PRESS AND CONGRESSIONAL RECORDS RE: ANTI- BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS AND ARMS TALKS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00364R000300090002-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 54
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 17, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 27, 1969
• Content Type: NSPR

 Approved E8q p 8RAJ05 7C rRDgppQ9,64R000300090002-4 S 4237
4 rriG`29, 1969
site to success in employment, housing, ABM CAN HELP ARMS CONTROL these two propositions are not in conflict
NEGOTIATIONS and, in fact, are mutually supporting.
education, and health. It is my view that just as the world would
Because the existence of hungry Amer- Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, as the be a far better place if nuclear weapons had
icans represents a strain on the self- Senate is aware, the Committee on not been technologically possible, so it would
respect of the Nation, we must act im- Armed Services, under the chairman- be a better world if neither MIRV's nor
ABM's were technologically feasible. Unfor-
mn mediately to end this stigma. Because ship of the distinguished Senator from ABM's ly they are feasible.
malalnutrit rition is such a stubborn link in Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), conducted tunate
It is also my view that the U.S.-U.S.S.R. we to the poverty cycle, a au et work the g great public hearings last week on the anti- relationship is not symmetrical. The Soviet
break this link. Because of the great ballistic-missile defense system. These Union has professed to be on the political
return resulting from a small investment hearings were held in connection with offensive in respect to the non-communist
in health and nutrition programs, we the yearly legislation authorizing funds world. The West During the years when the
sive
f
and enable hungry people to make the
contributions of productive citizens. Be-
cause the real costs of our inaction are
a high infant mortality rate, birth dis-
eases, physical disabilities and a short-
ened life expectancy, our action is long
overdue. Because we can expect that an
individual who is hungry will be listless,
apathetic, distrustful, frustrated, and
alienated, we must act before the in-
justice of hunger in this rich land pro-
duces social unrest and chaos.
Michael Harrington asserted in his
troubling book, "Another America," that
there are two Americas: one made up of
the middle and upper classes and "an-
other" America of the poor and the in-
digent. The middle and upper classes are
comfortably sheltered and are rarely
'"'~ A.,.,e-i;
?
indige
hi
h
c
highways w
They have their modern -
conveniently by-pass the ghetto areas. ask unanimous consent that it be printed
They have their suburbs which neatly in the RECORD.
avoid the migrant farm areas. And they There being no objection, the state-
have their immaculate high rise apart- ment was ordered to be printed in the
ments and shopping centers which have RECORD, as follows:
clearly forced the relocation of shacks. STATEMENT
BSOEE THE U S. ,ATE HONORABLE PAUL COMMITTEE Ni ON
But how long can the existence of 22
million poor be systematically denied? ARMED SERVICE, APRIL 22, 1969
Mr. President, the solution cannot be Mr. Chairman: It is a privilege to appear
found by turning away to a more pleas- again before this Committee on a matter of
ant question. We can no longer tolerate national importance, the ABM issue.
My first involvement with the nuclear
"another America" if we are to be a question was in 1945. At that time, as Vice
strong and healty county. Freedom de- Chairman of the U.S. Strategic Bombing
pends on free people, but hunger and Survey, I was charged with the supervision
conducted a suof scientists and rvey of the ffects of the nu-
n now to end the bond-
age unlessowe will keep
1 r weapons used at Hiroshima and Naga-
c ea
DEATH OF REPRESENTATIVE ROB-
ERT A. EVERETT, OF TENNESSEE
Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, the
91st Congress lost an outstanding Mem-
ber in the passing of Robert A. Everett
on January 26, 1969.
The middle South, the area he knew
and loved so well, will miss him, for he
epitomized public service and the cause
of good government in its finest sense.
He visited me in my Senate office On
January 4. It was the last time I was to
see and talk with him. Even then, his
zest for life made a deep impression on
me.
His congressional service had its mark
of greatness: concern for the disabled
veterans, flood control from Minnesota
to Louisiana, cotton research-and the
tireless, devoted service to the needs of
constituents will long be remembered.
I shall remember his smiling face,
booming voice, counsel, and good fellow-
ship.
To his wonderful mother I extend my
deep and heartfelt sympathy.
It was that which he sought for others.
that which he found, and that which he
shared as he made his way to God.
.
en
for fiscal year 1970 for the procurement litical d
United States was the only nation to possess
of aircraft, missiles, ships, and research nuclear weapons, we offered to share them
and development. with other nations under the Baruch plan.
On April 22, Hon. Paul H. Nitze, former That plan was rejected by the Soviet gov-
Deputy Secretary of Defense and now ernment. At no time was our monopoly of
chairman of the advisory council at the nuclear weapons a threat to the integrity of
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced In- other e reverse not one nho which believes that
ternational Studies, expressed to the eveye d on in held a So-m committee the view that in negotiations viet vied Union is situation,
nuclear wepaons, have h have had
with the Soviet Union on the limitation thnopoly on e same result.
and control of offensive and defensive once the Soviet Union developed a sub-
weapon systems, the executive branch stantial nuclear force it became evident that
has the best chance of arriving at an the relationship between us could develop
agreement satisfactory to the United in a more, or in a less, dangerous manner
States if Congress approves the ad- dep a df on the the United study ministration's request for authorization impact of teed. In In the e 1958
foreign yoon to
and appropriation for the ABM Safe- which I referred earlier, we emphasized the
guard system. desirability of striving for a U.S. deployment
I commend Mr. Nitze's opening state- which contributed to the stability of the
ment before the Armed Services Com- nuclear relationship rather than to insta-
l this could be done by
l
saki.
In 1949 I participated in the reevaluation
of U.S. policy which followed on the first
testing of a nuclear device by the Soviet
Union.
In 1958 I was one of the co-authors of a
study entitled ,The Impact of Technology
on Foreign Policy," done at the request of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
In 1961 and 1962 I participated in the work
of the Executive Branch on the Berlin and
Cuban missile crises.
In 1963 I was among those involved in
the successful effort to arrive at a limited
In 1967 I participated with rvar. melon`
in the development of the Sentinel Program. . dominance in land based ICBM's and sub-
In 1968 I testified before the Senate For- marine based missiles, as well as long-range
eign Relations Committee in favor of the nu- bombers. This . fact, coupled with local
clear non-proliferation treaty. superiority in the immediate vicinity of Cuba
Since January 20th of this year I have on the part of the United States, enabled
been enjoying the freedom of a private citi- President Kennedy to take a firm position
zen. in the Cuban missile crisis and caused Chair-
I wish today to support two propositions: man Khrushchev to withdraw.
The first, is negotiations into
promptly by the Executive Brancwith the States i has continued stocperfectt its second
Soviet Union on the limitation and con- strike deterrent capabilities. The U.S.S.R.
trol of offensive and defensive nuclear wea- has, however, changed its declaratory policy;
pons systems. The second is that the Con- that policy has no longer been characterized
gress support the request of the Executive by threats and unsubstantiated claims of
Branch for Fiscal Year 1970 authorization technological progress. The Soviet Union's
and appropriation in the amount of $490 action policy, however, has been to increase
million Total Obligation Authority for in- greatly its efforts in the nuclear field. The
vestment in the Safeguard system. I believe result has been to change the situation from
eve
bility. We be
developing mobile, dispersed or hardened
systems which would not be excessively vul-
nerable to a first, or a pre-emptive, strike.
This program was subsequently carried out
with the deployment of the Polaris system,
hardened Minuteman ICBM's and dispersed
or air alert bombers.
I find it useful to look at the U.S.-Soviet
nuclear relationship since 1957 in two dis-
tinct time periods. The first period was that
from 1957, the year in which the Soviet Un-
ion launched Sputnik, to 1962, the year of
the Cuban missile crisis. The second period
is that from the Cuban missile crisis to the
present time. During the first period the
United States was deeply concerned that
Soviet technology had in some important
respects over-leaped that of the West. Great
efforts were made, with the full support
of the scientific community, to develop rap-
idly the secure second strike nuclear de-
terrent capabilities to which I earlier
referred.
The Soviet Union, on the other hand,
relied more on claims of technological prog-
ress and a wide ranging series of threats of
nuclear destruction against other nations.
Their actual deployment of ICBM's as op-
5 mecum and ntermediate range
1missiles lar~_y _, d rected.__,aga nst, Europe,.
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seem paltry indeed if mis-steps in the So-
viet-American strategic relationship should
lead to a breakdown in stable nuclear deter-
rence.
I say this not to dramatize my remarks
but to stress the necessity for a proper
perspective on relations between Moscow and
Washington. Our preoccupation with Viet-
nam, however justifiable, must not lead us
to neglect the impending issues between
the United States and Russia. We must over-
come the familiar tendency for the urgent
to displace the important.
We have reached a unique juncture in the
arms race between ourselves and the Soviets.
We face a crisis in the dual sense conveyed
by the Chinese symbol for the that term, a
symbol suggesting a condition of both dan-
ger and opportunity.
A combination of political and technolo-
gical developments has brought us to an un-
precedented situation. It is now clear that
the great powers will either devise ways of
limiting the growth of nuclear arsenals or
they will plunge ahead into a costly and
dangerous competition in strategic weapons
with unforeseeable consequences for the
peace and stability of the world.
There have been previous escalations of
the arms race, to be sure, but not quite like
the one now looming. For the first time both
sides have expressed serious interest in seek-
ing to limit additional deployments of strate-
gic forces. The leaders of the Soviet Union
have now come to recognize what respon-
sible officials in this country have long de-
clared, that there can be no winner in a
nuclear war and that a rampant arms race
will leave both countries much poorer but
also less secure. Whatever else may be said
of Nikita Khrushchev, he brought essential
realism to the Soviet Government when he
abandoned the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of
the inevitability of war between Capitalism
and Communism.
Furthermore, the prelude to the present
dialogue has seen substantial achievements
in more limited realms of arms control. The
Partial Nuclear Test Ban, the Treaty pro-
hibiting deployment of weapons of mass de-
struction in outer space, the Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty, the "hot line arrangement", and
other measures of restraint have shown that
the Soviet Union and the United States can
carve out significant areas of agreement in
such difficult and delicate areas. These are
historic accomplishments. They augur well
for further efforts to find mutually accept-
able means of insuring both nations' secu-
rity.
Of equal importance is the fact that the
last few years have seen the evolution,
through a combination of U.S. restraint and
continued growth in Soviet missile forces, of
a kind of rough strategic equality between
the two sides. The most astute students of
Soviet behavior have welcomed this devel-
opment, because of the evident reluctance
of the Soviets to enter wide-ranging arms
limitation arrangements so long as they were
militarily inferior.
A central factor in the less heated strategic
atmosphere which has emerged during the
nineteen sixties has been the rapid advance
of the technology of surveillance. Both ma-
jor powers, but especially the United States,
have devised unusually effective means for
observing and monitoring the strategic in-
ventories of the other side. Rising confidence
in these techniques for determining force
levels in the Soviet Union has permitted the
United States to avoid repeating the massive
over-expansion of offensive weapons in which
it engaged in the early sixties.
These new technologies have also afforded
hope that compliance with certain arms con-
trol agreements could be verified without the
kind of local inspection to which the Soviet
Union has consistently objected. It has
seemed possible that we might escape that
cycle of suspicion which Roswell Gilpatric
once characterized by saying that "the So-
viets are forced to react to what they know
we are doing in response to what we think
they are doing."
These were some of the trends which began
to give a degree of assurance that the balance
of terror might become less delicate, and that
meaningful arms control was more than
merely conceivable. Unfortunately, other
trends have been at work to frustrate these
hopes.
Contrary to widespread opinion, deploy-
ment of anti-ballistic missile systems is by
no means the most significant of these
trends. In fact, while ABM is hardly a trivial
matter,* it is clearly a subordinate part of the
larger strategic problem. The more sinister
elements in the situation, the ones which
pose the gravest threats to the stability of
the strategic balance and to the possibility of
effective arms limitations, are pending in-
novations in the offensive forces of both sides.
Developments now under way on both sides
raise the likelihood that the level of offensive
weaponry available to the Soviet Union and
the United States will rise rapidly in the next
few years.
I refer, of course, to the multiple warhead
technology on which both the United States
and the Soviet Union are working. The so-
called MIRV concept, in which a number of
independently targetable warheads are
mounted on a single launcher, is undoubtedly
the most disturbing breakthrough in strate-
gic weapons since the advent of intercon-
tinental ballistic missiles. Not only does it
mean that a given rocket force may be modi-
fled to throw several times as many war-
heads, but it creates what could be insur-
mountable problems for inspection of an
arms control agreement.
Together with the possible development of
mobile land-based missiles, a technology of
special interest to the Soviet Union, the de-
ployment of MIRV systems would open large
opportunities for evasion of any arms agree-
ment which did not provide for extensive,
on-site inspection. Disagreements over in-
spection of that kind have always been a
major barrier to successful negotiations. But,
if MIRV is actually deployed by either side,
it will be virtually impossible to rely ex-
clusively on the means of national verifica-
tion which otherwise might be adequate to
monitor a freeze on strategic forces.
What this means is that the present oppor-
S 4239
such an exchange would not involve the
widespread intrusion required by more elab-
orate schemes, an agreement might be facili-
tated. An exchange of this kind could be
invaluable in providing experience in mutual
observation and could help lay the founda-
tions of trust which will be essential if more
extensive inspection arrangements are to
be accepted.
Obviously, any suspension of operational
tests of MIRV is at best a stop-gap. It can
only buy time for more elaborate arrange-
ments to be negotiated. A ban on MIRV
tests, as a means of impeding deployment of
such dangerous systems, can only stand if
both parties respect it and if they promptly
move forward on a number of other agree- _
ments. For example, such a suspension must
be conditional upon mutual limitation of
ABM deployment and an understanding on
the total number and size of strategic
launchers which both sides will have. If ABM
defenses for cities were deployed without
limitation, or if the number of delivery ve-
hicles continued to grow much beyond the
present levels, there would be irresistible
pressure to proceed with MIRV either as a
penetration device or as a means of multi-
plying retaliatory capacity in general.
But an initial suspension of MIRV tests
could be the critical lever on the arms race.
By curbing the immediate need for deploy-
ment of both new offensive systems and
ABM, it could create an environment for
success in the more detailed and elaborate
arms control discussions which must follow.
I believe there is a growing appreciation
of the perils of further delay in the proposed
arms talks and the need for prompt and bold
action to initiate them. Secretary Rogers
struck a heartening note when he announced
that the talks should begin in the next two
or three months. If they are not begun
quickly, mankind's technological capacity
will once more have outstripped its political
capacity to build a safer and more rational
world.
The President's proposal to deploy a modi-
fied ABM system must, of course, be evalu-
ated in this larger context. And in that con-
text I believe it should be seen for what it
is, a dependent variable.
I have voted against every appropriation
for ABM deployment. I remain skeptical.
the Armed Services Committee I am
In
tunity for strategic arms control is highly
perishable. Indeed, it is measured in months, developing the most intensive interrogation
It now appears that, however justified they. I can concerning the so-called Safeguard sys-
tem. There are a great many technical, po-
lt i
n pos-
last Administration may have fe
poning the arms negotiations with the Soviet
Union, however outraged we and our allies
may have been over Soviet ruthlessness in
Czechoslovakia, the delay in the arms talks
has been most adverse to their chances for
success.
That sober view is based on the conclusion
that, if MIRV is not controlled prior to de-
ployment, it will probably not be controlled
at all. And if MIRV is not controlled, other
limitations will be even more difficult to
achieve t1 tan otherwise.
In my judgment the most urgent task is to
limit further operational testing of multiple
warhead missiles. Once testing of these pro-
vocative systems is completed, it will be un-
likely that either side will believe the other
is not deploying them.
On the other hand, there are several major
factors suggesting the desirability and feasi-
bility of controlling test activity of this
kind. First of all, without extensive tests it
is doubtful that either side would have suf-
ficient confidence in these complex systems
to deploy them heavily. Secondly, unlike a
ban on deployment, an understanding to
forego operational tests of this kind lends
itself to verification by the kinds of surveil-
lance capabilities which both sides already
possess. In addition, there is much to be
said for seeking an exchange of observers
at the small number of facilities where such
full-scale tests could be conducted. Since
litieal and strategic questions which would
have to be answered satisfactorily before I
could consider supporting deployment at
this time.
Yet I believe it is vital that the President
have a fair hearing for his recommendation
before the Congress and the country exercise
their responsibility to pass judgment. This
is a matter in which we need to muster the
most balanced and objective view of which
we are capable.
I find it distressing that the President's
recommendation was caught up in a flood of
'opinions and emotions related to the earlier
Sentinel proposal. The ABM discussion had
already acquired such momentum that it has
been difficult to examine the new recom-
mendation strictly on its merits. The result
has been as Meg Greenfield so well por-
trayed it in the Was131ngton Post, "a ragged
non-debate on the ABM." If the nation is
to make the hard decision which this ques-
tion deserves, it will have to examine what
the President has in fact proposed-not what
others say he has proposed, not what his
predecessor proposed, not hat some wish
he had proposed.
In particular it just will not do to have
this matter descend, into a narrow political
contest, in which either partisan or per-
sonal advantage becomes a consideration.
Whatever others may imply, I do not for a
moment believe such factors influenced the
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A - SENATE April 79, 19.69
President's decision. In fact, had they done
so, he had every incentive to postpone or re-
ject an ABM deployment. I am utterly con-
fident that Mr. Nixon did not make his pro-
posal on this basis. Those who charge that
the President's decision was politically in-
spired reveal more about their own motives
than about his.
Nor will it do merely to ignore the poten-
tial vulnerabilities which intense technolog-
ical competition may create for strategic
forces. Some observers have blithely pro-
posed that the simplest and most effective
way to deal with a potential threat to Min-
uteman would be to adept a "launch on
warning" policy. That is, if the radar screens
showed what appeared to be an attack the
Minuteman force should be fired in a valley.
Apart from the technical uncertainties of
such a scheme, this Ill-conceived proposal
completely ignores the requirements of
stable deterrence. The entire effort of the
past decade has been to construct secure
second-strike forces which did not have to
be launched on warning. It has been recog-
nized by both the United States and the So-
viet Union that the creation of such hair-
trigger forces is a sure recipe for heightened
tensions and fears, and for increasing the
propensity to nuclear war at times of extreme
crisis. I urge those who have been attracted
to such a proposal to consider the implica-
tions of what they are suggesting. I, for one,
do not propose to replace a strategy of ques-
tionable wisdom with one of obvious lunacy.
My plea today is that we get our priorities
straight. The over-riding strategic problem
of our time is to limit the multiplication of
offensive weapons which increase the chance
that a nuclear exchange might actually be
initiated, not so much through a calculated
first strike out of the blue as through a pre-
emptive strike generated by fears that mul-
tiple warhead technology and other devices
might be used to destroy or defeat a coun-
try's retaliatory capability. As I have stressed,
the next few months are especially critical
and the problem of controlling further de-
velopment and deployment of multiple war-
head technology is especially vital. Only by
pressing forward urgently with strategic
arms control efforts to deal with these prob-
lems will we find a lasting means of pre-
venting or limiting ABM deployment.
The risks of an uncontrolled arms race
are frightening to contemplate. They in-
clude not only increased danger of a nuclear
holocaust, though that is ample reason to
seek to curb this deadly competition; but
the profound dangers of continued neglect
of social needs in this country and else-
where. Even a small fraction of the nearly
200 billion dollars which the world is spend-
ing on armaments could make an Inestima-
ble contribution to relieving hunger, rebuild-
ing cities, educating children, and to per-
forming all the other humane missions
which are now desperately starved for re-
sources. Unless we can begin to reduce in-
ternational tensions and to substitute pro-
grams of security through negotiation for
the elusive quest for security through com-
petition, the prospects for meeting the hu-
man needs of this planet are dim indeed.
These, then, are the real stakes In the de-
cisions we and the Soviets face in the com-
ing months. More than at any time in the
postwar period, it may be possible for us
and the Soviets, acting together, to choose
the risks we will bear; to ease the strains
on our societies by reducing the burdens and
hazards of unending strategic competition.
The moment is opportune, and the oppor-
tunity is too precious to lose.
CONSUMER PROTT, CTION$
Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, a re-
cent issue of the CWA News, the official
national newspaper of the Communica-
tions Workers of America, AFL-CIO,
contained a comprehensive roundup of
consumer protections that this Congress
must face up to. Interest in these issues
is widespread-and it should be, for they
directly affect every citizen. I ask unani-
mous consent that the article, entitled
"Let the Buyer Be Protected," be printed
in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
LET THE BUYER 13E PROTECTED
(NoTE.-The beginning of 1869 brought a
new President, a new Congress and presuma-
bly new attitudes in many corners of the
U.S. But the nation's interest in one old
thought-consumer protection-was height-
ening.
(Almost certainly, the old axiom of Caveat
Emptor, "Let the Buyer Beware," will be re-
moved from American usage. Aroused U.S.
citizens will not suffer much more abuse.
(Action may not be swift. But as long as
pressure Is kept on via public exposure, ac-
tion will come.
(The last days of 1968 brought two exam-
ples of the kind of commentary that will
keep the pressure on:
(Betty Furness, President Johnson's ad-
viser on consumer affairs, wrapped up her
work with a parting blast at manufacturers'
warranties, which she described as "more
garbage than guaranty." She also decried the
apparent attitude of President-elect Nixon,
who, "in effect said he felt consumer protec-
tion should go back to each of the Federal
agencies. In theory, that's a marvelous idea,
but in practice that isn't the way it works."
("Nader's Raiders," a group of seven young
lawyers assembled by Ralph Nader, a guiding
light in exploration of consumer protection,
released a study made last summer of the
Federal Trade Commission. It amounted to a
scathing denunciation of the FTC and Its
chairman Paul Rand Dixon in such terms
as "inept" and "anachronistic." Such charges
as "cronyism" have been refuted by Dixon,
but even if the truth lies somewhere between,
the report still has the effect of focusing at-
tention on consumers' needs.
(While support of consumer protections is
wholly predictable from such sources as
Betty Furness and Ralph Nader, support also
came from surprising sources, such as George
R. Vila, chairman and president of Uniroyal
Inc. -
(Implying that industry was getting what
it deserved, Vila laid part of the blame on
intensive TV and other advertising. As a re-
sult, Vila said, "Theconsumer-already suf-
fering from a sense of alienation-is con-
stantly bombarded by 72 fiercely competing
advertising claims. Is it any wonder he winds
up with a feeling of hostility and suspicion?
("We cannot ignore what is happening,"
Vila concluded. "We care not to merely con-
front it with blind resistance. Consumerism
will not disappear.")
TAX REFORM
Perhaps fundamental to the whole ques-
tion of the U.S. consumers' needs is the right
to an equitable tax structure which leaves
the U.S. working men and women paying
their fair share-but only their fair share-
of the costs of operating the Federal, state,
and local governments.
The benefits from a redistribution of the
tax load are many and obvious. First, a fair
redistribution would leave the working man
more money. Second, the increased revenue
when previous freeloaders assumed their fair
share would provide the kind of expanded
services the working man has aright to ex-
pect, aifthe way from highways to low-in-
terest housing loans.
But, unfortunately, the U.S. tax system is
not equitably distributed. Even the National
Observer, a weekly newspaper published by
the Wall Street Journal-credentials that
hardly qualify the Observer as a friend of the
working man-has gotten on the bandwagon,
citing these glaring examples. of inequity:
-A wealthy widow with an annual income
of $1.5 million in interest from tax exempt
municipal and state bonds pays nothing in
federal income tax-in fact, she doesn't even
file a return. Yet her gardener, who makes
$5,000 a year, must pay $350 in income taxes.
-An apartment building owner has earned
$7.5 million in personal income in the past
seven years. This should put him in the 70
percent tax bracket, or about $5 million in-
come taxes. But by carefully using the "fast
depreciation" loophole, he paid only $800,-
000 over the seven years. That's the same rate,
11 percent, paid by a man with a $10,000 a
year income and two children.
-A man purchased $10,000 worth of stock,
which he kept until his death, when it was
worth $100,000. It passes to his heir and there
will be no income tax-then or ever--on the
$90,000 in capital gains. That case history of a
loophole was cited by Rep. Henry Reuss (D-
Wis.), who estimates that $2.5 billion is lost
in Federal income taxeseach year because of
failure to tax inherited gains.
Other examples are legion. Some of the
foremost examples of tax loopholes feature
depletion allowances an oil and other
minerals, exemptions for charitable deduc-
tions and tax-free "non-profit" foundations.
The charitable cotributions can be expertly
employed. For instance, one aspect of the
Federal law provides that if In 8 of the previ-
ous 10 years a person's charitable contribu-
tions plus his federal income tax payments
add up to 90 percent of his taxable income, he
can deduct an unlimited amount for con-
tributions to charity in the present year.
The tax-free state and local government
bonds may be the most galling to the work-
ing man of all the tax loopholes. Originally
intended to help state and local governments
provide schools and other public services,
studies by the AFL-CIO reveal that in many
instances, "This federal subsidy has been
perverted into a tax loophole promoting plant
piracy, enticing runaway shops when many
communities used tax-free bonds to build
plants for private use and private profit,"
Obviously, the plugging of just a few of the
more glaring loopholes would allow raising of
the current $600 per dependent exemption
to $1,000.
AUTO INSURANCE
One of the hottest items in the current con-
sumer cauldron is the issue of inordinate
rates paid by U.S. drivers for often inade-
quate amounts of automobile insurance pro-
tection.
For the long run, the issue evolves arounc
the Keeton-O'Connell plan. Strongly en-
dorsed by the CWA Executive Board wher
it was first introduced, the Keeton-O'Connel:
plan calls for the elimination of the lon?
and costly process of establishing blame in
auto accident cases with losses of under
$10,000. Devised by two young law proles.
sore, the plan would revolutionize the whole
concept of auto insurance-and drasticalll
reduce costs to the consumer.
Meanwhile, such groups as the Ohio State
AFL-CIO have come up with some startlin?
inadequacies in current protections. For in-
stance, the Ohio A71,-CIO study shows that
auto insurance rates have risen a startling
25.8 percent in the past three years. That
compares with an - over-all increase in the
state's economy (consumer price index) of
barely 11 percent.
And what are auto owners getting for the
Increased premiums?
Not. much, according to the AFL-CIO find-
ings in Ohio,. -
A December report revealed case after case
of policy holders being canceled without ap-
parent cause, then being re-classified as high
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a greater tax: loss than the depletion
allowance.
"It's another example of the oil companies
finding a crack in the tax laws and widening
it until it reaches the proportions of a
chasm."
TIGHTER TAX LAWS FAVORED
A majority of 300 top corporation execu-
tives surveyed by a leading business maga-
zine favor closing of loopholes in the na-
tion's federal income tax laws.
Results of the survey-published this
month by "Dun's Review Magazine," showed
that most business leaders favor:
Reducing tax shelters such as the 27%2 %
oil depletion allowance.
A closer look at some of the exemptions
currently enjoyed by tax-free foundations.
Eliminating some deductions now used by
individuals and a lowering of the over-all
tax rate.
Taxing at least half the income of every
individual-regardless of the source of the
income.
Commenting on the poll, the magazine
stated:
"Amid this swelling bipartisan support for
an overhaul of the tax laws, perhaps the
most surprising aspect of the survey of busi-
ness leaders is the growing sentiment It dis-
closes for reducing the availability of tax
shelters."
On. FIRMS LOST BATTLE, WON WAR
WASHINGTON.-The government tried to
plug a petroleum industry income tax loop-
hole back in 1958 and the big loser was the
U.S. Treasury.
The reason:
In a successful legal battle to close one
loophole, worth a few million dollars to oil-
men, the government opened another loop-
hole worth an estimated billion dollars or
more to the same oilmen.
Looking back on the legal proceedings, a
Capitol Hill tax expert says:
"It is the most expensive victory the gov-
ernment ever won."
The unusuaa victory came in a decision
handed down April 14, 1958, by the U.S.
Supreme Court in a case known as the P. G.
Lake Case.
For the oil industry; it was a landmark
decision that opened the door to a billion
dollar tax dodge through the use of carved
out production payments.
The issue then before the court was this:
Should the proceeds of a production pay-
ment be taxed at the low capital gains rate
of 25% or at the ordinary income tax rates
that ranged up to 91 %?
Until 1958, lower courts and the U.S. Tax
Court had held that the sale of a carved out
production payment constituted the transfer
of a capital asset.
Using this interpretation of a production
payment, the lower courts said the, proceeds
from the transaction should be taxed as a
capital gains.
The Lake case was a consolidation of five
separate cases, four involving oil production
payments and one dealing with sulphur.
The lower courts had sustained the tax-
payer's argument that the production pay-
ment represnted the sale of a capital asset
and thereby the lower tax rate.
In appealing the case to the Supreme
Court, the government contended that the
payments were merely an assignment of fu-
ture income subject to taxation as ordinary
income and not capital gains.
The Supreme Court upheld the govern-
ment, moving The New York Times to report
the following day:
.,The Supreme Court held unanimously
that payments for rights to future oil profits
are taxable as ordinary income, not as capi-
tal, gains.
"The ruling was a blow to what has become
a widespread practice in the oil industry, so-
called 'in-oil payments:
"Forty-three cases are pending before the
Internal Revenue Service and officials have
said 'many millions' in tax revenue, are at
stake.
"In the government's view, the disputed
practice was a way to anticipate future in-
come and avoid paying full income tax on it."
As a result of the court's decision, the
production payment device has been used
by the oilmen not to "avoid paying full
income tax"-but to avoid paying any income
tax, as explained.
The decision paved the way for an oil com-
pany to create self-induced paper losses that
may be used to reduce or eliminate the in-
come tax payments of not only the oil com-
pany but its subsidiaries.
In the Lake case, the legal issues considered
by the Supreme Court were quite narrow and
did not involve the propriety, of selling pro-
duction payments to reduce taxes.
But the Tax Court, other lower courts and
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) all have
issued similar opinions on techniques em-
ployed to lower income taxes.
Typical is a decision handed down by the
U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, which
states:
"The legal right of the taxpayer to decrease
the amount of his taxes, or altogether to
avoid them by means which the law permits,
cannot be doubted.
"If, upon careful scrutiny, the transaction
has real substance and is not a sham, it mat-
ters not whether the taxpayer's aim was 'to
avoid taxes or to regenerate the world' . .
In private rulings, the IRS has expressed
the same opinion on production payments,
saying they, are proper as long as there is a
bona fide transaction.
There is nothing new about the sale of
carved out production payments-only the
purpose of the transaction has changed over
the years.
The use of production payments in the
.petroleum industry dates back to the turn of
the century-years before the United States
had an income tax.
At that time, a wildcat oil operator would
grant a production payment to a landowner
in exchange for the right to drill on his
property.
This concept later was expanded and the
wildcatters gave the production payments to
drilling companies-instead of cash-for their
services.
The final refinement came In the last few
years when tax experts found a way to reduce
and often eliminate an oil or minerals com-
pany's federal income tax liability through
the sale of a production payment.
ABM NEEDED TO PROTECT U.S.
DETERRENT
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, as
Senators know, the Committee on Armed
Services, under the able chairmanship
of the Senator from Mississippi (Mr.
STENNIS), held 2 days of public hearings
last week on the proposed anti-ballistic-
missile defense system. The hearings
were held in connection with the yearly
legislation authorizing funds for fiscal
year 1970 for the procurement of aircraft,
missiles, ships, and research and de-
velopment.
On April 22 the distinguished scientist,
Dr. William G. McMillan, professor of
chemistry at the University of California
at Los Angeles and noted specialist on
such strategic nuclear matters as re-
entry vehicle vulnerability, penetration
aids, nuclear weapons effects and missile
vulnerability, expressed to the committee
his views in support of early deployment
of the Safeguard ABM system as an es-
sential part of maintaining the viability
and credibility of our strategic deterrent.
I wish to commend to the attention of
this body Dr. McMillan's opening state-
ment given before the Armed Services
Committee and ask unanimous consent
that it be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the state-
nient was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
STATEMENT BY DR. WILLIAM G. MCMILLAN,
BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COM-
MITTEE, APRIL 22, I969
Mr. Chairman, and members of the Com-
mittee, your invitation has provided me a
welcome opportunity to offer my views on
the issue of ballistic missile defense.
Since this is my first 'appearance before
your committee, I thought I should begin by
sketching my technical background and ex-
perience.
BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE
I received my doctorate at Columbia Uni-
versity during World War II in that hybrid
field known as chemical physics. Immediately
thereafter I joined the Columbia University
branch of the Manhattan Project as a mem-
ber of the Chemistry Division, where we were
deeply involved in the design of the gaseous
diffusion plant for the production of Use.
After the war, I spent a year as a Guggenheim
Postdoctoral Fellow in theoretical physics at
the University of Chicago. In 1947 I joined
the faculty of the Department of Chemistry
at UCLA, where latterly I served six years as
Department Chairman. I have also taught at
Harvard and Columbia Universities.
During the 50's I served as consultant to
the Engineering Department of Brookhaven
National Laboratory and to the Lawrence
Radiation Laboratory in Livermore. Since
1954 I have been a part-time member of the
Physics Department of the Rand Corproation,
where my work has been concerned primarily
with such strategic nuclear matters as re-
entry vehicle vulnerability, penetration aids,
underground nuclear testing and test detec-
tion, nuclear weapon effects and missile
vulnerability.
In mid-1981 in anticipation of the Soviet
abrogation of the nuclear test moratorium
I was charged with forming the Scientific
Advisory Group on Effects to advise the Di-
rector of Defense Research and Engineering
and the Defense Atomic Support Agency.
This group played a large role in designing
the U.S. nuclear test programs aimed at ex-
ploring many of the strategic nuclear prob-
lems mentioned above.
In 1963 I was asked to chair a study group
on missile vulnerability for DDR&E, the Air
Force and the Navy. This group, which is
still in existence, greatly extended our un-
derstanding of missile vulnerability and
sponsored far-reaching changes in the de-
sign of our strategic missiles.
With the support of DDR&E and the Ad-
vanced Research Projects Agency, I founded
in 1984 the Defense Science Seminar aimed
at getting new young scientific talent in the
Defense advisory business. This seminar ran
for three successive summers, with a total
attendance of about 120 individuals. In 1965
I helped establish the Defense Intelligence
Agency Scientific Advisory Committee, which
I have since served as Vice Chairman. Also in
1965 I chaired a study for the JCS, on the
technical-military implications of possible
extensions of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty. In 1966 I participated In a related
study for the Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency. Most recently from October
1966 through December 1968, I served in Viet
Nam as Science Advisor to COMUSMACV.
THE THREAT
As Mr. Nitze so ably described, the intran-
sigence of the Soviet Union after World War
II left us no alternative to the development
of a strong nuclear deterrent. The hope that
the Soviets would join with us under the
Baruch plan for sharing the great potential
of the nuclear age was shattered with the
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first Soviet atomic explosion in 1949. Simi-
larly the national debate over the decision
to develop thermonuclear devices was punc-
tuated emphatically by the first Soviet
thermonuclear explosion in 1953.
Our policy of nuclear deterrence, which
came to maturity under President Eisen-
hower, has I believe seed us well. There
are, however, two curriillt Soviet develop-
ments that threaten the survivability and
credibility of our deterrent: their ballistic
missile defense systems; and their counter-
force efforts.
For-.some years I have followed closely the
growth of the Soviet ABM systems. By my
reckoning there have been three systems in-
volved: the first, partially deployed around
Leningrad and then apparently abandoned;
the second, deployed around Moscow and
now approaching operational status; and the
third or Tallinn system, very extensively de-
ployed throughout the Soviet Union, and
which appears to me likely to have a con-
siderable ABM potential.
I find very unpersuasive the argument that
the Soviets are building in the Tallinn devel-
opment yet another SAM antiaircraft system
to the neglect of a defensive system aimed at
what they must surely regard as the more
current threat of ICBM's and SLBM's.
By the counterforce effort I refer to the
current Soviet development of multiple war-
heads for their SS-9 missile. To me the evi-
dence as I understand it points very strongly,
If not unequivocally, towards a MIRV-i.e.,
a multiple independently targeted reentry
vehicle-system designed against the U.S.
land-based Minuteman system.
To impart some feeling for the strength
of my conviction on these two Intelligence
issues, I would strongly support spending a
substantial fraction of our Defense budget
to assure that neither of these Soviet de-
velopments be allowed to degrate our strate-
gic deterrent.
Put differently, I am most certainly not
willing to gamble the survival of our Min-
uteman force that such an interpretation
Is wrong.
In addition to the question of capability,
Intelligence must concern itself with the
question of iritent. Here the writing of such
high-level Soviet military planners as Mar-
shal Sokolovsky abound with references to
the need for a preemptive strategic first-
strike capability. They tell themselves they
must develop it, and now we see that .de-
velopment in progress. How much more no-
tification do we need?
In this focussing on the survivability of
Minuteman one often encounters the rebut-
tal-"Well, there is always Polaris." This
seems to me a hazardous position. The whole
point of the mix of strategic weapons sys-
tems-Minuteman Polaris, Poseidon, 3352
Bombers-is to have such diversification
that our deterrent could never be totally
negated. I am sure that if we are willing to
write off Minuteman as a component of our
deterrent forces, we would not have any dif-
ficulty inducing the Soviets then to focus
their full counterforce genius against our
submarine and bomber forces. In fact, I
fully expect there has already been long es-
tablished a Soviet group charged with de-
veloping specific means of countering such
element of our deterrent. To them, Polaris
may not look like 600 missiles, or 8,000 war-
heads if given a ten-fold MIRV multiplica-
tion, but rather as only 41 boats to be neu-
tralized. Certainly we know the Soviets are
engaged in large-scale ASW developments.
And our 600 B-52 bombers may be viewed
as a much smaller number of airfields to be
attacked-for which th may think their
Fractional Orbital Borardment System
(FOBS) is well suited.
Turning to the Chinese Peoples Republic
it is no secret that their progress in the de
velopment of atomic ld thermonuclear
weapons has been spectacularly rapid. While
their missile program has been less spectac-
ular, there can be little doubt that they
are striving to achieve an ICBM capability.
Now who will those ICBM's be aimed at? It
should be a sobering thought that no Ohl-
nese ICBM's would be necessary if only the
Soviet Union were their target.
As to intent of the CPR, we have the won-
derfully-candid statement of Marshall Lin
Piao, Minister of Defense, in September of
1965. This document developed the theme
that the U.S. nuclear capability is a paper
tiger, and "cannot save U.S imperialism
from its doom." It also laid out a blueprint
for what Marshall Lin euphemistically
termed "peoples wars of national libera-
tion," a blue-print that is being followed
by the North Vietnamese in their invasion of
South Viet Nam.
Thus while I had no part even as an ad-
visor in the Sentinel deployment decision,
which occurred while I was on overseas as-
signment, it did seem to me a prudent move
to anticipate a CPR ICBM threat.
TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY
It has been argued that even if there were
a sound military requirement for the Safe-
guard ABM System it wouldn't work anyway.
The technical reasons adduced for this view
include:
1. It is too complicated.
2. There is insufficient reaction time for
human decision-making.
3. It was designed for another purpose
("thin" defense of cities against a CPR
attack) and is thus unsuited for the defense
of Minuteman.
4. The radars can be blacked out.
5. Cheap and simple decoys can saturate
the defense.
Before commenting on these points I must
emphasize that I have no special expertise in
the engineering of either missiles or radar-
although I have studied Professor Panofsky's
excellent book on Electromagnetic Theory.
But we have all seen some other fairly com-
plicated systems built by our aerospace in-
dustrial complex that work, and work well;
for example, the Explorer, Surveyor and
Mariner space shots, topped by the magnifi-
cent performance of the Christmas round-
the-moon Apollo excursion. The use of solid
state electronic components, which were in-
vented only a few short years ago, has made
possible a vast improvement in reliability.
It would, of course, be folly to expect no
difficulties, no start-up bugs in any new sys-
tem. But both the Spartan and Sprint mis-
siles have been successfully flown many
times. At Kwajalein there has been con-
structed a Missile Site Radar (MSR) that
will soon be tested in operational launches,
and somewhat later in actual ICBM reentry-
vehicle intercepts. Already in operation are
numerous phased-array radars employing the
same basic principles as the Perimeter Ac-
quisition Radar (PAR). The computer re-
quired is well within the state of the art.
The nuclear warheads are either already de-
veloped or can be tested underground. In
other words there is a justifiably high con-
fidence that each and every component is
completely feasible.
The short time In which an ABM system
must react is indeed a severe problem. But it
seems to me far better to place that burden
upon a defensive system which would not
trigger a nuclear exchange, rather than upon
our ICBM's which certainly would If they
had to be launched on warning.
Since the new Safeguard deployment has
brought into question the rationale behind
the original Sentinel deployment, I believe
it may be useful to quote an important part
that seems to have been overlooked in Sec-
retary McNamara's San Francisco address on
18 September 1967. Ile said,
"Further, the Chinese-oriented ABM de-
ployment would enable us to add-as a con-
current benefit-a further defense of our
Minuteman sites against Soviet attack, which
means that at a modest cost we would in
fact be adding even greater effectiveness to
our offensive missile force and avoiding a
much more costly expansion of that force."
This, statement Is, of course, borne out by
the proposed Sentinel deployment, in which
4-face MSR's along with complements of
both Spartan and Sprint missiles were to be
collocated at both Grand Forks and Malm-
strom, the same two Minuteman bases to be
given priority protection under the Safe-
guard proposal. In other words, the difference
between the two deployments is more one
of emphasis than of kind.
Of course, many other approaches to hard-
point defense have been examined, but
precious-perhaps even critical-years would
be lost in starting over at this point.
A blackout attack, like that of a direct
attack upon the radars-the eyes and ears
of the ABM system-is of course a possible
enemy option, but is neither simple, guar-
anteed to work nor cheap in ICBM's and
nuclear warheads. To be sure, any defensive
system can be burned through with enough
concentration by the offense, but this ab-
sorbs time that would upset a concerted at-
tack, and absorbs warheads that could have
caused great casualties elsewhere.
Any nation, like the CPR, who can produce
ICBM's and nuclear warheads can of course
also develop penetration aids-given time.
In my view we can only hope to buy time,
time to give our political colleagues and their
foreign counterparts an opportunity to real-
ize a workable arms control agreement based
upon mutual concern,- mutual restraint and
mutual dedication.
ALTERNATIVE COURSES
In his San Francisco speech, Secretary Mc-
Namara made clear that intensive consider-
ation was being given to others means of
protecting our land-based deterrent: mobil-
ity, super-hardening, etc. It Is strange to find
some of those individuals who most strongly
oppose ABM deployment because of the risk
of escalating the arms race now advocating
proliferation of our Minuteman system to
assure its survivability.
In previous hearings of this Congress some
have even suggested launching the Minute-
man force on warning as a tenable course, or
undertaking a preemptive strike against the
CPR if their ICBM threat becomes intoler-
able.
I want to go on record as unalterably op-
posed to any intentional action-or in-
tentional lack of action-that would maneu-
ver the United States into such a position
that only a strike-first option remained.
INTERNATIONAL OVERTONES
One of the most often expressed argu-
ments against ABM is that it will inaugurate
a new cycle of escalation in the arms race.
Some of this fear may have been allayed by
the reorientation of Safeguard to the defense
of our deterrent forces. But it is noteworthy
that the Soviets first formally announced
their interest in arms limitation shortly after
the U.S. decision was reached to deploy the
Sentinel System. The Safeguard deployment
in no way reduces the deterrence inherent in
the Soviet retaliatory capability. That the
Soviets understand the desirability and in-
nocuousness of such a defense Is Illustrated
by Premiur Kosygin's declaration that their
ABM system is a threat to no nation and
doesnot contribute to an arms race.
Personally I should be sorry to see even the
thin city defense permanently rejected. I be-
lieve such a defense might serve to dampen
an unwelcome CPR adventurousness, and
thus to maintain for us a wider class of
options and more room for political maneu-
ver.
Finally. I believe the maintenance of the
credibility of our deterrent-to which Safe-
guard would contribute-is absolutely essen-
tial in our relations with NATO and our other
allies around the world,
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CONCLUSION
There are two additional reasons, which
may even be the strongest of all for an early
deployment of the Safeguard system. First,
a review of the Soviet ABM programs indi-
cates that they have for a number of years
been gaining operational experience from ac-
tually deployed systems, whereas we have not.
We can ill afford to allow an important gap
to develop in the learning process concerning
such an important capability. Second, it is
only through the actual deployment of the
major system elements that we can learn
with certainty how to cope with the problems
that will surely arise in command, control,
communications and the inter-action and
internetting of the radars with each other
and with the rest of the system.
I believe that the great majority of the
American people, with their down-to-earth
commonsense, are having as great a difficulty
as I am in swallowing the sophisticated argu-
ments that conclude it is somehow bad to
defend ourselves. I simply do not understand
why it is provocative for the U.S. to deploy an
A13M system as we are here considering today,
but not provocative of the Soviet Union to
have already deployed two ABM systems; nor
why it would be provocative of us to defend
our Minuteman forces against a developing
Soviet preemptive first-strike capability,
whereas it is not provocative of the Soviets
to develop that destabilizing capability. We
are told, in effect, to stop our provocative
action of punching the Soviets on their fist
with our eye. I sincerely hope that such an
inverted Alice-In-Wonderland view of the
world will not be allowed to prevail.
In summary, I support the early deploy-
ment of the Safeguard system as an essential
part of maintaining the viability and credi-
bility of our strategic deterrent.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
INDUSTRY MAKING MAJOR EFFORT
IN POLLUTION CONTROL
Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, the
pollution of our air and water is accepted
as one of the major problems facing the
United States today.
The growth of our population and the
resulting increasing in the industry and
services necessary to sustain it has made
the control of pollution more essential
than ever before. In recent years, en-
lightened industry has joined with all
levels of government in an effort to return
our environment to a state of cleanliness
and purity.
In the space of 5 years air pollution
control expenditures by the Federal
Government have jumped from $4.1 mil-
lion to $91 million. This year the Govern-
ment plans to spend $133 million.
A beginning has been made, Mr. Presi-
dent, but we have considerably more to
do. Yes; much to do.
American industry recognizes the need
to continue antipollution work and has
itself made constructive contributions to
the campaign in both talent and money.
The very nature of the business makes
the American steel industry deeply in-
volved in pollution problems, and there
are notable examples of success in reduc-
ing the amount of waste material loosed
in the atmosphere and streams.
Our steel industry last year spent $222
million to improve air and water quality,
almost evenly divided between the two.
This was in addition to expenditures in
the preceding 16 years totaling $600
million.
Steel spokesmen affirm that the job in
reducing pollution is going forward. They
are dedicated to continue high-level
spending on antipollution projects.
There are many outstanding examples
of new techniques and revolutionary
methods being applied to the. problems of
combatting pollution of the air and
water.
In our State of West Virginia, for ex-
ample, a new $100 million plant at Weir-
ton Steel Co. has been called the "mill of
the future," combining in a new facility
many modem antipollution devices in
addition to modern steel-producing
equipment.
And a new electric power plant near
Moundsville, W. Va., the Mitchell plant
owned by American Electric Power Co.,
has a stack 1,206 feet tall to carry waste
gases high into the atmosphere and away
from the ground. This is approximately
three times as tall as the average.
The electric power industry as a whole
spent $98 million to abate pollution in
1967. During the same year, the chemical
industry was spending $87 million,
petroleum $47 million and coal $18 mil-
lion fighting these problems in their own
spheres.
So, while we may sometimes think
that little is being done to purify our
environment, there is ample proof that
industry, as well as government, is mak-
ing a determined effort to create and keep
clean air and water in America.
S. 1717-A BILL TO INCREASE THE
INCOME TAX EXEMPTION, SUP-
PORTED BY JACK BOSTICK, VICE
PRESIDENT OF INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS
Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President,
recently I introduced a bill, S. 1717, to
increase the personal income tax ex-
emption from $600 to $1,200. As I said
at the time I introduced by bill, I feel
that we have waited far too long to take
such action.
Recently, I received a letter from my
good friend Jack Bostick, vice president
of the International Association of Fire
Fighters. Mr. Bostick is a fellow Texan
and lives in Fort Worth, Tex. He en-
closed with his letter a resolution which
was recently adopted by the IAFF in
convention. Because the resolution per-
tains "to the spirit, if not the letter" of
my bill, I ask unanimous consent that it
be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the resolu-
tion was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
RESOLUTION No. 86
Re increase in exemption for dependents
from $600 to $1800 for each dependent for
income tax purposes.
Whereas in the past number of years the
cost of living has risen steadily and in many
instances wages have not kept pace with the
rapid rise, and
Whereas for the above reason the cost of
supporting a family and dependents has in-
creased greatly, and
Whereas the present $600.00 exemption for
a dependent is no longer a realistic figure:
Therefore be it
Resolved,. That the International Associa-
tion of Fire Fighters strive for Federal legis-
lation to increase the $600.00 exemption for
a dependent to an $1800.00 exemption for
each dependent for income tax purposes; and
be it further
Resolved, That the International Associa-
tion of Fire Fighters solicit the aid of all
organized labor and pursue this legislation
with a united front.
Submitted by: Local Union No. 344, De-
troit Fire Fighter Association, Earl I.,
Sanders, Secretary.
SENATOR NELSON FIGHTS FOR
TIGHTER TRUTH IN PACKAGING
STANDARDS
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, an
editorial published in the May issue of
Wisconsin's nationally known the Pro-
gressive magazine, edited by Morris Ru-
bin, tells of the frustrations and confu-
sion confronting the housewife in per-
forming her routine but important task
of shopping for the family groceries.
In 1966, Congress passed the Truth in
Packaging Act, aimed at removing de-
ceptively packaged products from the
supermarkets. However, consumer stud-
ies conducted before and after enact-
ment of this law have proved that the
Truth-in Packaging Act has not accom-
plished all that it set out to do.
Our distinguished colleague and my
fellow Senator from Wisconsin (Mr.
NELSON), has long been a vigorous
spokesman for the consumer. We are all
familiar with his outstanding achieve-
ments in investigating the high costs of
prescription drugs and in assuring the
highest safety standards in automobiles
and automobile tires. Now Senator NEL-
SON has introduced an amendment to
the 1966 Fair Packaging and Labeling
Act which would require the price per
unit to be placed on the label of con-
sumer commodities, including food,
household goods, drugs and cosmetics.
The Progressive's editorial is just one
of the many voices urging Congress to
take action on this important legislation,
S. 1424. I ask unanimous consent that
the article be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
CHEAPER BY THE POUND
Three years ago this spring-before Con-
gress enacted the "truth-in-packaging" bill-
we reported in these columns on an Eastern
Michigan University survey involving thirty-
three college-educated housewives who were
turned loose in a supermarket with identical
shopping lists. Confronted by a staggering
variety of sizes and deceptive labeling of gro-
cery and household goods, these shoppers
were misled into spending an average of $10
for purchases that could have been made for
$8.90.
Food industry lobbyists successfully
persuaded Congress to pass only a diluted
truth-in-packaging law in 1966. As a result,
confusion still reigns in packaging. Senator
Gaylord Nelson, Wisconsin Democrat, recent-
ly pointed out that "consumers today still
must be mathematicians before they can se-
lect the best bargain from among the vast
variety of odd-sized packages on the mar-
ket."
He cited two consumer tests conducted in
California, one before and one after the
Federal law was enacted. In a 1962 test five
college-educated housewives were asked to
buy a total of seventy items at the lowest
unit costs. The women made thirty-four in-
correct choices and thirty-six correct ones.
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April 25, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
MILITARY VALVE AND POLITICAL COST
This, in effect, scathing criticism of Mc-
Namara aroused to his defence his fellow-
rationalist McGeorge Bundy, who had by
then left the White House to become Presi-
dent of the Ford Foundation. He, too, had
now become doubtful of the effectiveness of
military measures, however well executed, in
a limited war. He took the Committee to
task: "Nothing is less reliable than the un-
supported opinion of men who are urging
the value of their own chosen instrument-
in this case military force. We must not be
surprised, and still less persuaded, when gen-
erals and admirals recommend additional
military action-what do we expect them to
recommend?"
He warned that careful judgment was re-
quired between military value and political
costs. The ideologists continued to hold fast,
but the rationalists had had second
thoughts. As McGeorge Bundy now con-
fessed, "Grey is the colour of truth."
On September 29, the President revealed
in San Antonio his new negotiating formula,
which by then was already in the hands of
Hanoi.
Just before Christmas General Westmore-
land, the U.S. Commander in Vietnam, and
Ellsworth Bunker, the Ambassador in Saigon,
returned to the U.S. to sprinkle some op-
timism into everybody's ears. They both
talked about "light at the end of the tun-
nel," but many suspected that Johnson was
using them to set the right mood and tone
for the Presidential election year of 1968.
And, in fact, It had been clear for some
time that the war had become a stalemate.
The word was resented in the Johnson Ad-
ministration, but until the Tet offensive be-
gan in February, 1968, its use was accurate.
The Tet offensive caught the U.S. forces off
guard and proved how vulnerable they still
were; but their counter-offensive, so to say,
restored the stalemate It did not restore,
though, the lost confitfence in the political
and military assessments from Saigon.
THE ABM
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the
ABM debate symbolizes and encompasses
more than a weapons' system. The de-
velopment of technology as applied to
missile systems and other implements of
war affect our chances for disarmament
and tend to distort domestic priorities.
They have great implications not only in
the military field but in the fields of
industry, labor, the universities, and
politics and all these factors can be, and
have been, without any prior determina-
tion and without any deliberate intent,
developed into a partnership of enormous
proportions.
Mr. President, I have nothing but the
greatest respect for the military. I think
they are doing their job with integrity,
dedication, and patriotism. I have great
respect for industry in this country. They
are seeking business and achieving it.
Sometimes I think perhaps they go to
undue lengths. I have great respect for
labor, too, but labor too often finds
desirable the jobs which missile installa-
tions and other systems make available,
the work pays well and often carries a
good deal of overtime.
The universities have also been bene-
fiting for some time. The latest figure I
have indicates that last year, educational
and nonprofit institutions earned $772
million in research contracts-$16 mil-
lion more than in 1967.
For example, with no intention of im-
pugning any university, but rather to
note their excellence, I note from pub-
lished news sources that the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology is in 10th
place in this field, with $119 million in
Defense research contracts, and that the
Johns Hopkins University, for example,
is in 22d place with $57,600,000.
As far as the politics is concerned
there are many of us in this Chamber,
myself included, who must share a part
S 4057
of the responsibility, and a part of any
blame, because when it comes to getting
defense installations, missile or other-
wise, for our States and into our areas,
none of us have been shrinking violets.
I think that ought to be made clear.
So what has developed along with the
technological developments over the past
two decades, is a military-industrial-
labor-academic-political combination,
and that development simply cannot be
gainsaid.
To come back to the main theme of my
remarks, I would note that the Penta-
gon's allegation, in defense of the ABM-
Safeguard-system, is, in my opinion,
predicated on its belief that the Soviet
Union is developing a. first strike capacity
and that almost all our land-based mis-
siles or at least a sizable portion of them
would be destroyed on that basis.
It is well to reiterate and to emphasize
that the second strike capacity is only in
part predicated on the reaction of our
land-based missiles and that we have, in
addition, 41 Polaris submarines with 656
nuclear missiles and 646 nuclear armed
strategic Air Force bombers.
At this point, I ask to have printed in
the RECORD a table showing the increase
from 1963 through 1968 on the part of
the United States and the U.S.S.R. of
ICBM-intercontinental ballistic mis-
sile-SLBM--sea-launched ballistic mis-
sile-and total missiles from these two
systems. In addition, I would like on the
same basis to include the number of in-
tercontinental bombers. All this is public
information.
There being no objection, the table was
ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as
follows:
United
States
U.S.S.R.
United
States
U.S.S.R.
United
States
U.S.S.R.
United
States
U.S.S.R.
United
States
U.S.S.R.
United
States
U.S.S.R.
0
ICBM launchers_________________
514
100
834
200
854
270
934
340
1,054
720
1,054
905
SLBM launchers---------------
160
90
416
120
496
120
512
130
656
30
656
45
Total missiles -------------
674
190
1,250
320
1,350
390
1,446
470
1,710
750
1,710
945
Intercontinental bombers---------
1,300
155
1,100
155
935
155
680
155
697
155
646
150
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the Sena-
tor from Arkansas.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, with
regard to this table, I merely wish to say
that while the Senator has included, in
the table which he has just asked to be
inserted, I think, a very complete and
very good table of the nuclear weapons,
this by no means exhausts the capacity
of this country to destroy any enemy or
any antagonist, because we have enor-
mous capacity in the field of chemical
and bacteriological warfare agents, suffi-
cient at least to duplicate the destructive
capacity represented by the figures in the
table the Senator has inserted.
I wish only to make the point that this
table, with all of its impressive figures, by
no means tells the whole story. The Rus-
sians, as do we, have, in addition, the
further capacity to decimate populations.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the
distinguished chairman of the Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations, the Senator
from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT), is cor-
rect. And may I say that I have not even
given all the information at my disposal
relative to the number of warheads and
the like, but I shall do so now.
It is my understanding, subject to veri-
fication, that in 1963 the approximate
number of nuclear warheads was 7,844
for the United States and 755 for the
Soviet Union and that by 1968 the figure
was 6,556 for the United States and 3,295
for the Soviet Union.
I say that subject to verification; but I
have a pretty good idea that what I have
just stated is fact, and can well be
proved.
Another aspect of the development, or
in some instances, lack of development,
of missiles is indicated by the fact that
approximately $23 billion has been ex-
pended on missile systems planned, pro-
duced, deployed, and abandoned. Of that
figure about $4.1 billion was spent on
missiles which were abandoned in the
research and development stage. I shall
ask to have printed in the RECORD a list of
major missile projects terminated during
the past 16 years and not deployed; but
before doing so, I wish to give full credit
to the distinguished senior Senator from
Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON), who placed
these figures in the RECORD on March 7,
and thereby made them available to the
rest of us.
I now ask unanimous consent that the
list of terminated projects be printed in
the RECORD.
There being no objection, the list was
ordered to be printed in the RECORD, asp
follows:
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S 4058 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
April .25x 1969
Project
Year
started
Year
canceled
Army:
Hermes ______
Dart'----------
Loki----
Terrier, land based----.
Plato ------------------
Mauler _______
1944,
19527
1948
1951
1 951 .-
1960
194
I958
1956
1956
198
1965
Total Army-------------?
-----__-
Sparrow I__
1945
1958
Regulus
1955
1958
Petrel
1945
1957
Corvus. ___-------~_--
1954
1960
Eagle------
1959
1961
Meteor
1945
1954
Sparrow
1945
1957
Rigel
1943
1953
Dove
1949
1955
Triton
1948
1957
Oriole___________
1947
1953
Typhon--- ------------
1958
1964
Total Navy-------------------
Air Force:
Navaho ________________
1954
1957
Snark.
1947
1962
GAM-63 Rascal_________
1946
1958
GAM-87 Skybolt________
Talos, land based-------
1960
19
1963
Mobile Minuteman------
59
1962
Q-4 Drone_____________
SM-72 Goose___________
1954
1959
GAM-67 Crossbow -----
1957
1958
MMRBM
1962
1964
Funds
invested
(millions)
44.0
21.9
18.6
18. 5
200.0
399.4
195.6
144.4
87.2
80.0
53.0
52.6
52.0
38.0
33.7
19.4
12.5
225.0
t
S
e
ysm.
679.6
677.4 Third. A year from now, we should
446.0 know as a result of diplomatic initiatives
440, o as well as further research on the ABM
i 8: 4 whether there Is a sound basis for going
7as ahead with the building of an ABM Sys
74;6 tem or for setting it aside entirely. In
65.4
Total Air Force__________________ ________ 2,774.6
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the
following table shows the total invest-
ment for missile systems which have
been deployed but are no longer de-
ployed. These two sets of figures add up
to a total of $23,053 billion:
[Cost in millions]
Army:
Nike-Ajax ----------------------- $2,256
Entac (Antitank missile) -------- 50
Redstone --------------- - ------- 586
Lacrosse ------------------------ 347
Corporal ----------------z- --- 534
Jupiter -------------------------- 327
Total Army ---------- ------ 4, 100
Polaris Al------------------....
Regulus ------------------
Total Navy _________________
Air Force:
Houndog A ----------------------
Atlas D, E, F-----------------
Titan I - -- - - ----- --?
Bomarc A - -- - ?_ -
Mace A
Jupiter ------------------
Thor
---- - ---- -- -
1,132
413
255
5,208
3.415
1,405
328
498
1,415
race which could cost tens of billions of made crystal clear by so authoritative a
dollars; and in view of the fact that there voice as that of the majority leader.
are alternatives both of diplomacy and Mr. MANSFIELD Mr. President, I
weapons technology which have yet to appreciate the remarks of the distin-
be considered, it seems to me that it is
i
gu
s
h
e
d
senior Senato f N
rro
mew Yrk.
o
high time to put first things first. But I think he gives the Senator from
First. I would suggest that on the basis Montana too much credit.
of a number of Soviet diplomatic probes I not only appreciate what the Senator
over the past several months suggesting had to say, but I also agree with him.
a readiness to go forward on an arms There are two sides to this question, may-
limitation or freeze, a diplomatic reac- be the proponents are right.
tion should be tried on our part which It i
s a matter of jud
en
mt It
g
i
.s a
might lead to the setting of a time cer- matter of searching our consciences to
tain in the first part of June for nego- try to find the truth on the basis of the
tiations to begin in earnest between the best evidence available, and arriving at
Soviet Union and the United States. a judgment.
development should be continued on the
ABM system to determine more clearly
the prospects of resolving the technical
problems which have raised serious
doubts about the effectiveness of this
anti the State Department have not yet
provided the Senate with persuasive
grounds for going ahead with the de-
ployment of the ABM at this time.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
associate myself with the conclusions of
the distinguished majority leader, the
Senator from Montana. In presenting
these facts to the Senate and to the pub-
lic, he has rendered a great service. I
hope that his suggestions will be taken
most seriously.
I honor the President for being re-
sponsible for a review of this system. I
appreciate that he made a decided
change in the system which he In-
herited-the Sentinel.
He faced up to his responsibility of
exercising his best judgment on the basis
of the facts. And what he has done, we
in our individual capacities will have to
do as well. It is a part of our responsi-
bility as Senators from sovereign States.
I hope that recognition will be given to
the fact that probes have been made by
the Soviet Union and that the President
himself, as well as the Secretary of State,
have indicated that thereIs a very strong
possibility that talks will get underway
either late this spring or early this
summer. We need only refer to Secretary
Rogers' latest press conference.
I am somewhat disturbed at the ques-
tion of -priority. I think the key word
is "balance"; that we must balance our
foreign policy and our defense expend-
itures, on the one hand, with our do-
mestic problems and needs on the other.
If we can achieve a balance on that
basis, we shall all be further ahead than
I congratulate the Senator on his fine we would be if we were to place too much
statement. emphasis on the use of the word "prior-
Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Senator. ity" in one field or the other.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the If we were to become the strongest
Senator yield? nation in the world and were to spend
noted' with deep interest the views of the ournea and our society were disrupted,
__
. .
authoritative authoritative and have been-well borne uneasiness were to spread throughout
out under the auspices of the Senator the land, of what good would it be?
from Arkansas and the Senator from That is why we cannot give either of
Tennessee both in the principal com- these factors a priority
but
rather
,
,
,
mittee and in the subcommittee. ought to treat them, in effect, as a dual-
I appreciate the feeling of the Presi- ity That is why we must, in accommo-
dent of the United States upon this mat- dation with the President and the exec-
ter. But I think one thing needs to be utive branch, work to try to obtain a bal..
made very clear-and I know the Sen- ance. We must face up to these matters
ator from Montana will agree-that which are difficult, but which cannot be
there i
t
s no
Grand one whit less feeling about avoided.
Plus missile total---------------- systems terminated be- 18, 886 the security and future of our country in The matter must be considered, as the
............... e-
sore deployment - the heart of the Senator from Montana, distinguished Senator has already said,
4,167 the Senator from Arkansas, and myself on a nonpartisan?basis.
Total ----------------------- 23,053 than there is in the heart of the most it will do neither party any good to
ardent advocate of the Safeguard or anti- win a victory in this or in any other area
In view of the fact that the estimated ballistic-missile system.
cost of the Safeguard system will in- There is no partisanship In this mat- the country is the loser:
crease considerably above the present ter. I took this position before. The Sen- the I tone have with behnwhich espe the cially plea debate sed with
approximate $8 billion--$G, billion plus ator from Arkansas, the Senator from ABM has developed in the a on tot
for acquisition, construction,. cilddeploy Montana, and the Senator from Ken- only this year but also but last year. Ire, avt
merit and $2 billion plus for'.fesearch,and tucky (Mr. COOPER) also took this posi- also with par-
development-that there ar rave ques- tion before President Nixon was even ~~ been pleased with sthe ta ldin of pare
tions about the reliability oj the system; considered for the nomination of the part of the the undand the u the
that, inherent in the Safeguard proposal, Presidency of the United States. branch bra of t of he our rrsireespp and onsibility and utiur
is the start of a new phase of the arms I hope that these two factors may be our
Y reciprocal understanding.
A
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it 25, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I am
grateful to the distinguished majority
leader.
FOUR-STAR SCAPEGOATS
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed at
this point in the RECORD an editorial
entitled "Four-Star Scapegoats," pub-
lished in the Wall Street Journal of
April 24, 1969.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
The "military-industrial complex" has
become an increasingly fashionable bogey-
man, and indeed the notion is spreading
that the generals have created nearly all our
national ills, by running up defense spend-
ing and involving us in Vietnam. These prob-
lems are certainly serious, but making the
generals scapegoats for them obscures the
actual lessons to be learned.
The international climate being what it
is, the garrison state remains a real enough
long-term danger, though it ought to be
plain that at the moment military influence
is not burgeoning but plummeting. This
long-run danger surely will not be solved
by turning military officers into a pariah
class, as much as that would please those
intolerants whose personality clashes with
the military one. The danger requires a far
more sober diagnosis, and this would find
that many of the present complaints should
be directed not at the generals but at their
civilian superiors.
We tend to agree, for example, with the
complaints that the Pentagon budget is
swollen. But it tells us nothing to observe
that the officers press for more funds for
their department; in this they are no differ-
ent from any bureaucrat anywhere. Indeed,
the same people who think the generals mali-
cious for requesting large funds would find it
quite remiss if, say, the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare failed to make similar
demands for his concerns.
Choosing among competing budget de-
mands is the responsibility of civilians, in
the Pentagon, at the White House and In
Congress. Part of the current problem seems
to be that In the ballyhoo about "scientific"
management of the Pentagon, the old-fash-
ioned unscientific Budget Bureau review was
relaxed. More generally, it needs to be rec-
ognized that the problem of fat in the budget
is due less to the generals' greed than to a
want of competence or will in civilian re-
view.
Much the same thing is true In Vietnam,
There is plenty of room to criticize the gen-
erals' incoherent answer to the problems of
limited war, but many of the most decisive
mistakes were made by civilians.
Take the failure to understand the esca-
lation of our commitment implicit in sup-
porting the coup against Ngo Dinh Diem.
After we had implicated ourselves in over-
throwing the established anti-Communist
government, we could not with any grace
walk away without a real effort to salvage the
resulting chaos. Reasons of both honor and
international credibility left us vastly more
committed than before, and it was almost
solely the work of civilians.
Or take the fateful decision to have both
guns and butter, made in 1965 when the U.S.
part of the ground fighting started in earnest,
It was a civilian-and in no small part po-
litical-decislon to avoid mobilization, to
build the armed forces gradually, to expand
the bombing of North Vietnam at a meas-
ured rate, to commit the ground units piece-
meal. All of this is In direct contradiction to
the thrust of military wisdom. And if the
generals did favor defeating the Communists,
the little public record available also sug-
gests they favored means more commensu-
rate with that goal,
The point is not that the generals neces-
sarily should have been given everything they
wanted. The point is that the civilians de-
cided to do the job on the cheap. They would
have been wiser to listen when the generals
told them what means their goal required,
then to face the choice between allocating
the necessary means or cutting the goal to fit
more modest means. This discord between
means and goals is in a phrase the source of
our misery in Vietnam, and primary re-
sponsibility for it rests not on military
shoulders but civilian ones.
Blaming the generals for these problems
maligns a dedicated and upstanding group
of public servants. More than that, it obscures
the actual problem with the military-indus-
trial complex itself. For the real long-term
danger is that the garrison state will evolve
through precisely the type of failing that
led to fat in the budget and trouble In
Vietnam.
For the foreseeable future an effective mili-
tary force will remain absolutely essential
to national survival. An effective force de-
pends on generals who think and act like
generals. If they worry about funds for de-
fense and Communist advances in Asia, it is
because that is what we pay them to worry
about.
That the nation needs people to worry
about such things certainly does release
potentially dangerous forces that need to be
controlled. The military's responsibility for
controlling them is passive, to avoid political
involvement, and our officer corps has a
splendid tradition in that regard. The more
difficult task of active control is essen-
tially a civilian responsibility, and the
modern world makes it a terrible responsi-
bility. But make no mistake, civilian control
depends squarely on the will and wisdom of
civilian leaders.
This simple but crucial understanding gets
lost in the emotional anti-militarism grow-
ing increasingly prevalent. What gets lost,
that is, is the first truth about the actual
menace of a military-industrial complex-the
danger is not that the generals will grab but
that the civilians will default.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, while
I do not agree with some of the observa-
tions which are contained in the editorial,
I certainly agree that it is a mistake to
vent our frustrations on the Nation's
military leaders. Like the rest of us, these
leaders are trying to do their job for the
Nation, with such wisdom and ability and
special skills which they possess.
In particular, I am in agreement with
the article's basic thesis. It is evident that
civilian authority has been remiss in
exercising adequate control over the mili-
tary budget and for initiating foreign
policies which result, in the end, in major
military commitments. It is the responsi-
bility of the President and his civilian
agents and of Congress to exercise
judicious mangement over the military
establishment of the Nation. Together, it
is our responsibility to decide carefully
what to spend for military functions and
for what purpose. If, indeed, as the article
suggests, we were to wake up one morning
and find ourselves living in a garrison
state, the fault would lie not so much with
the military but with the civilian au-
thorities who had abdicated their respon-
sibilities and permitted thereby the ero-
sion of their constitutional responsi-
bilities.
S4059
ADDRESS BY SENATOR MUSKIE AT
BROWN UNIVERSITY
Mr. HART. Mr. President, I commend
to Senators and the public at large the
penetrating remarks by the able junior
Senator from Maine (Mr. MusxIE) at
Brown University, Providence, R.I., on
April 10, 1969.
As we debate the ABM question, and
indeed the whole philosophy of piling of
military might on military might, we
would all do well to consider this
thoughtful message from our respected
colleague.
I ask unanimous consent that it be
printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the address
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
REMARKS BY SENATOR EDMUND S. MUSKIE AT
BROWN UNIVERSITY, PROVIDENCE, R.I., APSIL
lo, 1969
For the last several years we have become
frustrated by the despair in our cities and the
neglect of urban problems.. But we have re-
assured ourselves constantly that new pro-
grams would be initiated and more funds
would be available as soon as the Vietnam
War was over.
Several months ago I first said that I
thought this assumption was unjustified.
Already, the pressure from the military has
mounted, and the President has recommend-
ed the deployment of the anti-ballistic mis-
sile system.
At the end of the Vietnam War-Defense
spending will not decrease automatically.
Our national priorities will not be adjusted
automatically.
And the domestic needs that demand a
massive commitment of funds and energy
will not be met automatically.
The decisions that the Administration, the
Congress, and the people make in the next
several months are not merely decisions for
1969, they are decisions for the Seventies,
These are not merely decisions about the
best kind of weapons for us to have, they
are decisions about the kind of society we
want to have.
And these are not merely decisions which.
will determine the strength of our deterrence
to nuclear attack, These are decisions whiefi
will determine the strength of the world's
resistance to nuclear destruction.
These decisions will not wait until the end
of the Vietnam War. They are being made
now,
And If they are going to reflect any com-
mitment to peace, to a sane defense policy,
and to a just life for all Americans, they must
be made on the basis of new thinking and
new priorities.
Since achieving the role of a major power
early in this century, our burdens of leader-
ship have grown. For our own security and
the security of the world, this country can
never withdraw from its central responsi-
bility for the preservation of peace.
However, this is a responsibility which we
derive not from our military strength alone,
or from a desire to exert undue influence on
the lives of other nations, but from our su-
perior size and our economic and techno-
logical strength.
It is not a responsibility we can avoid, but
it is one which we can abuse.
Because this responsibility is so easily
abused, yet so unavoidable, the ways in
which we choose to meet it must be care-
fully attuned to our national goals.
Our goal is not military domination, but
peace for ourselves and the rest of the world.
Our goal is not to equip each nation with
the capacity to annihilate its neighbors, but
to enable the peoples of all nations to exist
in a world free of hunger, poverty, and ig-
norance,
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 9, 1969
Gurney
McGee
Smith
Hansen
McGovern
Sparkman
Harris
Miller
Spong
Hartke
Mondale
Stennis
Hatfield
Montoya
Stevens
Holland
Mundt
Symington
Hruska
Muskie
Talmadge
Jackson
Packwood
Thurmond
Jordan, N.C.
Pearson
Tower
Jordan, Idaho
Proxmire
Tydings
Kennedy
Randolph
Williams, N.J.
Long
Russell
Williams, Del.
Magnuson
Saxbe
Yarborough
Mathias
Schweiker
Young, N. Dak.
McClellan
Scott
NAYS-3
McCarthy
Nelson
Young, Ohio
ANSWERED "PRESENT"-1
Fulbright
NOT VOTING-22
Church
Hollings
Murphy
Cook
Hughes
Pastore
Cranston
Inouye
Pell
Fong
Javits
Percy
Goldwater
Mansfield
Prouty
Gore
McIntyre
Ribicoff
Gravel
Metcalf
Hart
Moss
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Two-
thirds of the Senators present and voting
having voted in the affirmative, the
nomination is confirmed.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the President
be immediately notified of the con-
firmation of this nomination.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senate re-
turn to the consideration of legislative
business.
There being no objection, the Senate
resumed the consideration of legislative
business.
ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL
THURSDAY, JUNE 12, 1969 AT 11
A.M.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that, when the Sen-
ate completes its business today, it stand
in adjournment until 11 ?a.m. on Thurs-
day next.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF
SENATOR DODD
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that on Thursday,
after the completion of the period for the
transaction of routine morning business,
the Senator from Connecticut (Mr.
DODD) be recognized for not more than
1 hour.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
AUTHORIZATION FOR SECRETARY
OF THE SENATE TO RECEIVE
MESSAGES DURING ADJOURMENT
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that during the ad-
3ournment of the Senate from the close
of business today until 11 a.m. on
Thursday next, the Secretary of the
Senate be authorized to receive messages
from the President of the United States
and the House of Representatives, and
that they may be appropriately referred.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
AUTHORIZATION FOR COMMITTEES
TO FILE REPORTS DURING AD-
JOURNMENT
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that during the same
period all committees be authorized to
file reports, together with individual,
minority, or supplemental views.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
AUTHORIZATION FOR PRESIDENT
OF THE SENATE TO SIGN DULY
ENROLLED BILLS
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the President of
the Senate be authorized to sign duly
enrolled bills until June 12, 1969.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I wish
to ask the distinguished acting majority
leader whether or not there will be some
business on Thursday.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, on
Thursday, after disposition of routine
morning business, and after the address
by the Senator from Connecticut, the
Senate will proceed to the consideration
of S. 1708, the bill to amend title I of the
Land and Water Conservation Fund Act
of 1965. We expect to have at least one
rollcall vote on that legislation. There-
after the Senate will go over until Mon-
day next.
NOMINATION OF CARL J. GILBERT
TO BE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS-RE-
FERRAL OF NOMINATION
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, there
is a matter on the calendar about which
I have just had a discussion with the
distinguished chairman of the Commit-
tee on Finance. I wish to propound a
unanimous-consent request with regard
to one of the nominations on the Execu-
tive Calendar.
After consulting with the distinguished
Senator from Louisiana, I ask unanimous
consent that the nomination of Hon. Carl
J. Gilbert, of Massachusetts, to be a Spe-
cial Representative for Trade Negotia-
ations, with the rank of Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, be
referred to the Committee on Finance"
with instructions to report back the
nomination within 30 days.
After consultation with the Parlia-
mentarian this referral, or unanimous-
consent request, will not affect the origi-
nal jurisdiction of the Committee on
Foreign Relations to appoinments of this
nature but does constitute a special case
which will give the Committee on Finance
an opportunity to hear this nomination.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to the request of the Senator
from Arkansas? The Chair hears none,
and it is so ordered.
SYSTEM
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, on the
subject of the recommended anti-ballis-
tic-missile system, I wish to make two
additional points.
First, with respect to the remarks of
the distinguished senior Senator from
Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) today I
think it is clear under the circumstances
that there is a substantial controversy
over the deployment of the Safeguard
system or any anti-ballistic-missile sys-
tem in the defense of the United States.
I think it is unfortunate that in some
quarters it has become a highly emo-
tional matter. That has not been the case
with the distinguished senior Senator
from Missouri. I think he might join
with me in stating that is so on some
occasions.
Mr, SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. BAKER. I yield.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I do join with the
Senator in that regard.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, the only
two points I would like to make at this
late hour as follows: One, the dis-
tinguished senior Senator from Missouri
pointed out in a previous interview, as I
said earlier today, that if a certain chart
were released by the Defense Depart-
ment it is possible that the argument
over the deployment of the ABM system
might be over. Clearly, he has seen that
chart, as I have. I think it is clear the
argument is not over. I think it is clear
that there continues to be a substantial
controversy, and it is clear that there is
a substantial controversy in philosophy
over what is best and proper for the de-
fense of the United States.
I respect those who oppose the system.
I personally support deployment of the
system.
I make this last point. One of the
arguments advanced in opposition to de-
ployment of the ABM system is that the
response of the Soviet Union might be to
deploy a greater number of offensive
missiles so that it might overwhelm the
new ABM. As far as I know, no one
claims that Safeguard or any ABM sys-
tem is infallible or that it can entirely
protect the United States against attack
by an aggressor. On the other hand, I
think we are all trying to do the best
we can in the defense of this country. It
is important to this debate that it now
appears, and I have been informed, that
the time has come when it is cheaper to
build and deploy ABM Sprints than to
deploy additional Minutemen. The time
is at hand when it will be cheaper for
us to build a component of a defensive
system, an ABM Sprint, and its propor-
tionate share of the radar cost, than it is
for the Russians to build an offensive
weapon to try to counter it. We are all
concerned with the cost of defense. We
are all concerned most with defense as .
an abstract quality of necessity for this
country. I believe those two points, how-
ever, are significant in this colloquy.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. BAKER. I yield.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I appreciate the
position of the distinguished Senator
from Tennessee. It is not with respect to
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~
June 9, 1969 C ~
people like him, however, that I am anx- time we always must think of the cost cent of the "p.s.i." of a minuteman base.
ious for the chart`to be declassified. The, exchange ratio; that is, the cost to the The Spartan missile would never have
able Senator from Tennessee has been Russians to build a weapon to overcome been designed to defend a missile base esign
a on lrecord being in favor of the de-
wour eapons as cost of area defense against the Chinese att ck.
tern for o of f this Sentinel/Safeguard sys- Therefore the Sprint is the basic missile
tern fsome time. The Senator from of an offensive deterrent.
Missouri is against deployment, although I believe that in the case of the chart incident to the functioning of defense of
I am for further research and develop- which the distinguished senior Senator the Minuteman base by the Safeguard
ment; therefore, the release of the chart, from Missouri and I have both exam- system.
in my opinion, would not affect his opin- ined, by now virtually every aspect of it The Sprint is not a rifle. It has to be
ion any more than mine. But the people is known in this RECORD with one excep- guided, and the way it is guided is by
long-
people of i the tion,
who should decide ad are the
by, the USpMilitary Establish- ange-PAR-radar, ad but nthehe
raisal that
United short-
convinced y p
own States, I
own mind d that, hat, if this chart hart were m wre- meet, by the Department of Defense, of range-MSR-radar. Actually, the Spar-
leased, it would show those people that the number of warheads that would have tan also has to be guided by the MSR.
such a very small addition of Soviet to be delivered by the Russians in order Therefore, it is fair to say that if a
SS-9's would be necessary to nullify this to overwhelm our Minuteman as pro- radar with a p.s.i. of less than 10 per-
planned deployment of Safeguard, that tected by the Safeguard system. cent of the Minuteman site is knocked
the people would be unwilling to pay this I believe that that information should out by, say, the SS-11's, of which the
high price for this deployment. not be declassified. It has nothing to do Soviets have hundreds, then any SS-9
If we would have more information re- with the argument except in this sense: extrapolation would not make any dif-
leased in favor of those opposed to the Is the investment in Safeguard so great ference, because the Sprints themselves
system as against what is being released and our advantage so slight that we would be worthless.
by those for the system, I believe it would should not undertake it? That is the second component part of
be more in the democratic process. I say My reply to that is: My information the Safeguard system.
this without the slightest criticism of the is that now Safeguard is cheaper to By all odds, the most complicated as-
distinguished Senator from Tennessee, build than the offensive deterrent, and pect of the Safeguard system is the
for whom I have respect and admiration. that Safeguard is cheaper to build than third component, the computer; in fact,
Previously I have protested informa- the Russian offensive deployment that two of the world's foremost authorities com tion being declassified in apparent effort would be required to overcome it. on hpstiosay problems that have not even
to support those who favor deployment If that is the case, I believe there is
of this system. abundant demonstration of the desira- been worked out in theory. We all know
This morning, we have another illus- bility of turning this Nation to a defen- the computer itself has not yet been
tration of this problem-an article sive strategy instead of exclusively an of- completed. When you consider the num-
fensive one. ber of hours and months and years ex-
written front by page of William the Beecher, New Mr. SYMINGTON. Well, Mr. Presi- pended on a launch to the moon, where
York Times, the
ork dent, the one sure way to resolve this each operation is carefully watched by
who says: discussion is to release the chart. Let some of our foremost engineers and
The analysis, rby in iintelligence that multiple the the chart speak for itself. scientists, as against GI's handling a
warheads Pentagon pprimarly, suggests the Russians I did not mean to get into a colloquy system all around the United States, if
now to
may be capable of being ng guided the to three With respect to the ABM system this completely deployed by phase a sys-
scattered targets and powerful enough to de- afternoon, and am only doing so be- tem which would have to operate instan-
stroy hardened missile silos. cause my position on this matter was taneously and automatically, in a mat-
That statement, Mr. President, de- referred to earlier in the day. ter of seconds, you can realize why some
Glares that the Soviets today are testing But I would leave an additional of us have grave apprehension about the
MIRVS-not MRVS but MIRVS. Mr. thought with my colleagues this after- wisdom of deploying this system at this
Beecher is a responsible newspaper man, noon: Having spent -many years in the time.
therefore, must have been given this in- defense part of our Government, and Mr. President, someone recently said
formation by someone in the Depart- many years before that in the electron- to me, "We thought you were one of us."
ment of Defense. I would add that ad- ics industry, in private business, there I thereupon looked up what I have
ditional information was declassified in are three basic aspects I know are perti- worked for and voted for, in the interest
nent to this ABM system: of the security of the United States, this
the thrust of Mr. First is the missile itself. I put in the since I came into Government. The total
the story t Mr. believe that Beecher.
I do ri ot RECORD some time back a list of the $23 of the defense budgets is $953 billion; and
's is BBeecher of story , thent. billion and $50 million in missiles which because, for the first time, I oppose a
If it is not true, American ct people should will de- has been spent on missiles later aban- weapons system I consider unadvisable,
used, else Arapeople taxes doned for one reason or another. We all I am not "one of us." What is the logic in
what-
national again tgree t further taxes for know, as was so well illustrated in that; especially as I want to do what-
given all the security u facts. without first being North Dakota last summer, that even ever is necessary for the security of my
given all we have been working on for country.
I r. BAKER. E co I than for yielding. years, end up in test failure. There are varying opinions about
from AKri thank my colleague Next the radar. The radar incident to whether this cold car is becoming
relevant Missouri for his important and the Sentinel, Safeguard system is a great warmer; but I am confident every Amer-
demarks. deal more complicated than the missile; ican would agree that, when Mr. Stalin
I would point out, points however, coMr. st Pre s- in fact, the vulnerability of the radar was alive, the cold war aspect of our for-
import n that, p he eout, cost is this itself could well be the core of the weak- eign relations was far more serious than
importar aspect of defense, and in tness of this entire system. today. Then there was a monolithic
approachr , probably actually have We have had open testimony that the structure behind the Iron Curtain, and a
approached, probably for the first time "psi" of the radar was less than 10 per- man running things whom we all know
to history, a efensive whee it is and of cent of the "psi" of the Minuteman base. was interested in taking over the world.
m and all of My colleague from Louisiana (Mr. That is far from true today.
to build a defensive system e that goes -
it
the p than is to build its counter- LONG) asked me what "psi" means. That In 1950 the total budget for the Mili-
port in n th the offensive n ve build on arsenal, is a "per square inch" measurement- tary Establishment of the United
pet ffensivapons build a naa comparable to B.t.u.'s-British thermal States-Army, Navy, Air Force, and Ma-
Minuteman put han to b unit-for heat. In effect, it refers to the rine Corps-was $13.8 billion.
Minuteman and pufor it in its silo, to and amount of concrete around a base or site. I remember meeting the late great
build an than fens st a fee the in an effort This is a summary. President Eisenhower, in the Pentagon
to overcome o an weapon in an eff
to our defensive system. We have had open testimony before building. He was here to testify before
We are talking about great sums of the Armed Services Committee that the the Appropriations Committee, whose
money, Mr. President, but at the same "p.s.i." of the radar is less than 10 per- chairman at that time was Senator Mc-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE S 6205
had to use nuclear weapons, we would
hope we did not have to use strategic
weapons to destroy the enemy's cities,
but that we could achieve our purpose
by using tactical nuclear weapons on the
field of battle, to keep his army, with
huge amounts of manpower, from over-
whelming ours.
We can find a lot of ways to save
money in the military budget. There are
things we can do without. I have always
been convinced that we did not need all
those troops over there in Europe, that we
could get by with one division as well as
five. I believe the Senator from Missouri
shares that view. If we brought them
back, I would favor putting them back
in civilian life, or putting them on a re-
serve status, so as to save the large
amounts of money they are costing us,
and eliminate that tremendous drain on
our balance of payments.
But here we have a fundamental ques-
tion of whether this Nation should ever
be in a position that we are confronted
with another nuclear power which is
building a nuclear defense against our
nuclear weapons, and have no defense
against their weapons.
Mr. President, I am not familiar with
all the technical problems involved in
building a nuclear defense. I do recall
that when I was debating the space sat-
ellite bill some years ago, I was making
the point that we ought to realize the
magnitude of the grant we were giving
this space satellite company, because it
would be within the capability of some-
one, within a few years, to broadcast
from those satellites out there programs
that could be seen all the way around the
world.
The Senator from Missouri at that
time made a speech explaining how dif-
ficult and complicated it would be, and
how there was no way to be sure that at
any time in the foreseeable future that
would be practicable.
Well, we are seeing the programs from
the satellites. now. Of course, they are
not being beamed independently from
up there, but it is demonstrated that we
can put the signal up there and relay it
back, put power behind what we receive
back here, and televise it from coast to
coast, thus achieving the same result.
Some companies are working on what
they think will be a breakthrough to
give an 80-to-1 yield on atomic energy,
for the purposes of providing commercial
power. If we do that, we will be having
batteries, in a few years, that would make
it possible to broadcast directly from a
satellite a signal strong enough to be
seen by half the world at one time.
Things that seemed impossible or un-
thinkable a few years ago are becoming
old hat nowadays. I recently bought the
latest version of color television, the one
recommended by the salesman in the
store.
There are devices in that instrument
that cause it to correct itself against
various atmospheric and needed ad-
justments to change from one situation
or another. They are built into the set.
The picture changes automatically with-
out one knowing why it happens. It just
happens.
A person turns on the set and waits a
moment and it will adjust itself. How
they did it I have no idea. However, if
one puts enough good minds to work on
it, those things can be done.
We ought to hope that all of the money
we spend on the missile defense will be
wasted. We ought to hope that it will
never be necessary to employ the missile
defense to shoot down enemy missiles
aimed at our country. However, we
should not sit here and say, "It can't be
done."
In the past, it has been the other way
around. If we were to sit here and say,
"Why, it can't succeed. Don't try it," we
would find that while we were saying
this, the Soviet Union might very well
go ahead to develop a missile defense
which would put us at their mercy.
It would be a tragedy to sit here while
Red China went ahead at a tremendous
sacrifice to their people to find the re-
sources with which to develop missiles
and a missile defense to confront us with
an attack against which we had no de-
fense, while Red China could defend
itself.
We cannot risk that. To borrow a
phrase that the Senator from Missouri
used when he came here in about 1953,
"It does not do you much good to be the
richest man in the graveyard."
We should have a defense with which
to protect ourselves. We should have a
defense second to none.
I am not too worried about our abil-
ity to afford things. If we take the na-
tional debt and the national income
and make one single calculation to put
them in terms of constant dollars, we
find that all of our fears about the na-
tional debt and how much the Nation is
spending tend to diminish.
We would find in terms of constant
dollars, whether in terms of 1868 or 1948
dollars, that if we put it on the basis of
what a dollar will buy and project it
either forward or backward to see what
the comparative situation is, we are as
well able to afford a missile defense now
as we have been at any time in the past.
It has been pointed out to me that
our national debt in relation to our gross
national product-and particularly if
one looks at it in terms of the part held
not by the Federal Government itself,
but by the people and companies outside
of the Federal Government-it is less
than when we entered World War II.
And we are much bigger and stronger
now. However, we need to make that
kind of a correction to understand the
relative strength of our Nation and its
ability to afford something today com-
pared to its ability to afford something
many years ago.
Something has been said about our
gold outflow. Our main difficulty with
that, in my judgment, has been the fact
that we too long continued to follow
policies we followed at a time when we
wanted the other fellow to build up his
gold reserve at our expense. We con-
tinued to follow it long after the situa-
tion no longer justifies it.
We continue to follow trade and aid
policies which were founded on the basic
assumption that we need to help the other
fellow improve his position whether he
cooperates with us or not. Many of those
policies are still in effect today although
the circumstances have long since
changed.
We consider the possibility of building
a successful missile defense, we should
also keep in mind that many things
have been done in the past such as the
building of the first atomic bomb and
the first hydrogen bomb which others
said could not be done. Many things have
been done in space which others said
could not be done.
Unfortunately, in the space area, be-
cause of our failure to pursue our ob-
'jectives relentlessly, we let the Soviet
Union get there first. We are now be-
ginning to overcome the lead of the
Soviet Union that existed at one time.
Perhaps we will be the first nation to
land a man on the moon.
However, if we permit ourselves to be
pessimists and say that it cannot be done
and that we cannot delploy a successful
missile defense system, to the point that
we never even try to build one, then as-
suredly our enemy will have it first.
MESSAGE, FROM THE HOUSE
A message from the House of Repre-
sentatives by Mr. Bartlett, one of its
reading clerks, announced that the
House had agreed to the concurrent res-
olution (S. Con, Res. 29) to correct the
enrollment of Senate Joint Resolution
35.
The message also announced that the
House had agreed to the amendment of
the Senate to the resolution (H. Con.
Res. 192) to reprint a brochure entitled
"How Our Laws Are Made."
The message further announced that
the House had agreed to the amend-
ments of the Senate to the resolution (H.
Con. Res. 162) authorizing the printing
of the book, "Our American Govern-
ment," as a House document.
ENROLLED BILL SIGNED
The message also announced that the
Speaker had affixed his signature to the
enrolled bill (H.R. 3480) for the relief of
the New Bedford Storage Warehouse
Co.
CAMPUS. UNREST-SURFACE IM-
PRESSIONS AND ROOT CAUSES
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, as the
Nation breathes a sigh of relief to mark
the close of an academic year marked by
disorders and violence-a sigh once re-
served for the passing of summer from
our tormented and strife-torn cities-it
is well to reflect on the events of the last
year.
Many questions were raised in our
academic communities which will not
soon be answered. Why do the students
raise such profound hell? How did they
get that way? Who are they? What do
they represent? What do they want?
When will it all end?
I do not have all the answers. I doubt
that anyone does. However, the questions
cannot be ignored, for while only a few
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 12, 1969
LIMITATION ON STATEMENTS DUR-
ING TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE
MORNING BUSINESS
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that statements in
relation to the transaction of routine
morning business be limited to 3 minutes.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob-
jection, it is so ordered.
ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL
MONDAY, JUNE 16, 1969
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that at the conclu-
sion of business today, the Senate stand
in adjournment until Monday, June 16,
1969, at 12 o'clock noon.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob-
jection, it is so ordered.
EXECUTIVE SESSION
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senate go
into executive session to consider the
nominations on the Executive Calendar,
commencing with "New Reports."
There being no objection, the Senate
proceeded to the consideration of execu-
tive business.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The nomina-
tions on the Executive Calendar will be
stated, as requested by the Senator from
Massachusetts.
The assistant legislative clerk read the
nominations of Ambassadors, as fol-
lows:
Robert H. McBride, of the District of Co-
lumbia, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of the United States of
America to Mexico.
Richard Funkhouser, of New Jersey, to be
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotenti-
ary of the United States of America to the
Gabon Republic.
0. McMurtrie Godley, of the District of
Columbia, to be Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary of the United States of
America to the Kingdom of Laos.
J. William Middendorf iI, of Connecticut,
to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipo-
tentiary of the United States of America to
the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
The VICE PRESIDENT.- Without ob-
jection the nominations are confirmed.
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
The assistant legislative clerk read the
nomination of Lane Dwinell, of New
Hampshire, to be an Assistant Admin-
istrator of the Agency for International
Development.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob-
jection, the nomination is considered and
confirmed.
PEACE CORPS
The assistant legislative clerk read the
nomination of Thomas J. Houser, of Illi-
nois, to be Deputy Director of the Peace
Corps.
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, on be-
half of my colleague from Illinois (Mr.
PERCY), I ask unanimous consent to
have printed in the RECORD a statement
by him relative to the nomination of
Thomas J. Houser to be Deputy Director
of the Peace Corps.
There being no objection, the state-
ment was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
STATEMENT BY SENATOR PERCY
The nomination of W. Thomas J. Houser
to be Deputy Director of the Peace Corps is
now before the Senate. I enthusiastically
recommend that the Senate confirm the
nomination. -
It has been my privilege to know Tom
Houser for many years, and I deeply believe
that he is just the kind of man we so
urgently need in public service today..
Mr. Houser received his degree of Bachelor
of Arts in political science from Hanover
College, Hanover, Indiana. Subsequently, he
earned a law degree at Northwestern Uni-
versity Law School -and attended John Hop-
kins University School of Advanced Inter-
national Studies. As Commerce Counsel for
the Burlington Railroad, in Chicago, he
gained widespread respect from the business
community and the legal profession. alike.
He has been active in Illinois political life,
bringing to his work a deep commitment to
progressive and enlightened government. Fol-
lowing my election to the Senate, he served
as my chief counsel in Chicago for a year.
Now he is prepared to relinquish an out-
standing law practice in Chicago to serve the
Peace Corps and the Nation.
The country is most fortunate in having
Joseph Blatchford as Director of the Peace
Corps. He needs-and wants-a deputy who is
a competent aidministrator and a practical
idealist-a man who works well with people
as well as with ideas, a man who believes in
the program and in the Director to whom
he reports. Thomas Houser is just such a
man. He has won the confidence of the Ad-
ministration; and I know that in time, he
will earn the confidence of Congress and of
the country.
So it is without reservation or qualifica-
tion that I endorse the nomination of Thomas
J. Houser to be Deputy Director of the Peace
Corps.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob-
jection,.the nomination is considered and
confirmed.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the President
be immediately notified of the confirma-
tion of these nominations.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob-
jection, it is so ordered.
LEGISLATIVE SESSION
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I move
that the Senate resume the consideration
of legislative business.
The motion was agreed to, and the
Senate resumed the consideration of
legislative business.
PROTECTION OF DISABILITY EVAL-
UATION IN EFFECT FOR 20 OR
MORE YEARS
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senate pro-
ceed to the consideration of Calendar
No. 208, H.R. 4622.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will
be stated by title.
The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A
bill (11.R. 4622) to amend section 110 of
title 38, United States Code, to insure
preservation of all disability compensa-
tion evaluations in effect for 20 or more
years.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there ob-
jection to the present consideration of
the bill?
There being no objection, the bill was
considered, ordered to a third reading,
read the third time, and passed.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed in the
RECORD an excerpt from the report (No.
91-219), explaining the purposes of the
bill.
There being no objection, the excerpt
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
EXPLANATION OF BILL
By law, compensation is paid to veterans
who suffer disabling conditions as a result of
military service. As the name implies, the
purpose of the payments is to compensate
the veteran for the average economic loss re-
sulting from the disease or injury sustained
during his military service. Thus compensa-
tion payments are based not on need, but on
the degree of disability of the veteran. On the
basis of a medical evaluation, the veteran's
disability is rated between 10 percent and 100
percent (total disability). Under present law,
monthly compensation rates for disabilities
incurred in time of war range from $23 for
veterans with a 10-percent disabling condi-
tion to $400 for totally disabled veterans.
Higher compensation payments are au-
thorized for certain very serious disabilities;
for example, a blind veteran requiring reg-
ular aid and attendance receives $550 in
monthly compensation.
The law also provides for additional com-
pensation payments for the loss or loss of use
of certain specified limbs or organs. For ex-
ample, a veteran who lost an arm in wartime
military service would receive $47 monthly in
addition to his basic disability compensation.
In 1954, the Congress enacted a law (Pub-
lic Law 311, ssd Congress) which guaranteed
that a veteran rated as totally disabled for 20
or more years could not have this rating re-
duced thereafter unless fraud could be
shown.
Ten years later, another law was enacted
(Public Law 88-445) which prevented the re-
duction of any disability rating of 10 to 90
percent which had been in effect for 20 or
more years.
Because the law speaks of preserving the
"percentage" of disability, however, the high-
er payments to totally disabled veterans and
the additional compensation payments for a
specific anatomical loss or loss of use are not
presently included with the guarantee pro-
vision. Thus; for example, the Veterans' Ad-
ministration could decide that a $47 award
for loss of use of a foot, even though received
for more than 20 years, was no longer payable
because the foot was now usable.
This bill, which the Committee on Finance
approves, without amendment, would pre-
serve higher or additional compensation pay-
ments received for 20 or more years in the
same way as disability ratings are preserved
under present law.
The cost of the bill is nominal.
COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING
SENATE SESSION
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. president, I ask
unanimous consent that all committees
be authorized to meet during the session
of the Senate today.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob-
jection, it is so =95M
THE CASE OF THE SECRET CHART
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, ear-
lier this week the distinguished junior
Senator from Tennessee and the dis-
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United States
of America
r
A-AL
Toug ..11610nal Record
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 91" CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION
WASHINGTON, THURSDAY, JUNE 12, 1969
Senate
The Senate met at 11 ?'clock am.,
and was called to order by the Vice
President.
The Chaplain, the Reverend Edward
L. R. Elson, D.D., offered the following
prayer:
0 Thou whom no man bath seen, th
givest freely of Thyself, order what is dis-
ordered in our lives, bring our minds to
Thy truth, our conscience to Thy law,
our hearts to Thy love, and our souls to
fellowship with all mankind. Enable us
to hear Thy voice, and hearing it make
answer with humble trust and willing
obedience. Brood over our troubled world
that Thy grace may penetrate all men's
hearts until the old refrain, "Peace on
earth among men of good Silk" Is the
song and the desire of all natlnns.
In the Great Redeemer's name. Amen.
THE JOURNAL
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the reading of
the Journal of the proceedings of Mon-
day, June 9, 1969. be dispensed with.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob-
jection, it is so ordered.
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT
RECEIVED DURING ADJOURN-
MENT (H. DOC. NO. 91-126)
Under authority of the order of the
Senate of June 9, 1969, the Secretary
of the Senate on June 11, 1969, received
a message from the President of the
United States.
THE VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair
lays before the Senate a message from
the President of the United States-trans-
mitting the Second Annual Report of
the National Advisory Council on Eco-
nomic Opportunity. Without objection
the message will be printed in the
RECORD, without being read, and ap-
propriately referred.
The message was referred to the Coin-
mittee on Ir, tblic Wel as 1W I
follows:
To the Co ess of the United States:
I tr ffift herewith the Second An-
nual port of the National Advisory
Co oil on Economic Opportunity.
MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT
RECEIVED DURING ADJOURNMENT
Under authority of the order of the
Senate of June 9, 1969, the Secretary of
the Senate, on June 11, 1969, received
propriate
is received on June 11,
EXECUTIVE REPORTS O
MITTEE SUBMITTED
ADJOURNMENT
Under authority of the order of
Senate of June 9, 1969, the folio'
favorable executive reports of nomina
tions were submitted:
On June 10, 1969:
By Mr. Fursaxoxr, from the Committee on
Foreign Relations:
Robert H. McBride, of the District of
Columbia, a Foreign Service officer of the
clash of career minister to be Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of- the
United States of America to Mexico;
Richard Funkhouser, of New Jersey, a
Foreig.. Service officer of class 1, to be Ambas-
sador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of
0. McMurtrie Godley, of the Distric of
Columbia, a Foreign" Service officer o the
class of career minister, to., be Amb ador
Extraordinary and Plenlpote of the
United States of America to the Kingdom
of Laos;
J. William Middendorf II, of Connecticut,
to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Pleni-
potentiary of the United States of America
to the Kingdom of the Netherlands;
Lane Dwinell, of New Hampshire, to be an
Assistant Administrator of the Agency for
International Development; and
Tho>as J. Rouser, of Illinois, to be Deputy
Director of the Peace Corps.
No. 97
REPORT OF A COMMITTEE SUB-
MITTED DURING ADJOURNMENT
Under authority of the Senate of Feb-
ruary 7, 1969, the following report of a
committee was received on June 11,
1969:
By Mr. BYRD of West Virginia, from the
Committee on Appropriations, with amend-
ments:
H.R. 11400. An act making supplemental
appropriations for the fiscal year ending
June -30, 1089, and for other purposes (Rept.
No. 91-228).
MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE RE-
CEIVED DURING ADJOURN-
MENT-ENROLLED JOINT RESO-
LUTION SIGNED
Under authority of the order of the
Senate of June 9, 1969, the Secretary of
the Senate received a message from the
House of Representatives which an-
nounced that the Speaker had affixed
his signature to the joint resolution (S.J.
Res. 35) to provide for the appointment
of Thomas J. Watson, Jr., as Citizen
Regent of the Board of Regents of the
Smithsonian Institution, and it was
signed by the Vice President.
ENROLLED BILL SIGNED DURING
ADJOURNMENT
Under authority of the order of the
1Senate of June 9, 1969, the Vice Presi-
dent announced that on Wednesday,
June 11, 1969, he had signed the bill
(H.R. 3480) for the relief of the New
Bedford Storage Warehouse Co., which
had previously been signed by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
ENROLLED JOINT RESOLUTION
PRESENTED
The Secretary of the Senate reported
that on June 11, 1969, he presented to
the President of the United States the
enrolled Joint resolution (S.J. Res. 35)
to provide for the appointment of
Thomas J. Watson, Jr., as Citizen Re-
gent of the Board of Regents of the
Smithsonian Institution. -
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June 12, 1969
tinguished junior Senator from Colorado
expressed disagreement with my belief
that the publication of a certain classi-
fied chart presented by the Defense De-
partment to the Senate Armed Services
Committee would go a long way toward
letting the public make up its own mind
about this costly new venture into na-
tional defense weaponry.
Because there is this difference, and
because much of the information con-
tained on the chart is already a matter
of"public record, I would again urge that
this chart be made public.
I ask unanimous consent that an edi-
torial on this subject, published in the
St. Louis Post-Dispatch of last Sunday,
June 8, entitled, "Case of the Secret
Chart," be printed at this point in the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
CASE OF THE SECRET CHART
Senator Symington carries exceptional
weight in the ABM debate because he knows
the thickets of the Pentagon bureaucracy,
and the behavior of its bureaucrats, so well.
Drawing upon that intimate acquaintance, the
he has hurled another deadly harpoon at
case for deploying Safeguard by challenging
the Pentagon, to publish a "classified" chart
which it has been using to bolster its argu-
ment. If the charts exposed to public view, he
says, the argument will be over, for every-
one can then see that Safeguard will not ac-
complish its alleged mission of "protecting
our Minuteman deterrent."
As could have been predicted, the Senator's
initiative soon brought out from others
enough unofficial information about the
classified chart to permit deductions about
it. Evidently its purpose is to show that if
the Soviets continue building their SS-9 mis-
siles at the present rate, and if we now im-
mediately deploy Safeguard, then at a cer-
tain point in 1975, assuming a Soviet attack
on our Minuteman, the antimissile system
will protect enough Minutemen to permit a
retaliatory blow. Ergo, the deterrent will be
protected.
But reportedly the chart also shows some-
thing else. It shows that if the Soviets with-
hold their attack in mid-1975, but go on
/0,WCC%&~RDPEN51MR64R000300090002-4 S 6217
NATIONALCOMMITMENTS-
SENATE RESOLUTION 85
Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, I would
like to speak briefly in support of Sen-
ate Resolution 85.
After studying the report of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, I am con-
vinced that the Senate should reassert
its constitutional duties in regard to the
"national commitments" of this coun-
try.
It has only been in this century that
the role of the Senate in making com-
mitments involving our Armed Forces
has become obscure.
During the period from 1789 to 1900
there was .no question that article I of
the Constitution vested the war making
power with Congress. The President was
simply the director of our Armed Forces
with the power and authority to com-
mit our forces in defense of the United
States in the event of a sudden attack.
There was equally no question that,
although the President was given the
power in article II of the Constitution
to make treaties, his action required the
consent of the Senate. Since then, con-
siderable confusion has arisen in regard
to the respective roles of Congress and
the President in making commitments
with foreign countries.
While Senate Resolution 85 will not
have the force and effect of law, it will
serve very useful purposes. First, it will
make it clear to the President that the
Senate will expect to exercise the author-
ity given to it under article I. Second, it
will place all foreign countries on no-
tice that any commitment not passed
upon by the Senate, may well have no
binding force.
The resolution is nonpartisan-hav-
ing been approved by the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee by a vote of 11 to 1---
and is not aimed at any particular ad-
ministration, past or present.
When an executive commitment seeks
to obligate this Nation, such a commit-
ment should be submitted regularly for
Senate or congressional approval, as the
case may be, before it becomes binding
and effective. Otherwise, our system of
checks and balances, written into the
Constitution is not being allowed to func-
tion as intended.
arrest of all campus demonstrators who
resort to violence. Those belligerent gun-
toting Cornell "students" should have
been expelled forthwith. Also, they should
have been arrested for disorderly con-
duct and threatening violence. I agree
with Father Hesburgh, president of Notre
Dame University. He said:
Any group that substitutes force for ra-
tional persuasion, be it violent or non-vio-
lent, will be given fifteen minutes of medi-
tation to cease and desist ... if there is not
then within five minutes a movement to cease
and desist, students will be notified of ex-
pulsion from this community and the law
will deal with them as non-students.
We must, however, have complete sym-
pathy with the views of the majority of
students who know that the colleges and
universities of this country have not kept
pace with the times in this fast-moving
space age of change and challenge. The
establishment should realize that as
Washington Irving wrote:
Change is inevitable and brings with it a
surprising amount of relief.
Unfortunately, three of five trustees in
the Nation believe that speakers invited
to address their students should be
screened before being allowed on the
campus. A majority even believe that all
faculty members should be required to
swear to a loyalty oath as a condition for
employment as instructor or professor.
This, despite the fact that no Member of
the U.S. Congress is required to swear
to such an oath. -
Peculiarly also, nearly a majority of
present college trustees state that college
students demonstrating against any pro-
fessor or against university policy should
be disciplined or expelled even though
such demonstration is entirely nonvio-
lent. Such trustees would do well to re-
read the Bill of Rights to the Constitu-
tion of our country.
The facts are that only a very few, pos-
sibly 2 percent, of the trustees of Ameri-
can universities have read any books or
journals on higher education. It has been
the rule of the establishment in the past
that there has been no mutual discussion
and determination between students,
trustees and faculty members on goals
and purposes.
I propose that in every college in our
country some junior and senior students
and faculty members should be selected
to membership of boards of trustees to
help govern their own universities.
I have made that proposal in my State
of Ohio and I have made speeches in the
Senate for more than 6 weeks in that
connection. I am very pleased to note
that Princeton University has followed
the suggestion and has elected two stu-
dents to serve on its board of trustees.
Now a small college in Ohio leads the
way. Most universities in our country
have not basically changed their policies
and their courses of study at any time
in the last generation. Unfortunately,
this is the result of colleges and univer-
sities being run by trustees who are
highly respected, but most of whom are
millionaires selected because they and
their wealthy friends can contribute
financially to the universities of which
they are trustees. They suffer no pain
building SS-9s Instead, then within a few
months they will have the capacity to satu-
rate Safeguard defenses so thoroughly that
? our Minuteman deterrent will not be pro-
tected. In other words, even if the intricate
electronics of Safeguard work to perfection,
which many qualified scientists doubt, the
system would afford only a few months' "pro-
tection" from a nuclear attack.
Of course everybody knows what the script
calls for. Long before mid-1975, the Pentagon
would undoubtedly go to Congress with the
alarming news of a forthcoming Safeguard
gap, and the public would be told that na-
tsnal security imperatively demanded an
enormous expansion of the antimissile sys-
tem. This is, quite obviously, the true mission
of Safeguard-to serve as the first stage of an
unlimited escalation of the nuclear arms
race, guaranteeing juicy contracts and mili-
tary proliferation and cold war psychosis far
Into the future.
The Pentagon has long been accustomed to
scaring Congress and the public into provid-
ing unlimited weaponry funds by darkly
referring to horrendous military secrets which
cannot be told. Senator Symington deserves
the public's thanks for putting a neat, round
hole in these tactics as applied to the ABM.
- If Safeguard cannot be justified on the basis
of public information and common sense, it
cannot be justified at all.
OHIO COLLEGE LEADS THE WAY
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President,
college students demonstrating peace-
ably or violently, complaining against
archaic policies, denouncing the estab-
lishment governed by trustees, who were
graduates 20, 30, and 40 years ago, and
demanding that college courses which
have not been changed in more than 20
years be brought up to date, have a
point. In fact, it is becoming crystal clear
to any thoughtful person searching for
answers that university trustees and stu-
dents have become further apart in the
past 20 years. There is real reason for
demonstrations by college students. The
old order, or establishment, must accept
change voluntarily else it may be changed
violently.
Very definitely, I do not condone vio-
lence. I favor immediate expulsion and
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
lution making the termination date De-
cember 31, 1969-just to be on the safe
side? I think that comes nearer to being
right than October 31. You will note that
we paid no attention whatever to the Re-
organization Act and its date of July 31
each year for the termination of Con-
gress.
Would the gentleman agree with me
that Congress ought to take action to-
ward abolishing that July 31 date, for it is
utterly meaningless?
Mr. MAHON. It needs to be studied
very carefully. But I would not think we
ought to extend the expiration of the
pending resolution beyond October 31.
section 201, to which the gentleman re-
fers, will be blunted or wholly obliterated.
Mr. ROGERS of Colorado. Of course,
that will depend on what is agreed on
in. conference. I trust the conferees on
the part of the House will recognize the
inconsistencies that may have developed
and that this will be eliminated from our
system.
. The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr.
ALBERT). The time of the gentleman from
Colorado has expired.
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I move to
strike out the last word.
(Mr. GROSS asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, let me ask
an of the com-
h
i
h
d
rm
a
e
c
the distinguis
mittee what happens under the proposed because, when we go home, we want to
resolution to the Members' pay increase, be able to point with pride to our achieve-
nd I
l
i
since the housekeeping committee has
not acted on this question?
What happens to this salary grab of
February of this year, so far as the
Members are concerned? Will Members
be paid at the old rate or will they be
paid at the new rate?
Mr. MAHON. I believe that when the
photograph, so to speak, of the status
quo is %ken on the night of June 30 at
12 o'clock, it will disclose that Members
are now drawing pay at the new rate
and that this would obtain during the
fiscal year 1970 until action to the con-
trary is taken. I believe that is a fair
interpretation.
Mr. BOW. Mr. Speaker, will the gen-
tleman yield?
Mr. GROSS. I yield to the gentleman.
Mr. BOW. It would seem to me that
the House took care of that situation for
fiscal 1969 last week, last Tuesday, under
the resolution we passed taking care of
the pay for the post office and others.
And I think that Members will be paid
at the increased pay rate under this
resolution.
Mr. GROSS. If I may ask the chair-
man, what is so magical about the date
of October 31, 1969, the termination
date of this resolution?
Mr. MAHON. Someone just facetiously
said that that is the day after Halloween.
Mr. GROSS. I would say to the gentle-
man that it would be more appropriate
to relate it to April Fools Day.
Mr. MAHON. I would call the gentle-
man's attention page 1 of the report
in regard to th matter. The report
states:
The time period covered by the accompany-
ing resolution is limited to the four-month
period, July 1-October 31, 1969. Anything
hort'er than that is judged to be unrealistic,
b
ally since the membership is proceeding
tie announced plan of a mid-August
elttentng beyond Labor Day, and the
fort r fact f~lsat large segments of the budget
have dt been authorized by the Congress.
Al31 er ''continuing resolution will
have to be sought Just prior to October 31
if we do not complete the appropriation
bills by that dale. laut I hope sincerely,
and I , choose the word "hope" with care,
that we may not need another continuing
resolution.
Mr. GROSS. The gentleman says he
hopes sincerely, and I sincerely hope that
he is right. But would the gentleman be
amenable to an amendment to the reso-
This gives us an objective. I am sure
Congress will industriously work toward,
passing the legislation and doing its job
e, a
s
ments, on both sides of the a
hope we will be able to do that. I think
we have done a fair job so far as this
session is concerned, and we can do a
better job as we move along.
Mr. GROSS. From the lack of prog-
ress made so far in this session of Con-
gress, would we have any right to point
with pride to the enormous amount of
work done here? I doubt that anyone can
go out with a straight face and point
with pride to the work done by this ses-
sion of Congress thus far, and half of
this year is already gone.
Mr. MAHON. The gentleman would
probably agree with the gentleman from
Texas that virtue does not always reside
in passing legislation. Often there is
virtue in not passing legislation.
Mr. GROSS. But in the end do we not
wind up by passing it, to our sorrow most
of the time, even if we long delay action?
We wind up passing it anyway.
Mr. MAHON. Some of it, including
this measure, is necessary for the on-
going operations of the Government, as
the gentleman knows.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. AL-
BERT). The question is on the engross-
ment and third reading of the joint reso-
lution.
The joint resolution was ordered to
be engrossed and read a third time, and
was read the third time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The ques-
tion is on passage of the joint resolution.
The joint resolution was passed.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the
table.
GENERAL LEAVE
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unan-
imous consent that all Members may
have 5 legislative days in which to revise
and extend their remarks and insert
pertinent extractions in regard to the
continuing resolution.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there
objection to the request of the gentleman
from Texas?
There was no objection.
Members may have 5 legislative days in
which to extend their remarks on Senate
Concurrent Resolution 17.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there
objection to the request of the gentleman
from Colorado?
There was no objection.
TO EXTEND THE TIME FOR THE
MAKING OF A FINAL REPORT BY
THE COMMISSION TO STUDY
MORTGAGE INTEREST RATES
Mr. TEAGUE of Texas. Mr. Speaker,
I ask unanimous consent for the immedi-
ate consideration of the Senate joint
resolution (S.J. Res. 123) to extend the
time for the making of a final report by
the Commission To Study Mortgage In-
terest Rates.
The Clerk read the title of the Senate
joint resolution.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there
objection to the request of the gentle-
man from Texas?
There was no objection.
The Clerk read the Senate joint res-
olution, as follows:
S.J. RES. 123
Resolved by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That sec-
tion 4(g) of the Act of May, 7, 1968 (Public
Law 90-301) is amended by striking out "The
Commission may make an interim report not
later than April 1, 1969, and shall make a
final report of its study and recommenda-
tions not later than July 1, 1969," and in-
serting in lieu thereof the following: "The
Commission shall make an interim report
not later than July 1, 1969, and shall make
a final report of its study and recommenda-
tions not later than August 1, 1969,".
The Senate joint resolution was or-
dered to be read a third time, was read
the third time, and passed, and a mo-
tion to reconsider Taslaid n the table.
AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS
FOR THE ATOMIC ENERGY COM-
MISSION FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970
Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, by direction of
the Committee on Rules, I call up House
Resolution 448 and ask for its immediate
consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as fol-
lows:
H. RES. 448
Resolved, That upon the adoption of this
resolution it shall be in order to move that
the House resolve itself into the Committee
of the Whole House on the State of the
Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R.
12167) to authorize appropriations to the
Atomic Energy Oommission in accordance
with section 261 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended, and for other purposes.
After general debate, which shall be confined
to the bill and shall continue not to exceed
two hours, to be equally divided and con-
trolled by the chairman and ranking minor-
ity member of the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, the bill shall be read for
amendment under the five-minute rule. At
the conclusion of the consideration of the
bill for amendment, the Committee shall
rise and report the bill to the House with
such amendments as may have been adopted,
and the previous question shall be considered
as ordered on, the bill and amendments
thereto to final passage without intervening
motion except one motion to reeommlt.
GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND ON
SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLU-
TION 17
Mr. ROGERS of Colorado. Mr. Speak-
er, I ask unanimous consent that all
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H 5090 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE June 24, 1969
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gen- described the authorization as one of the
tleman from California Is recognized for most austere that has been reported by
1 hour. the committee in recent years. Since it
Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 min- has been my privilege to serve on that
utes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Committee, as well as on the Rules Com-
ANDERSON) pending which I yield myself mittee, I can add to what the gentleman
such time as I may consume. has said: The conviction that because of
Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 448 the very searching scrutiny that Was
provides an open rule with 2 hours of given the budget estimates by the Joint
general debate for consideration of H.R. Committee on Atomic Energy, reductions
12167 to authorize appropriations for the have been made where they should have
Atomic Energy Comftiission for fiscal been made and in a very few places-as
year 1970. will be indicated I am sure under time
The bill authorizes an appropriation authorized by the rule-the committee
in the total amount of $2,454,284,000- has recommended some increases. They
$1,973,282,000 for opercting expenses and are increases that are not really very
$481,002,000 for plant and capital equip- significant in total amount, and yet I
ment, think it will be shown they are very sig-
The authorization request submitted niflcant as far as the impact they will
by the Atomic Energy: Commission in- have on such programs as those dealing
eluded $1,963,800,000 for operating ex- with the civilian atomic energy power
penses and $484,252,000 for plant and and those programs dealing with Plow-
capital equipment, a. total request of share, or the peaceful uses of atomic
$2,448,052,000. The request was a 6.5- energy.
percent reduction front the authorization Mr. Speaker, I concur in what the gen-
for fiscal year 1969. tleman from California has said and rec-
Generally, the Conu ission's authori- ommend adoption of the rule.
zation request reflects estimated costs in Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of
two broad categories of effort; namely, my time.
military and civilian applications. Mili- Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I move the
tary applications primarily include the previous question on the resolution.
nuclear weapons and naval propulsion The previous question was ordered.
reactors programs, ani& portions of sev- The resolution was agreed to.
eral other programs such as special nu- A motion to reconsider was laid on
clear materials and sEcurity investiga- the table.
tions. Approximately 53 percent of the Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I move
authorization request is attributable to that the House resolve itself into the
the military applications. The civilian Committee of the Whole House on the
applications of atomic energy comprise State of the Union for the consideration
about 47 percent of the total request. of the bill (H.R. 12167) to authorize ap-
The authorization requests are exclu- propriations to the Atomic Energy Com-
sive of certain adjustments such as rove- mission in accordance with section 261
nues received and cost of work for others of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
which must be considered in calculating amended, and for other purposes.
the net authorization. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The ques-
The Joint Committee recommended tion is on the motion offered by the gen-
both increases and decreases in the au- tleman from California (Mr. HOLIFIELD).
thorizations for many "gf the AEC pro- The motion was agreed to.
grams. This was done to provide for a The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. AL-
higher level of effort on several of the BERT). The Chair designates as Chair-
high-priority programs. The recom- man of the Committee of the Whole the
mended authorization for fiscal year 1970 gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Mr. GROSS. Would the gentleman give
is about two-tenths of 1 percent more BURKE), and the Chair requests that the us the figure for the actual appropria-.
than the amount requested. gentleman from' California (Mr. SISK) tions for last year for the purposes of
Mr. Speaker, I urge, the adoption of temporarily assume the chair. this agency?
House Resolution 448 in order that H.R. IN THE COMMITTEE of TIC WHOLE Mr. HOLIFIELD. I will supply that
12167 may be considered. Accordingly the House resolved itself figure. I do not have it at hand at the
(Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois asked and into the Committee of the Whole House moment.
was given permission to revise and ex- on the State of the Union for the con- Mr. GROSS. What was the figure the
tend his remarks.) sideration of the bill (H.R. 12167) with gentleman gave with respect to the Nixon
Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. the Chairman pro tempore (Mr. SISK) budget?
Speaker, I yield myself such time as I in the chair. Mr. HOLIFIELD. The figure I gave
may consume. _ The Clerk read the title of the bill. was $6.2 million more than the Nixon
read by the distinguished gentleman 1 hour, and the gentleman from Califor- man, out IL is stuff $1[14 million less than
thr
from California, but I -would point out nia (Mr. HOSMER) will be recognized for last year's authorization. I will give
this is only two-tenths of 1 percent more 1 hour. appropriation figure. The staff will pro-
that in
than the amount requested by President The Chair recognizes the gentleman vide (
Mr. H OS just a moment.
e) the appropria
Nixon, and it is $164 Million less than from California (Mr. HOLIFIELD). tion figure ffigura in inzER fa debate.)
the amount authorized to. the Atomic En- Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I
ergy Commission last yew. yield myself 15 minutes. Mr. GROSS. I thank the to gentleman.
Mr. I30LTFIELI~. As to the balance
When the distinguis~yhed gentleman Mr. Chairman, before I start ,explain- between military and civilian applica-
from California (Mr. 21OLIFIELD) , the ing the bill, I would like to say that our tions of atomic energy, approximately 53
chairman of the committee, appeared purpose today is not to take the 2 hours percent of the recommended authoriza-
the other day before the Rules Commit- unless it is called for by the action of the tion is for military uses, and the remain-
tee and asked for a rule on this bill, he Members of the House. We are present- ing 47 percent for civilian uses. I might
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ing to the Committee today a bill which
has had several months of intense scru-
tiny. We have resolved all differences
between the members and have come to
a point of unanimity In presenting this
bill to the House. So we are not in con-
troversy on any item in the bill.
Members are aware we were delayed in
the consideration of this bill about 21,4
or 3 months because the Johnson budget
which came up to the Hill on January 16
was recalled by the new administration,
and we received the revised budget on
April 15. So outside of our staff studies
and our study of the whole subject mat-
ter we started our hearings right after
April 15, and we continued them until
we had all of our witnesses testify.
Therefore, the authorization bill was de-
layed for a month or so because of the
late receipt of the final approved bill by
the Bureau of the Budget.
This bill would authorize appropria-
tions to the AEC totaling $2,454,284,000
for both operating expenses and plant
and capital equipment funds for the fis-
cal year 1970. For comparative purposes
I might note that the recommended
amount is $64 million less than the
amount requested in the budget sub-
mitted by President Johnson on Janu-
ary 15. It is $6.2 million, or two-tenths
of 1 percent, more than the amount re-
quested in the budget submitted by Pres-
ident Nixon on April 15. But, most sig-
nificantly, it is about $164 million less
than the amount authorized to the AEC
in the fiscal year 1969, and this in spite
of the fact that we have had an increase
in the need for military expenditures.
We have absorbed those military ex-
penditures in the bill and we have of
course had to reduce some civilian ap-
plications in order to do that.
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. HOLIFIELD. I am happy to yield
to the gentleman from Iowa.
Mr. GROSS. The gentleman stated
what was authorized for last year?
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June 24, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE
say that just a few years ago it was pre- which will generate more nuclear fuel Soviets have now an advantage of about
dominantly military, but during the past than it consumes during operation, thus 230 submarines.
few years we have been able to bring providing this Nation with a virtually However, the most startling informa-
into existence many new uses for atomic limitless supply of energy. I cannot over- tion relates to the Soviets' vigorous build-
energy in the civilian application field, emphasize the benefits which this Na- ing program. They have a capability of
completed sevenoofhtheirr
have already one
and we are ushing ahead on this be- tion will cause there is great promise and in fact velopment ofv this from technology, successful de-
es. For eing. la ato realization from civilian uses of might
In twodothersa ease neitherofswhich sonstthataescapemebour Navy hasno
atom mic energy y at this time.
both
large
volves
truction KOCH. Mr. Chairman, will the wh ch hold great importance tothu an- planned. Thus, all availablcon e evidence in-
Mr.
Mr. HOyield for a question? , the
gentleman
committee
these pro_ Soviets that have a ballistic amissile sub-
s vote Mr. HOLIFIELD. I yield to the gentle- fity unds to the budget ha One od to
man from New York.
moneys to plantable radioisotope heat source power United States. Mor over, it is that also be-
Mr. used KOCH. for MIRV any the these ABM? p
HOLIFIELD. These moneys are converter for powering a heart pump. lieved that the Soviets will add about
Mr. be ur far .
to their
not to be used ent of If a radioisotope-powered heart device 70
research and can be developed it wll be of inestimable fleet by e1974, whereas teaUnited States
the ABM. Theyfaret fordeploy
development in weapon requirements value to heart surgeons and the thous- will add but 26. I believe the seriousness further
under det furnished the committee by the se, heart disease, The committee has recom- scored bytspeakersfiwho will follow me
don there through the Department t of f Defense, back through the
halls of should like a moment to call
pl ym is money in here for the de- AEmen Cdbudgetito initiate de a the I
ig to do Of the ABM. This has noth- the attention of the Members to the fact
matter of this device.
in g a with the subject
whether the Congress will ll or will not The committee has also recommended that beginning in World War II Hitler er- had
sunk
and he
submarines
56
ons appr
modes,000 Abut and mill ions and hundreds of mil ions of
continuation increasofe the $750
Mr, ove the HOLIh KOCH. How o and ea On the MI Safeguard ?system. unit minimum
Mr. KOLI Habout the MIRV MIRY , we nevertheless important, food irradiation tons of shipping right off our coast with
and
have e research development for mss- program, through which it is believed those 56 submarines.
sile warheads. Missile warheads for all that the feasibility and safety of pre- Now, today the Soviets have 375 sub-
of our missiles; the missile warheads serving food by low dose radiation will marines to our 143, almost three times
that are on Minuteman, the missile war- be established. in a world which knows as much as we have, And if we would get into
any kind
which heads that are Poseidon, the Sprint, Spar- turns of this program more t anijustify we needed submarine warfare, we would
tan, that would be Spe- be at a disadvantage of about 3 to 1 at
tam, , and SRAM. . The research h and dd de- this investment.
velopment in that field is applicable to If we could produce refrigeration in this time, with the Soviets. to take
e Mr.
Mr. all of the missile development of the ofathefoods and if wercould d velopra gentlema yield for aaquestioirman, would the
United States.
Mr. KOCH. I thank the substitute for the expensive refrigeration Mr. HOLIFIELD. I will be glad to yield gentleman,
Included d in the civilian category ry is equipment which is needed in tropical to the gentleman from New York.
$121 million for the operational costs countries and substitute radiation, which Mr. KOCH. Mr. Chairman,' I thank
and $234 million for plant and capital kills bacteria in the food itself and there- the gentleman for yielding. looking
through
own
the equipment for the high energy physics prevents shment .It will enable report to try and find out formmiyttee
program, for which the AEC has been mendous accompli m
designated by the President as executive fish that are caught in the ocean, for information what is involved with re-
g of $136 milliond with that
agent on behalf of the entire Federal instance, b refrigeration. You there to ABM and MIRV, I
Establishment. Establishment. ands of miles without
Turning to the provisions of the bill can see what this would mean in bring- respect to the ABM covering research,
I would like to testing.
tsection 101(a) of H.R. 12167 would ing ,protein into the
from the seacoato it would also development,
authorize whether we could
0appropriations of $1,973,282,- nations,
for "Operating expenses" of the be a great boon to the fish industry of ascertain what the amounts are with pect to
the
esting AEC. page you 3 the Joint Commit- our recommended inc ease countries.
$4 mil- also suggest botthe gent emanthis: that
tee's repmmit You will find a summary ary of lion for the naval nuclear propulsion those of us who are opposed to the MIRV
the committee's recommended gare not talking about deployment, but
zation
and subprograms. for the AEC's A more major or programs dst anr for w thatt b important t p ogramszto are talking about testing, and therefore
and onA detailed dis- $125,855,000. I need hardly point out to would we not, by supporting this bill and
ff each these areas wtlitle be $
foounund in the report t section entitled this body that it has been primarily supporting funds for the testing of
"Committee Comments," beginning on through the efforts of Congress that this MIRY, have already then. made a com-
page 6. As you will note from the refer- Nation has developed its superior nu- mitment which we are not willing at this
enced table, the committee has recom- clear submarine capability. The Joint time to do?
mended decreasing the funding for some Committee believes that particular vigi- Mr. HOLIFIELD. The gentleman of
programs while increasing others in an lance must be exercised if we are to main- course can make up his own mind as to
effort to provide the necessary funds to tain that superiority. As indicated in a what he is willing to do, but I will answer
maintain AEC's higher priority programs special committee print issued yesterday, the first question by saying that I find
at a viable level. If any Members have copies of which are available in the it impossible to say precisely how much
any questions, I will be happy to respond Chamber, there is considerable cause for research and development would go to-
to them. concern over the significant progress the ward MIR.V, toward those warheads that
Let me point out the major areas Soviets are making in submarine devel- go on the Minuteman, the Poseidon and
which have been affected by the Joint opment and construction. the Scram, and for Safeguard, which
Committee's actions. The more signifi- For example, according to unclassified the Congress has authorized, because in
cant increases recommended by the com- information, the Soviets now have a force the research and development and test-
mittee were for the civilian power reac- of 375 submarines, all of which were ing of warheads you are crossing the
tor program, $7.3 million; the naval nu- built following World War II, including technological border from one missile
clear propulsion program, $4 million; at least 65 nuclear submarines. to another.
and the AEC's Plowshare program, $10.5 In comparison, the United States has Therefore I would say it will be very
million. 143 submarines, of which 82 are nuclear difficult to take out of this whole re-
The AEC's civilian power reactor pro- and 61 are diesel. Most of the diesel- search and development on nuclear war-
gram is primarily directed toward the powered submarines, I might mention, heads and bombs that part you would
development of the breeder reactor are of World War II vintage. Thus the use in a MIRV warhead.
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 June 24, 19 69
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE 115093
within the joint committee that studied
it. A tremendous number of scientists
were involved. Among them were J.
Robert Oppenheimer, chairman, Center
for Advanced Studies, Princeton, N.J.;
James B. Conant, president of Harvard
University; Lee DuBridge, president of
the California Institute of Technology;
Enrico Fermi, of the University of Chi-
cago; I. I. Rabi, of Columbia University;
Hartley Rowe, vice president of the
United Fruit Co.; Cyril Smith, director
of the Institute for the Study of Mate-
rials, University of Chicago; Oliver E.
Buckley, president, Bell Telephone Co.,
and others. They said, "Do not make the
hydrogen bomb. Do not do it. If we do
not do it, the Russians will not do it."
I was chairman of the subcommittee
that studied the subject, with the gen-
tleman from Illinois (Mr.. PRICE) and
other Members of the House at that
time, and a Member of the Senate.
We came back from a study in the fall
of 1949 with the deep conviction that
we had to find out if the hydrogen weap-
on could be made. We had very little
evidence at that time that the Russians
were working on it, but we made this
recommendation against the advice of
all these famous people, including three
people-a majority-on the Atomic En-
ergy Commission, who said, "Do not do
this. Do not make the hydrogen bomb.
If we do not do it, the Russians will
not." The AEC's prestigious General Ad-
visory Committee was saying the same
thing.
As a result of our recommendation, in
Januaxy 1950, President Truman ini-
tiated the hydrogen bomb project on a
crash basis. Nineteen months later we
proved its feasibility and successfully ex-
ploded a hydrogen device.
Ten months later-I want to empha-
size that-10 months later the Soviets
exploded a hydrogen weapon. That was
in August 1953.
Now, who was right and who was
wrong? This Congress said that we had
to protect the United States. We could
not wait for the Russians to give us some
kind of mythical agreement, which they
might or might not fulfill. We in this
Congress decided that we had to pro-
tect the United States, and we took the
step against the advice of some of the
greatest scientists in the United States
at that time. We were right and these
great scientists, who were all right in
their own disciplines, who were experts
in their certain fields-they may be great
physicists or great in some other field-
but when they get into the field of judg-
ment on these things which we have to
deal with in this Congress, they are
about as naive as some other people
I could mention.
Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Chairman,
will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HOLIFIELD. I yield to the gen-
tleman from Oklahoma.
Mr. EDMONDSON. I thank the chair-
man for yielding, and I thank him for
refreshing the memories of a lot of us in
this House about the history of the hy-
drogen bomb development. The chair-
man has, I think; made"the Point very,
very clear that a continuation of the
testing and research and development
program is absolutely essential if we are
going to be in a position to make any
kind of agreement or a deal with the So-
viet Union regarding deployment.
It takes two to make a deal and or-
dinarily we have to have something to
give on both sides. We know the Soviet
Union is going ahead now with testing of
a MIRV capability, and for us to stand
still and not develop that capability is
going to put us in a position where we
have nothing to offer the Soviet Union
that is of really demonstrable value to
them if we reach the point, which is still
in the realm of speculation, of sitting
down and negotiating an agreement. It is
easier to negotiate from strength than
from weakness-and the Soviet will
never negotiate an agreement or keep
an agreement with a nation that is not
dealing from strength. That is their
history and that is the record.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from California (Mr. HOLI-
FIELD) has expired.
Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, I yield
the gentleman from California (Mr.
HOLIFIELD) an additional minute.
Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman
from California (Mr. HOLIFIELD) yield?
Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I
yield to the gentleman from California
(Mr. HOSMER).
Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, the fig-
ures that were requested by the gentle-
man from Iowa (Mr. GROSS) are the fol-
lowing: Fiscal year 1969 appropriations
to the Atomic Energy Commission were
$2,570,874,000. The authorization sought
by legislation before us today is $116,-
590,000 less than that; namely the sum
of $2,454,284,000.
Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I
thank the gentleman for furnishing
those figures. The bill then, is substan-
tially less than the appropriation of last
year.
Mr. HOSMER. It certainly is.
Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I
thank the gentleman.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes
the gentleman from California (Mr. Hos-
MER).
(Mr. HOSMER asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, it is a
pleasure for me to rise with the distin-
guished chairman of the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy and to join him in urg-
ing passage of H.R. 12167.
I believe that Mr. HOLIFIELD has ef-
fectively conveyed to you the spirit in
which the Joint Committee reviewed the
Atomic Energy Commission's authoriza-
tion request for fiscal year 1970. Every
effort has been made to wring the maxi-
mum out of each dollar which the. Joint
Committee has recommended for au-
thorization. As a result, the Joint Com-
mittee was able to report out a bill which
is approximately $164 million less than
the authorization for fiscal year 1969
notwithstanding the inclusion in this bill
of an aditional authorization of $217 mil-
lion for the 200-billion-electron-volt ac-
celerator as requested by both the John-
son and Nixon administrations. The to-
tal authorization recommended for fiscal
1970 represents a 6.2 percent overall re-
duction from fiscal year 1969 despite the
obvious increase in the cost of doing busi-
ness.
Approximately 37 percent of the AEC
budget is for the nuclear weapons pro-
gram, which entails production and sur-
veillance of, research and development
on, and the testing of nuclear weapons.
The administration requested $828,300,-
000 in operating expenses for this pro-
gram in fiscal 1970 and the committee
has recommended approval of the en-
tire amount. As noted in the committee
report at page 10, the AEC weapons pro-
gram for fiscal 1970 reflects a sizable in-
crease in combined production require-
ments for numerous complicated weap-
ons systems, such as the Poseidon, Min-
uteman, and short range attack mis-
sile-SRAM. This workload is the most
formidable ever undertaken by the AEC
production complex.
As the committee report notes, the
recommended authorization for the
weapons program includes $135 million
associated with the AEC's responsibili-
ties in connection with the ABM pro-
gram. This $135 million is devoted entire-
ly to research and development and test-
ing of nuclear warheads to be employed in
the ABM system. Accordingly, this
amount. of money will be required re-
gardless of the decision made in this fis-
cal year on deployment of the Safeguard
system.
With respect to another AEC program
associated with the military uses of
atomic energy-the naval propulsion
program-the committee has recom-
mended approval of $125,855,000 for fis-
cal 1970 operating costs. This represents
a recommended increase of $4 million
over the funds included in the Presi-
dent's budget request. This increase par-
tially restores a reduction of funds for
development work on improved nuclear
submarine propulsion plants made dur-
ing the administration's budget review
process. These additional funds will en-
able the Commission to proceed with its
advanced development program for nu-
clear propulsion reactors.
The other program which.I should like
to specifically mention is the Plowshare-
civilian applications of nuclear explo-
sives-program. You will note that the
Joint Committee has increased the re-
quested authorization by $10.5 million to
a total operating fund authorization of
$25 million. The committee feels very
strongly that the $25 million, level is the
minimum necessary to meet our domestic
commitments and to fulfill the obliga-
tions we will be assuming internationally.
The commitments of the Atomic Energy
Commission to the Interoceanic Canal
Study Commission call for four more
cratering projects before the Canal Com-
mission submits its report in December
1970. Funds for only one of these were
included in the administration's budget.
The Joint Committee is recommending
authorization of sufficient funds to com-
plete one more of these experiments in
fiscal 1970.
The credibility of our international
commitments as embodied in the nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, particularly ar-
ticle V, demands that we proceed to de-
velop the technology to enable us to make
available to the nonnuclear signatories
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H 5094 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE June 24, 1969
of that treaty the benefits from any
peaceful applications of nuclear explo-
sions. If the intent of that treaty is to be
realized, those nations must be assured
that they will suffer no economic detri-
ment by relinquishing the right to de-
velop or acquire nuclear capabilities and
such assurances will` only result from a
demonstrative endeavor by the nuclear
powers to fulfill their obligations.
If there are any questions about the
bill or the accompanying report thereon,
I shall be very happy to respond.
As noted by the gentleman from Cali-
fornia, Chairman HOLIFIELD, H.R. 12167
has been reported by the Joint Commit-
tee without dissent. I am confident that
the bill which the Joint Committee has
recommended to the Congress is sound
and I believe that it warrants your favor-
able consideration.
Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield
to the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr.
EDMONDSON) such time as he may con-
sume.
(Mr. EDMONDSON asked and was
given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Chairman, I
support this. bill and believe it is essential
to the security of our country and con-
tinued development of our naval defense
forces.
The bill before you provides the follow-
ing amounts to be applied in developing
nuclear propulsion plants for submarines
and surface warships: $125,855,000 in
operating expenses for research and de-
velopment; $9,550,000 for capital equip-
ment; and $4,400,000 for modifications to
the expended core facility in Idaho, for a
total of $139,805,000.
The amount recommended for fiscal
1970 operating expenses includes restora-
tion of $4,000,000 in operating -funds
which had been deleted from the AEC
request during the administration's re-
view of the budget. Such restoration will
permit the most important of the desired
work on advanced development of naval
propulsion reactors to move ahead. This
effort involves a wide range of reactors
from the high-powered, long fuel life
plants for the two-reactor aircraft car-
rier to the advanced, high-performance
submarine propulsion plants.
There are two distinct facets of this
development program. One involves an
advanced test core to ascertain the long-
range effects of irradiation on materials.
The other is development of a completely
unique core concept applicable to both
submarine and surface vessels. These ac-
tivities of course involve classified data.
The available declassified information is
published in the Joint Committee print,
"Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program,
1969," at pages 18 and 19 and 28 to 31.
STATUS OF U.S., NAVAL NUCLEAR REACTORS
The committee conducted its annual,
in-depth review of the naval nuclear
power program in April. As indicated in
the record of these hearings and in the
committee's report, there is reason for
considerable concern, _over the, U.B. nu-
clear submarine proahm relative fo the
Soviets both as to technology and pro-
duction. The committee has summarized
the situation in both of these respects on
pages 12 and 13 of its-report, and Chair-
man HOLIFIELD reviewed the figures in his
remarks.
While this country seems to be apply-
ing the brakes to our nuclear submarine
program the Soviets are rapidly accel-
erating theirs. Not only do the Soviets
have a much larger total submarine
force-375 versus 143 for the United
States-but the current emphasis being
placed on nuclear submarines by the So-
viets is estimated to place them ahead of
us in about 18 months. The same situa-
tion exists relative to advanced technol-
ogy. The addition of the $4,000,000 to the
budget recommended by the committee
is intended to reverse the trend at least
in the field of advanced technology.
POLARIS SUBMARINES
The committee report, on page 12, also
covers the phenomenal advances the So-
viets are making in building ballistic mis-
sile submarines-a present capacity to
produce one a month. It is estimated
that, since we are not building any more
Polaris submarines, the Soviets will take
the lead in this area also in the early
1970's.
The Polaris fleet is, of course, our most
invulnerable strategic weapons force. A
number of Members of Congress have
been asking how long we can depend on
keeping this force safe from a massive
attack. The question is, can we depend
indefinitely on the invulnerability of the
Polaris submarines?
In response to that question, I should
like to quote Admiral Rickover's com-
ment of this question as It appears on
page 132 of the hearing print I men-
tioned a few moments ago:
Let me first say that based on the best
evidence available, I believe that today our
Polaris submarines are safe from a massive,
neutralizing blow. Further, I am not aware
of any valid information indicating that the
Soviets possess a means to track and destroy
our Polaris submarines which they are on
station. However, there is no assurance that
this situation will prevail for long.
There is, in fact, evidence that the Soviets
are actively engaged in a determined effort
to acquire the capability to neutralize or
destroy our Polaris force. They have de-
veloped and they continue to develop faster
and quieter submarines. They are experi-
menting in all phases of submarine and
antisubmarine warfare-we are not. In fact,
during the past year alone they have de-
veloped several new types of nuclear sub-
marines; we have developed only one new
type in 10 years. It Is clear that a major ob-
jective of their naval programs is to in-
validate our own Polaris system.
Any doubt that exists on this point
serves to emphasize the importance of
increasing our efforts in the advanced
submarine program to preserve that in-
vulnerability of our Polaris type sub-
marines.
Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, I yield
such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON).
(Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois asked and
was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Chair-
nwi I call attention to the fact that un-
derthe authorization provided for in this
bill, the Atomic Energy Commission is
of course the executive agent for the
whole Federal Establishment with respect
to our high energy nuclear physics pro-
gram. Iam pleased to note that by this
legislation we have completed the au-
thorization of approximate $217 million
as the necessary funds to complete the
funding for the 200-billion-electron-volt
accelerator project which is going to be
located in western Illinois.
I should point out, I believe, that the
State of Illinois has gone ahead with its
commitment to do some things in con-
nection with that project. They com-
mitted themselves to provide, first of all
the site of 6,800 acres of farm lands lying
just beyond metropolitan Chicago, nec-
essary to locate this new facility,
I am proud to say that Illinois has now
virtually fulfilled its commitment to the
project. At a cost of some $26 million the
State has acquired this site and has
deeded the land to the Federal Govern-
ment.
There have been other areas where
they have made important progress as
well. Some 14 communities in the vicinity
of the project, with a total population of
almost 400,000, have enacted open-hous-
ing ordinances. In addition, the city of
Chicago, which is of course Only about 25
miles from the site, has passed the
ordinance.
These were commitments made by the
State and by authorities of the State of
Illinois at the time the decision was made
to locate the project in our State, and I
am proud those commitments have been
kept.
I want to say in conclusion that I
support this legislation. I concur with
what the chairman said earlier on the
floor, as one who has suggested openly
and continues to suggest the desirability
of our President taking the initiative of
proposing a moratorium on MIRY test-
ing. I see nothing inconsistent between
that position and the position we take in
this bill, that until such time as the ex-
ecutive branch has made that decision
we have to continue to provide the re-
search and development capability to
maintain the defenses of our country.
My mind goes back to the time when
we adopted the partial Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty, which I believe most of us on
this committee, if not all of us, sup-
ported at that time. A very Important
element in the decision to support that
treaty was the decision that at the same
time certain basic safeguards would be
maintained, and among them the ability
to maintain a readiness to resume test-
ing if there were a breach or a violation
of the treaty. We have maintained our
national laboratories and we have main-
tained our research and development ca-
pability in that regard.
Even so, when we get to talking about
this particular weapons system, I believe
we have to draw a distinction between
the research and development capability
and the political system which has to be
made at the level of the President him-
self as to whether or not a mutual mora-
torium should be called for with respect
to the flight testing of this weapons
system.
Mr. HQLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentI man j+ield?
Mr. ANDERSON -of Illinois. I am
happy to yield to the distinguished gen-
tleman from California.
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Mr. HOLIFIELD. Is it not true in re-
spect to research and development on
any kind of device that one has to test
it in order to know whether the theories
are working out or not? In other words,
testing is a part of the development of
the device.
In the case of the multiple warhead
for reentry, we cannot test a nuclear
weapon coming Into the atmosphere be-
cause of our treaty which precludes.us
from exploding anything like that in
the atmosphere, but we can, under the
treaty, test those warheads underground,
where they do not vent any radiation
beyond our national boundaries, and we
can test dummies of the same size, shape,
and weight inside the nose cone of a mis-
sile and determine how they act.
This is what we are talking about when
we talk about testing. We are testing, ac-
tually, dummies in this instance, but of
the same size, shape, and weight as the
nuclear components of the multiple war-
head, what they would be if we were
really using them in warfare.
Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Yes. I quite
agree with the gentleman from Califor-
nia. I believe this Is compatible with and
is a part of the whole research and de-
velopment function of Government. Cer-
tainly we cannot just try to carve out or
divorce that particular feature from the
research and development capability we
have sought to give the Commission by
the funding in this bill.
I just want to repeat that urging, as I
do, the President to pursue what he him-
self referred to as constructive proposal
on the part of those Members of the Sen-
ate who recently filed a resolution uring
a mutual moratorium, I think it would
be the height of folly for us to consider
any unilateral suspension and unilateral
cessation by stripping ourselves of the
capability to continue the research and
development and testing function. So, in
support of what I spoke of earlier, I do
not want to confuse that with the notion
that I think this bill is one that ought to
have the support of the Members of this
body.
Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, I yield
to the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr.
DUNCAN) as much time as he may con-
sume.
(Mr. DUNCAN asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
[Mr. DUNCAN addressed the Commit-
tee. His remarks will appear hereafter in
the Extensions of Remarks.]
(Mr. PRICE of Illinois (at the request
of Mr. HOLIFIELD) was given permission
to extend his remarks at this point in
the RECORD.)
Mr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Chair-
man, as chairman of the Joint Subcom-
mittee on Research, Development, and
Radiation, I have a special interest in
that section of the bill before you dealing
with the 200 billion-electron-volt accel-
erator.
More than 4 years ago the Subcom-
mittee on Research, Development, and
Radiation held a week-long series of
hearings covering the entire field of high
energy physics. Those hearings stressed
the relationship and importance of high
energy physics to the scientific leader-
ship of this nation. Central to those
hearings was a full-scale review of a high
energy physics national policy report
from the executive branch requested by
the Joint Committee. It had become in-
creasingly clear to the committee dur-
ing the 1960's that an overall national
policy in high energy physics was im-
perative for the guidance of the Con-
gress and the taxpayers.- The requested
report was transmitted to the Congress
by the President in January 1965. The
single most important recommendation
in that policy report, and one on which
the subcommittee spent a considerable
amount of time during those hearings
more than 4 years ago, concerned the
extension of proton energy. The specific
recommendation called for-construction
of a high-energy proton accelerator of
approximately 200 billion electron volts
in accordance with technical specifica-
tions developed by LRL, to be operated
as a national facility. This machine
should be authorized for design in fiscal
year 1967, and for construction in fiscal
year 1968.
It should be pointed out that an earlier
panel report-Ramsey_ panel, 1963-
made to the President's Science Advisory
Committee and to the AEC's General Ad-
visory Committee had a similar recom-
mendation as the next most important
step to be taken in the field of high-
energy physics. It should also be pointed
out that an extensive design study on
such a machine had been underway at
the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory dur-
ing the years 1963 to 1965.
The years 1965 and 1966 were spent on
a -vigorous nationwide search for the
most appropriate location possible in the
United States for such an important
basic research facility as the 200 billion-
electron-volt accelerator laboratory. Af-
ter some 99 meetings on this matter the
Atomic Energy Commission, advised by a
special committee of the National Acad-
emy of Sciences, selected a site in Du-
Page and Kane Counties, Ill., some 25
miles west of Chicago.
In the President's fiscal year 1968
budget request for project authorization
it-developed that the project scope had
been curtailed for budgetary reasons. My
subcommittee held hearings and re-
viewed in detail the proposed reduced
scope and management of this project.
The subcommittee and the full Joint
Committee not only concluded that the
accelerator should not be reduced in
its initial scope but also that considera-
tion should be given to building into the
machine the possibility of going to
much higher energies at some later date.
That year Congress authorized and ap-
propriated $7,333,000 for design of the
project.
During its authorization hearings for
fiscal year 1969 the committee was most
pleased to hear from the Laboratory Di-
rector, Dr. R. R. Wilson, that he and his
key staff had not only managed to de-
sign the machine to reach its original
intensity goal of 3 x .1018 protons per
pulse but also had incorporated an op-
tion to go to a higher energy than 200
billion electron volts at some later date.
And Dr. Wilson and his staff had ac-
complished all this within the budgetary
guidelines laid down by the executive
H 5095
branch--some $60 million less than the
original cost estimate without the option
of higher energy.
In the budget submitted last year ex-
traordinary efforts were made to reduce
both project obligations and project costs
for that year. A minimum construction
program restricted to key starts that
bore directly on Dr. Wilson's construc-
tion time table was proposed. Such a
minimum program required commit-
ments of approximately $25,000,000. This
additional amount was authorized but
actual appropriations were only $12,074,-
000. At this time all available funds have
been committed. The laboratory director
and his staff are now awaiting fiscal year
1970 appropriations in order to return
to their construction schedule, which
calls for an initial beam to be available
in July 1972.
This is an exceedingly complex and
technical national research facility. No
machine in this energy range, nor with
the novel and innovative features de-
signed by Dr. Wilson and staff, has ever
been built. More than 2 years ago the
U.S.S.R. succeeded in bringing into op-
eration the Serpukhov accelerator. This
proton accelerator quickly reached an
energy of 84 billion electron volts. The
highest energy machine in the United
States is the alternating gradient syn-
chrotron at the Brookhaven National
Laboratory, on Long Island, with an en-
ergy of 33 billion electron volts. The
U.S.S.R. will continue to have the high-
est energy machine in the world until
the 200-billion-electron-volt machine be-
comes operational. It is therefore very
significant to note that any substantial
reduction in the appropriations for fiscal
year 1970 will serve to extend the dura-
tion of the U.S.S.R.'s advantage in the
frontier science of high energy physics-
the field of science concerning itself with
the most fundamental laws governing
the constitution of matter and the ele-
mentary particles of which all matter is
constituted.
Also most important are the adverse
effects that continued piecemeal author-
ization and inadequate appropriations
have on the efficient and economically
planned construction schedule as well as
the morale and cohesiveness of the pres-
ent laboratory staff. A loss of the skilled
team now assembled at the site would
inevitably strike a severe blow to the
entire project. This staff has already
very vividly shown its potential. At pres-
sent, construction of the laboratory is
solely dependent upon the dollars avail-
able, as contrasted to a schedule utiliz-
ing the most efficient marshalling of the
laboratory staff and its contractors. Con-
tinued inadequate funding would very
probably disrupt the well planned con-
struction schedule and result in a sub-
stantial cost overrun.
The key staff-the 75 or so accelerator
physicists and engineers that have been
assembled under Dr. Wilson's leader-
ship-are critical to the success of this
project. They are among the very best
in their fields and represent an impor-
tant national asset. They have been at-
tracted to this project because of the
challenge it represents and because the
planned schedule is a fast and efficient
one that will bring the machine into op-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE June 24, 1969
eration at the earliest possible moment, period, the basis of all modern computer
with the maximum impact in the scien- circuits had its origin in the circuits de-
tific world. Loss of these people, or a veloped for particle detection devices. At
loss of morale due to a considerably the present time the techniques being de-
lengthened schedule, will have a serious veloped for pattern recognition in con-
impact on the quality of the accelerator nection with the analyses of high-
Second rate scientists ad engineers build
second rate facilities, and do it very expen-
sively.
As indicated earlier the 200-billion-
electron-volt machine is a highly com-
plex scientific instrument actually com-
prised of four acceerati rs that succes-
sively bring the accelerated particles up
to the desired energy. The design and
construction schedules are closely inter-
locked with, one another. Therefore the
initiation and completion of many
phases of the project are completely de-
pendent on earlier phases. A continuous
balance must be struck among the three
major phases of the project-design,
construction and procurement of long-
lead time components.
The Joint Committee is impressed with
the significant progress that has been
made on this project despite a history
of budgetary stringency and reductions.
The committee feels that further budg-
etary restraints will affect the schedule
and our international position vis-a-vis
the U.S.S.R. in this important basic re-
search field.
The committee is also of the opinion
that further budgetary reductions will
serve to increase the total cost, result in
the loss of key personnel and ultimately
reduce the quality of the important re-
search that should be possible with this
machine. The committee held its hear-
ings on the national policy for high-en-
ergy physics in March 19t5-more than
4 years ago. This project-- -the most im-
portant recommendation contained in
that polity-is to be a national facility
and requires a national commitment.
The Joint Committee believes strongly
that full authorization this year is es-
sential and that appropriations in the
order of the amount requested in the
President's fiscal year 1970 budget
should be made if the success of this
project is to be assured.
There are fundamental questions in
physics today that can only be answered
by the very high energy and the high
intensity that will become available from
this machine. For example, a question
that has plagued physicists in recent
years is the host of new subnuclear
particles that have been discovered, at
times seemingly without order in a field
where order is generally an underlying
principle. With the capabilities of this
machine it will be possible to search for
an elementary set of building blocks that
may form the basis for all matter and
life.
Some tremendous advancements that
have been made in this country are di-
rectly attributable to of associated with
accelerators. In the late 1930's, for ex-
ample, work on acceler8r research re-
sulted in large advancegln the develop-
ment of high-powered transmitting
tubes which were basic to the develop-
ment of radar and continue to be an in-
tegral part of radar systems. In this time
energy-physics research data are finding
application in biomedical work, and in air
and space surveillance activities. More-
over, certain accelerators are currently
being used for medical treatment and for
the irradiation of food to increase its
shelflife.
Mr. Chairman, high-energy physics is
important to education, it produces a
quantity of highly talented scientists, and
it contributes profoundly to modern tech-
nology. For these reasons I heartily en-
dorse the fiscal year 1970 high-energy-
physics program recommended to you
by the Joint Committee and, in particu-
lar, the full authorization of the 200 Bev
national accelerator which the colnmit-
tee has recommended.
Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, I rise in
support of H.R. 12167 and in doing so
wish to speak on a portion of the AEC
authorization bill in which I have a par-
ticular interest.
I refer to that segment of the physical
research program known as controlled
thermonuclear research. There is little
doubt in my mind that this research
program holds as much promise for the
future as did splitting the atom under
controlled conditions in that first atomic
pile under the west stands of Stagg Field
in Chicago on December 2, 1942.
If the controlled fusion process can be
harnessed for the production of electric
energy-and qualified scientists believe
it can be so harnessed-this Nation and
the world will have a virtually limitless
source of power. Moreover, if thermonu-
clear energy is put to this beneficial use,
we shall have not only the most abun-
dant source of power ever known to man,
extractable from ordinary water, but
the least environmentally offensive
source.
Significant scientific advances have al-
ready been made, especially very recent-
ly, In the area of plasma density and
confinement time by scientists both in
this country and in the Soviet Union.
This involves plasma, completely ion-
ized gas, at millions of degrees centi-
grade. However, much remains to be ac-
complished before our Nation's vast ca-
pacity to consume electrical energy will
have this source of power upon which
to rely.
In 1965 the Joint Committee asked the
AEC to commission a comprehensive
study of this entire program in order to
establish goals and ascertain the prob-
abilities of practical accomplishments.
An AEC select review committee, com-
prised of eminent scientists from within
and without Government, made a search
ing inquiry into the entire program. In
its comprehensive technical report the
select committee recommended that the
manpower resources, particularly scien-
tists and engineers, be doubled within 5
years in order to assure the influx of
vigorous and imaginative thought.
Shortly thereafter, the AEC issued a
policy and action paper on the control-
led fusion program which thoroughly
discussed the state of the art, the options
for progress and the need for applica-
tion of greater resources. That paper
noted that the accomplishment of the
ascertainable goals would require a net
annual increase in operating funds of
approximately 15 percent over a 5-year
period plus an annual requirement for
major device fabrication of $3 to $4
million. Under that formula the fund-
ing for this program in fiscal 1970 should
be at a level of over $40 million. The bill
before you recommends authorization of
$27,800,000-more than $12 million be-
low that level.
This is an area of endeavor in which
the Nation can ill afford the luxury of
less than a sustained effort. The Joint
Committee has exercised restraint in
recognition of the total budgetary sit-
uation. The recommended authorization
of $27.8 million is the amount consid-
ered to be an absolute minimum neces-
sary to maintain this program at the
proper level of effort to sustain the mo-
mentum generated by recent successes. I
wish I could be supporting an even
greater authorization for this program,
but, mindful of the limitations of the
national budget, I can only heartily en-
dorse this portion of the authorization
as reported.
Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Chairman, today
I cast my vote against the bill author-
izing an appropriation of $2.5 billion for
the Atomic Energy Commission. I vote
with knowledge that the programs to be
funded by this appropriation may well
have merit and may well be justified. The
merit of these programs, whatever they
are, are far outshadowed, however, by
the urgent need for the Federal Govern-
ment to apply its resources to the prob-
lems of our cities and the problems of
the poor.
I believe we have failed to establish
rational national priorities. Therefore,
I cannot place my stamp of approval on
an authorization of $2.5 billion, $828 Mil-
lion of which is to be devoted to the pro-
duction of nuclear weaponry, while' the
urgent need for funds for our cities is
being ignored.
As a candidate for the Democratic
nomination for the mayor of the city of
New York, I have for 6 months observed
with painful intensity` the problems of
New York City, problems most of which
are national in cause and origin, and
not of our city's design or creation, but
problems which nevertheless typify the
dilemma of all our major cities.
Mr. Chairman, I must report to you
that New York City is strangling; that
well-conceived programs to revive our
cities are being starved for funds; that
unless we in Congress carefully examine
our current pattern of allocating avail-
able national resources, we can expect
only an increase in the mounting hatreds
and bitterness now building, escallation
in the frightful polarization now taking
place between groups of people within
the city.
Congress must recognize its respon-
sibility for this frightening situation.
Through gross mistakein tflejstbu-
tion of our resourdes, we'ave~co i tee
mightily to the disintegration of our
cities.
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I know that New York City does have manned earth orbital missions, the fact
the talent, the knowledge, and the pro- remains that no mission has as yet been
grams to solve the problems with which approved by Congress.
it is struggling. As I said on June 10, the testimony
What our city does not have are the from the past several years in the House
resources. Committee on Science and Astronautics
The time has come for us to examine makes it perfectly clear that the NERVA
all of our programs-marginal, desirable, program is, at least as far as NASA is
and indispensible-programs for national concerned related to the promotion of
works, transportation and programs for
our cities-for the purpose of establish-
ing a sound and sane system of national
priorities.
Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, the bill be-
fore us (H.R. 12167) would authorize the
appropriation of $2,454,284,000 to the
Atomic Energy Commission for the fiscal
year 1970. This amount, which is recom-
mended by the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, is $64,318,000 less than
the authorization requested by AEC in
its original budget request, but $6,232,-
000 more than its revised request of
$2,448,052,000.
Certain areas of this bill are of special
concern. Let me discuss each of these
areas separately.
First, under the category of weapons,
$135 million has been recommended by
the committee for "research, develop-
ment, and testing of ABM compo-
nents"-committee report, page 10. The
report notet:
What the AEC will have purchased with
the construction and equipment funds pro-
vided through fifical year 1970 are capability
and capacity.
In addition to the clear intent of the
report, the debate and legislative history
on the floor should clearly indicate that
approval of this authorization does not
in any way infer approval by the House
of deployment of the Sentinel ABM sys-
tem.
A decision on whether or not to ap-
prove the administration's recommenda-
tion that the Sentinel anti-ballistic-mis-
sile system be deployed will come before
the House at a later date, at which time
I would hope it will be possible to obtain
a separate vote on that issue.
A second area of concern is $26,900,000
which the committee has recommended
for the final phases of the development
of the NERVA I engine.
I have on several occasions pointed out
to this body the ill-advisability of pro-
ceeding with the NERVA program, for
which NASA-despite its determination
to proceed with research and develop-
ment-has yet to define a mission, let
alone ask the House to approve a mission.
During the debate on the NASA au-
thorization billion June 10, I cautioned
the House:
Before authorizing more money for this
program, at least we should be aware of what
NASA intends for the future.
The report of the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy on H.R. 12167 reinforces
my belief that a mission must be defined
and submitted to Congress. On page 15
of the report, the committee noted that
it continued "to be concerned that no
mission has yet been planned for the
nuclear rocket," While the committee
suggested possible missions for the nu-
clear rocket, including manned and un-
manned lunar missions, unmanned deep
space missions, and manned or un-
glamorous and costly manned space
flight, specifically a manned mission to
Mars. Its purpose is interplanetary travel.
While such a mission may not have
been approved by Congress as yet, we
should 'recognize that further invest-
ments in the NERVA program will -in-
crease the pressure to approve whatever
purpose NASA ultimately determines for
the program. For as investments in the
program mount, NASA will argue that, if
the investments are not to be wasted, we
must proceed with whatever mission
NASA advocates.
Such a mission may, however, entail
spending billions of additional dollars on
a program of dubious national priority.
The NERVA program,, which is expected
to ultimately cost some $2 billion, is the
forerunner of a manned Mars mission
which I estimated last year would cost
perhaps as much as $200 billion into the
1980's.
Given the potential of the NERVA
program for increased cost over the next
few years, it is doubly important that
Congress establish a rational allocation
of our resources between our domestic so-
cial needs and the space program. Be-
yond that, we must set priorities within
the space program itself. This means ob-
jectives must be stated and a balance
established between manned and un-
manned space flights. Project 70-6-d, accelerator improvements,
When the costs of a manned Mars Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Berkeley,
mission may be as much as $200 billion- California, $680,000.
$200 billion which will be vitally needed Project 70-6-e, accelerator improvements,
Accelerator Center, Cali-
in such domestic areas as housing, edu- foStanford $640,000.
cation, and the abatement of pollution Project ,000.
in our air and water-should Congress medium and low energy physics, Improvements ,
quietly allow the pressure to build for the Project 70-6-g, modification c to Heavy Ion
adoption of such a goal? I think not. And Linear Accelerator, Lawrence Radiation Lab-
yet, as we pour more and more money oratory, Berkeley, California, $2,650,000,
into a program for which no mission has (7) ADMINISTRATIVE.-Project 70-7-a, com-
been approved, that Is precisely what puter building, AEC Headquarters, German-
Project 70-1-b, bedrock waste storage (AE
and site selection drilling only), Savannah
River, South Carolina, $1,300,000
Project 70-1-c, waste encapsulation and
storage facilities (AE only), Richland, Wash-
ington, $1,200,000.
Project 70-1-d, contaminated water con-
trol facilities, Savannah River, South Caro-
lina, $1,500,000.
Project 70-1-e, equipment test facility,
Oak Ridge, Tennessee, $5,700,000. -
(2) SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS.-
Project 70-2-a, rebuilding of gaseous dif-
fusion plant cooling tower, Portsmouth,
Ohio, $1,000,000.
Project 70-2-b, improvement of gaseous
diffusion plant electrical distribution sys-
tems, Paducah, Kentucky, $1,700,000.
(3) ATOMIC WEAPONS.-Project 70-3-a,
weapons production, development and test
installations, $10,000,000.
(4) REACTOR DEVELOPMENT.-
Project 70-4-a, high temperature sodium
facility, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Rich-
land, Washington, $6,300,000.
Project 70-4-b, research and development
test plans, Project Rover, Los Alamos Scien-
tific Laboratory, New Mexico, and Nevada
Test Site, Nevada, $1,000,000.
Project 70-4-c, modifications and altera-
tions to expended core facility, National Re-
actor Testing Station, Idaho, $4,400,000.
Project 70-4-d, modifications to reactors,
$1,000,000.
(5) REACTOR DEVELOPMENT.-Project 70-5-
a, conversion of heating plant to natural gas,
Argonne National Laboratory, Illinois, $560,-
000.
(6) PHYSICAL RESEARCH.-
Project 70-6-a, accelerator improvements,
zero gradient synchrotron, Argonne National
Laboratory, Illinois, $650,000.
Project 70-6-b, accelerator and reactor
additions and modifications, Brookhaven Na-
tional Laboratory, New York, $700,000.
Project 70-6-c, accelerator improvements,
Cambridge and Princeton accelerators, $200,
(8 HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I (9) CAPITAL EQUIPMENT.- Acqui ition and
have no further requests for time. fabrication to capital equipment not related
Mr. HOSMER. I have no further re- to construction, $172,525,000.
quests for time, Mr. Chairman. SEC. 102. LIMrrATIONS.-(a) The Commis-
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read. sion is authorized to start any project set
The Clerk read as follows: forth in subsections 101(b) (1), (3), (4), and
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of (6) only if the currently estimated cost of
Representatives of the United States of that project does not exceed by more than
America in Congress assembled, 25 per centum the estimated cost set forth
SEC. 101. There is hereby authorized to be for that project.
appropriated to the Atomic Energy Com- (b) The Commission is authorized to start
mission in accordance with the provisions of any project set forth in subsection 101(b)
section 261 of the Atomic Energy Act of (2), (5), and (7) only if the currently esti-
1954; as amended: mated cost of that project does not exceed
(a) For "Operating expenses", $1,973,282,- by more than 10 per centum the estimated
000, not to exceed $121,000,000 in operating cost set forth for that project.
costs for the High Energy Physics program (c) The Commission is authorized to start
category. a project under subsection 101(b) (8) only
(b) For "Plant and capital equipment", if it is in accordance with the following:
including construction, acquisition, or modi- (1) The maximum currently estimated
fication of facilities, including land acquisi- cost of any project shall be $500,000 and the
tion; and acquisition and fabrication of maximum currently estimated cost of any
capital equipment not related to construc- building included in such project shall be
tion, a sum of dollars equal to the total of $100,000 provided that the building cost lim-
the following: station may be exceeded if the Commission
(1) SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS.- determines that it is necessary in the interest
Project 70-1-a, waste storage tanks and of efficiency and economy.
tank farm waste handling systems, Rich- (2) The total cost of all projects under-
land, Washington, $10,000,000, taken under subsection 101(b) (8) shall not
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H 5098 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --HOUSE June 24, 1969-
exceed the estimated cost set forth in that in the gas-cooling area. Indeed today in- frank. We have spent on research and
subsection by more than 10 per centum. dustry has taken up the gas-cooling ap- development several hundred million
SEC. 103. The Commission is authorized to proach at Peach Bottom, in, Pennsyl- dollars over the period of the atomic
corn-
pe
Commission rform construction design services for any construction yania, where there is a producing gas- energy program. In some cases the conl-
project h whenever
(1) such construction been in- cooled reactor, I think with a 50,000-kilo- mittee itself has stopped projects when
(1) such construtructtion ion prote h project
cluded in a proposed authorization bill watt capacity, on a commercial utility we thought we h'ad'all the scientific in-
transmitted to the Congress by the Commis- line which was built as a part of the formation that we could get out of the
sion and (2) the commission determines demonstration program in which the project. We did not let the project run on;
that the project is of such urgency that con- AEC participated. As a follow-on to when we got to the end of what we
struction of the project should be initiated Peach Bottom, at Fort St. Vrain, in Colo- thought was the end of advanced tech-
promptly upon enactment of legislation ap- redo, the Public Service Co. of Colorado, nology in that project then we stopped
p SECEC. 104. When funds so for specified in cooperation with the General Atomics the project. In many instances the tech-
priation in an appro-
priation Act, transfers of amounts between Corp., and with the AEC, is building a nological information and development
"Operating expenses" and "Plant and capital large production powerline station on of the reactor in such a case which we
equipment" may be made as provided in such this principle. had stopped was then used in another
appropriation Act. Mr. HALL. I thank the gentleman for reactor which eventually brought out a
SEC. 106. AMENDMENT OF PRIOR YEAR AcT. - that part of the information which he successful reactor.
Section 101(b) of Public Law 90-56, as volunteered. I think he anticipated my Mr. HALL. The gentleman in the well
amended, is further ameMed by striking subsection (4) thereof the figure "$32,- second question, about the Fort %t. Vrain fully understands the advantages of re-
from 833,0 accelera- 33,000" for project 68-4-f, 200-Bev aleraprojector, indeed, all of the power re- search and development, testing and
tor, Du Page and Kane Counties near Chi- actor demonstration program projects. evaluation; as well as advantages from
cago, Illinois, and substituting therefor the The Fort St. Vrain project,-according to so-called fallout. However, would this
figure "$250,000,000." the committee's own report, encountered same explanation that the gentleman
SEC. 106. LIQUID METAL FAST BREEDER RE- considerable problems, and the commit- has - given, apply to the Malibu nuclear
ACTOR DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM-PROJECT tee has been asked by the joint com- plant which the committee has recom-
DEFINITION PHASE.-(a) The Commission is mission to keep it advised on a timely mended-
hereby authorized to conduct the Project
Br basis of the status of these efforts toward The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gen-
Breeeder Definition
Breeder Metal Fast
tor r Demonstration a iProgram, a reconfiguration of that project. Is that tleman has expired.
der Reactor Phase
under cooperative arrangements with reactor not true? (By unanimous consent, Mr. HALL was
manufacturers and others, in accordance Mr. HOSMER. That is true. allowed to proceed for 3 additional
with the criteria heretofore submitted to Mr. HALL. But my original question, minutes).
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Mr. Chairman, goes back to the status Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, as I started
without regard to the provisions of section of the experimental gas-cooled reactor to say, would the same explanation given
169 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as that was a part of the TVA authorization by the gentleman apply to the coopera-
tions th, for au thm on of a $7, 0,000 and built on contract by Union Carbide tive power reactor demonstration pro-
101 m of ount this c7,000,000
is included Act. and TVA at Oak Ridge. I believe, if you grams? At least three out of the five men-
is u eded in in in the section e amount
discontinued mcommittee report have wbeen
Sec. 107. The Commission is authorized to will search the records, you will find that tioned iin the
ere
appoint persons as employees to positions in it was never completed. modifi thin for cause, the first
the Atomic Energy Commission without re- I would like to know how much money not or properthese ly rly thought t out ut intthesand
gard to the provisions of section 201 of Pub- we put into that out of the taxpayers' place;
lac Law 90-364, and such positions shah not pockets before it was thrown overboard, benefactors have not been able to bear
betaken into cooyidsrutidn in determining as so many of these cooperative projects their portion of the matching funds. 1
of that oumbers of section ormployees bn numbers o oef vacancies subsection svbsa ( un)- and power reactor demonstrations are report, is the same general explanation
n applicable to these power reactor deco-
der subsection (b) of that section. being thrown overboard. apapplicable to these toter reactor that we,
HOLIFIELD (during the reading). I want it understood that I am in favor onstration
acceptable plans not coming that e,
of this bill. I believe in atomic energy .% pfound to
ass? "
Mr. Chairman, I ask urialered as read , consent I think it is here to stay. I believe the Mr. HOLIFIELD. Let me say to the
that the bill be considered committee has brought in a good report.
printed in the RECORD, and open to Certainly it is forthright and honest, but gentleman that in 1962 and 1963 the
amendment at any point. I believe that the Members and the tax- committee authorized two reactors in
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to California. One was the so-called Malibu
the request of the gentleman from Cali- payers need an answer to some of these plant, and one was for the Southern
forma? questions. California Edison Co.
There was no objection. Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, if the Mr. HALL. Is that the same one as the
Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I move to gentleman will yield, I do not personally Bolsa Island project?
strike the last word. recall that the TVA was a partner in any Mr. HOLIFIELD. That was a later
Mr. Chairman, I hope that I shall not cooperative gas-cooled reactor. The AEC project.
take the full 5 minutes. I know the need has had some experiments on its own, HALL. But the Bolsa Island proj-
today, expediting the business of the House and at the present time the TVA is actu- Mr.
ect Mr through.
L. Btoday, but I have two general sets of ally buying a 2,000-megawatt nuclear
concern about which I believe more gen- reactor for its system, but these are Mr. HOLIFIELD. The Bolsa Island
eral information is needed and I know I neither gas-cooled or in cooperation with project did not proceed because of the
would like to have, in addition to that the AEC. Perhaps the chairman of the escalation of prices. But let me get back
which Is in the committee report. committee will recollect something that I to the question.
First of all I would like to know the have not in connection with this. The gentleman will find an explana-
status of or what happened to the experi- Mr. HALL. The gentleman may be tion on page 34 of the report.
mental gas-cooled reactor which we built right on the details, technically; as to Mr. HALL. I will say to the gentleman
at Oak Ridge. whether it was to furnish power to the that I have read the report thoroughly,.
Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, will the TVA under contract or was being built Mr. HOLIFIELD. Yes, I am sure you
gentleman yield? experimentally and TVA was to bene- have.
Mr. HALL. I am glad to yield to the fit from the power therefrom. I am not The Southern California Edison Co. is
gentleman from California. knowledgeable enough to speak au- producing electricity from its nuclear re-
Mr. HOSMER. Which reactor is the thoritatively and from memory in this actor and it is the most advanced plant
gentleman talking about? area, but I think I do know that toward now on the line in the United States.
Mr. HALL. The EG0R. the end of the completion for this type The engineers and scientists believe it
Mr. HOSMER. The experimental gas reactor that it was stopped. will be competitive with other types of
cooling program? IvtrHOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, if the fossil fuel and other types of electrical
Mr. HALL. That is right. gentleman will yield, there was a reactor, generating plants.
Mr. HOSMER. As I recollect it, that I might say, at Oak Ridge, but this was In the case of the Malibu plant, they
a site, local au-
experiment served its stated the feasibility of further activity a bit of money on that. I am going to be thorizatio l trouble foin getting r the site.
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So there will never be any money to But I do think it is clear that there is cost about $10 million each. The Poseidon
build on that one. a real problem here-both of escalation missiles are expected to cost between $7
That was announced in the past, the and of foreclosing the option of negoti- and $10 million each. It will also cost
time when they could avail themselves ating an enforceable limitation on about $80 million to overhaul and con-
of that particular cooperative venture MIRV deployment. vert each of the 31 Polaris nuclear sub-
because it was to help develop the tech- At the appropriate time I will be cir- marines to carry, the large Poseidon mis-
nology which has now been developed. culating among my Democratic col- siles. Thus total MIRV costs may be on
Therefore, they are not at this time eli- leagues the substance of the Brooke res- the order of $10 to $15 billion, without
gible for any help. olution. The reason I am doing this is, including research and development
As I stated before, the Los Angeles I feel that this is the most effective way costs.
Water and Power Department could not to dramatize the concern that all of In the current fiscal year 1970 budget
get the siting because of local govern- us have about this expensive and very there is $2,074,000,000 for the Minuteman
mental opposition. critical weapons development. III and Poseidon programs. This is more
Mr. HALL. I commend the committee Some of us feel that we ought to take than twice the amounts in the budget
on its oversight and review of these proj- the initiative. I personally would hope for the Safeguard ABM.
ects and continuing to classify and nui- that we could do that. I think it is es- The Poseidon and Minuteman III
lify them where there will be no addi- sential that we come to grips with the MIRV's both employ a bus concept. This
tional civilian or military fallout, where MIRV issue and the separate resolution means that one propulsion and guidance
the arrangements cannot be completed. that has already been introduced by mechanism directs all of the individual
I will ask the gentleman finally, Has Senator CRANSTON and Senator BROOKE warheads carried by the missiles. After
the Commission completed the Sefor re- in the other body. the main missile boosters have cut off,
actor satisfactorily, in northwest Arkan- MIRV MORATORIUM the propulsion unit on the bus makes
sas near Fayetteville? Are you happy Mr. Chairman, we are today engaging minute adjustments in speed and direc-
with it? in the first dialog in the House of Rep- tion, and after each of these adjust-
Mr. HOLIFIELD. No. This reactor is resentatives on the critical issue of the ments releases another warhead, direct-
being completed by partnership between development and deployment of multiple ing it to a different target.
the Federal Government and 17 pri- independently targeted reentry vehicles. The Soviet Union is at the present time
vately owned utilities, also a German This discussion comes at a crucial testing at least two different concepts
concern is participating in the venture. time-a time when the President and the employing multiple warheads. In one
This is considered to be one of the most National Security Council are preparing concept, three warheads each in the 5-
advanced reactors for the purpose of im- the American position for the upcoming megaton range can be delivered in a
proving this breeding factor that I spoke strategic arms limitation talks with the pattern. Intelligence data available in the
of sometime ago. We are learning a great Soviet Union, and at a moment when United States has not conclusively deter-
deal from it at the present time. We are time is fast running out on our chances mined whether these warheads are in.-
continuing to learn. of ever being able to have an enforceable dependently targetable or whether they
I would say that that plant should arms control agreement limiting MIRV's. are merely multiple warheads like the
operate for another two or three years I would like to state at the outset that ones we have had on our Polaris missiles
to get the advance technology we need it is my firm conviction that the United since 1962 which deliver three warheads
in that field. States should at this time halt all testing in a fixed shotgun-like pattern. President
Mr. HALL. I will ask the gentleman of our MIRV system, and that further Nixon indicated last week, however, that
one final question. testing should be deferred at least until even if the Soviet warheads are not inde-
Cari he, as chairman of this commit- the arms limitation talks begin, and pendently targetable, he regards them as
tee which has oversight and review func- longer if the Soviets refrain from testing a threat to our ICBM's because the pat-
tion of the Atomic Energy Commission, their multiple warhead systems. And in tern of the Soviet warheads is much like
assure me that we are closing these ex- any event the United States should the layout of our Minuteman fields.
perimental and cooperative civilian dem- strongly press for mutual moratorium on The second Soviet concept being tested
onstration reactor projects down on time, MIRV's in these talks. involves the delivery of a string of up
in order to still get the greatest fallout i recognize that not all Members of to 10 warheads. Each of these warheads
from the technical evaluation and yet this body share this conviction. More- would land in a separate location, but
not waste the taxpayers' money in order ever, I recognize that not all Members of they would not be capable of being inde-
to continue at the insistance of a local this body are as familiar with the MIRY pendently targeted.
concern? issues as they would like to be. Accord- THE STRATEGIC SITUATION
Mr. HOLIFIELD. I believe that is true. ingly, I would like to take a few minutes MIRV's have at least two strategic
The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Mc- to outline the issues as I see them, and roles. MIRV's can increase the number
CULLOCH) is on our committee and we to explain the reasons underlying my of targets which can be struck by a given
had a research reactor in his district conclusions. missile launcher force. And MIRV's can
which much to our regret we decided THE STATE OF THE ART increase the probability that an enemy
needed to be shut down, and notwith- At the outset it is important to under- ABM will be penetrated.
standing the fact that it was in the gen- stand how very far along in MIRV devel- MIRV's will affect the strategic bal-
tleman's district, he finally agreed it opment we are, and to understand what ance only if one side perceives the MIRV
should be closed down, and we did close it is that we know about Soviet develop- warheads of the other to be either so
it down. ments in this area. large, or so accurate, or so numerous, as
We will continue to watch carefully all The United States has present plans to to be able to destroy a significant portion
research and cevelopment and we will use MIRV's on two types of missiles- of its land-based ICBM's in a first strike,
not allow any experimental device to the Minuteman III land-based ICBM's and thereby threaten the credibility of
continue beyond the point of what giving and the Poseidon submarine-based mis- its deterrent.
us a good scientific return. siles. These plans call for the deployment Thus the crucial question with regard
Mr. HALL. I thank the gentleman. of MIRV's on 500 out of 1,054 of our to the MIRV is whether one side sees its
Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Chairman, I move ICBM's and on 496 of the 656 missiles adversary's MIRV as a hard target-
to strike out the last word. on our nuclear submarines. The Minute- ICBM-killer. If so that side may per-
(Mr. COHELAN asked and was given man III is a new last stage which will be ceive a threat to its deterrent and may
permission to revise and extend his re- fitted. on the existing missile launchers have to take steps to maintain its as-
marks.) for the Minuteman force. The Minute- sured destruction capability.
Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Chairman, I have a man III will carry one to three warheads The U.S. Defense Department and the
detailed discussion on the MIRV pro- and is assumed to contain sophisticated President have seen the possible Soviet
gram which I think is of overwhelming penetration aids like chaff and decoys. deployment of large numbers of SS-9
concern to all of us. I will not have a The Poseidon will carry 10 to 15 war- ICBM's with MIRV's as potential hard
chance in the time allocated to get into heads, and can apparently also carry target killers and not as mere ABM
it all because I have some questions i penetration aids. penetrators. Accordingly, the admini-
would like to direct to the chairman. Minuteman III missiles are expected to stration has perceived a threat to the
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Yet at this time we have no intelli- our national security, as well as making man, as far as testing underground is
genre estimate which indicates that the possible a better use of our national concerned, that is not the matter that
Soviet Union will have such a city de- resources. we who are in favor of suspending flight
fense ABM deployed in 1971 when the But as I understand it-having had a tests have in mind. We are not concerned
first U.S. MIRV's will become operation- conversation with the distinguished with underground tests.
al. In fact, the lead time for city defense chairman of the Joint-Committee-there The, CHAIRMAN. The time of the
ABM deployment is considerably longer is nothing in this legislation which pur- gentleman from New York has expired.
than the lead time for MIRV deploy- ports to make any decisions with regard (By unanimous request, Mr. BINGHAM
ment. Thus, we could actually wait un- to either of these questions. was allowed to proceed for an additional
til there was firm evidence of a Soviet I have also discussed the matter of the minute.)
nationwide ABM before we put MIRV's ABM part of it with Senator GORE of the Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, it is
on our missiles. other body, and he assured me he had not the underground testing we are con-
These leadtime differentials, and the agreed to the Joint Committee's report on cerned about. It is the flight tests which
fact that the U.S. MIRV deployment is that basis. The report specifically states are under the control of DOD, as I under-
scheduled for several years in advance that the funds requested for ABM would stand it, that would indicate to the So-
of the threat it is said to meet, indicate be needed whether or not we decide to viets that at a certain point we have
that we could tolerate a few months de- proceed with deployment of the ABM developed an operational MIRV. that is
lay in MIRV development with no loss safeguard system. I assume that the same what we are concerned about.
in security. is true with regard to the MIRV. I understand this legislation does not
CONCLUSION May I ask the gentleman, the chair- make any decision with respect to
Thus, Mr. Chairman, with MIRV devel- man of the Joint Committee, whether I whether those tests should be continued
opment we face another costly escalation am correct in my understanding that this or not. Is that correct?
in the arms race which will not contrib- legislation before us does not, if passed, Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, again
ute to the increased security of either constitute any decision by this body with I will have to repeat what I said to the
side. Moreover, this development will regard to the desirability of proceeding gentleman, and I am trying to phrase my
make a nuclear first strike strategy con- with the deployment of the ABM safe- words carefully.
siderably more attractive than it is now. guard system. Testing of the missile with the com-
These awesome prospects can be avoid Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, that ponent dummy parts has occurred in the
ed if we can get a mutual moratorium is my understanding, that the money in past 2 or 3 years. It is occurring
on MIRV testing and deployment with this bill is for research and development now and will continue to occur, and at a
the Soviet Union. Whether we can work of all type warheads and has nothing to specific time when the tests are consid-
out such a moratorium depends in part do with deployment. ered to be successful, it will be assumed
on not going too far in our MIRV test- Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I thank then that there would be a utilization
ing. Since deferring these tests for a few the gentleman. of it by putting nuclear components in
months would not jeopardize the nation- Would I be correct in my understand- the warheads of our Minuteman and
al security, and might actually contrib- ing that the same is true with regard to Poseidon or any other missile we thought
ute to that security should an agreement the question of the testing of the MIRV it was adaptable to.
be reached, I strongly urge the mem- weapons, that that decision is presently Mr. BINGHAM. I understand that, Mr.
bers of this body to advocate and sup- in the hands of the President and the De Chairman. What I am concerned about
port a halt on U.S. MIRV development fense Department, and there is nothing is that we not come to a point later in
pending the commencement of the SALT in this legislation to indicate a decision the session when perhaps somebody de-
talks and continuing thereafter so long one way or another on that? bating a resolution such as the gentle-
as the Soviet Union refrains from test- Mr. HOLIFIELD. That is my under- man from California (Mr. COHELAN) is
ing its multiple warheads, and in any standing, with this qualification, that talking about, or my resolution, might
event pressing for a mutual moratorium the research and development and test- run into the argument, "Oh, no; we de-
on MIRV development in these talks. ing of warheads that has been going on- cided that question when we passed the
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gen- as the gentleman knows-since 1945, AEC authorization bill."
tleman has expired. continues. I want to be sure we will not be fore-
Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I move In the case of these different types of closed from debating that when the time
to strike the last word. warheads, the scientific technology used comes by reason of the fact that we pass
(Mr. BINGHAM asked and was given in one warhead is applicable to the other. this legislation.
permission to revise and extend his When it comes to testing the nuclear Mr. HOLIFIELD. I am sure the gentle-
remarks.) warhead for Minuteman or Poseidon, or man will be given that opportunity under
Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I re- if there should be a MIRV type, the nu- the rules of the House. I will be happy
gret that the general debate was so ab- clear warheads are tested underground to discuss that matter with him at that
breviated that I was not present to hear and are not tested in flight. time.
the previous discussion between the Mr. BINGHAM. I thank the gentle-
chairman of the Joint Committee and However, there are flights in which man.
my colleague, the gentleman from New dummy components of what we would Mr. Chafr-
York (Mr. KocH). call a multiple reentry vehicle would be Mrman, . I move to strike N of rithelinaisois. Mr. h in-requisite
First, I would like to say that I share tested by the flight of missiles. We are woods.
very intensively the concern that my col- continuously testing missile flights to ber of league, the gentleman from California, Kwajalein Island from the U.S. air base Mr. HARSHA. Mr. Chairman, I make
has expressed with regard to the further at Vandenburg. There have been in the the point of order that a quorum is not
testing of MIRV weapons. Some weeks past multiple entry vehicle tests both by present.
ago I introduced a resolution in the the United States and the Soviet Union. The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will count,
House, which now has 29 cosponsors. I This is nothing new, but they have always one hundred and fifteen Members are
regret that the gentleman from Cali- been dummy components and not the present, a quorum.
fornia prefers the form of resolution real thing. The gentleman from Illinois, (Mr.
that was introduced in the other body Mr. BINGHAM. I thank the chairman. ANDERSON) is recognized for 5 minutes.
by Senator BROOKE. But that is his privi- In passing, I might say it was my un- (Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois asked and
lege. I do not know that there is any derstanding from testimony of the De- was given permission to revise and ex-
enormous difference between the two. In fense Secretary Mr. Packard and testi- tend his remarks.)
any event, I think it is of great impor- mony we heard coming from Secretary Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Chair-
tance that the disarmament talks-the Laird that tests conducted by the Soviet man, I have listened with great care and
SALT talks-proceed with the utmost Union have been, as far as is apparent, great interest as well to the remarks both
ur 'ing, and there is no doubt that a mu- of MRV's, multiple reentry vehicles, and of the gentleman from California (Mr.
tual freeze on the development of the not MIRVs multiple independently tar- COHELAN) and of the gentleman who
MIRV weapon, as well as on the deploy- getable reentry vehicles. just addressed the Committee, the gen-
ment of the ABM, would be helpful to I would like to explain to the gentle- tleman from New York (Mr. BINGHAM).
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ought to be willing to try to take the the President to follow up the remarks fact, feel forced to proceed with its own'.
initiative and make such an attempt; made at his press conference by pro- MIRV. And since anti-ballistic missiles are',
the logical strategic response to MIRY, the
even though the chances are not very posing to the Soviets that we both cease question on the ABM would not be whether
bright In that regard. MIRY testing as of July 31 and that the to deploy the current Safeguard proposal,
Mr. Chairman, last Thursday evening moratorium continue for the duration but whether ABMs could be held to any-.
President Nixon held a press conference of the talks. I think both we and the thing like the Safeguard's limited size.
in which he discussed a wide range of Soviets are extremely apprehensive Now, the United States is confidena ce iw,
subjects. Of particular interest to me about the Pandora's box which would be months the key away from independent operational guidance technology,
was his announcement that he intended opened by MIRV and that we both re- though the is not testing multiple warheads
to begin strategic arms limitation talks alize, in the President's words, "that a large enough to be especially useful in at-
with the Soviet Union around the first moratorium could be mutually beneficial tacking the Soviet's hardened retaliatory mis-
part of August, subject, of course, to So- to us." silos. The Soviets apparently are testing mul-
viet acceptance of this invitation. Mr. Chairman, for these reasons, I have. tiple warheads of this counterforce size, but
I think the President is to be com- decided to introduce in this body, a red- their independent guidance capability seems
mended for sensing the urgency of these olution identical to the one introduced much rtg e the U.S. future. do to stop the
in the Stop the
talks and for rejecting any further de- in that other body by Senator BROOKE, Soviet tests the Umanifestly can
lay in their commencement. I would calling upon the President to propose to national interest. The U.S. MIRV would be
hope that the Soviet Union will agree to the Soviet Union an immediate and mu- absolutely necessary only if the Soviets de-
the the July 31 target date so that we tual moratorium on MIRV flight tests. I ployed a large city-defense ABM system, a
may begin substantive discussions on intend to circulate this resolution among project with a long lead time allowing the
checking the dangerous arms spiral. my colleagues on this side of the aisle U.S. to pick up MIRV development. Thus,
mutual lose and a V test sugrreat deal
Last week, before this body, I expressed and urge them to cosponsor it with me. the gain from a little
my concern over the delay in arms talks At the same time, the gentleman from to That is not to say the soviets would non.
and over the development of MIRV mis- California (Mr. CoxEIaN) will be cir- essarily feel they would suffer from such a
riles,. the multiple independently target- culating the same resolution among his limitation, for no doubt they would prefer
able reentry vehicles that both we and colleagues on the other side of the aisle that the U.S. does not deploy MIRV. Since
the Soviets are contemplating deploying. for the same purposes. I would ask that their interest in arms talks probably stems
I expressed the belief that we should all the Members of this body study the from a desire to limit strategic spending,
agi they would presumably forced e to the advan
the -
seriously consider proposing to the Rus- resolution carefully, consider its merits also,
sians an immediate and mutual mora- and its urgency, and join us in expressing tageeau. Thus there is c lean some chance
torium on MIRV flight tests pending a our concern over this crucial issue. the Soviets would agree to a test moratorium
formal agreement at the conference Mr. Chairman, at this point in the REC- provided it is offered to them before they
table. ORD, I wish to include certain editorials- feel the U.S. has perfected its own technology.
I am disturbed by the fact that if a and articles pertaining to this proposal In endorsing a mutual test suspension and
its
halt in these tests is not called soon, it and I call these to the attention of my commending ident Senator
Nixon Brook's ac tvitydi that
may be too late to work out an agreement colleagues. behalf (P es ds this demons of the MIRV
acceptable to either side. MIRV would The articles follow: heoblem. The same logi leads to the next
introduce a warhead counting problem [From the Wall St Journal, June 20, step, approaching the Soviets immediately,
that could only be checked by onsite in- tree while a mutual test suspension remains in
spections, something neither side is likely Ma. NixoN on MIRV the realm of possibility.
to agree to. In addition, MIRV would President Nixon says his Administration is -
signal a new escalation in the arms race considering a joint Soviet-American mora- [From the New York Times, June 20, 1969]
that would not only involve great costs torium on tests of multiple warhead missiles, MR. Nixon AND Mnrv
but would imperil the delicate balance of but rules out any unilateral suspension on No decision Richard Nixon will face as
terror being maintained by both sides, our part. Good enough, but we hope the President is likely to be more momentous
U.S. sounds out the Soviets on some sort of than the decision he faces within the next
The technology of MIRV is such that informal moratorium in advance of the arms few days on the proposal to suspend the
the greater it is perfected in accuracy, talks that may start later this summer. flight-testing of MIRV multiple-warhead
the more provocative it becomes as a When combined with missiles of appro- missiles. Mr. Nixon yesterday described this
potential first strike weapon capable of priate size and accuracy, a MIRV (multiple proposal as "constructive" and said he would
knocking out hardened missile targets. independently targetable reentry vehicles) favor it if the Soviet Union would agree to
The introduction of MIRV will con- capability could be used for a nuclear first do the same. But his attack on a "unilateral"
sequently put both us and the Russians strike taking out much of the opponent's suspension (of tests only the United States is
in a constant state of fear over both the retaliatory force. Yet the posture of mutual now conducting) and his statement that
deterrence, the bedrock of whatever sta- this move must be part of an arms control
capabilities and intentions of the other bility a nuclear World can hope to find, de- agreement (which may take years to negoti-
Side. pends more than anything else on each side's ate) confuse the issue.
I was, therefore, encouraged by Presi- confidence that its retaliatory forces are se- Immediate suspension of MIRV tests is es-
dent Nixon's reference last Thursday to cure from any such attack. MIRV technology sential to keep the door open for a strategic
a mutual moratorium on MIRV flight threatens that confidence, and thus directly arms agreement with the Soviet Union that
tests as "a very constructive proposal." threatens nuclear stability. - would freeze the existing nuclear balance,
The President went on to say that the President Nixon's remarks recognize the head off further escalation of the missile
administration is "considering the pas- special importance of multiple warheads in race and assure security to both sides. Con-
suggesting a MIRV test moratorium as part tinned testing for even a few more weeks
sibility of a moratorium on tests as part of the arms control agreement. Such an threatens to take the world past a point of
of any arms control agreement." I think agreement, though, is likely to take years of no return into an expensive and dangerous
the President was correct in ruling Out negotiation. The time during which the new round in the missile race. It promises a
a "unilateral stopping of tests on our President's suggestion of a MIRV test mora- five-fold multiplication of nuclear delivery
part." This would be unwise and a fool- torium remains feasible is measured in vehicles in the American strategic missile
ish risk that we could not afford to take. months at best. forces-from 1,700 to about 8,000, an expan-
I have proposed a mutual moratorium A limitation on MIRV seems conceivable sion that the Soviet Union would doubtless
and I was pleased with the President's only while it remains in the test flight state, match. Even if limits on Soviet and Ameri-
comment: when both we and the Soviets can easily can missile strength were later to be set at
monitor the other's efforts. Once operational these higher levels, an era of nuclear nervous-
Only in the event that the Soviet Union confidence is gained, any limitation could be ness would be almost sure to replace the pres-
and we could agree that a moratorium could enforced only through detailed on-site in- ent situation of stable mutual deterrence.
be mutually beneficial to us, would we be spection of missiles, a possibility that flies The bipartisan resolution introduced this
able to agree to do so. in the face of the Soviet's historic opposition week by Senator Brooke . of Massachusetts
However, I wish to reiterate my belief to any inspection of that kind. and 40 other Senators urging the President
that a MIRV test moratorium cannot Once MIRV is operational, each side would to seek an immediate moratorium with the
await a formal agreement at the SALT be forced to assume the other had deployed Soviet Union indicates a growing realization
await conference. al must head off this SALT it. This would not absolutely preclude arms in Congress that MIRV testing is now the es- limitation, but it would force the nuclear main governor on the arms race. It is more
calation now before either side is capable race up to its next plateau in spending and urgent than the issues that have dominated
of deploying the weapon. I would urge warhead proliferation. Each side would in the missile debate in recent months, such as
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June 24, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -
Authoritative officials speak of a formula dividually and will be far more accurate briefer and asked if he had really intended
under which both sides would freeze the than any previous or existing warhead. They to let MIRV out of the bag. Everyone agreed
number of offensive missile sites and move will be far better suited for destruction of to delete the reference to the new weapon
Into "thin" antiballistic missile systems. hardened enemy missile sites than any ex- syste was almost two more years before MIRV
"That would, in effect, be disarmament," in isting missile warheads."
the view of one Pentagon expert. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird implied surfaced publicly. But it was overshadowed
A more modest step, as some see it, would the same thing when he told Congress In in the strategic weapons debate by the ABM.
be a mere mutual freeze on the number of March of this year that he planned to spend MIRV's development as a "city-busting"
delivery vehicles, or buses. "If they freeze $12.5 million to improve the Poseidon guid- weapon is now continuing on a schedule
their. delivery vehicles they can MIRV UP ance system and thereby make it more effec- that calls for the first warheads to be in-
to the kazoo and they would have no first - tive against "hardened" targets, meaning stalled on two nuclear submarines in Janu-
strike," an official said, missile silos. ary, 1971. If the development is carried out
This means, however, that each side would Statements of this kind have alarmed as planned it will cost, according to present
have to make the worst assumptions about many scientists, such as Wolfgang Panofsky, estimates, about $17 billion-$7 billion for
how much megatonnage lies in the silos of the Stanford physicist who was a member of Poseidon, $10tbereoareor Minucleartemanswers an III. to
the prospective enemy. the President's Science Advisory Committee present
It could still be a prescription for further from 1959 to 1964 and chairman of its panel where the Rasl Ruthey ssians stand MIRV 9 velop-
arms stockpiling by both the Soviet Union on defense. ment. three huge wyr a tested the
re SS-9bl five
and United States. "They (such statements) are essentially with P y
As with all of the scenarios on nuclear threatening to the Soviets," Panofsky said, megatons each. Whether these were guided
war and its probabilities, MIRV has created ,and are technically wrong .. . From warheads or simply gravity bombs, such as
deep divisions in both the scientific and Po- Laird's -statement the Russians could not the Polaris A-3 missile has carried since 1962,
litical communities in the United.States. It help but draw the worst possible judgment is uncertain.
plan- (about MIRV) . My own view is that this But no expert disputes the possibility that
suggests to ners are seeking a a some "h"t Afirst-mstrikeerican" war capabiliity generation of MIRV is not a first-strike the Russians could quickly bring their MIRV
Hers ar technology breast of the United States.
against the Soviet Union. It suggests to threat to the Russians. The verbiage that has abreast
then t than the Mboth sides
rsenals would
sucker for gadgets, that it will buy any new technical side." s today
weapon that comes along, irrespective of The "technical side," however, continues increase possesses approximately enormously. The United d States today
need. It suggests to still others that the to bother MIRV critics such as Dr. Leonard about 1100 for the
arsenal
arms control. Maryland. There may be, Rodburg Bsays, limi- ut there could Union raised MIRVing, the wh s in t The view from the Pentagon on these is- tations on MIRV's accuracy today. could be the no 8 8766 ofarheads delivery vehicles-
sues is both reassuring and confusing. It is is no scientific barrier to far greater accu-
based on the promise that security is, in racy in the relatively near future, he believes. the Russian arsenal coraised to to 5150.
effect, found in insecurity, that the best The work of such guidance experts as Dr. Pentagon of not disturbing
the present time. The molt the
hedge against a nuclear war is, in Robert Charles Draper of the Massachusetts Intl- reasoning it that, both sid still would be
McNamara's words, "the certainty of suicide tute of Technology may make it possible left ring is arstrike capability,
to the aggressor." That is what is meant by fairly soon to put a small MIRV warhead al- Disarmament proponents are less sanguine.
the "balance of terror." most "on the silo door", Rodburg says. "With see MI Disarmament r development as simply
That balance, the Pentagon maintains, that kind of accuracy," he said, "you could They another useless step ve the "mad momen-
two be upset by the United States in only destroy a silo with a satchel charge." another the arms epc in
a step that, If men-
two ways-an infallible system of defense Whatever the implications of the Penta- t um"
would divert , al step needlessly h-
(ABM) protecting the country from sui- gon's conflicting descriptions of MIRV'- mis- wIng eapons that neither side requires.
cide" or an infallible system of offense to sion, the present policy is to stress the lim- _
destroy virtually all Soviet weapons in a itations of the weapon. Dr. Roland Herbst, From Time magazine, June 27, 1969]
sneak attack. the Defense Department's deputy director of ARMS CONTROL: THE CRITICAL MOMENT
MIRV has been called, by its critics, the research, said last week that pinpoint accu-
forerunner to that kind of "first-strike" Of- racy for MIRV may be achieved "at some (Nara.-The central fact today in the con-
fensive system. But the Defense Department time in the future" but it is "not In the frontation between the United States and
rejects the argument. neighborhood at this moment." the Soviet Union is that progress in tech-
The main reason offered is that MIRV's Military pressure to develop MIRV began nology has made it both necessary and pos-
warheads are too small and too inaccurate as early as 196'2. Defense Secretary Robert S. sible to place restraints on the nuclear-arms
for use against Russian missile silos. The McNamara at first said "no" to the new weap- race. The technological stars and planets are
MIRV "bus" to be installed on the new Min- on. His reasoning was that the United States now in favorable conjunction-and they will
uteman III missile, according to Defense of- could 'already kill as many targets as it not stay that way for long.)
ficials, will carry from two to three 200- wanted to without going into MIRV deploy- Last week, after months of delay, the U.S.
kiloton warheads. The "bus" on the new ment. Government began to act on that warning
Poseidon submarine missile will carry up to But at that time there were also military from William C. Foster, head of the Arms
15 warheads of about 50 kilotons each (the intelligence readings that the Russians were Control and Disarmament Agency in the
Hiroshima bomb was 20 kilotons.) building an ABM system around Moscow. It Johnson Administration. For the first time,
In order for a 200-kiloton warhead to have turned out afterwards that what intelligence President Nixon's National Security Coun-
a 70-per cent chance of knocking out a silo, originally proclaimed to be ABM defenses cil devoted a full session to defining the ne-
It would have to land no farther than 200 were actually anti-aircraft installations to gotiating positions that the U.S. will take
yards away; a 50-kiloton warhead would guard against advanced American bombers when it discusses possible limits on nuclear
have to land no more than 140 yards away. that McNamara never deployed. weapons with the Soviet Union. A second
This kind of accuracy, says the Pentagon, The Pentagon debated two alternatives to Security Council meeting is scheduled for
is not possible today nor in the foreseeable the Soviet ABM. One was the use of penetra- this week. The President also announced
future; the best that can be done now is to tion aids such as chaff and decoys for offen- that, if the Soviets agree on time and place,
guide a warhead to within about 440 yards of sive missiles. The second was MIRV. SALT-the long-awaited strategic arms lim-
its target. The first course was dropped on grounds ttation talks-will begin between July 31
That is close enough to kill a target--a that effective radar could distinguish in- and Aug. 15.
silo, for example-when large weapons are coming warheads from decoys and shoot them 'UPSET BALANCE
used, such as the 1-megaton warheads cur- down-an argument that, Ironically, oppo-
rently risks that William Foster describes
installed in Minuteman and Polaris. nents of the U.S. ABM used and Pentagon The are real. Central to them is a frighteninc new
But it is too far away for smaller warheads scientists dismissed. MIRV proved highly at- e MIRV, for "multiple inde-
Thus, be effective. tractive to the military. weapon re-entry "multiple
vehicle.-
more targetable,
Thus, MIRV's only present usefulness, its It promised a capability to hit more tar- pendently called
than the antiballistic rues"
promoters insist, would be against "soft" gets without violating McNamara's self-im- MIRV, , threatens even even m to upset the uneasy bclmi-
targets such as cities. posed freeze on the number of delivery ve- sile, i the th and uneasy U.S.S.R.
There is general, although not unanimous, hicles. "MIRV was the best route to num- deterrence that
have achieved. It may alsS sat off a domestic
agreement in the scientific community that bers," was one Pentagon spokesman's h
way of debate that d. td may al surpass a fervor the domestic
ac-
this description of MIRV's limitations is es- putting it. re bat that dispute.
sentially correct. And so, in an atmosphere of supersecrecy,
But the Pentagon itself has cast doubt on the Defense Department began developing Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are al-
this presumption by the conflicting state- MIRV. No one mentioned the awesome ready testing multiple missile launchers, al-
mente it has issued. Although it now insists acronym publicly until 1965 when a Penta- though the U.S. is believed to have a wide
that IkII~ G is ineii~e'uive ago fist silos, it took gon official made reference to it at a press lead. The Pentagon argues for continuing
precisely the opposite view in January, 1968 background session, the tests, and for development of MIRV, on
when it put out a statement saying that Pentagon newsmen were so astonished at the grounds that the U.S. system is nearly
"each new MIRV warhead will be aimed in- the disclosure that they went back to their operational and stopping tests would simply
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June 24, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE H 5107
by the Kennedy administration. During
the period of 1958 to 1961, representatives
of the United States and the Soviet
Union met in Geneva to work out ways
and means of developing a nuclear test
ban agreement.
However, while these negotiations were
in progress the Soviets on August 30,
1961, suddenly announced that they were
resuming atmospheric nuclear testing.
On September 1, 1961, they began their
test series, thus breaking the informal
moratorium.
The Soviet Union conducted a series
of approximately 50 atmospheric nuclear
tests with a total yield of about 120
megatons in the atmosphere.
The largest test was a terror weapon
of approximately 60 megatons-equiva-
lent to 60 million tons of TNT-deto-
nated on October 31, 1961, despite a res-
olution adopted on October 27, 1961, by
the United Nations appealing to the
Soviet Union to refrain from carrying out
such a test.
It was just a year later that the Soviet
Union brought the world to the brink
of nuclear war when it placed offensive
nuclear weapons in Cuba. At that time
President Kennedy said :
This action also contradicts the repeated
assurances of Soviet spokesmen, both pub-
licly and privately delivered, that. the arms
buildup in Cuba would retain its original
defensive character, and that the Soviet Un-
?ion had no need or desire to station strategic
missiles on the territory of any other nation.
And that quotation comes from Presi-
dent Kennedy's statement made on Oc-
tober 22, 1962.
Past Soviet words and actions have
not always coincided, whether we re-
member their invasion of tiny Finland
before World War II, or last August,
when they invaded helpless Czechoslo-
vakia.
History is replete with examples of na-
tions that have attempted to negotiate or
have sought to appease aggressors from
their position of weakness.
I, for one, agree we should negotiate
with the Soviet Union at any time and at
any place. But I strongly oppose unilat-
eral disarmament in the hope, and what
I consider the vain hope, that the Soviet
Union will not repeat the pattern that it
has repeated over all the years we have
tried to reach some kind of peaceful
agreement through international con-
ferences.
Mr. CEDERBERG. I want to compli-
}nent the gentleman in the well, the gen-
tleman from California, for the state-
ment he is making. It is a statement in
the best long-term interests of the
United States. I join him in his remarks.
Mr. HOLIFIELD. I thank the gentle-
man.
Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. IOLIFIELD. I yield to the gentle-
man.
Mr. COHELAN. While, as I have indi-
cated, I favor the principle of the Brooke
resolution, I personally would go fur-
ther on the theory that we can afford
the time. I would ask the distinguished
gentleman the following questions:
Do you not agree that the MIRV's are
justified by our defense planners as a
means of securing penetration of ABM
defenses? Is not that basically the thrust
of it?
Mr. HOLIFIELD. Will the gentleman
repeat his question?
Mr. COHELAN. My question is, Do you
agree that our MIRV's are justified by
our defense planners as a means of as-
suring penetration of ABM defenses?
Mr. HOLIFIELD. That is the Soviet
ABM defenses?
Mr. COHELAN. Yes.
Mr. HOLIFIELD. I think that might
very well be one reason. But there are a
number of reasons.
If you have a multiple warhead-that
is, multiple parts in the warhead-let us
say three or five or seven or whatever the
number might be-you gain the ad-
vantage of a spray shot that you have
with a shotgun as against a rifle shot.
A rifle shot is concentrated. There are
other advantages but that would be one
advantage.
Mr. COHELAN. But the gentleman
would agree that in the literature this is
one of the primary purposes for de-
veloping the MIRV; that is, to penetrate
ABM defenses. Is this not one of its
primary purposes in keeping the stra-
tegic balance?
Mr. HOLIFIELD. Yes. It would be use-
ful if there is an ABM system in being
in the Soviet Union. Yes, it would be
useful. But I also say that the Soviets
are testing multiple warheads, and for
us to deny ourselves the same privilege
and the same right to keep up with the
Soviet advances in technology, I think
is nothing less than suicidal.
Mr. COHELAN. Is it not true in terms
of their particular defenses that our
intelligence does not permit us to come
to the conclusion that they have any-
thing there that we cannot handle at the
present time? The point being that we
can afford a little time because of the
seriousness of this virtual quantum jump
in weapons development. Would the gen-
tleman say that that would be reason-
able?
Mr. HOLIFIELD. I am not willing to
concede that we should stop in our re-
search and development and that we can
afford that time, as the gentleman says.
To deny ourselves anything-I do not
concede that that is for the benefit of
the security of the United States.
They can stop this tomorrow if in the
disarmament negotiations they come in
and say, "Let us stop this." We can sit
down and say, "All right, we will stop."
They can do that with respect to nu-
clear weapons. They can also atop the
development of nuclear submarines that
they are turning out at the rate of one
per month and we are turning out at
the rate of 11/2 a year.
Mr. COHELAN. Would the gentleman
agree that our research is several years
ahead of theirs?
Mr. HOLIFIELD. I will not speculate
how far they have gone or how far
we are ahead of them.
At one time I can remember when we
had the atomic monopoly and many said
it would be 10 years before the Soviets
got an atomic bomb. They got it just 4
years later. They exploded one in Au-
gust 1949. We exploded our first device
in 1945.
In the late 1940's and early 1950's
there were many who said we should not
develop a hydrogen bomb. In 1953 the
Soviets exploded a hydrogen bomb. Ob-
viously they were working on it for some
time.
I do not know what they may be work-
ing on. I have some ideas. Some of them
I can express and some I cannot because
of their classification. But I am not will-
ing to say that the Soviets are fools and
that their trained scientists are not ca-
pable of making just as good weapons
as we make.
They certainly made long-range mis-
siles with 5,000- and 6,000-mile ranges,
and they exploded a 60-megaton weapon.
We never exploded anything anywhere
near that large. I am not saying we could
not. I know that we could. But I am not
willing to compromise the strength of the
United States on the basis of what the
Soviets might or might not do.
(On request of Mr. COHELAN, and by
unanimous consent, Mr. HOLIFIELD was
allowed to proceed for 2 additional min-
utes.)
Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Chairman, if the
distinguished chairman of the commit-
tee will yield again, does the chairman
not now feel that this is a momentous
breakthrough in the arms race?
Mr. HOLIFIELD. It is an important
breakthrough, but not any more than
the nuclear submarine or the hydrogen
bomb or any other major advance in
weapons systems.
Mr. COHELAN. You do not feel that
this is in any way going to destabilize the
strategic balance?
Mr. HOLIFIELD. I certainly do not,
no more than I think the ABM would
destabilize, because they already have
67 ABM's around Moscow. They have
several hundred additional in the Tal-
linn system, and you can guess what
that constitutes. I am saying they have
in existence devices such as the multiple
reentry vehicle. I do not know what de-
gree of sophistication they have
achieved. I do not think anyone else in
the United States knows. And neither
do they know the sophistication of our
weapons.
Mr. COHELAN. Let me ask one final
question, to which I think I know the
answer. As the distinguished chairman
of this committee, would you favor a
mutual moratorium in which both the
United States and the Soviet Union
would halt MIRV testing and deploy-
ment?
Mr. HOLIFIELD. Yes, and not only
MIRV testing, but nuclear submarine
building, plane building, and all other
forms of warfare-if we could get a
genuine mutual agreement to disarm,
coupled with on-site inspection, so that
we would know we were not being
played for suckers. But as long as
we have not been able to get mutual
inspection, I say we cannot go on Soviet
promises, because history has shown
they have not always kept their promises.
Mr. KOCH. Mr. Chairman, I move to
strike the requisite number of words.
I actually had not intended to partic-
ipate in the debate but merely to listed.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE June 24, 1969
I was intrigued by the presentation of
the distinguished chairman of the Joint
Committee and his response to several
questions. I, at first, believed and was
worried that passage of this bill, which
Includes a sum of money to be used for
the testing of MIRV, would in some way
be a decision made by this Congress on a
matter that is so momentous that it
ought not be the subject of an hour or
less debate, but rather be the subject of
a comprehensive debate. That it is a con-
troversial subject is apparent by the fact
that at this point there axe several pend-
ing resolutions concerned with the test-
ing of MIRV.
There is the Bingham resolution, the
Cohelan resolution, and the Brooke
resolution,. all of which Indicate the Con-
cern of Members of both Houses that the
question of whether or not we should
proceed with the MIRV be given further
consideration. I was reassured on that
point by the colloquy which took place
between my colleague, JONATHAN BING-
HAM, and the distinguished chairman,
when it was made clear ?hat passage of
this bill did not in any way foreclose the
real debate on MIRV which is yet to
come, and I -am now reassured that we
are not backing into something unin-
tentionally.
I would assume, as I am sure everyone
else in the House does, that when a mo-
mentous decision invoo'dng billions of
dollars and the escalation of the arms
race would be undertaken, that it would
be undertaken in a knowing way, in a
concrete way, that is to say, at a time
when everybody would know what they
were doing. When the distinguished
Chairman said he did not believe in uni-
lateral disarmament, I think he spoke for
every Member of this House. I do not
think there is any Member in this House
who believes in unilateral disarmament.
The real question, and the one that is not
going to be debated in 5 minutes by this
Member or any other Member, is, are we
doing something which will prevent mu-
tual disarmament when we proceed with
the testing of MIRV? There is at least a
considerable body of opinion which be-
lieves that the testing of MIRV might be
irreversible in its consequences, and there
are many of us who want to reflect on
that and want to have, considered dis-
cussions with respect to it before we make
such a decision. The fact that the Chair-
man made very clear that this House
will have an opportunity to make that
decision at a later time and in a more
deliberate way reassures me, and I thank
him for that reassurance.
(Mr. HOSMER asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, I move
to strike the necessary number of words.
Mr. Chairman, I think this is about the
end of the debate. I would like to bring
forth a few facts, amongst which is the
so-called MIRV is not sotie strange new
weapon that suddenly ,developed from
nowhere. It is no more lAaii an ordinary
progression in refinement of the origtflal
missiles we developed ih a rather crude
and unsophisticated state, which are
gradually being improved, as is normal
with any weapons system throughout
the history of man. All of which is nor-
mal and expected and anticipated. MIRV
is not any unbalancing shocker, as many
would have us believe. It is no surprise
to anyone familiar with defense or nu-
clear strategy.
The question has been raised as to
whether or not the MIRV is a first-strike
weapon. On that let us just look at what
deterrence is. It is a capability to strike
back devastatingly if somebody else
starts something and nobody is going to
start something unless he has a clear
first-strike capability to eliminate his
victim's capability to strike back. MIRV
or no MIRV makes no difference in this
regard. A multiple warhead missile is no
more or no less a first-strike weapon
than a single warhead missile. Total
cumulative relative strategic power de-
termines the first-strike issue.
As a matter of fact, one of the gentle-
men who is quite often quoted on this
subject, that is Wolfgang Panofsky, says
the only first strike danger about MIRV
is the talk that is going around about it
being a first-strike weapon, when in fact
it is no such thing and probably never
can be.
Now if I may proceed, the converse of
MIRV, of course, is simply going to a
larger number of missiles with single
warheads, which the Soviet Union has
been doing up to the present time. But
they have also been developing a MIRV
capability-and let me assure Members
of that and let me assure Members also,
that no one can assure Congress the
Soviet Union is not developing such a
capability. It has been revealed they
have conducted multiple intercontinen-
tal ballistic missile warhead tests. They
have dropped them in the Pacific. By
the pattern of the fall of these warheads
we cannot tell whether these were un-
guided or individually guided warheads
simply because individually guided re-
entry vehicles can be programed to fall
in a random pattern so that their guided
or unguided feature will never be dis-
closed. -
With this kind of capability for decep-
tion in mind, I want to advise the gentle-
men who have been endorsing the mora-
torium idea, that there is a pitfall in it
they apparently overlook in-so-far-as
MIRV is concerned. We cannot tell what
the other side is doing, and particularly
we cannot tell what they are doing so
long-so long, gentlemen-as these in-
dividual warheads are inside a nose cone
of a single missile.
If we want to make sense'in this area,
we must limit or put a moratorium on
the number of delivery vehicles-which
is something we can check on-and not
something which is inside those missiles,
the warheads to wit, which we cannot
check on.
Otherwise, we may be walking into a
trap. Many of us were around here in
the old days, when we had the Limited
Test Ban Treaty to contend with. We
found out that during those negotiations
and our forbearance from nuclear test-
ing was taken by the Soviets as nothing
more than an opportu, to rep~arefgr..
T Ie t s e llnd the a ever of a gentle-
man's agreement not to test.
Let me say this: This Nation today
might not be a free nation except for the
activities carried on by two men in this
Chamber today-Chairman HOLIFIELD
and Representative PRICE. They were the
men who in the days of the H-bomb
argument helped this Nation resist the
temptation to disarm itself by a uni-
laterial decision to forgo development of
the H-bomb. Incidentally, every single
one of the arguments being made today
against MIRV were made by the oppo-
nents of the H-bomb a decade ago. It
is all the same--all the same, tired old
arguments are being dragged out-only
the players have changed. If it were not
for Congressman HOLIFIELD and Con-
gressman PRICE and their persuasiveness
in behalf of the defense of this Nation,
we would not have got the H-bomb just
months earlier than on that shocking
day the Soviets burst theirs on the world.
It was as shocking a day almost, I
remind Members, as that day on which
sputnik orbited around, the world-when
the Soviet Union again surprised us with
their capability to develop hardware of
sophistication equal to ours.
I suggest that the Members of this
body look to real experts who know
atomic weapons and understand nuclear
strategy-experts like Congressmen
HOLIFIELD and PRICE-for advice in these
vital defense matters. I respectfully
suggest that some people new on the
scene, have not forgotten the lessons of
the past. They just never were around to
learn them in the first place. Therefore
they are neither reliable prophets nor
knowledgeable advisers.
Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I
should like to ask unanimous consent
that all debate cease in 5 minutes. We
have discussed this thoroughly. This
MIRV and ABM deployment situation is
not exactly in the bill. It is something to
come in the bill from the Armed Services
Committee later on. While it is interest-
ing, we have a $14 billion appropriation
bill in the wings waiting to come on, with
the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr.
EviNs) and his committee. Unless there
is a strong feeling we should have ex-
tended debate, I ask unanimous consent
that all debate cease in 5 minutes.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection
to the request of the gentleman from
California?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from
New York (Mr. LOWENsTEIN) is recog-
nized.
Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, I
yield to no one in my respect for the
gentleman from California and the
gentleman from Illinois.
That, of course, is not at issue. I am
curious about one thing. What is the ob-
jection to the resolution proposed by
Senator BROOKE and cosponsors by 39
other Members of the Senate on the
question of the testing and development
of MIRV?
Of course we are not now debating
MIRV specifically, but If we could agree
on that very constructive and sensible
resolution, we could proceed in general
rapper on this matter. That would be
a Yaliiy, unepect, turn of events,
it seems to ne.
Is there disagreement about the pro-
posal of Senator BROOKE, in which he has
been joined by so many of his colleagues
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June 24, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE H 5100
of both parties? I hear whispers here
about the judgment-even about the con-
cern for their country-of some Mem-
bers of this House who have raised ques-
tions about MIRV. Does anyone doubt
the judgment or the concern for the
future of this country of these .40 Sen-
tors as well? Could we not undertake to
conduct the discussion about this matter
without drifting off into silly innuen-
does?
In there anything in the Brooke resolu-
tion that is objectionable to anyone here?
If so, may we hear what, so we can con-
sider any objections on their merits?
Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. LOWENSTEIN. I yield to the gen-
tleman from California.
Mr. HOSMER. This whole business of
a moratorium is a negotiating tool in
connection with the SALT talks, the
strategic arms limitation talks, proposed
for August between the United States
and the U.S.S.R. The moratorium idea
is a negotiating tool which should be in
the hands of the administration, but
should not be thrust in its hands by ac-
tion of Congress, an action not requested
of Congress by the administration. It is
to be carefully noted that this negotia-
tion tool, even in administration hands
proved to be useless and dangerous in
connection with the limited test ban
talks. For this reason, that is, previous
failure, no use of it since has been at-
tempted. It was not used in the case of
the outer space treaty talks or in the
case of the nonproliferation treaty talks,
nor is it being used in connection with
the current talks on barring weapons of
mass destruction on the ocean bottoms.
Those who now want precipitously to
legislate a moratorium ought to reflect a
little on the weakness of the reed on
which they seek to lean.
That, in short, is my objection on the
merits.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from
New York (Mr. BINGHAM) is recognized.
Mr BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I just
wanted to make a couple of things clear.
First, I too believe in the deterrent
theory. It is our deterrent which assures
the security of this country, and I cer-
tainly do not want to do anything to
interfere with our maintenance of an
effective deterrent. But I do not believe
either the ABM or the MIRV are needed
for that purpose.
Second, with regard to the remarks
made by the distinguished chairman of
the Joint Committee, I certainly do not
believe we should proceed on the as-
sumption that the Soviets are nice peo-
ple, that they are easy to deal with, or
that they have good motives. I have no
such illusions. But I do believe we can
achieve agreement with them on mat-
ters that are of mutual interest to us,
as we did in the case of the Test Ban
Treaty and as we did in the case of the
Nonproliferation Treaty. I hope I am
correct in saying the distinguished chair-
man is in agreement We did the right
thing in pressing for, bath those treaties
and that we are better off for having
both those treaties.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from
Missouri (Mr. HALL) is recognized.
Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I have heard
some statements here that are of ques-
tionable basis in fact and certainly not
germane to this debate.
It is a matter of record that we started
the research and development in the au-
thorizing Committee on Armed Services
at least 3 years before there was any evi-
dence of the opponent's anti-ballistic-
missile capability or intent.
Second, while negotiations might be
worthwhile, after one is thrice rebuffed
one begins to realize it "takes two to
Tango." Any American knows if you get
in bed with a rattlesnake you expect to
get bit.
I am for this bill the way it is.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from
New York (Mr. PODELL) is recognized.
Mr. PODELL. Mr. Chairman I would
like to associate myself with the remarks
of the gentleman from New York (Mr.
BINGHAM) regarding funds for the pro-
posed MIRV system of weapons. It is
growing increasingly obvious that this
system is the rebirth of the Hydra of old
Greek mythology. A many-headed ICBM
would replace single-warhead missiles
we now possess in such numbers.
At one stroke ICBM's on both sides
would rise from single threats to multiple
ones to each party. Instead of a single
warhead, there will be from three to 10
under each nosecone. Such a weapon is
unwarranted at this time.
We must weigh our options carefully.
At this time there is no pressing need for
such a conversion of our major weapons
systems by MIRV installation. As of to-
day, there is a slim chance that meaning-
ful disarmament may be made reality
through effective inspection by spy-in-
the-sky satellites. These are now so
sophisticated that they are able, from
their Polar orbits, to delineate individual
telephone lines. Therefore, they would be
able to provide a meaningful system of
inspection if. some disarmament was at-
tempted under existing conditions.
However, if each power was able to
lift the nosecone from each missile and
replace its single warhead with from
three to 10 individually targeted war-
heads, the best spying system available
or projected would have no way of find-
ing out or ascertaining how many war-
heads comprised the other side's capa-
bility. A terrifying element would be in-
jected instantly into the geopolitical
equation of each power. Was the other
side attaining a first strike capacity?
Only an element of doubt is necessary.
The arms race and its insane momentum
takes over from there. Once the ques-
tion exists, the other side must take im-
mediate steps to match it. Hence, a new
escalation to the arms race confronts
us, and the mad roller coaster ride down-
hill toward inevitable destruction goes
even faster. We are all captives on the
same roller coaster.
For these reasons, I believe my col-
league's points are exceptionally well
made. There is no reason why we must
at this point swiftly begin to MIRV our
missiles, complete testing of the concept
or appropriate money for warhead de-
velopment or production. We already can
kill our opponents many times over. If
this system is developed, we shall be able
to kill them a few more times over.
Hurrah.
It is wisdom of a far-seeing sort as well
as the essence of moderation of hold off
on procurement, development, and test-
ing of this weapon. I concur with my col-
league in his excellent effort to avoid this
latest move toward frustration of final
hopes for disarmament.
The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the
Committee rises.
Accordingly the Committee rose; and
the Speaker having resumed the chair,
Mr. BURL of Massachusetts, Chairman
of the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union, reported that
that Committee, having had under con-
sideration the bill (H.R. 12167) to au-
thorize appropriations to the Atomic
Energy Commission in accordance with
section 261 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended and for other purposes,
pursuant to House Resolution 448, he re-
ported the bill back to the House.
The SPEAKER. Under the rule, the
previous question is ordered.
The question is on the engrossment and
third reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed
and read a third time, and was read the
third time.
The SPEAKER. The question is on the
passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and
Speaker announced that the ayes
peared to have it.
the
ap-
Mr. HARSHA. Mr. Speaker, I object to
the vote on the ground that a quorum is
not present and make the point of order
that a quorum is not present.
The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is
not present.
The Doorkeeper will close the doors,
the Sergeant at Arms will notify absent
Members, and the Clerk will call the
roll.
The question was taken; and there
were-yeas 406, nays 3, not voting 23, as
follows:
[Roll No. 871
YEAS--406
Abbitt
Bow
Clawson, Del
Abernethy
Brademas
Clay
Adair
Brasco
Cleveland
Adams
Bray
Cohelan
Addabbo
Brinkley
Collier
Albert
Brock
Collins
Alexander
Brooks
Colmer
Anderson,
Broomfield
Conable
Calif.
Brotzman
Conte
Anderson, Dl.
Brown, Mich.
Corbett
Anderson,
Brown, Ohio
Corman
Tenn.
Broyhill, N.C.
Coughlin
Andrews, Ala.
Broyhill, Va.
Cowger
Andrews,
Buchanan
Cramer
N. Dak.
Burke, Fla.
Culver
Annunzio
Burke, Mass.
Cunningham
Arends
Burleson, Tex.
Daddario
Ashbrook
Burlison, Mo.
Daniel, Va.
Ashley
Burton, Calif.
Daniels, N.J.
Aspinall
Bush
Davis, Ga.
Ayres
Button
Davis, Wis.
Baring
Byrne, Pa.
Dawson
Barrett
Byrnes, Wis.
de is Garza
Beall, Md.
Cabell
Delaney
Belcher
Caffery
Dellenback
Bell, Calif.
Cahill
Denney
Bennett
Camp
Dennis
Berry
Carter
Dent
Betts
Casey
Derwinski
Devill
Cederberg
Devine
Biaggi
Celler
Dickinson
Biester
Chamberlain
Diggs
Bingham
Chappell
Dingell
Blackburn
Chisholm
Donohue
Blanton
Clancy
Dorn
Boggs
Clark
Dowdy
Boland
Clausen,
Downing
Bolling
Don H
Dulski
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE June 24, 1969
Duncan King
Reid, N.Y.
Dwyer Kleppe
Reifel
Eckhardt Koch
Reuss
Edmondson Kuykendall
Rhodes
Edwards, Ala. Kyl
Riegle
Edwards, Calif. Kyros
Rivers
Edwards, La, Landgrebe
Roberts
Ellberg Landrum
Robison
Erlenborn Langen
ltodino
Esch Latta
Rogers, Colo.
Eshleman Leggett
Rogers, Fla.
Evans, Colo. Lennon
Ronan
Evins, Tenn. Lipscomb
Rooney, N.Y.
Fallon . Lloyd
Rooney, Pa.
Farbstein Long, La.
Rosenthal
Fascell Long, Md.
Feighan Lowenstein
Roth
Findley Lujan
Roudebush
Fish Lukens
ituppe,
Fisher McCarthy
Ruth
Flood McClory
ityan
Flowers McCloskey
St Germain
Flynt McClure
Fit. Onge
Foley McCulloch
Sandman
Ford, Gerald R. McDade
E;rhadeberg
Ford,
McDonald,
Scherle
William D.
Mich.
Schneebeli
Foreman
McEwen
t-s chwengel
Fountain
McFall
Scott
Fraser
McKneelly
S:ebelius
Frelinghuysen
McMillan
Shipley
Frey
MacGregor
:ihriver
Friedel
Madden
Sikes
Fulton, Pa.
Mahon
Sisk
Fulton, Tenn.
Mailliard
Skubitz
Fuqua
Mann
Slack
Galiflanakis
Marsh
Smith, Calif.
Garmatz
Martin
nith, Iowa
Gaydos
Mathias
Smith, N.Y.
Gettys
Matsunaga
Snyder
Giaimo
May
Springer
Gibbons
Mayne
Stafford
Gilbert
Meeds
Staggers
Goldwater
Meskill
Stanton
Gonzalez
Michel
Steed
Goodling
Mikva
Steiger, Ariz.
Gray
Miller, Calif.
Stelger, Wis.
Green, Oreg.
Miller, Ohio
Stephens
Green, Pa.
Minish
Stokes
Griffin
Mink
Stratton
Griffiths
Minshall
Stubblefield
Gross
Mize
Sullivan
Grover
Mizell
Symington
Gubser
Mollohan
Taft
Glide
Monagan
'raleott
Hagan
Montgomery
Taylor
Haley
Moorhead
Teague, Calif.
Hall
Morgan
.
Teague, Tex.
Halpern
Morse
Thompson, Ga.
Hamilton
Morton
Thomson, Wis.
Hammer-
Mosher
Tiernan ---
schmidt
More
Tunney
Hanley
Murphy, Ill.
Udall
Hanna
Murphy, N.Y.
znlman
Hansen, Idaho
Myers
Utt
Hansen, Wash.
Natcher
Van Deerlin
Harsha
Nelsen
VanderJagt
Harvey
Nichols
Vanik
Hastings
Nix
Vigorito
Hawkins
Obey
W aggonner
Hays
O'Konski
Waldie
Hechier, W. Va. Olsen
Wampler
Heckler, Mass.
O'Neal, Ga.
Watkins
Helstoski
O'Neill, Mass,
Watson
Henderson
Ottinger
Watts
Hicks
Passman
Weicker
Hogan
Patman
Whalen
Holifield
Patten
Whalley
Horton
Pelly
White
Hosmer
Pepper
Whitehurat
Howard
Perkins
Whitten
Hull
Pettis
Widnall
Hungate
Philbin
Wiggins
Hunt
Pickle
Williams
Hutchinson
Pike
Wilson, Bob
Ichord
Pirnie
Wilson,
Jacobs
Podell
Charles H.
Jarman
Poff
Winn
Joelson
Pollock
Wold
Johnson, Calif.
Preyer, N.C.
Wright
Johnson, Pa.
Price, Ill.
Wyatt
Jonas
Price, Tex.
Wydler
Jones, Ala.
Pucineki
Wylie
Jones, N.C.
Quie
Wyman
Jones, Tenn,.
Quillen
Yates
Karth
Railsback
Patron
Kastenmeler
Randall
Young
Kazen
Rarick
Zablocki
Kee
Rees
Zion
Keith
Reid, III.
Zwsch
NAYS-3
Conyers
Saylor
NOT VOTING-23
Blatnik
Kluezynski
Pryor, Ark.
Brown, Calif.
Macdonald,
Purcell
Burton, Utah
Mass.
Roybal
Carey
Mille
Satterfield
Gallagher
Nedzi
Stuckey
Hathaway
O'Hara
Thompson, N.J.
Hebert
Poage
Wolff
Kirwan
Powell
So the bill was passed.
The Clerk announced the following
pairs:
Mr. Hebert with Mr. Pryor of Arkansas.
Mr. Kirwan with Mr. Burton of Utah.
Mr. Carey with Mr. Gallagher.
Mr. Satterfield with Mr. Roybal.
Mr. Mills with Mr. Wolff.
Mr. Brown of California with Mr.
czynski.
Mr. Stuckey with Mr. Blatnik.
Mr. Macdonald of Massachusetts with Mr.
Nedzi.
Mr. Purcell with Mr. O'Hara.
Mr. Hathaway with Mr. Powell.
The result of the vote was announced
as above recorded.
The doors were opened.
A motion to reconsider
the table.
GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND
Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I ask
unanimous consent that all Members
may have 5 legislative days in which to
extend their remarks on the bill just
passed.
Thet SPEAKER. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from
California?
There was no objection.
Mrs. MAY. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall
No. 87 I am recorded as not voting. I
was present and voted "yea." I ask unan-
imous consent that the permanent
RECORD be corrected accordingly.
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
the request of the gentlewoman from
Washington?
There was no objection.
INDEPENDENT OFFICES AND DE-
PARTMENT OF HOUSING AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT APPRO-
PRIATIONS, 1970
Mr. BOLLING. Mr. Speaker, by direc-
tion of the Committee on Rules, I call
up House Resolution 449 and ask for its
immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as fol-
lows:
H. Rxs. 449
Resolved, That during the consideration
of the bill (H.R. 12307) making appropria-
tions for sundry independent executive bu-
reaus, boards, commissions, corporations,
agencies, offices, and the Department of
Housing and Urban Development for the
fiscal year ending June 30, 1970, and for
other purposes, all points -of order against
the provisions contained under the follow-
ing headings are hereby waived: "Appa-
lachian Regional Development Programs"
beginning qp page 3 line 22 through gage 4
line 3; "rndepencrent $ces- ppalachiaa
Regional Commission" beginning on page 4,
line 15 through page 4, line 21; "National
Aeroautics and Space Administration" be-
ginning on page 21, line 13, through page
23, line 3; and "National Science Founda-
tion" beginning on page 23, line 5, through
page 25, line 2.
The SPEAKER. The gentleman from
Missouri (Mr. BOLLING) Is recognized for
I hour.
Mr. BOLLING. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30
minutes to the gentleman from Califor-
nia (Mr. SMITH) and pending that I yield
myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, the three specific waivers
of points of order are necessary because
the items on which the waivers are given
or proposed by this resolution have not
been authorized by law. I explained this
to the House during the colloquy between
the majority and minority leaders last
Thursday. The items are, as anyone who
listened to the reading of theresolution
knows, the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, the National Sci-
enceFoundation, and a part of the Ap-
palachian development programs. The
waiver makes it passible for Members of
the House to work their will on the
specific provisionsof the appropriation,
and the Committee on Rules felt that- it
was ,wiser to handle the matter in this
fashion rather than permitting a situa-
tion to develop in which the Senate al-
most surely would add the items on the
Senate side when the matter came up,
and the only participation of the House
would be in conference, and on the con-
ference report.
Therefore the Committee on Rules rec-
ommends the waiver on these three
points of order.
I urge the adoption of the resolution.
Mr. SMITH of California. Mr. Speaker,
I yield myself such time as I may con-
sume.
(Mr. SMITH of California asked and
was given permission to revise and ex-
tend his remarks.)
Mr. SMITH of California. Mr. Speaker,
I concur in and agree with the remarks
made by the gentleman from Missouri
(Mr. BOLLING) In explanation of House
Resolution 449, and urge the adoption of
the resolution.
Mr. BOLLING. Mr. Speaker, I yield
5 minutes to the gentleman from Cali-
fornia (Mr.-MILLER).
(Mr MILLER of California asked and
was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. MILLER of California. Mr.
Speaker, last July the President signed
into law a bill which originated- in the
Committee on Science and Astronautics
and which was the culmination of 31/2
years of work. This is Public Law 90-407
which revised and streamlined the or-
ganic act of the National Science Foun-
dation.
That law contains a provision requir-
ing annual authorization of the Foun-
dation's budget from this point forward.
It was a provision not sought by this
committee. It was added in the Senate
and agreed to in conference.
When the conference report came be-
fore the House on June 27, 1968, no
Member of the House raised any objec-
tion to--the authorization provision or
any other part of the bill. The only dis-
cussion was between the distinguished
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S 6871
June. 20, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
MILE STI7
RESERVATI NITHOUT c CT BOOK OS SIN ety
full partnership in o ermru~lixliery of wilother l be ABM SUPPORTE
an appropriate fo
measures which recognize the new Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, a great Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, as the
awareness,' idealism, and talents of our verbal battle has raged in the Senate for vote on the Safeguard ABM system
young citizens. many weeks over the merits of the anti- draws near, it becomes increasingly im-
It is particularly critical that we afford ballistic-missile system proposal. portant for each Senator to inform him-
our young people the opportunity to seek While some observers have called this self fully on this critical issue.
answers, to express their views, and to a battle for headlines, and because of In recent months we have received a
use their influence in the development of numerous publications on the issue have deluge of material on both sides of the
our national -and t they want do also termed the controversy "the battle question. Unfortunately, much of this wa to in at o do y and and they want to do it of books," I am aware of the deep-rooted material tends to be colored by the views
youth can p and effective tmanner. That misgivings some Senators have about the of the author, whether it be a prominent
can participate-and partscipat- wisdom of the Safeguard proposal. scientist opposing deployment or the
d a a conhe politi mampa g s of 1968. Nationwide polls have indicated that Department of Defense trying to justify
Those the politcal ovNows is nut the American people by a substantial it.
lo k back Now is not majority favor the deployment of the For a fair, lucid, and factual presen-
Those ntfor us ns are
suffici young a to look band praise Safeguard proposal in the interest of the tation of the basic facts about the Safe-
young people for their persevering national security, and a vast majority guard system and an excellent summary
e,our responsibility
bring ing youth is the to do have an opinion on whether an ABM of the best arguments for and against
efforts. the Rather,
renew
discussion, ff formulation, and in implemen- ystem is in the best interest of the se- deployment, I commend to the attention
dnfr policies. and iworth curity of the people. of Senators, particularly those who have
is-
ompl hme is a worthy _ It is time we heard from the experts not yet made up their minds on the is-
tatn objet of our
fit our rive. Republic. accomplishment will bens- whose whole concern is the protection sue, the Democratic study group fact
fit our life and property in these United book entitled "ABM." The Democratic
My suppd. to this prbelief oposal those States. One such organization is the study group booklet provides all the basic
ally the age It i s 1 to 21 that those Civil Defense Association of Wyoming. information one requires to come to an
of discharging age group the ri t 21 are capable The Wyoming Association on May 15, informed judgment on deploying the
intelligent ent and the right conscientious ote in an 1969, approved unanimously a resolution Safeguard systems, in addition to a bib-
And cri manner. supporting the Safeguard proposal liography for further study of material
And a democracy thrives w when its base ase ,without reservation." From personal available from the CONGRESSIONAL
brought into the and adocratic persons are knowledge, I categorically assert that RECORD. It has been praised by Repre-dem aghon the ideal for whi we c. Full the motives of this association cannot be sentatives who support and those who
participatio accomplished he iden gimpugned. Oppose the Safeguard system. I have
strive. Rt to to te this in giving i
women the right ig vote, in eliminating I ask unanimous consent to have found the booklet most useful.
the poll tax, in passing the Voting Rights printed in the RECORD the complete text Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
Act, and in other measures. Now is the of the resolution adopted by the Civil sent book the Democratic study group
by
time to further extend our base by af- Defense Association of Wyoming. the book entitled study gin the
for full participation. tion was ordered to be printed in the HousRD.
Seven percent of our population is in RECORD, as follows: There being no objection, the study
the age group of 18 to 21. These approxi- RESOLUTION-APPROVED UNANIMOUSLY BY THE
mately, 13 million persons are actually CIVIL DEFENSE ASSOCIATION OF WYOMING, was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
adults in our society. They are in the MAY 15, 1969 as follows:
education process; they have jobs. And Whereas Civil Defense is concerned with ABM-DEMOCRATIC STUDY GROUP, U.S. HOUSE
for the most part, they can marry, buy the protection of life and property under OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1969
insurance, sign wills, and are treated as any condition; and: I. INTRODUCTION
adults in the courts of law and are Whereas the National posture for the pro- This DSG Fact Book is designed to pro-
tection of all citizens should be the concern vide Members of Congress with a basic un-
ry. Armed Forces to defend d of all elected officials at all levels of govern- derstanding of the proposed SAFEGUARD
the t sir c into
persons participate t in t e Pe Our young ment, and: ABM system, a history of anti-ballistic mis-
VISTA, the Peace Corps, in Whereas the proposed Anti-Ballistic Mis- sile development and the ARM debate, and
VISSTAs TA, and the community action and sile System would provide the best known a fair and factual exposition of the argu-
today able programs. I feel the youth of protection from a nuclear threat of an aggres- ments for and against SAFEGUARD
today are better educated and more sor nation, and: deployment.
aware. And, more importantly, I think Whereas the National Fallout Shelter Pro- The controversy over the proposal to de-
our young people possess a greater social gram is the primary and only element of Civil ploy an anti-ballistic missile system is cer-
conscience; are more perplexed by the Defense planning and programming for the tain to rank as one of the key issues of the
injustices which exist in the world; and protection of the population from nuclear 91st Congress. In addition to the immediate
are more anxious to rectify these ills. accident or attack, and: defense and foreign policy considerations in-
The future, in large part, belongs to Whereas time is the most limited com- volved, the ABM debate has other ramifica-
youth. It is imperative that they have modity during periods of international ten- tions as well. It has helped stimulate a
critical examination of national commit-
the opportunity to help set the course of sion Now therefore be it resolved that the Civil ments and the size of the defense establish-
that future. ment needed to fulfill these commitments,
My estimate of young people is high. It without Defense Association of Wyoming supports and it is expected to produce closer Congres reservation President Richard M.
continues to grow. I feel that our youth Nixon's proposed Anti-Ballistic Missile Sys- sional scrutiny SAFEGUARD of future authorization defense bills are cur proposals.
is equal to the challenges of today and tem, and encourages the Congressional dele-
tomorrow. They will aid in bringing into gation from the State of Wyoming and all rently being considered by both the House
being a better world than those of past other states in Region Six, Office of Civil and Senate Armed Services Committees. The
Defense, to assist in bringing this protec- first vote on the issue, however, is expected
generations have been able at create. tion to the population of the United States to come in the Senate. If authorization is
Mr. President, I facet that voting age at the earliest possible date, and: approved, funds for SAFEGUARD will be in-
by the House M M se one embers. . But t I the believe report so Be It further resolved that this resolution eluded in both the Department of Defense
by (DOD) and Atomic Energy Commission
strongly in this proposition that I have fens e se Counci Councilto the through its United Region States Six repre- Civil r e- (AEC) appropriation bills later in the year.
se
commented at length. It is gratifying sentatives meeting at Joplin, Missouri, on 17. . II HOW SAFEGUARD WORKS AND WHAT IT
that our colleagues determined that the 1s, and 19 June 1969, begging that body to WILL COST
recommendation for a lower voting age endorse this action in support of President An anti-ballistic missile (ABM) is a mis-
should be one of their key recommen- Nixon and his proposed national defense sile armed with a warhead designed to de-
4atlons. effort. stroy an enemy incoming intercontinental
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June 20, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
November 1966. Secretary McNamara an-
pounces that the Soviet Union has begun
deployment of the Galosh (Nike-Zeus-
type) ABM defense system around Moscow.
December 1986. China detonates its second
hydrogen bomb.
Congress approves $167.9 for ABM procure-
ment without the request of the Secretary
of Defense.
January 1967. President Johnson declares
that no U.S. ABM deployment will be made
until completion of arms control negotia-
tions with the Soviet Union, and requests
discussions for control of ABMs.
Defense Secretary McNamara, in his de-
fense posture statement, presents a detailed
argument against deployment of a complete,
Soviet-oriented ABM system: "It is a virtual
certainty that the Soviets will act to main-
tain their deterrent, which casts grave doubts
on the deploying of the NIKE X system for
the protection of our cities against the heavy,
sophisticated missile attack that they could
launch in the 1970s."
General Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, expresses disagreement with
the McNamara position and recommends a
"measure of defense" for the country. The
JCS recommends a two stage deployment
plan: (a) $9.9 BILLION to provide 25 cities
with ABM defense; (b) $19.4 BILLION to
add 25 more cities and thicken Sprint
defense.
February 1967. The Soviet Union an-
nounces that it has developed an ABM sys-
tem capable of protecting it against attack.
Dr. John Foster, then as now DOD Direc-
tor of Research and Engineering, says: "As
a matter of technical judgment I believe
that these larger (ABM) deployments carry
with them technical risks. The likelihood of
large and sophisticated attacks with the de-
ployment of significant U.S. defense increases
.the technical uncertainty of the defense
system.
June 1967. The House Appropriations Com-
mittee report on the DOD appropriations
bill for FY 1968 states: "It would appear
that the initiation of deployment of 'light'
or `thin' defense, now, may very well be a
most useful first step toward whatever level
of ballistic missile defense ultimately ap-
pears necessary."
At the Glassboro Conference President
Johnson declares his hope to work with the
Soviet Union in limiting development of
strategic nuclear weapons, including ABM
systems.
Summer 1967. The FY 1968 military
budget, containing a total of $782.9 million
for anti-ballistic missiles, is approved by the
90th Congress. Of these funds, $297.6 mil-
lion are allocated for ABM procurement,
$421.3 million for ABM research and develop-
ment, and $64 million for ABM construc-
tion. Of this amount, $366 million is speci-
field for the Sentinel system, an allocation
that President Johnson requested in antici-
pation of a decision to deploy.
Heated controversy over the question of
ABM deployment develops in Congressional
debate over appropriations for FY 1968.
September 1967. Secretary McNamara out-
lines the futility of erecting a Soviet-oriented
ABM but announces that "there are margi-
nal grounds for concluding that a light de-
ployment against this possibility (a U.S.-
Chinese nuclear clash) is prudent." Intelli.
gence estimates a Chinese nuclear capability
of 20-30 ICBMs by 1975.
'November 1967. DOD announces that the
ABM system to be deployed (named Sen-
tinel) is a thin configuration of the Nike
X system, and identifies the first ten areas
to be surveyed as possible site locations.
March 1968. President Johnson says the
Setinel program is of the highest national
priority,
kp"r'il 196$. In opening debate on the DOD
appropriations bill for FY 1969 the Senate
rejects, by a vote of 28-31, an amendment to
delay deployment of the ABM until certified
as "practicable" by the Secretary of Defense.
June 1968. The Senate rejects by a vote of
34-52 an amendment to delay ABM con-
struction funds for one year.
Foreign Minister Gromyko announces So-
viet willingness to engage in talks with the
United States about strategic arms limita-
tions: "The Soviet Union is ready to enter
an exchange of opinions ... (on) the mutual
limitation and later 'reduction of strategic
weapons, both offensive and defensive, in-
cluding anti-ballistic missiles."
The House of Representatives rejects an
amendment to the Defense Appropriations
Act for FY 1969 to delete acquisitions of
property and construction of related ABM
facilities 37-106, on a teller vote.
August 1968. A Senate amendment to de-
lete all funds for ABM construction is re-
jected 27-46.
The Soviet inavasion of Czechoslovakia
serves to jeopardize proposed arms control
talks and stimulates pressure for ABM de-
ployment in the U.S.
September 1968. Secretary Clifford directs
that Sentinel be exempted from the expendi-
tures reduction program.
October 1968. The Senate rejects, by a
25-45 vote, a proposal to delay construction
of SENTINEL for one year.
December 1968. Citizen opposition to pro-
posed sites at Boston, Chicago, and Seattle
becomes vocal.
January 1969. Secretary Clifford in his re-
port accompanying the DOD FY 1970 budget
request concludes: . even if the Soviets
attempt to match us in numbers of strategic
missiles we shall continue to have, as far
into the future as we can now discern, a very.
substantial qualitative lead and a distinct
superiority in the numbers of deliverable
weapons and the overall combat effectiveness
of our strategic offensive forces."
President Nixon takes office and initiates
a DOD review of strategic offensive and de-
fensive priorities.
February 1969: President Nixon on the 6th
says: "I do not buy the assumption that the
ABM was simply for the purpose of protect-
ing ourselves against attack from Commu-
nist China."
On the 13th Secretary Laird stresses the
priority of a Chinese-oriented ABM: "I am
more concerned about that defense (against
the Chinese threat) than I am about any
other kind of defense at the present time."
On the 20th Secretary Laird says that an
ABM system is necessary because the Soviet
Union is deploying a "sophisticated new ABM
system."
March 1969. At at press conference on
March 14 President Nixon announces deploy-
ment of a modified Sentinel, to be called
Safeguard, because: "The Soviet Union has
engaged in a buildup of its strategic forces
larger than was envisaged in 1967."
On the 20th Secretary Laird reverses his
earlier position and says the Soviet Union is
not deploying a "third generation" ABM sys-
tem around Moscow but is only testing such
an improved system.
The following day Secretary Laird says the
Soviet Union is "going for a first-strike cap-
ability, and there is no question about it."
On the 27th Secretary Laird submits his
amendments to the FY 1969 supplemental
and FY 1970 DOD budget to the House Armed
Services Committee and requests $900 mil-
lion for Safeguard procurement and con-
struction. In addition to this, $330 million
from FY 1969 could be carried over to FY
1970 for Safeguard costs. Secretary Laird
estimates the total cost of the system at
$6-$7 billion, an increase of $500 million
to $1.5 billion over the Johnson Adminis-
tration request. In the report accompany-
ing his requests, Secretary Laird says Safe-
guard deployment is necessary because "the
option of safeguarding our deterrent forces
against this potential threat (the Soviet
S 6873
threat) cannot be preserved by research and
development alone."
April 1969. Following Secretary Laird's
"first-strike" remark, a controversy develops
within the Administration over Soviet capa-
bilities and intentions. Secretary Rogers at
a press conference on the 7th seems to con-
tradict Secretary Laird: `. insofar as
whether they (the Soviets) are doing it (de-
ploying the SS-9) . with the intention of
actually having a first strike, I don't believe
that."
Spokesmen for the Administration con-
tradict Secretary Laird's statement on the
necessity for going beyond the research and
development stage. On the 15th, Vice Presi-
dent Agnew characterizes SAFEGUARD as
"really just a rather small research and de-
velopment project, with two test sites, at
Minuteman bases." Two weeks later, Deputy
Secretary Packard echoes Agnew and calls
SAFEGUARD "really a prototype deploy-
ment-a kind of research and develop-
ment."
Doubt begins to arise over Secretary
Laird's estimate of the Soviet threat. Former
Deputy Secretary Nitze, testifying on behalf
of SAFEGUARD before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, declines to endorse Sec-
retary Laird's view that the Soviet Union
is working toward a first-strike capability.
CIA Directai' Helms, testifying before a
closed session of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, reportedly characterizes the Soviet
threat as the same that faced the previous
Administration.
Public and Congressional controversy con-
tinues. Governor William Guy of North
Dakota, slated to receive one of the first two
SAFEGUARD sites, announces his unquali-
fied opposition to the project and concludes
"our Nation is being swept along by con-
trived hysteria to keep the pipeline of the
defense industries full." Administration and
opposition head-counters agree that the de-
cision in the Senate will hinge on how six
uncommitted Senators divide on the issue.
May 1969. It is learned that the total cost
of the SAFEGUARD system as announced by
Secretary Laird and Deputy Secretary Pack-
ard ($6-$7 billion) does not include the costs
of the nuclear warheads. The warheads are
in the AEC budget and will add at least $1.2
billion to the original estimate.
Later in the month the Defense Marketing
Survey, a McGraw-Hill service for defense
contractors, concludes DOD costs for SAFE-
GUARD will be $12.2 billion.
On the 9th, Governor Forrest Anderson of
Montana, site of one of the first two SAFE-
GUARD installations, states: "I have con-
cluded that the proposed ABM system-called
SAFEGUARD-would not be in the best in-
terest of Montana and I seriously question
whether the system would enhance our na-
tional defense posture."
On the 10th, Rear Admiral Levering Smith,
Director of Strategic Systems Projects for the
Navy questions Secretary Laird's evaluation
of the future vulnerability of the Polaris
submarine deterrent: "I am quite positive
that the new generation of Russian subma-
rines that are getting close to operational
status, that are now being tested, will not be
able to follow our Polaris submarines." Ad-
miral Smith also denys that the Soviet Union
has new anti-submarine warfare methods,
such as superior sonar or a satellite detection
capability, that would make the Polaris fleet
vulnerable.
On the 12th, Dr. John Foster, DOD Director
of Research and Engineering, upgrades the
possible SS-9 threat as stated by Secretary
Laird and Packard (500) to 600 by 1975. He
takes heated issue with those scientists who
question SAFEGUARD's reliability.
May 1969. On the 13th, Deputy Secretary
Packard reverses an earlier position and says
that SENTINEL monies are being used for
production of SAFEGUARD missiles and
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June 20, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
many countries would be tempted to acquire
nuclear missiles.
Con
No.
This action-reaction reasoning will only
lead to further escalation of the arms race;
the U.S. currently has the capability in of-
fensive weapons to easily overcome
Galosh, which is deployed only around
Moscow.
Former Secretary of Defense Clifford
said in 1968 that Galosh resembles "the
Nike-Zeus system which we abandoned
years ago because of its limited effective-
ness." We do not need to react to a Soviet
ABM system by building one of our own, par-
ticularly as the Soviets have slowed down,
If not actually halted, their deployment ef-
forts because of technical difficulties sci-
entists say our system will have.
As for the Tallinn system, which has in
the past been used to justify a U.S. ABM,
current intelligence shows it to be a very
thin Nike-Hercules anti-aircraft defense.
Is Safeguard reliable?
Yes.
DOD states that all of the components
will work and the system as a whole will
work. Spartan and Sprint have both been
flown. PAR is a variant of a radar in exist-
ence and a prototype MSR is being tested.
The complex computer systems required to
operate these components are feasible and
have been demonstrated in Apollo.
The problems confronting Safeguard are
no more insurmountable than those con-
fronting the development of the hydrogen
bomb.
Con
No.
The scientific community is almost unani-
mous in questioning Safeguard's reliabil-
ity. Safeguard has the most elaborate,
sophisticated, dynamic combination of rock-
etry, radars, computers, electronics, and
other technology ever proposed; moreover, it
can never be tested as a system.
With regard to the missiles, Spartan and
Sprint have a probability of failure of 34%
to 59%, thereby requiring at least 3 missiles
to achieve 97 percent probability of destroy-
ing an incoming warhead.
As far as the radars are concerned, statis-
tically there is a 72% chance that one or
more radars will be out of service at any par-
ticular time In a system of 12 MSRs. The re-
maining 11 are subject to blackout, which
even proponents admit has not been over-
come. The MSR is ten times as vulnerable to
overpressure as the silos it is defending and
will therefore be targeted first because its
destruction destroys the entire installation.
In the case of the computers, it is debat-
able whether a program could ever be written
to deal with the various forms of attack that
can be anticipated.
Moreover, the entire command and control
network upon which the system depends is
as vulnerable as any of its components.
The hydrogen bomb analogy in specious;
the scientific issue over the H-bomb was
whether a specific design concept could in
theory be developed into a workable weapon.
The questions surrounding Safeguard are
not theoretrical but practical and technologi-
cal.
Will penetration devices render Safeguard
ineffective?
Pro
No.
Penetration devices other than real or
dummy warheads of the same size and
weight as the real one will fall behind or
burn up in the atmosphere and expose the
real warhead to Sprint.
By forcing an opponent t0 use penetration
devices of weight equal to the weight of a
warhead one cuts down the weight of the
destructive payload each ICBM can deliver,
forcing him t6 achieve almost pinpoint ac-
curacy if his target Is a hardened Minute-
man.
Yes.
Against Spartan, the following penetra-
tion devices could be employed:
1. Decoys and chaff clouds, which need not
survive re-entry to fool Spartan.
2. Active radar jamming.
3. The defense radar, particularly the PAR,
can be blacked out with precursor nuclear
explosions. In heavy, well-timed attack the
defense's radars could even be blacked out
by the defense's own nuclear explosions.
Against Sprint, an attacker could send
several warheads in the same missile and
rapidly exhaust the supply of Sprints at a
particular installation.
Will Safeguard be obsolete by the time it is
operational?
Pro
No.
SAFEGUARD is expected to be effective
well into the 1980s against the threats it is
designed to counter. Careful study has pro-
vided- reasonable assurance that the system
can evolve to handle future penetration aids
developed by China or the Soviet Union,
SAFEGUARD, which will be deployed in
phases, takes into account the development
of new weapons technology.
Neither China nor any other nation new
to the nuclear missile field can leapfrog de-
cades of development of highly sophisticated
weapons systems.
Yes.
By the time SAFEGUARD is even partially
operational, in 1973, the Chinese will have
developed penetration devices, thus render-
ing the system Ineffective against them. It
is already obsolete against the Soviet pene-
tration capability, should they choose to de-
ploy it.
While the defense may be able to develop
more sophisticated technology which could
offset some of the penetration devices, the
offense Is capable of the same thing. All
SAFEGUARD will do is to escalate this tech-
nological buildup into a never-ending spiral.
Is SAFEGUARD necessary to meet the
Chinese threat?
Pro
Yes.
While the Chinese nuclear program has
slipped recently, it is anticipated that by
1975 they could have 20-30 ICBMs. Because
the Chinese are more unpredictable than the
Soviets, they may make an irrational attack
despite such a small force.
There is also the possibility that the Chi-
nese might, in the absence of an offsetting
U.S. defensive capability, be able to exploit
a limited strategic offensive capability for
purposes of nuclear blackmail to the detri-
ment of the U.S. Interest, in Asia.
It seems both imprudent and unreasonable
for the U.S. and the Soviet Union to be com-
pletely without protection against any coun-
try with less nuclear power, such as China,
If both countries have no defensive systems,
any country with ten missiles is a super-
power-it can destroy ten large cities.
Con
No,
Our deterrent power would certainly pre-
vent the Chinese from launching an attack,
the Chinese could penetrate the city-defense
aspects of SAFEGUARD in any event, and
there is no basis for assuming China would
commit national suicide by launching an at-
tack on the U.S.
We have deterred the Soviet Union's very
powerful nuclear missile force for many
years. There is no need for a system to deter
a Chinese nuclear capability that is 1/10
of the Soviets and %0 of our own.
The Chinese need to deploy only a small
number of ICBMs in order to penetrate
S 6875
SAFEGUARD and attack our cities. It is
much more likely that the Chinese are de-
veloping ICBMs to be in a position to deter
us-something they cannot do now.
As for being irrational, despite verbal sup-
port, China has done no more than the So-
viet Union in rendering open aggressive
support for foreign insurgencies and much
less in risking nuclear retaliation on behalf
of such insurgencies. If China is determined
to attack us, there are more effective meth-
ods than ICBMs. A nuclear weapon could
be smuggled aboard a neutral ship or a bio-
logical weapon carried In a suitcase, for
example.
If one were to concede the possibility of
blackmail, it would be more likely that China
would target her ICBMs against U.S. missile
bases on China's periphery or against the
cities of our allies than against the con-
tinental United States.
Will Safeguard defend the United States
against accidentally launched ICBMs?
Yes.
One cannot eliminate completely the pos-
sibility of an- accidental launch in a world
where thousands of missiles are ready to be
launched on a moment's notice.
If such an accident occurred, even a thin
ABM system is likely to work well since
there would presumably be only one, or at
most a few, missiles to destroy.
It could repay the entire cost of the mis-
sile system several times over if one accident
were prevented.
No.
Unless SAFEGUARD is expanded beyond
the Administration's current request, it
could only defend against such an accident
were the missile launched at one of the two
Minuteman sites currently scheduled for de-
ployment, and then not until 1973.
Accidental launch should be controlled in-
stead by an agreement with the Soviet Union
on the installation of self-destruct mecha-
nisms so that accidentally launched missiles
can be destroyed in flight. Should this be
impossible, defense against accidental launch
could be obtained at a fraction the cost of
SAFEGUARD by deploying a few Spartans
and unprotected radars designed for this
purpose.
Will Safeguard erode Presidential control over
the launch of nuclear weapons?
Pro
No.
While specific details of the decision-mak-
ing process must remain classified, the deci-
sion to fire will completely reflect the author-
ity of the President.
While the decision to launch must be made
in a short period of time, the decision to arm
the warhead of the missile can be made after
the missile has been fired.
Yes.
The time from verification to decision to
fire would not be more than a few minutes
if there is to be any chance of a successful
intercept. The President is therefore given
only the opportunity to ratify what the com-
puters say is inevitable, and cannot weigh
evidence or consult with advisors, particu-
larly if at the moment of attack he is away
from the National Command Authority in
Washington, D.C. Most proponents of the
system maintain that it will not work unless
the launch process is begun at the moment of
detection. In the case of an accidental launch,
the necessity to activate the system with no
delay would be even more urgent.
Does SafeGuard give the U.S. an extra option?
Pro
Yes.
Instead of having to resort to our retalia-
tory force in case of attack, SAFEGUARD
would give us the option of sending up anti-
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'A FC% S6877
ident had SAFEGUARD and considered it an
extra option in the event of attack, an op-
ponent might come to the conclusion that
he would use it and not launch our retalia-
tory capability and thereby be tempted into
a first strike.
SAFEGUARD, like NIKE ZEUS, will be
obsolete by the time it is deployed. While
research and development on ballistic mis-
sile defense should continue at the Kwa-
jalein island facility, the decision to deploy
should be deferred until the conclusion of
arms control negotiations with the Soviet
Union. Out national security requires that
we give highest priority to bringing the nu-
clear arms race under control.
VI. SELECTED LIST OF SAFEGUARD
AND OPPONENTS
Pro
Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski, Columbia
University, political scientist.
Dr. Lee Dubridge, Science Advisor to Pres-
ident Nixon.
Dr. Freeman Dyson, Princeton University,
nuclear physicist.
Dr. Richard Foster, former Director of
Strategic Studies, Stanford Research Insti-
tute, strategic analyst.
Dr. Richard Latter, Rand Corporation, nu-
clear physicist.
Dr. Philip Mosley, Director of the Euro-
pean Institute, Columbia University, po-
litical scientist.
Dr. Frederick Seitz, President of the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences, nuclear physi-
cist.
Dr. Edward Teller, founding Director of the
Livermore Laboratories, nuclear physicist.
Dr. Alvin Weinberg, Director of the Oak
Ridge Laboratories, nuclear physicist.
Dr. Eugene Wigner, Princeton University,
nuclear physicist.
Con
Dr. Jerome Weisner, a former Science Ad-
visor to President Kennedy and Johnson,
Provost of MIT.
Dr. George Kistiakowsky, former Science
Advisor to President Eisenhower,. chemist.
Dr. Donald Hornig, former Science Advisor
to President Johnson, physicist.
Professor Marshall Shulman, Director,
Russian Institute, Columbia University, po-
litical scientists.
Dr. Herbert York, former DOD Director of
Research and Engineering, nuclear physicist.
Dr. Donald Hornig, former Science Advisor
to President Eisenhower, Chairman of the
Board of MIT.
Professor Allen Whiting, Center for Chinese
Studies, University of Michigan political
scientist.
Dr. George Rathjens, Director of Weapons
Systems Evaluation, Institute for Defense
Analysis, strategic analyst.
Dr. Wolfgang Panofsky, Director, High-
Energy Physics Laboratory, Stanford, nuclear
physicist.
Dr. Jack Ruina, former Director of Ad-
vanced Research Projects Agency, DOD.
VII. GLOSSARY
ABM (anti-ballistic missile).-A missile,
or Combination of missiles, radar, and com-
puters designed to intercept and destroy in-
coming missiles before they reach their In-
tended targets.
binatton of opponents, at any time during PAR (perimeter acquisition radar) .-A
the course of a strategic nuclear exchange, long-range detection radar designed to de-
even after absorbing a surprise first strike. tect incoming missiles at a range of 1,000-
AMSA (advanced manned strategic air- 2,000 miles and track them until they come
craft).-A Mach II-plus aircraft designed to into the range of the MSR.
launch a nuclear missile along a flat tra- Penetration aids.-Devices such as decoys,
jectory to avoid an opponent's defensive sys- chaff, radar jamming, and precursor nuclear
tem, explosions used to assist the offense in over-
Blackout.-The temporary disabling of de- whelming the defensive ABM system.
fensive radar by Ionizing the air at about 45 Polaris.-The basic U.S. submarine-
miles altitude with the beta radiation of a launched missile, with a range of approxi-
nuclear explosion. This radiation and the mately 2,800 miles. 16 Polaris missiles are
fireball itself cause reflection or absorption carried on each of 41 Polaris submarines.
of radar waves for a ten minute period there- Poseidon.-A U,S. submarine-launched
by screening the incoming missiles from the missile, scheduled to replace Polaris mis-
defense. siles on 31 of the 41 Polaris submarines and
Damage limitation.-The ability to reduce to carry up to ten independently targeted
the damage of a nuclear attack by deploy- warheads.
ing ABMs to defend cities and/or targeting Re-entry vehicle.-That part of an ICBM
offensive missiles on an opponent's missiles that separates from the launching stages and
silos. carries the warhead(s) along a ballistic tra-
Deterrence.-A defense strategy that de- jectory outside the atmosphere and then back
pends on each side having the ability to in- into the atmosphere, where it then continues
flict unacceptable damage on the other after to target.
absorbing a surprise first strike. Reprogram capability.-A system in which
First strike capability.-The ability to an offensive missile signals its launch-con-
launch a nuclear attack upon an opponent trol point if it has launched its re-entry vehi-
without receiving an unacceptable loss in cle properly thereby allowing the offense to
return. program a backup missile if something has
FOBS (fractional orbit bombardment sys- gone wrong.
tem).-A nuclear delivery system intended to Sambis (sea-based anti-ballistic missile in-
deliver its warhead to a target on a trajectory tercept system).-A concept proposed for fu-
about 100 miles above the earth rather than tore development by the U.S., involving a
along a ballistic trajectory outside the network of anti-ballistic missiles on surface
atmosphere, in order to avoid defensive radar. and/or submarine vessels.
A fractionally orbited missile carries a smaller SS-9.-A large (20-25 megaton), reportedly
payload and is less accurate than an ICBM. inaccurate, Soviet missile, also capable of de-
Galosh.-A Soviet ABM system comparable livering a number of smaller yield warheads
to the NIKE ZEUS, comprising 67 missiles on and capable of knocking out Minuteman
launchers around Moscow. It has been par- missiles in their silos.
tially deployed but work has now ceased on SS-11.-The basic Soviet ICBM, equivalent
the system. to the Minuteman I.
Hardening.-Re-inforcing the geological Safeguard.-An ABM system configured
surroundings of a missile silo to withstand from the components of the NIKE X system,
the overpressure of a nearby nuclear explo- including PAR and MSR radars and Sprint
Sion. The harder the silo, the greater the and Spartan missiles, to be deployed in two
accuracy required on the part of an attacker phases, the first phase to protect U.S. retalia-
to destroy the missile in its silo. tory Minutemen at two sites and the second
ICBM (inter-continental ballistic mis- phase to protect two more Minuteman sites,
rile).-A long range (6,000-8,000 miles) mul- seven SAC bases, and Washington, D.C., and
tistage rocket capable of delivering nuclear to protect U.S. cities from Chinese or acci-
warheads to enemy targets. dental attack.
Kiloton.-The nuclear explosive equivalent Sentinel.-The Johnson Administration's
of 1,000 tons of TNT (Hiroshima bomb equals deployment of the basic NIKE X components,
20 Kilotons). designed to protect U.S. cities from Chinese
Launch on warning.-A concept of defense and accidental attack and prdvide eventually
that depends on assuring an opponent that some protection of the U.S. retaliatory force,
one's retaliatory capability will be launched now abandoned.
upon detection of incoming missiles rather Spartan.-A long-range (400 mile) missile
than absorbing the first strike and then component of SAFEGUARD, three stage, solid
launching the retaliatory attack. fueled with a nuclear warhead in the mega-
Megaton.-The nuclear explosive equiva- ton range, fired from an underground silo.
lent of one million tons of TNT. Sprint.-A short-range (25 mile) missile
Minuteman.-The basic U.S. ICBM. Min- component of SAFEGUARD, two stage,'solid
uteman I yields one megaton, Minuteman fueled with a nuclear warhead in the kilo-
II has a higher yield and/or trade off with ton range, fired from an underground silo,
penetration aids, Minuteman III is designed highly maneuverable and with a high rate
to carry MIRVs. of acceleration.
MIRV (multiple independent reentry ve- Tallinn system.-Soviet anti-aircraft de-
hicle).-A system of multiple warheads in fense system having no ABM capabilities, in-
which several carried by one re-entry ve- stalled around Moscow and Leningrad.
hicle can be maneuvered on independent Terminal defense.-A concept of ABM de-
courses to different targets. Tense that relies on short range missiles close
MRV (multiple reentry vehicle).-A sys- to the target to intercept those missiles in
tern of multiple warheads carried in one re- a heavy attack that get by the long range
entry vehicle but cannot be directed to dif- ABMs. This type of defense is used to pro-
tect high value targets (cities
ferent targets
bomber bases
,
.
,
Area defense.-A concept of ABM defense MSR (missile-site radar).-Performs sur- Minuteman fields) tens of miles across.
in which areas of the country, hundreds of veillance and detection, target track, missile Thick system.-A thick ABM system pro-
miles across, are given protection from at- track, and command functions for the anti- vides defense against heavy attack with long
tack by exo-atmospheric interception of in- ballistic missiles in the SAFEGUARD sys- range missiles and large numbers of short
coming missiles by long range defensive mis- tern. It is of shorter range than the PAR and range missiles located close to targets.
sibs tipped with large nuclear warheads. This takes over from it after initial acquisition. Thin system.-A thin ABM system provides
type of defense Is effective only against small NIKE X.-The thick U.S. ABM'system, de- defense for large areas of the country against
attacks, signed in 1963 but never deployed, utilizing light or accidental attack with long range
Assured destruction.-That level and de- the components of the SENTINEL and SAFE- missiles designed to intercept the incoming
ployment of nuclear capability which serves GUARD systems. ICBMs outside the atmosphere.
to deter deliberate nuclear Rttack by an op- NIKE ZEUS.-A first-generation U.S. ABM Titan.-A large (5-18 megaton) liquid-pro-
ponent by mainia ingat all times a highly system, utilizing unsophisticated radars and pellant U.S. ICBM. (The Titan II, of which
reliable ability to inflict an unacceptable de- the Zeus missile, authorized in 1957 but nev- 54 are deployed, is to be replaced by 1970 with
,,gree of damage upon the opponent, or com- er deployed. Minuteman II.)
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71 B00364R000300090002-4