of knocking out Minuteman launchers around Moscow. It has been par- missiles in their silos. tially deployed but work has now ceased on SS-11.-The basic Soviet ICBM, equivalent the system. to the Minuteman I. Hardening.-Re-inforcing the geological Safeguard.-An ABM system configured surroundings of a missile silo to withstand from the components of the NIKE X system, the overpressure of a nearby nuclear explo- including PAR and MSR radars and Sprint Sion. The harder the silo, the greater the and Spartan missiles, to be deployed in two accuracy required on the part of an attacker phases, the first phase to protect U.S. retalia- to destroy the missile in its silo. tory Minutemen at two sites and the second ICBM (inter-continental ballistic mis- phase to protect two more Minuteman sites, rile).-A long range (6,000-8,000 miles) mul- seven SAC bases, and Washington, D.C., and tistage rocket capable of delivering nuclear to protect U.S. cities from Chinese or acci- warheads to enemy targets. dental attack. Kiloton.-The nuclear explosive equivalent Sentinel.-The Johnson Administration's of 1,000 tons of TNT (Hiroshima bomb equals deployment of the basic NIKE X components, 20 Kilotons). designed to protect U.S. cities from Chinese Launch on warning.-A concept of defense and accidental attack and prdvide eventually that depends on assuring an opponent that some protection of the U.S. retaliatory force, one's retaliatory capability will be launched now abandoned. upon detection of incoming missiles rather Spartan.-A long-range (400 mile) missile than absorbing the first strike and then component of SAFEGUARD, three stage, solid launching the retaliatory attack. fueled with a nuclear warhead in the mega- Megaton.-The nuclear explosive equiva- ton range, fired from an underground silo. lent of one million tons of TNT. Sprint.-A short-range (25 mile) missile Minuteman.-The basic U.S. ICBM. Min- component of SAFEGUARD, two stage,'solid uteman I yields one megaton, Minuteman fueled with a nuclear warhead in the kilo- II has a higher yield and/or trade off with ton range, fired from an underground silo, penetration aids, Minuteman III is designed highly maneuverable and with a high rate to carry MIRVs. of acceleration. MIRV (multiple independent reentry ve- Tallinn system.-Soviet anti-aircraft de- hicle).-A system of multiple warheads in fense system having no ABM capabilities, in- which several carried by one re-entry ve- stalled around Moscow and Leningrad. hicle can be maneuvered on independent Terminal defense.-A concept of ABM de- courses to different targets. Tense that relies on short range missiles close MRV (multiple reentry vehicle).-A sys- to the target to intercept those missiles in tern of multiple warheads carried in one re- a heavy attack that get by the long range entry vehicle but cannot be directed to dif- ABMs. This type of defense is used to pro- tect high value targets (cities ferent targets bomber bases , . , Area defense.-A concept of ABM defense MSR (missile-site radar).-Performs sur- Minuteman fields) tens of miles across. in which areas of the country, hundreds of veillance and detection, target track, missile Thick system.-A thick ABM system pro- miles across, are given protection from at- track, and command functions for the anti- vides defense against heavy attack with long tack by exo-atmospheric interception of in- ballistic missiles in the SAFEGUARD sys- range missiles and large numbers of short coming missiles by long range defensive mis- tern. It is of shorter range than the PAR and range missiles located close to targets. sibs tipped with large nuclear warheads. This takes over from it after initial acquisition. Thin system.-A thin ABM system provides type of defense Is effective only against small NIKE X.-The thick U.S. ABM'system, de- defense for large areas of the country against attacks, signed in 1963 but never deployed, utilizing light or accidental attack with long range Assured destruction.-That level and de- the components of the SENTINEL and SAFE- missiles designed to intercept the incoming ployment of nuclear capability which serves GUARD systems. ICBMs outside the atmosphere. to deter deliberate nuclear Rttack by an op- NIKE ZEUS.-A first-generation U.S. ABM Titan.-A large (5-18 megaton) liquid-pro- ponent by mainia ingat all times a highly system, utilizing unsophisticated radars and pellant U.S. ICBM. (The Titan II, of which reliable ability to inflict an unacceptable de- the Zeus missile, authorized in 1957 but nev- 54 are deployed, is to be replaced by 1970 with ,,gree of damage upon the opponent, or com- er deployed. Minuteman II.) Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4