AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR MILITARY PROCURMENT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MISSILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RESERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00364R000300100001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 630
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 5, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 13, 1969
• Content Type: OPEN

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August 13 1.969
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENA
was gathered as he taxied the ship up to
the grand stand. While passengers told re-
porters, "We've never been more comfort-
able or less wearied," Gloria Swanson chris-
tened the plane from New York with another
bottle of grape juice.
In two days and two nights, 20 people in
two airplanes had crossed the continent-
2,343 miles by air and 970 miles by rail. No
other scheduled passenger carrier had ever
done that before.
And so it all began with fanfare, signals
flashing across the country and movie stars.
A few years later, the diary writer noted,
"if we can believe what they are telling
us about new planes coming along, some-
day another young Lindbergh, flying in a
fast jet-propelled or rocket ship will make
the trip so fast that he'll get there before
he started." And so it may be in the '70s?
because of the three-hour difference on the
clock, a supersonic transport will arrive in
Los Angeles before it leaves New York.
RECESS
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Presi-
dent, I ask unanimous consent that the
Senate stand in recess, subject to the call
of the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(At 12 o'clock and 29 minutes p.m., the
Senate took a recess, subject to the call
of the Chair.)
(At 12 o'clock and 48 minutes p.m.,
the Senate reassembled, when called to
order by the Presiding Officer (Mr.
EAGLETON in the chair.)
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, I suggest 'the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the
S 9965
it I and ordering conceive it as an
from Wisconsin planned to debate . changing
had already made some other plans imaginary instrument and then moving
concerning other matters that I must from that imaginary stage into the re-
look into in my home State. alities of the hardware and the putting
I called the Senator from Wisconsin together of the pieces and the creation
this morning and explained the situation. of a powerful item, like this plane, that
We had an understanding that each of will really operate.
We have to imagine this crisis over a
6- or 7-year period and the changes that
will come about, the competition for the
engineering talent and the scientific
talent, the competition for various kinds
of metals, the competition even in the
skilled labor field and all of the things
that go over a 6- or 7-year period. That is
the time over which this contract has
run.
I point out in the beginning that I
strongly support the items now in the
bill and the C-5A. However, I do not
approve of the kind of contract that
This was
first
us would proceed when we could. So in
view of these other pressing matters, I
am going to proceed, and I hope that the
Senator from Wisconsin will be here be-
fore too long. I believe that he will.
Mr. President, the pending amendment
concerns what we call the C-5A, which
is a new, large cargo-carrying plane. The
aircraft carries Army men and cargo as
well as for the Air Force. It has just
reached the point where we are close to
having the production line product roll
out, ready for use.
Mr. President, earlier in life one of my
favorite teachers?one that I have re-
membered all of these years, not only
for what she was, but also for many
things that she said?laid down a cardi-
nal guideline for her students in a spe-
cial talk one day when she said, "Always
keep your eye on the ball."
Regardless of all the things that may
come up about the contra& who nego-
tiated it, who signed it, who proposed it,
and who went into the matter, the ball
that we must keep our eye on is our na-
tional security.
The C-5A aircraft is an essential part
In these modern times of the military
plan for our national protection and our
national security. Part of that plan for
our national security is that we think it
Is necessary to protect certain other areas
of the world as part of our front line
was used in this case. s was
large trial that that type of contract had.
It will be fully explained later in the
debate. I am just debating the matter
now to hit the high points for the RECORD
so that it might be read during the
recess.
That contract will be explained fully
and critically by each side of the debate,
I think, but certainly I do not defend it.
I know it has been proven to be a bad
type of contract, a type that should not
be employed any further. Perhaps one
of the reasons it worked so badly in this
case was because, without having prior
use, it was used for one of the largest
contracts that we have ever gone into. At
any rate, it did not work out for this
case. It was bad for the Government and
It was bad for the contractor, too, as will
defense. very readily appear.
roll. This large cargo plane will replace The point I want to emphasize is that
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I ask
others that we have in use at the present we must keep our eye on the ball. Ac-
unanimous consent that the order for
time that are not as adequate and do not cording to all the testimony, I believe
the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without have the qualities this one possesses. This we have a good product. We have a good
isa modern plane. plane. We have one that is beyond the
objection, it is so orde
As a member of the Armed Services expectations of the Air Force, beyond
Committee and the one member of thatthe requirements of the specifications. It
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA- committee with special responsibility at
TIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 this time, I have been disappointed re-
FOR MILITARY PROCURMENT, RE- peatedly this year by the lack of sur-
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND veillance over several contracts that has
FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MIS- been exhibited by our Department of
SILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJ- Defense. I have not only been disap-
ALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RE- pointed in it, but frankly, I have been
SERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH greatly surprised.
The Senate resumed the consideration I have said several times during the
of the bill (S. 2546) to authorize appro- last several years that whatever might be
priations during the fiscal year 1970 for said about the past Secretaries of De-
procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval fense concerning their judgment, the
vessels, and tracked combat vehicles and acts they performed or did not perform,
to authorize the construction of test and what advice they gave or did not
facilities at Kwajalein Missile Range, and give to the President, I thought that we
to prescribe the authorized personnel were superb in our standing at the buss-
strength of the Selected Reserve of each ness table, at the contract table.
Reserve comronent of the Armed Forces, I really have been greatly surprised by
and for other purposes. the lack of surveillance and lack of at-
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, what is tention given a number of these larger
the pending business? contracts.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. I emphasize that if we really want to
ALLEN in the chair). The pending busi- understand the matter, we must get on
ness is amendment No. 108 offered by the the ground and appreciate the great
Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE) . problems that go with acontract to cre-
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Chair. ate something that is not in being, to
Mr. President, this matter was made create a new concept of a plane, a mis-
' the pending business yesterday. It was sile, a ship, or a submarine, to conceive
my impression at that time that there it in our minds from the beginning and
would be no debate on the amendment. get it on paper, and finally, through trial
However, I learned later that the Senator and error, starting and stopping, and
has had its usual bumps during the
trial-and-error period, but there is no
evidence that it is not going to come
through in a fine way, and its per-
formance is beyond expectations and
requirements.
I refer to one witness, the Senator
from Arizona. I requested him to go
down there and go through this plane,
go over it, and I was very much pleased
when he returned with his report. He
not only looked at it but also flew it, and
he will give a report on that.
We move now to this amendment. The
amendment, Mr. President, seeks to
strike from this bill $533 million for the
procurement of 23 of these aircraft and
certain lead funds.
We have what we call the No. 1 run,
run A. That is composed of 58 planes
in all-5 for research, development,
and testing, and 53 for regular type, the
finished product. All that has been taken
care of by money that already has been
authorized and appropriated. It is not
involved in this bill.
So that moves us over to run B, under
the contract referred to as run B, and
that will consist of 57 planes in addi-
tion to the 58 I have mentioned; but
this bill contains money for only 23
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S 9966 Approved For Relem
planes out of run B. At issue Is the
sum of $533 million for 23 C-5A aircraft.
What would be the effect of taking
this money out of the-bill with the adop-
tion at this amendment? It should be
understood that we do not have a single
plane yet for use; but they are on the
assembly line; they are moving. If this
amendment is adopted. it would require
a report from the GAO in 90 days; but
that is purely incidental. It would take
away the money for the plane. At the
very best, we would, lose 1 year. There
would be a delay in the entire program.
More money must benautherized by Con-
gress; otherwise, the production lines
will soon come to a grinding halt. We
will have a standstill,
That is just a fact of life regarding this
fine product which is just coming to
fruition and which wanted.
If we were to cut on the money, if we
ever were to get any planes for use, the
company would have to proceed solely
with its own money to complete the first
run of 58 planes, run A It is estimated
that if this should happen, the company
would sustain a loss of at least $600 mil-
lion. I doubt that any company can Stand
such a loss.
Incidentally, I wish to point out that
no one estimates that this company is
going to make a great deal of money even
if it gets all the contract?the planes
beyond the number called for by this bill.
Various estimates have been made. The
Air Force has estimated that the com-
pany will lose a certain amount, and the
company says they will lose less than
that. But all agree that there will be a
loss to the company under either situa-
tion.
According to the contractor, Lockheed,
if all the aircraft in run B are bought,
its loss would be in the neighborhood of
$13 to $15 million. The Air Force says
that if we buy all it is possible to buy
under run A and run B. they think the
Lockheed loss will be in the neighbor-
hood of $285 million. I mention that just
to indicate that by no kind of figuring or
estimates is this a contract in which the
contractor is going to make money.
There will be a loss either way it goes.
We talk about a 90-day investigation
by the GAO?whatever that may mean.
I will return to that later. But what the
amendment really does is to take the en-
tire project out of the bill and disallow
e money.
There is one thing fui ther about the
number of planes involved, and it is not
in the bill, and it does not have to be
decided now. If the Senate keeps the
money in the bill?as I trust it will do?
there still will be a question of whether
or not we are going to buy 34 additional
planes at a later date. That is a matter
that would be left up LI the Defense
Department initially. I do not know what
their decision will be. I do not know what
their recommendation will be. We cannot
decide that now. That is just another
rnileboard down the road.
We cannot possibly come to it now. It
is not involved in the bill. That is a
judgment to be made by the Secretary
of Defense. It would be up to him to
make that judgment and to give Con-
gress a recommendation
Mr. President, if this program is killed
now as a result of the failure to provide
funds in the bill for the 23 aircraft now
in question, additional Government
costs will be over $100 million because
there will be termination costs of at
least $30 million and $72 million in long-
lead funds approved last year and al-
ready committed. Those are costs that
are involved in the termination of a
contract. Sometimes we have to incur
them in the termination of contracts.
However, it is a necessary part of any
contract involving manufacturing of
extensive products like this. It is a cost
of doing business. It certainly is to be
considered and measured when we get
into the question of whether or not we
are going to terminate the manufacture
of a product that is more than good, it
is essential, and a product that we ac-
tually need in the years to come.
Mr. President, when these planes are
placed in operation they will replace other
planes and actual savings will be had
in connection with the operation.
In connection with the matter about
the General Accounting Office?and I
mention this with all deference to that
fine agency of the Government that is
certainly a great deal of help to the
Committee on Armed Services?they
have advised me that this amendment
provides for them to make a study and
to report in 90 days. They have inform-
ally advised me that at the best, any
study would take at least 6 months, even
in connection with those items they are
competent to study. They are not com-
mitting themselves by any means to say-
ing they are competent and have the
type men with the type training that
would be necessary to carry out all of
the requirements.
Mr. President, just a word about a
matter that was in the newspapers
lately. I wish to pause at this point to
say that I think the Senator from Wis-
consin has done a lot of fine work in
this matter. He is diligent and he always
pursues a matter. He is frank, clear,
and forceful in giving a report to the
Senate about his work. I am proud he is
that type man. It is a pleasure to work
with him in the Senate.
There has been a great deal of pub-
licity and many fancy names used about
this contract. They have called the C-5A
contract the Golden Handshake, and so
on. However, let us remember that the
main questions are whether it is a good
plane and whether we need it.
There has been a crack in the wing in
the testing A crack occurred in the wing
in a static test on July 13. I am advised
over and over by those who know?and
other members of the committee would
be more competent to speak on this mat-
ter than I am?that that is a normal
expectation in every aircraft develop-
ment. The failure occurred at 125 percent
of the load for which the airplane was
designed.
Every aircraft wing, as I understand
it, is tested upward and upward to the
point of breaking. That is how they find
out the terminal point. Where does the
strength of this mighty wing stop after
? all?
ATE August 13, /969
In this case it did not crack mitt' it
had reached the point of 125 percent of
the weight for which it was designed.
As I said, almost all aircraft, partic-
ularly the heavier ones, have experienced
failures of some components during
static testing. 'That Is what static test-
ing is for. To determine the amount of
stress and learn its breaking point Wieg
failure occurred on the B-52A, our
present so-called big bomber, at 139 per-
cent of the design load. In the C-130A
it occurred between 127 percent and 135
percent; in the C-1-0B it occurred at
139 percent; in the F-1040 It occurred
at 135 percent; and the C-141 had a math
landing gear frame failure at 129 percent
of loan, a vertical tall failure at 135 per-
cent, a fuselage failure at 120 percent,
and a men landing gear failure et 145
percent.
Many additional examples could be
cited. Failures of this kind are not unex-
pected. In fact, it is a part of the de-
velopment and testing process regular-
ly to be expected. They reveal these pos-
sible weaknesses in the structures at an
early stage of development to permit
design modifications in the production
of aircraft.
We have had much debate here about
the amount of money in this bill for re-
search and development. This is an il-
lustration of how Par removed from
real research, as we ordinarily term this,
is this testing we have been talking
about. Over and over again a good part
of the money for research and develop-
ment is really research, development,
test, and evaluation.
If I have any bearing at all with the
Department of Defense when they bring
over the recommendations next year,
they will have this research and devel-
opment account, as they call ft. broken
down with more commonsense and
divided up into categories where Sena-
tors will have at better opportunity to
know what they are passing on.
What is the need for the C-5A?
Certainly that has already been estab-
lished, Or there never would have been
such a plane devised and contracted for.
Six squadrons of the C-5A's will per-
mit the phasing out of such obsolete and
inefficient aircraft as the C-124's and
the C-133's. "C" means here "cargo,"
Mr. President.
With the C-5,A's we will reduce the
number of airlift aircraft in the fnrce
by one-half while providing more than
three times the transport capability.
Mr. President, that is the key fact
in this whole debate.
Times have changed. Modern aircraft
are altogether different. Versatility of the
C-5A is greater and its capability more.
Thus, I repeat, with the C-5A', we will
reduce the number of airlift aircraft in
the force by one-half, while providing
more than three times the transport
capability.
When we reduce the number of aircraft
by one-hail, we also reduce the number
of pilots, navigators, and the rest of the
crew members, including maintenance
men?all will be reduced, including repair
parts and all other items that go to Make
up the expensive line of operation. At the
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August 13, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RtCURD? SEN ATE S 9967
same time, we will have three times the
transport capability.
Second, the C-5A's operating cost per
ton-mile will be way lower than any
other airlift aircraft. It will be 2.9 cents
for the C-5A against 5.3 cents for the
C-141. That is the operating cost per
ton-mile. It will be almost one-half as
much for the C-5A as it is for the C-141
that is now in such extensive use.
Three, under any theory, the 23 air-
craft in the fiscal year 1970 request are
needed. They are ready now to start com-
ing off the assembly line. These will take
us only to four squadrons?the number
I am talking about-81 aircraft versus
the six squadrons of 120 aircraft, to be
approved as a minimum requirement by
the Secretary of Defense and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. That is under review by
the Joint Chiefs all the time.
As I pointed out a few minutes ago,
that will be a determination for the Sec-
retary of Defense, as to whether the last
purchase is made. It is not before us now.
If he decides to quit at the end of the
81 aircraft that the bill will build up to,
that is a matter of judgment, and also
a matter of judgment for Congress
whether to approve it, if the Secretary
of Defense does recommend it. But this
is no time to stop on a good plane just
as the first ones start coming off the line
for use.
Mr. President, despite cost overruns,
every indication is that the Air Force
will get an aircraft with fine performance
characteristics. It is the only aircraft
which can carry weapons and equipment
of any Army division; namely, tanks,
bridge launchers, armored personnel
carriers, and helicopters, concurrently
with the personnel associated with the
equipment.
If the C-5A is used to carry only man-
power, light equipment, and the lighter
weapons, it is so large that it can carry
an enormous load with great rapidity of
movement.
Mr. President, we have heard a great
deal of talk about overruns. I am going
to be quite brief on that matter, but the
idea is false that there can be a cer-
tainty and a fixed final figure in a con-
tract like this, without running into a
lot of big money, and it would cost just
as much to the Government in dollars,
even though not called overruns.
This contract had a form of sliding
scale. If there had not been a sliding
scale as to cost, any contractor, in order
to protect himself, would have required
a fixed amount, in much larger propor-
tions, in order to provide a cushion of
protection, even before we get to the
concept of profits.
I have already mentioned profits. As
I pointed out, so many changes came
about that it not only caused the so-
called overruns, but absorbed chances for
profit.
I would in no way try to defend over-
runs as such in any kind of contract. I
point out, however, that one reason for
the genuine overruns has been the in-
flation which has been raging in our eco-
nomy since 1964. There was a clause in
this contract which covered part of the
inflation, but we had an extraordinary
situation existing during those months
and years, which made the situation
different from what it had ever been. I
covered this point in my opening remarks
on this entire bill, and I would like to
restate my remarks at this time, which
occurred on page S7702 of the CONGRES-
SIONAL RECORD of July 8.
MAIN REASONS FOR OVERRUNS
The committee has found as a general
proposition that the principal reasons
that the original cost estimates in these
programs have been invalid in recent
years are as follows:
First. Subsequent to the original esti-
mates there were changes in the weap-
ons programs, that is, revision to the
total number of weapons to be produced
and the schedule at which they would
be produced, both factors causing an
increase in the unit cost.
It is possible to alter these two factors
in such a manner that unit costs will be
reduced. However, such decisions in re-
cent years have resulted in increasing the
costs of these programs. The assumptions
on which original estimates were made
were therefore invalidated to the extent
of these changes.
I think we have moved too rapidly
from research into procurement with re-
spect to some of these goods. In some
cases, the need exists, accentuated by
the war. So we had to move forward
regardless of cost.
Second. The military services them-
selves have requested changes in the
weapons through either a change in
technology or a policy decision which
caused an increase over the original
estimate.
Third. There appears to have been a
lack of sufficient management supervi-
sion over these various programs to take
timely action to either correct or recog-
nize, early, the overrun problem.
Fourth. There has been the fact of
abnormal inflation since 1964, which has
reduced the Defense procurement dollar
to a substantial degree. There is no pre-
cise index on the effect of the. Vietnam
war on the procurement dollar itself.
Some estimates, however, indicate that
the overall loss of purchasing power of
the defense procurement dollar would
approximate 25 percent.
Inflation since 1964 has affected not
only Defense moneys but many other
activities in the economy.
Between 1964 and 1968 the interest rate
on 3 months Treasury bills rose from 3.5
to 6.15 percent or an increase of 75 per-
cent; the interest yield on FHA home
mortgages from 5.45 to 8.05 percent, or
an increase of 48 percent; services?less
rent?rose 21.6 points from 117 to 138,6
or an increase of 18 percent; the cost of
food rose 12.9 points from 106.4 to 119.3
or an increase of 12 percent.
I point this out not by way of excuse.
I am not defending any of those con-
tracts. The military as such and civilian
groups as such were given some of the
hard reasons why some of the increase
occurred and have been given some com-
parison.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, without
attempting to fully cover all the ramifi-
cations of the contract and the plane, I
have presented the high points of what
the original conception was, the need for
the plane, the contract, and the type of
contract which was entered into in 1964.
I have covered the fact that it proved to
be the wrong type of contract.
I think one reason why the Depart-
ment of Defense got into the contract
for this large plane, involving so many
millions of dollars, was that it just did
not take time to try out that type of
contract on smaller missions or smaller
projects. If it had, these defects in it
would have shown up. But that is all be-
hind us now, and nothing can be done
about it. We have to start from where we
are.
This program is in fine form now,
right to the point where the planes are
going to start coming off the assembly
line. We certainly will need the ones we
have already appropriated money for.
The number is 58 in run A; and, by all
standards, we are going to need the 23
out of run B, as provided in the bill.
A great deal of testimony on this sub-
ject was taken by another committee. It
is entitled to consideration, of course. We
considered this item from every view-
point. Then for all of the public who
were interested, we had 2 full days of
hearings, in which that testimony was
taken. Nothing came out, either in public
or private, that attacked the plane, or the
product. Nothing came up that ques-
tioned the motives or questioned the im-
partiality of the Defense Department in
awarding the contract. All the evidence
is that, whichever way it goes, it is not
going to be a profitable contract for the
company. It is going to lose money, ac-
cording to its own estimates and accord-
ing to the Air Force. It is going to cost
more money than we or they thought it
would. We regret that, but it is another
illustration that, over these long periods
it is impossible to foresee what the future
holds. Who can contract with certainty
about the cost, particularly with things
moving forward as rapidly as they are
now in the field, for example, of elec-
tronics. It has gotten to the point where
over half the cost of a plane is in elec-
tronics.
In preparation of this vast matter, we
prepared a series of questions that re-
lated to the financial status of the pro-
gram and the developments and effect
of various lines of effort. We sent those
questions to the Department of Defense
for answers. I have the questions in my
hand. The questions are ours. The an-
swers are those of the Department of
Defense.
Having checked through those an-
swers, I believe they are substantially
correct. The staff believes they are gen-
erally and substantially correct.
For the information of other Senators
and all interested parties, I ask unani-
mous consent that the questions of the
Senate Committee on Armed Services
and the answers of the Department of
Defense thereto be printed in the RECORD
at this paint.
There being no objection, the ques-
tions and answers were ordered to be
printed in the RECORD, as follows:
Question No. 1: Financial Status of the
Program:
(a) How much has been obligated to date?
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE August 13, 1969.
(b) How much has been expended to date?
(a) On what date will present funds be
expended?
Specify these funds by fiscal year and
those under the continuing resolution.
AS OF JUNE 30, 1969
[Dollars in millions]
R. & D. Aircraft procurement
Fiscal
sear Obligations
Expendi- Expendi-
tures Obligations tures
1964
1965
10.0
42.0
10.0
42.0
1966
158.9
158. 9
1967
278.6
278. 6
1968
340.7
314. 2
196)
123.6
68. 7
Total _
953.8
872.4
385. 6 383. 7
414. 2 394. 7
443.7 414. 2
I. 243.5 1, 192. 6
On July 28, 1969, the Department of De-
fense, under the authority of the continu-
ing resolution for FY 1970, approved addi-
tional funding in the amount of $100 million
to protect production continuity. Of the
$100 million, $80 million has been obligated.
The difference of $20.0 million will be obli-
gated to the most urgent requirement con-
sistent with the financial management of
the total program. Based on the present rate
of expenditure, presently available funds may
be exhausted by 1 October 1969.
Question No. 2: Provide a summary of funds
that have been authorized prior to fiscal year
1970 and indicate how they have been ex-
pended or obligated.
Answer:
R. & D. AND PROCUREMENT AS or JUNE 30, 1969
[Dollars in millions'
Fiscal year
Program Expended
1964 10.0 10.0
1965_ 42. 0 42. 0
1966 _ 158.9 158.9
1967 667. 0 662.3
1968 781.9 708.9
1969 624.7 482.9
Total 2, 284. 5 2, 065. 0
Question No. 3: Provide a summary of the
effect on the present 0-5A aircraft program
If no fiscal year 1970 procurement funding
is forthcoming and the program is delayed
one year.
Answer: Failure to provide FY 70 pro-
curment funding would Void the current
contract option commitments for Run B. The
contract options between Lockheed and Gen-
eral Electric and their subcontractors and
suppliers would lapse. The Air Force would
be obligated to pay the $30.5 million Run B
termination liability if requested by Lock-
heed.
The $225 million over ' target funds re-
quested for FY 70 would still be required
to fund the contracts from target to cell-
sag for Run A. Additional funds would be
required because of the additional target and
ceiling associated with the repricing appli-
cation of the Run B option exercise in Jan-
uary 1969. These additional funds would
not finance Lockheed until FY 1971 funds
could be made available. IS is doubtful that
Lockheed would be able to finance on its
own the coats of continuing the Run A pro-
duction during this time period. As a result,
there is a substantial likelihood that the
contractor would be forced to default the
contract for the Run A aircraft.
If it is assumed that the costs of continu-
ing the current Run A production could be
sustained by the ootnractor there would still
be a production gap of about 18 months
between Runs A and B. During this gap, as
many as 40,000 employees could be affected.
Hp to 20,000 at Lockheed would probably be
laid off and 20,000 involved with subcontrac-
tors and vendors either laid off or put on
other work. The rehire and/or retraining of
these people would be extremely difficult.
Negotiation of the prices of the Run B air-
craft after this delay would be in a sole
source environment with no contractual
commitments or price options available. A
rough estimate of the cost increase is from
$400-$550 million for Run B.
Reduction in the Run A production rate
In order to stretch Run A and avoid a pro-
duction gap would void the existing contract.
Neogtiation of the stretch in Run A produc-
tion would probably permit Lockheed to
recover most of its presently projected losses
on RDT&E and Run A. This. negotiation
would be essentially sole source and again
with no contractual commitmente or price
options. It is likely that the program cost
increase would equal or exceed the cost in-
crease associated with the gap in the produc-
tion line discussed earlier. In addition, while
the total number of employees affected would
be reduced, the lower production rates would
require almost immediate lay-offs of people
by both Lockheed and their subcontractors
and vendors.
Question No. 4: What have we received for
this money so far? How many airplanes will
be delivered from prior appropriations?
Answer: Thus far, the bulk of the R&D ef-
fort has been completed. Five R&D aircraft
have been completed and about 600 hours
of flight testing have been accomplished.
About nineteen production aircraft are in
various stages of assembly. A substantial
amount of maintenance and operational
training equipment has been delivered. The
first operational aircraft is scheduled for
delivery in December 1969. We have high
confidence of securing a much needed stra-
tegic airlift capability with the delivery of an
aircraft that will meet all of its performance
guarantees. Fifty-eight (58) aircraft are con-
tractually required to be delivered from prior
year appropriations.
Question No. 5: Give a complete statement
of the effect of the repricing formula and the
reverse incentive on the procurement of the
23 aircraft proposed in the bill.
Answer: Our interpretation of the present
contract is that the repricing formula came
into effect when we exercised the Run B op-
tion in January 1969. It will apply to the 23
Run B aircraft requested for FY 70 and
will result in a new target cost and ceiling
price for the 76 production aircraft. This
means that some, but not all of the contrac-
tor's RDT&E plus Run A over-ceiling condi-
tion will be eliminated. This over-ceiling re-
lief would be only a fraction of that which
would obtain by applying the repricing for-
mula to all 57 Run B aircraft.
No reverse incentive (see questions 10 and
20) exists with the 23 aircraft being re
quested for FY 70. We are negotiating with
Lockheed to eliminate the possibility of a
reverse incentive, before more than the 23
FY 70 Run B aircraft are procured.
Question No. 6: What could the Air Force
be expected to receive in the way of opera-
tional C-5A aircraft in the event no addi-
tional funds other than the $225 million for
over-target costs on Run A in the present
bill and prior year funds were available?
Answer: Contractually, the Air Force can
expect to receive 58 aircraft when the $225
million is added to the Run A contracts.
Realistically, in view of Lockheed's projected
loss on the sale of only 58 aircraft, it is
questionable whether the contractor could
proceed if a decision were made not to buy
any Run B aircraft. If the contractor de-
faulted the contract, it is possible some 10
to 20 airplanes could be delivered.
Lockheed is contractually committed to
provide the 58 R&D and Run A aircraft. The
Government is committed to provide the
$225 million over-target funds requested in
the FY 70 Budget plus whatever additional
costs may result from the application of the
repricing formula relative to our exercising
the Run B option in January 1969, If Run B
were terminated, an additional $30.5 million
of termination liability would be also
required.
Question No. 7: Is the company not legally
committed to furnish 68 aircraft under
Run A?
Answer: The company is committed to
furnish five test aircraft under RDT&E and
53 operational aircraft under production Run
A, a total of 58 aircraft. This commitment is
legally binding so long as the Government
meets its commitments. This means that
funds must be provided in a timely manner
for the allowable costs associated with pro-
ducing these 58 aircraft.
Question No. 8: What changes, if any, are
being considered in the contracting methods,
i.e., repricing formula, abnormal escalation,
etc.?
Answer: It is the Air arce's intention to
change the C--5A Lockheed contract as fol-
lows:
a. Remove the reverse incentive possibility
feature from the repricing clause, which does
not arise until more than four squadrons are
procured;
b. Incorporate a new delivery schedule in
the contract;
c. Modify the methods Of procuring/pric-
ing spare parts;
d. Negotiate the disagreement as to the
intended application of abnormal escalation.
Other secondary issues and attendant mat-
ters will be clarified and resolved within the
overall negotiation package_
e. Negotiate the scope and operation of
the Correction of Deficiency Clause so as to
better clarify its meaning and to facilitate
Its administration.
Question No. 9: Summarize in simple terms
the cost elements of Run A.
Answer: The cost elements for R&D plus
Run A may be expressed in the following
way. These are based on the assumption that
only three squadrons are procured and no
repricing is involved.
Cost to Cost to
Government produce
Lockheed-Georgia Co __ 1,764 2,436
General Electric Co 534 558
Other program costs 214 214
Initial spares 201 201
or
R. 8.1. & E 1,003 1,246
Procurement 1,509 1,962
Initial spares _ _ 201 201
2, 713 3, 409
2,713 3,409
Question No 10: ?tarnish a graphic analy-
sis of how the reverse incentive operates.
Answer: Price adjustment in accordance
with Air Force position: (Applicable Run A
actual cost $1526M, Run A target cost
$832M).
Increase in
Increase in Overall con-
overall tract ceiling
contract for each $1
Quantity of Run a ceiling price over run A
Aircraft (millions) ceiling
AT-23
AT-33:
AF position ___ 393
Lockheed position 558
AT 57 680
$292 0.66
.89
I. 01
1.54
Reverse
incentive
No.
Na.
"yes.
Yes.
Question No 11: Can the Air Force give
assurance that the reverse incentive pro-
vision will be deleted frorn the contract? Ex-
plain the manner in Which the repricing
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formula will operate on the proposed pro-
curement of 23 aircraft.'
Answer: As Dr. Seamans publicly stated,
the nature of the Air Force commitment
beyond the 4th squadron is dependent upon
the results of negotiations. In large meas-
ure, these revolve around the deletion of
reverse incentive feature in the contract.
This deletion is a prime negotiation objec-
tive of the Air Force prior to procurement
of the balance of Run B aircraft. Presently,
operation of the reverse incentive on the
proposed FY 1970 buy of 23 aircraft depends
upon whether or not we procure the fifth
squadron. If we stop at 23 aircraft, repricing
of the contract Orget cost and ceiling will
be made only on the basis of the items
actually ordered. The total amount of Run
B costs to be treated in the repricing formula
will be just the target cost associated
with the 23 aircraft and associated support.
It is specifically noted that the procure-
ment of the 23 aircraft does not involve any
reverse incentive feature when the repric-
ing formula is applied.
Question No. 12: Explain in precise terms
the elements of the C-5A aircraft contract
which will be controlled by military person-
nel and those elements controlled and ad-
ministered by civilian* personnel. In other
words, what is the chain of authority for the
contracting and administration of the pro-
gram?
Answer: Authority and responsibiity for
procurement decisions concerning major Air
Force systems, such as the C-5, rests com-
pletely with the Secretary of Defense and
Secretary of the Air Force. Military people
evaluate technical material, selection data
and procurement approaches and make rec-
ommendations when required. Final deci-
sions clearly and completely rest with the
statutory civilian appointees with the De-
partment of Defense.
Statutory procurement authority for ex-
ecuting contracts for the government within
the Air Force flows from the Secretary of the
Air Force through the Chief of Staff to the
Deputy Chiefs of Staff (Research and Devel-
opment) and (Systems and Logistics) and
to the Director of Procurement Policy in Air
Force Headquarters and then to Air Force
Systems -Command and Air Force Logistics
Command.
Under this authority the Deputy Chiefs of
Staff and the Director of Procurement Policy
are responsible for providing the Commands
with broad policy and procedural guidance
resolving issues beyond Command jurisdic-
tion, assessing Command compliance with
established policy and guidance, and for
supporting the Air Force Secretary in con-
nection with his statutory and administra-
tive responsibilities to Congress.
In the C-5 aircraft and engine procure-
ment, the Air Force followed its standard
source selection procedures. The Air Force
Secretary was the Source Selection Author-
ity. The Source Selection Advisory Council
and Evaluation Board functions were carried
out by senior military members of the Aero-
nautical Systems Division and C-5 System
Program Office respectively at Wright Field,
Ohio. Contractors submitted proposals cov-
ering all elements in great detail. Proposals
were evaluated by a large, highly skilled
group of specialists specifically picked for the
task. Recommendations of these Source Se-
lection bodies were reviewed at appropriate
levels in the Command chain up to the Air
Force Secretary. Based on a detailed review
of these recommendations plus those of the
major Commanders and Chief of Staff, the
Air Force Secretary determined that the rec-
ommendation of General Electric for the en-
gine would be accepted and the award of
the airframe contract to Lockheed was in
the best interest of the Government. The Air
Force Secretary provided a detailed report to
the Secretary of Defense.
In addition to source selection decision,
others are required during regularly sched-
uled program reviews, program change re-
quests, or when a program varies from the
cost schedule or performance requirements
of the contract. Again, these decisions are
made by the Secretary of the Air Force or
Defense.
Question No. 13: The current cost esti-
mate under which you are operating is based
on a study culminating in late October which
Is now ten months old. Lockheed and the Air
Force have serious disagreement about cer-
tain provisions of the contract and how they
apply. The question is, if the October 1968
estimates should be substantially wrong?
substantially lower?and the alleged ambi-
guities in the contract should be decided in
favor of Lockheed, how does the Government
exposure change?
Answer: The Government exposure will
Increase if our October estimate to complete
production Run A (53 aircraft) is substan-
tially low. This is so because in exercising
the Production Run B option in January
1969 we activated the price adjustment
clause.
The Government exposure is the contract
ceiling price and the price adjustment clause
adjusts the contract ceiling price. Opera-
tion of the price adjustment clause and the
resultant increase in ceiling price, is dic-
tated by (1) the cost to complete Run A air-
craft, and (2) the total number of Run B
aircraft procured.
In addition, if the abnormal economic
escalation estimates increase, the contract
ceiling would increase further by that
amount.
The current negotiations with Lockheed
are being conducted with a view toward mu-
tual resolution of all of the ambiguities
presently in the contract. One of the prin-
cipal ambiguities relates to the use of the
abnormal escalation in the repricing formula.
Should we be unable to resolve these ambi-
guities in negotiation, the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) and/or
the courts would be resorted to. A judgment
favorable to the contractor in these cases
would also increase the Government ex-
posure.
Question No. 14: Based on the October cost
data, what was the estimated cost per
aircraft
(a) Under Run A with 53 aircraft? (5
R&D not included)
(b) Under Run A plus 23 aircraft of Run
B?
Answer: The procurement cost for the 53
Run A aircraft (assuming completion of the
Run B buy) was estimated at $1,901 million
for an average cost of $35.9 million per air-
craft. If we had decided at that time not to
buy Run B, the repricing formula would not
have become effective. The procurement cost
of the 53 aircraft would have been $1,509
million for an average cost of $28.5 million.
It is very unlikely that this cost would be
valid if we decide now (after exercising the
Run B option in January) not to buy Run
B. The cost of the Run A aircraft would
probably be decided in court, if the aircraft
were produced at all. The average price would
probably be substantially higher than $28.5
million. As noted earlier, however, there is
no assurance that Lockheed would be able
to complete Run A if Run B is eliminated.
If we procure Run A plus only 23 aircraft
of Run B (76 production aircraft), consid-
ering the effect of the price adjustment
clause, the average procurement (flyaway
plus AGE, training, and data) cost for the
76 aircraft would be about $29.9 million.
Question No. 35: On page 24 of the C-5A
study the following appears:
"It should be noted that the costs to the
Government reflected above are based on the
detail cost review completed in October 1968.
There is a distinct possibility that costs may
continue to increase. A quick look cost re-
view is now in the process of being completed
by the Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD).
Preliminary information from this cost re-
view indicates that the estimated cost to
complete the program (i.e., the contractor's
cost) may increase above the October 1968
estimates."
Furnish some estimate as to what the
maximum cost to completion will be, based
on the information now available.
Answer: A revised cost estimate is now be-
ing completed by the System Program Office.
Preliminary information indicates a poten-
tial increase in the two to four percent range
for the six squadron program. Part of this
increase is associated with the schedule slip.
The October 1968 estimate was based on a
Run B production rate of four aircraft per
month. The Air Force changed to three per
month in order to extend the decision time
for the fifth and sixth squadrons pending
more definitive cost data. That action ex-
tended the production period several months
and results in some increased cost in Runs
A and B. These factors combined with in-
creased inflationary trends contribute to the
potential cost increase.
Question No. 16: How will the spares be
provided and how will it affect the contract?
Answer: We are now negotiating with the
contractor to determine specifically how the
spares are to be provided and how their pro-
curement will effect the contract. Our in-
tent is to get good spares at reasonable prices.'
We intend in our negotiation to establish a
reasonable break-out of the spares and in-
sure that we procure from Lockheed only
those spares and equipment that cannot ef-
fectively be procured directly from the sup-
plier. We do not intend for the procure-
ment of the spares from Lockheed to off-set
the losses expected to be incurred as a re-
sult of their RDT&E and Run A efforts.
Question No. 17: Is the aircraft meeting
all performance specifications, specifically,
the sink rate, the lower flap speeds, and wing
failure?
Answer: The aircraft is predicted to meet
or exceed all of its mission performance
guarantees. Its weight empty is projected to
be exceeded by less than 1%. However, the
aircraft is more streamlined (less drag) than
required and this more than offsets the slight
additional weight and permits it to meet or
exceed the performance guarantees. Some
minor changes were made to some specifica-
tions. This was done to produce a better air-
plane through a more balanced design and
to reduce cost to the Government. No deg-
radation of safety or mission performance
resulted. Equitable consideration was re-
ceived by the Government. The sink rate,
flap speeds, etc., all meet established mili-
tary standards. Critics who do not under-
stand the technical details may allege the
Air Force reduced criteria to "help" the con-
tractor. This is not the case. For instance
the sink rate was changed from 10 feet per
second maximum to nine feet per second.
The FAA standard is 10 FPS; but the FAA
allows a lower weight for 10 FPS. The Air
Force nine FPS at a higher weight is equiv-
alent to the FAA standard of 10 FPS at its
lower weight.
The flap speed criteria change affected only
the use of full flaps. The criteria for use of
partial and take-off flaps were not changed.
Since the flaps on the C-5 are not consid-
ered a braking device, the reduced speed for
use of full flaps will impose no diverse limit-
ation on operation or performance.
The static test failure in the wing of the
test article was not related in any way to
any specification changes made. This failure
was not unusual for the static test program
the purpose of which is to demonstrate the
aircraft capability to withstand flightloads
up to 150% of its design limit load.
Question No, 18: How many significant
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changes have been made and have any of
them resulted in a degradaZion of the per-
formance specifications?
Answer: Only minor changes have been
made in the specifications as outlined in the
answer to Question 17. None have resulted
in any degradation of the mission perform-
ance of the airplane.
Question No. 19: How real is the threat Of
termination if no funds are available by the
end of August?
Answer: The contract, as amended, permits
Lockheed to request termination if Run B
funding is not provided before 1 September.
The contract also permits equitable cost and
schedule adjustments associated with the
funding delays. The purpose of these provi-
sions is to maintain program continuity and
to protect vendor commitments. The risk of
termination, depends largely on the con-
tractor's confidence that ry 70 funds will
be ultimately provided. Both contractors
have a number of subcontractor funding
commitments which must be met. The Air
Force would attempt to assist in this interim
funding problem. It is likely, however, that
there would be a cost increase to the program.
If funds were delayed for several months
after the 1 September date, it is probable
that a number of the vendors and subcon-
tractors commitments would lapse. There
would be a substantial cost increase and a
schedule slip. The General Electric contract
does not permit them to request termination
if funding is delayed but price and schedule
adjustment could result, depending on the
extent of the delay.
Question No. 20: Define in simple terms:
(a) The meaning of the repricing formula
(b) The reverse incentive as it applies to
the repricing
Answer:
(a) The intention of the repricing formula
was to preclude catastrophic losses to the
contractor. A formula was devoloped In rec-
ognition of the early commitment to opera-
tional aircraft prior to development. The
clause provided that if the actual costs as-
sociated with the production of Run A air-
craft exceeded the contract target costs for
that effort by a specified amount or greater,
the contractor is entitled GO an adjustment
in the overall target and ceiling price. The
amount of this adjustment and the changes
to the contract prices are determined pur-
suant to the application of the formula. Un-
til the target for Run A aircraft are exceeded
by 130%, the repricing formula is not in-
voked.
(b) A point can be reached where, for each
additional dollar of oast occurring in the
production of Run A aircraft, the result is
an increase in total contract target and
ceiling of more than a dollar. This potential
could encourage a contractor to add costs to
Run A so as to reduce his overall loss on
both the Run A and the Run B production.
Question No. 21: What would be the im-
pact of delaying appropriation of FY 70
funds for procurement of the Run B aircraft
until after completion of a 90 day review
of the program?
Answer: The Air Force has requested $533
million for the 23 FY 70 aircraft of Run B.
In the event the appropriation of FY 70
funds is delayed 90 days, the actual delay in
applying these funds to the C-5 contract
would probably amount to four or more
months. The Lockheed contract as amended
requires FY 70 fun& for the 23 aircraft to
be on contract by 1 September 1969. The
contract stipulates that if such funds are
allotted after 1 September, an equitable ad-
justment in the price, delivery schedule, Or
both may be made provided the contractor
has incurred additional costs or delay due
to the funding delay. Further, the contrae-
tor can request termination for convenience
of the Government in the event funds are
not allotted by 1 September.
There would be a substantial impact as-
sociated with this funding delay. Existing
contract options between Lockheed and Gen-
eral Electric and their subcontractors and
suppliers would be voided. As a result, pro-
duction costs would increase by about $140
to $170 million depending on whether the
Run A delays were stretched to preclude a
production line gap or not.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, for the
time being, that will conclude my re-
marks. I believe they are the main high
points.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield
to the Senator from Virginia, a valuable
member of our committee.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr-President,
I would like to say a fey words with re-
gard to the Senator from Mississippi.
This is the sixth week that the Senate
has been debating the pending legisla-
tion.
During all this time the Senator from
Mississippi has been on the floor and he
has carried the burden of answering the
many questions?proper questions--
which have been put to him as commit-
tee chairman.
I doubt if there have been any commit-
tee chairmen in recent years who have
been under such intense pressure in re-
gard to work here on the floor for such a
long period of time as has the distin-
guished Senator from Mississippi in han-
dling on the floor of the Senate this very
important and very difficult bill.
When the legislation was first sub-
mitted, the budget request sought by the
Johnson administration totaled $23 bil-
lion. Then the new administration came
into office, and the budget request was
revised somewhat to $22 billion. Then
the Committee on Armed Services, of
which the Senator from Mississippi (Mr.
STENNIS) is chairman, went over this
proposal in great detail.
The bill which finally came before the
Senate represents, in round figures, a
total of $20 billion for procurement of
military weapons for the fiscal year 1970.
So the committee brought about that
reduction and now recommends to the
Senate that the budget request of the
Nixon administration be reduced by $2
billion.
I favor such a reduction.
That is, in round figures, a 10-percent
reduction.
The committee is aware of the need
to carefully scrutinize all items in the
budget, whether it be a budget for the
Defense Department, or a budget for the
Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, or any of the other departments
of the Government.
The committee went into these matters
very carefully and, as I mentioned be-
fore, has recommended to the Senate
that the authorizations for military pro-
curement be reduced from the amount
originally requested by $2 billion.
That is a substantial reduction, but I
think it is one that can be sustained.
I think that we can accomplish, with
the reduced amount of money, all that
Is necessary to be done to protect the
security of the United States.
I say again, Mr. President, that I have
great admiration for the way the dis-
tinguished chairman of the committee,
the Senator from Mississippi (Mr.
STENNIS) has handled this legislation on
the floor of the Senate during 6 difficult
weeks. The hours have been long each
day, and there has been a keen debate.
I say to those whose viewpoints have
differed from those of the Senator from
Mississippi and the Senator from Vir-
ginia that I think it is important and
desirable that Senators do just what they
have done for the past 6 weeks: go into
these budgeted figures item by item, and
require justification.
I believe that the Senator from Mis-
sissippi has fully Justified what the com-
mittee has recommended, and I state
again that I am pleased to be astociated
with the distinguished Senator. I com-
mend him on his handling of a very dif-
ficult problem over a long period of
time.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I thank
the Senator from Virginia for his gra-
cious remarks. What little I have done
required much help, and help was forth-
coming from many different sources, in-
cluding the Senator from Virginia. He
played an important part in the making
of this bill, in tearing it apart, as it were,
and then putting it back together. We
all owe him a debt of gratitude for his
fine work; I do, particularly as chairman
of the committee. / appreciate his state-
ment, and I give him fair warning that
I am looking forward to getting a lot
more work out of him.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. PROXIVIIRE. Mr. President, be-
fore I yield to the Senator from Indi-
ana, which I shall do in a moment, I
wish to say that I concur in everything
the distinguished Senator from Virginia
has just stated about the distinguished
Senator from Mississippi. This has been
a very difficult and trying 6 weeks for
him. He has done a magnificent job. I,
as one who has disagreed occasionally
with the Senator from Mississippi, can
say that he has been most helpful and
accommodating, though he has certainly
been under unusual pressure. Rarely in
the 12 years I have been in the Senate
has any chairman, had to meet chal-
lenges as often as las the Senator from
Mississippi on this measure; and he
has done the great job of meeting them.
I agree wholeheartedly that this de-
bate is certainly in the national inter-
est, as well as in the interest of a more
intelligent and healthy fiscal policy.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I thank
the Senator from Wisconsin. There has
been a little effort, from some sources,
to try to drive a wedge between Senators
who might have differing viewpoints. I
am proud of the Senator from Wiscon-
sin for not letting them do it. I, too, did
my Part in not letting them do it. After
all, we are all here working for the same
cause. I do not deserve any credit for
the days I have spent on this floor; for
It is a privilege to be a Member of this
body. It has been a little bit rugged at
times, but it is a privilege, and I think
trying to do our duty is reward enough
for all of us.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I
think every Senator is proud of the way
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August 13, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? StiNA
that the Senator from Mississippi has
done his duty and handled his work on
this measure.
I yield now to the Senator from In-
diana.
Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, before
I begin my prepared remarks, I, too,
would like to express my appreciation
for the outstanding work done by the
Senator from Mississippi. He is well
versed and well informed, and takes
the debate in his stride, in a manner he
might not do if he did not have the
feeling that the debate on the Senate
floor is entirely sincere on both sides,
and with good purpose, and that differ-
ences of opinion do not necessarily mean
that those who hold them are disagree-
able otherwise. The Senator from Mis-
sissippi has stood up extremely well un-
der the strain, and I compliment him,
before he leaves the floor for a well
deserved recess, for the fine work he
has done.
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator
from Indiana. He has always been an
important contributor to the debate on
these matters.
F?I4 : A $25 BILLION MONUMENT TO THE PAST?
Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, the
pending military procurement bill con-
tains a $239 million authorization for the
purchase of a new Navy fighter plane,
the F-14A. This item is significant be-
cause it marks the first procurement re-
quest for a new fighter system which
may run to a cost of nearly $25 billion
over the next decade. In this year of the
taxpayers' revolt, I believe that no new
system of such major proportions should
escape close congressional scrutiny.
My own interest in the F-14A has been
heightened by some disturbing news?I
have been informed that according to a
recent cost comparison study conducted
by the Pentagon, the relative cost of
carrier-based fighter strength far ex-
ceeds the cost of comparable land-based
strength. The F-14A, a carrier-based
fighter, will require reevaluation if these
high costs can indeed be avoided by bas-
ing our air strength on land. At any rate,
our consideration of the F-14A should
be undertaken with full knowledge of
these cost relationships, and so I am re-
questing today that the Defense Depart-
ment release to the Congress this most
recent study of the problem, which clari-
fies the economy of land-based air
strength and which adds measurably to
the doubts which already surround the
proposed F-14A. I have sent a letter to
the Secretary of Defense requesting the
immediate release of this revealing cost
comparison study.
It will be difficult, of course, for the
U.S. Senate to conduct its own study of
the F-14A. This new fighter aircraft is
an enormously complicated weapon, just
as complicated as the ABM or the
MBT-70. The features of the F-14A must
be described in a technical jargon which
requires our closest attention; the need
for the F-14A must be measured in un-
certain probabilities about the future;
and the high cost of the F-14A must be
judged against the far higher cost of in-
adequate military preparedness.
But we must not let these difficulties
prevent us from taking a hard, critical
look at the F-14A. Whenever the ex-
penditure of so much money is at issue,
the Congress has a responsibility to do
no less. Accordingly, I shall outline some
of my own doubts about the F-14A, and
suggest some alternatives to the blank-
check approval of that weapons system
which is found in the bill as it reads
today.
In the words of Secretary of the Navy
John Chafee, the current F-14 program
is an outgrowth of the cancellation of the
F-111B, the Navy version of the ill-fated
TFX tactical fighter-bomber. In fiscal
year 1969 .Congress appropriated $130
million to finance engineering develop-
ment of this new plane; and now, for
fiscal year 1970, the Senate Armed Serv-
ices Committee has recommended ap-
proval of the $224.6 million F-14A pro-
curement request, with an additional
advance procurement of $14.4 million.
These funds represent new obligational
authority for development only?techni-
cally, real production of the aircraft will
not begin until fiscal year 1971, accord-
ing to Assistant Secretary of the Navy
Robert A. Frosch. This year's money will
be spent building airplanes, but test and
evaluation models only, not full-scale
production models.
The F-14, when fully developed, will
be a multipurpose carrier-based fighter.
The A model, designed to become opera-
tional in 1973, will be a swing-wing, tan-
dem seating, supersonic aircraft?with a
new airframe design incorporating the
engine and the avionics of the now
abandoned and ill-fated F-111B. It was
envisioned as a replacement of the Navy's
F-4 Phantom, to perform a fleet air-
defense mission, carrying the yet-to-be-
developed Phoenix air-to-air missile.
The F-14B and F-14C models will be-
come operational in the middle and late
1970's as advanced technology engines
and advanced avionics become available
to replace the older component systems
planned for the F-14A.
Doubts about the wisdom of producing
the F-14A in quantity stem in part from
this mismatch between a new airframe
and an old engine. By producing the
F-14A, the Navy hopes to replace our
F-4's by 1973, 2 years before the F-14B
is scheduled to become operational. This
may be a worthy goal, but it is not yet
clear that a hybrid aircraft such as the
F-14A is the proper means to reach that
goal. By rushing the F-14 airframe into
production before its engine and avionics
components are fully developed, the
Navy may find itself saddled with an
expensive, low-performance substitute
for what it really needs, resulting in the
worst of both worlds.
Surprisingly, well-known flaws in the
F-14A design are not even mentioned in
the committee report. That report de-
scribes the F-14A as an aircraft of "su-
perior range, endurance, and maneuver-
ing performance over the F-4, allowing
greater utilization of its supersonic capa-
bilities in the combat situation." This
evaluation is misleading because it does
not mention the fact that the air combat
performance of the F-14A has been com-
promised by its multipurpose specifica-
tions and its hybrid design. The airframe
of the F-14A was not designed to carry
S 9971
the heavy weight of the F-111B engine,
and when fully loaded with the 1;000-
pound Phoenix missiles, the aircraft will
not be capable of anything approaching
"superior performance." I have learned
that the acceleration of the F-14A, when
it finally becomes operational in 1973,
will be less than the best Soviet fighter
in operation today, in 1969.
The committee report also fails to
mention the serious difficulties which
have plagued the Phoenix missile, the
complement to the F-14A. I have learned
that the Phoenix, which has been under
study and development since 1957, was
tested live for the first time only last
year. These tests, however, did not meas-
ure the capability of the weapon against
maneuvering targets, multiple targets, or
jamming. The Phoenix missile is fan-
tastically complicated?five times as
complex as our next most sophisticated
radar missile?and we must not take its
successful development for granted.
Finally, and perhaps most important,
the committee report failed to mention
the conceptual flaws of the F-14A sys-
tem. Technical difficulties aside, it is
simply not clear that a carrier-based
fighter is needed in the 1970's. This
brings me back to my point about the
relative costs of land and sea based air
strength. But it also raises the question
of just what mission the F-14A would
perform. The F-14A was originally de-
signed to protect the fleet from a Soviet
bomber attack, but as we know, the
Soviet bomber threat has never ma-
terialized. Chairman MAxoN of the House
Appropriations Committee made this
point clearly enough during hearings in
1968 when he said:
The bomber threat against the fleet, as
you know, has been predicted by Navy offi-
cials for some time. It has not, of course,
developed to date.
I understand that Chairman MAHON
has expressed concern again about the
substances of this, even as late as today.
Later in 1968, a report on the U.S.
tactical air power program by the Senate
Armed Services Preparedness Investi-
gating Subcommittee, made a similar as-
sessment of the Soviet bomber threat,
and drew the obvious conclusions with
regard to the F-14A when they said:
The F-111B was designed primarily for
fleet air defense against Soviet supersonic
bombers. But that threat is either limited
or does not exist; 'and therefore, we believe
the Navy should re-examine the prime re-
quirement for the VFX-1 (F-14A) as to its
most important role, in the light of the most
predictable threat to the fleet.
If our fleet were to come under Soviet
attack in a conventional war situation,
of course, Soviet submarines would pose
the most predictable and by far the
greatest threat to our carrier force. As
unlikely as that contingency may be, it
Is clear that the F-14A will not be of
much help in meeting the danger of a
submarine attack.
Clearly, the F-14A deserves a more
critical appraisal than it has received
to date. My own assessment of the F-
14A suggests two alternatives to blank
check approval. First, we could prohibit
the purchase of any production model
F-14A's. Second, we should deal with the
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G972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-- SENATE August 11, 1969
conceptual as well as the technical flaws
in the system. We should admit to our-
selves that a multipurpose carrier-based
fighter is never going tote able to provide
superior air combat performance.
It has been 20 years since the United
States has developed a single purpose,
air-superiority fighter; in those same 20
years the Soviets have developed four
such fighters. Our air superiority over
the Soviet Union could be threatened if
we continue to develop .110K-type multi-
purpose designs.
The proposed Air Force F-15 shows
more promise than the F-14A for this
very reason. There has been a firm deter-
mination, reinforced by a directive from
the Air Force Chief of Staff, not to com-
promise air-superiority capability of the
F-15 through corollary mission require-
ments. Unlike the F-14A, the F-15 will be
a single seat, fixed wing aircraft with a
thrust-to-weight ratio of better than
1 to 1. I believe it is a mistake to assume
that anything less will provide us with
adequate air combat strength, and I be-
lieve that we must pass judgment on the
F-14A with this comparison in mind.
In conclusion, Mr. President, I hope
that my remarks will stimulate a more
thorough review of this $25 billion wea-
pons system. I intend to continue my
discussion of the F-14A until all relevant
information has been made available to
the Congress, and until the troublesome
issues which I have raised are fully
clarified.
I ask unanimous consent to have print-
ed at this point in the RECORD a letter
written by me to Secretary of De-
fense Melvin Laird under date of August
13, 1969.
There being no objettion, the letter
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
AUGUST 13, 1969.
Honorable MELVIN LAIRD, '
Secretary, Department of Defense,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As the Senate con-
tinues to review the pending military pro-
curement bill, it will be helpful to insure
Congressional access to all relevant informa-
tion detailing comparative out and advan-
tages of various weapons systems under
consideration.
Accordingly, I would like to request the
release of a cost comparison study, con-
ducted in the Office of Systems Analysis,
which measures the relatiVe cost of carrier-
based and land-based air strength.
Sincerely,
Mr. HARTKE.
my friend, the
from Wisconsin,
VANCL FIARTICE,
U.S. Senator.
Mr. Pre,sident, I thank
distingue,hed Senator
for yielding.
C-5A : AN UNNECESSARY PLANE?A FISCAL
DISASTER
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I
thank the Senator from Indiana, and I
thank him especially for the substance
of his remarks.
I think it is most desirable that this
very expensive, new plane which is of
highly questionable value be critically
examined, as the Senator intends to ex-
amine it.
I think this has a great deal of merit.
It is an example of how we can save a
great deal of money. Certainly, by means
of fiscal pressure, the Senator from In-
diana and I will try to hold down the
budget and decrease the immense
amounts being spent in the military area.
I think the Senator has found one
area in which we can make substantial
savings without any real loss.
Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I thank
my friend, the Senator from Wisconsin.
He is well known for his diligence in
pursuing such matters. He is trying to
cut down on the Government expenses
where it can be done without threatening
our national security.
C-5A: AN UNNECESSARY PLANE, A FISCAL
DISASTER
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I
thank the Senator.
Mr. President, the purchase of the
C-5A by the Air Force from the Lock-
heed Corp. already represents one of the
greatest fiscal disasters in the history of
Federal procurement. The purpose of
my amendment is to make the best of a
bad situation, to suspend pouring good
money after bad, to permit an investiga-
tion based on current data and the latest
analyses.
WEAK CONTRACT
The C-5A contract is one in which
there is now every evidence of a "buy in"
bid. That is a deliberate low bid, im-
possible of fulfillment, in order to get
the award of a major contract.
It is a contract in which the target
cost has been greatly exceeded.
It is a contract in which the "ceiling
cost" has also been broken.
It is a contract in which there is a $2
billion overrun.
The planes are being built in a
Government-owned plant, with large
amounts of Government-owned machin-
ery, and where huge "progress payments"
are made which in effect supply the
working capital.
The Federal Government investment
in this matter is very great. The Lock-
heed investment is minimum.
REVERSE INCENTIVE
But, in addition, it is a contract which
has a repricing formula in which there
Is a blatant reverse incentive. If the costs
of the first 58 planes exceed the original
estimates, the contractor is rewarded.
Each additional plane will cost -more,
not less. The contract gives incentives
for excessive costs and inefficiencies. Just
think of that: the contract gives incen-
tives for excessive cost and inefficiency.
It is a contract in which the "reverse
incentive" becomes effective if any part
of the second run of planes beyond the
original 58 is authorized. This is the
"golden handshake" in which millions
are at stake in my amendment.
It is a contract under which there is
already a 6-month delay in delivery.
MODIFIED SPECIFICATIONS
It is a contract in which the original
specifications have already been modi-
fied and reduced. FAA requirements are
not to be met. The landing sink rate has
been modified. The wing stress failed to
meet specifications.
It is a contract in which the contractor
has thus far failed in meeting key re-
quirements in some aspects of quality,
timely delivery, and costs; and, under its
outrageous terms, the contractor will
be rewarded for inefficiency if my
amendment is not adopted.
HEARINGS BY COMMITTEES
The Subcommittee on Economy in Gov-
ernment first looked into the C-5A last
November. Since that time at least three
other congressional committees have
held hearings and heard testimony about
this contract. In addition, a recent study
has been conducted by the Air Force,
The Air Force study, entitled "Review
of the C-5A Program," was released or
July 28, 1969. The striking fact, however,
is that none of the investigations of the
costs of the C-5A since last year have
been able to proceed on the basis of any
significant and substantial information
gathered since the hearings before the
Subcommittee on Economy in Govern-
ment in November, 1968. The fact is
that even the recent Air Force review.
published only a few weeks ago, failed
to gather any new cost data. I quote from
the Air Force study:
It should be noted that the costs to the
Government reflected above are based on
the detailed review completed in October
1968.
The information gathered by the Sub-
committee on Economy in Government
was also based on the cost review com-
pleted in October, 1968. That informa-
tion led the subcommittee to conclude
that there would be a cost overrun in
the C-5A program of approximately $2
billion.
Mr. President, I point out that only
five of these planes have been produced
out of 120, and they already have an
overrun of $2 billion in a contract that
originally was to call for $3.4 billion. It
is costing $2 billion more than that. SPe-
cifically, according to testimony received
by the subcommittee, the original esti-
mate of the cost of 120 C-5A airplanes
was $3.4 billion. Because of cost over-
runs mainly being experienced in the
performance of the Lockheed contract,
actual costs would total $5.3 billion.
These estimates included the cost of
spare parts. I will come back to the sub-
ject of spare parts later, because I am
sure there will be a dispute on the floor
with respect to this matter when we re-
turn in September; and there was a dis-
pute when I was briefed by the Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force, Mr. Whit-
taker, as to the actual size of the over-
run. The difference is that, somehow,
the Air Force does not want to include all
the spare parts, including replenishment
parts. When they are questioned on it,
they admit that the spare parts are es-
sential parts of the plane. They have to
be purchased. They should be included
both in the first estimate and in the last
estimate, and that is what I have done.
EMBARRASSING FACTS
At first the Air Force refused to com-
ment on the C-5A cost overruns. I can
well understand this refusal. In light of
earlier Air Force assertions and repre-
sentations to Congress about the C-5A,
it must have been extremely embar-
rassing for the Air Force when these
facts came to light. Only a few months
prior to our hearings, the Air Force had
testified before another committee of
Congress that the current costs of the
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0 veiugust 13, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL REC ?
S 9973
C-5A were within the original cost esti- to the performance of the C-5A as well tation programs which are desperately
mates?in other words, no cost overrun, as to the costs. Both of the Air Force needed.
For example, on March 6, 1968, Alex- spokesmen to whom I have referred also
DOUBLE HOUSING FUNDS
ander H. Flax, Assistant Secretary of the testified that the plane would be delivered It is almost double all the funds we
Air Force for Research and Development, on time, and that the first delivery was intend to spend in 1970 for low- and
testified before the House Subcommittee scheduled for June 1969. They also testi- moderate-income housing by HUD.
on the Department of Defense, of the Bed of their high expectations of the The overrun on the C-5A is more than
Committee on Appropriations. Secretary performance of the plane. Now we know twice as much as we intend to spend in
Flax was asked whether C-5A program that these claims were also overopti- this entire fiscal year for low- and mod-
was within the original cost estimates. mistic. The fact is that a substantial erate-income housing for the entire
He replied: delivery slippage has occurred. The Air country. If there is one economic shame
We believe it is within the range between Force was to have its first C-5A's last in this country, where we have really
the target and ceiling costs at the moment. June. They were not delivered. In other fallen down, it is in low- and moderate-
Secretary Flax went on to say: words, the contractors have already income housing.
failed to meet their delivery schedule. It is only slightly less than all the $2.3
in the program office the contractor is in the The first deliveries are. now scheduled billion in the fiscal 1970 budget for Fed-
According to the best estimates of people
range where he should be between the tar- for next December a slippage and de- eral outlays to elementary and second-
get and the ceiling costs, lay of 6 months. ary education.
Whether the plane when it is finally The C-SA overrun would virtually pay
Secretary Flax added that the aver- delivered will perform according to the for all non-service-connected pensions
age weapons systems cost of the first 53 contract specifications is also a clues- for the U.S. veterans for fiscal year 1970.
production aircraft would be $22 million tion, in my opinion. For we have learned It is more by $300 million than all the
each and that the average weapons sys- t the C-5A has developed a wing money we spend on veterans' hospitals
tems cost for the first 115 aircraft would
be $18.6 million per copy. To be generous
with Secretary Flax, his testimony was
wildly overoptimistic.
SECOND TESTIMONY
On May 8, 1968, the Air Force again
testified to Congress, this time before the
Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations
for the Department of Defense. General
Robert G. Ruegg, Deputy Chief of Staff,
Systems and Logistics, was asked to de-
scribe the C-5A program. He responded:
The design, development and manfacture
of the C-5A aircraft is progressing very sat-
isfactorily and is generally on schedule.
General Ruegg then stated that the
current average weapons systems unit
cost for the approved program of 120
C-5A aircraft was $19.6 million per
plane.
It should be noted that there is a
slight discrepancy between the testi-
mony of Secretary Flax before the House
Subcommittee on the Department of De-
fense of the Committee on Appropria-
tions and the testimony of General poor families for an entire year. eu weof the American people on t e ot er,
Ruegg before the Senate Subcommittee are having trouble getting the full $100 the time has come to call a halt to such
on Appropriations for the Department million for that program. The $100 mil- outrageous excesses.
of Defense. The discrepancy amounts to lion needed for the program for the en-
a mere $1 million per plane. Secretary tire country is only one-twentieth the $2 AIR FORCE PRESS RELEASE
Flax testified that the cost would be billion overrun on this one plane. As I stated, at first the Air Force would
$18.6 million for 115 aircraft, while Gen- COMBAT TROOPS not officially comment on the disclosure
eral Ruegg testified that the aircraft Mr. President, the $2 billion, at $10,000 of the overrun. Finally on November 19,
would cost $19.6 million for 120 aircraft. per man per year, would finance the pay 1968, a week after the disclosure wasmade before the Subcommittee on Econ-
It seems strange that the unit cost of and allowances and associated personnel omy in Government, the Air Force did
120 aircraft would be more than the costs for 200,000 combat troops or more make a statement in the form of a press
unit cost of 115 aircraft. But this dis- than 10 combat divisions for a full year. release. The press release stated as
crepancy and this confusion in the wake That is why many of us say this coun- follows:
of the real facts as we now know them try would be stronger if we spent defense C-5
is neither here nor there, unless one funds more efficiently. The prime contract for the C-5, with Lock-
were to expect consistency and accuracy The $2 billion overrun on one plane heed Aircraft Corporation for the airframe
on the part of the Air Force with re- and one contract would finance all the and General Electric Company for the en-
gard to the costs of its weapons systems. economic assistance or AID funds in gines, were the first on a "Total Package"
Again to be generous to General Ruegg, the fiscal 1970 budget of $1.973 billion, basis, which was an innovation in Govern-
his testimony on the costs of the C-5A The $2 billion is five times the amount ment procurement. Under these contracts,
was also wildly overoptimistic, in the budget for rural electrification, designed to check the large cost increases
COST AND DELIVERY SLIPPAGE It is more than five times the amount of the past, the competing contractors made
commitments with respect to production C-5
The point is that the Air Force has the Interior Department will spend on airplanes prior to their development.
been asserting as recently as 6 months all forms of recreation. In view of the great risks inherent in such
before the hearings before the Subcom- The $2 billion excess to be spent on commitments, which embraced a period of
mittee on Economy in Government--my the C-5A is almost 20 times the $212 seven years, the contracts contained safe-
subcommittee?that there was no C-5A million in the Department of Transpor- guards both for the Government and thecontractors. The Government is protected by
overrun, and the Air Force assured Con- tation budget for urban mass transpor- contractual provisions which create increased
gress that the program was proceeding tation to which the President addressed motivation for the contractors to produce
satisfactorily. These assurances, by the himself with such vigor in the past few technically superior equipment on time at
way, related to the delivery schedule and days?and high-speed ground transpor- the lowest cost possible. For example, the
crack during static testing in the last and medical care.
few weeks. Just how serious this wing The $2 billion overrun on the C-5A is
crack is and how it relates to, the over- almost three times the $742 million in
all strength or weakness of the C-5A air- the Federal budget in fiscal year 1970 for
craft has not been publicly disclosed so law enforcement, justice, and civil rights.
far. What kind of priority system is that
In any event, one can well understand when our cities are burning, when our
the embarrassment of the Air Force to Courts are jammed, when the crime rate
see the public disclosure of the $2 billion has risen, and when millions of Amen-
overruns in November 1968. cans still suffer the stigma and indig-
HUGE FUNDS AT STAKE nities of second-class citizenship?
Mr. President, $2 billion is a phe- These are among the reasons this con-
nomenal amount of money. These are tract is outrageous. What kind of pri-
not the funds for the yearly procure- orities do we have when we spend $2
ment of an entire military service. Two billion more on one single plane than for
billion dollars is the amciunt of money any one of the programs I have men-
by which costs will exceed the estimates tioned aboVe?
on one weapon system alone. That is the The alarming thing about it is the Air
hard, shocking, scandalous fact. Force performance. They have backed
Look at the alternatives to spending and filled. They have tried to hide the
the money on the overrun. facts. They have atempted to cover up
Two billion dollars would pay for the the excesses.
housing subsidy under the new home- CHANGE PRIORITIES
owners section of the 1968 Housing Act, For the sake of the security of the
for some 3% million housing units for country on the one hand, and the welfare
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 13, 1969.
contractors pay 2O-SOc of every dollar above
the target price of 2B$. The Government is get an investigation to determine wars and one minor "brushfire" war.
whether that was desirable.
That is we assume, not that we might
not obligated to pay anything above the
ceiling price of 2.4B$ for the first 58 airplanes Why would not the 58 C-5A's present- have to fight these two wars in succession
including their engines atoll the research and 13r authorized, funded, and under con- or in a relatively short space of time;
development. Similarly, should the Govern- struction not meet whatever military re- rather, we assume that we might have to
ment proceed with a follow-on buy, the con-
quirements exist?
wage the wars all at once, simultaneously.
c
tract contains a formula whi+la would reduce My information indicates that the I might add, that how this farfetched and
but not eliminate large lOsses that the on-
tractors might incur on the nrst 58 airplanes, Air Force and the military already have questionable assumption crept into our
by increasing the target cost of the follow-on more than adequate aircraft capability defense policy and our foreign policy is
airplanes. All of these terms were contained with the cargo planes in its inventory, a mystery to me and until a relatively
,
In the original competivelv awarded con- In addition, the Air Force has access to short time ago, very few Members of the
tracts, the cargo capability of private carriers. Congress, on the basis of my information,
The Government is nate considering the The Air Force has traditionally utilized knew that there was such an assumption,
question of ordering c-5 aiepl.ines beyond the private carriers for its airlift needs. This In any event the military requirement
original 58, but no decision has been made, seems to me to be an eminently sound for the C-5A, and specifically for the full
The incentive for the contractors to reduce
costs remains in effect; and any such order policy. But with the addition of the C-5A 120 aircraft, is based on the 2-plus war
and the excess cargo airlift capability contingency Plus the McNamara rapid
will provide continued posit,ive motivation. ? . . ? -
to maintain cost control. which it would bring to the Air Force, I deployment strategy.
At the beginning of this pr,-Tam over three predict that there will be a change in this
years ago, the Air Force estimated that the Policy. Already there are signs that the LS IT COST EFFECTIVE?
cost of development and production of the military is cutting down on its use of In my judgment, the 23 aircraft from
first 58 airplanes would be $1.3 billion. The private carriers. I think this is unf or- run B cannot be justified even if we ac-
corresponding estimate for the 120 airplanes tunate, that it represents a mistake in cent the assumption that we must be
ultimately contemplated was $3.1 billion. judgment, and that it will impair our prepared to engage in two major con-
ng
private carrier fleet. ventional wars and one minor war, siuml-
?
lation and all other factors, ;,re $3.25 billion
Current estimates, includi economic esca-
THE 58 PLANES WOULD BE PRODUCED taneously, which, as I have indicated,
and $4.3 billion, indicating increases of 41 .
and 39% respectively. strikes me as an unrealistic if not irra-
Now let me explain that my amend- tional assumption.
These additional costs result from: (1)
increased costs for labor and materials result- ment would not end the C-5A program I do not say that the United States
ing from the combination of a significant war altogether. Fifty-eight planes has been should not have any rapid deployment
effort and an unprecedented demand for authorized and are under Construction, Capability. No doubt some rapid deploy-
civilian aircraft, both of which occurred after as I have stated. My amendment does not ment capability is desirable. That is not,
the original estimates, (2) the introduction apply to the 58 aircraft under construe- the question here. The 58 C-5A's now
of new technology, and (3) modifications to tion. These aircraft are known as first under production will give us substantial
overcome technical difficultiv.; inherent in
the development of all new aircraft. production run, or run A. A second pro- rapid deployment capability. What is at
Based on flight experience to date, the duction run is also contemplated by the issue is the question of whether the 23
C-5 will exceed its technical rfor Air Force. In fact, the Air Force may be additional C-5A's will add significantly
guarantees. contemplating several subsequent pro- to our deployment capability. In my
duction runs,
judgment, it will not. The 23 additional
What all that verbiage means is that The second production run is known aircraft will add only the capability to
the Air Force was admitting that the as run B. The total number of aircraft move the equipment for half an Army
120 C-5A's would cost approximately $1.2 in run B is 62 units. The authorization division to Europe in 3 weeks and for less
billion more than the original 1965 esti- bill before us today contains funds for than one-quarter of a division to Asia in
mates. This concession, although it did 23 aircraft from the second production the same period.
not represent the whole kWh, indicated rim, or run B.
This is a very small capability con-
part of the magnitude of the problem.
My amendment applies only to the 23
CONGRESSONAL RESPONSI aILITY sidering the very large price we are being
aircraft in run B. The funds that my asked to pay. I would also add that the
'The problem revealed by the C-SA case amendment would strike from the bill McNamara rapid deployment concept is
goes far beyond the cost of a single weap- are the funds earmarked for the 23 air- questionable because the C-5A is justi-
ons system, even though the cost prob- craft. The amendment provides that no fled only during the very early move-
lem alone is very great. The problem is more than 58 C-5A's, meaning run A, ment requirements following the out-
whether the Congress is willing and shall be purchased until after the Comp- break of hostilities. Only for the 1- to 3-
ready to exercise its full responsibility to troller General of the United States has week period following the beginning of a
the American people with regard to the completed and submitted to the Congress war can the C-5A be justified. At any
military budget. In my view, military a comprehensive study and investiga- later period, that later than 3 weeks,
spending for many years has been out tion of the projected costs of the C-5A's. ships become a much more efficient and
of control so far as the Con aress is con- Among the facts the Comptroller Gen- effective means of moving men and
cerned. The Congress, in short, has failed eral should gather are those which would equipment. Ships, of course, can move
to properly exercise its constitutional allow us to judge, whether the purchase many more men and much larger ton-
responsibility to provide fOr the common of the 23 aircraft from run B would add ages than aircraft.
defense. This responsibility should not significantly to the deployment capa-
signify the complete abdication of au- bility of the military forces of the United As an example, if we plan to move our
military forces to Europe from the
thority by the Congress over the military States. This in effect is the military
United States in a period of 2 weeks,
budget in general and military weapons requirement,
systems in particular. ships become more economically efficient
The essence of the military require- than C-5A's. If we plan to deploy our
The C-5A program symbolizes the fail- ment Justification for the C-5A concerns forces to Asia during a 314-week period,
ure and the breakdown of the present the rapid deployment strategy envisioned ships are more economically efficient
system, by the former Secretary of Defense, than C-5A's.
way A 0-5A? Robert McNamara. This strategy con-
In the first place, Congress unthink- templated the availability of military SHIPS LESS EXPENSIVE
ingly permitted the military to sell the forces for very rapid deployment. It The question should be asked, what is
C-5A concept to it. Is there a real mill-our realistic readiness capability? The
would therefore depend upon a strategic
tary requirement for the C.-5A? What is deployment force which could deliver the fact is that our military has never dem-
the nature of this military requirement? necessary military forces with unpre- onstrated the capability to assemble and
Why do we need 120 C-5A's? even assum- cedented speed,
deploy more than one or two light air-
ing that there is a real requirement? TWO AND ONE-HALF WAR STRATEGY borne or marine divisions in a matter of
a few weeks. Any plan we may have to
I may emphasize that my amendment All of us have now heard of the 21/2 assemble, transport, and reassemble for
would permit 58 C-5A's, already author- war contingency. This means that our combat 12 or more heavy, mechanized
ized. It would simply mean that the ad- entire defense strategy is based on the or armored divisions in a period of a
ditional 23 C-5A's--or going to 81 C- assumption that we might have to fight few weeks is completely unrealistic based
5A's?would be held up until we could simultaneou
sly two major conventional on our experience and our peacetime
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Augusf 13,
training. If we take our experience into
account and allow for the relative readi-
ness capabilities of peacetime troops,
ships are far more inexpensive than the
C-5A for equal deployment capability in
a 2-month period after D-Day. Accord-
ing to information that I have received,
ships are one-half to one-sixth as ex-
pensive as the C-5A for such a period.
In other words, if 23 additional air-
craft are not purchased there will be
only a minor impact at best on our over-
? all rapid deployment capabilities. This is
because of the relatively minor incre-
mental advantage to be gained from
the purchase of the 23 additional planes,
considering their cost. The fact is that
we already have more than an adequate
aircraft capability from our available
C-141's, C-130's, and our civilian reserve
aircraft. Indeed this aircraft caPability
is already adequate even assuming the
21/2 war contingency. According to my
information currently procured air-
craft forces are adequate even for emer-
gency wartime supply.
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS STUDY SAYS PLANE NOT
JUSTIFIED
I recently asked Philip N. Whittaker,
the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force,
Installations and Logistics, to brief me
on the military requirement for the 23
additional aircraft or for the 120 aircraft.
Mr. Whittaker replied that the military
requirement is based on classified infor-
mation. I can well understand the Air
Force's reluctance to discuss the military
requirement publicly. I have learned that
the most recent study by the Office of
Systems Analysis into the C-5A program
concludes that the 23 follow-on aircraft
cannot be justified on either military or
economic grounds.
Mr. President, I suspect that this is
probably the most important statement
I shall make this afternoon, and I wish
to repeat it. I think if all Senators know
of this statement, very considerable
question will arise in their minds as to
whether they should vote for this C-5A;
and I think it would be very persuasive
to many Senators to vote for my amend-
ment. Let me, therefore, repeat it: The
most recent study by the Office of Sys-
tems Analysis into the C-5A program
concludes that the 23 follow-on aircraft
cannot be justified on either military or
economic grounds.
That is an analysis by the Office of
Systems Analysis, in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. I do not know how
we can get a better qualified authority,
and it is especially persuasive in view of
the fact that the Secretary of Defense
and the Defense Department have asked
for these aircraft and yet their own
analysis shows they cannot be justified
on either military or economic grounds.
TWO BILLION DOLLAR OVERRUN
The second major issue in the C-5A
procurement is the matter of costs. I
have indicated that the conclusion of the
Subcommittee on Economy in Govern-
ment was that the cost of 120 aircraft
will be about $2 billion more than was
estimated when this contract was en-
tered into in 1965.
This brings us to a discussion of the
C-5A contract. Since the largest portion
of the overrun and the problems revealed
so far deal with the Lockheed contract,
I will refer to it. The contract entered
into by the Air Force with Lockheed was
a negotiated, fixed price incentive con-
tract. It was the first contract utilizing
the so-called total package procurement
concept?TPPC. When the Air Force
announced the award of this contract, it
did so very proudly. It was proud of the
contract as a new concept in procure-
ment, that is, the total package procure-
ment concept which was supposed to
achieve two major objectives. Because
the C-5A contract gave birth to this new
concept, it is important to understand
what it was supposed to do.
FAILURE OF TOTAL PACKAGE PROCUREMENT
First, total packaging was supposed to
act as a deterrent against cost overruns
in less than promised performance. To
accomplish this objective, all develop-
ment, production, and as much support
as is feasible of a system throughout its
anticipated life, was to be procured in a
single contract, as one total package.
The contract for the C-5A includes price
and performance commitments by the
contractor, which is supposed to motivate
him to control costs, perform to specifica-
tions, and produce on time. In view of
the enormous overrun and the 6-month
delay in the delivery schedule, at least
two of the three criteria for performance
of the contract show negative results. It
has been our experience that contractors
have often bought into an R. & D. con-
tract by offering to perform it at a low
price and making other promises, often
unkept, in order to place themselves in a
position to be the prime contractor or the
sole source contractor for the production.
The production of a weapons system, of
course, is usually the more lucrative end
of the job.
INEFFECTIVE METHOD
Second, total packaging was supposed
to motivate contractors to design for
economical production and support of
operational hardware.
In May of 1966, several months after
the award of the C-SA contract, the Air
Force published a description of the total
package procurement concept. This de-
scription contains the following pas-
sages:
Most simply stated, the TPPC as conceived
by the Air Force, envisions that all antici-
pated development, production, and as much
support as is feasible of a system through-
out its anticipated life is to be procured as
one total package and incorporated into one
contract containing price and performance
commitments at the outset of the acquisition
fees of a system procurement.
In other words, the C-5A contract with
Lockheed included R. & D. production,
and support; that is, spare parts. The
contract also contained priceand per-
formance commitments.
PAST FAILURES
In explaining why the Air Force felt
the need for this new contractual device,
It stated:
Thus, the history of defense procurement
is replete with cost overruns and less than
promised performance which were, at least in
part, the results of intentional "buy in" bid-
ding where cost estimates are understated
and performance and scheduled estimates
overstated on the initial contract and this
has been the case even where there has been
no substantial increase in the then state of
the art.
The principal benefits enumerated by
the Air Force in this publication are that
the contract:
First, requires a tightening of design
and configuration and discipline.
Second inhibits the unrealistic sales-
manship or buy in bidding, includes
overestimates of performance as well as
underestimates of cost.
Third, motivates the contractor to de-
sign initially for economical production,
and should produce not only lower costs
on the first production units, but also a
lower takeoff point on the production
learning curve, thus, benefiting every
unit in the production run.
Fourth, permits the Department of
Defense to negotiate with a contractor
on the basis of binding commitments
concerning the performance and the
price of what is really required?opera-
tional equipment.
OBJECTIVES -:17NOBTAINED
These were the expressed objectives of
the total packaging concept as embodied
in the C-5A contract. They are desirable
objectives. Unfortunately, none of them
were obtained in the C-.-5A contract.
There is considerable evidence, in my
judgment, that Lockheed engaged in un-
realistic salesmanship and that its intent
was to buy into the C-5A. It did this by
underbidding the Boeing Corp. which
was also a candidate for the C-5A by
$300 million. Lockheed also underbid its
nearest competitor in price, the Douglas
Corp. by $100 million. The enormous cost
overruns cast Lockheed's low bid in a new
perspective. In light of what we now
know, Lockheed's low bid is ludicrous,
and it can be reasonably concluded that
Lockheed knew or had reason to know
that its bid was unrealistic. The proposal
submitted by the Boeing Corp. by the
way, was considered superior on tech-
nical design grounds than the Lockheed
proposal by the Air Force Source Selec-
tion Board.
The Air Force assertion that this con-
tract was based on binding commitments
concerning the performance and price is
especially foolish or deceptive in view of
what we now know. This brings us to a
discussion of the now famous repricing
formula and it also brings us to the sub-
ject of spare parts which I said earlier I
would more fully discuss.
REPRICING FORMULA
The repricing formula contained in
the contract was first publicly disclosed
in hearings last November. The repricing
formula is the most blatant reverse in-
centive in Government contracting that
I have ever encountered. It provides, in
effect, that the second production run,
run B, is to be repriced, on the basis of
the actual cost of the first production
run, run A, and in accordance with a
specific formula. The effect of using the
repricing formula is to renegotiate with
the contractor over the price of the
follow-on production, run B. It means
that in the event the actual costs of the
first 58 planes exceed the original esti-
mates, the contractor receives a higher
price for the follow-on production. In
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S 9976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 1$, 1969
other words, the higher the cost to pro-
duce the first 58 planes, the higher the
prices goes for the follow-on aircraft.
As can be seen, there is a very limited
incentive to control the costs. Instead of
being penalized for exceeding these cost
estimates, the contractor in this case is
awarded a higher price for the follow-on
production.
NO BINDING COMMITMENT ON COST
How firm, therefore, are the firm price
commitments which the Air Force has
claimed for the C-5A contract? I asked
this question of the then Assistant Secre-
tary of the Air Force, Robert H. Charles--
the father of the package procurement,
and some Senators say he wrote the book
on it?when he testified before the Sub-
committee on Economy in Government
on January 16, 1969. The colloquy with
Mr. Charles on this point follows:
Mr. PROXMIRE. Do we really have binding
commitments on the C-5A price if the con-
tract is repriced for future production runs
in order to take care pf cost overruns in the
initial production? Do we not lose one of
the main advantages of the total packaging?
MT. CHARLES. No, I think not.
Chairman PROXM/RE. I do not see how we
can have binding commitments, on the one
hand, on price and a repricing projection at
the same time.
Mr. CHARLES. I do. It is a binding clause
In the contract. Any contract adjustment is
made pursuant to a formula to which the
competitor bids. I see nothing non-binding
about it.
In other words, to the Air Force a con-
tract clause provides for a firm price
commitment even though another clause
in the contract provides for a waY to
increase the price. It seems to me that
under that kind of arrangement, the only
party committed is the American taxpay-
er and he is committed to pay any price,
no matter how high and excessive it
might be, once the Air Force decides it
wants a new weapons system.
AIR FORCE NOW ADMITS MISTAKE
But even the Air Force has recently
admitted that the repricing formula was
a mistake. The Air Force states in its
recent review of the C-5A program:
This provision was well intentioned but
poorly comprehended at the time of award.
In operation it is beset with ambiguities,
complicating its implementation and rais-
ing the prospect of a reverse incentive. Un-
der a selected set of conditions, the point
can be reached where, for each additional
dollar of cost occurring in the production
of Run A aircraft, an increase of total con-
tract target and ceiling of more than a
dollar could result. This potential could
encourage the contractor to add costs to
Run A so as to reduce overall loss on both
the Run A and Run B production.
GOLDEN HANDSHAKE
Contrary to Air Force claims at the
early stages of this program, when it
was being sold to the Congress and to
the public, the contract has not produced
lower costs for the first production units.
The costs for the first production units
are greatly exceeding the original esti-
mates. Thus, instead of a lower takeoff
point on the production of learning curve,
benefiting every unit in the production
run, we have a higher takeoff point on
the production learning curve, thus in-
flating every unit in the production rim.
On top of all this, we have the repricing
formula, which has been called the
"golden handshake," which further in-
flates the cost of the run B aircraft. The
Subcommittee on Economy in Govern-
ment concluded in its unanimous report
the following:
Not only were the price increases made
possible by the repricing formula, but the
cost overruns which are resulting in the
higher prices may very well have been en-
couraged by the existence of the formula
and by the nature of the formula. For the
mere fact that a repricing provision existed
in the contract constituted a built-in get-
well remedy for almost any kind of cost
growth. According to this provision, the price
of the second increment (run B) could be
increased ori the basis of excessive actual
costs on the first increment (run A). The
motivation, if any, of the incentive feature
of the contract is thereby largely nullified,
provided the contractor is confident that
the Government will exercise the option. Why
bother to keep coats down if their increase
forms the basis for a higher price? Addi-
tionally, because of the nature of the for-
mula, the higher the percentage of overrun
over the original contract ceiling price on
the first increment, the higher the per-
centage by which the second increment is
repriced.
As I have indicated, the Air Force itself
now recognizes that the repricing for-
mula was a serious mistake. The mistake
was so serious that the Air Force says it
would now like to renegotiate the con-
tract to remove the reverse incentive fea-
ture. The Air Force review of the C.-5A
program calls for such a renegotiation.
The problem, however, cannot be so
easily resolved. Revising the contract to
eliminate or modify the repricing form-
ula will not make this a good contract
nor will it necessarily reduce the cost of
the C-5A to the Government. And the
cost is what is at issue here.
SHOULD STOP AFTER FIRST RUN
There is no way, in my judgment, to
get out from under the huge cost of this
program without curtailing it at this
point. If the program is. ended at the
completion of the first 58 aircraft, Lock-
heed would be forced to absorb the cost
of overruns for which they are responsi-
ble, over and above the ceiling price in
the contract. There is no reason for Lock-
heed not to absorb the costs over and
above the ceiling price.
And these costs, by the way, would in-
clude the possibly extensive costs brought
about by the recent failure of the C-5A
wing to meet structural strength require-
ments. I might add here that the failure
of the C-5A to meet the structural
strength requirements in the contract is
a serious matter. It is no excuse to say
that the plane is satisfactory to 100 per-
cent of its designed load limit, and that
it only fails to meet 150 percent of the
designed load limit. The fact is that the
150 percent provides for a safety feature
which is absolutely essential before any
plane can be deemed airworthy. The FAA,
according to my understanding, would
require this plane to meet 200 percent of
its designed load limit. But the Air Force
has decided for some reason which it has
not made known, not to seek FAA certi-
fication, although the contract provides
for FAA certification. In addition, the
fact that the plane failed to meet the
static tests indicates that it would more
than likely fail under dynamic condi-
tions. Static tests only simulate dynamic
conditions. The static tests that occur on
the ground do not create the same kind of
stresses on an airframe that is created
during the dynamic conditions that occur
in the air.
LETTER TO SECRETARY
On this point I wrote a letter to Robert
Seamans, Secretary of the Air Force, on
July 18, 1969, inquiring about the report-
ed crack in the C-5A wing. I also ad-
dressed certain questions to the Secretary
relating to recent changes in the C-5A
specifications which seem to represent
degradations in its performance stand-
ards. So far I have had no response from
the Secretary of the Air Force to my
letter, although I wrote him on July 18!
However, I believe that what I said to
him was pertinent to this discussion:
JULY 18, 1969.
The Hon. ROBERT C. SEAMANS, Jr.,
Secretary of the Air Force, Department of
Defense, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
DEAR Ma. SECRETARY: I have noted the re-
cent announcement by the Air Force that
tests of a C-5A aircraft produced a crack in
one of its wings.
This development seems to me to raise ad-
ditional questions about the C-5A program.
You may be aware of recent testimony by
Mr. A. E. Fitzgerald before the Subcommittee
on Eat:moray in Government with regard to
certain changes in the C-5A specifications.
One of the changes, according to Mr. Fitz-
gerald, is a decrease in the maximum speed
for lowering flaps on landing from 205 knots
to 180 knots. Another change is a decrease
In the maximum allowable sink rate at land-
ing. It occurs to me that both of these
changes represent degradations in the C-SA
specifications.
What are the reasons for lowering the
standards of the C-5A specifications?
Have wing cracks, fuselage cracks, or any
other substantial defects been produced in
the C-SA prior to July 13, 1969, by ground
static tests or other tests or usage of this
aircraft?
Were the performance standards for the
C-&A lowered because defects were produced
in previous tests?
Would you be normally advised of any
defects produced from the C-SA during tests?
Will the delivery schedule for the C-5A be
affected by the current difficulty? If the
delivery schedule will be delayed, please esti-
mate the amount of the delay.
Please estimate the cost of fixing the cur-
rent difficulty (the cracked wing). Who will
pay the cost of necessary modifications, the
Government or the contractor?
In the event that Congress does not auth-
orize the purchase of the Run B aircraft,
who would pay the costs of the modifica-
tions made necessary by the cracked wing?
In the event that Congress does authorize
the purchase of Run B, who would pay the
costs of the modifications?
Your early response to these questions
will be appreciated.
Sincerely,
WILLIAM PROXM/RE,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Economy in
Government.
IS GOVERNMENT LIABLE FOR REPAIRS4
The question that we also need an-
swered is whether the purchase of the 23
additional aircraft would make the Gov-
ernment liable for the cost of repairs and
modifications necessary to correct the
structural defect. This is one of the ques-
tions which my amendment seeks to an-
swer. In the amendment, the Comptrol-
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August 13, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL ? A
ler General is instructed specifically to
seek an answer to this question.
I should add here that according to the
lawyers for the contractor, the Govern-
ment would be liable not only for the
costs of repairing the cracked wing and
making whatever modifications are nec-
essary, but would also be liable for all
contractor losses and termination costs
if the full 120 aircraft are not procured.
This view is based on the fact that the
Secretary of the Air Force early this year
exercised the option to purchase the fol-
low-on aircraft.
The exercise of this option was an-
nounced on the morning of the January
16, 1969, hearings before the Subcom-
mittee on Economy in Government, of
which I am chairman. This announce-
ment came in spite of my request to the
Secretary of Defense that the Govern-
ment not commit itself to purchase the
Run B aircraft until a complete investi-
gation of the cost overruns could be com-
pleted. The investigation I asked for was
not even started on the morning of Jan-
uary 16, when the announcement of the
Government was made.
COST OF SPARES
The amendment I have introduced ad-
dresses itself to several other cost issues,
including the cost of spares. The Air
Force has consistently tried to gloss over
and obscure the huge cost increases that
have occurred on the spare parts. It has
even attempted to create the impression
that the original contract did not include
the cost of spares. This is not true. The
contract entered into in 1965 with Lock-
heed did not include the cost of spares.
Now the Air Force claims that the ori-
ginal contract included only the cost of
Initial spares as distinguished from re-
plenishment spares. The difference, as
it has been explained to me by the Air
Force, is that the initial spares would be
comparable to the first set of tires on an
automobile needed to replace the ori-
ginal tires, while the replenishment
spares would be the second and third set
of new tires.
The question, then, is whether the ori-
ginal contract estimates included the cost
of the replenishment spares.
REPLENISHMENT SPARES IN CONTRACT
In answering that question, I would
first point out that the contract itself
contains a provision covering the costs
of replenishment spare parts and repair
spare parts. Secondly, it has always been
assumed by persons familiar with the
contract from its origin that replenish-
ment spares were included in the orig-
inal contract estimates. This assump-
tion is based on the description of the to-
tal package contract described by the
Air Force in 1966 and on an early brief-
infl document written in 1965. The Air
Force's description of total packaging,
as I stated earlier, indicated that all
anticipated development, production,
and as much support as is feasible was
to be included in the total package con-
tract. This would include spare parts,
whether initial or replenishment.
Further, the briefing document which
I referred to states explicitly that re-
plenishment spare parts are to be in-
cluded as part of the C-5A package. I
will now read from this briefing docu-
ment. On the title page is the following:
Contract AF 33(657) 15053 FPLF-VP, C-5A,
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Lockheed?
Georgia Div.
On page 3 of this document, which was
prepared by the Air Force, is the follow-
ing:
What we bought: Item A?RDT&E, Sys-
tem Integration and Assembly ACFT/Mis-
sion Kits, Training/Training Equipment,
AGE, System Test, System Management,
Data and Reports.
On page 4, this list of what the Air
Force bought continues:
What we bought: Item B?Production,
ACFT/Mission Kits, Training & Train-
ing Equipment, AGE, Contract Technical
Services.
Provisions for: Initial Spare and Repair
Parts, Replenishment Spare and Repair
Parts, Up Dating/Modification Changes.
It will be noted, of course, that the
list of what the Air Force bought with
the C-5A contract included initial spare
and repair parts as well as replenishment
spare and repair parts.
In my judgment, the Air Force is in-
tentionally attempting to confuse the
Congress and the people on the subject
of spare parts.
Mr. President, I go into the detail on
replenishment spare parts because again
and again we have had different esti-
mates as to the original cost of the C-5A
and as to its present cost. Repeatedly,
those who have argued that the overrun
is not $2 billion but some lesser figure
It is $1.4 or $1.3 billion?have said that
in the initial estimates, replenishment
spare parts were not included, and that
by adding the cost of replenishment
spare parts in the present estimates, we
are not comparing the same things. I go
into this detail today to estabilsh beyond
any question the documentation to show
that I am comparing the same things,
that the replenishment spare parts are
included in both, and that on that basis
there is a $1.9 billion to $2 billion
overrun.
Rarely has there been a case with so
much concealment and obstruction on
the part of a Government agency with
respect to its handling of public funds
that has been so well demonstrated and
documented in public hearings. The cal-
lous and devious treatment by the Air
Force of one of its employees, Mr. A. E.
Fitzgerald, well illustrates this point.
FITZGERALD CASE
Mr. Fitzgerald has been the deputy
for Management Systems, Office of the
Secretary of the Air Force, for almost
4 years. His responsibilities until recent
months included development of the
management controls used on the C-5A
program. He was also a member of the
steering committee reviewing the financ-
ing of the C-5A. He was first asked to
testify before the Subcommittee on
Economy in Government last November
because of his recognized expertise in
the area of management systems and
cost controls.
Mr. Fitzgerald's problems began when
he was invited to testify. The Air Force
first attempted to deny his appearance
before the subcommittee altogether. Only
S 9977
after repeated urgings by my office did
the Air Force finally relent and grudg-
ingly permit him to appear. However,
the Air Force notified me that Mr. Fitz-
gerald was to appear only in the capacity
of a "backup" witness. The main witness
was to be someone else. But this some-
one else was an individual with whom
the subcommittee was not familiar and
whom it had not invited.
In other words, the Department of De-
fense was attempting to dictate to the
Subcommittee of Congress who was to
be its principle witness: and the Depart-
ment of Defense had taken it upon itself
to inform us of the appearance of some-
one who was not invited, while relegating
the individual who was invited to
"backup" status. Of course, the subcom-
mittee insisted on hearing from Mr.
Fitzgerald, and we did.
However, the Air Force denied Mr.
Fitzgerald the opportunity to prepare a
written statement, although the sub-
committee had requested a written state-
ment from him in our letter of invitation.
A written statement permits the witness
to organize his testimony in an orderly
way, and to prepare statistical data,
charts, and other materials. It also
provides a committee with a chance to
become familiar with the testimony in
advance of the hearing, to prepare
thoughtful questions, and to have a more
fruitful dialog with the witness. But the
subcommittee was denied this oppor-
tunity because of tbe directive to Mr.
Fitzgerald not to prepare a written
statement.
The only explanation, in my judgment,
is that the Pentagon was attempting to
interfere with this witness' testimony by
gagging him as much as possible.
This explanation is amply supported
by the events that followed Mr. Fitz-
gerald's oral testimony in November. In
his oral testimony, responding to direct
questions from me, he conceded the fact
that there would be a cost overrun on the
C-5A, possibly as high as $2 billion.
COMPUTER ERROR
Less than 2 weeks after his testimony,
he was notified of his loss of Civil Service
tenure. Imagine that. Less than 2 weeks
after this man testified before a congres-
sional committee and simply answered a
question put to him--and as far as we
know he answered it honestly?he was
notified of the loss of his civil service
tenure by the Air Force. The Air Force
claims that this action was only coinci-
dental to the fact that he had recently
testified before the Subcommittee on
Economy in Government about the C-5A.
It was called a "computer error." We
checked on the basis of the latest testi-
mony and found that the,computer made
very few errors. It had made two errors
before that were similar to this one, al-
though it made some 50,000 decisions.
Whether the Air Force's action in strip-
ping Fitzgerald of his job protection was
a coincidence may be judged from the
events that followed. For the subcommit-
tee subsequently obtained a copy of a
memorandum to the Secretary of the Air
Force from the Secretary's administra-
tive assistant. The memorandum was
dated January 6, 1969.
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S 9978 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 18, 1969
GET RID OF )11ZGRRALD
The intriguing feature of this memo-
randum is that it concerns ways in which
the Air Force could get Ad of Mr. Fitz-
gerald. I think the Members of this body
ought to think about this a few minutes.
Here was the Secretary of the Air Force,
Harold Brown, receiving an interoffice
memorandum from his administrative
assistant. The subject of the memoran-
dum was ways by which the Air Force
could get rid of one of its civilian em-
ployees. The civilian employee happened
to be Mr. A. E. Fitzgerald. The civilian
employee happened to have testified be-
fore a committee of Congress on the costs
of the C-5A cargo plant. The civilian
employee testified that there would be a
$2 billion cost overrun oh -this program.
Previously the Air Force had gone to
great lengths to hide the costs of the
overruns. Less than 2 weeks after his
testimony the civilian employee was
stripped of his Civil Service public ten-
ure. A few weeks later a memorandum
is prepared by the administrative assist-
ant on how to get rid of the civilian em-
ployee. Is this still a coincidence?
The memorandum itself explained for
the benefit of Secretary Brown three
separate actions "which could result in
Mr. Fitzgerald's departure" They were,
first, adverse actions for cause. Second.
reduction in force. Third, conversion of
Mr Fitzgerald's position from an ex-
cepted category to career service, and
then eliminating him in subsequent com-
petitive procedures. To etplain the last
possibility, the memorandum contains
this example of Air Force ethical
constraints:
This action is not recommended since It
is rather underhanded and Would probably
not be approved by the Civil Service Com-
mission, even though it is legally and pro-
cedurally possible.
A coincidence?
I have done everything in my power
to prevent the Air For oe from taking
punitive action against Mr. Fitzgerald.
In my view, he is a dedicated, loyal Fed-
eral employee and citizen, whose conduct
is beyond reproach. His only offense is
that he is cost conscious. His job is to
control costs, to save the taxpayers'
money. He works at this job conscien-
tiously and tries to save as much of the
taxpayers' money as possible.
He is extremely competent in this area.
He is one of those rare persons who is
highly gifted and who has had the char-
acter and the strength to persist in what
is an unpopular job of trying to hold
down costs. This is the kind of conduct
which engenders real hostility on the
part of contractors and others who
worked with him in the Air Force and
the Pentagon.
COLD CLIMATE FOR F/TZGERALD
Unfortunately, there are those in high
places in the Air Force and in the De-
partment of Defense who do not agree
with this approach to Government
spending. And these persons have been
responsible for the peculiar coincidences
affecting Mr. Fitzgerald's job. Even now
they are attempting to hound and dis-
credit him.
His major responsibilities have been
taken away from him. Instead of the
major weapons systems for which he was
formerly responsible, his new job is to
look into the cost overruns on a bowl-
ing alley in Thailand.
But perhaps the most reprehensible
and dangerous acts committed by the
Air Force in connection with Mr. Fitz-
gerald's appearance before the subcom-
mittee relates to the supplemental testi-
mony the subcommittee requested last
November. The subcommittee had asked
Mr. Fitzgerald to prepare certain cost
data and other information in writing,
to be submitted to the subcommittee fol-
lowing the close of oral testimony. Among
other things, the? subcommittee had
asked for a breakdown of the C-5A cost
overruns. The request was made on No-
vember 13, 1968.
DELAYED TRANSMITTAL
Not until December 24, 1968, did the
subcommittee receive the materials from
Mr. Fitzgerald, and only after the sub-
committee has raised strenuous objec-
tions to the delay in transmitting the
supplemental testimony. In fact, as the
subcommittee later learned, Mr. Fitz-
gerald had prepared his supplemental
testimony within a few days of the No-
vember 13 apeparance and had turned
it over to the Air Force for transmittal
to the subcommittee. The Air Force had
held on to the supplemental testimony
and intentionally delayed its transmittal
for more than 4 weeks.
The materials received on -December
24, were labeled "Insert for the Record
testimony of A. E. Fitzgerald." How-
ever, upon checking with Mr. Fitzgerald,
the subcommittee learned that the mate-
rials received on December 24 were not
the same materials prepared by Mr. Fitz-
gerald. They had been altered by the
Air Force. More importantly the Air
Force had altered the C-5A cost esti-
mates prepared by Mr. Fitzgerald. The
alterations made it appear that Mr. Fitz-
gerald's figures corresponded with the
official Air Force figures contained in its
November 19 press release.
The subcommittee advised the Air
Force that it would not accept the mate-
rials received on December 24 as the
testimony of A. E. Fitzgerald. We in-
sisted on our right to receive the true
and accurate testimony of the witness,
unaltered and uncensored by the Air
Force. The subcommittee finally, on
January 15, received Mr. Fitzgerald's au-
thentic and uncensored testimony.
The Air Force's attempts to muzzle,
interfere and alter the testimony of Mr.
Fitzgerald cannot be justified. They ap-
pear to have been almost desperate and
panic stricken in their efforts to prevent
public disclosure of the C-5A overrun.
The Air Force testimony in two separate
committees of Congress in March and
May of 1968 that there was no C-5A
overrun should be considered in this con-
nection.
LATE REPORTING OF OVERRUN
What also needs to be considered is
the fact that they began to learn of
the C-15A overrun as early as November
1966. During that month an Air Force
team, which included Mr. Fitzgerald, vis-
ited the Air Force plant in Marietta,
Ga., where the C-5A was being pro-
duced. The review team found overruns
of up to 100 percent in key segments of
the program.
That was in 1966, a year and a half
before Mr. Flax testified before an ap-
propriations subcommittee of the House
that there were no overruns, and that
the costs were between the cost and the
ceiling.
The second visit 3 weeks later con-
firmed the initial observation. The over-
run in the C-5A program grew steadily
in late 1966. Yet, according to the evi-
dence received by the subcommittee, evi-
dence of its existence began disappear-
ing from Department of Defense internal
reports. In 1968 evidence of the over-
runs also disappeared from internal Air
Force reports. In fact, the Air Force re-
ports had been changed by directive from
higher headquarters to eliminate the
evidence of the C-5A overruns. Mr. Fitz-
gerald requested an audit to determine
the true facts about the C-5A costs but
it was never performed.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. PROXMIRE. I am happy to yield
to the Senator from Virginia.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. The Senator
from Wisconsin mentioned that the rec-
ords were altered, and I believe he said
by higher authority. Could the Senator
identify the higher authority more pre-
cisely?
Mr. PROXMIRE. I cannot identify it
other than by saying that the informa-
tion, the testimony of Mr. Fitzgerald, was
sent to us and we received it. We then
checked with Mr. Fitzgerald and he said
that that was not his testimony, that it
had been changed by persons in the Air
Force. Unfortunately, at the present
time, I do not know and I cannot tell
the distinguished Senator from Virginia
who it was that changed that testimony.
I will do my best to determine the
identity of that person, or persons, and
provide it for the RECORD.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I was not so
much concerned about that as whether it
was done within the Air Force or by a
higher echelon; namely, the Depart-
ment of Defense as differentiated from
the Air Force.
Mr. PROXMIRE, Again, I would have
to say to the distinguished Senator from
Virginia that I am not sure. I think he
makes a good point. It could come from
either source. It would not be fair to the
Air Force to assume that it was likely
they, because it might very well have
come from the Department of Defense.
Mr. Fitzgerald worked insthe office of the
Secretary of the Air Force. His superior
was in the office of the Secretary of the
Air Force. On the other hand, he did
work with the Department of Defense in
this, and it could have come from either
area, both of which, of course, would be
higher headquarters than Mr. Fitzgerald.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I have had
great concern about this contract, just
as has the Senator from Wisconsin. I
shall not further interrupt the Senator
at this time, but when he finishes his
address, I should like to go over a few
points with him.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Very good.
Mr. President, I believe that the evi-
dence in the case indicts the Air Force
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August- 13, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE S 9979
and Department of Defense for its han-
dling of the C-5A program. The C-5A
has been mismanaged and public funds
have been mishandled. The Air Force
has shown its great disregard for the
heavy responsibility it has over the use
of public funds, and it has shown serious
disrespect for Congress by its high-
handed conduct.
MISMANAGED WEAPONS SYSTEM
I might point out that the Air Force
is not alone in this regard. The House
investigation of the Army Sheridan tank
program revealed similar disclosure
problems, deceptions, and mismanage-
ment on the part of the military. The
Aerospace Daily and Executive Report,
a trade newspaper, on July 30, 1969, com-
mented on certain aspects of the tank
and the C-5A cases. I believe what the
Aerospace Daily has to say on this mat-
ter is significant because that journal
can by no means be labeled as critical
of military spending or of the aerospace
industry. I will therefore read excerpts
from what the Aerospace Daily has to
say:
Pentagon internal reporting has come un-
der fire and suspicion as an outgrowth of
findings of the House Army tank investiga-
tion and Congressional hearings on the C-5A
jet transport cost overrun.
In the $2.5 billion Army tank procurement,
House Armed 8ervices Committee investiga-
tors found internal reports misleading, in-
accurate and deliberately optimistic. Officials
connected with the program were criticized
for failing to provide objective information to
high command upon which logical and sup-
portable decisions could be made.
In the now $4.6 billion C-SA Galaxy trans-
port procurement, Air Force admits that it
deliberately did not report for two years
initial and continuing cost growth which
showed up only five months Into the eight-
year program.
In the fl7st case, Army claimed it wrote
optimistic reports on development of the
M-551 Sheridan light assault reconaissance
vehicle and its Shillelagh weapons system
because at every reporting period developers
"believed" serious deficiencies were shortly
to be corrected. The House investigation
shows they were not in many cases, despite 10
years of work.
In the second case, Air Force said it with-
held cost growth because it did not want to
jeopardize the financial condition, in the
stock market and elsewhere of its only C-5A
supplier.
As a result of these faulty reports, Con-
gressmen and Senators charged with respon-
sibility for authorizing and appropriating De-
fense funds have been abashed to discover
they are the last persons to find out about
unsolved developmental problems and cost
overruns. In a time of inflation, high taxes
and serious Federal budget constraints, they
are placed in a tenuous position vis a vie
their constituents.
The article then points out that the
Senate Armed Services Committee has
requested quarterly reports on cost,
schedule, and performance on 31 major
weapons systems and that it is consider-
ing having the General Accounting Office
monitor contracts, The Aerospace Daily
continues:
How effective this step will be has to be
seen. House tank investigators found that
GAO was denied access to Army records, a
procedure which the Pentagon can invoke
under "executive privilege" precedents. Fur-
ther complications are caused by differing
record-keeping and auditing procedures used
by the services and by their contractors.
A price example is the fact that in the
C-5A procurement Air Force estimates that
contractor Lockheed Air Craft will lose $285
million. Lockheed estimates it will lose $13
million but make a profit after spares are
ordered. The systems analysts in Laird's of-
fice have still another set of figures.
It remains that the Pentagon's veracity has
been hurt by the findings of Congressional
inquiries into the tank and transport pro-
curements. Members of Congress can forgive
and forget if they feel they made a bad de-
cision based on objective information. But if
the information they received was not honest,
they will look at future Pentagon reports
askance, and take them with a very large
grain of salt.
TIME TO CALL A HALT
What all of this adds up to, in my
judgment, is that the Congress must call
a halt to Pentagon shenanigans. The C-
5A case symbolizes the worst aspects of
military procurement. The Air Force has
been managing this program since 1965
and it has utterly failed to do a good job.
Public funds have been squandered on a
program of dubious value which will cost
at least $2 billion more than Congress
originally agreed to pay. Where are the
C-5A overruns leading? The recent Air
Force report admits that "there is a dis-
tinctive possibility that costs may con-
tinue to increase." I believe that this
statement means that the Air Force is
putting the Congress on notice that it
will come in at a later date to ask for
even more money for the C-5A.
Mr. President, let me add that when
Assistant Secretary Whittaker briefed
me in my office a few days ago he said
that, too. He said that there is evidence
of further cost growth, that we have not
seen the end of the overruns on the C-5A,
that we cannot say that $2 billion is the
limit; it could be more. There is every
Indication that it will be more. As a mat-
ter of fact, the Air Force now is being
franker in predicting overruns than it
has been at any time.
The American people deserve a better
accounting of its tax money with respect
to the C-5A program than we can now
give. My amendment will at least place
the Congress in a position of knowing
what the real military requirements for
the 23 additional aircraft are and what
the economic justification for them is.
The amendment asks the General Ac-
counting Office for an investigation of
the facts and to submit its findings with
recommendations to the Congress within
90 days.
NEED MORE KNOWLEDGE
Clearly it is not unreasonable to re-
fuse to authorize any additional C-5A's
until we know more about this program.
Furthermore, if it is determined that
there is a military requirement for the
23 additional aircraft, then I believe we
ought to know what they will cost and
whether their costs will be ballooned by
the re-pricing formula. I therefore urge
the adoption of the amendment.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that sections from the.Subcommit-
tee on Economy in Government Report
on the Economics of Military Procure-
ment, on the C-5A overruns, which in-
eludes a table on the cost overruns, be
printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the excerpts
were ordered to be printed in the REC-
ORD, as follows:
2. COST OVERRUNS: THE C?CA CARGO PLANE
The Air Force selected the Lockheed Air-
craft Corp. as the airframe prime contractor
for the C-5A, a large, long-range, heavy
logistic aircraft, on September 30, 1965, after
proposals had been received in response to
Requests for Proposals (RFP) from 5 firms,
and preliminary contracts had been entered
into with 3 of them in 1961. It is not clear,
from the evidence, how much price compe-
tition had to do with the selection. Secretary
Charles testified that there was competition
among the firms. But when asked how low
Lockheed's bid was compared to the others,
he refused to disclose the figures on the
grounds that "this is company proprietary
information". A similar procedure resulted
in the selection of General Electric as the
engine manufacturer.
The contract with Lockheed is a negotiated,
fixed price incentive fee contract. It is also
the first contract utilizing the total pack-
age procurement concept (TPPC). Two major
objectives of the concept, according to the
Defense Department, are to discourage con-
tractors from buying in on a design and de-
velopment contract with the intention of re-
covering on a subsequent production con-
tract, and to motivate contractors to design
for economical production and support of
operational hardware. Thus, TPPC is sup-
posed to act as a deterrent against cost over-
runs and less-than-promised performance.
To accomplish this, all development, pro-
duction, and as much support as is feasible
of a system throughout its anticipated life,
Is to besprocured in a single contract, as one
total package. The contract includes price
and performance commitments to motivate
the contractor to control costs, perform to
specifications, and produce on time, As the
C-5A is an incentive contract (TPPC 'does
not necessarily result in incentive contract-
ing) it contains the usual financial rewards
and penalties associated with incentive con-
tracting.
The C-SA contract for the airframe pro-
vides for five research, development, test and
evaluation (R.D.T. & E.) aircraft plus an ini-
tial production run of 53 airplanes (the total
of 58 planes is called run A), and a Govern-
ment option for additional airplane. The
present approved program for the C-5A is
120 airplanes comprised of run A (58 air-
planes) plus run B (57 airplanes) plus five
airplanes from run Cl.
The testimony received during the No-
vember 1968 hearings indicated a cost over-
run in the C-5A program totaling as much
as $2 billion. A "cost overrun" is the amount
in excess of the original target cost. Accord-
ing to the testimony, the program originally
called for 120 C-5A airplanes to cost the
Government $3.4 billion, but because of cost
overruns mainly being experienced in the
performance of the Lockheed contract actual
costs would total $5.3 billion,
Following the November hearings, Senator
Proxmire asked GAO to investigate into the
causes and amount of the C-5A overruns and
other matters relating to the contract.
On November 19, 1968, the Air Force an-
nounced, in a press release, that the original
estimate for 120 C-5A aircraft was $3.1 bil-
lion, compared to the current estimate of
$4.3 billion. Subsequently, in response to a
request by the subcommittee, Mr. Fitzger-
ald, who was responsible for the develop-
ment of a management controls used on the
C-5A and who was on a steering committee
directing a financial review of the C-5A,
supplied a breakdown of the estimates of
C-5A program cost to completion. This data
showed Air Force estimates for 120 airplanes
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 13I 1969
was $3.4 billion in 1965, and $5,3 billion in cal advances beyond the state of the art, dismayed to learn that this decision was
1968, indicating an overran of about $2 bil- The inflation argument, which is supposed made before the completion of the GOO in-
lion. The difference between the Air Force to account for $500 million of the cost vestigation and without a full disclosure of
press release and the data supplied by Mr. growth, appears questionable. The contract the reasons for the cost overruns. The public
Fitzgerald seecos to be accounted for in the contains an inflation provision to protect the interest in economy in Government was not
figures for spare parts. The data supplied by contractor from unforeseeable price changes served by this precipitous decision, an-
Mr. Fitzgerald shows $0.3 billion for spares in the economy, to go into effect 3 years after flounced a few hours before the start of a
estimated in 1965, and $0.0 billion in 1968. the issuance of the initial contract, that is, congressional hearing and a few days before
If the figures for spares are celded to the esti- October 1, 1968. The initial 3-year period the inauguration of the new President,
mates in the Air Force press release, the tele was supposed to be considered &normal busi-
sets of figures are close to r.ne another. new riek. The Air Force official explanation Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President,
In the January 16 follow up hearing, GAO of this provision states: "The contract thus will the Senator from Wisconsin yield?
reported on its investigation, the nature of included in the price an amount which re- Mr. PROXMIRE. I am happy to yield
Which is discussed below on page 40. Briefly, fleeted a projection of the mounting cost to the Senator from Virginia.
GAO transmitted to the subcommittee lig- trend in the economy of labor, materials,
urea supplied by the Air Force 2 days prior equipment, and subcontract prices." If fu- Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I do not want
to the hearing. These figura; indicated a sub- ture inflation for at least 3 years was in- at this time, to comment on the amend-
to
overrun but a smaller total cost for eluded in the price, it is hard to see why ment offered by the Senator from Wis-
the overall C-5A program than the $5.3 bil- inflation should be a major factor in later consin because I want to give it more
lion figure shown in the November hearth. s increasing the price. Without a more study than I have had the opportunity
The reason for the lower total was the orals- thorough investigation of the Go5A program, to give it up to this point. However, I
sion by the Air Force at the COatS Of the the technical problems encountered, the commend him for going so fully and into
spares, failure to anticipate them at the time of the
Nevertheless, testimony and other en- negotiation, and operations of the inflation such detail in regard to the C-5A con-
dence received in the course of the hearings provision, the subcommittee cannot form any tract.
confirmed the existence of the approximately firm conclusions about the reasons for the It seems to me the Senator from WiS-
$2 billion overrun in the CaiA program, the enormous overrun. consin has rendered both the Senate and
reverse incentives contained in the repric- A repricing formula built into the contract the American people a real service.
lag formula, and large overruns in other Air was also revealed in the November testimony. I have been deeply concerned with re-
Force programs. The latest estimate of the The repricing formula is one of the most gard to this contract, which appears to
total cost of 120 C-5A's, including spares, blatant reverse incentives ever encountered me to be so flexible and so ambiguous
provided by Secretary Charles., is $5.1 billion, by this subcommittee, it should be recalled
This is close to the estimate previously sup- that the Coco contract is supposed to repre- that either party can do almost anything
plied by Mr. Fitzgerald, and about $2 billion sent an important step toward cost control. it might wish to do.
more than was estimated in 1965. The eel- An Aix Force manual on the total package In that connection, I ask unanimous
lowing table shows the estimates supplied procurement concept dated May 10, 1966, consent to insert In the RECORD at this
by Mr. Fitzgerald, the Air Force press re- states that "It should produce not only lower point some inquiries that I put to the
lease of November 19, 1468, and Assistant Costs on the first production units, but, in
Secretary Charles: president of Lockheed and other officials
turn, a lower take-off point on the produc- of Lockheed when they appeared before
COMPARISON OF ESTIMATES OF C 5A PROGRAM tion learning curve, thus benefiting every the Committee on Armed Services. That
unit in the production run." The facts about
Iln billions of dollar A the C-5A axe just the reverse. Costs for the testimony begins on page 2150, beginning
Whether the actual performance of the t.-D&
Fitzgerald
Air,Forre
relcasel
Charles
1965
1968
1965
1968
1965
1968
120 aircraft:
ROT. & E. plus
production
AFLC 2 invest-
$3.1
$4.4
$3.1
$4.3
p.3
ment
.3
.9
.8
Tote:
3.4
5.3
3. 1
4.3
5,1
with, "Senator BYRD of Virginia. Thank
first production units are greatly exceeding
original estimates, resulting in higher take- you, Mr. Chairman," and goes through
off point on the production learning curve, page 2152, ending with, "Senator BYRD
thus inflating every unit in the production of Virginia. Thank you very much."
run. In addition, the contract is supposed to There being no objection, the extract
provide the Government with binding COM- was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
mitrnents on price and performance. Obvi- as follows:
ously, there is in fact no binding comm..
rnent on price if the price can be modified Senator Byrd?
upwards, as is being done in the C-5A, be- Senator BYRD of Virginia. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman,
cause
cause actual costs are exceeding estimates.
lives up to its promise remains to be
shall not attempt to second-guess either
the Air Force or Lockheed on this contract.
seen.
On the matter of delivery, it is
Necessarily it is a very
interesting
complicated one. It
1 The Air Force press release of Nov.19.1968, did not provide to note that the Air Force announced on does seem to one after 2 days at hearings it is
cost breakdowns between RAT. & E. (iesearch development, February 25, 1969, a 6-month delay in the a very flexible one and a very ambiguolis one
testing, and engineering), production ruus, and AFLC invest- first operational C-5A aircraft from June I woud like to get an understanding of a
meat. The figures given seem to omit Atia investment. 1969 to'Deceinber 1969. couple of things.
by Fitzgerald includes spare parts; that submitted by Charles
2 AFLC (Air Force Logistics Command) investment submitted
Not only were the price increases made As I recollect Mr. May's chart, Lockheed
includes initial spares, replenishment .pares, and support. possible by the repricing formula, but the says that the cost to the Government when
Table submitted by Secretary Charles (heilings, pt. 1, p. 311) cost overruns which are resulting in the high- Mr. MAY. Yes, sir.
the contract is completed will be $3.2 billion.
does not include estimates for 1965.
er prices may very well have been encouraged
The cost growth in the 0-5/1 program can by the existence of the formula and by the Senator BYRD of Virginia. Now the Air
be seen in the table. The figures supplied nature of the formula. For the mere fact Force testified yesterday, said I checked my
by Fitzgerald show an ineeease from $3.4 that a repricing provision existed in the memory a little while ago, that the cost to
billion in 1965 to $5.3 billion in 1968. The contract constituted a built-in get-well rem- the Government will be $4.3 billion, or a
Air Force press release can be reconciled with edy for almost any kind of cost growth. difference of more than $1 billion, and could
the Fitzgerald figures if the AFSLC inveet- According to this provision, the price of the it be explained where that $1 billion is?
meat (spares) is added to each of the esti- second increment (run B) could be increased Mr. MAY. Senator Byrd, I think we have to
mates. Thut, the $3.1 billion estimate for on the basis of excessive actual costs on the recognize that the Air Force estimates are
1965 would total $3.4 billion, and the $4.3 first increment (run A), The motivation, if for the total program, including the Govern-
billion estimate for 1968 would total $5.2 any, of the incentive feature of the contract ment-furnished engines. Our projections that
billion. Secretary Charles' own figures far is thereby largely nullified, provided the con- we showed you are only for that portion of
1968 total $5.1 billion. The subcommittee re- tractor is confident that the Government the cost that Lockheed is responsible for,
jects the attempts of Air Force spokesmen will exercise the option. Why bother to keep and this involves primarily the airframe.
to minimize the size of the program or the costs down if their increase forms the basis Now that differential that you speak of, as
size of the overrun by removing spares 8.8 for a higher price? Additionally, because of best I can understand it consists therefore
an item of oost. Spares are an integral part the nature of the formula, the higher the of items that are not within the framework
of the Co5A program and shOuld be included percentage of overrun over the original con- of our contract, plus the difference in esti-
in any consideration of costs, tract ceiling price on the first increment, the mates that exist between what the Air Force
According, to the Air Force, tile coat growth
higher the percentage by which the second feels our mete will be and what we feel they
in the Ch-&A program has resulted from nor-
increment is repriced. will be for 115 airframes.
mal development problems associated with The subcommittee learned, on the morn- Senator BYRD of Virginia. You feel that
complex weapons and inflation However, the ing of the January 16, 1969, hearing, that the your cost will be a great deal less than the
subcommittee notes that the C--543 was Air Force had exercised the run. B option Air Force believes your cost will be?
chosen for the first application of the total for 57 additional C-5A aircraft, apparently Mr. MAY. I think the Air Force estimate is
package procurement concept partly for the committing the Government to spend at least approximately $200 million higher than ours
complex weapon system requiring technologi.
reason that it was not considered a highly $5.1 billion an aircraft originally estimated through 115 airplanes, and that the differ-
to cost $3.3 billion. The subcommittee was ence in those numbers that you are citing
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'August 13, 1969
is accounted for by the prime contract with
the General Electric Co. for the furnishing of
their TF-39 engines.
Senator BYRD of Virginia. Then the cost to
the Government, if you take Lockheed's
figure, is not $3 billion which your chart
shows? That is only your part of the contract?
Mr. MAY. Yes. We feel that is the only por-
tion that we are competent to testify about.
Senator BYRD of Virginia. Yes, I agree with
that, but I wanted to get clear that the total
contract, the total cost to the Government
will not be $3.2 billion for the total con-
tract. It will be $3.2 billion if you are correct
insofar as Lockheed's share is concerned.
Mr. MAY. That is correct, sir.
Senator BYRD of Virginia. You have a dif-
ference between the Air Force and the Lock-
heed Company, there is a difference of about
$272 million, as I understand the figures.
The loss would be 285 if the Air Force is cor-
rect, while it would be roughly $13 million if
Lockheed's figures are correct.
Mr. MAY. Yes, sir.
Senator BYRD of Virginia. How much has
Lockheed actually spent_on the C-5A pro-
gram to date? Do you happen to have those
figures?
Mr. MAY. The number is approximately
$1.5 billion, Senator, and we will supply the
precise number for the record if we may.
Senator BYRD of Virginia. You will supply
the precise figure for the record?
Mr. MAY. Yes, sir.
(The information furnished is shown
below.)
"Through May 30, 1969, Lockheed has ex-
pended $1,372,112,173. In addition unliqui-
dated progress payments to subcontractors
amounted to $197,580,196. In total, through
May 30, 1969, the amount was $1,569,682,369."
Senator BYRD of Virginia. Now, how much
has Lockheed received from the Federal Gov-
ernment up to this point?
Mr. MAY. I will have to supply that for the
record, sir.
(The information furnished is shown
below.)
"Cash receipts from the Government
through May 30, 1969, are as follows:
"Final billing for contract line
items delivered $494,
878,
575
"Progress payments to Lock-
heed for work in progress
827,
609,
140
Total 1,
322,
577,
715
"Progress payments to sub-
contractors for work in
progress
197,
580,
196
"As additional information, through May 30,
Lockheed had incurred $91,966,571 in un-
reimbursed work in process costs."
Senator BYRD of Virginia. I am not sug-
gesting that this be done at all, but if the
contract were canceled at the end of Run A,
do you have an estimate as to what Lock-
heed's profit or loss would be?
Mr. HAUGHTON. We do not hal4 such an
estimate, Senator, and we think that it is
past the time when it would be canceled at
Run A, because we already have funding on
Run B, so Rttn B would have to be included
now.
Senator BYRD of Virginia. And as I under-
stand from your reply to one of Senator
Symington's questions, Lockheed feels that
it has a contract for 155 C-5A aircraft.
Mr. HAUGHTON. Subject to certain funding
requirements, yes, sir.
Senator BYRD of Virginia. Of course Con-
gress has not approved the funding, but
Lockheed feels that it does have a contract
for 115 aircraft, provided the Congress funds
the 115 aircraft?
Mr. HArrorroN. Right, yes, sir.
Senator BYRD of Virginia. Now it was testi-
fied yesterday that Lockheed is 6 months be-
hind schedule. Does Lockheed concur in that
assertion?
Mr. HAUGHTON. Yes, sir.
Senator BYRD of Virginia. The contract pro-
vides for a penalty up to a total of $11 mil-
lion for schedule delays. As I understand it,
no penalties have been determined or assessed
at this point.
Mr. HAUGHTON. That is right. There have
been no penalties assessed, because the oper-
ational aircraft are not required for delivery
as of this time.
Senator Bran of Virginia. Yesterday the Air
Force testified that it is not, at this time,
able to estimate as to what the Government
would lose if the program were terminated
at the present time. Does Lockheed have an
estimate as to what the Government loss
would be if the program were to be termi-
nated?
Mr. HAUGHTON. No, sir; we do not, because
it goes out into termination clause for all
the suppliers of the program, and I do not
have that figure. I think that figure would be
very difficult to develop with any accuracy.
Senator BYRD of Virginia. The next ques-
tion may be one that you would prefer not
to answer and I will not press it if you feel
that way for business reasons, but what
percent of the business of the Lockheed Corp.
does the C-SA program represent?
Mr. HAUGHTON. Well, there Is going to be
2 or 3 years in here when it is going to ap-
proximate 25, close to 25 percent of our total
sales. Our sales last year ran $2.2 billion,
and I think our sales average on the C-5
over a 3- or 4-year period would be about
$500 million a year.
Is that about right, Torn?
Mr. MAY. A little higher than that, but
substantially 25 percent.
Mr. HAUGHTON. About 25 percent, maybe a
little more, give or take a little.
Senator BYRD of Virginia. Thank you very
much.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President,
may I ask the Senator from Wisconsin
his estirnate as to the total cost to the
Government if and when the contract is
completed.
Mr. PROXMIRE. The total cost to the
Government, on the basis of the evidence
we have now?and, as I said, my esti-
mate would have to be conservative be-
cause the Air Force tells us it is going to
be higher?is $5.3 billion for the 120
planes.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. As I understand
It, that is the estimate which the Sena-
tor and his staff made. It is not the Air
Force estimate?
Mr. PROXMIRE. I understand the
Air Force estimate is $5.2 billion.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. The Air Force
estimate for the completed contract is
$5.2 billion?
Mr. PROXMIRE. $5.2 billion.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. And the esti-
mate of the Senator from Wisconsin is
what?
Mr. PROXMIRE. $5.3 billion.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Through May
30 of this year, Lockheed has expended,
in round figures, $1.570 billion, accord-
ing to testimony submitted on page 2151
of the committee hearings. Lockheed has
received, during the same period of time,
up to the date of May 30, $1.520 billion,
in round figures, on this contract from
the Government.
Mr. PROXMIRE. This is an important
colloquy. The Senator is pointing out
that Lockheed has received almost 100-
percent reimbursement?not quite, but
very close to it.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Lockheed has
received practically 100-percent reim-
bursement, which means Lockheed has
been operating on Government money.
Would the Senator not agree?
Mr. PROXMIRE. The Senator is abso-
lutely correct, not only with respect to
progress payments, but the Government
owns the plant in which Lockheed is
building the plane. $150 million worth of
equipment is also owned by the Govern-
ment. Therefore, Government capital,
the capital supplying the equipment, is
largely, but not entirely, Government
capital; a great deal of it is; and almost
all of the working capital cost is pro-
vided by the Government.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. So Lockheed
has had the benefit, I calculate, of some-
where around $150 million in interest. If
the Government had not put up the
money and Lockheed had had to go on
the market to borrow the money, Lock-
heed would have been billed for that
money and would have had to pay it.
Mr. PROXMIRE. The Senator has
made a point that escaped me. That
point should be made. $150 million is just
about right. It may be a little more than
that in view of what has happened to
interest rates, but it is close to that.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I would like to
make a further study?
Mr. PROXMIRE. If the Senator will
yield, I want to make the point that
interest payments are not reimbursable.
They are not allocable. So the point is
well made that it would have had a great
effect on Lockheed.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. So Lockheed
has had the benefit of $150 million of
otherwise nonreimbursable cost that has
been paid by the taxpayers.
Mr. PROXMIRE. That is correct.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. So when we
speak of the total cost of the contract,
I think it is well to consider the interest
charges, as well as the other figures the
Senator gave, to make up the total.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I agree wholeheart-
edly with the Senator.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I would like to
read into the RECORD at this point one
paragraph of the statement I made be-
fore the committee last June when the
officials of Lockheed appeared before the
committee.
Now, just another brief comment or two.
Mr. Haughton has mentioned the lack of
flexibility in the contract.
Lockheed had been complaining of lack
of flexibility.
Continuing the statement:
I admit I find the contract very difficult
to understand, but it seems to me that here
is a great deal of flexibility in that contract,
and a great deal of ambiguity in the contract,
to the extent of at least $272 million worth,
because that is the difference between what
the Air Force figures the final figure will be
and what the company figures it will be, so it
seems to me there is a great deal of flexibility,
and the taxpayers will be called upon to
pay somewhere between those two figures,
the one mentioned by the Air Force of 285
million and the other by the company of $13
million. In the way of flexibility, while I
say I do not fully understand the contract, it
seems to me there is a great deal of flexibility
in this contract and a great deal of am-
biguity,
The question lam suggesting is wheth-
er the public interest is being adequately
protected by the Department of Defense,
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S 9982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 18, 1969
particularly the Department of the Air
Force. It is not Lockheed's responsibility
to protect the taxpayer, but it is the Air
Force's responsibility to protect the tax-
payer. The Air Force is a Government
organization. It is part of the Depart-
ment of Defense. It receives all of its
money from the taxjaayerS. It is the
responsibility of the Government--the
Air Force in this case?to say that any
contract made on behalf of the Govern-
ment adequately and /Fully protects the
general public and the tax funds that
come out of the pockets of the wage
earners of our country.
What passed through my mind, as I
was listening to the distinguished Sena-
tor from Wisconsin as be spoke on the
Senate floor this afternoon and bro'ught
out many facts and figUres, just as went
through my mind during the committee
hearings, was whether the Air Force in
its procurement practices is adequately
protecting the taxpayers. I think it is
Important that all Government agencies
handle their contracts in a way that will
adequately protect the taxpayer.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the Senator
from Virginia. His point is well taken.
We should be concerned not only with
the Lockheed contract. That is only one.
The Air Force spends billions and billions
of dollars of the taxpayers' money every
year. It is important to focus attention
on the practices which have been high-
lighted by the way the-Lockheed situa-
tion was handled. No matter what action
Is taken on my amendment, the im-
portant lesson we should learn from the
Lockheed contract is that the Air Force
simply must handle its procurement
practices more honestly as far as Con-
gress is concerned and_ ft must handle
them with far greater regard for the
American taxpayer than it has in the
past. I think that is the point made by
the Senator from Virginia, and it was
made extremely well. I think it was the
most important point Of all made with
reference to the Lockheed contract, in
terms of what we can save in the future.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. The Senator
from Wisconsin has rendered a splendid
public service in focusing attention upon
this fact. As he pointed out a moment
ago, it concerns not just the C-5A con-
tract or just the Air Fbrce, but all de-
partments of Government, and partic-
ularly the Defense Department, because
that is where the greatest spending oc-
curs and that is where these large con-
tracts are. It is important that the De-
partment of Defense promulgate prac-
tices and procedures which will protect
the tax dollars taken from the pockets
of the wage earners. What the Senator
from Wisconsin has been doing in recent
weeks in this regard, and what he is d0-
ing today on the floor, I believe will
contribute substantially toward the pro-
tection of the dollars of the American
taxpayers.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the Senator
from Virginia. I assure him that our sub-
committee has just started hearings,
which will continue through the recess,
into the spending of a number of GOT-
emment agencies?not the Defense De-
partment alone.
Mr. President, the current issue of Life
magazine, on August 15, 1969, contained
an article entitled "The New Math of
Inflation," which should be a lesson for
everyone in politics, particularly those
who serve our country in the Senate and
the House of Representatives. It says:
For a decade it's been called "the affluent
society," but suddenly the U.S. public is be-
ginning to think all those dazzling statistics
and ever-rising curves are a giant con game.
Between inflation, which today is at an an-
nual rate of 7.2%, and the relentless in-
crease in Federal, state and local taxes, we
are all running to stand still. In fact, many
have begun to fall behind, and the average
citizen is furious about it. The Life Poll,
conducted by the opinion research firm of
Louis Harris and Associates, Inc., reveals
that 86% of a nationwide cross section 4:4
young and old, rich and poor, rural and city
dweller assess their anger at current tax
policies as either "high" or "very high."
Eighty-two percent of them want major cuts
in federal spending now, and a surprising
56% are even ready to see wage and price
controls imposed to stabilize prices. Twenty-
one percent claim they are ready to take part
in a tax revolt, and another 22% who could
never openly oppose their government said
they could sympathize with those who did.
The Bureau of the Budget made an
analysis last year of controllable and
uncontrollable spending. They found
that about $100 billion of our Federal
spending is controllable. We obviously
cannot control such items as interest on
our national debt; we could pass all the
resolutions in the world, and still could
not do it. We cannot cut social security
payments. But 80 percent of all our na-
tional spending is in the budget.
As the Life magazine article points
out:
The potential savings in the post-Vietnam
defense budget are estimated by the August
1 Fortune at $17.6 billion out Of $78.7 bil-
lion. . . . To get this monstrous 40% of all
federal spending under control would be the
biggest single step toward a more rational
schedule of national priorities.
In this connection, Mr. President, I
call to the attention of the Senate a
series of very thoughtful and revealing
articles in the current issue of Look
magazine, which I shall ask to have
printed in the RECORD.
The articles are entitled as follows:
"The Defense Establishment," writ-
ten by Charles W. Bailey and Frank
Wright.
"Defense Contract: The Money Web,"
written by Gerald Astor.
"Generals for Hire, written by Berke-
ley Rice.
"The Waste," written by David R.
Maxey.
"How to Cut the Budget," written by
David R. Maxey.
"The University Arsenal," written by
Ruth Gelmis, showing how the univer-
sities have become involved and en-
meshed, and what the effect has been.
A fine epilog by Averell Harriman,
entitled "Our Security Lies Beyond
Weapons."
I ask unanimous consent that the arti-
cles which I have listed, published in
Look magazine for August 26, 1969, be
printed in the RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the articles
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
Tale DEFENSE ESrABLISHMENT
(By Charles W. Bailey and Frank Wright)
For the first time in 30 years, the American
defense establishment is on the defensive.
Not since the 1980's?before World War
the cold war, the Korean War, Vietnam--
have those who build and manage our mili-
tary machine been seriously challenged.
The argument this year in Washington has
been centered mainly on the ABM?the anti-
ballistic-missile system that President Nixon
proposed to defend our own intercontinental
missiles and bomber bases against surprise
attack.
But the issue has become much broader:
What is the proper place of the nation's de-
fense establishment in the Government and
in American society? Has the military ma-
chine grown so large that it threatens to
throw that society critically out of balance?
Once again, critics are raising the specter of
the "military-industrial com.plex"-- -the
shorthand label for that combination of
political, military and economic pressures
that influence U.S. security policy, military
strategy, armed forces and defense spending.
The Vietnam war has dragged on for years,
and military victory, despite repeated predic-
tions by the nation's civilian and military
leaders, is now admittedly beyond our grasp.
Military spending has grown steadily until
it swallows almost $80 billion a year?more
than 40 cents of every dollar in the Federal
budget?and requests for new and more cost-
ly strategic weapons may offset any savings
that would result from a cease-fire in Viet-
nam.
Pressures are rising for greater Federal out-
lays to meet the dcanestac needs of -a nation
whose multiplying urban problems are com-
pounded by racial, social and economic
stresses. The voices of concern do not sing
in unison, sad most of them recognize both
the complexities of the keue and also the
high motivse of those with whom they dis-
agree. The chorus is rising nonetheless.
"I don't question the patriotism of any-
one," says Sen. Mike Mansfield of Montana,
majority leader of the VB. Senate. "But I
do question the judgment of creating a mili-
tary-industrial-labor complex which exer-
cises such great power. You have to control
the money?control the spigot?and then you
can get into philosophy."
Former Vice President Hubert Humphrey
says, "It isn't as if bad men were conspiring
against good people. It is that events com-
bine to bring about a preponderant alloca-
tion of resources to defenee. That preponder-
ance inevitably affects national polities, in-
evitably brings a looseness of control, and
feeds on itself."
Walter F. Mondale of Minnesota, a young
Democratic liberal in his fifth year in the
Senate, sees the issue as one of national pri-
orities: "I've watched every fiscal dividend be
dribbled away. There's not a dime left for
people. We ought to write a book on our-
selves. The first chapter ought to be what
we think we are as white people. The rest
should be on what we really are and what
we do to people who can't defend them-
selves?the Indians, the blacks, the Mexican-
Americans. Then we call them animals be-
cause they don't react right after we've beat
them fiat. If you Want to destroy the defen-
sive capacity' of our nation, just keep it up
the way we've been going. If these young
militants on campuses anti in the political
parties are going to be the leaders?and
someday ithey are?they aze not going to be
interested in keeping this kind of society
together."
John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, who
speaks for anti-ABM Republicans in the
Senate, recalls his early efforts to question
big defense outlays: "You couldn't find out
anything. The Armed Services Committee
would say, 'It's classified,' or 'We've gone
into this already and have more information
than you'."
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August 13, 196Vrovd S9983
Another anti-ABM spokesman, Democratic
Sen. George McGovern, knows firsthand the
kind of pressures that can be generated.
Some of his South Dakota constituents
urged him to try to get an ABM site in the
state because of the economic benefits it
would bring. "I don't think there's any con-
spiracy between the military and industry,"
he says, "but it does develop a momentum.
Even the clergymen know their congrega-
tions are swollen by defense installations.
There's a subtle influence on labor unions,
business, community groups."
The defense establishment is complex. It
Is huge. It is also one of the most pervasive
institutions in the nation: one out of every
ten Americans who works for a living is
part of the defense establishment. In the
fiscal year just ended, an estimated $78.4
billion was spent on defense?nearly nine
percent of the gross national product.
There are 500 major military installations
in the continental United States, and 6,000
smaller ones. The Defense Department con-
trols 45,000 square miles of land?an area the
size of Pennsylvania. Overseas, we have 3,400
big and little bases in 30 foreign countries,
Hawaii and Alaska.
Some 22,000 U.S. corporations are rated
"major" defense contractors, and another
100,000 or so get a piece of the action through
subcontracts. One example of the geographic
spread of the defense dollar: When Lock-
heed Aircraft Corp. got the contract to build
the C-141 Starlifter jet transport for the Air
Force, it bought parts and services from
1,200 other firms. Just one small part for the
plane?a fuel-pump switch?required ma-
terial from New York, Connecticut, Illinois,
Ohio, California, Wisconsin and Massa-
chusetts.
The major share of defense spending?$44
billion last year?goes for weapons and other
equipment. Two-thirds of that went to the
100 biggest defense contractors, and a whop-
ping one-quarter of the total?$11.6 bil-
lion?was paid out to these ten: General
Dynamics, Lockheed, General Electric, United
Aircraft, McDonnell-Douglas, American Tele-
phone & Telegraph, Boeing, Ling-Temco-
Vought, North American Rockwell and Gen-
eral Motors.
Even the university campus can be a big
defense contractor. Last year, both MIT and
Johns Hopkins University were among the
top 100.
Some states do better than others. Cali-
fornia got one out of every seven defense-
procurement dollars last year?or $6.5 bil-
lion. Texas was second with $4.1 billion. The
rest of the top ten are: New York, Connecti-
cut, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Massachusetts, Mis-
souri, New Jersey, Indiana.
How did it all start? And how did the de-
fense establishment get so big? There are
many reasons for its growth?but only one
for its birth: We live in a dangerous world.
At the end of World War II, the nation
rushed?as it had after every war?to dis-
mantle it,s armed forces and turn its atten-
tion to the search for the good life. Suddenly,
however, the U.S. faced an unprecedented
military and ideological challenge. The Soviet
Union sought to expand its dominion west-
ward across Europe and southward into Iran,
Turkey and Greece. In Asia, another Com-
munist government came to power in a bitter
civil war In China. The United States hesi-
tated?and then, in an extraordinary series
of basic policy decisions, moved to check the
Communists. The rationale was "contain-
ment," which came to mean a U.S. commit-
ment to meet, if necessary with armed force,
any Communist encroachment on independ-
ent nations that asked for our help. This
required our nation for the first time to
maintain a large peacetime military force.
Beyond this, there was another reason for
the pyramiding growth and cost of defense:
atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs, jet airplanes
and, finally, intercontinental missiles made
the tools of war astronomically costly. The
complexities of these weapons dictated years
of research and dayelopment before they
could be ready. Their capacity to strike a
single, sudden, devastating blow meant that
a nation committed by political decision to
constant readiness for conflict could no longer
wait until war began to beat its plowshares
into swords.
There are other reasons?some of them un-
related to either high policy or the march
of science?why defense spending has grown.
Neither Congress nor the White House has
been able to find ways of exercising any-
thing like the critical scrutiny that is
routinely applied to much smaller domestic
programs. Many congressmen are reluctant
to vote against anything for "our boys in
service." Secrecy labels applied to many proj-
ects hinder those who do raise questions.
Finally, there is "pork"?the economic bene-
fits that defense spending can bring to a
community.
There are positive factors too. By and large,
the Pentagon and its industrial allies have
done all they can to encourage congressional
permissiveness. This year, there are 339 De-
fense Department employees assigned to
"legislative liaison"?the bureaucratic eu-
phemism for lobbying. That works out to
two Pentagon agents for every t.hree members
of Congress; no other special-interest group
comes close to having so many.
Defense Department lobbyists don't limit
themselves to pushing the Pentagon's legis-
lative program. They also spend much of
their time currying favor with congressmen
in other areas?passing advance word of con-
tract awards so members can get political
credit for "announcing" them, or handling
inquiries about the problems of constituents
in service.
They also give special attention to con-
gressmen who hold major influence over
defense affairs. The South Carolina district
of Chairman L. Mendel Rivers of the House
Armed Services Committee is chock-full of
Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps
bases. Georgia?home of Sen. Richard B.
Russell, for years, chairman of the Senate
Armed Services Committee and now head of
the Appropriations Committee?is loaded
with armed services installations and defense
Industry. The congressional military barons
get some personal benefits too. The Air Force
routinely provides planes from its "VIP" fleet
to ferry them around the country. And one
night this spring, the Defense Department
not only turned out its top brass for a Mis-
sissippi testimonial dinner for Chairman
John Stennis of the Senate Armed Services
Committee but also flew in the entertain-
ment?a Navy choir from Florida, an Army
WAC band from Alabama and an Air Force
string ensemble from Washington, D.C. - -
If the Pentagon can bring heavy pressures
and blandishments to bear on Congress, the
defense industry?companies and unions
alike?can exert massive leverage on both.
Its lobbyists, ranging from high-priced vice
presidents to clerks, do most of their work
In private, staying out of public debate over
weapons systems or budgets.
Industry's influence in Congress is some-
times magnified by outside help?from cham-
bers of commerce, state and local officials
or labor unions eager to impress on con-
gressmen the benefits of defense bases or
contracts. A study two years ago of 27 firms
slated for prime contracts on the ABM sug-
gests the potential for this kind of pres-
sure; the firms operate more than 300 plants
In 172 congressional districts spread across
42 states. Thus, at least 256 senators and
representatives had some economic stake?
direct or indirect?in the ABM. A recent
estimate that 15,000 firms, including subcon-
tractors and suppliers, would share in ABM
spending suggests that the impact is even
broader.
At the Pentagon, several factors combine to
bolster industry's standing. First, the grow-
ing complexity of modern weapons has made
it ever harder for Government to keep its
provisioners at arm's length. No longer does
a service simply decide what it wants, design
It, and then advertise for somebody to build
it; now, industry's "sss men"?strategic-
systems salesmen?and engineers play a
major role in military-weapons design.
Industry and the military join hands in
other ways too. There are the service as-
sociations, to which active and retired officers
as well as industry representatives belong.
The groups are large (the Air Force Associa-
tion counts 100,000 members) and often
rich?upwards of $2 million yearly income
In some cases, with industry providing much
of it through dues and advertising in as-
sociation magazines that advocate bigger and
better weapons.
Another factor is the ease with which
some men move from defense industry to the
Defense Department, and vice versa. Secre-
taries of Defense, and lesser officials, have
come from industry, and returned to it. Re-
tired military officers flock to defense in-
dustry, often going to work for a firm whose
operations they had monitored while on
active duty.
When industry and the Pentagon go hand-
in-hand to Congress, they find powerful
friends awaiting them. A few senior mem-
'hers control congressional action on mili-
tary matters; four committee chairmen?all
Southerners, all conservatives, all well along
in years, all with over 20 years of service?
make up the elite:
Rivers, 63, a congressman for 28 years,
chairman of the House Armed Services Com-
mittee.
George Mahon of Texas, 68, .a congress-
man for 34 years, chairman of the House Ap-
propriations Committee.
Stennis of Mississippi, 68, a senator for 21
years, chairman of the Senate Armed Serv-
ices Committee.
Russell, 71, whose 36 years of service make
him the Senate's senior member, chairman
of the Senate Appropriations Committee.
These men are strong and talented in
their own right. But the primary source of
their power lies in the seniority system, in
the way members are chosen for advance-
ment, and in the structural and jurisdic-
tional tradition of Congress.
The Southern flavor of the defense posi-
tions?one official calls it "the South's re-
venge in perpetuity for Gettysburg"?is a
self-feeding process. Warm weather and ease
of year-round operation lead the military to
spend much of its money in the South. Mem-
bers of Congress from Dixie therefore gravi-
tate to the committees that deal with mili-
tary affairs, and because it is relatively easy
for them to get reelected, they build up se-
niority and thus control the committees,
This process is even more marked in the
Senate, where the smaller membership al-
lows senators to serve on more than one
major committee. The result has been the
creation of interlocking directorates; the
three topranking members of Armed Serv-
ices?Stennis, Russell and Republican Mar-
garget Chase Smith of Maine?are also on
Appropriations. Such dual membership and
parallel inclinations almost always produce
the same result: Armed Services approves
Pentagon proposals and Appropriations pro-
vides the money to finance them.
There are more personal ties to the Pen-
tagon too. Two members of the Senate
Armed Services Committee hold commis-
sions as major generals in the Reserve forces,
a third is a retired two-star Reserve gen-
eral. The man who writes the military-con-
struction appropriation bill each year?Rep.
Robert L. E. Sikes of Florida?is a major
general in the Army Reserve. A 1967 Minne-
apolis Tribune survey of the entire Congress
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S 9984 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August IS,- 1969'
turned up 82 senators and 107 representa-
tives with Reserve COMMiSs11113s.
One reason military ccentattees generally
have their way is the systeM itself; If you
attack the other fellow's committee on the
floor, he may do the same Ws yours. Armed
Services and Appropriations members defend
their bailiwicks with relentless zeal against
either indivdual attack or jurisdictional raids
by other committees. The bulk and com-
plexity of programs, the frequent censoring
of reports and hearings records for "security"
reasons, and the traditionally one-sided na-
ture of the testimony that is_published?all
these also inhibit Opposition to military out-
lays.
The debate on the defense establishment
has been highlighted this year by a new
round of "horror stories" atout Pentagon
mismanagement and inefficiency: $2 billion
increase in the cost of a new_tiant jet trans-
port; the belated cancellatiga of a contract
for a new helicopter that was badly flawed.
Such disclosures of waste are only ancillary
to the basic issues in the rising debate over
the proper role and size of the nation's de-
fense establishment. But saving a billion
here and a billion there hes its merits?
especially in the light of the military's post-
Vietnam "shopping list" of hew and even
more costly weapons.
The new weapons list is long and varied.
It includes a replacement for_the Minuteman
missile, now the backbone of our strategic
force; multiple warheads to boost the strik-
ing power of missiles; a long-range bomber
to replace the 5-52; fighter planes for the
Navy and Air Force; three nuclear-powered
aircraft carriers at a half-billion dollars each.
There are dozens of others.
All of these systems would cost money.
But critics argue that some of them?
especially the Multiple Inapendently-tar-
geted Reentry Vehicle (MIRV), as the multi-
ple-warhead project is called could also
seriously escalate the U.S.-Soviet arms race.
To some in Congress and elsewhere, MIRV
is a greater menace than the ABM.
The case of MIRV points up the critical
Importance of how decisioni are made on
whether or not to build a Weapons-system.
The crucial decisions are male, in the end,
by only one man: the Preaclent. But the
coinage of presidential actions is often
minted long before it is issued by the White
House. Proposals for foreign and defense
policy, for military strategy and for the
spending to implement them come to the
President's desk from many sources: the
Secretaries of State and Defense, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Coun-
cil, the Budget Bureau, the Congress. Policy-
making decisions should, in theory, flow in
an orderly sequence: first, basic foreign
policy, defense policy to support it, military
strategy to implement defense policy, mili-
tary forces to carry out the strategy; finally,
budget decisions to pay for the forces. But,
in fact, it sometimes goes the other way:
money decisions determine force levels, these
in turn affect strategy, strategy influences
defense policy?and defense policy then dic-
tates foreign policy.
One man who served two Administrations
in a top national-security sae puts it this
way: "What is needed is a counter to the
parochially presented programs and deci-
sions of the Defense Department. No other
part of our society functions with so little
check and balance. This is not a plot?it is
the failure of the rest of our society to de-
velop the expertise to permit reasoned deci-
sions on basic policies."
Can this be done? Many people who know
the problem firsthand are gWomy. But the
effort is going to be made. A half-dozen pro-
posals for study of the defense structure,
and its implications for future national pol-
icy, are under way or about to start?includ-
ing several in the Defense Department it-
self. The suggestions cover the waterfront
and include privately financed research cen-
ters to review programs, a new joint Senate-
House committee with a strong grant of au-
thority to review national priorities, a new
independent defense-review office to analyze
military spending, expansion of the Budget
Bureau's staff. Some think that a deter-
mined, open fight will have to be made on
the floor of the House and Senate over every
major defense issue.
Even with much stronger congressional
control, the President will have the key role.
"The question in defense spending is 'how
much is necessary?'" President Nixon said
In June. "The President of the United States
is charged with making that judgment."
Still, questions of costs and priorities per-
sist. None of the answers will come easily,
especially in a world where nations build
great military forces not to make war but
to deter it?a world where weapons are built,
as one scholar suggests, "not to be used but
to be manipulated."
But however hard the questions, they are
at least being asked, some for the first time
in 20 years, some for the first time ever.
Upon the course of the debate that has just
barely begun, and upon the kind of answers
that emerge, may depend the place of the
United States in the next decades -or the
next century.
DEFENSE CONTRACT: THE MONEY WEB
(By Gerald Astor)
The Pentagon has long been able to jet
combat troops to fight 5,000 miles from
American shores if a President decided to
apply kill power there. But heavy equip-
ment?tanks, cannons, helicopters, portable
bridges and trucks?all traveled slow water
freight. So the word went out from the Pen-
tagon to U.S. industry: build us a really big
bird.
Lockheed won, and the droopy-winged
C-5A Galaxy, 247 feet in length, is the big-
gest bird yet to get off the ground. In one
load, the four engines will lift an M-48 bridge
launcher (128,420 pounds), four quarter-ton
trucks with trailers, two ambulances, two
five-ton trucks with trailers, two three-quar-
ter-ton trucks with trailers plus 52 soldiers
to erect the bridge and drive the vehicles.
The C-5A gives the U.S. armed forces mas-
sive airlift power, but when it grabs its maxi-
mum gross weight of 762,000 pounds and
flings itself into the air, a lot more than mili-
tary hardware goes into the wild blue yon-
der. In the three and a half years since Lock-
heed got the contract, it has added 10,000
workers to its Marietta, Ga., plant. Chubby
C. U. Dixon, Jr., a mason who earned $5.55
an hour, signed on for $3.75 an hour to stuff
C-SA wings with electrical gear. "Outside,
there's no vacation, no retirement, no credit,
and it don't rain in here," says Dixon point-
ing to the 76 acres of U.S. Air Force Plant
B-1.
Perhaps another 9,000 Lockheed-Georgia
people who worked on other projects have
moved on to the C-SA along with the new
recruits. In fact, of Lockheed's $6 million
weekly payroll, approximately $4 million goes
to C-5A workers. For 15 years Gene Amos has
been drawing paychecks from Lockheed. "I'm
one of the lucky ones, never been laid off,"
says Amos, a troubleshooter on the produc-
tion line. "It's a funny thing," he goes on,
"but when the union's negotiating a con-
tract, businesses in the area all seem to raise
their prices just before the contract's signed.
So all you keep are the fringe benefits."
Employees of Lockheed-Georgia spend
their money In 85 counties, and most of
them pass along their dollars in the Atlanta
area and Cobb County, where Marietta is.
Gray-haired Len Gilbert, director of the
Cobb County Chamber of Commerce, crosses
one leg over the other and says, "What does
Lockheed mean to us? A heckuva lot, In
1961, a low point when they had about 13,100
employees, the total wages for a quarter in
Cobb County amounted to $33 million." He
paused to locate the figures. "In the last
quarter of 1968, Cobb County showed a pay-
roll of $85 million." Corresponding figures
for 1961 and 1968 show an increase in retail
sales from $133 inillion to $368 million. "A
payroll dollar turns over seven times," points
out Gilbert, making the C-SA responsible for
a big chunk of those sales. While the popu-
lation of Marietta shows only a slight in-
crease since the 1960 census figure of 25,000,
suburban Cobb County has added 66,000
folks to the 114,000 that lived there then.
Marietta Mayor L. Howard Atherton remem-
bers when the former tenant of the factory,
Bell Aircraft, stopped making B-29's in 1945,
and 32,000 people lost their jobs. "It felt like
the end of the world, but it wasn't so bad.
When Bell shut down, the people left town.
It was a transient population. Now, it's dif-
ferent. Lockheed is culturally and economi-
cally a part of Marietta. Lockheed people are
much more solid, they pay their bills, par-
ticipate in the community life. They couldn't
just move away."
Atherton, who is a drugstore owner, believes
that even in the unlikely event that Lock-
heed should go the way of Bell, his com-
munity would survive. "There's been so
much building in the last few years, con-
struction's had a bigger effect than Lock-
heed." In the next breath, Mayor Atherton
calls the company "vital not only to Marietta
but the whole state."
Some local citizens agree with him. The
head of a jewelry outlet says business is up,
and not just because of the aircraft workers.
"But I often say if Lockheed goes, every-
thing goes. Yet there is a helluva lot of new
industry around." The manager of a small-
loan company says, "We're not solely de-
pendent upon Lockheed, and with Atlanta
coming out this way, it wouldn't be that
bad if there were a outback."
The C-&A spins a web of money that
touches far beyond Marietta-Atlanta or even
the rest of Georgia. Through subcontracts.
the money flows to people in 44 states plus
Canada and the United Kingdom. One large
satellite effort belongs to Avco in Nashville,
Tenn., which builds the 223-foot wings.
Avco also makes fuselages for Bell heli-
copters, wings for other Lockheed planes and
metal office furniture. But the largest num-
ber of employees, 1,500, work on the droopy
C-5A wing, making it, in effect, the largest
project in Nashville industry. Few workers
joined Avco for this particular job?most
sifted over from other assignments.
Avco's $125 million C-5A contract sounds
like handsome business, but General Man-
ager and Vice President Charles Ames says,
"We couldn't live on programs like the
C-5A." When and if Lockheed goes ahead
with the L-10-11 air bus for civil transport.
Avco expects to add workers.
One smaller subcontractor operates out of
an abandoned shopping center in Caldwell.
N.J. Nash Controls, Inc., a subsidiary of Sim-
monds Precision, turns out small actuating
devices. Business dropped when the Pentagon
canceled production an Lockheed's Cheyenne
helicopter but picked up with the C-5A. Sen-
sitive to recent congressional rumblings an
the "overrun" in the C-5A price (perhaps $2
billion extra), Lockheed officials blame the
higher costs on severe inflation in their in-
dustry and production-capacity shortages.
Whether one talks to executives, assembly-
line workers or local officials, the fears of the
military-industrial complex get midget shrift.
"We gat enough problems building the
C-5A," says Gene Amos, "without worrying
about that." "It's all a lot of nonsense," says
Avoo's Charles Ames. "The civilians I know
in the Department of Defense are very dedi-
cated, have the highest integrity. There's no
desire to perpetuate any military-industrial
complex."
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S 9985
GENERALS FOR HIRE and colonels at Lockheed makes one wonder around. The salesmen take care of selling,
about their objectivity.
but if you don't have an intro like me, you
(By Berkeley Rice) There are same limits on what kind of work waste your time with underlings who don't
For those who have trouble understanding these men may do when they retire. Federal have any power. If I want a contract, I know
the complexities of the military-industrial laws prohibit retired officers frsm selling to exactly who to go to. Some other guys may
complex, one graphic illustration is the traffic the Department of Defense for three years know the technical stuff, but I know the
in retired military officers who join the de- after retirement and to their own service for people. That's my expertise."
Such expertise may raise questions about
conflict of interest, but not to most retire
officers who have joined the defense industry.
Says Pete Higgins, "You take a man who
retires around 45 to 50, with his kids ready
for college, and he's got a problem. Ile can't
do it on his retired pay. He's got to have a
second career. Many of these men have no
other marketable experience. Where the hell
else do you want them to go!"
No one seems to know, but as they con-
tinue to go into the defense industry the
contracting process may suffer. One Defense
official claims, "the fact that these lucrative
job opportunities exist cannot help but in-
fluence those who deal with defense contrac-
tors. I remember trying to hold down costs
on a large contract once, and a general work-
ing with me said, 'I must be out of my mind,
trying to cut the overhead on this company.
I'll be part of that overhead in a few years.'"
When military men spend much of their
careers dealing with companies they may
eventually work for, they naturally develop
some concern for the company's point of
view. When 90 percent of the major defense
contracts are negotiated in such a congenial
atmosphere, price and the public interest
can easily become secondary considerations.
A normal buyer-seller relationship has a
built-in check against this sort of thing,
because the buyer must spend his own
money. The services do not, a fact which
Pentagon officials and procurement officers
often seem to forget.
Despite all the criticism of defense spend-
ing, most military men look on the growing
traffic betweeti the services and the defense
industry as natural and proper. An admiral
who has bade the transition himself claims,
"It's good for the military, It's good for the
company, and it's good for the country."
tense industry. More than 2,000 retired gen- life. However, the laws are vague about what
erals, colonels, Navy admirals and captains constitutes "selling." Since 1962, the Depart-
now work for the 100 largest defense con- ment has taken action in only one case in-
tractors. Their numbers have tripled in tale volving a major contractor. Asked why, a
last ten years. The top ten firms employ more Defense Department legal officer comments,
hen half of the 2,000. Many of these had ?I doubt if anybody here is vigorously beat-
been involved in the contracting process on
major weapons systems. Their decisions often
meant millions of dollars to companies for
whom they now work.
Sen. William Proxmire (D., Wis.) calls this
a dangerous and shocking situation." While
not charging anyone with corruption, he
claims the trend represents "a distinct threat
to the public interest." The threat, he says,
is twofold: high-ranking retired officers may
be using their influence at the Pentagon to
affect decisions on contracts with their com-
panies; active officers involved in procure-
ment may be influenced by the prospect of
jobs with companies they are buying from.
Defense contractors, of course, deny the
charges of influence-peddling, and insist
they hire ex-military men because of their
expertise, and not in reward for past favors.
Despite these denials, research on the em-
ployment of retired officers reveals some in-
triguing patterns. Take the Minuteman II
missile program, which has climbed from an
original price of $3.2 billion to $7 billion. One
of the major subcontractors is North Ameri-
can Aviation ($669 million in 1968 defense
contracts). Its autonetics division produces
the missile's guidance system for the Air
Force. Two Air Force plant representatives
and a project officer for the contract recently
retired and joined North American auto-
netics, one as division manager. Lt. Gen. W.
Austin Davis, ex-chief of 'USAF's Ballistic
Systems Division, which handled the con-
tract, is now a vice president of North Amer-
ican. His chief procurement officer also joined
of 104
ing the bushes trying to discover violations
of the selling laws."
Since the purpose of defense companies is
to sell to the Defense Department, some ob-
servers feel the question as to which em-
ployees are engaged in sales is ridiculous.
Anyway, most large firms now call their sales-
men "marketing men." As defense companies,
many of the marketing men are retired offi-
cers, but they do not sign the contracts.
W. T. "Pete" Higgins, a former Navy officer,
Is "marketing manager for naval programs"
for an electronics company. "I come with the
team that makes the presentation," he
admits, "but only as an adviser. With my
background in naval electronics, I know
damn well I'm helping the company get con-
tracts." Does this mean using his influence?
"That's nonsense," says Higgins. "Anything
of significance goes through ten to fifteen
levels in the chain of command before a final
decision. Only peanuts are settled on a single
level that could be influenced by personal
interest."
Helping the company get defense contracts
is a popular non-selling job for high-ranking
retired officers. They usually have titles like
"assistant to the president" or "director of
advanced planning," but they are known in
the trade as "rainmakers." Regardless of how
much clout they have at the Pentagon, they
bring to their companies valuable inside
knowledge of service plans for future weap-
ons systems. When a general or admiral who
has been involved in planning or research on
the company, which employs a total
a big project retires, defense contractors bid
high-ranking retired officers, including sev- for his services as eagerly as any professional
eral other Air Force generals. football team after a top college quarterback.
Asked if this employment pattern is un- When Maj. Gen. Harry Evans retired in 1967
usual, a senior Pentagon official remarked, "It as vice director of the Air Force's $3 billion
happens all the time. Almost all the officers Manned Orbiting Laboratory program, he was
who have anything to do with procurement immediately hired as vice president and gen-
go into the business. Naturally, they go to eral manager of Raytheon's Space and Infor-
the companies they've had the most contact mation Systems Division. In 1966, Bell Aero-
with. If you check the history of any missile space Corporation, the Army's largest sup-
or weapon program you'll find the same Pifer of helicopters, hired Gen. Hamilton
story." Howse, former chief of Army Aviation, as
The story usually ends with the Defense vice president for product planning.
Department paying far more than the origi- Most of the large defense companies have
nal estimate. When the Navy contracted with high-ranking ex-officers in their Washington
Pratt & Whitney for 2,000 engines for the offices, Everyone denies that they have any
controversial TFX, or F-111, the original bid influence on defense contracts, but they are
was 6270,000 per engine. By 1967, when pro- obviously there because they know their way
duction began, the price had risen to more around the Pentagon. One of them is Lt. Gen.
than $700,000 apiece. The man who signed William Quinn, former Army Chief of Pub-
the production contract was Capt. Patrick lie Information, arid now in charge of "Wash-
Keegan, the Navy's plant representative at ington operations" for Martin Marietta, which
Pratt & Whitney. Soon afterward, he retired Produces many of the Army's missiles. "We
from the Navy and joined P. & W. as special maintain liaison with Defense," says General
assistant to the executive vice president. Quinn, "but I don't go over to the Pentagon
Sharing his office was another special assist- on any sales matters." Asked about using his
ant, a former colonel who until his retire- influence, he admits he knows "half the peo-
ment had been in charge of engine purchases pie in the hierarchy over there," but claims
for the Air Force, he never uses his contacts for business. "Be-
The problem of plant representatives is lieve me," says Quinn, "this operation is as
crucial, for they are the watchdogs who sup- clean as a hound's tooth. Our real contribu-
pos,edly guard against delays, failures and tion is in maintaining a dialogue between our
cost overruns on a contract. At Marietta, Ga., companies and the military people."
where Lockheed Aircraft Corporation ($1.8 Just how retired officers can help to "main-
billion in 1968 defense contracts) is turning tam n a dialogue" can be seen in the work of
out the giant C-5A jet transport, 230 Air an ex-Navy officer who prefers to remain
Force officers watch over production. Despite anonymous. He retired in 1968 from the
all this supervision, however, the C-SA is well Bureau of Naval Weapons, where he had been
behind schedule, and the final price on 115 involved in the selection of contractors. He
planes has climbed from the original bid of now works for one of them as a $200-a-day
$1.9 billion to $3.2 billion. The fact that some consultant in Washington. "I know a lot of
of these Air Force production supervisors will Navy, people here," he says, "and I sort of
probably join the 210 other retired generals help the company's men find their way
It's certainly good for the companies thriv-
ing on defense contracts. It may be good, or
at least comforting, for the military to deal
with former comrades who understand their
problems and look forward to jobs in in-
dustry. But as defense costs continue to drain
funds desperately needed for domestic pro-
grams, some AMeriCallS are beginning to
wonder if "it" is really good for the country.
THE WASTE
(By David R. Maxey)
Remember Robert Goodloe Harper? No?
He's the prophet who said, in 1798, "Millions
for defense, but not one cent for tribute."
We haven't let Bob down. Harper's hyper-
bole, now puffed to $80 billion annually, is
still part of the American way of life. Con-
gress has traditionally watched domestic
spending like a hawk, but focused loosely on
defense. Here are some examples of looseness
that have stirred interest. How do you like
them?
DIVE! DIVE!
In 1964, the Navy planned to buy 12 Deep
Submergence Rescue Vehicles. Purpose: to
lend aid to disabled submarines. Cost: $3 mil-
lion each. In June, hideous new cost esti-
mates surfaced. Now, the Navy will buy six
vehicles for $80 million each. Cost increase:
2,666 percent. Since the 1920's, we have had
one submarine accident at which the DSRV
might have had a chance of being useful.
One.
THE RUSSIANS WERE COMING, THE RUSSIANS
WERE COMING!
The threat of Soviet bombers in American
skies caused us to build a gigantic air-de-
fense system. One estimate of cost: $18 bil-
lion. The Russians failed to uphold their part
of the bargain by not building enough bomb-
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S 9986 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August
ers to be a real threat. We ahould be grateful
for that, because our air-afense system does
not work very well. Now h*r this testimony:
Senator Cannon: "In osfter words, the Air
Defense Command agrees that if the Soviets
sent over (deleted) heavylrombers now, we
would only knock down (deleted) out of the
(deleted) ?"
Dr. Foster [of the Defense Department]:
"I cannot speak for the Air Defense Com-
mand, sir; but I am not the least bit stir-
prised. (Deleted)."
Senator Cannon: "I am shocked at that."
Senator Symington: "Inteedible."
The system maligned abeee costs annually
at least $124 billion to operate, with out-
siders betting on $2 billion.
DIS/NGENUITY WALTZ
Gordon Rule, Director of Procurement Con-
trol and Clearance, U.S. Navy, told Sen.
William Proxmire at a meeting of his eels-
committee recently why defense-procure-
ment programs so often cost much more than
estimated: "We play games. The contractors
know if they tell the Department of Defense
how much a system will really cost, they'll
scrub it. The Department of Defense knows
If they tell the Congress the real cost, they'll
scrub it. You start in with both sides know-
ing its's going to met more." Proxmire
shouted that was dishonest. Rule replied
that he preferred to call it disingenuous.
BALLAD OF ERNIE FITZGERALD
In November, 1968. A lernest Fitzgerald.
Deputy for Management Systems for the Air
Force, told the Proxmire itibeommittee he
estimated the Lockheed a-BA cargo? plane
would cost about $2 billion more than the
Air Force had originally estinsated. Pentagon
executives became cross with Fitzgerald for
his candor. Twelve days later, he found that
his Civil Service status had been revoked.
"Computer error" was blamed for giving him
that status in the first plaee. Senator Prox-
mire then unearthed a memo to Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force Robert Charles.
The memo discussed ways 'eel fire Fitzgerald.
Fitzgerald still has a shriveled version of his
job, but cost control on large weapons pro-
curements is not part of it, The Air Force
has since verified that Fit raid's estimate
of a $2 billion overrun on the C-5A is very
close to right. Lockheed first estimated that
it would lose $13 million on the C-5A, then
allowed it might make a feW bucks.
THE LITTLE HELICOPTER THAT COULDN'T
Helicopters are crafts of real beauty only
when they work. The Cheyenne helicopter
was never beautiful. It was to be a gunship,
built as such from the grolund up. Willis
Hawkins, then Assistant Soseretary of the
Army for Research and Development, sup-
ported the idea. Hawkins had mine to the
Army in 1983 from a vice president's job at
Lockheed.
It took time to decide what firm should
build the Cheyenne Experts first rated Vertol,
Bell, Lockheed and Sikorsky in that order.
A Source Selection group a generals made
changes, rating Lockheed first, then VerboI,
Sikorsky and Bell. A final pier gave the con-
tract to Lockheed. Why? "Stronger manage-
ment." "What general," rips a critic, "could
rate Lockheed's management anything but
high when he knows that the Assistant Sec-
retary came from Lockheed?"
On March 23, 1966, Lockheed got the re-
search-and-development cOntract. Three
months later, Willis Hawkins resigned and
save $450 million. Benson also proposed
billion assumption, was never debated in
returned to Lockheed. The first Cheyenne shortening basic training for soldiers not
appeared in May, 1967, followed by nine more. the Congress, even though the Defense De-
aimed at combat roles?that is, most of
Test flights began. In March. 1969, a Chey- partment has made it vrey, very clear that them. Saving: $50 million a year. The Air
enne off California threw three rotor blades it is covering the possibility of such a war. Force and the Navy have already short-
and plunged, killing the pilot. In April, the Once our contingencies are agreed on, ened basic training for their men. And why,
Army threatened to cancel the contract for Schultze said, we take the step of asking asks Benson, should every Army officer be
lack of satisfactory performance. Estimated what force levels we need to handle them, shuttled around as if he were in training to
costs had soared all the way from $138 mil- How many men? Then, what weapons sys- be Chief of Staff? Right now, men move
lion to $186 million for 15 ships. In May, 1969, tems should we buy? on the average of once a year. Benson shows
the Army canceled the Cheyenne, after So. An orderly process, from commitment savings of $500 million if assignment changes
spending $159 million, to contingency to force level to weapons could be lowered by 25 percent
137 1969
BUT IT WORKS ON PAPER Systems. Schultze cautions that every de-
A study by Richard Stubbing of the Bu. cision along the way needs fresh scrutiny,
erau of the Budget said we're getting worse, because, for instance, the decision to be ready
not better, in the design and application of for two and a half wars does not make the
electronics system for aircraft and missiles, force level needed to fight them obvious and
Strubbing listed 13 major Air Force and Navy unchangeable. Schultze delights in the ex-
aircraft and missiles produced since 1955, ample of the Navy's aircraft carriers. Cur-
pointing out that only four had electronics renter, the Navy has 15. Why 15? One tea-
systems that were over 75 percent reliable, son is that the Washington Naval Disarrna-
Eleven other systems, which coat $25 billion, ment Treaty of 1921 ladled out national
sputtered below the '75 percent standard, quotas of capital ships. The U.S. got 15. After
Four programs were either canceled or phased World War If, the Navy saw that the 15-
out for low reliability. Stubbing said we'd battleship force was obsolete. The aircraft
do better to ask systems contractors to build carrier became the new capital ship, but we
working models rather than promising re- cling to the magic number still.
liability based on paper estimates. He also' Carriers are what one critic calls
hide-
thought competition between contractors ously vulnerable" to air attack. They work
would concentrate their minds wonderfully, best, when the U.S. has unquestioned air
THE HIGH COST OF ABORTED MISSILES superiority, such as in Vietnam. But does
their vulnerability, and the number of dry-
Sen. Stuart Symington of Missouri pointed land fields, justify having 15? It the force
out last March that over $4 billion had been could be cut to 12, say, the U.S. would Save
Spent since 1944 for missiles that never got about $360 million. And the direct cost of
Into position to be fired. They all perished building one new carrier is about $540
million.
Schultze comes down hard on the mili-
tary tendency, logical only in a werld of
limitless wars and money, to plan for every
possibility, remote or not, and build forces
and weapons systems to meet it.
Currently, we are planning AWACS, the
Airborne Warning and Control System, to
add to our existing air-defense system. The
logic of air defense tortures the mind. We
built the system to shield us from Russian
bombers, which the Russians never really
got around to building. Now, we spend to
improve it in order to discourage Russia from
getting around to building bombers. Pro-
ponents of AWACS say it will warn us of
Kamikaze-style attacks from Soviet medi-
um-range bombers. How likely is that? And
would it feel better to know that if our cities
crisp in a nuclear war, we'd be burned by
missiles instead of bombers? There is. by
the way, much reason to doubt that
AWACS will work any better than the cur-
rent system.
In June, 1968, Congressional Quarterly,
putting civilian and military officials off the
record to elicit candor, did an exhaustive
reporting job on the Defense budget. CQ
found Pentagon Insiders estimating that,
aside from savings on weapons systems we
don't need, around $4.2 billion could be
excised by cutting the size of the armed
services. That estimate did not assume an
end to the Vietnam war, but only a reduc-
tion in the proportion of support troops to
combatants (now about three to one), and a
drop in the number of men in the "tran-
sient" category?men budgeted in excess of
force requirements because they'll be travel-
ing, not working.
Nine months later, Robert Benson, for-
merly of the Comptroller's Office, Defense
Department, wrote in Washington Monthly
that he saw another $1.5 billion in savings
from troop reductions in Europe. We have
over 300,000 there now, plus 200,000 depend-
ents. Benson argued that the U.S. will not
send troops into Eastern Europe anyway
during the research-and-development phase
of their lives. Big as that figure is, it's smaller
than if those missiles had been produced and
depolyed, then found to be technically sick
or obsolete. Fifteen other missiles did get
into position, then were scrapped. Cost:
$18.8 million.
How To Cue THE BUDGET
Vietnam is a giant teaching machine.
Without the mind-riveting pain it causes,
we might still be leery of questioning the
operations of the Department of Defense. We
might still be dreaming that since our
military establishment is the finest in the
world, the running of it is better left to
military experts, well-supplied with money.
Such dreams have faded. Congress, less
afraid of being labeled unpatriotic, is asking
penetrating questions. And the answers
prove beyond imagining that if to err is
human, the Pentagon is full of mortals.
From that finding, it is only a step to asking
Whether we can't have sufficient defense at
lower cost, and perhaps use the savings for
programs with lower priorities, like healing
our cities and making poverty an anachron-
ism. The answer to the first part of that
question is yes. The Defense budget can be
cut without radically thinning our blood.
Some of the best thinking about the
military budget has been done by Charles
Schultze, former Director of the Bureau of
the Budget and now a Senior Fellow at the
Brookings Institution in Washington,
Schultze, a rational man, hopes that our
defense planning proceeds logically. First,
we examine what our commitments around
the world are. For instance, we now have
in force better than 40 mutual-security
agreements involving the U.S. in the defense
of large chunks of Earth. Should we be all
that involved? Do some pacts need re-
thinking? Given those commitments, what
kind of fight might we get into? What threats
should we plan for?
This June, Schultze reminded Sen. Wil-
liam Proxmire's Subcommittee on Economy (witness Hungary, Czechoslovakia), so the
in Government that our contingency plan- forces can be reduced without critically
ning now says that we should be able to diluting the American, presence.
start fighting, simultaneously, a major Benson found further savings in people.
"NATO" war in Europe, a major war with He figures that if annual leave time for a
China in Southeast Asia, and a minor scuffle serviceman were cut from 30 days to 20
in Latin America, such as our last trip to (to more nearly match civilian vacations), it
the Dominican Republic. Schultze pointedly would slice manpower requirements enough
said that the China war contingency, a $51,0
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u rt 13, 1969A pproved Fotin: 00001-3
Between them, Benson and the Congres-
.sifytal'Quarterly staff agreed on a cut in the
Defense budget of $9 to $10 billion a year,
Vietnam or no Vietnam. Benson's estimate
includes a 15 percent increase in the effic-
iency of defense contractors. That might
take some doing.
In the broadest terms, and with examples
almost too fierce to mention, the Proxmire
subcommittee found that there never has
been much interest in cost control, either
on the part of contractors or their customers
in the armed services. Ernest Fitzgerald, who
first identified the $2 billion cost "overrun"
on the Lockheed C-5A jet transport that
cost control is seen as "antisocial aeivity."
He cited the case of the Mark II avionics sys-
tem, a "black box" for the navigation gear
and radar on the F-111 fighter-bomber. Costs
on the system, experts bet, have risen from
a planned $610 million to $2.5 billion.
In June, Secretary of Defense Melvin
Laird, doing some digging of his own, pro-
duced a study of 12 weapons systems that
showed cost overruns ranging from 0.2 per-
cent to 194 percent on nine of them. The
latter increase was on SRAM, the Air Force's
Short Range Attack Missile, now expected
by the Pentagon to cost $313.9 million more
than was estimated. Outsiders bet the SRAM
bloat is worse than that. Laird dryly noted
that $1.4 billion of the nine overruns was
due to "optimistic original cost estimates"
on the part of weapons contractors.
But contractors suffer from more than
simple optimism. They sometimes underesti-
mate their costs deliberately, in order to bid
low and grab a contract. This practice is
called "buying in." It is based on the as-
sumption, valid historically, that the cus-
tomer services will pay the costs no matter
how they creep. Former Assistant Secretary
of Defense Robert Charles could not recall
for Proxmire when he'd last seen a major
defense contractor lose money on a contract.
That, in spite of the fact that over 90 percent
of all weapons systems end up costing twice
what the contractors' original estimate said
they would.
Fitzgerald has some ideas of how to bring
an atmosphere of candor and concern for
cost into the military-industrial dialogue. In
the process of explaining them, he has made
public a privileged language. For instance,
when a manager of a weapons-system pro-
curement finds that costs are outrunning the
money Congress gave him, he has a "funding
problem." In other words, costs are not too
high, his funds are too low. Fitzgerald re-
ports that since he's been in the Pentagon,
he has never heard of cost reduction as an
answer to a funding problem. A? "credible"
cost estimate is one high enough so that
actual costs do not produce an embarrass-
ing overrun.
What Fitzgerald and others are telling us
is that bargaining and cost control, twixt
military and contractor, is not gimlet-eyed
jockeying in the best sense of free enterprise.
It is more the murmuring of lovers.
Fitzgerald would like to see the Pentagon
use what are known as "should-cost"
studies. These studies, sharp penciled by
efficiency experts, try to answer what a
weapons system should cost, assuming for
one sweet, fleeting moment that the con-
tractor operates in a reasonably efficient
way. The Government would function as a
management consultant to show the com-
pany how to hold costs down. Previous
should-cost studies found considerable waste
motion and superfluous workers, sometimes
overstaffed up to 60 percent for the work
needed. Taken together with hard-nosed
devotion to economy on the part of top
Pentagon offieials, should-cost studies and
other techniques, Fitzgerald thinks, could
result in the saving of billions. Think that
over. Billions.
We should lay to rest now the notion that
defense cuts would damage the economy.
Arjay Miller, ex-Ford Motor Co. vice chair-
man, told LOOK Senior Editor Al Rothen-
berg: "I think a reduction in military ex-
penditures . . . would have a plus effect
on the economy. When rumors of peace break
out, the stock market goes up...."
If the Pentagon moves sharply to slash
costs, the size of the Defense budget will
depend all the more on the decisions made
in the White House and Congress about
how ambitious the country's defense policy
should be. Charles Schultze is not impressed
with the idea that a well-organized mili-
tary-industrial complex has been siphoning
cash out of the Treasury with evil design.
Rather, he said, the American people "have
pretty much been willing to buy anything
carrying the label 'Needed For National
Security.'" Schultze talked about involv-
ing the Bureau of the Budget, traditionally
the President's watchdog, more deeply in
the writing of the Defense budget. Previously,
the Department of Defense was less scru-
tinized than any other Cabinet department.
President Richard Nixon recently took
Schultze up on that, giving Budget Director
Robert Mayo what Mayo called his "march-
ing orders" to examine Defense thoroughly.
All the talk of cost-cutting now, of reduc-
ing the Defense budget, echoes down the road
to a time when the bad dream of Vietnam will
be over. Then, we will find out what kind of
"peace dividend" we'll get, i.e., how much
money will be available for use in domestic
programs or for paying out to taxpayers in
the form of lower taxes. Projecting tax gains
from a growing economy and the savings
from not being in Vietnam against the auto-
matic increases in domestic programs and
the growth in non-Vietnam defense spend-
ing, Schultze forecast a cumulative fiscal
dividend of $35 billion by 1974. That sounds
large, until we note that increases in military
spending already planned will use up the $20
billion' a year we save from leaving Vietnam.
The Defense budget can go marching on
without the war. Whatever fiscal dividend we
do get will come from the gain in tax reve-
nues from a full-tilt economy. And Schultze's
projection does not include the costs of large
new weapons systems, or an escalation in the
arms race. Those would poison the dividend.
The Nixon Administration has already cut
$1.1 billion in expenditures from the 1970
Johnson Defense budget. Recently, the Man-
ned Orbiting Laboratory, a project on every-
one's list of extraneous matter, was un-
manned. Future savings from that surgery
will be at least $1.5 billion, perhaps more.
And Laird has given every indication that
his study of nine weapons systems would not
be the last hunt for waste.
But we also have the word of Robert Moot,
Defense Department Comptroller, that the
Pentagon expects no significant cutbacks be-
low the $80 billion budget, even after Ameri-
can forces move out of Vietnam. He guessed
$75 billion would be somewhere near right,
unless "our commitments and our missions
can be cut back." And the responsibility for
thinking about that, aside from the Presi-
dent's, lies with a Congress now somewhat
awake to the chances of saving some dollars
for domestic consumption.
THE UNIVERSITY ARSENAL
(By Ruth Gelmis)
Angry students and newly formed groups
of concerned faculty are raising some tough
questions on college campuses. The Ameri-
can multiversity, it seems, is fast on its way
to becoming a docile Pentagon pet, depend-
ent on military financing and deeply en-
meshed in the defense establishment.
On March 11, more than 1,400 students
crammed into Stanford University's Memo-
rial Auditorium to demand the facts about
that school's involvement in war research.
(Stanford ranked 46th last year among the
nation's defense research-and-development
contractors.) The answers were to come from
S 9987
five university trustees. One was William
Hewlett, president of Hewlett-Packard, whose
defense sales last year totaled $34 million.
Hewlett is also a director of Chrysler ($146
million in defense contracts) and FMC Cor-
poration ($185 million) . Another trustee was
Charles Ducommun, a director of Lockheed
($1.9 billion) .
Among the trustees who were not there
were the president of Northrop Aircraft and
the 'chairman of General Dynamics.
A trustee began, "I don't think it's fair to
say that the university is participating in
the war." The audience groaned. He con-
tinued, "Many people within the university
are actively opposing the war."
"It's very nice," a student shouted, "to
view the university as an open -place where I
do my thing and you do your thing, only
your thing happens to be doing research on
weapons of destruction and death in the
name of the university."
The two-hour confrontation turned very
nearly into a rout, as the trustees' answers
became progressively inadequate, irrelevant
and evasive. At one point, Hewlett flatly de-
nied a charge that FMC manufactured nerve
gas. The students presented evidence; Hew-
lett countered that his source was the presi-
dent of the corporation. Finally he admitted
FMC had been making nerve gas up to six
months earlier.
The trustees' performance at that meeting
radicalized a good many students, including
Mike Sweeney, a former editor of the Stan-
ford Daily who was sufficiently respected by
the administration to have been appointed
two important student-faculty committees.
Sweeney walked in a liberal and walked out
a radical. Now he pickets and demonstrates.
"I've lost all my credit with the Establish-
ment. It doesn't matter; you no longer care
that much whether your future is going to
be destroyed, whether you're imprisoned,
whether you'll be physically endangered?
because there's no alternatives."
The Stanford University trustees appoint
the Board of Directors of the Stanford Re-
search Institute. SRI was created in 1946 as
a nonprofit "wholly-owned subsidiary" of
Stanford to "improve the standard of living
and the peace and prosperity of mankind."
It does nearly half its research ($29.7 million)
for the Defense Department. Ten percent of
its work ($6.2 million) is military research
directly related to Southeast Asia. SRI oper-
ates top-secret counter-insurgency projects
in Thailand, including a new $1.8 million
contract accepted last December. It has also
done secret counterinsurgency research in
Vietnam, Honduras and Peru. One classified
project is summarized as "considering the
advantages and disadvantages of providing
U.S. operational assistance to the armed
forces of the Government of Peru engaged in
counterinsurgency operations."
SRI'S board includes:
Ernest Arbuckle, chairman. Arbuckle is a
Stanford trustee, a director of Hewlett-Pack-
ard and a director of Utah Construction &
Mining .Utah built B-52 bases in Thailand,
and its affiliate, Marcona Corp., mines iron
ore in Peru.
Edmund Littlefield, also a Stanford trus-
tee, and president of Utah.
Malcolm MacNaughton, president of Cas-
tle & Cooke, which owns 55 percent of Thai-
America Steel and 84 percent of Standard
Fruit. Standard Fruit imports bananas,
nearly half its supply from Honduras.
Edgar Kaiser, chairman of Kaiser Alumi-
num, part owner of Thai Metal Works. Kaiser
also has an 80 percent interest in the phos-
phate deposits of the Sechura Desert in Peru.
Fred L. Hartley, president of Union Oil of
California, which has drilling rights off the
Thai coast.
Gardiner Symonds, chairman of Tenneco,
which now has extensive concessionary rights.
in.Indonesia.
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S 9988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
August 1; 19?
Counterinsurgency is not the brainchild
of these directors, but it protects their in-
terests very well.
Jerry Dick, a young physicist and father of
two, is opposed to the Vietnam war. In Feb-
ruary, at a meeting sponsored by the Stan-
ford chapter of the American Association of
University Professors, Dick heard SR/ Presi-
dent Charles Anderson argue that no re-
searcher was forced to take on any project
he found morally objectionable,
Dick stood up: "Sir, I was pressured into
doing chemical-warfare research." That can-
dor, he learned later, nearly cost him this
security clearance.
I went looking for Dick, and an employee
told me, "I think he's still here, but he may
not want to see you." Couldn't I talk to him
on the telephone? "Well, that might net
work either. It's clear that they can bug the
switchboard, and a lot of us here think they
probably do."
I asked Weldon "Hoot" Gibson, execu-
tive vice president of SRI, If Dick was still
working there. His face flushed with anger.
"I don't know. I really don't. Have you seen
him? Don't bother. . . . People like that
have a decision to make?do they want to
_ support the organization or not?"
When I found Jerry Dick, he'd been fired.
William Rambo is associate dean of the
Stanford School of Engineering and director
of the Stanford Electronics Laboratories
target of a nine-day student sit-in in April.
The labs held $2.2 million la classified con-
tracts, primarily in electronic-warfare re-
search, before the faculty senate di-
rected on April 24 that the contracts
be phased out. Shocked faculty mem-
bers learned meanwhile, from the sit-in stu-
dents, that contract titles and summaries
had been carefully edited to delete military
references, apparently to faellitate approval
of the contracts by a watchdog committee
on classified research. "Applied Research in
Electronic Warfare Techniques," for ex-
ample, became "Applied Research in Elec..
tromagnetics."
Rambo is on the board of, and holds stock
in, Itek, an electronics firth that held over
$80 million in defense contracts at the end
of last year.
He is also a member of sEVLial military ad-
visory committees, including the Defense De-
partment Advisory Group on Electronic War-
fare and ECOM?the Army Electronics Com-
mand. In other words, he is called upon as an
expert to advise the Defense Department on
the usefulness of the kinds of equipment
Itek supplies.
Rambo, in all sincerity, stt yS he wonders
"how much talent we are denying the Gov-
ernment by this sensitivity regarding con-
flicts of interest."
In a 1966 memo, Hubert Heffner, then
Stanford's dean of research a ad now Nixon's
deputy science director, aeknowledged that
it was "not uncommon" for faculty mem-
bers to be directors of private firms, and, de-
clining to set rules, urged teachers to be
"sensitive" to potential conflicts of interest.
Sensitive or not, professors acrass the nation
sit on the boards of defense industries and
advise military committees.
MIT'S research budget for the academic
year 1967-68 was $174 million, and 95 per-
cent of this came from the Federal Govern-
ment, with $120 million from the Defense
Department alone.
Such heavy dependence on one source wor-
ries many university administrators, includ-
ing Cornell's former preddent, Jamee Per-
kins, who warned that the "acceptance- of
Government work and corporate donation
has been known to result in a slowing down
of the university's critical faculties."
One laboratory director may already be
In trouble because of his Cautiously critical
views. Dr. Wolfgang Panofsky, who directs
the AEC-funded $30-mil1ionea-year Stanford
Linear Accelerator Center (SLAC), believes
university scientists ought to play a crucial
role as an independent source of public re-
view of defense policy: "It can't come from
people who work directly for the Defense De-
partment because they're obligated to live
by official policy. It can't very well come
from the contractors whose living depends
on the Defense Department. So the universi-
ties are the only places with the technologi-
cal expertise left. The real problem is how
do you keep the universities from becoming
captive in the process of furnishing this ad-
vice?" One answer, he says, is that "the live-
lihood of the university must in no way de-
pend on Defense Department support."
A professor at the Center, arguing that
"the director of a laboratory Is not a free
man," attributes SLAC's current funding dif-
ficulties to political reprisals. "This lab is
not being pleasant politically anymore. Most
of the people here have come out against
the ABM, so the Center has begun to lose
a few of its friends in Congress. And the
way you get a budget increase is, you have
friends on the AEC, friends on the Joint
Atomic Energy Committee."
A few months ago, as if deliberately to
substantiate that charge, Francisco Costag-
liola, who was at the time an AEC Commis-
sioner, wrote to Stanford and MIT threaten-
ing that should the schools decide against
doing classified research, he would press for
withdrawal of all AEC research money.
Sidney Drell, another SLAC professor,
found himself in an awkward position when
he addressed the Stanford March 4 Convoca-
tion. (Stanford and more than 30 other
universities held convocations that day to
raise the issue of war research.) Drell care-
fully avoided taking a public stand on the
ABM that day because he felt constrained by
his position as a member of the President's
Science Advisory Committee. He is an op-
ponent of the ABM.
Money, or the lack of it, has boxed a num-
ber of university administrators into a corner.
Some admit a desire to pull back from de-
fense work and reorient research priorities,
but complain there is simply rio alternate
source of comparable financing. The one
agency specifically charged with supporting
basic research, the National Science Founda-
tion, has only enough in its till to support 12
percent of that research. But the Defense
Department, NASA and the AEC do support
a good deal of basic research, partly because
they can more easily get appropriations.
When pressure on the Defense Department
compelled it to cut back on some of its con-
troversial foreign-country projects, it offered
to transfer $400,000 of its own $7.8 billion
research budget to the State Department.
The Department of State's current budget for
research contracts is $125,000.
Stanford's President Kenneth Pitzer com-
plains, "Our national priorities are wrong."
But when he needs funds for university re-
search programs or expansion, where is he to
go? The new Stanford Space Engineering and
Science Building, for example, was made pos-
sible by grants of $2,080,000 from NASA and
$992,000 from the Air Force.
Universities have learned that it doesn't
hurt to have a Pentagon man on your staff.
When the president of the California Insti-
tute of Technology, Lee DuBridge, left for
Washington to become Nixon's Science Ad-
viser, he was replaced by Harold Brown, then
Secretary of the Air Force. Last year, Caltech
received $3.5 million from the Defense De-
partment, much more than its entire student
tuition. NASA and the AEC supplied an addi-
tional $5 million. Caltech also operates the
nearby $214-million-a-year Jet Propulsion
Laboratory for NASA.
A year ago, the University of Rochester,
whose defense contracts increased from $1
million in 1966 to $13 million in 1968, hired
as its vice president and provost, Robert L.
Sproull. Sproull is the current chairman of
the Defense Science Board, the top Pentagon
science-advisory committee.
The University of California. holds $17 mil-
lion in defense-research contracts and ad-
ministers the $250-million-a-year missile-
development and testing laboratories at
Livermore and Los Alamos. Its new president
is a former Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Charles Hitch. The -university also maintains
an $80,000-aeyear office irrWashington.
MIT chose Jack Ruins to be vice president
in charge of the Lincoln and Instrumenta-
tion laboratories, -which do most of their
business ($92 million) with the Defense De-
partment. A former Pentagon official, Ruina
Is a pragmatist: "You can say you'll with-
draw the labs [from military work], but
who's going to pay their sedary?"
The heavy investment in military research
has a snowballing effect. As one professor
complains, "The trouble is, when you de-
velop it, somebody will want to build it."
The researcher who takes on a military con-
tract because that'a where he can most easily
get funding, and then develops a new tech-
nique or weapon, frequently starts a new
"spin-off" corporation to produce it. Route
128 around MIT and Harvard and the 900-
acre industrial park owned by Stanford Uni-
versity are crowded with hundreds of aero-
space and electronics spin-offs, most of them
doing most of their business with the De-
fense Department. In recent years, 160 new
firms have spun off from MIT alone.
The new corporations in turn hire univer-
sity consultants (MIT professors may con-
sult one day out of five) and graduating
students. For that one-third of MIT's grad-
uate students who support themselves as re-
search assistants, future careers are deter-
mined by the kind of research they do while
In graduate school. In 1968, 45 percent of
MIT's industry-bound graduates took jobs
with the top 100 prime defense contractors.
Many still receive draft deferments for work-
ing in a defense plant.
Every new employee of a defense-oriented
corporation has a vested interest in a swol-
len defense budget. His livelihood depends
on it.
Half of all U.S. research and development
is military in nature. Last year, the U.S.
spent four times as much an chemical and
biological warfare as it did on cancer re-
search. The man who invented napalm was
not a Dow employee but a Harvard profes-
sor working in a Harvard lab. Universities
and nonprofit research institutes received
$665 million from the Defense Department
in 1968, for work on the ABM and MIRV. for
research on aerial-weapons systems, anti-
personnel bombs, chemical and biological
warfare, incendiary weapons, counterinsur-
gency, and such mind-teasers as the cla,ssi-
fied contract titled "Beliefs and habits of cer-
tain foreign populations of significance for
psychological operations."
Talent and funds that could be applied to
problems of urban blight, disarmament, pol-
lution, poverty, and disease are drained into
newer, bigger, better weapons systems.
Dr. James Killian, chairman of the MIT
Corporation (he was the nation's first pres-
idential Science Adviser), has recommended
to a Senate subcommittee that an ad hoc
task force be created to review our weanons
technology and strategic policies. Scientists
thus "free 03 organizational loyalties" could
make recommendations "without being con-
strained by any departmental commitments
or biases."
Such a task force is not even in the plan-
ning stage. l'Ugh t now, if the President wants
a detailed study of, say, Russia's strategic
capabilities vis-a-vis the U.S., he asks the
Defense Department to ask the Air Force to
ask the Rand Corporation to do the study.
There is no large-scale, eivilian-sUpported
"think tank" to which the public or Con-
gress or even the President can go directly
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PAugust 13, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE
for advice on strategic policy. The scientist's
voice is captive, reaching us only after It has
been filtered through Pentagon agencies and
distorted by military interpretation.
OTJR SECTIRITY LIES BEYOND WEAPONS
(By W. Averell Harriman)
Like Many other Americans, I am fearful
about the present role of the military in our
national life. Military men have as their pri-
mary responsibility the defense of the nation,
and they are miscast when they are expected
to be omniscient on other vital national con-
oerris. It is in some ways unfair to ask them
to accept responsibility for decisions on
which they are clearly unqualified to give a
balanced judgment.
I have worked closely with our military
officers during the past three decades and
respect them for their competence and dedi-
cation to our country, I have held many of
them in the highest esteem, among them
General Marshall. I vividly recall Marshall
explaining to President Roosevelt that his
advice was given purely from a military
standpoint.
When military men advised extreme action
In Vietnam, I am not sure that they fully
realized the limited character of our objec-
tives there. We are not there to win a war,
but simply to stop the North from taking
over the South by force, and .to permit the
people of the South to decide their own fu-
ture. I am not sure that all those advising
the President fully understand how limited
our objectives are. Somehow or other, there
is a feeling that we are fighting the inter-
national Communist conspiracy?rather than
Vietnamese national Communists who do not
Want to be dominated by either Peking or
Mosoow. The international Communist sit-
uation is quite different today than it was
in the early postwar period. During those
days, I was always on the side of those want-
ing more arms for our nation. When South
Korea was attacked, we had a military
budget of only about $14 billion, and we suf-
fered greatly from it. But today, we have a
military budget of almost $80 billion, and
have so many other requirements in our
country that it is time to call a halt to our
arms buildup. The war in Vietnam is an un-
fortunate drain on our resources, and will, I
hope, be brought to an early settlement. The
money we spend there is urgently needed
now to reunite our own divided country.
It is not the military's job to know how
that is to be done, and they cannot be ex-
pected to weigh the technological require-
ments of the military against the require-
ments in our cities. The military today are
asking for new weapons that in my judgment
are clearly less important than other na-
' tional needs.
We obviously must maintain nuclear ca-
pability giving us a second strike force that
would deter the Soviet Union or anyone else
from hitting us. But that does not mean
we have to be ahead in every aspect of nu-
clear capability, nor does it mean that we
must have many times the power to over-
kill any enemy.
In 1941, I was in -London as President
Roosevelt's representative to Prime Minister
Churchill and the British Government. Even
then, I was struck by the difference in the
role of the military in Britain and in the
U.S. The British War Cabinet consisted of the
political leaders of the country, and the
ministers of the armed services were not
even members of it. I am not suggesting
that the British military leaders were not
highly respected or that their views were
not given full weight. But they were given
weight within the Cabinet in balance with
the other problems of the British nation. The
military chiefs of staff were advisers to the
Cabinet. The military establishment was in-
tegrated into the policy-making procedures
of the British Government. They had no
contact with the Parliament, nor did they
glee any public expression of their views.
This is altogether different from our pres-
ent procedures. Not only the Secretary of
Defense but also the Chiefs of Staff go to
the committees of the Congress and testify
on all sorts of matters. As a result, a num-
ber of senators and congressmen get an un-
balanced view of our nation's needs from
military men who are responsible for only
one aspect of our national concerns. What
I am suggesting is that we have a group of
senators and congressmen whose attention is
concentrated on military needs. That is why
we had one member of the Congress saying
a short while back that if we turned over
the Vietnam war to the soldiers, they would
win it in a month.
Nothing could be more absurd than that
statement. But it indicates the mind-set that
some members of Congress get after steady
bombardment by the views of our military.
Their responsibility is the security of the
nation, and they must look at the worst of
everything. Those who see only the possible
military threats would drive us into another
world war. That is why isolated military
judgments of political situations are not
sound. Robert Kennedy wrote that during
the Cuban missile crisis, he was struck by
how often his brother's military advisers
took "positions, which, if wrong, had the
advantage that no one would be around at
the end to know" how wrong they were.
All of us abhor Soviet repression of free-
doms at home and in Czechoslovakia, and
their support for Communist subversion in
independent countries. But I decry the at-
tempt that is being made today by some in
the Defense Department and Congress to
scare the American people into believing
that the Soviets are scheming to attack us
with nuclear weapons. No one knows the
intention of the Kremlin, but I can speak
from my Russian experience that dates back
over forty years. I am convinced that the
Soviets are as anxious to avoid destruction
of their country by nuclear war as we are of
OUTS.
It is particularly alarming that there ap-
pears to be a new policy in the Pentagon, to
have the civilian-directed offices of Interna-
tional Security Affairs and Systems Analysis
support the recommendations of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and not question them.
It is reassuring that the Congress is in-
creasingly showing concern over military
programs and exercising its independent
judgments on decisions.
I believe that negotiations we are now
starting with the Soviets to control the
nuclear arms race are the most important
we have ever undertaken. They can be suc-
cessful if we act wisely.
From my talks with Mr. Kosygin and other
Soviet officials, I am satisfied that they want
to stop the nuclear arms race for two rea-
sons. They don't want to divert further ex-
penditures from their pressing internal needs.
And they believe the U.S. and the Soviet
Union should come to an understanding now
to reduce the risk of nuclear war. This is a
time of world opportunity?a split second
in history. I have been told by my scientist
friends that both sides can develop effective
MIRV's (Multiple Independently-targeted
Re-entry Vehicles) in a relatively short time.
It is vital that agreement be reached before
this occurs. We can each tell the number of
missile sites the other has but we cannot
know the character of warheads fitted to the
missiles without detailed on-site inspection.
I was very much shocked to hear that the
military had gone ahead to order these mul-
tiple warheads without telling the Congress
or the public that they had done so.
There are advisers in our defense establish-
ment who are on record as opposing an
agreement with the Soviet Union on nuclear
restraint. They are entitled to their opinions,
S9989
but it would be inexcusable If actions Were
taken that committed us to the arms race
without the widest possible discussion. I am
sure President Nixon believes that an agree-
ment on nuclear restraint is of vital import-
ance to our nation, and most Americans
share this judgment.
It Is interesting that it took eight years for
the Congress and the public to understand
what President Dwight Eisenhower was talk-
ing about when he warned about the mili-
tary-industrial complex. It is only recently
that we have begun to question the new
weapons programs, the wisdom of immediate
deployment of the ABM, and testing of the
MIRV. Until now, the pressure from the Con-
gress has been to appropriate more money
than the Administration requested for new
weapons programs. Pressure comes now in the
opposite direction, The turnaround is due
largely to the unpopularity of the war and
the urgency of domestic needs. We are be-
ginning to recognize the danger of a mili-
taristic attitude on the part of our country.
Our security will not come from the number
of our weapons. It will come from the
strength of our moral force at home and
abroad, from our economic and social
strength, and from the unity of our people.
Mr. PROXMIRE. In addition, Mr.
President, I call attention to two editori-
als, published in the New York Times of
August 11, 1969, one entitled "Homage
to the Astronauts," and the other entitled
"Portrait of Mars." I read briefly from
the first editorial, as follows:
This background makes it particularly un-
fortunate that the formal celebration planned
this week has such a narrow, nationalistic
cast. In the words of the plaque they left on
the moon, the astronauts "came in peace for
all mankind." Yet their visit to the United
Nations next Wednesday will be very brief,
while the rest of the day will be devoted to
an American celebration of an American
achievement.
Perhaps it is not too late for more imagina-
tive planning to emphasize the role of the
astronauts as envoys of all humanity, emis-
saries whose trip was made possible by con-
tributions of knowledge from many nations
over many centuries. Better than any men
before them, after all, Armstrong, Aldrin
and Collins know that this one planet is
one world and that what unites men is far
stronger and more important than the forces
dividing them.
I also wish to quote briefly from the
followup editorial, on where we go from
here, entitled "Portrait of Mars." After
discussing what the remarkable shot we
have seen in the last few days has re-
vealed about Mars, the article says:
Whether the Pimentel-Herr hypothesis is
right or wrong, the case is strong for further
intensive study of Mars by unmanned satel-
lites?as against a precipitate switch to the
much more costly alternative of manned
exploration. A race to put men on Mars would
be a moondoggle for whit% there is neither
need nor justification.
I hope when we look at the space
authorization bill, which I understand
will be before us shortly after we return,
we will keep that in mind. The National
Advisory Council advised some time ago
that we can save a billion if, for the
next 3 or 4 years, we limit our space
exploration to unmanned exploration.
Our voyage to the moon is the most
remarkable achievement in centuries.
Having accomplished that, our next step
should be unmanned space exploration, A
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August 1A 1,060
t get Up to a comfortable 70 degrees or so at penditure of at least $2 billion on re
best, they descend at worst to hundreds of search, development, test and evaluation
degrees below zero. For lovers of comfort,
Mars is as uninviting as the THOM, and weii alone?before any of these aircraft enter
over a hundred timet as far away. our strategic arsenal
The irrepressible optimists who refuse to
believe that earth alone has life in this solar
system did get something to cheer about
from Mariner 7. Professors Piznentel and
Herr believe they detected methane and am-
monia in Mar's south polar region, and they
suggest this may have a biological origin,
i.e., there may be some primitive form of life
In that past of Mart.
It is an exciting hypothesis worth further
investigation, but for the moment the idea
must be viewed as an extremely long shot.
Methane and ammonia can arise from non-
biological processes, Moreover, there are
serious contradictions between some of the
Pimentel-Herr conclusions and thote of other
Investigators using different data sent hack
by Mariner 7.
Whether the Pimentel-Herr hypothesis is
right or wrong, the case is stneng for fur-
ther intensive study of Mars by unmanned
satellites--as against a precipitate switch to
the much more cottly alternative of manned
exploration. A race to put men on Mars
would be a moondoggie for which there is
neither need nor justification.
The fascinating close-approach photo-
graphs sent back by the two Mariners covered
only 20 per cent of the planet, and they
offered no explanation for the changing pat-
terns of dark and light that telescopes have
shown on Mars for centuries. /additionally,
Mariner 7 has uncovered an intriguing mys-
tery by demonstrating that the bright area
called Hellas is decidedly atypical in not
having craters. That revelation immediately
raiees the question of what processes have
obliterated the craters that meteors must
have created in Hellas too
with less potential loss of life and a grew
saving in funds.
I ask unanimous consent that the New
York Times editorials from which I have
quoted be printed in the IlEcoae at this
point.
There being no objection, the edi-
torials were ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, RS follows:
HOMAGE TO THE Asteineenes
By this morning, if all goes as planned, the
three Apollo astronauts Wall have been re-
leased from quarantine Wad reunited with
their families. Then they Will begin receiving
the world's homage for their historic accom-
plishment in a celebration that will start
with Wednesday's grueling cross country
parade.
Armstrong, Aldrin and Coning richly de-
serve the heroes' acclaim they will receive
in the days immediately ahead As no earlier
feat has ever done, their aueeessful trip to
and return from the moon captured the
imagination of men and women almost
everywhere. In the universal glow produced
at least briefly by their suer-eel, many of the
normal divisive barriers arineng men broke
down. They were hailed in afiecow as Well as
in Washington, in Cairo as Well as in Jerusa-
lem, in New Delhi and Karaehi, in East Ber-
lin and West Berlin.
This background makes it particularly un-
fortunate that the formal eelebration plan-
ned this week has such a narrow, nationalis-
tic cast. In the words of the plaque they
left on the moon, the astronauts "came in
peace for all mankind." Yet their visit to the
United Nations next Wednead will be very
brief, while the rest of thai day will be
devoted to an American celebration of an
American achievement.
Perhaps it is not too late for more imagina-
tive planning to emphasize the role of the
astronauts as envoys of all reoinanity, emis-
saries whose trip was made pessible by con-
tributions of knowledge frcall many nations
over many centuries. Better than any men
before them, after all, Armstrong, Aldrin and
Collins know that-this one planet Is one
world and that hat unite: men is far
stronger and more important than the forces
dividing them.
PORTRAIT OF MAR':
On that eventual day when the first men
walk on the surface of Mars, ',hey will fired
much "magnificent desolation' akin to that
seen by Neil Armstrong and Edwin Aldrin
when they strolled on the mom last month.
That virtual certainty emerges from the
brilliantly successful exploration of the red
planet just completed by Mariners 6 and 7.
Their expedition lacked the human drama
of Apollo 11, but the scienaile information
they returned may well qinilify the two
Mariners as the moat scientlfieally produc-
tive enterprise men have yet e irried out in
space.
. Generations of science fictien writers?
from H. G. Wells and Edgar Rice Burroughs
to Ray Bradbury?were mistaken, it turns
out, in their visions of human or nonhuman
civilizations on Male. On thaeentrary, Mars
it a bleak, arid wasteland, a gee----gist's night-
mare of twisted plains and innumerable
craters whose typical landscape is almost ene
distinguishable from that of the moon.
True, Mars has a thin atmosehere?whose
ground-level pressure is about that found
twenty or thirty miles above the earth?but
it is composed mainly of caelion dioxide, and
cauld never support any coMplex life fa-
miliar here on earth. Woree yet, the Martian
surface--or most of it anyway -is bathed
daily in a deadly shower of ultraviolet radia-
tion, and there is no equivalent of the life-
saving protection provided by the atmos- 1
phere here. While Martian temperatures may
I might say at this point, Mr. Presi-
bomber, we are talkingenes1 ecord,c
dent, that in talking about this new
bomber, we are talking about a system
the eventual cost of which could be as
high as or higher than that of the Safe-
guard anti-ballistic-missile system about
which we have just debated for some 5
or 6 weeks. Moreover, it is contemplated,
according to a recent issue of Aviation
Week & Space Technokiey:
Under the new schedule, USAF will select
by November 1 a single contractor for the
final development and production of the
AMSA.
We are clearly at the threshold of a
major new expenditure, We should not
be drawn into it little by little without
having a clear idea of where we are going
and why. I believe, therefore, that the
time is at hand for a thorough exarnina-
tion of our entire strategic bomber
program.
With the cosponsorship of the Senator
from New York (Mr. GooDELL), the Sen-
ator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD) , and
the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROX-
MIRE), who have been leading the effort
to review our military outlays, have
proposed an amendment to the pending
bill which aims to hold AMSA to the
fiscal 1969 spending level; in other words,
to avoid an acceleration of work on the
system. It would leave $20 million in the
For the scientifically minded or even the pending authorization hill, to be e0M-
merely curious, the rich harvest of the bined with $5 million in carryover au-
Mariners can only whet the appetite for more thority from fiscal 1969
knowledge.
ADVANCE MANNED STRATEGIC
AIRCRAFT
Mr. MeCIOVERN. Mr. President, the
military procurement authorization bill,
S. 2546, represents a significant increase
for an advanced manned strategic air-
craft.
In fiscal 1969 the approved program for
this project was $25 million. It is pro-
posed that we spend $100.2 million in fis-
cal 1970, for purposes outlined by De-
fense Secretaries Clifford and Laird in
their respective posture statements.
Secretary Clifford raised the figure to
$77 million, to "continue the competi-
tive design phase initiated with fiscal
year 1969 funds and to advance the
development of the long leadtime avionics
and propulsion systems."
Secretary Laird added another $23 mil-
lion, to "shorten the competitive design
phase and permit the start of full-scale
engineering development in fiscal year
1970. While no decision on produc-
tion and deployment must be made
now, the accelerated research and de-
velopment effort could advance the initial
operational capability?I0C--of this air-
craft by 1 year."
While we might take some small com-
fort from the fact that we can avoid a
final decision this year on a system es-
timated to cost a minimum of $12 bil-
kin, it is nevertheless important to rec-
ognize that present plans call for the ex.-
Mr. President, this would be the ef-
fect of reducing by $80 nhilli the
amount requested in the pending au-
thorization bill for work on a new
bomber.
In the meantime I hope we can initiate
a more extensive review of the alleged
need and justification for any strategic
bomber force at all and for this elaborate
new system in particular. I am especially
interested in learning more about the
administration's contentions in this
regard.
For my own part, I must say that at
the end of a substantial amount of
study, including briefings from the Air
Force officers in charge of the AMSA
program, .1 have been unable to escape
the conclusion that the many legs upon
which the AMSA case rests, even in com-
bination, cannot begin to support it.
The case for retaining any kind of a
bomber deterrent is almost as doubtful.
I will call up my amendment for active
consideration shortly after the recess.
In preparation for discussion at that
time, and so that all of us can develop
a clear understanding of the Admin-
istration's position, we have submitted
to Defense Secretary Laird the following
list of questions bearing on the strategic
bomber program. Most of them have been
discussed with Air Force oincials in both
classified and unclassified terms. I have
asked that they be answered in wilting
for the public record, and that the re-
sponse be supplied to me by the end of
the recess.
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August 12, 1969CONGRESSIONAL RECOR ? S 9725
ing and technical direction of system
developments; operations analysis and
long-range military planning; and gen-
eral and continuing research and experi-
mentation in support of military R. & D.
Our study of the nonprofits, including
a Defense Department briefing, indicates
that there has been a general tightening
of management and control of the de-
fense FCRC's, including a noticeable re-
duction in the fees which have been paid
to the major FCRC's. However, the sub-
committee took issue with the Defense
Department criteria for determining the
reasonableness of FCRC executive com-
pensation rates. It does not seem appro-
priate to the subcommittee that
executive salaries for these nonprofit, no-
risk Government-sponsored and Gov-
ernment-funded activities should be
equated to compensation for profitmak-
ing organizations in private enterprise
having the same operating budget or the
same "sales." We found it difficult to jus-
tify a salary of $97,500 for the chief
executive of an FCRC when the salary
of the Secretary of Defense is only $60,-
000. That was the basis for the recom-
mendation by Senator HARRY BYRD Of
the restrictive language in limiting such
executive compensation. Senator BYRD'S
amendment is contained in section
204(a) of the authorization bill.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. McINTYRE. I am happy to yield to
my colleague on the Armed Services Com-
mittee and also my colleague on the Re-
search and Development Subcommittee.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President,
first may I congratulate the distinguished
Senator from New Hampshire for the
tremendous amount of work that he has
put into the handling of this legislation
as chairman of the Subcommittee on Re-
search and Development. He has handled
it with great ability and great industry.
In regard to the amendment the Sen-
ator from New Hampshire just men-
tioned, I think we should emphasize for
a moment just what it will do and what
it will not do.
It does not prevent the. payment of
salaries in excess of $45,000, but it does
make mandatory that any such salaries
above the figure of $45,000 must be ap-
proved by the President of the United
States.
As it is now, the salaries for these
Government-sponsored, nonprofit orga-
nizations are in effect determined by
self-perpetuating boards of trustees, and
then those salaries, set by the boards of
trustees, must be approved by the De-
partment of the Air Force or the appro-
priate department in the Department of
Defense.
So this provision would take away from
the Department of Defense the right to
establish salaries in excess of $45,000,
and would require that they have the ap-
proval of the President of the United
States.
The reason why both the subcommit-
tee and the committee felt such a pro-
vision was desirable was that, as a prac-
tical matter, all of the funds for the
Govermnent-sponsored, nonprofit or-
With these proposals, which I strongly
urge the Congress to enact, we can en-
hance America's human resources. By
opening up the opportunity for man-
power training on a large scale, we build
a person's will to work; in so doing, we
build a bridge to human dignity.
RICHARD NIXON.
THE WHITE HOUSE, August 12, 1969.
MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE
-.A message from the House of Repre-
sentatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its
reading clerks, announced that the
House had agreed to the amendments
of the Senate to the bill (HR. 10107) to
continue for a temporary period the ex-
isting suspensionf ty o ertain-istle.
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-
TIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR
MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RE-
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND
FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MIS-
SILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJA-
LEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RE-
SERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH
The PRESIDING 0101,10ER (Mr. EA-
GLETON in the chair). The Chair lays be-
fore the Senate the unfinished business,
which will be stated.
The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A
bill (S. 2546) to authorize appropriations
during the fiscal year 1970 for procure-
ment of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels,
and tracked combat vehicles, and to au-
thorize the construction of test facilities
at Kwajalein Missile Range, and to pre-
scribe the authorized personnel strength
of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve
component of the Armed Forces, and for
other purposes.
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the bill.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I yield
myself 40 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from New Hampshire is recognized
for 40 minutes.
Mr. McINTYRE: Mr. President, I have
a prepared statement here that defends
and replies to the thrust of the amend-
ment being offered by the distinguished
Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT) .
I want to make it clear that I do not
plan to yield for questions or any col-
loquy during the presentation of this
proposed statement, with one exception.
I shall be glad to yield to the distin-
guished Senator from Virginia (Mr.
BYRD) who is a member of the Subcom-
mittee on Research and Development of
the Armed Services Committee, since I
will be referring directly to actions which
took place in that subcommittee and in
the full committee.
Mr. President, this amendment would
make a further reduction of $45,614,000
of the R.D.T. & E. portion of the au-
thorization bill. I would call the Senate's
attention to the fact that the bill, as re-
ported by the Armed Services Commit-
tee, has already reduced the $8.2 billion
request by $1 billion and $43 million.
This represents a total reduction of some
121/2 percent of the funds requested for
R.D.T. & E.
The areas in the field of military re-
search that the Senator's amendment
seeks to reach and further reduce over
and beyond the committee's recommen-
dation are:
First, Federal contract research cen-
ters;
Second, DOD contracts with foreign
research institutions;
Third, policy planning studies with
foreign policy implications;
Fourth, the Themis program; and
Fifth, Project Agile?R. & D. on low
level conflict.
The Armed Services Committee has al-
ready cut this overall field of military
science research by $50.5 million. Most of
this cut will be absorbed by the five pro-
grams under attack in the Fulbright
amendment?about $40 million.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield to me? ?
Mr. McINTYRE. I have already indi-
cated that I do not plan to yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. This is not for a
question. I wanted to modify my amend-
ment, so the Senator will know what I
have in mind.
Mr. McINTYRE. I yield for that pur-
pose.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
wish to modify my amendment on page
3, line 24, to add the following new sec-
tion:
SEC. 205. None of the funds authorized to
be appropriated by this Act may be used
to carry out any research project or study
unless such project or study has a direct
and apparent relationship to a specific mili-
tary function or operation.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be so modified.
FEDERAL CONTRACT RESEARCH CENTERS
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, let me
first discuss the Federal contract re-
search centers. These are the so-called
"think tanks." These are one of the re-
sources which gives the Department of
Defense a capability to meet the chal-
lenging requirements for new system
concepts and their orderly and timely
development into operational military
systems. Other parts of the mix of re-
sources for doing this job include in-
house laboratories and contracts with
profit-oriented industry. During the
past 5 years the R.D.T. & E. funding for
the nonprofits or Federal contract re-
search centers has been decreased sig-
nificantly in an orderly, but programed
fashion. I would caution against a pre-
cipitate reduction without proper plan-
ing and laying of the groundwork for
transfer of tasks being performed by
these FCRC's to other scientists and en-
gineers?either in-house or contractor
employed. Large reductions without pre-
planning will probably result in the dis-
banding of talented teams of scientists
and engineers with a consequent serious
impact on many high priority programs.
The time lost and the added cost of re-
creating these teams at a later date
would nullify the cost savings achieved
by this reduction.
It was the feeling of the subcommit-
tee that these nonprofit corporations
serve a useful purpose in three areas:
System planning and systems engineer-
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S 9726 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 12, 1969
ganizations come from the American
taxpayers.
That being the case, the committee felt
that the salaries shad be more in line
with those paid by the Government for
positions of great restionsibility, such as
the Secretary of Defense and other Cab-
inet officials.
But the committee recognized that
there are many technical experts whose
services are needed, and in those cases
higher salaries may be set if they have
the approval of the President of the
United States.
I will take just one corporation, the
Aerospace Corp. In fiscal 1969 its operat-
ing budget was $71272,000. Of that
amount, it received Its entire funding,
$74,272,000, from the Tiedartment of De-
fense.
In regard to Aerospace, the informa-
tion submitted to the- committee shows
that there are 68 persons in Aerospace
earning in excess of. $30,000 per year.
There are 19 who earned in excess of
$42,500.
To give the Senate the range of sal-
aries, the President was paid last year
$97,500. A senior vice president was paid
$66,000. A vice president for operations
was paid $65,000. Another vice president
for operations was paid $58,000. Another
vice president and general manager was
paid $55,000. Another vice president was
paid $50,000. Another vice president was
paid $50,000. Another vice president was
paid $50,000. Another vice president was
paid $50,000. Another vice president was
paid $45,000. Another vice president was
paid $45,500.
The committee went into this matter
very carefully. It felt that there should
be some restraint with regard to what is
done with respect to these 16 Govern-
ment-sponsored, nonprofit research or-
ganizations.
With that in mind, the amendment
which is included in the bill was devel-
oped and was approved by the committee.
I thank the distinguished Senator
from New Hampshire for yielding to me
at this point.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I com-
pliment the Senator from Virginia for
his work, not only On the particular
amendment he has been discussing, but
generally for his help, counsel, and ad-
vice on the subcommittee, and, of course,
his activities on the full committee. It
has been a pleasure to be associated with
him, particularly as we have delved into
this matter of research and development
during the past year.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Presi-
dent, will the Senator Veld?
Mr. McINTYRE. For what purpose?
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I wish to
compliment the Senator.
Mr. McINTYRE, Oh. I always yield for
that.
The PRESIDING OPeICER. The
Senator yields for a compliment.
Mr. BYRD of West Vir iinia. Mr. Presi-
dent, the Senator yields for a compli-
ment that is well deserved. I have been
greatly impressed by the presentations
that have been made during the debate
on this bill by the able junior Senator
from New Hampshire. I think that he
has been exceedingly diligent in his work
as chairman of the subcommittee; and
the statements that he has made, his
participation in colloquies on the floor,
and his answers to questions have indi-
cated that he has a very thorough grasp
of the subject matter. I know that one
can only acquire the knowledge with re-
spect to a bill that he obviously has ac-
quired with respect to this bill through a
great deal of hard work, effort, and dili-
gence. It is gratifying to see Senators
come to the floor who are so well pre-
pared to present their case on a bill, and
the Senator from New Hampshire has
certainly set an extremely fine example.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I
thank the Senator from West Virginia
for his very kind remarks, but I would
add that, as one of the so-called junior
Senators, I have learned much and have
profited greatly from watching my dis-
tinguished colleague from West Virginia
in his Presentations, because I think it is
generally recognized that there is no
harder-working Member of this body
than my distinguished friend from West
Virginia.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I thank
the Senator. I think the Senate is in-
debted to him, and he has done a great
service for the country, on the subject
matter of the legislation which his sub-
committee has delved into. It is a very
difficult subject matter, and I have lis-
tened to his presentation with interest.
I wanted to pay him this tribute be-
cause I felt it was well deserved, and
again I say the Senate is indebted to
him. I congratulate him, and I know he
will continue to do great work on the
Committee on Armed Services.
Mr. McINTYRE. I thank the Senator
very much.
Furthermore, the subcommittee felt
that there should be a general reduction
in the level of effort of FCRC's, par-
ticularly since we see an overall reduc-
tion in the total DOD research and
development budget. In addition, we
noted that the Defense Department has
instituted a policy authorizing Defense-
sponsored FCRC's to invite them to take
up to 20 percent of their business from
non-DOD sources.
The subcommittee recognized that the
total operating budget of the Federal
Contract Research Centers is not neces-
sarily, indeed not usually, funded from
a single account. For example, the line
item for Aerospace Corp. under Military
Astronautics and related equipment is
$24.7 million, whereas its operating budg-
et planned for fiscal year 1970 is $78
million. The rest of the funding is pro-
vided from various programs for which
Aerospace Corp. provides system en-
gineering and technical services. We rec-
ognize the difficulty of identifying ap-
propriate accounts to which a reduction
should be charged. It is expected that the
impact on the FCRC's will be in excess
of the recommended cut.
The efforts of the Federal Contract
Research Centers are generally charac-
terized by two attributes. First, each
center has a "mission oriented" rather
than a "scientific discipline-oriented"
charter; that is, each center is given
tasks directly connected to the Services'
operational needs. To carry out these
tasks, an FCRC must involve many kinds
of scientists and engineers. Thus, the
contributions of any one center are carte
varied?in terms of scientific disciplines
and areas of technology, and in terms
of the duration and scope of effort lead-
ing to a contribution.
Second, many investigations are con-
ducted concurrently within each center,
and the culmination dates of investiga-
tions are widely staggered. Thus, a small
sampling of the contributions made by
all FCRC's during a given short period
of time is not representative of their
long-term cumulative value.
Because of these two characteristics,
what I wish to point out is: First, a
rather detailed listing of some of the
important developments from one FCRC,
the Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns
Hopkins University; and second, a sam-
pling of illustrative contributions by
other FCRC's. This should provide a
"feel" for both the range of the center's
activity as well as the larger range of
work accomplished by this entire cat-
egory of R. & D. orga,nizations.
APPLIED PHYSICS LABORATORY
The Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns
Hopkins University, working primarily
for the U.S. Navy, has long been a pro-
ductive member of the DOD's research
and development team. The fiscal year
1967 DOD funding of this organization
-was $31.4 million. The level of technical
effort haS been reasonably constant over
the past several years. In return for this
Investment the Applied Physics Labora-
tory has:
Developed the basic surface-to-air
missiles, Terrier, Tartar, and Tabs,
which are now deployed on upward of
60 ships and has undertaken the job of
improving the capabilities of these sys-
tems against new threats, countermeas-
ures, and other environmental factors.
Released to production, in December
1966, design modifications for the Terrier
and Tartar missiles to extend the capa-
bilities of the missile.
Mr. President, I am now talking about
the missiles on our warships today, on
the high seas of the world.
Formulated testing methods and devel-
oped the necessary ancillary test equip-
ment to permit the rapid determination
of the state of operability of the ship-
board weapon systems of the Tartar and
Terrier ships. A system dynamic tester
has been developed that provides real-
istic target simulation for the fire con-
trol system and generates a test problem
similar to that of engaging a stringent
target. The functioning of the Ere con-
trol system is automatically evaluated
and a scoring is displayed. The first
model of this equipment was successfully
tested aboard the U.S.S. Berkeley in the
fall of 1966. A further advance in oper-
ability testing involved the design of
automatic equipment for the evaluation
of the Navy tactical data system com-
puter complex already aboard Terrier
ships of the DLG-26 class. This com-
Priterized test program was successfully
demonstrated aboard the U.S.S. Wain-
wright and work is proceeding for the
installation of the teat program aboard
all the Terrier ships having the NTDS
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rr-Ralease,2, ,E4A,RDP7e1EMO
system. The testing programs materially
contribute to the online readiness of the
DOD CONTRACTS WITH FOREIGN RESEARCH proposed project, and fourth, at least
INSTITUTIONS one of the following special conditions is
shipboard weapon systems. The amendment by the Senator from inherent in the proposed work.
Conceived and developed the Navy Arkansas would reduce the authorization First. The research or development in-
navigation satellite system. This sys- for Defense Department contracts at for- volves geographical, environmental, or
?
tem provides extremely accurate navi-
gation fixes for the Polaris submarine
fleet, independent of weather conditions.
The entire development, including the
concepts, the computing programs, de-
tailed satellite design, construction and
checkout, the development of the ship-
board navigation receivers and com-
puters, and the development of the sup-
porting ground system for tracking, com-
manding, and controlling the satellite
was accomplished by the Applied Physics
Laboratory.
AEROSPACE CORP.
Aerospace Corp.: They devised a pro-
gram for modifying formerly operational
Atlas E and Atlas F missiles into configu-
ration suitable for target vehicle boosters
for the advanced ballistic reentry sys-
tem program and the Nike ABM test pro-
grams. The total projected cost saving
of modifying 134 boosters over procure-
ment cost of that many new target ve-
hicle boosters is estimated at $1.47
billion.
Within the past 2 years Aerospace
Corp. has developed an analytic method
for predicting radio frequency attenua-
tion caused by the plasma-sheath sur-
sounding reentry vehicles. This is a sig-
nificant contribution, in the efforts to
overcome the problems resulting from
radar and telemetry signal attenuation
during a critical portion of the missile
or space capsule flight profile.
HUMAN RESOURCES RESEARCH OFFICE
Human Resources Research Office,
George Washington University: During
the last 12 months they have conceived
and designed a radically new training
device for aviators. This device will re-
duce required instrument training flight
time from the present 50 hours to 40
hours. The savings in projected flight
costs are estimated as $1,700 million
per year.
or flora not
eign institutions by $2 million, culturalcon ion , ,
The Department of Defense has con- found and not feasible to duplicate or
tinning priority needs for certain se- simulate within the United States and its
territories.
Second. The work involves diseases,
epidemiological situations, or availability
or clinical material which are not present
within the United States.
Third. The work involves a unique re-
search idea highly relevant to DOD
needs.
In this fiscal year 1970 budget the De-
partment of Defense requested $5,700,000
for work in this impotant field of re-
search, the field of research which is de-
voted almost entirely to physical sciences,
otherwise called the hard sciences. The
Armed Services Committee has reduced
this request by some $513,000 leaving a
total authorization of approximately
$5.2 billion. The amendment of the Sen-
ator from Arkansas calls for a further
reduction of $2,000,000 reducing this pro-
gram to a figure of $3.7 million or in ef-
fect practically gutting this type of work,
for the reduction overall would be great-
er than one-third. The reduction of one-
third of these high priority research in-
vestigations which can only be carried
out abroad include, as I have said, in-
vestigation of parasitic diseases of rele-
vancy to naval and military personnel
in foreign areas, to long-range global
communications and of environment in
foreign areas of importance to our mili-
tary. A reduction of this scope would
eliminate further progress on more than
100 projects planned for foreign investi-
gators.
Last year, fiscal year 1969, there were
451 research undertakings in 44 coun-
tries at a cost of $9.2 million. The cost
of this program of fiscal year 1970, after
the committee reduction, has reduced it
to $5.7 million, in which there will be 207
projects. This is the present plan but not
all the projects have been approved and
there rhay well be some changes in these
numbers because of the cut already made.
Of the $5.7 million only $300,000 at the
very outside that could possibly be la-
beled social and behavioral sciences and
all these may not be programed during
the year.
I ask unanimous consent that a com-
plete list of the projects planned for fis-
cal year 1970?their contracts for re-
search?for foreign institutions along
with the nature of the research and the
amounts of funds be printed in the REC-
ORD.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the REC-
ORD, as follows:
lected foreign research and development
projects. One very important area is that
of long-range radio communications re-
quired for our worldwide communica-
tions network. Interaction of solar radia-
tion with the earth's upper atmosphere
produces global extent ionization of the
region called the ionosphere. The rapidly
changing conditions of the ionosphere
affect in a primary way Defense com-
munications. For this reason we support
ionospheric and radio propagation re-
search in Australia, Canada, and Nor-
way to acquire essential data not obtain-
able within the United States.
A second area of prime importance is
that of military medicine in foreign
countries where our American troops are
stationed or operating. Many diseases are
endemic to a specific geographic locale
and their presence greatly affects the
force strength of our command and force
units. It is not desirable nor feasible to
pursue stateside research on many ?of
these diseases since it is not desired to ,
bring them into the United States.
Therefore Defense supports selected re-
search projects in military medicine in
such countries as Japan, Israel, Italy,
and Brazil.
A third area of key importance is that
of environmental and meteorological
phenomena related to the land, sea, and
air that our Defense units operate on or
over the globe. It is simply not possible
to carry out the required research from
stateside alone. Foreign investigators
having a daily presence and long estab-
lished experience in specific geograph-
ical areas are important contributors to
the basic knowledge that we require
about terrestrial sciences in foreign
lands, about the oceans and seas far dis-
tant from the United States and about
MITRE CORP. atmospheric weather phenomena in for-
Mitre Corp.: They developed an inter-
eign areas. To meet priority Defense re-
q
ferometer radar technique to provide auirements, selected research projects
are supported in Berlin, Canada, Den-
capability for rapid and precise deter-
mark, Greece, and other countries.
mination of satellite orbits and ballistic Defense has established stringent cri-
missile trajectories and information re- teria for selection of research and devel-
garding the physical configuration of
opment projects by foreign performers.
the target satellite or missile. All ongoing or further research and ex-
This gives an idea of some of the tre- ploratory development by foreign per-
mendous research advances that these formers shall be supported by DOD only
so-called think tanks have come up when it has been determined that, first,
with. it is clearly significant in meeting urgent
I now turn my attention to the De- defense needs of the United States; sec-
partment of Defense contracts with for- ond, it cannot be deferred for later ac-
eign research institutions. This is an- tion; third, the proposed foreign investi-
other area that the Fulbright amend- gator certifies that he is unable to obtain
ment attacks. support from any,other source for the
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S 9728 i,uNGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE August 12, 1969.
Military department and
contract agency
Tine
Argentina:
N Universidad de Buenos Aires
F Consejo National de Invest.
Cient.
F National University of L.a
Plata.
F Consejo Nacional He I nvesti-
gaciones.
Australia:
A tVlonash University
N University of Queensland__ _ _
F University of Sydney
F University of Adelaide _
F University of Sydney
Austria:
A Institute of Hygiene, Univer-
sity of Vienna.
F University of Vienna
Belgium:
A Von Harman Institute
F Von Karmen Institute for
Fluid Dynamics, Rhode
Saint/Genese.
F Von Kerman Institute for
Dynamics, Rhode Saint/
Genese,
F Von Karmen Institute for
Fluid Dynamics, Rhode
SainVGenese.
Do
F Von Karmen Institute for
Fluid Waterloorhode-St
Genese,
F University of Liege _
Born-Bunge Foundation
Bolivia:
D Colegio San Calixto . _ _
F San Andres University
Brazil:
A University of Sao Paulo
A Minas Gerais University
A Federal University of Bahia
A Universidad Mackensie
Do_
A Institute Adolfo Lutz
N University of Sao Paulo
F Comissao Nacional De Activi-
dades Espac, J Dos Campos.
F Fundacao Service Especial de
Saude Publica.
Canada:
A York University
A McGill University.
A Royal Victoria Hospital
A University of Manitoba
N McGill University
Do
Do
Do
N Computing Devices of Canada_
A Manitoba University
N Institute of Oceanography_...
N British Columbia Research
Council.
N York University
N McGill University
N McGill University
N University of Toronto
N University of British
Columbia.
F Laval University
D McGill University
D Canadian Armament Re-
search and Development
Establishment.
? RCA Victor, Limited
Ceylon: A Medical Research
Institute.
Funds
planned
for fiscal
year 1970
Development of effective protective and thera-
peutic drugs for radiation sickness.
X-ray spectrometry of galactic sources from
7.76outhern Hemisphere.
Wearch in stellar spectroscopy
Wilecular mechanisms of steroids action on
tespiratory systems,
Microbiological and immunological studies of
_pathogenesis and virulence in leptospirosis.
Haute and pharmacological action in toxin
from deadly jellyfish.
*My of cosmic radiations at extremely high
eil
Reoevich directed toward propagation of solar
pai iicles.
Steliar intensity interferometer
andentiology, virology, and immunology of
tO-horne encephalitis and other tick-
be. oe diseases.
Cnmposition and content of meteorites
Flow characteristics associated with V/STOL
model testing in wind tunnel.
The influence of cross flow on 2-dimensional
sep iration.
Applantion of the blunt-trailing edge blade
to p 1.
taesiiir separation in hypersonic flows
Lem-density high-temperature gas dynamics__
E*i ,iental aerodynamics.
High resolution atmospheric I R absorption and
sky background emission interfermoetric
Dead i ipment of sleep patterns, women doctor
en,' use.
Spech ,ii characteristics of infrasonic acoustic
wa /vs and related seismic research:
lay research at high altitude
Control of ribonucleic acid synthesis in gian
chromosomes.
Schietosemiasis drug screening
Pathogenesis of diarrhea in severe strongy-
toidasis.
Ai:atmospheric studies LA 60
Solar inicrowave radio emission LA61
Ariteuirus studies in Sao. Paulo, Brazil
Mathematical investigations of problems of
ocean surveillance of navigation.
Measuiements of the earth's total magnetic
Kehl and its variations.
Epideiciological studies of Amapari virus
Kictelo.i. of atmospheric constituents
Extremely low frequency electromagnetic
pheilemena.
Investigation of pathogenesis and treatment
of si jock.
Shrift of factors influencing the passage of
dreg.; into the malarial parasite plasmodium
Be yir.
Electric properties of ice
Arctic plankton ecology_
HE audio absorption in ice
Energy budget and other tropical microclima-
tolovical research.
Antehlatic detection and classification
Investigations of pheromones as chemosteri-
lent-. tor insects with special reference to
synthetic queen substance and its analogs.
Sydeimitics biology and hydrographic rela-
tion or seine species of calanus.
Mitine borer biology
Brain nucleic acid changes during learning_ __
Mechanisms of polymer degradation
High magnetic fields and insulators
Very high altitude missile and decoy gas
dynamics; missile aerodynamics for broad
altiiiide ranges. ,
Fundamental air-sea exchange processes and
then relation to wind wave generation:
()online turbulence.
Nalizehemoral control of thyrotrophic activity.
Psychological processes of the central nervous
system.
Hypervelocity Research program
10.0
24. 0
12.0
16. 0
18.0
12. 0
50. 0
25. 0
60. 0
20. 0
Military department and
contract agency
Title
Chile:
A Comisten Nacional de
Investigacion.
F Universidad de Chile__
F Catholic University of Chile__
F Catholic University of Chile
F Comision Nactional de
I nvestigacion Cientifica y
Technologica.
Colombia:
F Universidad Nacional de
Colombia.
F Universidad del Valle
Costa Rica:
A University of Costa Rica
Denmark:
N Marine Biological Laborto_
F Danske Meteorologiske
Institute.
17.0 Equador: On..
F Universidad Central del
10. 0 Equador.
Finland:
15. 0 F Institute of Occupational
Health.
France:
A Ecole Pratique des Hautes
Estudes-Sorbonne,
15.0 A Institute for Cell Pathology.
N Campagne de Recherches et
d'Etudes Aeronautiques.
F Observatorie de Paris
F University of Lyon
Germany:
A Institute for Animal Phys-
iology, J. W. Goethe Uni-
versity.
A Free University of Berlin .
A Research Office for Physical
Bioclimatology.
A Rheinisch-Westfaifische
Technische Hochschule.
F Bochum Radio Observatory
F Technische Hochschule
Munchen, Munich.
Ghana:
F University of Ghana, Accra_
20. 0
15. 0
20. 0
30. 0
50. 0
14, 0
15.8
12.0
5. 0
8. 0
5.0
15. 0
20. 9
7. 0
Greece:
F University of Athens
D Seismological Institute of
8. 0 Athens University.
Iceland:
N Surtsay Research Society.....
India:
A Bombay National History......
12. 0
IS. 0
25. 0
20. 0
10.0
15.0
20. 0
20. 0
150.0
20. 0
13.0
10. 0
15. 0
26, 0
11.0
15.0
50, 0
15.0
140. 0
700 0
Radar 5ackscatter studies 100. 0
LeMnspirosis-A serological survey of occupa- 1.0
demi groups in Ceylon,
F University of Calcutta
Indonesia:
A Lembaga Biologi Nasional
Iran:
D Pahlavi University
Israel:
A
Structure function relationships inhuman and
high elevation adapted mammal hemo-
globin.
_ Form and function invariants in the visual
system.
_ Nervous connections in the vestibular system_
Studies in synaptic mechanisms
I3iochemical properties of nerve membrances_
Studies of ecology and disease transmission__
Disease ecology of tacaribe group viruses _
Physiological studies of leishmania
_ Ecological investigations on bottom living
marine animals.
Ionospheric research using active satellite
transmissions.
Arctic geomagnetic observations
Studies of psychotomimetics
Funds
planned
ter fiscal
year 1970
20. 0
21.0
8. 0
7. 0
8. 0
0.0
30. 0
7.0
10.0
14. 0
3.0
6, 0
Mathematical and electrical analogs of heat 10.0
transfer in man.
Metabolic and sensory stimuli in the regula-
tion of food intake-behavioral and electro-
physiological study.
Laser action on living cells
Rheo-electricat apalogy: Supercavitating pro-
peller design.
Research directed toward the improvement of
planetary phettogrammetrY.
Neurophysielogical mechanisms of The states
of sleep.
Microcirculatory behavior In shock___ _
Daily analysis of circumpolar 30 and 10 mb
maps E486.
Atmospheric aerosols between 700 and 3,000
meters, [-1127.
Measurement of thorny concentration of
lower atmosphere.
Ionospheric studies using active synchronous
satellite t ra nsmissions.
Investigation of spectral radiation properties
of Atmosphere and earth.
Ionospheric studies using active satellite
transmiisions.
20. 0
20.0
10. 0
18, 0
10. 0
6,0
20 0
10,0
15.0
7.0
10.0
7.0
Ionospheric research using active satellite 15.0
transmissions.
Aftershocks and crustal structure in Greece__ 20,-S
Ecological succession of biota on a newly
formed oceanic land mass. _
Studies of the bionomics and taxonomy of the
birds of India, taxonomy of the birds of
Bhutan.
Radio, astronomical and satellite studies of the
ionosphere.
Migratory animal pathological sur-
vern(gdnoesnieasia), avian studies in
Nutritional studies -Iran_
Israel Institute of Applied Social Re- Investigation of leadership quail-
search, ties of kibbutz-raised young
men.
A Rogoff-Wellcome Medicine Research In- Isolation of snake venom toxins
stitute. and study of their mechanism of
action.
A Technion Institute of Technology Photochemistry of antimalarial
drugs.
N Institute of Technology Techn ion-Israel_ _ Cross-stresses In the flow of gases
(Reiner-effect).
Basic theories Inc nonnumerical
data processing.
Effects of heat sources on plane-
tary circulation,
Ionospheric research using Sat-
ellites.
Seismk source Identification tech-
niques.
Pharmacological and biochemical
changes in animals made acres-
sive by isolation.
Immunological reactions in viral
hepatitis.
Hebrew University
Hebrew University
F National Commission for Space Research.
D Weizmann Institute of Science
Italy:
A Pharmacological Research Institute
A University of Genoa
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20.
10. 0
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S 9729
Military.department and
?
contract agency
Title
Funds
planned
for fiscal
year 1970
Italy-Continued
A Chemical Institute of University of Rome__ Individual activity coefficients of
ionic species.
F University Degli Studi di Pisa Comparative neurophysiology of
F University of Ferrara Research on mechanics of breath-
ing.
F National Institute of Optics___ Problems in visual performance of pilots
F University of Milan Neutron flux of earth's radiation environment__
F University of Sassari Identification of photodynamic systems in the
retina.
F Arcetri Astrophysical Ob- Solar radio spectroscopy and detection of sun
servatory spectral lines.
F University of Milan Physiology of cerebrospinal fluid
Jamaica: Ionospheric studies using active satellite
F University of West Indies. transmissions.
Japan:
A National Cancer Center
Research Institute.
Kyushu University
A Institute of Microbial
Chemistry.
A Nara Medical College
A _ Do
A Kitasato University
A Sasaki Institute
A Nara Medical College
A Japanese Foundation for Can-
cer Research.
A Kitasato Institute
A National Institutes of Health
A Do
A Kitasato Institute
A Yamashina Institute or
Ornithology.
A Kanazawa University Neuronal activities on the regu.ation of
feeding.
A Hokkaido:University Physiological activity of the brown adipose
tissue.
A Kumamoto University Biological reactions to cellular antibodies
with special reference to their immune-
pathological and immuno-chemical prop-
erties.
A Do Endogenous mechanism of vascu.ar response
in inflammation, with special reference to
biologic significance of specific permability
factors and their inhibitors newly isolated
from inflammed sites.
A Kirume University Interaction between arbovirus and myxovirus_
A Shi-Ehime Preparatory of Life cycle and control of paragoniumus in
Japan. Shikoku area.
F Tokyo Medical and Dental Gamma-aminobutyric acid in sensory physi-
University. elegy.
F Kumamoto University Neural organization of sensory information for
taste.
Measurement of human complement com-
ponents in dengue shock syndrome.
Taxonomical and ecological studies on lung
fluke, paragonimus in Pacific area; with
special reference to Southeast Asia.
Microbial drug resistance (genetics and evolu-
tion of It factor and plasmids).
Polymeric structure of hemoglobin and its
relation to function.
Localization by electron microscopy of several
phosphatase activities.
Nature and mode of action of local antibody in
intestine.
Investigation of cell component structural
changes in homologous transplants com-
pared with normal cells.
Electron microscope studies on several phos-
phatase activities in neurons and gliacytes
infected with Japanese encephalitis virus.
Differences in antigenic specificity and im-
munogenicity of tissue transplants.
Cytochemical studies on ultrastructures o1
toxoplasma gondii and allied organisms.
Mode of infection of scrub typhus
I mmunologica studies on scrub typhus and
its center in Japan.
Studies on encephaiitozoon (nosema cuniculi)
infections in man.
Migratory animal pathological survey
Kenya:
F College of Nairobi, Kenya__ _ Ionospheric studies of radio emissions
Korea:
A Seoul National University____ Multiplication and antibody formation of Jap-
anese encephalitis virus in snakes.
A Kyung-HEB University Migratory animal pathological survey(Korea)_ _
A Seoul National University_ _ Ecological survey and mass chemotherapy of
filariasis on Cho Do, Korea.
Malaysia:
A University of Malya Mosquitoes of Malaysia 20.0
A Do Weathering of rocks under humid tropical 20.0
conditions.
?
Netherlands:
A International Training Center 4.0
for Aerial Survey.
N Central Laboratory, T.N.O 20.0
10. 0
15. 0
10. 0
6. 0
10. 0
3. 0
10. 0
15. 0
4.0
10.0
7. 0
12.0
3. 0
3. 0
7.0
7. 0
3. 0
6. 0
10. 0
15. 0
15. 0
20. 0
5. 0
8. 0
6. 0
6. 0
12. 0
5. 0
5. 0
8. 0
5.0
10. 0
13. 0
5. 0
15.0
Role of image quality of photogrammetrjc
pointing accuracy.
Mechanical strength of filled elastomers of the
types used as solid propellants in rocket
motors.
Antilymphocyte serum, homologous bone
marrow transplantation and irradiation.
F Radiobiological Institute of
the Organization for Health
Research.
Norway:
A Electroencephalographic Lab- Brain, behavior and intracerebral blood flow__
oratory.
A University of Oslo Neuropsychological studies of mechanisms of
visual discrimination.
A Do Photochemical atmosphere model containing
oxygen and hydrogen. .
N Universityr of Bergen Degradation of marine surfaces by salt re-
quiring bacteria.
F Auroral Observatory Ionospheric studies using satellite transmis-
sions.
F University of Oslo The investigation of variable radio and optical
solar phenomena.
F University of Bergen X-ray and particle radiations at high altitudes
in the auroral zone.
D University of Bergen Detection seismology
D Norwegian Defense Research Norwegian seismic system phase II
Establishment.
15.0
20. 0
5. 0
5. 0
20. 0
10. 0
13. 0
15. 0
Military department and
contract agency
Title
Funds
planned
for fiscal
year 1970
Peru:
A University Peruvian Caye-
tam Heredia.
A Do
A Do
A Do
A Do
A Do
F Institut Geofisica Del Peru
Lima.
Do
F Geophysical Institute of Peru_
F Institute Geofisico Del Pero_ _
D Institute Geofisica! Del Peru_
Philippines:
A Mindanao State Univer-
sity.
A National Museum
A University of Philippines
A Do
A National Museum
A University of Philippines
A Do
F Manila Observatory
Spain:
F Observatory of Ebro_
F University of Salamanca_
Sweden:
A Sahlgrens Hospital, Uni-
versity of Goteborg.
N University of Goteborg,
Medical.
F Stockholms Universitet
Stockholm.
F Kiruna Geophysical Ob-
servatory, Kiruna.
F Royal University of
Uppsala.
Do
F Kiruna Geophysical
Observatory.
F University of Goteborgs
D University of Uppsala
Switzerland:
A University of Lausanne
A University of Basel
A Physiklisch-Meteorologische
Observatorium.
F Universitat Bern
F Universitat Zurich
Taiwan:
A Tunghai University
A Kaohsiung Medical College___
A Tunghai University
A National Taiwan University
A Do
Thailand:
A Applied Scientific Research
Corp.
A Do
A Medical Sciences University
Facility for Tropical Medi-
cine.
A Bangkok School of Tropical
Medicine.
University of Medical Scien-
ces.
A Do
D Applied Scientific Research
Corp.
United Kingdom:
35.0 A Liverpool School of Tropical
675.0 Medicine.
Physiologic changes in the cardiopulmonary 15. 0
system by ascending to high altitudes.
Endocrine alterations at high altitude 0.0
Coagulation studies in newcomers to high 5.0 '
elevations LA-134.
Hormone metabolism in men exposed to high . 10.0
elevatien LA-128.
Respiratory physiology on ascent to high 15.0
altitudes. .
Role of adrenal cortex in process of acclima- 20. 0
tization to high elevation.
Equatorial ionospheric effects study 10.0
Research directed toward the study of the 20. 0
. airglow at low latitudes.
Radio solar measurements 9.0
Observations of earth magnetic field 5. 0
Observation and study of infrasonic waves in 30.0
the atmosphere.
Migratory animal pathological survey (South .5.0
Philippines).
Migratory animal pathological survey (North 5.0
Philippines).
Filariasis studies in the Philippines 7.0
Fluorescent antibody test in ineasurement of 7.0
malarial immunity.
Ecology. of Southern Samar 15.0
Determination of malaria vector on Pangut- 0.0
aran Island, Sulu Archipelago.
Determination of choloroquine resistant P. 8.0
Falciparum Parasitas Impalawan and other
Provinces of the Philippines.
Conduct radio observations of the sun 30.0
Ionospheric studies using active satellite 3.0
transmissions.
Morphobiochemical correlations involved in 6.0
the differentiation eye lens.
Newer advances in treatment of shock in man 10.0
Effects of noise on inner ear cells 30. 0
Rocket sampling of solid particles in tlPe 2. 0
mesosphere.
Study of characteristics of auroral ionosphere 10,0
and its irregularities.
Research, design and development refraction 33.0
and gravity experiments.
Evaluation of high latitude cosmic ray data_ _ _ . 7.0
High latitude geomagnetic data 4.0
Integrated nervous control of the cardiovascu- 10.0
lar and gastrointestinal systems.
Seismic body waves and surface waves 15.0
Investigation on structure and biological activ- 12.0
ities of human immunoglobins M. & D.
(IGM and IGD).
Variation-resistant matrices and related 5.0
mathematical topics.
Measure of direct solar radiation and sky- 5.0
brightness in UV and visible part of spec-
trum.
Pulmonary pathology of oxygen toxicity 12.0
Sugar and peptide intestinal digestion and ab- 10.0
sorption.
Migratory animal pathological survey 5. 0
Biochemical studies on toxic nature of snake 10.0
venoms.
Biology and pathophoricity of biting midges 7.0
(Diptera: Ceratopogonidae) in Taiwan.
Hast-parasite relationships of Schistosoma 8.0
Japonicum in Taiwan.
Studies of cardiotoxin and vasoactive sub- 20.0
stance releasing components of cobra
venom.
Migratory animal pathological survey (Thai- 8.0
land FE 315).
Migratory animal patholog cal survey (Thai- 5.1)
land FE 316).
Investigation of filariasis in Thailand 10. 0
Leptospirosis in Thailand, with special ref-
erence to epidemiology, pathology and C.
Investigations on the patterns of epidemiology
and endemicity of diseases occurring due to
largescare environmental changes in north-
east Thailand.
Schistosomiasis in Thailand, studies on inci-
dence, epidemiology, life cycles and its
causing .cercarial dermatitis (carry-on and
redirection of above).
Reaearch? on tropical environmental data
(trend)and basic environmental data (bend)
in Thailand
Chemotherapy of rodent malaria drug action
against exoerythrocytic stages and drug
resistant strains.
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20. 0
200. 0
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MIONTINi citffiti31-q?sYkiff?3ool0000tta
ziugust, 12, 1.969
Military
contract
department and
agency
IC
Funds
planned
for fiscal
year 1970
United Kingdom?Continued
A Maybridge Chemical Co
A Royal College of Art
F U. College
F Imperial College
N University of Cambridge,
Department of Pathology.
N Oxford University, Pharma-
cology and Physical Chem-
istry Departments.
N Sir William Dunn School of
Pathology, University of
Oxford.
N University of Sussex
Potintial antimalariais based on quinoline-7-
carboxylic acid.
perimental cartography
search for determination of air density
temperature and winds at high altitudes.
rigin of auroral primaries
tyoprotective mechanism
-Studies on decompression sickness and inert
- gas narcosis.
lielhods of protecting Navy personnel against
- biological toxins.
iiai pattern recognition in naval tasks
10.0
20.0
10.0
7.0
6.0
02.0
20.0
10.0
Military department and
contract agency
Title
Funds
planned
far fiscal
year 1970
United Kingdom?Continued
N Royal College of Advanced The absorptiOn of sound by Polymer solutions_ 9.0
ech
N University of Keefe Recombination reactions of importance it 7. 0
propulsion.
N Cambridge Language Resi- Semantic research for automatized language 8.0
i
dent Unit. translation and inforthation reBieval.
F University of London
F Kings College ion marls sPeCtrometry of the lower ionosphere_ 50.0
Gravitational physics 10. 0
N Trinity College, University of Body temperature regulation 10.0
Dublin.
F University College, Dublin__ Radio and entice !emission from high energy 20.0
osmic rays.
Uruguay:
A Univeisidad de la Republica... Relationship between wild entourages and - 4.0
mycoses, especially S. American blastomy-
cases.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, the
subcommittee and committee have gone
over this list and scrutinized it carefully
and find strong justification for the con-
tinuation of this program at the level of
$5.7 million as approved.
Mr. President, I turn now to policy
planning studies.
The amendment of the Senator from
Arkansas is also aimed at policy planning
studies with foreign affairs implications
carried out by DOD. The total requested
for such studies was $6.4 million.
The Armed Services Committee has al-
ready recommended a cut of $0.7 million
from this amount. The ndditional cut
proposed by the Senator from Arkansas
would reduce the program to $2.7 mil-
lion, or a total cut of 58 percent. Clearly
the cut suggested by Senator FULBRIGHT
would severely curtail the policy plan-
ning effort.
Policy planning studies seek to insure
that military strategy does not lag be-
hind social and political change and be-
hind weapons technology and weapons
development.
Through it we try to better understand
the circumstances, situations, and en-
vironments that may be controlling in
the future application of military re-
sources.
Because this is such a nebulous area,
it requires particularly intense, profes-
sional exploration of the problems to ar-
rive at judgments which materially en-
hance national capacity and effective-
ness.
Yesterday and, I arti sure, on many
other days, we heard the distinguished
Senator from Arkansas talk about pro-
grams, projects, and studies of the
Turkish Revolution from 1916 to 1921,
the Ataturk revolution. The Senator
mentioned a program effort involving
Ceylon.
In the colloquy had between the Sena-
tor and me, I tried tn point out that
he was really nitpicking, picking on what
I call horrible example so as to intim-
idate the opponents and picture the en-
tire program in a manner that I con-
sider to be completely unfair.
I point out for the RECORD that this is
a sample I have chosen of some of the
programs that would be considered under
this area. The following are typical
broad subject areas:
PROJECT TTTLiO
Japanese Rearmament, Nuclear, and Space
Programs.
PROJECT DESCRIPTION
A study of factors and developments af-
fecting the Japanese military contribution to
the U.S. effort in Asia, including the security
pact.
PROJECT TITLE
Soviet Military and Foreign Policy.
PROJECT DESCRIPTION
A continuing study of Soviet military doc-
trine, use of military strength for political
purposes, foreign policy, and political in-
stitutions in the Soviet Union and East
European states.
PROJECT TITLE
Strategic Analysis of Southeast Asia--1969
(SALA).
PROJECT DESCRIPTION
Includes analyses of Malaysian foreign
policy, regional military cooperation, and
Australian foreign and military policy.
PROJECT TITLE
Strategic Postures Study (SPOST).
PROJECT DESCRIPTION
Work supporting a continuing Army staff
study effort to analyze and evaluate alterna-
tive postures for the US, the USSR, and CPR
in the 1968-80 period.
PROJECT TITLE
Navy Policy Planning Study.
PROJECT DESCRIPTION
To identify tasks the Navy would be re-
sponsible for in the post-1975 period for im-
proved inputs into the Navy Strategic
Planning process.
PROJECT TITLE
Navy Role in Exploitation of the Ocean
Resources.
PROJECT DESCRIPTION
To define the Navy's interests, objectiVes
and options in the exploitation of the oceans'
resources.
PROJECT TITLE
The Future Security Posture of Japan
1970-1985.
PROJECT DESCRIPTION
Assesses the likely security postures of
Japan during 1970-85 and the implications
for USAF long-range planning.
PROJECT TITLE
Strategy, Concepts and Military Objectives
Studies to Support Air Force Long-Range
Planning.
PROJECT DESCRIPTION
Analyzes future changing political eco-
nomic and military trends to insure that the
Air Force is responsive to U.S. security needs.
PROJECT TITLE
Sino?Soviet Economic Potential.
PROJECT DESCRIPTION
A continuing study of the economic back-
ground of Soviet and Communist Chinese
military power. Presently it includes studies
of outlays, employment, and organizational
problems in Soviet R&D, Soviet foreign eco-
nomic relations and Chinese civil aviation.
PROJECT TITLE
European Security Issues.
PROJECT DESCRIPTION
An examination of a range of alternative
security arrangements and the role of the
U.S. presence in Europe.
PROJECT TITLE
Command & Control Problems for the Na-
tional Command Authority.
PROJECT DESCRIPTION
A study of information and control facili-
ties, system.% and procedures required for
management of crises and control of conflicts.
PROJECT TITLE
Communist China.
PROJECT DESCRIPTION
A broad effort to correlate and evaluate
data on Communist China's political, eco-
nomic, military objectives and to determine
the foreign policy implications for the U.S.
These are the types of studies that
chew up the money. These are not the
funny, horrible examples that the Sen-
ator from Arkansas dragged out last year
and this year. These are the types of stud-
ies and programs that I would think the
present occupant of the chair or the Sec-
retary of State would like to know are
ongoing in the event a decision has to be
made involving this area. I think I would
want it.
I cite these in order to present a better
idea of just what this program Is about.
It was clear to the committee that
most of these studies are more properly
a responsibility of Federal agencies other
than the Department dr Defense. Specifi-
cally, most of these policy planning stud-
ies would appear to be more logically a
responsibility of the Department of
State. We have recommended that these
projects be taken over expeditiously?
this year?by the appropriate agency and
that the Defense Department phase it-
self out of this area of research except in
cases that are direcly defense related. I
think that the Senator from Arkansas
should recognize that if the Defense
funding for these studies is withdrawn
the plans of the Armed Services Commit-
tee to transfer rather than eliminate
these studies will be thwarted. There
would be no funds with which to continue
many programs previously initiated,
since it is too late this year to include
them in any other agency's budget.
As the Senator from Arkansas is aware,
the Defense Department has made a
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August 12,, 1969
ApprovestrieesassiVaniffijafkIREPAT364R000300100001-3 S9731
variety of efforts to decrease its role in programs which would have to be re-
social science studies related to foreign ducecl OT cancelled in the event of an
policy and to increase the role of other additional cut, which the Senator from
agencies. These include cuts in the level Arkansas is suggesting, in the Agile funds
of effort, curtailed field work overseas, include:
offers to transfer funds to the Depart- A reduction in vital equipment devel-
ment of State, and proposals for a high- opment and field experimentation in the
level interagency committee under non- Small Independent Action Forces. This
DOD leadership to develop priorities and is a system approach toward the need
responsibilities for knowledge and analy- of patrol size operations being under-
sis dealing with the external world. How- taken by Advanced Research Projects
ever, the ability of the Department of Agency jointly with the Army and Ma-
Defense to affect what other agencies do rine Corps.
is appropriately limited.The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time
I know that the Senator shares my be- of the Senator has expired.
lief that our foreign and defense policiesMr. McINTYRE. I yield myself 5 adcli-
need to be better informed about the ex- tional minutes.
ternal world, not less. In recent hearings There is a great need for a systematic
under his direction, the important point and integrated study of the small hide-
was made that we need a strong effort pendent action force?the patrol?with a
to understand how the world looks to view toward making this most hazard-
ous, but vital, military operation a more
effective and less risky venture. This
program is examining the various com-
ponents of the Small Independent Action
Force?the man, equipment, environ-
ment, techniques, and the interaction of
these components to determine how they
can be improved.
The proposed reduction would have a
serious impact upon a major element of
the Agile budget, namely border control
systems. Research in this critically im-
portant area in order to advise friendly
nations to effectively protect the inte-
grity of their borders and desist from
offensive actions is highly significant to
the United States. For example, a major
fraction of the current activity is related
the Fulbright amendment is too drastic to Korea which is now facing increased
and should be defeated. North Korean infiltration attempts
THE AGILE PROGRAM which, if not halted, could embroil the
The Senator from Arkansas would re- United States in an undesirable con-
duce Agile by an additional $5 million. frontation. This effort which ARPA re-
Agile is one of the elements of the budget cently initiated is a direct result of a
activity which is "other equipment" in request for assistance from General
the Defense agencies budget. The Armed Bonesteel, Commander of U.S. Forces in
Services Committee reduced that budget Korea. The lessons learned could also be
activity by $25 million. In making this applicable to other areas in support of
reduction, the committee recognized that U.S. policy, if necessary.
because, this budget activity funds a A third example of research which
number of very high priority programs? would be adversely affected by a sub-
I am now talking about the category stantial Agile reduction is the study, in ,
"other equipment"?the $25 million re- Thailand, of Communist terrorists' lines
duction ordered by the Committee on of supply and their mode of operation.
Armed Services would be reflected by In conversation with Dr. Foster yes-.
substantial cuts in the Agile program. terday, which was substantiated today,
"Other equipment" includes such pro- Dr. Foster, who is No. 3 in the Depart-
grams as intelligence data-handling ment of Defense, the Chief of Research,
systems, advanced sensors, cryptologic Testing, Evaluation, and Development,
activities, and a number of classified pro- assured MO that if this further cut ad-
grams which are vital to our national vanced by the Senator from Arkansas
security. For example, one program (Mr. FULBRIGHT) is agreed to, it would
which is included is the provision of $74 have a substantial impact on the Agile
million for nuclear weapons effects tests. program.
Senators will recall that this activity is These are directly relevant and im-
part of the program to provide safe- portant applications of research to im-
guards to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. proving our ability to cope with existing
h t dvised and threats to our Armed Forces. I believe this
are progressing satisfactorily and con-
tributing significant new knowledge and
techniques to established defense re-
quirements. This would diminish the
contributive research efforts of approxi-
mately 60 university faculty members
and 120 graduate students on important
defense related research problems in 10
different universities and colleges.
The issue here is whether it is desir-
able to encourage new centers for re-
search. A good start has been made in
this direction by Project Themis, and the
evaluation of results so far is promising.
The Armed Services Committee did not
believe that the Themis project should
be completely canceled nor suffer such
reduction as this amendment calls for.
The Themis program for fiscal year
1970 requested $33 million.
A 12-percent reduction of the Armed
others and to avoid imposing our parte- Services Committee reduced this by ap-
ular cultural views on others. I suggest proximately $4 million. The Fulbright
that we miss the point when we limit our amendment would now add $8 million to
efforts to curtailing the activities of the the $4 million reduction recommended
Department of Defense alone. Instead, I by the full committee.
invite the Senator from Arkansas to join This will reduce the program a total of
with me and my colleagues on the Armed ? about $12 million, to a total of $21 mil-
Services Committee to see to it that na- lion, and would cut it- 36 percent.
tional needs for rational understanding In view of the fact that this is the last
of the world are met by the government year of new starts for the program, the
as a whole with an appropriately dimin- total reduction of $12 million will mean
ished role for the Department of that there will be no new starts this year.
Defense. I wish to state, too?with emphasis?
THE THEMIS PROGRAM that the Themis program is concerned
Mr. President, on the subject of the only with unclassified subject matter?
Project Themis, which is the fourth area and deals exclusively in basic research.
under attack in the amendment of the It is the opinion of the committee that
distinguished Senator from Arkansas,
this is a recommended cut in this amend-
ment of some $8 million. I would want
to put this proposed cut in the full con-
text of what the Research and Develop-
ment Subcommittee and full Committee
of the Armed Services have already done.
This program is based upon a 1965
Presidential request to all executive de-
partments requesting more emphasis on
establishing new centers of research ex-
cellence at universities in fields relevant
to the Department's missions. DOD's
plan provided for starting 200 new uni-
versity programs over' the four-year pe-
riod from fiscal year 1967 through fiscal
year 1970, an average of 50 new pro-
grams each year. The university response
was very enthusiastic; more than 1,000
proposals were submitted by universities
in the first 3 years, from which 118
projects were selected and funded. In the
fourth and final year of new starts in
fiscal year 1970, 25 new starts are planned
which require $10 million of funds.
Since the cut in this amendment super-
imposes itself on a reduction of some 12
percent already made by the Armed Serv-
ices Committee, this cut of $8 million
would cause: In 9 when
First. The elimination?if it has not consented to the treaty it insisted that kind of research deserves our support.
been eliminated already?of the 25 new these safeguards be instituted. I, per- Mr. President, the point here is that
fiscal year 1970 starts. This will defer sonally, would not like to see our efforts Agile has already sustained a reduction
the growth of research skills in the im- in this field reduced by action of the in its funding in this bill by action of the
portant defense-related areas of detec- Senate. The Test Ban Treaty requires Armed Services Committee which
tion and surveillance, structural me- these tests to be conducted underground, reduced the "other equipment" category
chanics of defense vehicles, oceanog- and underground nuclear testing is ex- by $25 million. This additional reduc-
raphy, and resuscitation and treatment pensive. It is one of the prices we pay tion now recommended would cut deep
of the wounded. for the reduced tensions which grow into valuable programs.
Second. Will also be the termination of out of limitations on atmospheric nuclear Mr. President, in summary, let me say
approximately 10 of the 118 ongoing testing. that the amendment we are considering
Project Themis contracts all of which Some of the research and development here would reduce research efforts by
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s 9732 Approved For ReleaniM4/11/30 ? CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3
RESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 12, 1969
-
an additional $45 pillion. These same Mr. McINTYRE. I am happy to yield to Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is
research efforts havd already been cut the distinguished chairman of the Corn- correct.
by the Senate Armed. Services Commit- mittee on Armed Services. Mr. STENNIS. There really is not
tee by more than $504nillion. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, in spite enough time. However, we cannot pass
Many of the programs which are of of my contact with the subject already on these matters unless we hear the
particular concern 10 the Senator from this year to sonic extent, I have been very arguments.
Arkansas will be cdt in the reduction much interested in what the Senator has Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think the Senator
made by the Armedaer vices Committee, had to say about these projects. is correct.
It is my feeling, Mr. President, that I do not see how anyone could listen to Mr. McINTYRE. I yield the floor.
further cuts in the littoral Contract Re- his statement of facts?and I know it is Mr. PULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
search Centers, beyarel those made by correct?without being most favorably yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Ben-
the Senate Armed Se; vices Committee impressed with these programs. ator from Michigan,
including the efforts made by the De- Like everything else these programs Mr. HART. Mr. President, first, I wish
pertinent of Defense_ to further reduce need regulation, they need thorough sur- to repeat what I have said before the
FCRC expenditures -by taking more of veillance, and they need annual review. Senator from New Hampshire. He has
their income from non-DOD sources, is I appreciate the statement made by the done a magnificent job hi scaling down
as far as we should go at this time. Senator that it is his purpose as the or, to use his own expression, scrubbing
As with all of the questions raised in chairman of the subcommittee to eon- out or cleaning up, some of the aspects
connection with the research programs tinue surveillance over the various pro- of the bill. We are all in his debt. The
we have under considaration here, the grams and the multitude of other items taxpayers are in his debt. Having said
Research and Development Subcommit- that are not included in the amendment. that, I wish to disagree with his chara,c-
tee, which I chair, IX going to consider I thank the Senator, and I salute him terization of the action of our friend
these programs in great depth during the and congratulate him for a very fine job from Arkansas (Mr. PULBR/GETT ) as "nit
coming year. We will he in a better con- in a tedious and sticky area where it is Picking."
dition at this time next year to provide very difficult to get the real merits of the I disagree completely that the Senator
the Senate with a more comprehensive situation. from Arkansas yesterday, in comment-
understanding of these programs and I also reiterate my interest with refer- lug on some of the research projects,
their meaning to the total DOD mission. ence to all of these projects to see if the was trying to endanger the whole pro-
But, continuing. This amendment executive branch cannot review them, gram unfairly. The programs that the
would severely cut agray great parts of pick them out, and place some of them Senator from Arkansas discussed are a
the research at foreign institutions, so that those they wish continued, can Part of the package. This is what we are
Since 1968, the DOD-has cut the funds be placed somewhere else in the budget, being asked to authorize money for. If in
for this research from $13.1 million to in some other department, so that better the eyes of any of us some of the items
the $5.7 million requested this year. We surveillance over them can be had, make something less than good sense,
need this research, Mr. President, be- I thank the Senator. ? then our responsibility is to talk about
cause it involves conditions of geography, Mr. McINTYRE, Mr. President, eer- them.
culture, disease and e-xpertise which are tainly under the leadership of the chair- Just as I have commended the Senator
not possible of study in the United States man of the Committee on Armed Serv- from New Hampshire for scrubbing up or
or not available in this country. ices, the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. scaling down, I commend the Senator
This amendment proposes a $3 million STENNIS), the committee has given this from Arkansas for putting his finger on
cut in policy planning research. The DOD military authorization bill the best study something that, to us, does not make
Is quite willing to have much of this re- in depth I have seen in the short time sense. Nobody will be intimidated by
search done elsewhere lad the imposition I have been in the Senate. that.
of the cut made by the Senator from The Fulbright amendment attacks We are talking about an item of $7
Arkansas would elimTnate the research areas we have already acted on and billion-plus. We are suggesting that in
and that would leave the DOD without where we continue to work, as the Sen-
that reach of $7 billion is some money
much valuable information which is ator has emphasized. It is apparent that that does not have to be authorized or
available in no other place. these projects are being scrubbed down some proposal that need not be under-
The amendment by the Senator from and scaled down. It is important that' the taken.
Arkansas would kill al new starts in the Senator realizes that this matter has Each of us has a family budget. Unless
Themis program arat severely hamper been looked into carefully, we are operating on the poorest poverty
some of the ongoing programs. This pro- Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator base, we all know that the budget con-
gram was established to provide new again. I express my regret that more tains some money that really does not
centers of excellence with a broad Senators cannot be present to hear these have to be spent, and the survival of the
geographical representation in fields matters discussed by each side in order family would not be destroyed or even
relevant to the DOD mission. All of these to hear the arguments pro and con. I do seriously jeopardized if we did not spend
advantages would be practically elimi- not see how it is possible to vote on a some of the money that we have set aside
nated by the pending amendment. matter so involved as this matter with-
to spend.
The Agile program ha received a major out having a chance to hear more of the We might ask ourselves what it would
s
reduction from the action of the arguments, be like if we had a family budget of $7
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will billion. Is it not likely that somewhere
Armed Services Committee. The proposed
amendment would reduce funds for Agile the Senator yield? there would be certain expenditures that
by an additional $5 million. Since there Mr. McINTYRE. I yield, really need not be undertaken? One does
Is only $27 million in Agile in the begin-
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I not have to be a Ph. D. in domestic sca
fling, it is obvious that this additional cut -
certainly agree with the Senator from ence, home economics, or general eco-
Mississippi on what he has just said. nomics to know that if we are given $7
will severely cripple a program dealing
billion a year, we probably do not have
Some Senators have reverted to their old
with counterinfiltraton systems, new ina
to spend all of it, and that the economy
customs too quickly. We were able to get
trusion detection sensors, border control
might even be stronger if we did not
quite a bit of interest in connection with
analysis, border area security systems,
pacificationspend all of it.
the ABM discussion, but now we have
efforts, and village defense
corps selection and training, the same attendance on these amend- The Senator from Arkansas yesterday
meets that we used to have on the old gave a list of some projects that struck
Mr. President, I urge that the end- bill. I wish Senators would remain in the him, and struck others of us, as examples
meat by the Senator from Arkansas be Chamber. We would make much better of why it is not necessary to go all that
defeated. We must- be austere. We have progress. I share the Senator's regret way. I think it is not an tmfairness to the
been austere. We must not go beyond that more Senators are not present, program to hold that view.
prudence.
Mr. STENNIS, I thank the Senator. Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, will
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the However, I wish to add that they do have the Senator from Arkansas yield to me
Senator yield? many other duties, on my own time?
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August 12, 1969
atar from Michigan is recognized for 5
additional minutes.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does the Senator
from Michigan yield to me for an obser-
vation?
Mr. HART. Indeed I do.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the
Senator from New Hampshire does not
deserve any criticism at all, even though
the Senator from New Hampshire did
cut these programs by 8 percent from
the budget request, I believe. But the
budget went up on most of these items,
contrary to most Government programs
that I am familiar with on the civilian
side.
The amount for Federal contract re-
search centers, for example, in 1969, I
am informed was $263.3 million. The
1970 request is $277.4 million. That is a
5-percent increase.
On social behavioral science research,
the 1969 figure is $45.4 million and for
1970 it is $48.6 million, a 7-percent in-
crease.
If I understand correctly, the Sen-
ator from New Hampshire did cut back
the budget request, but actual cut over
what it was in actual expenditures last
year is not quite that much. But, in any
case, I agree with the Senator that it
looks like nit picking when we are talk-
ing about $45 million in a budget of $80
billion. But in practically any other pro-
gram before this Congress,. $45 million
would look like quite a substantial
amount. $45 million would be a great
deal for a project on the White River or
the St. Francis River in my State, for
example. My senior colleague, Mr. MC-
CLELLAN, and I?he in particular?have
often put out a great deal of energy to
get $45 million for a natural resource
development.
Just because this is only a small part
in such a huge appropriation request,
only $45 million, we can call it peanuts
or we can call it nit picking, but only in
the sense that it is small in comparison
to the total.
But it is not small relative to any other
standard in this country but the stand-
ard of the Pentagon and the Defense
Department.
In a letter which I put in the RECORD
yesterday, dated July 24, and which is
from John S. Foster, Jr. of the Defense
Department, it was stated, after con-
siderable discussion, that it is not pos-
sible to arrive at the cost of the projects.
We are met with that argument very
often. In reply to the Senator from New
Hampshire's question as to why we do
not discuss current projects, I asked Mr.
Foster in my letter of June 10, why we
could not get the cost. He said:
The funding of these projects is based on
a total project cost, with such multiple out-
puts anticipated. Any effort to isolate a cost
figure for a given report would be arbitrary
and probably not represent the actual costs
involved. Nor would such a cost estimate rep-
resent a measure of the payoffs from the re-
search.
Then in the next paragraph, which is
a significant one and which is the type '
of thing which is ongoing?I believe
it is ongoing, in the words of the Senator
from New Hampshire, and which I think
ought to be stopped?Mr. Foster says:
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. McINTYRE. Let me try to give an
example to the distinguished Senator
from Michigan.
Mr. HART. Take the proposal that the
distinguished Senator from Arkansas was
discussing. Those are the ones I am say-
ing were not used to intimidate any-
one?
Mr. McINTYRE. I do not know?
Mr. HART. To respond to this.
? Mr. McINTYRE. Here are some of the
'programs discussed yesterday by the
Senator from Arkansas:
First. "The Attaturk Revolution in
Turkey."
Second. "Gandhi, Nonviolence, and
the Struggle for Indian Independence."
Third. "The Sinhalese Buddhist Revo-
lution of Ceylon."
Fourth. "The Egyptian Revolution,
Nasserism, and Islam."
Fifth. "Militant Hindu Nationalism:
The Early Phase."
Mi. HART. Now, with respect to
that?
Mr. MeINTYRE. All right. Just a min-
ute now. I have the floor. There is ab-
solutely not one nickel in the 1970 budget
for these program& What is the Senator
bringing them up for? What is he bring-
ing them up for but to intimidate and
scare the rest of Congress into thinking
they are spending that money this fool-
ishly? My statement has a number of ex-
amples in it of the type of ongoing pro-
grams and projects that we are making
today; otherwise spotlighting these other
programs the Senator from Arkansas has
Mentioned, in my opinion, is nit picking.
Mr. HART. I think we could more
aptly say that he is talking about mis-
takes we have already made. Does not
the Senator agree with that?
Mr. McINTYRE. I am not prepared to
defend the 1968 budget here. I am here
to talk about the 1970 budget.
Mr. HART. Maybe we cannot agree on
the characterization of the studies the
Senator has just enumerated and which
were discussed yesterday, but if we had
to do it all over again, would we really
buy a book on Ataturk? If we had it to
do all over again, would we really do any
of those things which, in my book, rep-
resent the kind of thing that the national
family budget really does not have to
spend money on to get?
Mr. McINTYRE. I cannot judge what
determination was made prior to 1968.
Those we talk about now have not been
funded at all since 1968. Maybe if it
seemed important to study the theories
of revolution. It may well be interesting
to have some scholarly expertise study
into the Ataturk Revolution, or the rev-
olutionary process in Ceylon. The point I
want to make is that we are here talking
about the fiscal year 1970 budget. Why
do we not talk about the programs in
1970 instead of pulling these things out
of the past trying to scare the rest of the
Senate into voting against the bill?
Mr. HART. What about providing em-
pirical trade conclusions about ideolog-
ical goals which support insurgency? We
are funding that and that has been an
ongoing one. That was mentioned.
Mr. McINTYRE. Insurgency has been
quite a problem for the Department of
Defense during the past 3 or 4 years in
a place called Vietnam.
Mr. HART. Does the Senator think
that the University of Massachusetts un-
der this contract will either get us out
of Vietnam or keep us out of another one
like it by this kind of study?
Mr. McINTYRE. I am not going to
indulge in what the University of Mas-
sachusetts can do. The able Senator from
Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE) is now in
the Chamber. Perhaps he can reply to
that.
Mr. HART. No; if there is still time
remaining?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
yield 5 additional minutes to the Senator
from Michigan.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Michigan is recognized for 5
additional minutes.
Mr. HART. Let me explain why I rose
to react as I did. It is not nit picking.
Whatever it is, it is a discussion of chap-
ter and verse on projects which were
authorized by Congress for the Depart-
ment of Defense to undertake. There are
those of us who hold a deep 'conviction
that whatever else it is relevant for, or
to, whatever agency of the Government,
if any, should be buying the Military
Establishment should not.
If there is any nit picking, it is nit
picking of ourselves because routinely
over the years we have said to them, "Go-
ahead, if you think you need it. Here is
the money."
The Senator from Arkansas and others
are saying, and I too think it is not
Inappropriate, in the review of military
requests, to review what some of us be-
lieve to have been mistakes made by the
military. Heaven knows, when we come
in here looking for money for school
feeding programs, or when we try to get
aid started or even to maintain it, we
are lectured at considerable length about
what happened last year and the year
before with some of the money we gave
them then. In a sense, that is what we
are doing with the Department of De-
fense right now. I think the Senator
from Arkansas performs a very useful
service in attempting to do just that.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Michigan yield?
Mr. HART. I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I appreciate what
the Senator has said. I repeat, I think
the Senator from New Hampshire has
done a good job in undertaking to criti-
cize it at all. It has never been done be-
fore, to my knowledge. He has been a
tower of strength in getting anything
underway. But the situation here, as I
see it, has been built up over a number
of years before the Senator was even on
the committee or even a Member of the
Senate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time
of the Senator from Arkansas has ex-
pired.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
yield myself, or the Senator from Mich-
igan, 5 minutes and then I will let him
yield to me because I want him to par-
ticipate in this colloquy. I yield 5 min-
utes to the Senator from Michigan so
that he may yield to me.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
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S 9734 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 12, 1969
In the case of projects not yet completed available for R. 8z D. this current year wish to ask the Senator from Michigan
and for which only into reports are avail- that it had the previous year.
Looking at the request the Depart- a question?
able, significant results can be expected in
the future. In the case et tonapleted projects, Mr. BROOKE. No.
the final report represattts only a portion af ment of Defense made for research this Mr. FULBRIGHT. 1 wanted, as a mat-
the total output. For exalinple, in one project year, $8.2 billion, apparently the Depart- ter of fact, to continue a bit on what
funded over a period of nine years, a total ment does not understand the meaning the Senator says, particularly as to uni-
of 29 technical reports, 7f.2 scientific journal of the close vote on that amendment. versity research, This is one of the large
publications, and significant contributions But, to its great credit, the Armed Serv- items. The budget request for university
to a book were produced in addition to the ices Committee has responded in, I think, research for 1969 was $254.4 million, and
final report Which you received, as has been said several times before, for 1970 $305.9 million, which is a 20 per-
That is the sort of thing which I think very effective fashion. cent increase,
is beyond the normal or proper activities The Defense Department this year re- As a matter of fact, we do know of,
of the Department ofi)clense. It is not quested an authorization of $8.2 billion, and there is a great deal of evidence of,
a literary institution Created to produce The committee reduced the figure to $7.1 the disapproval by many of the students
books. In my view, it is not supposed to billion, more than $1 billion less than of the intrusion of the military program
So out and produce research works on the Department sought, which is more into our universities.
Ataturk or warlordisrit, or Islam, or the than $600 million less than authorized I ask unanimous consent to have
Sinhalese Revolution-in Ceylon. These the last fiscal year and about $400 mil- printed in the RECORD, because it Is ex-
studies are irrevelant to and beyond the lion less than was appropriated last fig- actly on this point, an article entitled
proper scope of the Defense Department.cal year. "Turned-Off Young Scientists Force
That is the math point. Again I commend the committee for Major Cutbacks in Military Research,"
Actually, the cut ram proposing is its review and its recommendations, but written by Victor Cohn, and published
relatively very small as compared with I think the further reduction, modest as in the Washington Post of May 12, 1969,
the basic research total in the bill which it is, proposed by the Senator from which describes the attitude of young sel-
ls $430 million. That is a large amount of Arkansas is possible. entists in the various schools. Under the
money for basic research. By "basic" 1 None of us is sure what causes unrest headline it says, "Caution: The military-
mean not related to any specific project on the campuses, but to the extent that industrial complex is armed and dan-
in the Defense Department. Of course, the student knows that research and de- gerous. ABM is an Edsel," referring to
the nonbasic research is far greater than velopment by the Federal Government is signs carried by physicists picketing the
that. But basic researth is the type of overwhelmingly entrusted to the De- White House April 30.
research we would expect to be done in partment of Defense-- There being no objection, the article
a graduate school at Harvard or Yale The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
or Princeton, and so on, generally. It is ator's time has expired, as follows:
sometimes called pure science. It has Mr. HART. Mr. President, will the Sen- -
A. URNED-OFP YOUNG SCIENTISTS FORCE MAJOR
nothing specific in mind. ator yield me 1 additional minute? CUTBACKS IN MILITARY RESEARCH SCIEN-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes. TISTS FORCE RESEARCH CUTBACKS
of the Senator has expired. Mr. HART. That those engaged in re-
(By Victor Cohn)
Mr. FTJLBRIGHT. I yield myself 5 search, contrary to general assumptions,
minutes more, are not the universities primarily, but "Caution. The military-industrial complex
is armed and dangerous."
1 hope the Senator from New Harnp- the think tanks as the Senator from "ABM is. an Edsel."?Signs carried by
shire and the Senator from Mississippi Arkansas has developed, if they see the physicists picketing the White House April 30
would inform me if there is anything ratio of the Federal Government's allo- In a less violent, but equally radical way
that they especially do not like in the cations of research and development for science students, younger scientists and
amendment. I would certainly entertain the military and then compares it to the many older professors of physics and physi-
some revisions to it. Otherwise, I would amount of money the Federal Govern- ?logy have been raising their own hell on
like to have a vote on it It is a worth- ment allocates for research in new tech- the campuses.
while amendment. niques for housing, for antipollution ef- In the view of Prof. Don R. Price, Har-
vard political scentist, this is "a new kind
As I said before, it is the first time in forts, and so on, he gets a very obscure of rebellion," linked only in part with the
25 years that we have made a serious notion of our priorities. Perhaps, more activist kids and college students in general.
effort to bring the whole authorization correctly, such students get an illustra- It is a rebellion of young and discontented
for the Pentagon under review. tion of priorities which offend them and technologists?against the ABM and other
outrage them.
I was Just handed the annual report costly milltary-technological systems, against
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- "weaponeering" at secret laboratories on or
of the Rand Corp., for 1968. Over
ator's 1 minute has expired, near campuses and, in many cases, against
10,000 publications have been produced,
Mr. HART. May I have 1 minute more? doing any research, secret or non-secret, to
with some 500 new titles published each help the military.
F
Mr. ULBRIGHT. I yield 1 minute.
year. It sounds like a big publishing it is a rebellion against computer (enters
Mr. HART. When we say, "Let us put and social science projects serving the CIA.
house such as they have in New York,
first things first," what do we identify It is a rebellion against what one young
publishing fiction and other paperback
in our minds as having first claim? physicist called "the whole misuse of tech-
books. Most of these titles that I have
Look at this bill. Look at the bulk for nology to spoil rather than. save the country."
read have nothing to do with the proper
research. Look at the bill in its totality. Sometimes painstakingly logical, some-
responsibilities of the Defense Depart-
ment. So I hope the Smalor from New Then compare it with the programs, in times only emotional and shrill, this rebel-
some cases of long standing, intended to test
swbeeele in
csn it
hcaslion reasingly effective. In the
Hampshire would consider going a little
relieve hunger and to insure a broader
further in his cut. Caused or helped cause giant Stanford
... availability of medical care. One does University--derided by the new dissidents as
Mr. HART. Mr. President, of course I
share that hope. not have to be a member of the SDS to the "Pentagon of the West"?to decide to
The effort we are making to reduce the Jump up and scream, "Your allocations phase out half the secret military projects
and your priorities are all out of whack." at its Stanford Applied Electronics Labora-
authorization for research and develop- So can we not persuade ourselves, in tory. The Stanford rebellion was conducted
ment and evaluation began actually addition to the reduction that the com- largely by undergraduates, but sympathetic
more than a year ago. On April 18, 1968, mittee has made of more than $1 billion and vocal professors gave them vital meral
the Senate defeated an areendment that for research, to add $45 million for the authority.
I proposed reducing thedefense author- Made Stanford's trustees place a mora-
reasons so eloquently assigned by the torium on new chemical and biological war-
ization for those activities from the
Senator from Arkansas?
fare contracts at the nearby Stanford Re-
committee-approved total of $7.8 billion
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time search Institute, nominally "independent"
to $7.3 billion. That was a reduction of of the Senator has expired. but in effect owned by the university trustees.
$508 million. That defeat was on a roll- Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, will the Caused huge Maasachusetts Institute of
call vote, and we lost 28 to 30. Senator yield? Technology to call a moratorium on taking
any new secret contracts at a pair of crack
If the amendment had been approved,
the Department of Defense would have Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, / radar and rocket guidance laboratories that
yield myself 5 minutes,
have supplied much of the brainpower be-
had about the same amount of money Does the Senator from Massachusetts hind U.S. weaponry.
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August 12, 1969
Forced American University in Washington
to cancel a partly secret Army research
contract with the University's Center for
Research in Social Systems.
Seen physicists picketing the White House;
professors buttonholing Senators and Rep-
resentatives and organizations with many
names but like purposes?Project Daisy, Ad
Hoc Committee of Concerned Scientists?
spring up at campus after campus.
?This movement and student protests in
general have in the past year forced the
Defense Department to cut in half?from
some 400 to 200?its "classified" or in com-
mon parlance secret research and develop-
ment contracts on U.S. campuses.
REPORT ON CONTRACTS
This week Dr. John Foster, director of de-
fense research and engineering, is expected
to discuss the problem at a news conference.
According to figures he has gathered, there
are now such contracts or grants in effect
at some 60 universities.
He will say they now represent about $20
million worth of all the department's some
$250 million this year in 5500 campus
projects.
In addition, the department finances what
another official estimates to be $200 million
in work?most of it classified?at "research
centers" like MIT's Lincoln Laboratory and
Instrumentation Laboratory, Caltech's Jet
Propulsion Laboratory and Johns Hopkins'
Applied Physics Laboratory.
Most of these centers are operated by the
universities on "not-for-profit" contracts,
partly to keep secret work off the campuses
themselves.
Foster may also report that the principal
concentrations of classified research (accord-
ing to one of his staff) are at:
MIT and Stanford. MIT's are entirely at the
Lincoln and Instrumentation (or "I") Labs,
neither of which MIT consider part of its
teaching campus. There are no classified
projects on the MIT campus proper, but the
"I Lab" is on the campus fringe and both
labs have close staff and graduate project
connections.
University of Michigan, many at a uni-
versity facility at Willow Run. Despite
wrenching 1967-68 protests by students and
faculty, the university this academic year has
rejected just one classified proposal and ap-
proved 36 others.
University of California at Berkeley, Uni-
versity of Texas, Georgia Tech, Ohio State
University and New Mexico State University.
For well over a year the Defense Depart-
ment has been straining to reduce classified
work on the campuses. "We still have some
that need not be classified," an official re-
ports, "mainly where a contracting officer has
just used that as an easy way to give investi-
gators access to classified material. This is not
the only way to do this, and we want to
reduce unneeded classification to zero."
There will then remain a hard core of still
classified projects that both Defense officials
and many professors and colleges consider
proper and necessary. These deal with sub-
jects like laser and maser detection (of dis-
tant objects like missiles) , electronic coun-
ter-measures, advanced radar, underwater
sound?"things that in the national interest
need to be kept secret" and need to be done
for the country's defense, in the view of Dr.
Charles Kidd, a deputy to Dr. Lee DuBridge,
the President's science adviser.
But DuBridge?though no activist?re-
moved secret work from the Caltech campus
as "inappropriate" 20 years ago.
ONE-DAY STOPPAGE
"Inappropriate" was a mild word on March
4, 1969, when MIT students?some of the
country's brightest future scientists and ad-
vanced engineers?joined turned-off faculty
members to hold a "one-day research stop-
page to protest "misuses of science." The
University of Pennsylvania, the University of
Rochester and some 30 other campuses saw
similar demonstrations. And new organiza-
tions began to proliferate.
Some coalesced or merged loosely with a
group started in New York City in February
around a lanky elementary particle physicist
from Stanford, Dr. Martin Pearl, as "acting
secretary." This "Scientists for Social and
Political Action" or SSPA quickly counted
500 or so members in "40 or 50" local chap-
ters.
Pearl?at age 42, standing between the
young and the old in science?bows to the
"atomic scientists" who first attempted polit-
ical action after World War II, and in bitter
battle helped win civilian control of atomic
energy. "But now," he says, "these men are
the scientific administrators. They have to
be careful of what they say. Now a second,
fresh voice is needed."
NOT RESPONDING
A younger associate, Brian Schwartz of
MIT, is blunter: "These older men have lost
contact with the real world. They're not re-
sponding to the younger problems."
The younger problems exploded at Stan-
ford in early April. For nine days, student
dissidents occupied the Applied Electronics
Laboratory, site of some $2 million a year
in defense research.
The younger problems were hoisted onto
picket signs in Washington April 30, when for
the first time in history, it was stated?first
time or not, it was rare-1'75 pale, variously
bearded, bookish-looking physicists pick-
eted the White House. Their target: the ABM.
Their leaders: David Nygren of Columbia and
Tom Kir ic of Harvard.
The physicists were here for the American
Physical Society's annual meeting. This usu-
ally staid convention has boiled up into an
indignation meeting over President Nixon's
proposed Safeguard ABM system," said a news
report. Wearing "Stop ABM" buttons, physi-
cists prowled hotel and Congressional corri-
dors. "Even the controversy over the security
'trail' of J. Robert Oppenheimer in the 1950s"
wrote William Hines in the Chicago Sun-
Times, "did not match this intensely politi-
cal climate."
MORATORIUM ARRANGED
The younger problems boiled up again at
both MIT and Stanford. At MIT, students
marched into the office of President Howard
Johnson for a sit-in and talk-out, especially
about secret work on military helicopters and
multiple-entry atomic missile guidance. All
agreed to move to a lecture hall. Next the
MIT faculty met. The upshot was a morator-
ium on secret projects until a special 22-man
group studies the whole role of the Lincoln
and "I" Labs, sites of some $95 million a year
in Pentagon contracts.
At Stanford too there were more demon-
strations and faculty meetings. The upshots
there: (1) a start on an "orderly" phasing out
(or conversion to non-secret) of some $2
million a year in secret contracts, represent-
ing about a third of the Applied Electronic
Labs' defense work; (2) a pledge to end chem-
ical and biological warfare research and
counter-insurgency studies at Stanford Re-
search Institute (worth about $1.1 million a
year).
At both Stanford and MIT many professors
have balked. Someone must defend the coun-
try, they indignantly say. Someone must pro-
vide the knowledge. And many of the best
minds are on campuses. If universities sev-
ered all Defense ,Department ties, says Jack
Ruins, iv= vice president for the special
laboratories, "the country would be left in
the hands of the professional military and
industrial group."
At Stanford, Prof. 0. G. Villard Jr.?radar
researcher and son of the late Oswald Garri-
son Villard, crusading editor of the Nation?
said: "As the son of a liberal who was a
devoted pacifist, I have searched my con-
science and always felt I have been com-
pletely faithful to the pacifist traditions of
my family. I have always considered that my
research was 100 per cent directed toward
saving human lives. This development essen-
tially brings my research here to an end, and
I believe the decision will have a most un-
fortunate effect on the long-term viability
of the School of Engineering and even of the
university."
These men were talking mainly about
classified and directly linked military
research.
PENTAGON FINANCING
But there is still another trend, against
even open, non-secret basic study financed
by any military or para-military agency. The
Defense Department finances much basic re-
search in physics, chemistary, electrical
engineering and the like, partly because it
knows that almost all such knowledge is ulti-
mately needed; partly because it wants to
maintain contacts With bright scientist-
consultants. Of some $1.5 billion in Federal
basic research money now going to colleges,
some $247 million (16 per cent) comes from
the Pentagon.
Last month University of Maryland stu-
dents picketed a computer center doing non-
secret work on pattern recognition for the
CIA. At MIT last week, disaffected students
protested a Defense-financed, non-secret
project to make new computer methods
available to any social scientist?whether
working on Vietnam peasantry or the succor
of the American poor. At Stony Brook, the
Students for a Democratic Society, stormed
another computer center. The computer cen-
ter may be fast becoming the American Bas-
tille.
To most young or old scientists, if not
to their students, this is illogical.
SYMPATHY FOUND
Still, there is great sympathy among them
for these many youths who are coming to
consider almost all research "complicit"
war research "for the system."
An important answer to the very young,
maintains Stanford's Martin Perl, is to turn
much research to social purpose. "The un-
controlled spawning of technology has pro-
duced pollution and contributed to socially
destructive conditions," says his new orga-
nization. "Yet there is no real attempt to
apply technical skills to improve life."
"This is what we want to tell people," said
one of the new scientists during the Physi-
cal Society meeting here. "We're not very vio-
lent types. We're not about to riot. We just
want to exercise our democratic rights."
Is all this the high-water mark of a tem-
porary scientists' movement or is it a be-
ginning of something larger? Only time will
tell, but if the young scientists keep talking,
there may be a new element in the American
political dialogue. After years of relative si-
lence, says Dr. Charles Schwartz of the Uni-
versity of California, "a large number of sci-
entists are coming out of their little dark
laboratories," and things may never be the
same.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. On May 1, 1969,
the Washington Post published another
article entitled "MIT Curbs Secret Mili-
tary Research," written by Victor Cohn.
It was the MIT delegation of students
and a professor who came to call on me,
asking me what they could do to dis-
associate to a much greater degree?
they were not adamant that it be com-
plete?the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology from military research.
They did not like their university being
considered simply an adjunct of the
Pentagon. I ask unanimous consent that
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research?as Dr. Edward Teller suggested last
week?it plans to almost eliminate it on
campuses and diminish aignificantly in the
off-campus university laboratories.
The Pentagon's ooncern about its mu ver-
city research program, which accounts for
one-third of its entire research effort, was
heightened last month when two of the
Nation's most prestigious institutions Stan-
ford University and the Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology---decided to begin cutting
back their Defense involvement.
In an effort to improve its image among
the Nation's university students and young-
er faculty to ward off new and more serious
criticism and protect its valuable relation-
ship with the institutions, the Pentagon has
begun looking for ways to make accommoda-
tions.
Under the guidance of Dr. John S. Foster
Jr., director of Defense Research and De-
velopment, it has recently:
Cut its classified research projects in uni-
versities from 8 per cent of the total to 4
per cent and hopes to get down to 1 or 2
per cent.
Urged Congressional committees at every
opportunity not to take primitive measures?
such as criminal legislation or fund outoffs?
against student militants and radicals. In-
stead the Pentagon recommends "leaving the
initiative for solving the problem with the
university administration."
Emphasized that the scope of a university's
defense research is a decision to be made
independently by the university, and en-
ootuaged and aided universities in diversi-
fying their research in non-defense areas.
Brought university scientists and admin-
istrators to Washington to explain campus
problems to the Defense officials who oversee
the research activities.
Accelerated the formerly combersome pro-
cedures for Pentagon review and release for
publication of papers prepared by university
researchers In Defense-sponsored activities.
The number of classified projects has been
trimmed largely by declassifying, not by end-
ing them.
While the Pentagon insists publicly that
this declassification is purely the result of
an accurate application of existing security
guidelines in areas where there was too much
caution before, it is nevertheless clear that
some relaxation of standards is involved.
"We just make sure now that, indeed, the
work is truly classified," one high Pentagon
official said, "and that it's not a case where
someone at a lower level decided to classify
it just to be safe. Classified Projects are re-
viewed now at the highest levels."
Foster, speaking to the American Nuclear
Society in Seattle lett Wednesday, said that
"some applied research and development con-
tracts funded by the Defense Department at
universities?normally at separate off-campus
labs?are and must remain classified."
While the Pentagon's classified projects are
a handy-target for campus militants, there
is a question about how much of an issue
they actually are.
Since only 4 per cent of the total is classi-
fied, Foster says, "I believe this issue Is over-
rated, and many of the people at universities
Who have investigated the facts agree."
Rep. Lawrence Hogan (R-Md.), one of 22
GOP congressmen who toured campuses re-
cently to determine the causes of student un-
rest, said the problem was never mentioned
to him, although there was a broad dissatis-
faction with professors who spend more time
on Defense projects than in dealing with stu-
dents.
A Pentagon official who deals with Univer-
sity research says there has been no change
in the number of proposals received from the
institutions themselves for projects. POT
every proposal it approves, the Pentagon re-
ceives eight.
One Pentagon official suggested that a
small amount of classified work should be
the article to which I have referred be
printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the REC-
ORD, as follows:
[From the Washington Post, May 1, 1969]
MIT CURBS SECRET MILITARY RESEARCH
(By Victor Cain)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology?
the Nation's leading science and engineer-
ing university?has ordered -a temporary halt
on accepting new secret military research
at two famous laboratories-.-
The action was in rsponse to mounting
student and faculty protests against mili-
tary research by U.S. universities?and
against big new weapons systems like the
anti-ballistic missile.
As evidence of that growing movement,
some 175 young anti-ABM physicists picketed
the White House for 45 minutes yesterday,
then presented Dr. Lee A. DuBridge, the
President's science adviser, with a petition
opposing the Safeguard ABM system pro-
posed by President Nixon.
The petition was signed by nearly 1200
members of the American Phycal Society
now meeting here.
Other physicists went to Capitol Hill
to give Congressmen ang-Safeguard peti-
tions signed by 729 colleagues at many uni-
versities. versities.
"A large number of scientists are earning
out of their little dark laboratories" to
give the public their opinions on weapons,
Charles Schultz, a Univerffity of California
physicist, told a group of House membess.
Just such a coming out--starting with a
one-clay research stoppage iSlarch 4--culmi-
nated in MIT' decision to declare a morato-
rium, perhaps until fall, on new classified
projects at the two laboratories.
A 22-member panel will review the labs'
roles?and perhaps, said one MIT source,
"recommend that they be sold or otherwise
disposed of, to be operated with no MIT
connection."
REPORTS SOUGHT
MIT President Howard rehnson asked the
panel to make a temporary report by May 31
and a final one by Oct. 1. Panel Chairman
Frank Pounds, MIT School of Management
dean, said he will try to have the final report
ready May 31.
All work on present projects will continue
in the meantime and the laboratories may
accept "contract modifications."
One of the affected labs is the Lincoln
Laboratory, which has been doing missile
detection studies important to ABM develop-
ment, though not working on ABM system
hardware. The other is the Instrumentation
Laboratory, which is working on the guidance
system for MIRV (multiple independently-
targeted re-entry vehicles) Warheads for the
sea-horse Poseidon missile.
The Linooln Laboratory Cmn. buildings out-
side Boston and in Cambridge) was estab-
lished 18 years ago at Defense officials'
"urgent" request?so MIT recalled?to de-
velop radar and associated air defense sys-
tems. Almost all its work is for the Defense
Department.
CONTROLS FOR ROCHETS
The Instrumentation Laboratory (on the
fringe of the MIT campus in Cambridge)
works on guidance, navigation and controls
for rockets and spacecraft. Three-fifths of
its work is for the Defense Department, two-
fifths for the civilian space effort.
Together, the two labs have 3700 employes
and a current annual budget of $116 million.
Their scientists are not part of the MIT fac-
ulty, and MIT has labored to keep their secret
efforts at arm's length; there are no secret
projects now on the MIT campus proper.
Still the labs' staffs and MITs faculty
have close links. And these links have been
given much of the credit for the labs' high-
quality work and high-quality staffs.
MIT President Johnson initially named
Pounds to head an 18-member panel includ-
ing faculty, students, alumni, Lincoln and
Instrumentation Lab staff members and MIT
trustees. Among the panel members are
Julius A. Stratton, former mrr president
now board chairman of the Ford Foundation,
and Dr. Victor Weisskopf, noted physicist
and a member of the Union of Concerned
Scientists that held the March 4 research
stoppage.
FOUR PANELISTS ADDED
Pounds added four supplementary panel-
ists, including Roam Chomsky, celebrated
MIT linguistics professor and another March
4 protester.
Protest against the ABM has been the
loudest item of unofficial business during
American Physical Society meetings here
this week. Some 3000 physicists and their
wives jammed a convention hall Tuesday
night to hear an anti-ABM debate, and 1216
voted overwhelmingly against Safeguard in
an informal ballot (76 per cent opposed it,
21 per cent favored it).
Physicists have been visiting their Sen-
ators all week carrying anti-ABM petitions.
"Every swing Senator has been visited," said
Martin Perl, Stanford physicist and an or-
ganizer of Scientists for Social and Political
Action.
The Physical Society officially said its mem-
bers have voted 8559 to 6405 to meet next
January in Chicago, despite many members'
protests over police handling of disorders
during the Democratic Convention. The so-
ciety also named a committee to seek ways
for concerned physicists to examine scien-
tists' role in society?a lesser response to
demands for a new division on science and
society.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I ask unanimous
consent to have printed in the RECORD
the following additional articles:
An article entitled "Defense Research:
Pentagon Declassifying Projects Studied
in University Labs," written by Richard
Homan, and published in the Washing-
ton Post of June 23, 1969.
An article entitled "MIT Curb on Se-
cret Projects Reflects Growing Anti/mill-
tary Feeling Among Universities' Re-
searchers," written by William K.
Stevens, and published in the New York
Times of May 5, 1969.
An article entitled "Dissident Scien-
tists Brew Defense Program Tempest,"
written by John Lannan, and published
in the Washington Star of February 5,
1969.
There being no objection, the articles
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Washington Post, June 23, 1969]
DEFENSE RESEARCH?PENTAGON DECLASSIFY-
ING PROPECTS STUDIED IN UNIVERSITY LABS
(By Richard Homan)
Faced with the threat of serious disruption
of its research activities in universities, the
Defense Department is making a determined
effort to adjust them to the changed atmos-
phere on the Nation's campuses.
Within the past year it has cut by half the
amount of classified defense research?a par-
ticularly provocative reminder of Pentagon
presence?done in universities.
As a matter of policy, basic research proj-
ects in universities are no longer classified
and a program of high-level, stringent peri-
odic review of applied research projects has
been established to determine whether their
classification is still justified.
Although the Pentagon does not expect to
do away with all classification of defense
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kept on campuses?to provide a target for
the most violent radicals so they wouldn't
turn their attentions to unclassified projects.
Until the reassessment of Pentagon-spon-
sored activities by Stanford and MIT, only
two serious challenges to classified research
had arisen on campuses in more than a
decade. In 1967, New York University and the
University of Pennsylvania canceled projects
dealing with chemical and biological war-
fare.
At a speech before the American Institute
on Problems of European Unity last week,
Dr. Teller, one of the world's foremost nu-
clear physicists, complained that security
classification was "scattering our scientists
away from defense work."
In a broad attack on all secrecy in research,
Teller said, "we must adopt a policy of open-
ness. We have classified everything; we have
succeeded in a fabulous manner in confusing
the American public, the Congress, by this
secrecy.
"Secrecy has not succeeded in slowing
down Russian research, even in the most
secret areas such as my own, nuclear ex-
plosives. Secrecy does not hurt anybody ex-
cept ourselves. I think a thoroUgh review of
secrecy is needed."
[From the New York Times, May 5, 1969]
M.I.T. CURB ON SECRET PROJECTS REFLECTS
GROWING ANTIMILITARY FEELING AMOITG
UNIVERSITIES' RESEARCHERS
(By William K. Stevens)
The Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy, by declining temporarily to accept new
programs of classified research from the Gov-
ernment, has spotlighted a new stage in the
evolution of what might properly be called
the Federal-industrial-academic complex.
This vast, interrelated social organism has
been the main instrument of scientific in-
quiry and technological advance in the
United States since the instrument was born
of wartime necessity, in total secrecy, three
decades ago.
Since then it has undergone successive
mutations?first with post-World War II de-
mobilization, then with the onset of the cold
war and the start of the space age, and now
with a rising tide of antimilitary feeling
among university researchers.
That feeling coupled with a growing inter-
est in how science and technology might
serve the nation's social needs, is said to have
lent urgency to M.I.T.'s decision, announced
last week, to place a moratorium on new
secret research projects.
PANEL TO REPORT
The moratorium will last until Oct. 1,
when a 22-man panel is to report on its re-
examination of the institute's relationship
to two of its semi-independent divisions, the
Lincoln Laboratory and the M.I.T. Instru-
mentation Laboratory, which are two of the
country's major contractors for research
sponsored by the military.
The study of the two laboratories' roles
was undertaken, M.I.T.'s president, Howard
W. Johnson, said in an interview last week,
as part of a continuing internal reassessment
of the institute. But he said the laboratories
were made the subject of a special separate
study because of "widespread concern" about
secret military research among M.I.T. pro-
fessors and students.
The ferment is rooted in fears of military-
industrial dominance, in a deep sense of un-
certainty about nuclear war as expressed in
dissent over the antiballistic missile system
and, especially, in the Vietnamese war, ac-
cording to Dr. James R. Killian Jr., chair-
man of the M.I.T. Corporation, who was a
science adviser to President Eisenhower.
"A SHIFT IN INTEREST"
"There is now a shift in interest," Dr.
Killian said in an interview in his office
at M.I.T. "There was a period when the cut-
ting edge of technology was in the areas of
the military and space. But there is a feel-
ing now that in terms of national need we
ought to devote a larger proportion of work
to other fields." He mentioned transportation,
bioengineering, medical research and social
problems generally.
"I would lay great stress on this shift of
mood," he said.
Today's mood is far different from the one
in which some of the nation's leading sci-
entists found themselves in the fall of 1939
when Dr. James B. Conant, then president
of Harvard University, invited them to his
home to talk about the role of science and
scientists in the war that had just begun.
KISTIAKOWSKY IN GROUP
"I was among them," Dr. George B. Kis-
tiakowsky, the Harvard chemist who later
succeeded Dr. Killian as President Eisen-
hower's science adviser, said in an interview
last week. "We talked of the possibility of
offeringiour services to the British. We would
also be learning the problems of warfare in
case the United States should become in-
volved."
Separately, a group of American physicists
had become concerned over the prospect of
using nuclear fission to produce a bomb of
vast destructive power.
"In view of this situation," Dr. Albert Ein-
stein wrote to President Roosevelt on Aug. 2,
1939, "you may think it desirable to have
some permanent contact maintained between
the Administration and the group of physi-
cists working on chain reactions in Amer-
ica."
After the fall of France in 1940, Mr. Roose-
velt gave the concerned scientists official
power by chartering the National Defense
Research Committee, headed by Dr. Vannever
Bush. Its purpose: to organize American
science and technology for war.
COORDINATED EFFORT
Expanded into the Office of Scientific Re-
search and Development (0.S.R.D.) , the Bush
group coordinated the country's over-all sci-
entific effort throughout the war and over-
saw the initial development of the atomic
bomb until the Manhattan Project was set
up separately.
With the end of the war, 0.S.R.D. was de-
activated, and most universities got out of
the business of secret research. But the coun-
try was left with an 0.S.R.D. legacy that is
the basis of the country's scientific and tech-
nological effort, and of the Federal-indus-
trial-academic complex, to this day: the Gov-
ernment contract as the main mechanism for
financing private research.
PATTERN ESTABLISHED
Basic research had all but stopped during
the war, and Government contracts let main-
ly by the Office of Naval Research, under-
wrote its rebirth afterward. Had it not been
for this, Dr. Bush said the other day, the
result for scientific research "would have
been a catastrophe."
Within a few years other Government
agencies were financing research across the
whole spectrum of scientific activities. For
the most part, money to universities was
for nonsecret basic research, and that re-
mains the pattern.
The Federal Government during the cur-
rent fiscal year is spending more than 85-bil-
lion for the support of research and nearly
$11-billion for development, or the fashion-
ing of new products based on the fruits of
research.
Of the 85-billion for research, about $1.5-
billion is going to the colleges and univer-
sities. Of this $1.5-billion, $247-million?or
about 16 per cent?comes from the Depart-
ment of Defense.
Of the $247-million from the Defense De-
partment, only about 4 per cent goes for
secret research, Dr. Lee A. DuBridge, Presi-
dent Nixon's science adviser, told the Senate
Government Operations subcommittee last
week. Ile said this was down from 8 per cent
two years ago.
Since shortly after World War II, few uni-
versities have done secret research. And Dr.
DuBridge said in an interview last Satur-
day that almost all the money going from
the Defense Department to universities for
nonsecret projects was for basic research.
He defined basic research as research in
which the only goal is the pursuit of new
knowledge, wherein "you can't tell in ad-
vance whether it's going to be socially useful
or not."
Most of the disengagement from military-
oriented research in the academic commu-
nity, he said, is in the realm of applied sci-
ence?that is, research directed toward a
specific goal.
M.I.T. SHARE LARGE
However, most of the applied research in
military matters is done in the Defense De-
partment's own laboratories or by industrial
contractors. The government this year is
spending about $1.3-billion in these two
categories.
M.I.T. has a disproportionate share of
military research contracts. Not only is it
allocated more Federal research grants than
any other university ($96-million worth in
the fiscal year 1967, the latest year for which
comparative figures are available), but near-
ly half the amount?$47-million worth?is
from the Department of Defense.
By comparison, the recipients of the next
four largest Federal allocations were: Uni-
versity of Michigan, $56-million total, in-
cluding $13-million from Defense; Univer-
sity of Illinois, $52-million, $12-million De-
fense; Columbia, $52-million and $11-mil-
lion; University of California, Berkeley,
$48.8-million and $7-million.
M.I.T.'s high proportion of defense research
funds can perhaps be traced to the Lincoln
and Instrumentation laboratories. The Lin-
coln Laboratory?created in 1951, early in the
cold war, to develop early warning systems
for the detection of incoming enemy bomb-
ers an,d missiles?has spent $05-million, of
which $64-million came from the Defense De-
partment.
The instrumentation Laboratory, which is
the world's leading research center for self-
oontained missile-guidance systems, received
$30-million to develop the guidance systems
for the Thor, Polaris and Poseidon missiles.
In the fiscal year 1968 it spent $20-million
for development of the guidance and naviga-
tion system of the Apollo spacecraft under a
contract from the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration.
Few of those interviewed believe the two
M.I.T. laboratories will or should be closed
clown. The main point at issue is their fu-
ture form and relationship to the institute
at large.
"I hope this problem won't be solved by
S.D.S. pressures," said Dr. DuBridge, refer-
ring to Students for a Democratic Society.
"It's important for universities to look at
themselves when they're not in a period of
crisis," Dr. Johnson of M.I.T. said, "and we're
not."
[From the Washington Star, Feb. 5, 19691
DISSIDENT SCIENTISTS BREW DEFENSE PROGRAM
TEMPEST
(By John Lannan)
A new tempest is brewing in the national
scientific community over whether the de-
fense establishment absorbs too much of
the oo-untry's scientific and technological
energies.
In New York this week several groups of
younger physicists are pressing a host of
proposals for political activism and at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology an
activist step has already been taken?a day-
long "research stoppage" has been called for
March 4.
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In Manhattan, the cans for action were fOr university research as between 1969 cost of -$71,600,000, which amounts to an
heard during the aamrial meeting of the and 1970. average of $59,000 per man-year.
American Physical Society. The research In Project Themis, which is generally That is quite a sizable sum to appro-
stopPage at MIT has been scheduled by a
newly formed Union of ncerned Scientists,
called the Federal aid-to-education proj- priate, to turn over to an organization for
at the Instigation of more vocal members in ect of the Pentagon, there is a 13-percent no specific purpose, in a sense to do with
Oci
the physics department. increase in the budget request. I am un- as they please, and at these rates.
?This is not a strike in terms of the able at this point to estimate precisely Rand, in turn, agreed "to perform a
standard use of the word," said the union% what effect that has over the actual ex- program of study and research on the
chairman, Prof. Francis T Low. "It's not penditure last year on these particular broad subject of aerospace power, with
directed against MIT. It a psychological items. The Senator stated the overall the object of recommending to the U.S.
amounts but it was not broken down into Air Force preferred methods, techniques,
specific items. and instrumentalities for the develop-
On this matter of social behavioral ment and employment of aerospace
science research, the one which has at- power."
tracted much of the criticism, there was I presume that out of that profound
an increase of 7 percent between the 1969 research they came up with a project
and 1970 budget requests. There was a like the C-5A. That is one example, I
specific reduction of $1.5 million, as I un- presume; I hope it was not, but I do not
derstand it, by the committee. know what they produced that has been
As to the Federal contract research of great value.
centers, there was a 5-percent increase. We were told yesterday, much to my
This represents a very large amount; the surprise, by some Senators, that our air-
actual amount, as to these research cell- planes are inferior. One of the Senators,
ters, is $263.3 million in 1969, and $277.4 in the course of the debate, said they are
million in 1970, a 5-percent increase. inferior. I do not believe that, myself;
As I understand it, the committee ac- but it seems that whenever there hap-
tion does not specifically cut these items; pens to be a problem and if they want
it provides for an overall cut, which may more money, the argument is that the
be applied, according to the report, in product is inferior. If we are talking on
broad categories; and, of course, this is the Fourth of July, on the other hand,
one reason why it is of no particular we have got the best planes and equip-
significance to say, when the Senator is ment in the wOrld. It all depends on the
defending this item, "you should specify circumstances how good the products
the precise ones you have got." I do, not are. My guess is that our planes are as
know that the committee specified ex- good as anybody's. We certainly have
actly what they thought. If I correctly spent as much money as anyone on them.
understand the report, on page 49, the Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the
committee recommended reductions in Senator yield?
the general areas as follows: The Army, Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
$10 million; the Navy, $15 million; and Mr. MURPHY. Possibly the Senator is
the Air Force, $12 million, which is very making reference to remarks made by
much in the same pattern as my amend- me yesterday, in which I pointed out that
ment. We more or less used the same ap- we had not had a new model fighter
proach, but we went one step farther. plane laid down, I believe, since 1954,
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- and that the B-52's being used so effec-
ator's time has expired. tively?thank goodness we have them?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield myself 5 ad- are, many of them, 10 years old, and
ditional minutes. some of them older than that.
We went one step further in at least I do not think I used the word 'in-
recommending, although the amend- ferior." I might have implied that we
ment itself does not require it, cuts of could have had better planes had we
specific amounts within the categories, had better planing in the Department of
I am not at all sure that it is wise prac- Defense, in the background. I think
tice for the Senate to go beyond that, somewhere along the line we have been
other than as to some one very specific negligent; and I know my distinguished
up political activism. At least
item that might be called to our atten- colleague agrees with me that when we
two and pos-
sibly three groups are bent on making the tion, such as the ones we mentioned, the send our boys out to defend the security
prestigious American Physical Society more Ataturk study and some of the others. of the country, we do not want to give
responsive to what they say are the needs It is very hard to find out about those them second-class equipment.
rather than the fears of people. until after the studies have been author- Mr. FULBRIGHT. I agree with the
INVOLVEMES4 r SIGHT ized and are in process, or well along. In Senator, but I have never been under
One group is trying to change the society's many cases, it is difficult to know what is the impression that they have had sec-
constitution, (a move that failed almost two being done until the study is completed. ond-class equipment.
to one last year,) to get it involved with On the "think tanks," the funding of The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
contemporary problems. AIP's constitution the "think tanks," it seems to me, is ex- ator's 5 minutes have expired.
rather than public policy. tremely loose, Rand being one of the Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield myself 5 ad-
now limits its activities to scientific issues
Still another is trying to broaden the AIP's principal ones?a very large operation. I ditional minutes.
role in the education, of the public to the wish to explain briefly why I think that The planes we have lost, for example,
dangers as well as the benefits of scientific is a very loose way to control these in Vietnam, were not lost because they
and technological advance. operations, were confronted by superior airplanes,
Still a third is trying to establish some The financing of these research cen- but because they were shot down with
sort of an action group ,uch as that spawned ters, commonly called "think tanks" is ground-to-air missiles and other ground
by the MIT faculty. not on a project-by-project basis at all, fire, which I do not think a better plane,
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Here is an area in but under agreements by the various if there was one, could have avoided.
which the evidenceL is quite clear, I be- military agencies to provide long term They have not been outclassed in air
lieve, that it is not in the interests of our support to the organizations they sport- battles. At least, such incidents have not
universities nor, I think, in the long-term sor. The current Air Force contract with been brought to my attention.
interests of the Pentagon itself, to Rand, for example, covers the 5-year pe- / read in today% newspaper that we
alienate the young scientists or the young nod from 1966 to 1971, and is for a mini- have sent 72 more new Phantom jets to
people of this country. Yet there is a 20- mum of 1,277.8 man-years of prates- Spain to impress the Spanish with what
Percent Increase in the budget request sional scientific effort, at an estimated good planes we have. They are more
protest."
OTHER CAMPUSES PRESSED
The MIT group is seeking to spread ite
disaffection with the w4 things are to other
campuses.
"We've made contact with 10 to 20 others
already," said Murray Ed n, a professor of
electrical engineering. "We're sending letters
to other institutions anil maybe a couple of
hundred are going or have gone out."
The letter-writing catriptign, LOW explain-
ed, is a person-to-person one, faculty mem-
bers at one institution writing to colleagues
at another. Though each union member's
goals may differ, the basic idea is the same:
That the nation is dissipating on defense its
scientific capabilities for bettering human
life.
The Vietnam conflict appears to be little
more than a precipitating factor in bringing
on the March 4 protest at the Defense De-
partment's single largest research contractor
amongst educational institutions.
"I think we're all very unhappy about the
Vietnam war," said Lou. "but that's not
what we're protesting about."
CONFIDENCE sHAEEN.
But the 42 faculty members who signed
the original statement of purpose nearly a
week ago said Vietnam hes "shaken our con-
fidence in (the government's) ability to make
wise and humane decisions."
They also pointed out that "there is also
disquieting evidence of an intention to en-
large further our immense destructive ca-
pability." They said the response of the
scientific community to these intentions
"has been hopelessly fragmented."
The union's proposals include a call to
start "a critical and continuing examination
of governmental policyln areas where science
and technology are of actual or potential
significance:" to turn research from defense-
oriented to environmental-oriented projects,
to start their students questioning their fu-
ture professional commitments; to express
opposition to the anti-ballistic missile sys-
tem and, finally, to organize scientists into
an effective and vocal political action group.
In New York, several groups of younger,
concerned physicists are busily drUrnming
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modern than the F-100's which they re-
placed. However, that is not .exactly the
point.
The Rand Corp., the "think tank," has
a free hand to spend $71 million during
this period of 5 years at an average of
$59,000 per man-year.
I think this is loose accounting. And
I protest strenuously under the present
budget conditions and the difficulties we
had in getting money for the education
bill just recently passed, and for other
bills.
Efforts are made to cut items out of
the education bill and other bills.
I protest the disproportionate amount
we are spending in these research proj-
ects which have very questionable rele-
vance to the mission of the Defense
Department.
They have nothing whatever, in my
opinion, to do with the protection of the
men in Vietnam. These are not research
projects for a better plane.
That is not what the Rand Corn is
really doing. These are different proj-
ects. They fall under a different cate-
gory. All these behaviorial science re-
search studies have nothing to do with
the qualities of a plane or any other
hardware. They have no relevance to the
hardware used to fight. Some of the
studies are designed, in my opinion, to
assist in brainwashing either the enemy
or our own soldiers or someone else, I
guess, because they fall in the field of
psychological research, which is an inter-
esting subject but is unrelated to the
mission of the Defense Department.
The university research is sort of in
a class by itself. Regardless of what ef-
fect it may have upon the Pentagon ac-
tivities, I do not want them to further
undermine the integrity of our universi-
ties or schools.
This is a much more serious matter
than whatever they may wish to do to
the program of research of the Penta-
gon itself.
I feel the same way about research in
foreign institutions. We are having
enough trouble with our foreign rela-
tions. This is an area with which we are
all familiar. We know about the protests
all around the world at our foreign re-
search activities and the difficulties we
have had.
The President came back from one trip
abroad and reported that everyone is en-
thusiastic about the United States. If
everyone is as enthusiastic about the
United States, I think the enthusiasm
is limited to the moon shot. It would
be very strange indeed that the attitude
toward many of the policies we are fol-
lowing would be changed 'that quickly.
The important thing is that to intrude
our defense-sponsored research into the
foreign institutions harms our relations
with the foreign nations.
There was a specific example of this in
Sweden last year. The Swedes protested
the program we had paid their universi-
ties to undertake.
We know what has happened in Japan.
We know about the violence originating
In university circles in Chile when the
Camelot was brought to light. In India
last year, approximately a year ago, we
remember what happened there.
I have an article entitled "India Sus-
pects U.S. Scholars," written by Bernard
D. Nossiter, who is one of the most re-
ceptive and able reporters the Washing-
ton Post has. The article was published
In the Washington Post of August 15,
1968.
I read the first paragraph:
American scholars in India are again sus-
pect after parliamentary explosion here over
a Himalayan research program supported by
Defense Department funds.
Here we have an actual injury to our
relations because we intrude with De-
fense Department funds into foreign
academic research. What we are doing is
driving friendly countries away from us.
They certainly simply do not like it. I
do not blame them for that. They do not
wish to be an appendage of the Penta-
gon. I think they are quite justified. I
think that that item, which is $5.7 mil-
lion, should be eliminated.
I do not see any excuse for our going
abroad and subsidizing these people. I
assume that originally there was some
idea that we might cultivate them and
that they would be ingratiated and
would respond.
Domestically, when we give a contract
to people, they usually respond and are
appreciative of the money. Perhaps the
specific professor who got the contract
abroad might even have been apprecia-
tive. However, on balance, the people in
the institutions and in the country do
not like it. It is bad policy.
The PRESIDING OlenCER. The time
of the Senator has expired.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
yield myself an additional 2 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Arkansas is recognized for an
additional 2 minutes.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed at
this point in the RECORD the article to
which I have just referred and also an
article entitled "India Still Wary on U.S.
Scholars," Written by Joseph Lelyveld,
and published in the New York Times on
August 14, 1968.
There being no objection, the articles
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Aug. 15,
1968]
INDIA SUSPECTS U.S. SCHOLARS
(By Bernard D. Nossiter)
NEW DELHI, August 14?American scholars
in India are again suspect after parliamen-
tary explosion here over a Himalayan re-
search program supported by Defense De-
partment funds.
The incident centers around the Himala-
yan Border Countries (HBC), a project affili-
ated with the University of California at
Berkeley. The nature of the research ap-
pears to be innocuous and of no military
significance. But opposition politicians on
the left and right have created a storm be-
cause $282,000 is coming from the Pentagon.
In reply to questions in Parliament last
week, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi said
she would "very carefully look into" the
project. Her Minister of State for External
Affairs, Bali Ram Baghat, said that the
government views the program "with con-
cern" and is "reviewing the advisability of
permitting" it to continue.
FOUNDATION ORDERED our
India has already ordered the Asia Foun-
dation here to pack up because it received
' money from the Central Intelligence Agency.
In view of the rising wave of Indian national-
ism, American researchers say they would
not be surprised if the government now for-
bade them to enter the sensitive Himalayan
region near China and denied visas to
scholars supported by military or intelligence
money.
The blowup was forecast last winter by a
California professor of anthropology, Gerald
53. Berreman.. He resigned from the Hi-
malayan project, writing its director, Leo
Rose, a political scientist at Berkeley:
"It seems unlikely that one would be per-
mitted by the governments of host nations to
pursue anthropological research (and pre-
sumably most other social science research
which takes place in the countryside) if it
were known that the money came directly
from the United States military establish-
ment."
OPPOSED TO VIET WAR
Berreman also resigned on what he called
moral grounds, citing his opposition to the
war in Vietnam. He is now in India under a
Fulbright-Hays fellowship, hoping to study
urbanism in a northern city. Yesterday, offi-
cials in the Ministry of External Affairs ques-
tioned him about the Himalayan project.
The program began in the late 1950s, sup-
ported entirely by Ford Foundation money.
When this source began drying up, Director
Rose hunted up other outlets and found
funds at the Defense Department's Advanced
Research Project Agency, the Smithsonian
Institution and elsewhere.
The project has produced analyses of the
relations between Tibet, India and China;
the political system of Nepal; and other
studies in linguistics, ethnology and anthro-
pology.
Berreman, who examined the Pentagon
contract, says it places no curbs on the schol-
ars. It enables them to choose their own
projects and guarantees that none of their
findings shall be classified.
FOES IN PARLIAMENT
The furor in Parliament was touched off by
a member of the Revolutionary Socialist
Party. Members of the Jana Sangh, a party of
right-wing Hindu fanatics, and Communists
suggested that the research is merely a cover
for American espionage.
The National Herald, a daily that usually
reflects the government's line, said that per-
mission for the scholars to work in the Hima-
layas "should never have been approved by
anyone alive to the nation's self-respect and
security . . . Whichever organization in the
United States finances it, research and in-
telligence have been inextricably involved
during the postwar period."
Perhaps as a result of this affair, professors
here say, there have been unusual delays in
granting visas to other American researchers
with grants from the Health, Education and
Welfare Department's Fulbright-Hays pro-
gram. Ironically, India appears to have dis-
covered the military sponsorship of the Him-
alayan project from hearings held last May
by Sen. Fulbright's Committee on Foreign
Relations.
[From the New York Times, Aug. 14, 1968]
INDIA STILL WARY ON U.S. SCHOLARS?.
CONCERN OVER PENTAGON OR CIA IN-
VOLVEMENT STRONG
(By Joseph Lelyveld) ?
NEW DELHI, August 13?Three months ago
Prof. Gerald D. Berreman, a University of
California anthropologist, applied for a visa
to come to India for a year of research and
teaching. Today he called at the External Af-
fairs Ministry here to assure worried officials
that he was not an operative of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
It is an assurance that Indian officials now
feel they must have from all American schol-
ars interested in their country. But there was
a special irony in Professor Berreman's case
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August 12, 1969
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
because he helped to start the controversy
that made the Indians edgy.
Last January he sent Senator J. W. Ful-
bright, chairman of the Foreign Relations
'Committee, a copy of a letter he had written
withdrawing from participation in a research
project on the Himalayas. He felt that the
project had been cendpromised by financial
support from the Pentagon.
The anthropologist Wryly describes himself
as a wild-eyed opponent of the wax in Viet-
nam. His letter explained that this was the
basis of his "moral abler. lion" to taking the
funds. It also cited what he termed a prac-
tical objection?that the project and all other
serious academic resejVcir by Americans in
India could easily become controversial here
as a result of the Defense Department's in-
volvement
Dr. Berreman, who later got a grant from
the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, discovered to his dismay how ac-
curate his forecast was. In fact, the contro-
versy that has blown up here has caused the
Government to hold up on all visa applica-
tions from Americans with any kind of aca-
demic pursuit.
Indians became conscious of the Penta-
gon's support of scholarly research only a few
weeks ago, when there were press reports of
Congressional testimony by Adm. Hyman G.
Rickover before Mr. Pulbright's committee.
The outcry in Parliament was immediate.
One member charged that the Pentagon and
C.I.A. were busy infilhating spies into the
Himalayas, not only as scholars but also as
artists, bird-watchers and yogis.
Privately, Inidan officials say they do not
really suspect the scholar:, of being spies. But
they make it clear that research underwrit-
ten by the Pentagon has no future here.
COOPERATION IN etlE PAST
This is also ironic, for India's own Ministry
of Defense has cooperated in the past with
the Advanced Research Project Agency, which
gave the Himalayan projek t a grant of $280,-
000.
As Professor Berreman e ,plains it, the proj-
ect was not an integrated program of re-
search but a pot-pourri of diverse studies
in several disciplines thrown together for the
specific purpose of attracting funds.
The anthropologist, who wrote an article
last February for The Ne Lion decrying the
"moral imperialism" of the Peace Corps,w
as
asked whether there was any clear moral dif-
ference between taking money from the De-
fense Department and taking it from the De-
partment of Health, Educe tion and Welfare.
"Oh, I know I can't be entirely consistent,"
he replied. "If I were to be entirely con-
sistent, I wouldn't 134q my taxes and
I wouldn't be teachin,; at the Uni-
versity of California. Its not consistency that
I want but impact?in the form of opposi-
tion to the war."
Professor Berreman, who is here on a two-
month tourist visa now, hopes to return next
month to do a study of urbanization in Deb-
ra Dun, a town near the Himalayas but not
in them. The author of a book called "Hindus
of the Himalayas," he Atomised the officials
he saw today that he would not try to do any
further research in the mountains.
Among others waiting for action on their
visas are a dozen graduates of professional
schools at the University of California who
should already have arrived here for a year
of further studies. A University of Wisconsin
student of linguistics who Ed hoped to study
Tibetan and Sanskrit in Darjeeling has been
asked to move from the Himalayan resort to
Benares.
American officials say they are not unduly
alarmed by the difficulties the scholars are
meeting. "Remember," one said, "we've had i
our moments of xenophobia and obscurant-
ism too."
Mr. HART. Mr. President, in the
course of the discussion it has been sug-
gested that there are certain research
projects which more appropriately could
be undertaken by other agencies and de-
partments of the Government. How-
ever, they are not doing it. The Defense
Department is. Without the Senator's
amendment, some of these worthwhile
things would terminate. A willingness to
assist in the transfer from the Defense
Department to department X has been
voiced.
I ask the Senator if it is not true that
If there are projects of a research na-
ture which are trimmed back by agree-
ment to the Senator's amendmdnt, proj-
ects which are thought to be worthy as
research projects, there is on the Senate
calendar a bill to authorize appropria-
tions for activities of the National Sci-
ence Foundation. That bill in regular
order will follow the disposition of this
bill by the Senate.
I know of no way in which we can
operate here as jugglers. We will have to
take a stand here at some time, and I
hope that it is now. We will have to say
no to some of these rather esoteric and
certainly not directly defense-related re-
search projects and cut them off and,
happily, we are in a point of time in
relation to the Senate bill in which the
measures that will follow have value,
and something may be picked up in the
following bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
time of the Senator has expired.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
yield myself an additional 5 minutes.
Mr. HART. We are ready to make the
transfer. However, before we are in a po-
sition to be able to transfer, we have to
saw off the defense from that kind of
research.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
agree with what the Senator says I am
a cosponsor with the Senator from Okla-
homa of a measure to create a founda-
tion for research in the behaviorial
sciences. That would be a perfectly prop-
er place to transfer these behavioral
projects, assuming that they are good
projects.
Mr. HART. Mr. President, that bill will
follow the pending bill.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
agree with the Senator. I think that his
Point is well taken.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed at this point in the
RECORD for the information of the Sen-
ate a list of a number of particular in-
stitutions.
This one is for the fiscal year 1968
from the Department of Defense. It gives
the name of the contractor and loca-
tion and the amount of money for the
fiscal year 1968.
I also ask unanimous consent to have
printed at this point in the RECORD for
Project Themis, a list of the universities
that consist of both private and public
universities. The list gives the funding
for 1967, 1968, and 1969. That, of course,
s the latest we have. I.do this to show
how extensive is the intrusion of the
Defense Department into Practically all
of the important institutions of the
United States.
Mr. HART. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
This again goes too far and lends cre-
dence to the allegations of those who
say that we are becoming a militaristic
nation and that our civilian government
and civilian life is being subordinated
to the overwhelming influence of the
military.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
SECTION Il?NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, FISCAL YEAR 1961
lExcerpt from Department of Defense listing of 500 contractor
according to net value of mtary prime contract awards to
research, development, test, mid evaluation work]
Rank
Name of contractor and location
Thousand:
of dollar
10 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. _ _ _ _ 119, 17!
Cambridge, Mass - 31, 66,
Lexington, Mass 87, 51.
20 Aerospace Corp 73, 33,
El Segundo, Calif 73, 30
San Bernardino, Calf 3:
22 Johns Hopkins University 57, 61
Baltimore City, Md 2,71
Silver Spring, Md 54,90
--
30 Mitre Corp., Bedford, Mass 35,71
36 Stanford Research Institute 28, 71
Ethiopia _
19
Thailand 5
Homer Village, Alaska 1
Menlo Park, Calif__ 27,60
Stanford, Calif ....1. 32
Mercury, NeV 43
Cheyenne, Wyo- 7
40 Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Calif 19,13!
44 California, University of 17,39,
Berkeley, Calif 5,76;
D3Vis, Calif 12-i
Irvine, Calif 61
La Jolla, Calif 5, 51(
Los Angeles, Calif 1, 471
Point Mugu, Calif 12
Riverside, Galif 89
San Diego, Calif 3, 182
San Francisca, Calif_ 256
Santa Barbara, CaliL 870
Santa Cruz, Calif44
? -., ,
45 System Development Corp 17,372
Huntsville, Ala 414
Lompoc, Calif 700
Los Angeles, Calif_ 61
Santa Monica, Calif 13, 120
Washington, D.0 863
Belleville, Ill 350
Lexington, Mass 375
Rome, N.Y 191
Dayton, Ohio 303
Falls Church, Va 1, 226
Hampton, Va 234
Norfolk, Va 35
46 Stanford University 1 ,422
Palo Afto, Calif 218
Stanford, Calif 1 ,204
51 Rochester, University of Rochester, N.Y....._ 13,182
55 Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory, Inc 12, 500
57
60
64
65
Edwards, Calif 86
Buffalo, N.Y 11, 889
Wright-Patterson, Ohio 37
Fails Church, Va 448
ITT Research Institute 12,172
Chicago, III 7,017
Annapolis, Md 5,130
Wright-Patterson, Ohio.. 25
Institute for Defense Analysis, Arlington,
Va 11,691
Pennsylvania Sate University, University
Park, Pa 10,513
Research Analysis Corp 10,967
Iran 155
Vietnam 880
McLean, Va 9,273
Various &mettle ?241
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364R0003001
SECTION II-NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, FISCAL YEAR SECTION II-NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, FISCAL YEAR
1968-Continued 1968-Continued
SECTION II-NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, FISCAL YEAR
1968-Continued
Rank Name of contractor and location
Thousands
ot dollars Rank Name of contractor and location
66 Columbia University, New York, N.Y
70 Michigan, University of
Honolulu City, Hawaii 1,600
Ann Arbor, Mich 6,947
Willow Run, Mich 734
Ypsilanti, Mich 197
71 Illinois, University of
Chicago, Ill
Urbana, Ill
72 Battelle Memorial Institute
Germany_ _ _
Washington, 13.0
Columbus, Ohio
Richland, Wash
78 U.S. National Aero Space Agency
Edwards, Calif
Moffett Field, Calif
Pasadena, Calif
Washington, D.0
Houston, Tex
Ridgeley, W. Va
Thousands
of dollars Rank Name of contractor and location
9,929 147 Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pa
9,478 151 Harvard University
Boston, Mass
Cambridge, Mass
Fort Davis, Tex
153 Minnesota, University of, Minneapolis,
8,583 Minn
- 154 California Institute of Technology, Paso-
89 dena, Calif
8,494 155 Texas A. & M. Research Foundation, College
Station, Tex
8,322 156 Purdue Research Foundation
85 Riverside Research Institute, New York, N.Y_
92 Washington, University of, Seattle, Wash_
94 Texas, University of
57
114
8,036
115
Lafayette, Ind
West Lafayette, Ind
160 New York University
Thousands
of dollars
2,575 254 Smithsonian Institution 1,082
2, 524
Washington, D.0 1,067
182 Cambridge, Mass 15
2,182
160 260 Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind 1,044
261 Kansas, University of 1,044
2,507
2,487
2,475
2,455
2,442
13
Kansas City, Kans 18
Lawrence, Kans 1,026
262 American Institute of Research 1,038
Palo Alto, Calif 93
Silver Spring, Md 145
Camp Lejeune, N.0 54
Pittsburgh, Pa 746
2,304 265 Case Western Reserve University, Cleve-
land, Ohio 8,011
266 Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, N.Y.. 1,001
267 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission ' 995
7,026 Bronx, N.Y 731
- New York, N.Y 1,513
25 Syracuse, N.Y 25
40 University Heights, N.Y 35
19
77 167 Maryland University of 2,100
155
6,710 Baltimore City, Md 703
College Park, Md 1,397
6,315
5,552
5,386
Alamogordo, N. Mex 10
Austin, Tex 4, 598
College Station, Tex 68
Dallas, Tex 43
El Paso, Tex 502
Galveston, Tex 135
Houston, Tex 30
96 Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, Woods 5,143
Hole, Mass. ' 175
105 Utah, University of 4,356 181
182
' Dugway, Utah 283
Salt Lake City, Utah 4,073
107 Syracuse University Research Corp 4,172
Burlington, Mass 94
Syracuse, N.Y 4,078
117 Dayton, University of 3,610
Dayton, Ohio 3,358
Wright-Patterson, Ohio 252
118 Cornell University 3,595
Arecibo, P.R 1,585
Ithaca, N.Y 1,949
New York, N.Y 61
123 George Washington University 3,306
Washington, D.0 3,295
Alexandria, Va 11
128 Southwest Research Institute 3,149
Wright-Patterson, Ohio 226
Dallas, Tex 35
San Antonio, Tex 2,888
131 Denver, University of, Denver, Colo 2,902
133 Ohio State University Research Foundation_ 2,958
Columbus, Ohio 2,686
Wright-Patterson, Ohio 272
134 American University, Washington, D C 2,944 229
138 National Academy of Sciences 2,838 234
Washington, D.0 2,756
Watertown, Mass 47
National Academy of Sciences, Dover, NJ_ 35
139 Duke University, Durham, N.0 2,012 235
140 New Mexico State University
Alamogordo, N. Mex 24
Las Cruces, N. Mex 640
University Park, N. Mex 1,612
White Sands MS., N. Mex 511
143 Alaska, University of, College Village,
Alaska 2,695
146 Miami, University of 2,602
Coral Gables, Fla 1,141 248
Miami, Fla 1,461
252
172 New Mexico, University of 1,906
Albuquerque, N. Mex
Sandia; N. Mex
174 New York State University of
Washington, D.0 175
Germantown, Md 39
Las Vegas, Nev 270
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Albuquerque, N. Mex 451
Oak Ridge, Tenn 40
Richland, Wash 20
934
1,052 268 Illinois Institute Technology, Chicago, III__ 988
270 U.S. Commerce Department 985
1,982
Boulder, Colo 540
Albany, N.Y 1,538 Washington, D.0 324
Buffalo, N.Y 318 Gaithersburg, Md 46
New York, N.Y 115 Rockville, Md 10
Stony Brook, N.Y 11 Suitland, Md 65
1,969 271 Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J 983
Oregon State University, Corvallis, Dreg--- _
Florida, University of, Gainesville, Fla
Princeton University, Princeton, N.J
184 Midwest Research Institute
Kansas City, Mn
Wright-Patterson, Ohio
186 Louisiana State University of, Baton Rouge,
La
188 Georgia Tech Research Institute, Atlanta,
Ga
195 Stevens Institute of Technology
1, 842 273 Southern Research Institute, Birmingham,
1,803 Ala 965
275 Colorado University 964
1,762 - -
Boulder, Colo 706
1,615 Denver, Colo 258
147
277 Northeastern University, Boston, Mass 952
279 Washington University, St. Louis, City Me_ . 933
1,754 281 Brown University, Providence, R.I 932
282 Pittsburgh, University of 921
1, 596 Washington, D.0 195
Pittsburgh, Pa 726
Hoboken, N.J 1, 559
New York, N.Y
197 WisconsinAniversity of, Madison, Wis
204 Hawaii, University of Honolulu City, Hawaii
210 Analytic Services Inc., Falls Church, Va
212 Cincinnati, University of Cincinnati, Ohio_ _ _
214 Oklahoma State University of Stillwater,
Oklahoma.
218 Iowa, State Univ of Science and Technology,
Ames, Iowa.
219 Chicago, University of
Chicago, III
Lemont, III
222 Florida State University, Tallahassee, Fla _
225 Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colo_
226 Kansas State University of Agriculture,
Manhattan, Kans.
228 Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute of
Brooklyn, N.Y 1,274
Farmingdale, N.Y 30
Catholic University of America, Washington, 1,304
D.C.
Research Triangle Institute 1,254
2,707 236
37 293 Missouri, University of 876
1,591 Columbia, Mo 798
1, 568 Kansas City, Mo 50
1,495 Rolla, Mo 28
1,446
1,422 296 Notre Dame, University of, Notre Dame, Ind _ 855
297 Oregon, University of 846
1,372
Eugene, Oreg 531
1,360 Portland, Dreg 315
1,320 298 Oklahoma, University of 840
40
Fort Sill, Okla 100
1,338 Norman, Okla 335
1,329 Oklahoma City, Okla 405
1,321
309 Virginia, University of, Charlottesville, Va 787
1, 304 316 Tennessee, University of 751
Iran
Durham, N.0
Triangle Park, N.0
Georgia Institute of Technology Atlanta, Ga.
New Mexico Institute Mining and Technol-
ogy.
China Lake, Calif
Socorro, N. Mex
238 Syracuse University
Syracuse, N.Y
Utica, N.Y
Pennsylvania, University of Philadelphia,
Pa
Rhode Island, University of, Kingston, R.I_
Knoxville, Tenn 520
Menphis, Tenn 64
Tullahoma, Tenn 167
317 Southern California, University of 749
Los Angeles, Calif 735
296 San Diego, Calif 14
606
352 319 Southern Methodist, University of, Dallas,
Tex 735
1,220 321 Delaware, University of, Newark. Del 732
8,218 325 Georgetown University, Washington, D.C_. _ 714
328 Yale University 709
200
1,018 New Haven, Conn 684
Alamogordo, N. Mex - 25
1,197
334 Houston, University of, Houston, Tex 680
1,184 338 Auburn University, Auburn, Ala 657
13 339 University Corp. Atmospheric Research 655
Boulder, Colo -40
1,125 Sunspot, II. Mex 695
1,084
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SECTION II?NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, FISCM. YEAR SECTION II?NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, FISCAL YEAR
1968?Continued
1968?Continued
Thousands
Rank Name of contractor and location of dollars
341 Dartmouth College, Hantiiir, N H ____ ____ 652
342 Arizona State University, emple, Ariz_ 649
348 American Society for Engineering, Wash-
ington, D.0 621
351 Lowell Technical Institute 618
--- _ ?
Billerica, Mass_ 40
Lowell, Mass 578
?
0
352 Lovelace Foundation, Allhiuerque, N. Mex_ 613
354 Ohio University,Athens Jo
608
358 Northwestern liniversity,Iyaastos, Ill 590
357 American Institute for Reieatch 569
--
Washington, D.0 26
Pittsburgh, Pa 481
370 Mississippi State Universtr, 'alate College,
Miss .. 564
371 Travelers Research Center Hartford, Conn__ 561
376 North Carolina State Untyamity, Raleigh, _
N. r
C " 551
388 Massachusetts, University ot _ 511
--- - ?
Amherst, Mass 493
Waltham, Mass 18
---- -
Rank
Name of contractor and location
Thousands
of dollars
390 Arizona, University of, Tucson, Ariz__ 504
396 National Society Professional Engineers,
Washington, D.0 493
418 Michigan State, University, East Lansing, 464
Mich.
427 Boston College 455
Chestnut Hill, Mass 318
Weston, Mass 137
. _
428 South Dakota School of Mines and Tech- 454
I . .
444 Nevada, University of Reno, Neu
446 Flight Safety Foundation, Phoenix, Ariz ._
462 North Carolina, University of, Chapel Hill,
N.C.
464 U.S. Interior Department___ _
SECTION II?NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, FISCAL YEAR
1968?Continued
Rank Name of contractor and location
Thousands
of dollars
468 Tufts University 380
---- --
Boston, Mass 41
Medford, Mass 339
_
478 Arctic Institute of North America._ 35:4
Canada_ _ 75
Washington, D.C___ 279
479 Alabama, University of... 351
426 Birmingham, Ala 176
423 Hontsville, Ala_ 102
390 University, Ala _ 73
aga 483 Utah State University of Agriculture Cccl
applied science 344
Denver, Col 50
Washington, D.0 37
Bartlesville, Okla 85
Albany, Oreg
Pittsburgh, Pa 165
467 Presbyterian Hospital, Chicago, III_ 384
Bedford, Mass------------- 62
Logan, Utah 82
485 Iowa, State University of, Iowa City, Iowa _ 342
487 Lehigh University, Bethleham, Pa 241
Total . 665.35
PROJECT THEMIS
The list shows all the Themis piojects funded through fiscal year 1969. The original 4-year plan called for 50 new starts for each of fiscal years 1967,. 1968, 1989, and 1970 for a total of 200
programs. During the first 3 years only 118 of the planned 150 new starts were approved. The fiscal year 1970 budget request for $33 million provides tor (1) 25 additional new projects lobe started
during fiscal year 1970 which would require $10 million, and (2) the renewal of the ongoing Themis programs which would require $23 million.
PROJECT THEMIS PROGRAMS?FUNDING BY FISCAL YEARS ($1,000)
Military
Department
State and institution
Alabama:
A Auburn University
Al University of Alabama
A Alaska: University of Alaska
Arizona:
N Arizona State_
AF Do
AF University of Arizona
AF University of Arizona at Tucson
California:
AF University of California, San Diego'
N University of Cilifornia, Riverside
Colorado:
N Colorado State_
N Colorado State.
AF Colorado State at Fort Collins_
Connecticut: University of Connecticut__ _
AF Delaware:
A University of Delaware
N University of Delaware at Newark _ _
District of Columbia:
AF Georgetown University.
N Catholic University _
N Catholic University
N Catholic University
Florida:
Al University of Florida
A University of Florida
N Florida State_
A Florida State__
N Florida State
Georgia:
A Georg ?Tech.
Al Georgia Tech
N University of Geo iia at Athens..
Hawaii:
N University of Hawaii
Al University of Hawaii
A University of Hawaii at Honolulu
Illinois:
Al Illinois Institute of technology.
A Illinois Institute of Technology at Chicago
Indiana:
Al Indiana University
N Notre Dame University
Iowa:
N Iowa State.
Al do_
A University of Iowa
N _do
Kansas:
A University of Kansas
Al do
Al Kansas State
N do
Al University of Kentucky
A Kentucky University at Lexington
Al do
A University of Louisville
Louisiana:
A Louisiana State_.
AF do
Kentucky:
Program topic
Information processing
Structural mechanics
Human ecology
Human performance in isolation
Detection devices, techniques and theory
Precision optical systems
X-ray and XUV radiation physics
Transport phenomena in flow systems
Solar radiation effects
Tropical weather disturbances, surface effects
Predictability of low-altitude winds_
Effects of environment on sensors
Structural fatigue
Fluid mechanics and heat transfer
_ Oceanography
Laser technology
Vitreous state structure and dynamics
Dynamics of cable systems
Underwater acoustics
Solid state materials
Logistics and information processing
Geophysical fluid dynamics
Prediction of tropical weather phenomena_
Computer aided instruction
Low-speed aerodynamic
Interface phenomena
Statistical analysis and information retrieval
Astronomy research
On-line computer systems
Vector-borne tropical diseases
V-STOL aerodynamics
Degradation of structural materials
. Environmental hazards
Deep sea engineering
Automatic navigation and control
Ceramic and composite materials
Vibration and stability ot military vehicles .
Application and theory of automata
Remote sensing instrumentation
Social and behavioral science
Performance in altered environment_
Nuclear radiation effects on electronic components
Fiscal year Fiscal year
1967 1968
343
404
380
171
202 ...
190 --
409
409
398 200
500
430
410
563 281
404
400
340
600
202
386
402
200
170
300
500
460
339 170
350 195
350 175
409
409
400 198
400 200
400
449
400
400
400
Metal deformation processing
Research in electrochemical processes
Environmental stress physiology
Performance assessment and enhancement
Infectious and communicable diseases
Digital automata
200
224
500
400
200
200
200
577
468
399
342 171
368 400
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Fiscal year
1969
120
400
200
203
460
522
400
250
215
400
205
280
480
202
193
201
500
200
170
350
250
230
170
200
215
220
205
400
205
400
200
200
200
225
750
200
200
200
200
288
204
460
400_
200
170
200
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PROJECT THEWS PROGRAMS?FUNDING BY FISCAL YEARS ($1,000)?Continued
S9743
Military
Department State and institution
Program topic
Fiscal year Fiscal irz
1967
Massachusetts:
N University of Massachusetts Deep sea structures
N Boston College Elementary chemical kinetics
Michigan:
AF Michigan State University at East Lansing Behavioral studies
Minnesota:
N University of Minnesota Infrared detector and laser technology
N Gas turbine technology
N __ do Organization performance and human effectiveness
Mississippi:
A Mississippi State Rotor and propeller aerodynamics
AF University of Mississippi Biocontrol systems
Missouri:
A University of Missouri at Columbia_ Fluid transport properties
N University of Missouri at Rolla Aqueous aerosols in atmospheric processes
AF do Basic studies on electronic materials
A do Terrestrial science research
AF Washington University at St. Louis Control, guidance and information studies
AF ___do_ Optimum detection systems
AF Nevada: University of Nevada Cloud physics -
AF New Hampshire: Dartmouth College Time-shared computing systems
New Jersey:
AF Rutgers University Fluid flow aerodynamics
N Stevens Institute Nonlinear physics of polymers
A do Cryogenic sciences and engineering
A do .. Evaluation of terrain vehicle systems
New Mexico:
N New Mexico Institute M. & T Environmental sciences
N University of New Mexico Radiation effects on electronics
New York:
AF SUNY-Albany Modification of environment
N SUNY-Buffalo Environmental physiology
A Rensselaer Polytechnic Electrochemical power sources
N __do Radiation effects
A __do Optimum digital signal processing
N Yeshiva University, New York City Research on thin film materials
North Carolina:
North Carolina State Materials response phenomena
Digital encoding systems
North Dakota:
A North Dakota State Control of vectors of diseases of military importance
N University of North Dakota High pressure physiology
Ohio:
A Case-Western Reserve Research in R. & D. management
A Ohio University Low-level navigation
Kent State University Liquid crystal detectors
University of Cincinnati Internal aerodynamics in air-breathing engines
Oklahoma:
A Oklahoma State Electronic description of the environment
N University of Oklahoma Mechanism and theory of shock
N Oregon: Oregon State On-line computer environmental research
Pennsylvania:
A Drexel Institute of Technology Powder metallurgy
AF do Forecasting by satellite observations
N Jefferson Medical College Pathogenesis of acute diarrhea! disease
A Lehigh University Nonlinear wave propagation
N _do Low-cycle fatigue in joined structures
N do Fluid amplification
N Hahnemann Medical College Bioamines in stress
A Rhode Island: Rhode Island University at Kingston___ Photoelectronic imaging devices -
A South Carolina: Medical College of South Carolina Resuscitation and treatment of wounded
N South Dakota: South Dakota School of Mines Modification of convective clouds
AF
AF
A
Tennessee:
0 University of Tennessee at Knoxville
AF _do
AF
A
A
A
A
A
AF
A
AF
AF
A
AF
A
Fiscal year
1969
360 180
380 190
400 200
278 139
409
446
400
399
460
400
324
342
406
370
399
600
199
290
200
162
171
460
180
440
400
190
200
415
140
204
220
200
400
400
400
400
250
290
162
170
200
203 268
185 185
199
300
460
.430
400
300
407
482
580
200
350
230
215
400
390
200 200
396 200
393 197
527 263
150
200
410
400
241
405
290
510-
408
390
400
400
Dynamic sealing
Remote sensor research
- University of Tennessee at Tullahoma MHD power generation
Vanderbilt University Coating science and technology
Texas:
Texas A. & M Optimization research
__do Meteorology research
Aircraft dynamics of subsonic flight
Texas Christian Human pattern perception
University of Houston Information processing
Rice University Coherent and incoherent EM radiation
do ' Remote sensing of gamma ray signatures
Southern Methodist Automatic navigation
..do Statistics in calibration methods
Texas Tech Performance and man-machine effectiveness Ai
Utah: University of Utah Chemistry of combustion
Vermont: University of Vermont Isolation and sensory communication
Virginia:
University of Virginia Learning control systems
do Atomic interaction in gases
do Cryogenic instrumentation
Virginia Polytechnic, Blackburg Vehicle engineering and control
V/STOL aerodynamics
West Virginia: West Virginia University
Total
368
260 130
300
400
430
272
380
150
408
400
550
200
215
388
100
190
350
400
398
200
502
470
200
410
342 171
408
416
150
200
205
200
240
202
290
255
204
195
200
200
400
520
400
184
100
150
204
200
275
155
215
194
135
190
175
400
200
296
235
200
255
170
200
400
400
208
19,375
28,180 29,239
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if it is
convenient to the Senator from Arkan-
sas, would he be willing to allow the
Senator from Massachusetts to speak at
this time.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, that
is agreeable. I yield to the Senator from
Massachusetts.
Mr. STENNIS. If the Senator from
New Hampshire will yield time, Mr. Pres-
ident?
Mr. Mc1NTYRE. I yield 12 minutes to
the distinguished Senator from Massa-
chusetts.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, if I may
take a somewhat different approach to
the proposal as set forth by the Sen-
ator from Arkansas, let me first say
that the policy and general philosophy
as set forth by the Senator's proposal
was shared and was considered by the
Subcommittee on Research and Develop-
ment of the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices, under the able leadership of the
distinguished Senator from New Hamp-
shire. In fact, it is in keeping with the
policy as mandated to that subcommit-
tee by the distinguished Chairman of the
Armed Services Committee, the Senator
from Mississippi. So the matters which
the Senator from Arkansas raises are
matters which the committee had before
it in its deliberations and in its final
decision, in its report to the full Armed
Services Committee.
Mr. President, I should like to analyze
very briefly the contentions of the Sen-
ator from Arkansas and then conclude
by proposing certain questions to the
Senator from Arkansas which I trust he
will answer and which may be helpful
in this debate.
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Attguat 12, 1969
Mr. STE/sINIS. Mr. President, may we
have order, so that those of us who wish
to hear may do so?
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
RELLMON in the chair). The Senate will
be in order.
Mr. BROOKE. The Senator from
Arkansas proposes a $45.6 million cut, in-
cluding a 10-percent, or $27 million, cut
in Federal contract research centers; a
$2 million, or one-third, cut in research
by foreign institutions; a 20-percent, or
$5 million, cut in project Agile, counter-
insurgency work, which includes largely
technological work, not just social and
behavioral research; $3 million from
other social science research; and $8
million, or 25 percent, from project The-
mis, a program for university research.
If the Department of Defense distrib-
utes the committee's 12-percent cut in
the research budget evenly across all
categories, the Federal contract research
centers will be reduced by more than
Senator FULBRIGHT has proposed. All the
categories that the Senator has men-
tioned are subject to the large cut the
committee has imposed already, unless
the Defense Department considers them
of such high priority that other pro-
grams are reduced disproportionately.
Moreover, social and behavioral re-
search on foreign military environments
and policy planning studies are specifi-
cally cited by the committee as an area
to be reduced by 12 Percent or by $1.5
million of the $13.3 million, and by the
recommended transfer of approximately
$4 million in projects to other agencies
with responsibility in these areas. For ex-
ample, some policy planning studies
might go to State, ACDA, and AID; and
some more basic research might go to
the National Science roundation. Work
in these areas already has been reduced
by approximately 11 percent since fiscal
1968 and by the effects of inflation, which
the Senator has not mentioned, and
which I am sure he would want to take
into consideration.
Thus, a thorough pruning of work in
this area is already assured by the com-
mittee's action.
Apparently, Senator FULBRIGHT has
several concerns: allegedly worthless re-
search; defense connections with the
universities; the SUPPOSed hazards of do-
ing research under defense auspices in
foreign countries, on the assumption that
it may lead to engaging in military ac-
tion there at some time.
Mr. President, many knowledgeable
people agree that some of the research
Involved might better be carried out un-
der other auspices, and the committee
has provided for this. But unless the
State Department and other agencies
obtain greater authorizations, this of
course, will be impossible.
Thus, the effect of adopting the Ful-
bright amendment simply would be to
reduce further what is widely recog-
nized as an inadequate national effort in
social and behavioral research. Surely,
we should first seek to create better me-
chanisms for funding work in this gen-
eral field before we trim the limited ef-
fort already underway.
If it is insisted that all Defense re-
search must be strictly tied to DOD mis-
sions, we would have to cut out all basic
research in physical sciences as well.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. BROOKE. I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Did the Senator
hear the Senator from Michigan state a
moment ago that on the calendar is the
National Science Foundation authoriza-
tion, and it will be up very soon, and we
could authorize an increase to be taken
up?all the items about which the Sena-
tor is talking? Assuming that they are
justifiable research contracts, it would
be a much more appropriate way to do
it, it would seem to me. That bill is al-
ready on the calendar.
May I also say to the Senator that I
told the Senate a moment ago?I do not
know whether he heard it?that a dele-
gation from one of the most prestigious
Institutions in the country, and certainly
in his State of Massachusetts, waited on
me with respect to the problem of the
instrusion of the military. They are not
antimilitary. They simply were making
the point that they hated to see MIT be-
come dominated or too dependent, I will
say, upon a military appropriation. I be-
lieve that MIT last year had $119,175,000.
This is an awful lot of money. In one
sense, of course, it is a great compliment
to MIT. These students, I was told by the
professor who brought them, were among
the best students they had. They were not
dropouts; they were not in that sense.
They were serious, very intelligent young
men who did not wish to see MIT be con-
sidered just a kind of dependency of the
Pentagon. They had great pride in MIT's
reputation as one of theworld's
technological institutions.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am sorry about it.
I would have thought that the Senator,
too, would be interested in preserving the
great reputation of Harvard and MIT as
among the leading educational institu-
tions in the world. It was a great shock
to me?and I think to the entire coun-
try?to suddenly see an eruption on the
campus of Harvard University, the oldest
and I would say probably the most re-
spected institution in America. I cannot,
of course, prove that it was just because
of this.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think it contrib-
uted to it.
Mr. BROOKE. If the Senator would
yield, I would say that that was caused
primarily by ROTC, not defense research,
of which the Senator is well aware. There
may have been some contribution. But I
was about to say, before the Senator
asked his question, that universities
themselves are in the process of gaining
better control of defense research pro-
grams.
I had a conversation recently with
James Killian and Howard Johnson of
MIT. They are well aware of this prob-
lem. What the Senator has said relative
to the students at MIT is certainly shared
by members of the faculty and of the
administration.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.
Mr. BROOKE. They are aware of the
problem, and they are trying to get on
top of the problem, and I think we should
give them an opportunity.
I might also point out that the De-
fense Department is cooperating in seek-
ing better balance and in reducing classi-
fied research to a minimum. These things
are ongoing at the present time, as the
Senator very well points out.
Of course, I am interested in main-
taining the integrity of MIT, Harvard,
and the other institutions of higher
learning in the Commonwealth and
throughout the country; but I think these
programs are now being given close
scrutiny by the administration and the
faculty as well as the student body.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. If the Senator will
permit me, I should like to read an AP
dispatch from Washington dated May 15,
1969:
Dr. John Foster, the Pentagon's research
chief, told a Congressional committee
Wednesday that he saw "no evidence of major
adverse impact from student demonstrations
against defense research at universities."
Mr. President, I submit that Dr. Foster
is just out of touch with the situation in
this country. And it was not just Har-
vard. I mentioned Harvard because it is
such a great institution.
Mr. BROOKE. The Senator mentioned
Harvard specifically.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator will re-
call that at Berkeley, which is certainly
also one of the great institutions, where
there was a very clear protest about the
participation at the university in IDA.
The some situation prevailed at Cornell
and at one university after another. I am
not saying it is the only thing. The war
is probably the greatest single contribu-
tor, but they were also protesting about
the participation of the university in IDA.
There are many aspects to it. It is not just
the military. In many cases it takes the
attention and time of their leading pro-
fessors to go off on these highly paid re-
search projects and leave the teaching of
the students. In other wilds, the stu-
dents are being shortchanged. I know
they are correct because the attention
and time of the finest university profes-
sors in many cases are directed and
siphoned off in very large contracts that
are given them.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have the article to which I
referred printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
FOSTER BACKS U.S. RESEARCH AT UNIVERSITIES
WasunvoroN.?Dr. John Foster, the Penta-
gon's research chief, told a congressional
committee Wednesday that he saw "no evi-
dence of major adverse impacts" from stu-
dent demonstrations against defense re-
search at universities.
Defending the research program, Foster
said, "I hope you will not be misled by those
who suggest that * * ? academic research
[supported by the Defense Department] rep-
resents a sort of sandbox for scholars, ir-
relevant to defense missions, unproductive
technically and, worst of all, inimical to the
best interests of universities. It is more
fundamental.
"It is the great national advantage we
possess because we are able to bring together
essentially independent and well-informed
people?from government, industries and
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universities?over long periods for voluntary
work on our tough prOblems. This is the core
of our capacity for technological superiority,"
As for demonstrations directed at Penta-
gon research, Foster renewed his argument
of a year that responsibility for dealing with
them should be left with university adminis-
trations.
While Foster regarded "some of the current
turmoil as irresponsible action," he added,
"I still have confidence in the ability of the
academic community, in the aggregate, to
cope ultimately with the situation."
Foster warned against congressional effort
to curb such research at universities where
demonstrations have taken place, saying,
"We must not run the risk of eroding nation-
ally important research by precipitate puni-
tive action against features of university life
that are essential to our future."
The PRESIDING Or.VICER. The time
of the Senator has expired.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, how
much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator has 27 minutes remaining.
Mr. McINTYRE. I yield 5 minutes to
the Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I would
appreciate it if the Senator from Arkan-
sas would allow me a little time. I think
the colloquy was very helpful and I am
grateful to him for joining in.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I would be glad to
do so.
Mr. BROOKE. I think this is a healthy
trend and creates an awareness on the
part of the administration, the faculty,
and the members of the student body.
The Senator referred to Dr. Foster.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. But he is not aware
of it.
Mr. BROOKE. He is not aware of it.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. But he is the head
of research.
Mr. BROOKE. I think the Depart-
ment of Defense is aware of the neces-
sity for gaining better control of de-
fense research on campuses.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. But this is the man
who hands out the money. That is the
trouble.
Mr. BROOKE. But he said this is not
caused by defense contracts with the uni-
versities. I think he is attributing this
to the war in Vietnam and the chemical
problems and, as we are all aware,. the
ROTC matter.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. They all contribute.
I agree that no one thing does it; they
all contribute.
Mr. BROOKE. It is a healthy trend,
but to carry it so far that university ties
are severed would be, in my opinion, a
very unwise move.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. By my amendment
we would not sever them.
Mr. BROOKE. I think it would de-
prive the universities of work on national
defense. I am sure the Senator would
agree that it would weaken one of our
best guarantees that open and objective
research and counsel, not alleged pres-
sures of a "military-industrial" complex
are shaping the defense policy. I am sure
the Senator would agree that thus, uni-
versities themselves should determine
whether and under what circumstances
they should engage in defense research.
This is a matter we should leave up to
the universities and not something we
should establish as a matter of policy or
mandate. Such programs should not be
terminated by congressional fiat.
Defense-sponsored social science re-
search abroad is already down by 70 per-
cent since fiscal 1968 and all proposals
are now subject to thorough interagency
review under State Department auspices.
It is a highly dubious and antiintellic-
tual proposition to assume that research
on foreign areas somehow increases like-
lihood of U.S. military involvement. With
all due respect, I do not believe that is
SO.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. BROOKE. I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The point I was
making is that the intrusion of our mili-
tary into university life is offensive and
it creates ill will. I believe there is evi-
dence of it in the articles which I have
had printed in the RECORD. I was not
making the point we were more likely to
become militarily involved,
Mr. BROOKE. It could just as well de-
crease it as increase it.
Whether we involve ourselves mili-
tarily is a matter of policy, not research,
and that policy can be most wisely
shaped if careful preliminary research is
done.
The reports subnlitted by the Senator
from Arkansas yesterday, in my opinion,
are hardly the whole story. Out of such
policy studies have come many of the
fundamental concepts and programs on
which national security rests.
Concepts and rationale of stable deter-
rents, the first strike, second strike dis-
tinction, the rationale for security
through arms control rather than arms
competition, the most informed critics
of MIRV and ABM, have all been in-
fluenced importantly by work done on
these research efforts.
Economies are also realized. Overseas
bomber bases were reduced at savings of
billions of dollars a year after studies
in the midfifties revealed their vulner-
ability to missile attack. These and other
savings grew out of such analysis as the
Senator from Arkansas attacks so cate-
gorically, analysis costing only a pittance
of the savings from the basic studies
alone.
If there is waste, payoffs from such
research are sometimes so great as to
. compensate many times over, especially
in view of the relatively small fraction
of the budget in these categories.
It is also utterly misleading for the
Senator from Arkansas to assert that
no one knows the cost of studies he cites.
As the letter of July 24, 1969, from the
Department of Defense, printed in the
RECORD at the request of the Senator
from Arkansas at pages S9621?S9622, in-
dicates, the cost of individual reports are
not easily determined, but the costs of
projects, from which many reports may
emerge, are know.
The costs of the projects from which
the Senator from Arkansas has selected
certain reports to question are specified
by the Department as $11,530,408 over a
period of 15 years.
Many of the concerns voiced by the
Senator from Arkansas are shared by a
number of us.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
time of the Senator has expired.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that I may proceed
for 2 additional minutes.
Mr. McINTYRE. I yield 2 minutes to
the Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Massachusetts is recog-
nized for 2 additional minutes.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, that is
why the Subcommittee on Research and
Development and the Committee on
Armed Services took strong action in
these several areas. However, the com-
mittee's action is more than sufficient.
Indeed; many observers will fear that
too much damage has been done to the
defense research effort by the reduction
of more than $1? billion, and we should
not go further at this time.
Mr. President, it is for that reason
that I urge that the Senate agree to the
committee recommendation and reject
the amendment offered by the Senator
from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT) .
Mr. President, I have some questions
I would like to ask the Senator from
Arkansas and I shall submit them to him
inasmuch as the time of the Senator
from New Hampshire is running out.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I yield
10 minutes to the Senator from Califor-
nia (Mr. MURPHY) .
Mr. MURPHY. I thank the distin-
guished Senator from New Hampshire.
would like to speak momentarily, on
one aspect of the proposed amendment
which has to do with the Federal Con-
tract Research Centers. We have heard
great approaches to many of these mat-
ters in terms of dollars. The understand-
ing, the use of the dollars, and the com-
plexity of the operations concerned,
sometimes have not been fully discussed
or fully understood.
I wish to express my appreciation to
the distinguished Senator from New
Hampshire for permitting me this time,
and acknowledge the concern of the
Senator from Arkansas about spending
by our Department of Defense, which is
widely known, and, of course, I join him.
I think that great economies may be
forthcoming in the future. I do believe,
however, that some attention should be
given to the kinds of Federal Contract
Research Centers that we have, and the
kinds of tasks that they perform. This is
important since the Senator from Ar-
kansas wishes to cut $27 million from
the funding for these organizations
whether or not they are engaged in the
area of social sciences.
As an example of the areas of respon-
sibility in the FCRC's; eight are operated
under the auspices of universities, each
concentrating in the fields in which each
respective university has specific
strengths.
Three others do analysis work and,
sometimes rather loosely, I think, are
called think tanks, because they have a
concentration of very expert brains.
In my hometown of Los Angeles, I be-
lieve there are more Ph. D.'s than any
other place in the world accumulated un-
der one roof. They perform valuable
review of our posture on a continuing
basis. Two other Federal Contract Re-
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August .c12, 12969
search Centers are engaged most spe-
cifically in the systems management
field.
The latter two, it should be pointed out,
were built up under the auspices of the
Congress for the direct purpose of han-
dling profoundly complicated technical
programs on a nonprofit basis so as to be
most scrupulous in avoiding conflicts of
interest in all places wherever possible,
in order to save the taatpayer's dollars.
However, these and other FCRC's have
been of other great benefit to the tax-
payer.
Because of the kind of work the
FCRC's do there have been tremendous
savings of dollars which, this Senator
is convinced, could never have been
achieved in any other way. For instance,
it was documented some years ago to the
satisfaction of the Secretary of Defense
and the Congress that the Aerospace
Corp., acting with its Military partner,
the Air Force, had in fact effected a sav-
ings of a billion and a half dollars in its
ballistic missile progranis in its first 5
years of operation, and it is acknowl-
edged that this same team has brought
about the savings of at least another bil-
lion since that time.
While there are 16 FMC's, I believe
he success of Aerosme Corp., is
typical of them all and., 'Mr. President,
it is easily documented fin' the purposes
of our discussion here today. One of the
most successful programs conducted by
the Air Force and Aerospace Corp. has
been the Titan III project which has en-
joyed a tremendous run tit great savings
to the Government. I have previously
commented on this some weeks ago. The
secret of this success hasTheen outstand-
ing, professional technical management
which brought about a situation whereby
our Nation was able to place operational
payloads on Titan III boosters which were
originally supposed to be R. & D. vehicles.
In other words, they cortibined-research
and development with actual payloads
at one time. Yet, and this is important,
because of this professional management,
about which I speak, the Titan HI took
on operational missions_ while still an
R. & D. vehicle with enorinous success
and tremondous savings. I might add,
parenthetically, that all of our space
flights to date have been launched by
boosters developed by or evolving from
those built by the military.
Another of the most valuable Federal
Contract Research Centers, the Rand
Corp., which has been mentioned today,
has been responsible for sUbstantial sav-
ings in numerous areas;There are two,
however, which are typical of the kinds
of economy these groups do effect.
Rand's study of strategic air bases in
fact developed a new coffeept of opera-
tions which, by the Air Force's own esti-
mate, resulted in net savings of $1 billion
in installations alone, and was judged to
provide the same or better security as
other proposed systems Mating from $10
to $22 billion more over a 4-year period.
So this is really not wasted money. What
we are doing is buying an accumulation
of the very best brains pessible.
In a second typical example, because of
Its noncompetitive status, tbe Rand Corp.
was able to bring the industrial computer
groups together on common ground to
exchange technical information and to
initiate computer sharing among them.
This cooperative pooling of programing
techniques, known as Share, is estimated
by the Department of Defense to have
saved military installations and defense
contractors, and therefore the taxpayer,
approximately $50 million.
There is yet another example of the
kinds of vital work carried on by these
Centers which must be given notice. The
Institute for Defense Analysis completed
a test and evaluation study in mid-1968
only 1 short year after it was under-
taken. This project was a comprehensive
analysis of the testing requirements for
the Minuteman III and Poseidon weapon
systems. The spectacular results showed
how to determine the actual performance
of these systems by testing without the
enormously increased casts the Depart-
ment of Defense feared might be needed
through the use of what up to that time
were the only known testing techniques.
This successful effort by the Institute
for Defense Analysis was accomplished
by forming a team of knowledgeable
staff people along with military officers
and highly qualified engineers from
industry.
In other words, they put together the
very best brains. The work of this team
resulted in the resolution of a severe
problem which the Government itself
had been unable to resolve even after re-
peated attempts. In other words, Mr.
President, if the Institute for Defense
Analysis had not licked the problem, it
probably would not have been done even
today and I, for one, cannot put a price
on that.
While I ant mentioning this specific
Center, I believe it is very important to
note that of the total contract budget of
the Institute for Defense Analysis, only 5
percent is allocated for foreign policy and
social studies. Yet the Senator from Ar-
kansas asks us to reduce the FCRC fund-
ing by 10 percent.
Mr. President, the Department of De-
fense, again with the consent of the Con-
gress, years aeo decided that it would be
necessary to use the Federal Contract
Research Center approach in extremely
complex programs in problem areas.
The PRESIDING Otees.CER. The time
of the Senator from California has ex-
pired.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I yield
3 additional minutes to the Senator from
California.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from California is recognized for 3
additional minutes.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, if I do
not finish my remarks in that time, I ask
unanimous consent that the remainder
of them be printed in the RECORD because,
obviously, because of this protracted dis-
cussion which has taken place there will
not be time for me to read it all. I ask
this so that Senators who are not pres-
ently in the Chamber may have the bene-
fit, if they so desire, of reading what I
think has been a rather carefully pre-
pared explanation of the exact PucPe6e
of these Centers, why they were put to-
gether and what they do.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, as an ex-
ample of the degree of expertise needed,
the difference between the development
of airplanes and large booster rockets
applies. In the construction of an air-
craft, you Can always taxi it down the
runway, lift off to an altitude of 1 foot
and settle back to the runway subse-
quently analyzing problems within the
machine and correcting them.
However, in the case of the booster
racket with its valuable payload, you
have no such luxury. What is important
here is the stark fact that the booster
alone, without payload, frequently casts
several million dollars. Therefore, it
must work?and work right?the first
time. The military simply does not have
enough people trained in the manage-
ment of such programs in-house to guar-
antee, this kind of success. But, by using
an FCRC's technical ability the job can
be done, was done and must continue
to be done.
Mr. President, so far I have mentioned
the successful story of only three of our
Federal Contract Research Centers. But,
the story with the rest is pretty much
parallel. Yesterday, the distinguished
Senator from Arkansas introduced an
amendment which if I read it correctly,
would have the effect of reducing FCR,C
funding by $27 million across the board.
Yet the thrust of his argument centers
on the activities carried out by these
groups under contract to the Depait-
ment of Defense in the social sciences
and foreign affairs. I submit that this is
dangerous because it uses the area of
foreign policy and social sciences as the
target, but, aims at all disciplines within
the FCRC's with a shotgun or broadside
effect. That is the great danger of
generalizations.
There is an additional perspective to
this question that has received too little
attention here in this debate. It is the
straightforward proposition that it is
vital to our Nation's safety that the
planners in the Department of Defense
be aware of the far-reaching and serious
military consequences of changes in for-
eign governments. Certainly, no one in
the Department of Defense nor in the
FCRC's has any wish to interfere with
the prerogatives of the State Depart-
ment and from my conversations with
them and my study of their work I can
say with certainty they want no part of
it. Yet, military implications of foreign
governmental change do exist?they are
real. Mr. President, it would be folly to
ignore them with possible serious mis-
calculations the result. It has been pre-
viously demonstrated to the satisfaction
of the Congress that the very best way to
analyze such situations is via the exper-
tise offered by the FCRC's and, while
regrettable, we must see today's world
as it is and not as we wish it to be. Thus,
we have an obligation to our own safety
and security to have the advantage of
just this kind of analytical review.
Perhaps, what the Senator is really
saying is that these centers represent
the military-industrial-scientific-educa-
tional complex which he so greatly de-
plores. We have heard much of this com-
plex?I prefer the words "American
team"?of late and we would do well to
remember the gist of the thoughts of our
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August 1.2, 1969
beloved Gen. Douglas MacArthur who,
as a part of his legacy, told us that the
one great reliable strength of our Nation
as it maintained its place in the world
is our industry-military team which was
and is called upon for our security every
day of our lives. Certainly, by now it is
not necessary to once again remind this
body that retiring President Eisenhower
actually pointed to this team with pride.
Furthermore, those who are so con-
cerned about this team would do well to
remember that the Federal.Contract Re-
search Centers do in fact serve as a buffer
or governor on both the military and
the prWate sector. They do not make a
product. They pay no dividend" other
than to the taxpayer.. The important
safeguard which exists here is simple:
Both military and industrial security in
these installations are operated by the
Department of Defense and because the
Secretary has confidence in the FCRC's
they are able to gather together all the
very best proprietary data, gleaning and
coordinating all the best information
while protecting it from piracy, but of-
fering it as an asset to our security.
Nonetheless, we are told here that this
amendment will reduce the authorization
for the Federal Contract Research Cen-
ters by $27 million because the chairman
of the Committee on Foreign Relations
S 9747
executives in enterprises such as the They will go up the street to large pri-
major management consulting firms and vats industrial concerns like TRW,
research organizations, both profitmak- Hughes, North American Rockwell, or
ing and nonprofit. Many of these organi- Lockheed.
zations do Government contract work, Surely, the distinguished Senator from
and compensation in excess of $45,000 is Arkansas is well aware of the fees and
common in most of these posts. Even in salaries that ability and a good rec-
the case of university professors, there ord can draw. The Senator from Arkan-
are a substantial number of senior peo- sas, being the great lawyer he is, has re-
pie whose activities, including consulting, ceived in his lifetime career special fees
bring them incomes in the $50,000 to because of his expertise and knowledge of
$60,000 range. Again, much of this con- the law.
suiting is paid for from Government con- Mr. President, I believe there is an-
tract funds, including Department of De- other important factor worthy of our
fense funds. profitmaking enterprises consideration today which applies to
normally provide additional incentives, bath amendments. I refer to the social
such as stock options, not available in and economic problems that loom so
nonprofit organizations such as the large in America now. It is acknowledged
FCRCs, and universities provide other that the most competent and successful
fringe benefits in many cases. organizations created for the purpose
In the case of most of the FCRC's, the of solving problems are those currently
boards of trustees set the salaries of the engaged in defense and space work. They
top personnel. These trustee constitute have developed a whole new concept
an impressive roster of public-spirited called systems management. Lately a
citizens, including leading public figures, new term has come into common use: I
ex-public servants, university presidents refer to "civil systems" which simply
and industrial executives. These men are means the application of the systems
acutely conscious of their policy respon- management or systems engineering ap-
sibilities and of the public interest nature preach to those enormous problems
of the organizations. They are well able which face us from within. The great
to judge the performance and quality of organizations we have created to solve
the persons whose salaries they set. our defense problems since World War II
These boards of trustees are keenly are in being?they are operating and in
place. They could, in fact, be our most
important national resource when we
turn them to the problems of pollution,
waste disposal, communications, crime,
delinquency, transportation, urban re-
newal, and the eradication of poverty, all
of which are approaching crisis propor-
tions as the distinguished Senator from
Arkansas himself has often said.
So far, Mr. President, the potentially
most promising approach to the solution
to these problems is through the appli-
cation of systems management or the
systems approach or civil systems, if you
will, by our great concerns in the aero-
space industry of which the Federal
Contract Research Centers are such a
vital part. It may well be that other de-
partments of the Government will want
to use the abilities of these centers to-
ward the ends I have just outlined?and
this Senator believes they should. It may
also well be that the Department of State
could profitably use their services, since
is concerned about their work in e aware of the need to attract and to hold
social sciences. Again we have the gen- individuals of the highest caliber in the
eralization which is akin to the old top management position of the FCRC's
apples and oranges?which is akin to if these organizations are to be able to
lumping all the animal world together continue their effective performance in
and saying all must wear horseshoes or? the national interest. The responsibilities
In this case?all will have their rations are great; much of the work is pioneer-
cut since there is a problem with horse- ing and its quality is extremely impor-
shoes. Mr. President, what we are asked tent. Management judgment and talent
to do here is to consider the social sci- is an absolute essential. For all of these
ences, condemn the work the FCRC's are reasons a limitation such as the one
doing in the social sciences, lump the proposed appears inappropriate and in
social sciences together with architect fact harmful.
engineering, weapons analysis, systems The present language, left as is, sug-
management, and cut back on the whole gests that in the absence of Presiden-
works. tial approval, some 20 officials of the
Mr. President, I have the privilege of FCRC's would have to take a cut in total
serving on the Subcommittee on Re- compensation back to $45,000, or leave
search and Development chaired by the their jobs, or the FCRC's affected would
very able Senator from New Hampshire. have to cease doing business with the
I can tell the Senate that under Senator Department of Defense.
MCINTYRE'S leadership, the subcommit- Mr. President, I am reminded that
t into the question of the Federal many years ago I was called before a
Contract Research Centers very thor- committee of this very body to explain
oughly. When the Subcommittee on Re- just why the late Clark Gable could draw we all know how many problems that
search and Development reported to the a salary of $7,500 a week. Many on the Department has had over the past 8
full Armed Services Committee on its committee asked "What does he do?" years, and the Committee on Foreign Re-
work, my friend the distinguished Sena- "How can he be werth $7,500 a week for lations would wish to consider appropiate
tor from Virginia offered an amendment what he does?" My answer was that he funding.
which is included in the bill and would doesn't do anything, but he has an ex- However, it is extremely important
limit the salaries of FCRC technical and pertise?he is an actor of supreme ac- that these organizations, these going
management personnel. I did not co- complishment and in free and open corn- concerns, not be impeded or reduced or
sponsor that amendment for numerous petition he can earn this much money. discouraged here as we consider defense
reasons, but, I certainly understand Clark Gable's name in lights over a Procurement. As a matter of fact, that
and congratulate Senator BYRD for his theater sells tickets and offers an in- so-called military-industrial complex we
motives in offering it. come to all involved as the result of free are supposed to be so concerned about
However, we should remember that the trade. could, through these self-same FCRC's,
complexity and national importance of I do not mean that there is detailed turn out to be the best friend our advo-
the work of the FCRC's require highly commonality between the motion pie- cates of domestic priorities ever had.
talented and competent management. ture business and the FCRC's. I do mean, The importance of independence and
The competition for top people in this however, that these people about whose objectivity in these organizations is
field of endeavor is considerable. The salaries we are so concerned are among paramount, and has long been recog-
major FCRC's are managed by people the finest technical people we have and nized as such. The FCRC's are for the
who would otherwise be serving as senior they are dedicated to their country and most part engaged in highly important
professional executives in industry or in- programs. Should they become discour- and complex research on matters of
dustrial laboratories, as university ad- aged, I can say for certain they will not great significance to military planning
ministraters or senior professors, or as go into $40,000-a-year Government jobs. and national security policy. More re-
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cently, because of the major contribu-
tions of these organizations in the field
of national security, it has been urged by
many, including the Secretary of De-
fense, that they apply their skills and
experience to other impost tent national
problems such as those of the environ-
ment and the cities. A number of them
are doing so, and this is becoming a sig-
nificant portion of their. work. It would
seem unwise and inappropriate to inhibit
the application of this national resource
to domestic problems by placing special
restrictions on them in a military pro-
curement bill.
Mr. President, the distinguished and
highly respected Director of Defense Re-
search and Engineering, Dr. John S.
Foster, stated in his recent testimony be-
fore the Committee on Armed Services
that?
Second, we have reconsidered recently an
issue which has been brought up from time
to time for several years?whether or not
these primarily Defense-sponsored organiza-
tions should be permitted or even encouraged
to apply selectively their specialized capa-
bilities to major domestic problems such as
transportation, urban redevelopment, hous-
ing, and medical services. We have concluded
that when an FCRC has capabilities suitable
to a non-Defense client, ia should be Per-
mitted, to undertake non-Defense work. In
short, we believe that the DOD has developed
in the FCRC's a "national resource" which
should be used as national priorities dictate,
consistent with our needs in the national
security area. Thus I have begun discus-
sions with other parts of the Federal Gov-
ernment and with the FCRC's to introduce
this concept of "selective diversification." I
must add, however, that we do not intend to
fund programs designed to solve domestic
problems, nor do we intend to act as a per-
manent "middle man" in administering any
such programs. Similarly, we do not intend
to reduce or dilute our DOD funding to
FCRC's for national security work, nor do we
expect the FMC's to reduce or delimit their
contribution to defense needs.
Mr. President, it is important to this
bill that there be no further reduction
in funds authorized for Federal Contract
Research Centers. I hope I have made
some small contribution to erasing some
of the misunderstandings that exist
where they are concerned. I have seen
first hand the work they are doing and
I know the capabilities of their people.
I can report with confidence, as can
many of my colleagues, that many of our
most advanced, most significant, and o
most successful new ideas for our security t
begin at these centers.
These Centers are vested ith the tre-
mendous responsibility for sNatems man- t
agement, long range planning and the
solutions to tomorrow's problems. While
I wish today's problems made it possible
for me to join with the Senator from s
Arkansas in his amendment, I believe the
examples I have just cited are so corn- w
pelling as to leave us with the clear re- r
sponsibility to support the funding of w
these Federal Contract Research Centers
as one of our great hopes for the future. w
I depart from my prepared remarks for ? f
a moment to point out that during the
committee hearings concern was ex- s
pressed over salaries in the FCRC's. I eci
attempted to explain the reason. When
the Federal Contract Research Centers se
were put together, it was of extreme ne- $
cessity that the very best and the very
finest brains be obtained.
The PRESIDING OrviCER. The time
of the Senator has expired.
Mr. MURPHY. May I have 1 additional
minute?
Mr. -McINTYRE. Mr. President, I yield
1 minute more to the Senator.
Mr. MURPHY. I know from practical
experience that many of these scientists
and administrators are working in these
projects at a cost to themselves. I know
they could go down the street from Air
Research, for instance, and be hired at
Thompson-Ramo-Woolridge at higher
salaries. I know they could walk down
the street and be hired at Hughes Air-
craft or Hughes Tool and be paid a
higher salary.
I also pointed out that to get the sec-
ond-best brains would be a mistake, be-
cause these are the men who conceive
the ideas, who draw the expert analyses
for the Air Force and other services, to
proceed at the greatest savings, in the
most practical way.
Because of my knowledge of the per-
formance of the Federal Contract Re-
search Centers, notwithstanding that I
dislike to be in opposition to the amend-
ment of the Senator, I shall be forced
to oppose it.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I
thank the Senator from California. He
has been a very helpful member of the
Research and Development Subcommit-
tee and particularly with respect to this
matter.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, if the
Senator will yield me 10 seconds, I have
been on that committee, and I know the
chairman of the committee agrees with
me that there is a real lack of knowledge
of what happens in these centers. I know
he agrees with me that, as soon as we
have the time, he will accept the invita-
tion to come to my State. There are two
of these Federal Contract Research Cen-
ters in my State that I think would be
very good to visit. lam sure we would like
to visit them and have a look at close
range and ascertain what is being ac-
complished and exactly how the pro-
grams works. If we do that, I think we
will have a greater understanding of
what we are discussing
I am extremely happy to be a member
f the Senator's committee, where, for
he first time I believe a great scrutiny
t these matters is being had.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, will
he Senator yield me a few minutes on
matter?flother
Mr. FULl3RIGHT. First, may I respond
to the remarks of the Senator from Mas-
achusetts for a moment?
The Senator from Massachusetts
anted to conserve his own time, He was
unning short of time. He submitted in
riting a number of questions to me.
Before I proceed to the questions, I
ish to say that I have great sympathy
or the attitude of the Senator from Mas-
sachusetts, because there are many re-
earch projects in the universities or
ucational institutions of his State.
It is my understanding that Massachu-
tts Institute of Technology, with over
119 million last year, is the largest sin-
R000300100001-3
ATE August 1,2, 1,969
gle educational institution on the payroll
of the Defense Department. Harvard, of
course, has a much smaller alloctaion,
but it is substantial, over $2.5 million.
The University off.Maseachusetts, under
the Themis program, had a substantial
amount, $720,000. Boston College had
$440,000.
However, on the other side, in my view,
is the impact these research programs
may have on the celleges and universities.
What I am more interested in is the
preservation of the integrity of our edu-
cational institutions, whether they are
in my State or in any other State.
The first question the Senator from
Massachusetts asked was: Would the
Fulbright amendment affect the $4 mil-
lion recommended to be transferred to
the Department of State for foreign pol-
icy research?which is in the report?
It would not affect it. As far as I know,
there is no evidence that the Department
of State wants these programs, nor is
there any evidence that the transfer of
the projects are of projects which are
worthwhile of themselves. My own guess
is that it would be better that they be
discontinued. In any case, there is no
evidence it would affect it at all.
The second question of the Senator is:
The Fulbright amendment would impose
a further $2 million, or one-third, cut in
research by foreign universities and in-
stitutions. Is the Senator aware that this
area has already been reduced by 70 per-
cent since fiscal year 1968?
I am aware of that. I already
congratulated the Senator from New
Hampshire for reducing it, but we still
have contracts in 44 different foreign
countries. I have already given my reason
why I think it is bad policy, and it ought
to be reduced to a bare minimum, if not
eliminated.
It is possible that there may be some
unique situations in which a program
would be Justified, but I am quite con-
fident there is no justification to have
them in 44 countries. I air not sure our
foreign policy can stand that much inter-
vention by the Defense Department. It
ought to be kept at a minimum. Besides,
If there are some unique situations in
which research and development would
be justified, I would strongly recommend
that it be sponsored by some other
agency, the National Science Foundation,
or the National Institutes of Health, or
the Department of Commerce, some
agency other than the military.
Surely, it ought to be obvious now to
all Americans that military intrusions is
offensive to small countries, or to any
country. Military intrusion is much dif-
ferent from intrusion by cultural or other
institutions, because people are suspi-
cious of the military, as going to their
own security. We always run Into that
danger. Tourists can go abroad without
harm. People can live in another coun-
try. But when soldiers are stationed in
another country, traditionally it has al-
ways caused suspicion. So I think there
is a great difference, because it arises
from fears of our own country, and I do
not think it is good for our relations.
Mr. IVIcINTYRE. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield at that point?
Mr. FULI3RIGHT. I yield.
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Mr. McINTYRE. One thing that
plagues me is that if the State Depart-
ment and the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee of the Senate and its counterpart
in the House, and the President of the
United States have had something to do
with setting the foreign policy of this
country and setting out the goals and set-
ting out the objectives, once those objec-
tives are made clear, or at least scaled
down to somewhere along the lines the
distinguished Senator from Arkansas
would like to see, I think it would be no
trouble for the Department of Defense to
scale back the activities the Senator
complains about. But the State Depart-
ment and the Senator's committee and
the Administration set the pace, and the
Department of Defense is only trying to
carry it out.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The other day I
discussed the purpose of our country in
this field in connection with the posture
statement. I only wish to say that I have
strongly disapproved of our tendency to
intervention, and I have done that pub-
licly, beginning with our intervention in
the Dominican Republic in 1965.
I thoroughly disapprove of the ease
with which we accept the responsibility
to intervene in another country's affairs
and tell them what to do and tell them
what kind of government they ought to
have, and so forth. The Senator is aware
of my disagreement with our policy.
It is true that I am only one Senator,
but the Foreign Relations Committee has
gone through quite a change in its atti-
tude toward that policy. The foreign
policy I am really complaining about is
that of the previous administration, led
by Secretary Rusk in the State Depart-
ment. I thoroughly disagree with his
definition of the mission of the United
States. This we have discussed. Now with
a new administration and with new of-
ficials in the administration, I had hoped
we would begin to follow a different ap-
proach.
This amendment is a small segment or
part of that approach of downgrading
our intervention and intrusion into for-
eign countries; to treat other countries
more as equals, with greater respect, and,
hopefully, to cultivate better relations
with them.
The foreign programs I am talking
about are one little aspect of it. I am
doing my best to change our policy. I
am doing the best I know how to get out
of Vietnam and change our policy.
? The hearing we had this morning is
in connection with a situation which we
are very fearful may become another
Vietnam. All I can say to the Senator is
that I am doing the best I can to change
it. I have not been very -successful, but
that is all I can do.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield briefly?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. McINTYRE. I hope the Senator
from Arkansas appreciates the position
the Armed Services Committee, with this
authorization bill, is in. Since the Sen-
ator from Arkansas does not set the for-
eign policy of the United States, and the
State Department and the administra-
tion do, he will find that we, as we try to
answer the questions and try to help him
in understanding this particular bill,
more or less find ourselves in a bind be-
tween the position of the State Depart-
ment and the attitude of the distin-
guished Senator from Arkansas toward
the foreign policy of this country.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I do
not know whether the State Department
has really approved these projects or not.
On my inquiry last year, the Bureau of
the Budget was not aware of most of the
projects and had not examined them.
They do not examine Defense Depart-
ment programs as they do other pro-
grams.
I think the participation of the State
Department in the program of the De-
partment of Defense, if at all, is perfunc-
tory. Even this contingency planning
agreement with Thailand is not in the
custody?or-the State Department. I re-
quested it from the State Department,
and they came back with the letter which
I put in the RECORD the other day, say-
ing, "We regret we cannot give it to you,
because the Secretary of Defense is re-
luctant to allow it outside of his control,"
which meant, in effect, that here is an
agreement between Thailand and the
United States, and it is not even in the
hands of the State Department.
So we have a lot of difficulties in this
area, and I am not at all sure the State
Department is a very free agent when it
comes to such matters. The one agency,
and the only agency in the Government,
in my opinion, that can ever exercise any
degree of restraint upon the Defense De-
partment is the Senate, because of its
peculiar characteristics, in that we are
more independent than anyone else in
the Government. We have longer terms,
and that is why we were given longer
terms. We represent our States, and thus
represent larger constituencies than
Members of the House of Representa-
tives. I shall not describe our system of
government further, but I think the Sen-
ate is the only agency that can possibly
bring its influence to bear upon the mili-
tary establishment.
It will be seen that this is not wholly
imaginary, when you look around the
world and look at all the other major
countries, wherever they may be. Most
of them are dominated by their military
establishments. We have got to assume
that the United States and the American
people are gifted with some very special
qualities, if we are to be able to avoid the
same fate. The Senator can look at Rus-
sia, or at China, or where have you;
Latin America, Brazil, Argentina, Peru,
and so on. I shall not call the rolls, but
most of them are largely under the in-
fluence of the military.
There is a reason for it. I do not know;
perhaps in the long run it is better. I do
not think so, with the present state of
my information. I prefer to maintain the
dominance of the civilian authorities;
and our Constitution, I think, was in-
tended to provide for that.
The next question the Senator from
Massachusetts asked me is as follows:
Many of the examples of "questionable"
studies cited by the Senator from Arkansas
were contracted 3, 4 or 5 years ago. Since
then, DOD research has been subjected to
muoh closer scrutiny. Does the Senator have
.any knowledge of current or projected studies
which would substantiate his fears?
I may say that the studies I cited were
the most current that the Defense De-
partment would provide; and I will say
again, as I have said often, that it is not
easy to get some information out of the
Defense Department. We are engaged,
at the moment, as I say, in a very serious
contest with them over this agreement
with Thailand. In this case, we have
used, in our statement and in the in-
sertion, the latest information that the
Defense Department was willing to pro-
vide. I do not have the power of subpena
on the Secretary of Defense or the Com-
mander in Chief, and I cannot make
them give me what the committee wants.
I simply provided the best information
we could get from them.
I think the Senator from New Hamp-
shire will admit that it is not always easy
to get, neatly and efficiently, anything
you want out of the Defense Department.
It is a huge bureaucracy of millions of
people. The Joint Chiefs of Staff itself,
I think, now constitutes some several
thousand people. All I can say is that I
got the latest information that was avail-
able. I asked for the latest, and this is
what we were given.
The Senator next asks whether I have
any views of universities regarding this
amendment.
No, I have not submitted it to univer-
sities. I do have views of universities
about the intrusion of the Defense De-
partment into their activities. I have
already talked about that at length. I
have views as to the reactions of the
students and professors as to the extent
of the intrusion by both research proj-
ects, ROTC, IDA, and what have you.
The Senator's fifth question is as
follows:
The Senator from Arkansas has cited many
"horrible examples." Does he have any in-
formation as to what percentage of actual
research programs this type of prOgram
represents?
No; I have no idea how to arrive at a
percentage. The examples I put into the
RECORD speak for themselves;Some peo-
ple do not think they are horrible ex-
amples. I do not think they are horrible;
that is not the word I used. I think they
are wholly inappropriate to the functions
of the Department of Defense. Some of
them would be defensible as activities of
the National Institute of Health, the Na-
tional Science Foundation, or the De-
partments of Commerce or State, but
they have no relation to Defense, and
the only reason as far as I can see why
they were sponsored by the Defense De-
partment is that the Defense Department
has no difficulty getting any amount of
money it wants, for this or any other
project. That is the situation we seek to
correct.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in RECORD a com-
munication from the Department of De-
fense entitled "Behavioral Sciences Proj-
ects Proposed for Funding in Fiscal Year
1970," issued as of July 22, 1969. This re-
quest is partially in response to the Sen-
ator's questions; although the informa-
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S 9750 ust 42, 1269
tion is not very specific, it gives some idea
of the present attitude of the Defense
Department in this area.
There being no objection, the state-
ment was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES PROJECTS PROPOSED FOR
-FUNDING IN FISCAL MAR 1970
ARPA behavioral science research can be
understood Most accurately as level of effort
support for technical areas of special im-
portance to the Department of Defense. In-
dividual contracts vary widely in level of
support and in duration. Frequently a con-
tract is funded over a three-to-five year pe-
riod, and rarely for a longer period of time.
The best estimate of future support is a line
extension of present level of effort for a tech-
nical area, recognizing that individual con-
tracts will change according to research
progress.
RATIONALE FOR MAJOR PROGRAMS
We are terminating almOst all ARPA Be-
havioral Sciences research work outside the
U.S. ARPA has reoriented is behavioral
science research work into a, direction where
there is broad agreement in the research and
defense community that more promise ex-
ists?the interdisciplinary combination of
the computer and behavioral seiences in spe-
cific problem areas. The objective is ta pre-
duce results to Defense user organizations
within five years. Initially, we have extended
support to three basic programs to be con-
ducted at universities where unique talent
now exists. Simultaneously, we began's, man-
agement inquiry to determine how to use an
applied research organization to apply the
results of the basic research to specific and
immediate DOD operational problems. As the
work progresses, and to the extent that the
results of our management analysis warrant,
we plan to phase down ARPA sponsorship of
university participation in the three pro-
grams.
The first university program is the Cam-
bridge Project which seeks_ te provide tools
needed to determine trend and interaction ef-
fects in complex DOD systems. System ex-
amples include designing hardware for effec-
tive human operation, training and educat-
ing personnel, organizing manpower, and al-
locating resources. We have more than
enough data, but we lack tools to enable Us
to extract patterns and raw inferences from
them. The work takes advantage of existing
ARPA-funded interactive ocenputing capabil-
ity at MIT and will have Wide participation
by MIT and Harvard scientists. This effort
will be supported at approximately $2,400,000
yearly.
The second university program, the Center
for Computer-Based Behavioral Studies at
UCLA, seeks to construct a theory and prac-
tice of gaming in order to improve substan-
tially its realism for training and prediction.
As a good example, many vital Don missions
require that DoD people know how to bargain
and negotiate effectively with counterpart
members of other nations; help is needed in
the appropriate training of. military advisors,
defense attaches, and staffs of alliance com-
mands. Faced with analogous problems in
labor relations, major schools of business ad-
ministration and major corporationii have
turned increasingly to gaming (i.e., simula-
tions) for training and predict ion. This effort
will be supported at approximately $1,000,000
yearly.
The third university program, Quantitative
Political Science, seeks to develop quantita-
tive tools and unclassified data bases to im-
prove our ability to predict national security
needs. The work is accomplished at the uni-
versity of Michigan, the University of Hawaii.
the University of Southern California and
Yale University. The data archive at the Uni-
versity of Michigan will be managed by the
Inter-University Consortium for Political
Research which currently distributes other
types of social science data to faculty and
students at 120 member universities. If suc-
cessful, the tools would help us to distin-
guish between likely and unlikely future con-
flict situations. DoD must try to predict fu-
ture security situations and needs in order
to plan for logistics, force structure, strategy,
and research and development. Faced with
analogous needs, government departments
responsible for the domestic economy turned
more than thirty years ago to the develop-
ment of quantitative predictive tools and
supporting data bases. DoD has made only
fragmentary use to date of quantitative po-
litical science for conflict and sociology. How-
ever, even these limited efforts have been use-
ful to JCS, DIA, and Service officials. The
basic university work in building the tools
will all be unclassified and the regults freely
available. The later applications of the tools
to operational DoD problems will probably be
carried out elsewhere. This effort will be sup-
ported at approximately $850,000 yearly.
In addition, ARPA intends during FY 70
to support research in the following areas:
Teaching and Learning?The Department
of Defense must maintain a vigorous and
broad set of education and training activities
for its personnel. As external threats become
more complex. U.S. personnel increasingly re-
quire improved training to perform their
jobs. Much of the new techrtolgy developed
for other military purposes can also be applied
to more effective training and education sys-
tems. ARPA sponsored research in computer
assisted instruction has resulted in prototype
systems which permit the instructor to man-
age teaching aids and resources with greater
flexibility. These systems also promise to cut
costs substantially under the terms of the
instructional funds required for each student
contact hour. The flexibility and economy of
these systems will permit progress in de-
veloping techniques and methods of instruc-
tion which-are most effective with students
whose learning styles and abilities vary
widely. Further research is concerned with the
constraints imposed by different classes of
subject matter and modes of presentation.
Support during FY 70 will be approximately
$185,000. During FY 70 specific contracts will
be funded at Bolt, Beranek and Newman, and
the University of Texas.
Human Performance?The attributes and
evaluation of individual and group perform-
ance is fundamental to the operations of the
Department of Defense. AR.PA's research in
this area is primarily concerned with estab-
lishing rules to assess the relationship be-
tween human capabilities to perform mili-
tary jobs and basic abilities suoh as signal
detection, memory, information processing
and perception. Support during FY 70 will
be approximately $360,000. During FY 70
specific contracts will be funded at the Uni-
versity of Michigan and the University of
Oregon.
Human Communication?This research
area is concerned with principles of human
communication as they affect coordination of
effort in the execution of military tasks. This
effort is and will continue to include work on
competence to learn and use foreign lan-
guages and second languages. The knowledge
gained will then be used to develop and test
educational materials to improve cross-cul-
tural communication. Support during FY 70
Will be approximately $550,000.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield 5 minutes
to the Senator from South Dakota.
Mr. McCrOVIeteN. Mr. President, in
view of the limitation on time, I should
like to speak very briefly on two unre-
lated matters, the first having to do with
the President's welfare message as it re-
lates to our food assistance program, and,
second, to make some remarks on the
prisoner information policy of North
Vietnam.
DOES THE NIXON WELFARE PRO-
POSAL WEAKEN lets; FOOD AS-
SISTANCE PROGRAM?
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, with
regard to the President's historic mes-
sage on last Friday, which he trans-
mitted in greater detail to Congress yes-
terday, there is one matter of very grave
concern to me, and that is the apparent
intention of the administration, as out-
lined in that message, to phase out time
food assistance program for those Per-
sons who choope to participate under
the newly proposed family assistance
program.
Mr. President, I have no objection--
in fact I rather welcome it?to the re-
placement of some of our plethora of
welfare programs with an income main-
tenance program as suggested by the
President. But if in fact the adminis-
tration proposes to offer a family of four
a maximum of $1,600 in cash, and then
tell the family that chooses that option
that they are exCluded from the food
stamp program, it will be, in effect, de-
creasing very substantially the amount
of aid now being received by millions of
Americans. My preliminary estimates
lead me to believe that if this exclusion
policy goes into effect, and we deny food
assistance to those families who choose
the income maintenance program sug-
gested by the President, in 44 out of the
50 States we would actually lose, for
many millions of people, the amount of
assistance they are now receiving under
a combination of food stamps or com-
modity assistance plus the welfare pay-
ments they now receive.
Mr. President, it is a fact that it re-
quires almost all Of the $1,600 that the
President has suggested for income
maintenance to provide a family of four
with an adequate diet. So it is my in-
tention as the chairman of the Select
Committee on Nutrition and Human
Needs that has been looking into the
problem of hunger and malnutrition in
the United States to call administration
witnesses before our committee at a
very early date to clarify the matter.
I hope very sincerely that the Presi-
dent will press his proposal for an in-
come maintenance program, but that he
will not press it to the inclusion of the
food stamp program.
We must do either one or two things.
We must permit both of the programs
to operate simultaneously or else we will
have a very substantial increase in the
income maintenance figure suggested by
the President.
Mr. President, last May, President
Nixon pledged that his administration
would put an end to hunger in America
for all time. He then moved swiftv to
accomplish this goal by sending to Con-
gress a plan to expand and improve the
food stamp program.
In his historic welfare message of last
Friday, the President added to his ear-
lier pledge by Proposing a family as-
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August 12, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
Three-stage deeentraNzation of administra-
tive responsibilities
First, State administration of 25 percent
of apportioned funds when it designates a
"lead agency" and develops comprehensive
manpower planning capability and an ap-
proved manpower plan; second, State admin-
istration of 68% percent of the funds when
it establishes (1) a Comprehensive Man-
power Agency to operate the unified pro-
grams in accordance with an approved plan,
(2) a State manpower planning organization
to coordinate all manpower related programs,
and (3) arrangements to designate Mayors
as area prime sponsors; and third, State con-
trol of 100 percent of its apportioned funds
when the State meets objective standards of
exemplary performance in planning and
carrying out its manpower service system.
Allowances and wages
The basic allowance to individuals enrolled
in a manpower training program will be
based on the average weekly wage In em-
ployment covered by the State's unemploy-
ment compensation law. In FY 1971 the
basic allowance will be 40 percent of such
average weekly wage, in FY 1972-45
percent and in FY 1973 and there-
after-50 percent. Trainees with family re-
sponsibilities will be allowed an additional $5
per week for each dependent, up to six de-
pendents. In lieu of such allowances, public
assistance recipients will receive an incentive
and expense allowance of $30 per month in
addition to their welfare payments during
training.
A completion bonus equal to twice the
individual's weekly allowance, will be paid
upon the successful completion of an au-
thorized training course of 15 Weeks or
more duration.
Workers employed in "work experience" pro-
grams will be paid wages at rates no lower
than the lowest rate prescribed in the Fair
Labor Standards Act. Workers undertaking
employer compensated on-the-job training
will be compensated at the higher of the
applicable minimum wage rate or the pre-
vailing wage rate for similar work in the
locality.
State apportionment of funds
The Secretary of Labor would apportion
at least 75 percent of the funds aPpropriated
to carry out the Act (except its Job Corps,
Job Bank and extended appropriation pro-
visions) each year among the States in
accordance with criteria which he would pub-
lish. Metropolitan areas within States
(Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas, or
other designated areas) would be guaranteed
apportionment of an amount in proportion
to the numbers of persons in the labor
force and number of disadvantaged indi-
viduals residing in the area compared with
the State total of such persons. Federal funds
apportioned to the States under the regular
program would be available to pay 90 percent
of program costs.
Incentive apportionment
An amount equal to 5 percent of the funds
appropriated will be available for supple-
mental apportionments to States and areas
which meet the exemplary performance
standards. The Federal Government will con-
tribute $2 for every dollar of available State
funds.
Federal program authority
The remaining 20 percent of the funds will
be available for expenditure directly by the
Secretary to carry out the purposes of the
Act. The Federal Government would be au-
thorized to arrange directly for all or a por-
tion of the operation of program activities
when a State failed to assure its responsi-
bilities under the Manpower Training Act or
when it was only in partial compliance with
provisions of the Manpower Training Act.
In addition, such programs could be con-
ducted directly with funds not apportioned
to the States, in conducting research and
demonstration programs under title III, the
Secretary of Labor will consult fully with in-
terested Federal agencies (including the
Civil Service Commission with regard to the
effect of the programs on the Federal service).
Manpower training as an economic stabilizer
In any fiscal year in which the national
unemployment rate reaches 4.5 percent for
three consecutive months, the Secretary of
Labor could spend additional funds on au-
thorized programs equal to 10 percent of the
amount then appropriated under the Act for
that year. When unemployment drops help*
the trigger level, remaining unobligated
funds will no longer be available.
Computerized Job Bank
A National Computerized Job Bank would
be established in each State, or on a regional
basis where sparsely populated States can be
grouped together, to facilitate the placement
of persons in employment for which they are
qualified. The Bank would be operated with-
in each State by the State Employment Beier..
ice. The Secretary would operate the
interstate phase of the Bank's operation, col-
lecting information from each State and
making it available to all States. Information
regarding both job applicants and joir orders
would be processed through the system. To
the extent that Federal agency vacancy in-
formation may be required, the Secretary
will consult fully with the Chairman of the
Civil Service Commission in developing any
reporting requirements. Federal vacancies
will be filled in accordance with laws
and regulations which apply to Federal
employment.
Advisory bodies
The National Manpower Advisory Com-
mittee will be continued.
A new Intergovernmental Advisory Coun-
cil on Manpower will be established_ It will
be composed of representative Governors,
Mayors, and other elected local officials, and
will advise the Secretary on the Federal-
State-local partnership established to admin-
ister manpower programs.
Other acts affected
The Manpower Development and Training
Act of 1962 and Title V of the Economic
Opportunity Act are repealed and replaced by
the manpower services provisions of this Act.
The provisions of Title of the Econornie
Opportunity Act are also replaced by the
manpower services provisions of this Act. A
new Title I-B of the Economic Opportunity
Act authorizes the Office of Economic Oppor-
tunity to undertake experimental programs
in the employment and employment-related
problems of the poor. Title I-A of the Eco-
nomic Opportunity Act (Jab Corps) is trans-
ferred to the Manpower Training Act, and
administration is placed directly in the Sec-
retary of Labor. ze6/14
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-
TIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970
FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT,
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT,
AND FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF
MISSILE TEST FACILITIES AT
KWAJALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND
RESERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH
The Senate resumed the considera-
tion of the bill (S. 2546) to authorize ap-
propriations during the fiscal year 1970
ler procurement of aircraft, missiles, na-
val vessels, and tracked combat vehicles
and to authorize the construction of test
facilities at Kawajalein Missile Range,
and to prescribe the authorized person-
nel strength of the Selected Reserve of
each Reserve component of the Armed
Forces, and for other purposes.
S 9767
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
ask for the yeas and nays on the amend-
ment.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I yield
myself two and a half minutes.
'Mr. President, I should like to sum UP
the situation with which we are con-
fronted in connection with the Fulbright
amendment.
The first thing I Wish to make clear
to the Senate is that the Armed Services
Committee already has cut research, de-
velopment, test, and evaluation by over
a billion dollars. The cut suggested by
Senator Fulbright amounts to close to
$46 million, in an area in which we al-
ready have cut $50 million, of which $40
million will be falling on the same pro-
grams about which the Senator from
Arkansas is complaining so strongly.
The committee has had the best of
staff work, excellent staff work. This
year, the chairman set up the R. & D.
Subcommittee, and a hard and close
scrutiny was conducted into these areas
of the budget.
Sometimes when we approach a prob-
lem and try to cut in and reduce the
expenditures, we suddenly become aware
that if we cut too deeply, go a little too
far, we may be doing more harm than
good and may nullify any good that has
been done.
In 1970, we have been able to reduce
this budget. We feel very strongly that
when Senator FULBRIGHT suggests that
some of these small programs be cut by
58 percent, by 36 percent, by 33 percent,
he is in effect reducing these programs
more than he should. So when we con-
sider our own cuts, which have measured
anywhere from 10 to 12 percent on these
programs, it seems that it is piling on too
much and that, in the interest of good
budgeting and forward-looking work for
the research and development and in the
area of military research, the amend-
ment of the Senator from Arkansas
should be defeated, and defeated soundly.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield myself 3
minutes.
Mr. President, there is over $400 mil-
lion for basic research or nonmission
research, in the $7 billion research au-
thorization for the Department of De-
fense. I am proposing the following: to
cut $45 million overall. It will reduce the
funds for the so-called think tanks by 10
percent, or $27 million, which is much the
largest item. There are 16 of these re-
search centers called think tanks.
It will reduce the research in foreign
institutions by $2 million, which is one-
third, which is the point the Senator
meant. I think it should be cut out. It
will cut behavioral and social research
performed in other places by $3 million.
An example of that is the Hudson
Institute.
It will hold the line on new starts under
Project Themis by cutting the budget re-
quest by $8 million. It will reduce the
counterinsurgency research, Project
Agile, by $5 million.
All this amounts to $45 million. All I
can say is that I apologize to the Senate
for being so timid that I did not propose
three or four times this amount, because
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S 9768 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
several of these programs should never
have been started and should be stopped.
The only excuse I can give for not pro-
posing $145 million or $200 million is
that, out of deference to the Senator
from New Hampshire?he has made a
good beginning?I thought I had better
be as modest as I could and hope to get
something beyond what he has done. He
has done a good job, but not good enough,
because a number of these projects
should be discontinued. They are inap-
propriate for the Defense Department. It
does not necessarily mean that all of
them are inappropriate for other agen-
cies, but they are not related to the mis-
sion of the Department of Defense. It is
not a question of redefining the Depart-
ment of Defense mission in this case. It
Is in other areas that we discussed the
other day, particularly in the field of
hardware, but not in these research proi-
ects, especially in foreign universities, in
the behavioral sciences.
I hope the Senate will continue to take
the attitude that from now on we are
going to subject the Department of De-
fense appropriations or authorizations
to the same kind of scriatiny which is
given to other departments of the Gov-
ernment. I may say that $45 million in
any other department of the Govern-
ment would not seem like a pittance. I
agree that in this agency it seems very
small.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time
of the Senator has expired.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am proud that the
Senator from Oregon has cosponsored
this amendment with me.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, a par-
liamentary inquiry.
The PRESIDING OnsiCER. The Sen-
ator will state it.
Mr. STENNIS. What is_ the situation
as to time?
The PRESIDING OrkiCER. Each
side has 3 minutes remaining.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I will
be pleased to yield to the distinguished
chairman of the Committee on Armed
Services the remainder of my time.
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator
for his generosity.
Mr. President, nothing has been gone
over more carefully by a well-informed
subcommittee, unusually well staffed,
than the items about which we have
been talking. That subcommittee recom-
mended a 12-percent reduction in these
items. That reduction was -adopted and
brought here before the Senate. It is
about $40 million.
The amendment of the Senator from
Arkansas would reduce the amount
around $45 million more in those same
categories. A great deal a what the
Senator is talking about here is in the
1968 budget, or at least a part of it. A
great deal of his criticism is that these
items should be in some other depart-
ments of Government. We state in our
report that some of theist should be
transferred to the Department of State.
I suggested yesterday that the Senator
pick out some of them and give them to
the committee. We thought it was too
late in fiscal year 1970 to dump them
out in the waste basket without anyone
having jurisdiction over them. There-
fore, we dealt with the situation as best
we could.
In this group I am fully satisfied
that the subcommittee intelligently and
diligently made an effort to get a firm
recommendation for the Senate. I hope
the Senate takes the recommendation
seriously and approves the work of the
subcommittee with this understanding.
We are sending a letter to the Depart-
ment of Defense and any other depart-
ment involved that all of these items are
to be looked over and divided up and
sent to us the next time so that they will
come to us in more detailed form.
Mr. Y017NG of North Dakota. Mr.
President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. I yield.
Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr.
President, I wish to point out to the
Senator that the Committee on Appro-
priations will also be making cuts.
Mr. STENNIS. Yes.
Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. In
the past the argument was usually made
for the foreign aid authorization pro-
gram that it could be cut later and it
usually was by the Appropriations Com-
mittee. This is not the last committee
that will review the matter.
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator.
Any information we have will be passed
on.
Mr. FLTLBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. What the Senator
from North Dakota has said about for-
eign aid certainly does not apply to the
Military Establishment and never has
over the years.
Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. We
rarely appropriate as much as the au-
thorization provides. Our committee cut
$1.5 billion last year over even the House
action.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Is the Senator say-
ing the percentage of the cut on the
Military Establishment has been com-
parable to that on foreign aid by the
Committee on Appropriations?
Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Yes, it
is for other than military personnel costs.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I cannot remember
that ever having been true.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, there is
one additional point. I know the Senators
are busy, and I am also busy and I am
not able to be in the Chamber as much
as I would like to. However, it is tragic
to me to see all the work that has been
done by this subcommittee slashed to
pieces when during the fine debate on
both sides attendance was limited to
three or four Senators. Many Senators
have not heard the real facts.
I thank the Senator for yielding.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield to me for 1 minute?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield all my time
to the Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. STENNIS. I yield.
August n; 1969 "
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, the
thing that is confusing and puling in
this matter is that it has been admitted
that there are some research programs
included here that are not connected
with defense. For the life of me, I cannot
understand in view of this fact how a
cut of $45 million is going to peopardize
the country. I am going to vote for the
cut.
Ur. STENNIS. There is no mention of
unworthy items in here.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia subsequently
said: Mr. President, as a member of the
Subcommittee on Research and Develop-
ment of the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices, I supported a reduction of more
than a billion dollars in the funds re-
quested by the Department of Defense
for research and development. As a mem-
ber of that subcommittee and as a mem-
ber of the Armed Services Committee, I
supported a reduction of 12 percent in
funds requested by the Department of
Defense for research and development.
Some feel that these cuts were too heavy;
others feel that perhaps some additional
reductions might be made. I am a little
inclined to the latter view. I am a little
inclined to think that perhaps we could
further reduce, in a small way, the re-
maining funds. But the majority of the
committee felt that a 12 percent reduc-
tion at this time is as far as we should
go. Most of the members felt that a bil-
lion-dollar reduction in these funds is as
far as we should go at the present time.
So, Mr. President, on the matter of
funds for the Department of Defense, I
feel that there can be and should be
reductions in the amount requested; and
I feel that the Armed Services Committee
has taken an important step in this re-
gard when it has recommended to the
Senate that the requested funds for re-
search and development be reduced by
$1 billion, or 12 percent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
PACK WOOD in the chair). All time has ex-
pired. The question is on agreeing to the
amendment of the Senator from Arkan-
sas (Mr. Futsarear). In this question the
yeas and nays have been ordered, and
the clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk called the roll.
Mr. KENNEDY. I announce that the
Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Goat) is
absent on official business.
I also announce that the Senator from
Nevada (Mr. BIBLE) , the Senator from
Mississippi (Mr. EASTLAND) , the Senator
from Utah (Mr. Moss), and the Senator
from Texas (Mr. YARBOROUGH) are nec-
essarily absent.
I further announce that, if present and
voting, the Senator from Utah (Mr.
Moss), and the Senator from Texas (Mr.
YARBOROUGH) would each vote "yea."
Mr. SCOTT. I announce that the Sen-
ator from Ohio (Mr. SAXBE) IS necessarily
absent and, if present and voting, would
vote "yea."
The Senator from Illinois (Mr. Peacv)
is detained on official business and, if
present and voting, would vote "yea."
The result was announced?yeas 49.
nays 44, as follows:
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August 12, 1.969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE
Aiken
Bayh
Boggs
Burdick
Byrd, W. Vs.
Case
Church
Cook
Cooper
Cranston
Dole
Eagleton
Ellender
Fulbright
Goodell _
Gravel
Griffin
Allen
Allott
Anderson
Baker
Bellmon
Bennett
Brooke
Byrd, Va.
Cannon
Cotton
Curtis
Dirksen.
Dodd
Dominick
Ervin
Bible
Eastland
Gore
[No. 79 Leg.]
YEAS-49
Harris
Hart
Hartke
Hatfield
Hughes
Inouye
Javits
Kennedy
Mansfield
Mathias
McCarthy
McGee
McGovern
Metcalf
Mondale
Nelson
Packwood
NAYS 14
Fannin
Fong
Goldwater
Gurney
Hansen
Holland
Hollings
Hruska
Jackson
Jordan, N.C.
Jordan, Idaho
Long
Magnuson
McClellan
McIntyre
Pastore
Pearson
Pell
Prouty
Proxmire
Randolph
Ribicoff
Schweiker
Scott
Spong
Symington
Tydings
Williams, N.J.
Williams, Del.
Young, Ohio
Mfllet
Montoya
Mundt
Murphy
Muskie
Russell
Smith
Sparkman
Stennis
Stevens
Talmadge
Thurmond
Tower
Young, N. Dak.
NOT VOTING-7
Moss Yarborough
Percy
Saxbe
So Mr. FULBRIGHT'S amendment was
agreed to.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
move to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I move
- to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
AMENDMENT NO. 129
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I call
up my amendment (No. 129).
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment of the Senator from Arkan-
sas will be stated.
The legislative clerk read the amend-
ment, as follows:
On page 5, line 11, strike out the quota-
tion marks and the word "Funds" and insert
in lieu thereof the following: "Not to ex-
ceed $3,000,000,000 of the funds".
On page 5, line 17, strike out the words
"the Secretary of Defense" and insert in lieu
thereof the words "the President".
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
yield to the Senator- from Washington
(Mr. JAcxsoN) without losing my right
to the floor.
CONSTRUCTION, OPERATION, AND
MAINTENANCE OF THE KENNE-
WICK DIVISION EXTENSION, YAK-
IMA PROJECT, WASHINGTON
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I ask
the Chair to lay before the Senate a mes-
sage from the House of Representatives
on S. 742.
The PRESIDING OFFICER laid be
fore the Senate the amendment of te e
House of Representatives to the bill, S.
'742) to amend the act of June 12, 1948
(62 Stat. 382) , in order to provide fol- the
construction, operation, and maintenance
of the Kennewick division extension,
Yakima project, Washington, and for
other purposes, which was, on page 2,
line 4, strike out "fifty-six-year", and
insert "fifty-year".
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, the con-
struction of the Yakima project was ini-
tiated in 191)5. There are presently six
operating divisions in the project. The
Kennewick Division is the most recently
constructed, having been authorized in
1948. S. 742 would authorize an extension
to the Kennewick Division and would
bring 6,300 acres of land under irrigation
and provide wildlife and conservation
benefits.
When the Senate approved this bill last
March, it was the fourth time the legis-
lation had been passed by this body. The
House of Representatives passed the leg-
islation with minor amendments in June.
However, at that time I received a com-
munication from officials of the Yakima
Indian Tribe expressing concern over
whether this project, if approved and
constructed, would jeopardize the water
rights of the Yakima Tribe, and in addi-
tion, whether the construction of this
project in any way would adversely affect
proposed Indian irrigation projects on
the Yakima Reservation.
I have discussed this matter with the
Indians, and members of the staff of' the
Committee on Interior and Insular Af-
fairs have reviewed the questions raised
by the Indians. In addition, the Secretary
of the Interior and his staff have gone
Into the issues very carefully to deter-
mine if the Kennewick Extension would
adversely affect the Indian projects or
impair the water rights of the Indians in
any way.
By letter dated today, the Secretary
of the Interior has assured me that hy
drologically the authorization and s
sequent construction of the Kenne ick
extension would not affect adverse the
water available to the tribe fo their
projects. I quote from the 5 etary's
letter:
Further, in our view, the ? ? for, and
desirability of, the three Indi: projects will
not be affected by the Kenn- ick extension.
These three projects must tend or fall on
their own merits and ju ification. Finally,
there is nothing in our .pinion, in the lan-
guage of S. 742 or legislative history
which we would cons e as adversely affect-
ing the Indian inte is. We will, in the de-
velopment of the , eject, make certain that
any prior and s ? ?rior water rights of the
tribe are fully .rotected and will require
that these rig; be recognized explicitly in
contracts en ed into pursuant to S. 742.
?
Mr. Pr
that the
appear
Th
was
as
dent, I ask unanimous consent
ull text of the Secretary's letter
t this point in my remarks.
e being no objection, the letter
dered to be printed in the RECORD,
110WS:
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Washington, D.C., August 12, 1969.
on. HENRY M. JACKSON,
Chairman Committee on Interior and Insu-
lar Affairs, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN': Your letter of June
4, 1969, enclosed for comment a telegram
from Chairman Robert E. Jim of the Yakima
Tribal Connell which expressed concern re-
garding the effects of S. 742, a bill to au-
thorize the Kennewick extension of the
Yakima reclamation project in Washington,
on Yakima Indian rights to the use of water
for their reservation. The Department has
received similar telegrams from Mr. Jim.
S 9769
Since these telegrams were sent, the bill
passed the House of Representatives with a ?
minor difference?not in issue here?from
the previously-passed Senate- version.
The Kennewick project was authorized by
the Act of June 12, 1948 (62 Stat. 382),
which reserved capacity in the main canal
for the future extension of irrigation to
7,000 acres of additional land. S. 712 would
authorize this extension.
Mr. Jim and the Yakima Tribe are con-
cerned that this project will impair the
water available to the tribe and lessen sub-
stantially their chances of obtaining the nec-
essary funding and authorization for three
irrigation projects which they consider ex-
tremely important to the economic develop-
ment of the reservation. We can appreciate
their concern and, for this reason, we met
with them within the last few days in order
to obtain a more complete un
of their position on the legis
try to alleviate their concern
extent possible.
ts
fully the water avail
Wapato Sates unit, t
project which
appropriation
project. We
The
on th
erstanding
Ion and to
the greatest
The irrigation projects
eh the Yakima
Indians wish to cons
in order to utilize
to them are: the
Satus Creek project,
and the Toppenish
eek project.
The Wapato un
Is an authorized Indian
Id irrigate an estimated
5,000 acres at
oat of about $500,000. No
as been requested for this
aye, however, agreed to revievi
the props?
far the purpose of considering
such a r
eat in the near future.
er two projects would be located
atus and Toppeniah Greeks, respec-
tivel
Authorization for these projects has
not
?
?

een requested by the Department to
. We will review these projects and pro-
e you with more information on them
soon as possible,
We have advised Mr. Jim and the tribe
that the Department does not want to prej-
udice their ability to gain approval at all
or some of these projects in the near future,
nor do we want to do anything that would
Impair or infringe on their rights to water
for all of these projects.
We are satisfied, based on information fur-
nished by the Bureau of Reclamation, that
hydrologically the authorization and subse-
quent construction of the Kennewick exten-
sion would not affect adversely the water
available to the tribe for the above projects.
The project is not dependent on water from
the Yakima Reservation. Further, in our
view, the need for, and desirability of, the
three Indian projects will not be affected by
the Kennewick extension. These three pro-
jects must stand or fall on their own merits'
and justification. Finally, there is nothing
in our opinion, in the language of S. 742 or
its legislative history which we would con-
strue as adversely affecting the Indian in-
terests. We will, in the development of the
project, make certain that any prior and su-
perior water rights of the tribe are fully
protected and will require that these rights
be recognized explicitly in contracts entered
into pursuant to S. 742.
We hope that the expression of the De-
partment's views herein will help to remove
the deep concern expressed by the tribe and
result in final passage of S. 742 as quickly
as possible.
It should be noted that the tribe has indi-
cated that their concern is caused partially
by some statements made by the Depart-
ment on the project a few years ago. If you
find any such statements in the record of
this legislation which may have contributed
to the concern of the tribe, we will be glad
to clarify them.
Sincerely yours,
WALTER J. HICKLE,
Secretary of the Interior.
?
?
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S 9770 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 12, 1969
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, in view agencies. It was the Office of Naval Re- peculiar jurisdiction of the Department
of the assurances provided by the Secre- search that stepped into the vacuum left of Defense for basic research. The chair-
tary of the Interior, I move that the by the wartime Office of Scientific Re- man, the Selaator from Arkansas (Mr.
Senate concur in the amenoment of the search and Development to continue FULBRIGHT) said to him:
House.
Federal funding of research at our lead- It would seem that the National Science
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ing universities. The ONR, the Army, and Foundation, NM, or the AEC should have al-
question is on agreeing to the motion of the Air Force all helped sustain the pace most exclusive jurisdiction to do basic re-
the Senator from Wasingtoia, of postwar research and to build up the search as distinguished from applied re-
search. Do you agree with that?
The motion was 45,te41 immense national resource now repre-
sented by our trained scientists and en- This is what the- admiral replied:
gineers, by our laboratories, by the dis- I think the problem you have here is
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA- tinguished science faculties of many that the Department of Defense is able to
TIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR public and private universities. This mil- get large funds for doing basic research while
MILITARY PROCUREM ISNT, RE-
oposesib had a le for discussion other
itary support for research was in the this
inotG?wveith rpineut
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND
national interest during the decade that agencies I
ee-
FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MIS-
saw the creation of the research
retary of Defense McElroy on that subject,
pro-
SILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJA-
and this- is the point he made. He said it
grams of the National Institutes . of
LEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RE- is important that basic research be done in
Health, the Atomic Energy Commission, the United States. As I remember his words,
SERVE COMPONENTSTRENGTH and the National Science Foundation he said it was not too important that the
The Senate resumed the consideration Now the situation has changed. Defense Department do it, but that the work,
of the bill (S. 2546) to authorize appro- There exists today a whole panoply of should be done, and since the Defense De-
priations during the fiscal year 1970 for Federal departments and agencies each partment has the funds to pay for the work
procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval with responsibilities for the funding of it is therefore being done by them.
vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and research. The Bureau of the Budget in The ready accessibility of Defense
research, development, test, and evalua- its special analysis Q for the fiscal year funds for research has kept the Defense
tion for the Armed Forces, and to au- 1970 budget lists 14 separate departments Department in the role of a principal
thorize the construction of test facilities and agencies with such responsibilities sponsor or patron. This then is the is-
at Kwajalein Missile Range, and to pre- Their estimated obligations range from sue: Should our research scientists and
scribe the authorized personnel strength $1.491 billion for NASA down to $7 mil- engineers continue to look to the defense
of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve lion for the Department of Justice. The agencies for $1.3 billion out of a total
component of the Armed Forces, and for range of their interests sweeps across the estimate of $5.2 billion of Federal obliga-
other purposes of the life and physical sciences tion for research?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, may and is beginning to extend to the social This is the issue that has attracted the
I say that the next 2 amendments should sciences. They represent an existing attention of many college
students and
not require over 5 minutes' discussion,
mechanism for civil agencies to assume contributed to campus unreSt.
I hope Members of the Senate will re- more responsibility for the overall fund- Consider the recent first report of the
main on the floor. ing of research so that the military can MIT Review Panel on Special Laboras
I yield, without losing my i laid to the concentrate upon its proper functions tories, issued last May 31. Here the re-
floor, to the majority leader, and responsibilities,
view panel clearly expresses its concern
Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. President, the What is our present situation? with heavy emphasis on defense-related
Fanbright amendment which was just Yesterday, Senator PROXMIRE inserted research. It said;
a -
adopted by the Senate is in my opinion into the RECORD nine tables beginning at We find today a heavy emphasis on fie-
of a most significant nature. It should Page 59629. Examination of these tables fense-related research and d,evelopment in
have far reaching effects on realining shows how much our research has come the country at large, an emphasis which de-
the Federal sponsorship of research at to depend upon the Defense agencies, tracts from similar efforts aimed at other
all sources but especially at our academic Particularly basic research of the kind urgent needs of society. Although the em-
institutions, I am particularly pleased that should be sponsored by civil agen-
phasis on defense work cameabout a .
response to perceived national needs, it has
with the adoption of that part of the (tICS, especially by the National Science hampered the nation's ability to cope with
amendment adding a new section 205. Foundation. If we look at table III, we the problems of the oontemporary world
That new section should go a long way see that the Defense Department for As far as M.I.T. Is concerned, the nation's
toward obtaining the needed readjust- the fiscal years 1966 to 1969 has funded emphasis on defense produces a bias toward
ment of sponsorship, more research at colleges and imiversi- specific areas of research at the institute,
I had prepared the following amend- ties than has the National Science Foun- and makes it more difficult to move in other
ment in the event the Fulbright amend- dation. If we look at table IV, we see that directions. M.I.T. has a role to play in a t-
ment were not successful:
over these 3 fiscal years, the Defense tempting to redress this balance, not only
Department in virtually every field of within itself but also at the national level.
On page 3, line 25, insert the following
new section: science is a major Federal sponsor and Many of you will recall the request
"sm. 205. None of the funds authorized far outspends the NSF. Table V makes Made last year for current information
to be appropriated by this Act may be used the case even stronger, for here the De- about ongoing research projects of Fed-
to carry out any research project or study fense Department has been funding as oral departments and agencies. The re-
unless such project or study has a direct and much or more basic research than the suiting 12 cartons have been men-
apparent relationship to a specific military agency which Congress established for tioned many times in this Chamber. 1
function or operation."
this very purpose; namely, the National must confess that trying to get an over-
The amendment is identical with that Science Foundation. all grasp of this massive outpouring of
part of the Fulbright amendment that What has happened is that research information has been no easy task, and I
adds a new section 205. That section 205 has ridden on the coattail of military wonder, based on our experience, what
is now apart of this bill, appropriations simply because that mon- mechanisms exist within the executive
It should be emphasized again as the ey was easy to obtain, branch to grasp the whole of thess
debate continues on this measure that Take basic research as a case in point, varied, diverse research programs.
the vigorous give and take displayed which by definition cannot be closely, di- We have made two preliminary forays
again today is not intended as an attack rectly and visibly linked to a given need into this massive collection of project
upon the military. Rather it is serving or problem. If the linkage is direct and information. Taking one field of science,
to raise and illuminate many important visible, then the work is probably applied chemistry, we counted 1,988 chemistry
Issues, one of which is the extent the De- research, or engineering. A year ago last research projects reported by eight de-
fense Department should fund research, April, the Senate Foreign Relations Com- partanents and agencies. Of these, the
particularly research not directly and mittee held hearings on Department of top three agencies were DHEVV with 617
visibly linked to present and foreseeable Defense sponsored foreign affairs re- projects, NSF with 458, and DOD with
military needs and responsibilities. messiah. At those hearings Admiral Rick- 392. The DOD projects represented costs
The Nation's scientific community has over, who is given to calling a spade by of about $17.4 million for fiscal years
a longstanding debt to the Defense Its Proper name, was asked about the 1987 and 1968. Of these, 124 Air Force
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"Augstst 12, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
projects were with universities and 1'7
with industry; 157 Army projects were
with universities and one with industry;
21 Navy projects were with universities
and five with industry. Taken together,
of the 392 chemistry projects reported by
DOD, 302 were in universities and educa-
tional institutions, 23 were in industry,
53 were performed abroad, and 14 were
with other kinds of organizations.
These figures reveal how much re-
search in chemistry has come to depend
upon DOD funding.
Turning to other fields of science, we
looked at project information reported
under the combined heading of be-
havioral and socisd sciences. Here we
find 280 DOD research projects reported
representing obligations of $14.8 million
for fiscal years 1967 and 1968 combined.
Of these, 186 were going on at universi-
ties: seven were funded by the Advanced
Research Projects Agency; nine by the
Army; 63 by the Air Force; and 107 by
the Navy. Our initial screening identi-
fied 11 subjects in which more than one
Defense agency was sponsoring research;
table I shows this information.
Going further, an admittedly subjec-
tive reading of these project titles for the
behavioral and social sciences suggested
that many could have been equally well
funded by the National Science Founda-
tion. In fact, of the 280 projects reported
by DOD for behavioral and social sci-
ences, as many as 212 representing obli-
gations of $9.7 million out of a total of
$14.8 million for fiscal years 1967 and
1968 combined, seemed appropriate for
NSF and other civil agency support;
table II gives the details. With the per-
mission of the Senate, I would insert in
the RECORD a list of the titles for Defense
research projects reported in behavioral
and social sciences that initial reading
suggests are appropriate for funding by
the National Science Foundation.
The members can judge for themselves
how directly and visibly related to de-
fense needs are such research projects
as "rate-controlled speech and mediat-
ing variables in second-language learn-
ing," funded by ARPA; or "the socio-
economic aspects of command control
in developing nations" by Army; or
"organ pathology and prenatal-post-
natal biochemical responses associated
with early social-developmental rela-
tionships" by the Air Force; or 'organi-
zational, cultural and personal factors
influencing work productivity" by the
Navy.
I cite these titles not to point a finger
of ridicule, for we have no information
as to the scientific quality of the work or
the standing of the investigators. What I
do intend is to question the relevance of
subjects of these kinds to the military
needs of the Nation, and to question why
scientific research of this kind, if needed
in the national interests, is not funded
by other departments and agencies.
Mr. President, this body can long de-
bate the issue of Defense support for re-
search that is more appropriate to other
agencies without ever affecting what is
going on. Debate can frame the issues,
but only action can produce change. The
change that national interests dictates
is to relieve the military of its present
funding of research not clearly, directly,
and visibly linked to its responsibilities
and functions. Whatever action we take
will be painful, particularly if other
members of this body who are concerned
with funding of research by civil agen-
cies under their jurisdiction are not
persuaded to provide the funding so that
DOD can transfer such work without dis-
rupting too much of the ongoing re-
search.
Despite the pains of reductions, or ter-
minations, or transitions, I propose that
our national interests require us to act
now and at least to begin the disengage-
ment of Defense from funding of re-
search not closely related to its needs.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the RECORD three
tables which bear on this subject.
S 9771
There being no objection, the tables
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
TABLE I.-RESEARCH SPONSORED BY MORE THAN 1 DEFENSE
AGENCY
Project
Air
Navy Force Army ARPA
Learning foreign languages x x x
Pattern recognition x x x
Learning x x x
Visual perception x x x
Decisionmaking x x x
Teaching complex material x x
Effects of drugs on performance._ x x
Behavior under stress x x
Leadership x x
Group interaction x x
Memory x x
TABLE II,-COMPARISON OF TOTAL NUMBER OF DEFENSE PROJECTS IN BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES FOR 1968 WITH
THOSE POSSIBLY APPROPRIATE FOR SUPPORT BY THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
Number
of
projects
Number
of NSF
type
Fiscal year 1967
Funding for all
behavioral and
Per- social science
cent research
NSF
type
Fiscal year 1968
Funding for all
behavioral and
Per- social science
cent research
NSF Fur-
typo cent
ARPA 12 12 100
Army 22 18 81
Air Force 76 71 93
Navy 170 111 65
Total
$611,683
849,045
1, 595, 000
5, 372, 000
280 212 75 8,427,728
PROJECTS IN THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL Scr-
ENCES REPORTED BY THE DEFENSE DEPART-
TN' 1968 THAT APPEAR APPROPRIATE
FOR SUPPORT BY THE NATIONAL SCIENCE
FOUNDATION
ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECT AGENCY
Research on the psychological origins of
revolution, fy '67, $39,000.
Factors associated with cultural change in
Middle Eastern countries, fy '68, $238,000.
Research on behavior in international sys-
tems, $0.1
Experimental study of the psychological
processes involved in the use of language, $0.
Handbook and casebook for practical eval-
uators, fy '68, $32,000.
Risk-taking and negotiation In leakier and
delegate groups, fy '67, $36,483.
On-line computer studies of bargaining
behavior, fy '67, $216,000.
Computer recognition of patterns of be-
havior, fy '68, $89,775.
The characteristics of incentive systems
and their effect on individual behavior, fy
'68, $95,000.
Psychological processes of the central ner-
vous system, fy '68, $200,000.
Modes of organizing and presenting com-
plex educational material fy '67, $110,800.
Rate-controlled speech and mediating var-
iables in second-language learning fy '67,
$179,400.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
The relationship between subjective a,nd
objective assessments of fatigue. fy '68,
$7,850.
The effects of psycho-active chemicals on
cognitive social skills. fy '67, $10,688; fy
'68, $1,840.
Socio-economic aspects of command con-
trol in developing nations. fy '67, $85,934;
fy '68, $74,000.
Temporal orientation and task perform-
ance. fy '67, $19,528.
Comparative studies of the central mech-
anisms of sensory discrimation. fy '67,
$24,912.
Performance: vigilance-factors influencing
I "$0" means a project is on-going in fy
'67 and '68 but was previously funded.
$611,603
100
1654, 775
$654, 775
100
744,673
87
343,825
340,242
99
1,554, 000
3,030, 000
97
56
1,020, 000
4, 440, 000
1,008,600
2, 824, 000
98
63
5,948,356
70
6, 456, 000
4, 827, 017
74
detection and monitoring. fy '67, $30,667;
fy '68, $30,890.
Effects of drugs on sensorimotor processes
and mentation. fy '67, $32,586; fy '68,
$30,321.
Perceptual lag as a function of onset and
offset visual stimulation. $0 either year.
Stimulus factors in human timing be-
havior. fy '67, $1,899; fy '68, $300.
Remote detection of cortical unit spike dis-
charge; is it possible? fy '67, $18,689.
Sleep and dream research. fy '67, $28,063;
fy '68, $22,500.
Analysis of visual and pupillary function-
ing. fy '67, $14,338.
Basic studies of psycho-physic measure-
ment theory applicable to human sensory
processes. $0 either year.
Adaptation to bodily rotation. fy '67,
$16,436; fy '68, $1,791.
Suppression and fusion in stereopsis. fy
'67, $44,856.
Development of a psychophysical photo
quality measure. fy '67, $10,948.
Interdisciplinary research iii learning con-
trol systems and pattern recognition. fy
'67, $341,500; fy '68, $170,750.
Suppression and fusion in stereopsis. fy
'67, $33,634.
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
An information system for an enclaved so-
ciety. fy '68, $89,000.
Military contribution to modernization-
Middle East and North Africa. fy '67,"
$36,000.
Decision making in situations of practical
action. fy '67, $57,000.
Persuasive communication in functional
organizations. $0.
Visual perception of movement. $0.
- 'Research to improve language training/
Western Europe. fy '68, $49,000.
Political development and moderization
in Islamic countries-military planning, $0.
Measurements of attitude and attitude
change. $0.
Ultrasonic determination of body compo-
sition. fy '67, $28,000.
An experimental study of the develop-
ment of consensus. fy '67, $21,000.
Studies of uncertainty, information search
and decision-making. $0.
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S 9772 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
Theory and methods in the study of or-
ganizational stress. fy '67, $112,000.
A model for stimulus releva rice. $0.
Performance and Wooten iical responses
related to social changes veleus chemothera-
py. fy '67, $38,000.
Organ pathology and prenatal-postnatal
biochemical responses asseciated with early
social-developmental relatieleilliPs. $0.
Spatial-temporal effects of high intensity
point sources of light on the induction of
apparent motion. fy '67, 821..000.
Examination of short term :Ind long term
memory processes/role of temporal lobe. fy
'67, $16,000.
Study of the narrative- review in pro-
grammed instruction. $0.
Human selective learning, fy eV, 318,000;
fy '68, $20,000.
Effects of physical and symbolic stressors
on perceptual mechanistm.fy '67, $25,000.
Social-cultural aspects of development. fy
'67, $33,000.
Emergent leaders in deeeleping nations.
$0.
Research in background imigery interpre-
tation. fy '68, 316,000.
Military implications of chnige: Commu-
nist China. fy '67, $104,000. _
Predictive model for intra-geoup negotia-
tion, fy '67, $26,000.
Methodology for analysis_ re" internal so-
cial movements. fy '67, $9,000.
Innovation, social exch,ange and institu-
tionalization. fy '67, $49,000.
Measurement Of reactions to earees. fy '67,
$33,000.
Aerospace power and behavioral knowledge.
fy '67, $105,000.
Psycho-physiological measur ment of re-
sponse to information overload et. complexity.
fy '67, $68,000.
Transfer of technology under military and
related conditions-Japan and other coun-
tries. $0.
Social psychological aspects of stress. fy
'67, $94,000.
Rational models for strategic behavior. fy
'67, $24,000.
Movement, learning and behevior. fy '67,
$30,000; fy '68, $36,000.
Transformational and orgatite Lionel proc-
esses in memory. fy '67, $14,000.
Comparative study of nomad ive behavior
among Japanese and American youth. fy
'67, $34,000.
Social-psyclaological factors in the devel-
opment of new nations. $0. _
Influence of memory factors on sensory
discrimination. fy '68, $15,000.
Leadership, organizational effectiveness,
and human resources. $0.
The desire for group achievement: origins
and effects. fy '68, $61,000.
Operational description of behavioral laws,
fy '67, $19,000.
Cultural differences in task approach and
optimal performance in a. trans. for task. fy
'68, $400,000.
Simulation studies of organiparional com-
munication behavior under Stress. fy '67,
$47,000; fy '68, $43,000.
An analysis of group feedback effects. fir
'67, 330,000.
Allocation of resources in a multirnan-
machine system simulation. fy '68, $40,000.
Elementary processes In petite: n percep-
tion. $0.
Social mobility and professionel motiva-
tion-application to Air Force manpower pool.
fy '68, $11,000.
Speech characteristics as indices of atti-
tude, mood and motivational State. fy
$47,000.
Study of cognitive and affective attitudes.
$0.
Altered levels of consciousness and human
performance. fy '67, $64,000.
Psychophysiological baseline pattern an-
alysis. fy '67, $83,000 fy '68, $32,000.
Elite structure ancl elite tranaformation in
totalitarian political systems. $0.
Perception of dynamic stimuli, Sy '67,
$38,000.
The prediction of subject motivatibility in
laboratory experimentation. fy '67, $29,000;
fy '68, $19,000,
A study in social science decision making.
$0.
Experimental study of the effects of sur-
round brightness and size on visual perform-
ance. fy '67, 079,600.
Organization of information about human
learning transfer and retention. fy '67,
$25,000.
Criteria for the design of new forms of
organization. fy '67, $45,000; fy '68, $65,000.
Remembering, forgetting and recovery of
memory. fy '67, $30,000.
Psycho-physical relations in perception of
space, time and velocity. fy '67, $8,000.
Executive decision making in organiza-
tions under stress and crisis. fy '67, $47,000.
Operational analysis of behavioral situa-
tions, fy '67, $20,000.
Political-idological systems and hostility
patterns. $0.
Movement and perceptual-motor perform-
ance during atypical input conditions, $0.
Individual differences in motor and verbal
skills. fy '68, $62,000.
Expectations of motivations related to
power differences within groups. $0.
Decisions and decision-makers: the effects
of confidence, social risk and commitment
fy '67, 329,000.
Effects of supportive, close and punitive
styles of supervision. fy '67, $5,000.
Improvement of learning capabilities. fy
'67, $87,000.
A systematic investigation of contrast ef-
fects related to vigilance tasks. fy '87, $17,000.
Effects of task characteristics on perform-
ance. fy '68, 350,000.
T.T.S. DEPARTMENT OP THE NAVY
Human engineering guide to equipment
design and evaluation, fir '87, $15,000; fy
$80,000.
Experimental techniques for predicting
performance of electronics personnel. fy '67,
$20,000; fy '68, $37,000.
Properties of visual displays and methods
for evaluating the effectiveness of displays.
fy '68, 320,000.
Functional evaluation of electrolurnines-
cent pictorial status displays. fy '67, $20,000.
Psycho physiological problems of pilot pro-
tection. fy '67, 340,000; fy '68, 330,000.
An integrated system for measuring diver
performance. fy '67, $26,000; fy '68, $50,000.
Development of computer assisted instruc-
tion procedures to aid in teaching complex
concepts. fy '67, $70,000; fy '68, $70,000.
Determination of the relationships be-
tween the electrical activity of the human
retina and the perception of form. fy '67,
$15,000.
The role of motivation in Naval leader-
ship. fy '67, $57,000.
Investigation of habit reversal techniques
of potential use with Navy personnel. fy '67,
$15,000; rY '68, $34,000i
Image enhancement of Navy display sys-
tems, fy '68, $11,000.
Inducing cooperation between adversaries.
fy '67, $41,000.
Psycho physics mechanisms of atten-
tion, memory, information processing and
decision making, fy '67, $31,000; fy '68, $25,-
000,
Dynamics of conflict and cooperation In
small groups, teams, and crews. fy '67, 445,000.
Speech as an indication of stress, $0.
Recognition and discrimination of com-
plex visual stimuli in continuous motion. fy
'67, 355,000.
Pattern recognition of EEG to determine
level of alertness. fy '68, 346,000.
New teehniquee for presenting human-en-
August 12: 1969-
gln.eering data to design engineering. fy '68,
$20,000.
Effect of cold water on divers. fy '67, $30,-
000; fy '68, 337,000.
Systems analysis research on pilot land-
ing performance. fy '67, 340,000; fy '68, $26,-
000,
Development of techniques for using com-
puters to administer and score psychologi-
cal tests to Navy applicants. fy '67, $76,000;
fy '68, $26,000.
Computer-assisted instruction informa-
tion exchange. fy '67, $47,000; fy '68, $56,000.
Diver performance measures. fy '67, $30,-
000; fy '68 823,000.
Machine augmentation of human strength
and endurauee. fy '68, $400,000; fy 88, $167,-
000.
Improving intelligibility of divers using
helium-oxygen breathing mixtures, fy "68,
$44,000.
Comparison of different organizational
structures in terms of crew effectiveness. fy
'67 810,000.
Psychological and physiological factors af-
fecting team performance. fy '67 327,000.
Effects of perceptual isolation on the hu-
man Subject. fy '67 426,000; fy '68 $23,000.
Inetractional strategies In computer as-
sisted instruction. fy '67 357,000; fy '68 $71,-
000. _
Improving search and acquisition for tar-
gets In peripheral vision. fy '67 $31,000; fy
'68 $20,000.
Computer classification of physiological
responses in hazardous environments. fy '67
$34,000.
Application of attitude change principles
to equipment acceptance. fy '68 $39,000.
Relationship between Navy vigilance tasks
and body chemistry changes. fy '68 $40,000.
The effects of persuasive communications
on attitudes. fy '67 $38,000,
Effects of drugs on stress and vigilance he-
havior of Navy operators. fy '67 335.000.
Drug enhancement ancement of performance on Na-
val personnel under stress. fy '67 $22,000; fy
,68 322,o
Electrical activity of human eye muscles
under statin and dynamic viewing conditions.
fy '67 316,000: fy '68 $16,000.
Special methoris for resisting psychological
warfare techniques. fy '67 $26,000; re '68
$65
Comparative study of electroencephal pat-
terns. fy '68 $14,000._
Determination of the relationships among
sensory and display interpretation factors
in man-machine information transfer sit-
uations. fy '67 $35,000; fy '68 335,000.
Organizational, cultural and personal fac-
tors influencing work productivity. fy '67
3131.000.
Determination of the effects of high in-
tensity light flashes on the eye and on visual
perception. fy '67 $4,000; fy '68 $15,000.
Survey of human factors and biotechnol-
ogy research. fy '68 $22,000.
Interaction of drugs with other factors
determining human performance. $0.
The measurement of stress and its rela-
tionship to and effects on human perform-
ance in mental and motor work. $0.
Processing of information sequentially die-
played by computer-driven cathode-ray
tubes, fy '67 328,000.
Work producing capabilities of underwater
operators. fy '67 031,000; fy '68 330,000.
Symposium on applied models of man-
machine systems. fy '68 $4,000.
Defining the conditions which control how
well test material is learned and how long it
is remembered. fy '67 $32,000.
Row human beings acquire and evaluate
Information in the process of Inu-kirg judg-
inents and decisions. fy '88 $30,000.
Military implications of modernization in
the Far East. $0,.
The study of leadership effectiveness in
complex situations. fy 117 $15,000.
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August 12, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-- SENATE
S 9773
It is my further understanding that
before the Senate concludes its business
tonight, the distinguished Senator from
Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE) will lay down
his amendment on the C5-A; that we
will come in at 10 o'clock tomorrow
morning; that the Senator from Wis-
consin and other Senators will lay the
foundation for the amendment. The
amendment, however, would not be
voted on tomorrow, but would be the
pending business when the Senate re-
turned on September 3. It is a very im-
portant amendment, and it is hoped
that a full attendance will be in the
Senate at that time.
In other words, to those of you who
are interested in attending the state
dinner at Los Angeles-and that is only
one factor among many others-if we
go through with what I have just dis-
cussed, there will be no rollcall votes
tomorrow; and all I can say, on that
basis, is Godspeed.
Sound conduction in the ear affecting milt- The measurement of speech intelligibility.
tary communications. fy '67 $26,000. fy '68 $16,000.
Group information processing and cleci- Leadership requirements in differing or-
sion-making in complex situations. fy '67 ganizational settings. fy '67 $23,000; fy '68
$50,000. $30,000.
Military implications of social change. fy Experiments on leadership, authority and
'67 $140,000. , influence. fy '67 $22,000.
Determination of the relationships between Theories and models of military group be-
the responses of humans and the physical havior. fy '67 $37,000.
dimensions of stimulation for the sense of Research on panic behavior. fy '67 $5,000;
taste. $0. fy '68 $4,000.
Research to improve methods of training in The influence of power on group produc-
f oreign languages. fy '67 $19,000. tivity and morale. $0.
Helium speech distortion correction using Reduction of hostility within groups to
an analog simulation of the human ear. fy enhance team performance. fy '67 $20,000;
'68 $35,000. fy '68 $20,000.
Development of classification procedures to Studies of computer-assisted instruction;
Identify pilot vertigo research. fy '68 $50,000. instructional strategies and behaviorally
Biophysical changes affecting behavioral oriented language. fy '68 $68,000.
performance. fy '67 $20,000; fy '68 $20,000. Conference on group decision making. fy
Consulting and advisory services for the '68 $6,000.
social and behavioral science. fy '67 $14,000; Effects of group interaction on problem
fy '68 $17,000. solving. $0.
Identification of variables which predict Identification of factors influencing the
international conflict. fy '67 $26,000; fy '68 effectiveness of management and leadership.
$24,000. fy '67 $28,000; fy '68 $45,000.
Analysis of reward as a means of promoting Theory and measurement of international
adult learning. fy '67 $29,000. conflict. fy '68 $165,000.
Enhancement by drugs of Naval person- Research on how visually patterned stim-
nel performance under stress. fy '67 $65,000; uli are classified by the nervous system. $0.
fy '68 $49,000. Undersea work performance and psycho-
Control of purposive movement through logical adjustment. fy '67, $22,000; fy '68
sequenced electrical stimulation of brain
sites. fy '67 $121,000; fy '68 $51,000. $30,000.
Research on factors involved in the de-
Investigation of methods to reduce train- tection and identification of visual and audi-
ing failures among intellectually able stu- tory signals. fy '67 $35,000.
dents. fy '68 $25,000. Techniques of differential assignment of
Effects of extreme environments on per- personnel. $0.
formance of Navy teams and groups. fy '67 Comparative research on interpersonal per-
$5,000. , ception. fy '68 $15,000.
Mechanisms of human auditory localiza- Characteristics of Navy trainees that en-
tion as related to Naval communications sys- hance or inhibit learning. fy '67 $44,000.
terns. fy '68 $33,000. Comparative analyses of leadership prac-
Techniques for improving human memory. tices. fy '68 $31,000.
fy '68 $43,000. . Implications of organizational stability and
Neural mechanisms involved in the proc- instability for psychological operations. fy
essing of visual and auditory information. $0. '68 $150,000.
Comparative studies of conflict and conflict Experimental analysis of aggressive be-
resolution. fy '68 $36,000. havior. fy '67 $43,000; fy '68 $26,000.
Analysis of the human behavior processes Brain nucleic acid changes during learn-
involved in solving complex problems. fy '67 ing. fy '68 $26,000.
$22,000; fy '68 $20,000.
Basic mechanisms in. attention and vigi-
lance of human operators. $0.
Atlas of principles of group behavior for
studies of crew Isolation and confinement.
fy '67 $15,000; fy '68 $33,000.
Speech analysis of men under stress. fy '67
$25,000; fy '68 $25,000.
Determination of the factors influencing
the perception of form and distance of un-
derwater divers. fy '68 $7,000.
Underwater work measurement techniques.
fy '67 $25,000; fy 68 $34,000.
PROGRAM
ADJOURNMENT FROM AUGUST 13
TO SEPTEMBER 3, 1969
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
move that the Senate turn to the con-
sideration of House Concurrent Resolu-
tion 315, with, of course, the proviso that
the Senator from Arkansas does not lose
his right to the floor.
The PRESIDING .r.riCER. The con-
current resolution 11 be stated by the
clerk.
The legislative cle k read the concur-
rent resolution (H. Con. Res. 315) as
follows:
H. Coil. ES. 315
Resolved by the H
(the Senate concu
Houses shall adjourn
13, 1969, and that
said day they sta
o'clock noon on W
1969.
se of Representatives
ing), That the two
on Wednesday, August
hen they adjourn on
adjourned until 12
nesday, September 3,
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, for
have order?
Mr. PROUTY. r. President, may we
the information of the Senate, it is my
intention shortly to call up House Con-
The PRESID G OFFICER. The mo-
current Resolution 315, but if the dis-
tion is not deba ble.
tinguished minority leader, in the mean-
the floor?
Mr. STENNIS Mr. President, who has
time, has any questions, I will endeavor The PRESID G OFFICER. The ques-
to answer them. tion before -th Senate is an adjourn-
Biophysics of vision for design of optimal
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I would like to ask the distinguished majority ment resolutio and is not debatable.
target displays. fy '68 $4,000. leader about the program for the balance Mr. PROU . Mr. President, I ask for
Attitude change for the enhancement of of the day, but more particularly about the yeas and nays, then, if I cannot
morale. fy '67 $30,000. speak.
Improvements in underwater voice cora- the program for tomorrow, and whether The yeas a d nays were ordered.
munication. fy '68 $34,000. or not there may be recorded votes on The PRESI sING OFFICER. The ques-
Research on psychiatric effectiveness of fu- any amendments that may be submitted, tion is on : : eeing to the concurrent
Research on physical and psychological fac- contingent will be going to the dinner resolution. e clerk will call the roll.
ture weapon systems crews. fy '67 $54,000. knowing, of course, that a substantial
tors involved in underwater speech commu- Mr. STEN S. Mr. President, a parlia-
nication. fy '67 $50,000; fy '68 $57,000. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, it is mentary in. iry.
. in California.
Effect of noise on inner-ear cells. fy '67 The PRE- DING atoriCER. The Sen-
$43,000; fy '68 $28,000. a good thing that the distinguished mi- ator will st: e it.
Behavioral science inputs to the prediction nority leader raised that particular Mr. S i IS. What are we voting on?
of conflict. fy '68 $275,000. question at this time. It is my under- The PRE IDING OFFICER. The clerk
Conference on psychological problems in standing that the distinguished chair- will restate the resolution.
large-scale change. fy '67 $7,000; fy '68 man of the Foreign Relations Commit-
$24,000. tee, the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. The legi ative clerk read as follows:
Automatic teaching systems; man-machine FULBRIGHT) , has two amendments whichResolved cc the House of Representatives
interactions involving high speed digital (the Senat: concurring), That the two
computers. $0. may not take too much time. Houses shal adjourn on Wednesday, Au-
Effect of environmental restriction on per- It is my further understanding that gust 13, 19&, and that When they adjourn
formance, fy '68 $4,000. there is a very strong possibility that a on said day they stand adjourned until 12
o'clock noo on Wednesday, September 3,
Factors involved in modifying hostile at- yea-and-nay vote on House Concurrent
1969.
titudes. fy '67 $2,000; fy '68 $36,000. Resolution 315, the resolution to ad-
Comparative study of interaction between journ for 3 weeks, will be asked for;
ideology and behavior. fy '67 $50,000. and, of course, if it is, it will be granted. ment of the pledge made by the joint
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Mr. MANSFIELD. This is a fulfill-
S 9774
leadership to all Senators, and about
which all Senators were informed as
long ago as last January, with no ob-
jection at that time.
The PRESIDING OFFI(ielt. The clerk
will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. KENNEDY. I announce that the
Senator from Tennessee eMr. GORE),
is absent on official business
I also announce that the Senator from
Nevada (Mr. BrseE), the Senator from
Mississippi (Mr. EesTeeeie), he Senator
from Utah (Mr. Moss), the Senator from
Georgia (Mr. RUSSELL) , and the Senator
from Texas (Mr. Yeretoeoueer) are
necessarily absent.
Mr. SCOTT. I announce that the Sen-
ator from Ohio (Mr. Seem) is necessarily
absent.
The Senator from Oklahoma (Mr.
BELLMON), the Senator freer' Utah (Mr.
BENNETT), and the Senator from Illinois
(Mr. PERCY) , are detained on official
business.
If present and voting, the Senator from
Utah (Mr. BENNETT), and the Senator
from Illinois (Mr. PERCIa, would each
vote "yea."
The result was announced?yeas 76,
nays 14, as follows:
[No. 80 Leg.]
YEAS-70
Gurney Montoya
Hansen telnet
Harris mphy
Hart Muskie
Hartke on
flatileld PP ckwood
Hollings EPerson
Hruska PdU
Hughes Proxmire
Inouye aftlidolph
Jackson Ribienff
Javits achweiker
Jordan, N.C. ainith
Jordan, Idaho Saps rkraan
Kennedy >g
Long Sten nis
Magnuson St, yens
Mansfield Symington
Mathias Th,irmond
McCarthy tower
McGee Tydings
McGovern Williams, N.J.
McIntyre Soong, N. Dak.
Metcalf Too rig, Ohio
Miller
Mondale
NAYS-14
Ervin
Goldwater
Holland
McClellan
Pastore
NOT VOTING-10
Bellmon Gore Lambe
Bennett Moss iborough
Bible Percy
Eastland Russell
So the concurrent resolution (H. Con.
Res. 315) was agreed to.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE August 12, 1969*
Anderson
Baker
Bayh
Boggs
Brooke
Burdick
Byrd, Va.
Byrd, W. Va.
Cannon
case
Church
Cook
Cranston
Curtis
Dirksen
Dodd
Dole
Dominick
Eagleton
Ellender
Fannin
Fong
Pulbright
Goodell
Gravel
Griffin
Aiken
Allen
Allott
Cooper
Cotton
Presty
Scott
Talmadge
Williams, Del.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield without losing his right
to the floor?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, may we
have order?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ate will be in order.
The Senator may proceed.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, for
the information of the Senate, there may
well be one or two rollcall votes this eve-
ning before adjournment. I do not think
that the debate on the next two amend-
ments will take very long.
I would suggest that in the interest
of better procedure and a more expe-
ditious departure, Senators stay as close
to the floor as possible so that we can
dispose of the amendments one way or
the other.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
Point out that my statement will not take
over 3 or 4 minutes.
Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield me 1 minute?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
yield 1 minute to the Senator from Wash-
ington.
JURISDICTION OF SENATE COM-
MITTEES ON MASS TRANSIT
MEASURE
Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, yes-
terday the administration sent up a
proposed piece of legislation on mass
transit that encompassed a great num-
ber of transit problems and rapid tran-
sit in urban areas.
It goes back in some instances to the
proposal contained in the original mass
transit bill, the jurisdiction of which lies
in the Banking and Currency Committee.
Many of the suggestions contained in
the bill are also within the province of
the Commerce Committee.
The distinguished Senator from Utah
introduced a bill and had it referred to
the Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency. However, the distinguished chair-
man of that committee and the Senator
from New Hampshire (Mr. COTTON) and
I have an agreement that when they get
through with that measure, it will be
forwarded to the Commerce Committee
so that we may consider the sections
that properly belong within the jurisdic-
tion of that committee.
This is an all-Inclusive, pretty wide-
ranging bill.
I wanted the record to reflect this sit-
uation.
PROPOSED 1VIEETING OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS COMMA:I-IV&
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, be-
fore I make my statement on the pend-
ing matter, there is one other matter
that I should like to point out. Because
of an unexpetted emergency, we were
not able in the Committee on Foreign
Relations this morning to vote on a
pending matter. There was a rollcall in
the Senate much earlier than we had
expected.
As soon as we dispose of the two
amendments, If we can get a quorum, I
would appreciate it very much if the
committee members could come to the
committee rooms so that we might have
a very brief meeting. It should not take
more than 5 or 10 minutes to dispose of
the one remaining piece of business?the
Peace Corps measure?before we ad-
journ.
Mr. President, I hope that the com-
mittee members can come to the com-
mittee room. I guarantee them that it
will not take more than a few minutes.
We will either do it or not do it within
10 minutes. / would appreciate it if after
the disposal of these two brief amend-
ments the members of the committee
would come tAtivoinntittee room.
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-
TIONS POR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR
MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RE-
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND
FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MIS-
SILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJ-
ALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RE-
SERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH
The Senate resumed the considera-
tion of the bill (S. 2546) to authorize ap-
propriations during the fiscal year 1970
for procurement of aircraft, missiles,
naval vessels, and tracked combat
vehicles and to authorize the construc-
tion of test facilities at Kwajalein Missile
Range, and to prescribe the authorized
persoemel strength of the Selected Re-
serve of each reserve component of the
Armed Forces, and for other purposes.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President,
amendment No. 129 does two things.
First, it makes clear that no more than
$3 billion of the funds appropriated for
use of the Armed Perces of the United
States may be used to support the forces
of Vietnam and other free world forces
In Vietnam, or local forces in Laos and
Thailand.
Second, this amendment require.s that
the decisions as to the expenditures of
these funds are to be the responsibility
of the President rather than the respon-
sibility of the Secretary of Defense.
My purpose in proposing this amend-
ment is to tighten up the provisions of
this authorizaton bill.
As it now stands, the Congress would
be authorizing the Secretary of Defense
"on such terms and conditions as he may
determine" to spend, Without any limita-
tion whatsoever, an amount that could
be as high as $80 billion to pay the ex-
penses of armed forces other than those
of the United States.
This, I know, is preposterous. The Vec-
etary of Defense would do not such
hing. But that is precisely what the lan-
uage of title IV authorizes as I read it.
There must be some limit on the
mount we are expected to take from
he use of our Armed Forces and give to
ther free world forces.
I guess I do not know what that limit
My amendment specifies that not more
an $3 billion may be spent on foreign
rmed forces. That is more than we
pend for economic foreign aid and for
any domestic programs. It is but 10
ercent of the some $30 billion which the
ietnam war costs the United States
nnually.
I know it will be said that there must
a broad delegation of discretion in
e expenditure of these funds because
hope that South Vietnam forces will
e over more and more of the burden.
ut I suggest that the Senate is entitled
least to have an estimate of how much
xt year is to be used to pay for the
rces of allies fighting with us in Viet-
a
Is
th
a
111.
13
V
a
be
th
we
tak
at
ne
fo
Dam.
If the chairman of the Armed Services
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August 12, 196APProved FaffR6TORMSORM/3REMitRDPflritioAR000300100001-3
-
Committee is not agreeable to the limit- I want to offer this substitute amend- Mr. STENNIS. I yield.
ing figure of $3 billion for this purpose, ment now. Instead of saying "not to ex- Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President,
I would be interested in receiving some ceed $3 billion," I think we should put there is'a $500 million difference here. As
other estimate. it at $2.5 billion; and if more money is I understand the position of the distin-
It does not make much sense to me to needed, they can get the authorization guished Senator from Mississippi, he
hold elaborate hearings on the Defense for it. agrees with the principle of what is de-
Department budget, to receive detailed So I do not think we should try to step sired by the distinguished Senator from
estimates on the costs of various weapons on the President of the United States by Arkansas. We are in a fight in Vietnam,
systems, and then to adopt language in requiring him to issue a certificate, and we are and have been taking mili-
this bill which says in effect that not- My amendment, which reads as fol- tary action in Laos and Thailand.
withstanding any other law authorizing lows, is offered as a substitute: I would hope that the able chairman of
funds for the Armed Forces of the United On page 5, line 11, strike out the quotation the Committee on Foreign Relations
States, the Secretary of Defense can marks and the word "Funds" and insert in would accept the proposal presented by
spend whatever he desires to support lieu thereof the following: "Not to exceed the chairman of the Committee on
other free world forces in Vietnam and $2,500,000,000 of the funds". Armed Services.
On page 5 line 17, insert for the word "con- Mr. FULBRIGHT. I intended to do
S 9775
local forces in Laos. ditions" the phrase "under Presidential
The Congress must be cautious of such regulations".
wide open delegations of authority.
I hope the chairman of the Committee That will put it forth in the register.
on Armed Forces will accept this amend- The President is responsible for what it
ment. does, anyway. I think that will take care
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President and of the situation.
members of the committee, I call special So I offer that as a substitute, and I
attention to the situation with respect to thank the Senator from Arkansas very
title 4. It may be that a rollcall vote will much for calling attention to that mat-
not be required on the matter. ter. This language, if it is going to refer
I will first make a brief_ explanation of to the other authorization bills, should
title 4 of the bill. It covers what was once have a limit on it, and it is limited. Let
called foreign military aid or foreign aid me repeat for clarity, that it is limited
for the military. But this section is lim- to the forces in Vietnam, other free world
ited to the South Vietnamese and other forces in Vietnam, and the local forces
free world forces in Vietnam, local forces in Laos and Thailand.
In Laos and Thailand, and for related Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
costs during the fiscal year 1970 on such the Senator yield?
terms and conditions as the Secretary of Mr. STENNIS. I yield.
Defense may determine. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Inasmuch as it does
Mr. President, that is the identical deal particularly with the local forces in
language that was used for last year in Laos and Thailand, two countries in
the authorization bill as brought forward which, at least technically and legally,
without any change and also for the we are not at war, does the Senator not
year 1968. think it would be better that this respon-
I am going to propose an amendment sibility be given to the President? We are
as a substitute to the amendment of the now discussing before our committee a
Senator from Arkansas. The funds now matter involving Thailand, and it seems
in the bill for this purpose amount to to me that this is a matter of such con-
only $147 million. That is in hardware sequence that it should be squarely the
The authorization is merely for the Ap- President's responsibility to make a deci-
propriations Committee, concerning such sion on a matter of this kind, as distin-
other amounts as they may appropriate guished from the ongoing war in Viet-
and for whatever purposes they may ap- nam. That is the part of it that struck
propriate. The Appropriations Commit- me?that it should be a presidential re-
tee now has authority to appropriate sponsibility in the law.
items except military hardware for our Mr. STENNIS. I think it should be a
A r Navy but they do not have au- presidential responsibility. He is respon-
thority to appropriate even 0. & M. sible for it, anyway. Certainly, we can
,
funds?operation and maintenance trust him to make the regulations about have the presidential responsibility at
funds?for the Army of South Vietnam. this matter, and then the Secretary of the very peak, but I think he should be
So this would be a general authorization. Defense, acting under those regulations permitted to make the regulations, and
When this matter came before us, my and our law and restrictions, I be- then the Secretary can act on them.
best recollection is that in looking at it, lieve---- Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, a
the Chief of Staff said that this is iden- Mr. FULBRIGHT. Customarily, I say parliamentary inquiry.
tical to the matter of last year, and that to the Senator, under the foreign aid bill The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
was correct. We did not get to the figures which my committee has handled, the ator will state it.
then, however, and they gave me the funds are made available to the Presi- Mr. FULBRIGHT. Is it proper for me
figures later, and showed how it was dent. to accept the substitute or withdraw my
spent last year for this purpose?$2.5 Mr. STENNIS. Yes. amendment?
billion. For this year, it is estimated to Mr. FULBRIGHT. That has been tra- Mr. President, I modify my amend-
be $2.26 billion for this purpose. ditional, since the beginning. Actually,..., ment as proposed by the Senator from
On that point, I did not notice the open this is an item which has been in the Mississippi.
end clause in here, which is the three or foreign aid bill, in foreign assistance, in Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the
four words on pages 1-2 and 15: "under the past. In fact, some Members pres- Senator yield?
this or any other- act." That gives it an ently are considering taking it back into
open end, unlimited authorization. I have that bill. Mr. STENNIS. I do not understand.
not favored that since we built the Air Therefore, I would suggest?I do not The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
Force Academy. I do not like us to make know that it is all that important?that ator from Arkansas has modified his
open end authorizations unless it is it would still be more appropriate for the amendment.
absolutely necessary. That is my record responsibility to be given to the Presi- Mr. FULBRIGHT. I modify my amend-
on it. dent. ment in accordance with the suggested
But I failed to point that out to the Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will words of the Senator from Mississippi.
committee; I am sure I did. That is why the Senator yield? It is his proposal, and that disposes of it.
that when I rose. I certainly accept the
amendment of the Senator from Missis-
sippi as to the amounts. His explanation
of it is understandable.
I say to the Senator from Missouri that
the prosecution of the war, of course, is a
military matter. But this involves far
more than a military matter, as we
found this morning; and it is the very
matter into which the Senator from
Missouri is looking. I think it is primarily
a political matter as to how far we go in
a commitment to support the local forces
in Laos and Thailand in particular, as
distinguished from Vietnam.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I know of the legis-
lative background incident to the matter
we were discussing this morning, and as-
certained that the Secretary of Defense
believes the matter we discussed this
morning, if implemented, would necessi-
tate the approval of Congress.
Again, it is my hope that the chairman
of the Committee on Foreign Relations
would take the language suggested by the
chairman of the Committee on Armed
Services.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am willing to ac-
cept the Senator from Mississippi's pro-
posed amendment in place of mine and
would, of course, support it. I merely
brought that to his attention, in that I
thought there might be a distinction be-
tween the significance of the local forces
in Laos. But if the Senator from Missis-
sippi feels that strongly about it, I am
perfectly willing to accept his amend-
ment as a substitute for mine.
Mr. STENNIS. It is my intention to
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S9776 Approved For Re
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment is so modified.
Mr. STENNIS. I want to discuss it a
little further, but I yield to the Senator
from Kentucky.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
SPONG in the chair). Will the Senator
send the amendment, as modified, to the
desk.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield
to the Senator from Kentucky.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. MiPresident, will
the Senator yield to me first briefly?
Mr. STENNIS. I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Did the Senator
suggest to strike "any other act" and
only confine it to this act?
Mr. STENNIS. No, that was done in
marking it up.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator does
not wish to strike out "any other act."
Mr. STENNIS. No, that is part of it.
The ceiling is on it now. -
Mr. FULBRIGHT Very-well.
Mr. STENNIS. I yield to the Senator
from Kentucky.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I did not
wish to intervene until the Senator from
Arkansas and the Senator from Missis-
sippi had agreed upon the questions
which the Senator from Arkansas had
raised. Now, I wish to raise another ques-
tion on this section. I hope I may have
the attention of the Senate for just a
few minutes.
When I first read title IV on page 5
of the bill, the thought came to me that
it could be considered a commitment as
defined in the national commitments
resolution which was adopted almost
unanimously by the Senate. I may attach
too much importance to language, but
I want to give the reasons for my think-
ing in this direction.
In Vietnam we are furnishing supplies
and equipment to the South Vietnamese
and to other free forces who are assisting
the South Vietnamese. We are also using
our troops in support of the South Viet-
namese.
The same situation may prevail in Laos
and Thailand, as far as I know. We have
authorized the supply of equipment and
materiel to Laos and Thailand. Until a
few years ago such supplies were author-
ized under the military assistance section
of the foreign aid bill; in 1967 the au-
thority was transferred to the military
authorization bill.
My question goes to the meaning of
the word "support." Is it intended in this
section that support of free forces in
Laos and Thailand is limited to equip-
ment, materiel, and supplies, or is it in-
tended that word "support" shall include
the use of our own Armed Forces in sup-
port of the local forces of Thailand and
Laos.
Mr. STENNIS. No.
Mr. COOPER. If use of our forces is
intended, article IV of the bill could be
construed as a commitment of our Armed
Forces.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the Sen-
ator presents a very good question but
I do not hesitate for one moment in
answering. It does not include troop
personnel of that kind.
As a matter of fact, I shall have print-
ed in the RECORD within just a few min-
cataiGNIESBIODOAICIUMFM1B00afflcIA0t3300100001-2
flugust 12 1969
utes an itemization of these very items
for fiscal year 1968, fiscal year 1969, and
fiscal year 1970, prospectively. We are
dealing here with $2,226,400 for fiscal
year 1970 which includes no military
construction at this time, but procure-
ment for the Army, Navy, shipbuilding
conversion, aircraft procurement, mis-
sile procurement, and other procure-
ment, and the operation and mainte-
nance for the Army, Navy, Marine Corps,
and Air Force. So it is strictly military
matters, and military matters alone.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I accept,
of course, as all of us do, the statement
and. intention of the Senator from Mis-
sissippi, about his understanding of the
matter. But it is important that we know
the intention of the language which
speaks of itself. I would ask if the Sen-
ator from Arkansas and the Senator
from Mississippi would be willing to
modify paragraph (2) which now reads
"(2) local forces in Laos and Thailand:"
so as to insert before "local" the words:
"to provide equipment, material sup-
plies, and maintenance thereof to";
The additional language would remove
any question of the intention?I do not
know this is so intended; I hope it is
not intended to use any of these funds
for our forces to support the local forces
of Laos and Thailand.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. COOPER. I base my suggested
language in part on a statement made
by former Secretary of Defense McNa-
mara when he asked that funds to assist
Laos and Thailand local forces be taken
out of the foreign aid bill and placed in
the defense bill. He supported his request
in a letter to Senator RUSSELL, chairman
of the Armed Forces Committee.
We are prepared to provide Laos and Thai-
land the equipment and supplies they re-
quire to combat the armed Communist forces
which threaten their freedom. Therefore, the
transfer itself implies neither escalation of
conflict nor change in type or level of assist?.
ance; it merely reflects the most effeotive
manner to handle the problem.
My amendment would limit the use of
any of the funds, as far as Laos and
Thailand are concerned, to equipment,
material, and supplies
Mr. STENNIS.The Senator might sup-
ply his language on that point. With re-
spect to equipment and supplies there,
we already have a list in the RECORD of
what is represented,
Perhaps the language would provide
this would not include any troops or
U.S. forces. Maybe that would cover it.
Mr. COOPER. "Other than U.S.
forces." -
Mr. MTTLFR. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. I yield.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I would
like to make a comment. Perhaps the
Senator from Mississippi and the Sena-
tor from Kentucky might indicate
whether or not this is within the scope
of the Senator's proposed language. My.
understanding is that maintenance can
be involved as well as the actual sup-
plies and material.
Mr. STENNIS. Yes.
Mr. MILLER. If we are going to have
maintenance, this could indicate con-
tract maintenance, or it could indicate
modifications of _equipment. So I cer-
tainly think maintenance should be in
this language if we are going to use spe-
cific language.
Mr. STNIS.n The word "mainte-
nance is in the bill of particulars that
I am going to have printed in the RECORD.
It does include many things in addition
to military hardware. It really has no
place in this bill, strictly speaking, except
$147 million. As a'inatter of convenience
we put it in 2 or 3 years ago.
I yield to the Senator from Arizona.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I
am certain I know what the Senator
from Kentucky is getting at. I find my-
self in favor of that but I have a question
as to whether or not his exclusion would
be so complete that we could not, for
example, install radars in Laos or Thai-
land, or electronic detection equipment,
or electronic relay equipment that would
require, at least for a time, personnel
from the United IStates. These people
might not be in uniform. They might be
South Vietnamese. Would the idea of the
Senator from Kentucky go that far?
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I shall
try to make myself clear. I do draw a dis-
tinction between operations, on the one
hand, in Vietnam and in Laos and Thai-
land, on the other.
Whatever may be one's views on Viet-
nam, we are assisting Vietnam in at
least two ways: one by the supply of
equipment and materiel; and the other,
and of greateat importance, by the
use of our Armed Forces in support of
Armed Forces of Vietnam and other
free forces. I have never voted against
funds for these purposes.
It has been said by former President
Johnson that we have made a commit-
ment for the use of our Armed Forces by
the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. It has
been debated and debated. In any case,
we are in Vietnam, and we are at war.
I do not know what is occurring in Laos
or Thailand but I know it has not been
declared either by the Executive or the
Congress that we have a commitment in
Laos and Thailand agatnst the Pathet
Lao, or any insurgents in Thailand, or
Loas. The United States is at least not
at war in Laos or Thailand. My purpose
is to be sure that we do not provide
funds for the use of our Armed Forces in
support of the local forces of Laos and
Thailand and thus run the risk of be-
coming engaged in war without joint
authority, of the Executive and Congress.
On June 25, the Senate passed a reso-
lution which had been introduced by
the Senator from Arkansas, which was
later modified and passed almost unani-
mously by the Senate. It states:
Resolved, That (1) a, national commitment
for the purpose of this resolution means the
use of the Armed Forces of the United States
on foreign territory, or a promise to assist
a foreign country, government, or people
by the use of the Armed Forces or financial
resources of the United States, either im-
mediately or upon the happening of certain
events, and (2) it is the sense of the Senate
that a national commitment by the United
States results only from Edfirmative action
taken by the executiveand legislative branch-
es of the United States Government by
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means of a treaty, statute, or concurrent
resolution of both Houses of Congress specifi-
cally providing for such commitment.
Mr. President, this bill when enacted
will become a statute. It will represent
the action of both Houses of Congress.
It leaves no doubt that we are ready to
provide financial resources of the United
States to local forces in Laos and Thai-
land, but if we do not make certain by
proper language that it does not provide
funds for our Armed Forces to engage
in fighting in support of the local forces
of Laos and Thailand, it would be inter-
preted that this statute does provide such
funds for such use of our Armed Forces.
This may be said to strain language, but
if it is strained, we become involved in
Vietnam by strained action, by the
strained premises by the evolution of
events which, I am sure, no one in the
early years intended or thought would
bring us into that war.
I want to provide language in this sec-
tion, that will insure that use of the
funds involves only the financial re-
sources of the United States. That means
our money, our equipment, our materiel,
our supplies and operations related
thereto. It would prohibit the use of
Armed Forces in support and combat
support, of local forces fighting in Laos
and Thailand.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, per-
haps we are missing a danger involved
in all of this; namely, if we lend or sell
equipment to the present Vietnam Gov-
ernment, it is very possible that in the
not too distant future, the North Viet-
namese and the Vietcong could well be
using that equipment against some of
the countries which today are on our
side; specifically, Laos and Thailand.
That, I think, is a great danger, as
evidenced by the fact that in the hear-
ings conducted in the Foreign Relations
Committee last year, relative to the sale
of arms to other countries, we found
there were some 6,000 American tanks
which, in effect, were for sale if it could
be arranged on the right basis to coun-
tries in other parts of the world where
the tanks were not considered obsoles-
cent.
With complete respect for the remarks
of the distinguished Senator from Ken-
tucky, there is no real secret about the
fact that we have and are conducting
military operations in Laos; also that we
are conducting military operations from
Thailand, I believe that it is important
to recognize tonight if Americans are in
danger in Thailand, or if Americans are
in danger in Laos, because of actions
taken over recent years, it is as im-
portant for us to work to defend them
in those countries as to defend them in
South Vietnam.
This morning, in a hearing conducted
in the Foreign Relations Committee with
respect to certain activities, the witness,
not of high rank, testified that before
anything occurred under the contingent
agreement in question, the matter should
be taken up with the Congress.
That, to me, made considerable im-
pression, because at least up to this ad-
ministration, many things took place
in Laos and Thailand which were not
taken up with the Congress. So I checked
the legislative history of the present
Secretary of Defense when he was a
Member of the other body, and found
that he was forceful in stating such
matters should be taken up with the
Congress.
I also found to my satisfaction that
the reason this witness stated it should
be taken up with the Congress was prob-
ably because the Secretary of Defense
believed it should be taken up with the
Congress. I believe, therefore, that we are
in a new era when it comes to the method
and the nature of risking troops and
utilizing equipment, in foreign countries.
I would give full and great credit to the
efforts which have been made by the
chairman of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee so as to clarify this matter in
these hearings.
But, for these reasons and because of
the position taken by the current man-
agement of the Defense Department, I
would hope that we would see fit to pass
title IV as it is now in the bill.
Mr. President, I regret implications?
not made here on the floor of the Sen-
ate?which would imply that we have no
military operations in Laos. We know
we are having them there; and we know
we have built six major bases in Thai-
land.
I believe that title 4 is all right. I think
this discussion has been constructive
from the standpoint of the future.
Mr. STENNIS. As it is, by adoption of
the amendment of the Senator from
Arkansas?
Mr. SYIVIINGTON. That is right; the
amendment of the able Senator from
Arkansas, as modified by the amendment
of the distinguished chairman of the
Armed Services Committee. We will have
both committees working together, and
this part of the bill will be settled.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the Sen-
ator from Texas had asked me for recog-
nition. I yield to him.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I would
like to associate myself with the remarks
of the distinguished Senator from Mis-
souri. I think the thrust of the amend-
ment of the Senator from Kentucky
would be to deny involvement of Ameri-
can personnel. It should be roundly de-
feated, To begin with, what we are talk-
ing about when we talk about Thailand
and Laos forces is paramilitary forces, re-
garding counter-insurgency work. We are
trying to give them the sophisticated
equipment to do anything, for example,
airlift and radar. If we cannot train
them to use the equipment, it is pretty
useless to give it to them.
I might say that our bases in Thailand
are defended by Thai troops. Is is pro-
posed that they get no personnel support
from the troops in Thailand? Are we
going to get no support for the air bases
that are supposed to be defended?
The thrust of the amendment of the
Senator from Kentucky would be to
necessitate using American personnel for
work that they would not have to do if
we were to allow some support of Thai
troops or paramilitary troops.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I would
like to hear from the Senator' from
Arkansas.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if the
Senator will excuse me just a minute, the
Senator from Arkansas and the Senator
from Indiana asked me to yield to them.
I believe the Senator from Arkansas
asked me first. I yield to him.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, as I
said a moment ago on this particular
amendment, it seems to me that, with the
amendment of the Senator from Missis-
sippi, it would be satisfactory. I think the
matter raised by the Senator from Ken-
tucky, however, is a very significant one,
and I do not want, in any offhand way,
to make what might be called a national
commitment with regard to Thailand.
In my next amendment as printed, No.
111, which deals with the question of the
Secretary of Defense making available
reports prepared by outside organiza-
tions, I have in mind such things as
"think tanks," and so on. That amend-
ment is before the Senate.
I have also prepared another section
which I want to discuss as a modification
to my amendment, which provides that?
The Secretary of Defense shall also provide
to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives a
copy of all bilateral contingency plans, signed
by a representative of the Department of De-
fense and an official of a government of a
foreign country, involving use of United
States forces for the joint defense of that
country.
It deals, in effect, with the point the
Senator from Kentucky has raised.
The point of the Senator from Ken-
tucky is a very important one. I do not
wish, through inadvertence, to see an-
other Gulf of Tonkin resolution go
through here without knowing it. I am
inclined to believe that, with the explana-
tion and interpretation given by the Sen-
ator from Mississippi and the Senator
from Missouri, it would be certainly an
outrageous way to interpret it if it were
done that way.
I wonder if the Senator from Ken-
tucky could not offer this amendment at
a later date as his own amendment on
this precise subject. I do not know wheth-
er the next amendment would cover it.
I think the Senator has a valid point,
but I do not think it is necessary, with
what has been said with regard to this
amendment.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if I may
say this, I think the Senator from Ken-
tucky has made a contribution here. I
have enjoyed getting his thought. This is
purely a money bill. This is purely a spe-
cial section here for foreign military aid.
It has 2 years of use as a precedent. Ex-
cept to put a ceiling on it, I believe we
ought to proceed in that way.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator be-
lieves it would be an outrageous distor-
tion to interpret it as authority for use
of our military forces, apart from what
they are presently doing?
Mr. STENNIS. I do not see how it
could be interpreted that way. It would
be a real monstrosity.
I yield to the Senator from Louisiana.
Mr. 'FLI,ENDER. Mr. President, I do
not think there Is any question that the
amount is for military hardware and
uses of that kind, and does not involve
soldiers at all. But I rose to ask the Sen-
ator this question; He earmarked $2.5
billion. During the hearings that were
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S 9778 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE August 12, 1969
held 2 weeks ago, the figure was $2.2 bil-
lion instead of $2.5 billion.
Mr. STENNIS. Thatis correct.
Mr. ELLENDER. Would the Senator
modify his amendmencto include that
figure?
Mr. STENNIS. No. I think there should
be some latitude. The 0.2 billion, which
I mentioned during the, debate, was ar-
rived at when the budget was written up.
We have already had a somewhat aug-
mented program to aid tile Vietnamese
to build up their military forces.
I think that $2.5 billion figure is a real-
istic one.
Mr. ELLENDER. The reason why I
raised the question is that we used the
figure of $2.5 billion during all the hear-
ings we had as being the amount of for-
eign aid to be used for military hard-
ware.
Mr. STENNIS. It will not hurt at all
to have this excess. I suggest that in the
supplemental bills the extra amount of
money will be used. It is better to have
it done that way than to have the de-
partment draw the money from some-
where else and then mune before the
Congress with a big defteit. I think we
ought to accept the figure of $2.5 billion.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, it is late
and I do not want to detain the Senate.
As I have said, I may be straining the
point, but I do not think so.
This is an important matter. For years
we have been talking about_Vietnam, and
cries of anguish have gone up because we
did not look ahead and consider the end
that the steps that were being taken
could lead to-our involvement in war.
This bill before us will become a
statute-could be another step involving
the United States much as the course of
events led to our involveMent in Viet-
nam.
I would agree that it wOUld be a mon-
strosity if the President of the United
States, upon the language of this section,
should consider the language of this bill
as authority to enter war in Laos or
Thailand. It would be a monstrosity, and
I have full confidence in President Nixon,
and that he would not do so, but that
does not relieve us of our responsibility.
It is admitted here by the chairman
of the committee that these funds shall
be used only for what has been termed
miltiary assistance.
. Is that correct?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is correct,
Mr. COOPER. And, as I understand
that they shall not be used for our
armed forces in support of fighting, or
assisting fighting of the local forces of
Laos and Thailand, other than for sup-
plies. Therefore, I will propose another
amendment. "Military assistance," I be-
lieve, is a phrase of art. Is it not?
Mr. STENNIS. Well, the Senator would
know more about that than I would.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. For years it was In
the foreign aid legislation. I assume it Is
still considered as such.
Mr. COOPER. In the testimony of the
Secretary of Defense before both
the Armed Services Committee and the
Foreign Relations Committee in 196'1, he
spoke of the transfer of military assist-
ance from the foreign aid bill to the de-
fense bill. He called it military assistance.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is right.
Mr. COOPER. That is what it had been
termed when it was considered by the
Foreign Relations Committee.
I propose: On line 15 before "local"
insert the words "military assistance"
so as to read "Military assistance to local
forces in Laos and Thailand." If these
two items, Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand,
were separated and distinguished there
would be no problem of a misunder-
standing.
However, the same words are employed
for the use of funds in Vietnam as for
Laos and Thailand, and there could be a
mistake about their meaning. I would
urge that before "local" there be inserted
the words "Military assistance."
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I would think that
would be all right.
Mr. ,STENNIS. We are talking about
money. We are talking about funds. The
first sentence reads "Not to exceed $2.5
billion of the funds authorized for ap-
propriation for the use of the Armed
Forces," and so forth. We are talking
about money, and that is all.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.
Mr. STENNIS. And it would not fit in
there before the Senator's words "local
forces," it seems to me.
Mr. COOPER. I thoughtmy suggestion
would help. I will offer the amendment I
first proposed. Is it in order for me to
offer an amendment?
Mr. SYMINGTON. Will the Senator
read it?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Chair rules that it is not in order for the
Senator from Kentucky to offer an
amendment at this point, except by
unanimous consent.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, a par-
liamentary inquiry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator will state it.
Mr. COOPER. After the pending
amendment is voted upon, as it has been
modified would an amendment to the
modified amendment then be in order?
The PRESIDING OieloiCER, Will the
Senator from Kentucky send his pro-
posed amendment to the desk?
The Chair would say, in answer to the
inquiry of the Senator from Kentucky,
that after the pending amendment, as
modified, is voted upon, it would be in
order that his amendment be considered.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I think
the amendment has been fully explained.
I ask unanimous consent that the table
of funds to which reference has been
made, the last item being $2.2 billion, be
printed in the RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the table was
ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as
follows:
ESTIMATED AMOUNTS INCLUDED IN MILITARY FUNCTIONS
BUDGET FOR SUPPORT OF FREE WORLD MILITARY
ASSISTANCE FORCES IN VIETNAM, LAOS, AND THAILAND
AND RELATED COSTS, FISCAL YEAR 1970
INCLUDING THE AID/DOD REALINEMENT
(In millions of dollars]
BUDGE]
Fiscal
Fiscal
Fiscal
year
year
year
1968
1969
1970
Military personnel:
Army
118. 0
114.2
116. 3
Navy
.8
.6
.1
Marine Corps
15. 0
14. 8
14.2
Air Force
.2
.2
.2
'
134.0
129.8
030.8
Total, military
personnel_
Operation and maintenance:
Army
605.8
708, 0
632. 8
Navy
43.3
47. 5
53.7
Marine Corps _____ _
6. 1
10, 7
10.3
Air Force
55.0
131. 8
157. 1
Total, operation and
maintenance__ ___
710. 2
898,0
853.9
Procurement:
Army
552. 5
1, 243, 5
927. 3
Navy:
Other procurement
5.8
10.2
4. 2
Shipbuilding and
conversion_ __.
4. 5
6, 5
3.4
PAMN-Navy aircraft
and missiles
.2
Marine Corps
68. 5
50 8
88. 3
Air Force:
Aircraft procurement__ _
36.1
88.1
103.9
Missile procurement_ _ ....
.1
Other procurement
67.4
85,4
114.4
Total, Procurement...
734.9
1, 484. 5
1,241.7
Military construction:
Army
1.7
10.7
Navy
1.9
Air Force
9.0
1,5
Total, military
construction
02.6
15.5
Grand total
1, 591. 7
2, 527. 8
2, 226. 4
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I believe
that for the information of Senators,
the clerk should read the amendment of
the Senator from Arkansas, as modified.
The PRESIDING Olor.LCKR. The clerk
will state the amendment of the Senator
from Arkansas, as modified.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
On page 5, line 11, strike out the quota-
tion marks and the word "Funds" and insert
in lieu thereof the following: "Not to exceed
$2,500,000,000 of the funds".
Oct page 5, line 17, strike out the words
"the Secretary of Derense" and insert in lieu
thereof the words "the President".
On page 5, line 17, insert after the word
"conditions" the phrase "under Presidential
regulations".
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the amendment of
the Senator from Arkansas, as modified.
The amendrnent, as modified, was
agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the
Senator from Kentucky now call up his
amendment?
Mr. COOPER, Yes.
The PRESIDING' OFFICER. The
amendment will be stated.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows:
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August 12, 196u
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, in regard
to the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.
The Senator is very persuasive. It is a
fact, even though I thought it was a
monstrosity, that later the resolution was
interpreted as it was by the President of
the United States, that it was so inter-
preted; and every time the matter came
up it was thrown in our faces. I believe
the Senator's amendment will make the
Senate's intent clearer and more posi-
itive. I do not really see how this can re-
strict the President's obligations, and I
hope the Senator from Mississippi will
accept the suggestion of the Senator from
Kentucky. What we are trying to do is
protect ourselves from such a monstrous
interpretation. That having happened
within the memory of all of us here, I
believe it would be a very healthy thing
for it to be accepted.
Mr. President, I am not sure; can I ac-
cept it? I would be willing to do so, with
the agreement of the Senator from Mis-
sissippi.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the Sen-
ate has voted on the other amendment.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is right.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, a parlia-
mentary inquiry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator will state it.
Mr. COOPER. I have the floor, but I
will yield to the Senator for that purpose.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the
amendment of the Senator from Arkan-
sas has already been agreed to. Can any
one Senator accept another amendment
to that?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is the
Senator from Mississippi asking that
question as a parliamentary inquiry?
Mr. STENNIS. Yes, of course.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair
rules that it cannot be accepted. The
On page 6, line 15, after (2) insert the
following: "to provide equipment, material,
supplies, and maintenance thereof to".
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, there has
been a very good discussion, but I do
want to have for the RECORD an interpre-
tation of the section. I would not 13e so
interested if I had not been conscious of
the steps by which our country became
involved in the war in Vietnam. I shall
spend a minute or two on the subject.
It all started very simply. Under Presi-
dent Eisenhower, military advisers were
sent to Vietnam. I do not know whether
I should speak of a statement former
President Eisenhower made when he is
now dead, but I think it proper. He came
here one day 2 years ago and talked to
a number of us. He said?
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may we
have order?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ate will be in order.
Mr. COOPER. He said that the only
commitment he had made, was to Pro-
vide military assistance in the form of
advisers, and to provide economic aid
as long as South Vietnam made appropri-
ate steps to help itself.
I may say that, after searching the
record, that is all I could ever find that
he had promised.
For years, he had our military advis-
ers in Vietnam. We furnished equipment
to Vietnam; we supported various
regimes?it is hard to remember how
many?and then, as the fighting in-
creased in the outer areas, we began to
send troops to those areas, to assist the
South Vietnamese in actual fighting.
They were finally fired upon, and it be-
came a matter of national honor to de-
fend them, as the President had the right
to do, additional troops were sent to
South Vietnam and step by step we had
become involved in the war in Vietnam. amendment of the Senator from Arkan-
I am sure that President Eisenhower, sas has been voted upon. This is new
President Kennedy, or President John- matter.
son never intended that we would be Mr. COOPER. I hope not, but it is pos-
involved in war and certainly no major sible we may be in war in Laos or Thai-
war. But we conveyed to South Vietnam land; and if we go into war with the con-
the impression that we would stand with current authority of the President of the
them and defend them. I believe we con- United States and Congress, we will un-
veyed that impression throughout South- derstand where we are, and at least Con-
east Asia. gress and the President will have made a
Wars start from small beginnings. I determination that it is in our national
have thought, and many Senators have interest.
thought?it was definitely the expression We may become involved in war with-
of the Senate in the adoption of the out such a determination at some point,
National Commitments Resolution? with some 35,000 troops in Thailand, as
that a likely way to become involved in a I recall.
war is to put our armed forces in an- Mr. FULBRIGHT. There were 45,000
other country where there is a local at the last count, I think.
war. And if we stay there long enough Mr. COOPER. If at some point we thus
and send enough men there, they will became engaged in fighting, we may find
be fired on some day, and then, as I have ourselves at war by the same process as
said, it is a matter of national honor that by which we backed into war in
and, because the President has the con- Vietnam.
stitutional duty to protect our troops, we Again, I point out that the language
will be involved in a war. of the amendment applies both to Viet-
Mr. FULBRIGHT, Mr. President, will nam and to Laos and Thailand. It is the
the Senator yield? identical language.
Mr. COOPER. I yield. I read the language to which I refer:
Mr. FITLBRIGHT. What the Senator uzit EetutnoreigegfzsagronatZf
for
rtatees
has said does revive in my memory very under this or any other Act are authorized
clearly what was said, and particularly to be made available for their stated pur-
what I said, after having been briefed poses to support: (1) Vietnamese and other
and informed by the Secretary of De- free world forces in Vietnam, (2) local forces
fense, the Secretary of State, and the in Laos and Thailand;
The same language is used for both
countries. It is a possible interpretation
that these funds could be used in the
same way in Laos and Thailand as they
are now being used in Vietnam.
I have said that it would be prepos-
terous if the Secretary of Defense or the
President were to use the funds in Laos
and Thailand as they are being used in
Vietnam as a result of the language of
title IV. However, it is our province and
our responsibility to make certain that
the funds are not treated in the same
way. This is the purpose of my amend-
ment. It is simply to provide that as far
as Laos and Thailand are concerned,
these funds will only involve material,
equipment, supplies, and related costs.
The term "related costs" is in the lan-
guage of the bill.
If this is what is intended by the spon-
sors of the bill and the administration,
I do not see why they should not accept
my language. It would remove all doubt.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. COOPER. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Missouri is recognized.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
make two points. In effect, we have been
In war in Laos for years, and it is time
the Ameircan people knew more of the
facts.
Second, the present Secretary of De-
fense states that, if this matter comes
up again from the standpoint of any con-
tingent agreement, he believes it is a
matter which should be taken up with
the Congress.
Mr. ALLOT". Mr. President, I believe
that the previous remarks of the distin-
guished Senator from Missouri, as well
as his just completed remarks, are well
taken.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
thank the Senator.
Mr. ALLOT". Mr. President, I have
been very quiet during the course of this
debate. And, as I have listened to the de-
bate, I find my emotions swelling up
within me to the place where I think I
would be hard pressed to express them
in the period of 3 or 4 hours.
I am not a warlike man, nor am I an
unpeaceful man. But I find it difficult for
anyone who was concerned with the vital
committees of the Senate to stand on
this floor and say he did not know in
the spring of 1964 that we were becoming
involved in the war in Vietnam.
It is impossible for anyone not to have
known it.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President,
Senator yield?
Mr. ALLOTT. I yield.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President,
Senator referring to me?
Mr. sALLOTT. I was referring to any-
one who was e member of the Foreign
Relations Committee or the Appropria-
tions Committee at the time.
Mr. COOPER. Let me say in response
that during that debate I said that I
knew what we might get into. I voted
for the resolution, but I had no misap-
prehension about its possibilities. The
debate will show that on that day I said
that It could lead us into war, but we
will the
was the
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gust 12, 1969
at war or anticipated that we would be Mr. ALLOTT. I apologize. I had my
had confidence in the President that he
would use his authority with Judgment.
However, I do not want the United
States to get into the tame situation
again by the failure of the Congress to
exercise its responsibility.
Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I appre-
ciate the situation of the Senator. And
I ask him, and he can answer it in
any way he wants to, if he does not be-
lieve the Secretary of Defenae of his own
party and if he does not believe his own
President, because we have had assur-
ances from both of them that we will not
have any more commitrnerts of troops
in the Far East.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the
Senator let me respond?
Mr. ALLOTT. The Senator may re-
spond.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. Presid, iit, I believe
in the responsibility of the President,
and I believe in President Nixon. He is
my President whether he is Republi-
can or Democrat. It happans that we
are members of the same pat .y, of which
I am proud.
I understand and respect his respon-
sibility. I believe that he will exercise
it to the best of his ability, and he has
great ability.
I believe also in the responsibility of
Congress, both the House Of Representa-
tives and the Senate. I belieVe that we
have a responsibility to determine also,
whether the United States should go into
war and whether we should become in-
volved in situations which will send us
into war--whether our national inter-
ests, security and proper commitments
are actually involved.
We are talking about the future, and
whether we will take step, or refuse to
take steps that may prevent or inhibit
the possibility of war.
Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I under-
stand the concern of the Senator about
not wanting to become involved in
another Vietnam. However, my state-
ment was that there is no reason for
anyone who was a member of the For-
eign Relations Committee oe the eApa
propriations Committee, and particular-
ly the Defense Subcom.mittte, or the
Armed Services Committee, not to have
known in the spring and summer of 1964
that we were going to become involved in
a war.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. Preskitnt, I yield
for a question.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, it
seems to me that repeating the state-
ment is inviting comment upon a mat-
ter which was discussed at length. And
the Senator looks in this direction.
I was there. It is true that in the
spring of 1964, we had appioximately
15,000 or 16,000 soldiers in Vietnam.
There had been a gradual escalation
from the time that President Kennedy
came in, when there were lesa than 800
men who were considered to bc advisers.
They were not considered to be combat
soldiers.
Mr. ALLOTr. There were G36, if the
Senator wants the exact figure.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I do
not think anyone thought that we were
at war there in the future, dates crossed.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The alleged inci-
dents took place on the second and
fourth of August, 1964. The resolution
had been prepared long before that, I
think. It was intreduced in the House
and it was acted upOn almost instantane-
ously.
Mr. ALLOTT. Let me say to the Sen-
ator that my mind played me a trick
I thought it was before this.
But I will still go back to the state-
ment I made that in 1964 no member of
the Armed Services Committee or the
Appropriations Committee?particuarly
the Defense Committee or the Foreign
Relations Committee--should not have
known that we were being committed to
a war at that time.
Now, Mr. President, I want to con-
tinue?
Mr. FULBRIGIIT. Maybe we should be
a lot brighter than we are, but I did not
know it, I am frank to say.
Mr. ALLOTT. Well, I am not surprised.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. ALLOTT. I yield.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President,
having had some unpleasant personal
experiences about that time in 1964, in-
volving this subject, I can speak with
some experience on it.
I have made the charge repeatedly,
and it has never been denied?and this
information came to me before my cam-
paign actually started?that we did not
drift into this war. We had a small num-
bers of advisers over there in 1960 and
1961, and suddenly 15,000 to 16,000 men
were sent over, with explicit orders to
shoot back.
I tried to bring this to the attention
of the American public; I could not get
anybody to listen to me. r do not think
it would have made a bit at difference.
But we were at war when the Gulf of
Tonkin incident took place. I remember
begging for equal tine on television so
I could present not the Republican side
but this American side of the under-
standing of what was going on in Viet-
nam, and I never got any place. When
you are shooting back in a situation such
as that, you are in war; and although
we had advisers over there who were ex-
plicitly told never to fire on anyone, this
advisory situation ended some time in
1962: when the troops were told to fire
back.
I suggest to the Senator from Ken-
tucky that, unless I am badly mistaken,
even his language could not prevent a
President from giving the same orders or
a Secretary of Defense frotn giving the
same orders.
So I have a feeling that what we are
talking about now gets to the fact of
whether or not we, as Senators, have
faith, regardless of whether we are Re-
publicans or Democrats, in the man who
has been elected President and the men
with whom he has surrounded himself as
Secretary of State and Secretary of De-
fense.
I merely wanted to inject this because
have not heard it brought up. I have
never been challenged on it, and I have
made it and made it and made It.
President Eisenhower had been given
the opportunity to go to war in Viet-
nam and he rejected it?I think very
wisely?on the advice of General Ridge-
way and General Gavin.
I certainly did not think we were get-
ting into war when President Kennedy
sent advisor personnel out there.
It is my impression that at about the
same time he sent troops to Germany
because Khrushchev had threatened
him, he believed, at the meeting at
Vienna.
I do not believe that he intended to
get into war any more than he intended
to get into war in Germany by sending
those troops there.
No action had been taken when it
came to the Gulf of Tonkin incident it-
self?
Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, with all
due deference to the Senator, I said that
I would yield for a question. I have been
listening to the distinguished Senator,
without interrupting him for weeks now.
I yielded for a question, not for a speech.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. Presfdent, I will
put it this way. Has the Senator read
the report of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee on the incidents of the Gulf of
Tonkin?
Mr. ALLOTT, Recently?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. At any time.
Mr. ALLOTT. Yes.
Mr. leutiBRIGHT. Was the Senator
not impressed with the fact that the
representations given to that committee
by the then Secretary of State, Secre-
tary of Defense, and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff proved to be
in error?
Mr. ALLOTT. I am completely aware
of that. And I was present during all
of the Gulf of Tonkin debate. I am aware
of the statements made by various Sen-
ators at that time.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is
aware that the statements made by the
Chairman of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee were based on information given
to him which information proved to be
in error.
The question I ask the Senator is this:
That being so, how can he make the
statement that we all knew?and I as-
sume he means by that intended to ac-
cept?the Southeast Asia resolution was
the equivalent of a declaration of war?
ALLOTT. Mr. President, I have made
no such statement. I have tried to make
my remarks, and I am going to make
them if we stay here until midnight, de-
spite the Senator's loquacity. I never
made the statement or implied the state-
ment that when the Gulf of Tonkin reso-
lution, for which I admit I voted, was
passed, everybody knew we were going to
get into war. That was not in 1964. The
Gulf of Tonkin resolution was not passed
in 1964.
Mr. PASTORE. Yes; it was.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Unfortunately, it
was in August of 1964.
Mr. ALLOTT. I thought it was before
that. I apologize.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I happen to know
about that I was present
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Mr. ALLOTT. I would say to the Sen-
ator that I see no reason to challenge it,
looking backward for 5 years now.
Mr. STENNIS addressed the Chair.
Mr. ALLOTT. I wish to continue.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if the
Senator will yield for this statement?it
is 6 o'clock, and if we are going to have a
vote tonight, I think we should vote,
with all deference to the Senator from
Colorado. I just want to give my opinion.
Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I want to
defer to the Senator, but I have kept very
quiet during the past weeks. My remarks
will be very short. The fact that I would
like to speak for 3 or 4 hours does not
mean I am going to do so or have any
intention of doing so.
Mr. STENNIS. I withdraw my request.
Mr. ALLOTT. If the Senator will per-
mit me to continue for a short time, I
will be very grateful to him.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Colorado has the floor.
Mr. ALLOTI'. Mr. President, looking
sit the present amendment, I wish to say
this: The thing that has concerned me
about many of the rash of amendments
that we have had?some of them have
been meritorious?is that in my belief
the Senate may be moving toward the
position of creating a vacuum in South-
east Asia.
I know that the domino theory was
discredited by all the intellectuals in this
country several years ago. But whether
the domino theory was discredited by
the intellectuals or not, the fact is that
if we do not preserve free governments
in Southeast Asia, we are leaving a
vacuum which is going to be filled faster
than we can turn around by the Red
Chinese and by the North Vietnamese.
As long ago as 1962, I brought to the
attention of the State Department?
without any action or any acknowledge-
ment in any way?the fact that Red
Chinese troops were roaming at will
through a good portion of northern
Thailand. They still are, except that now
they are actually engaging in acts of war.
This is a large area. It is composed of
many people, and with it a lot of the
natural resource wealth of the world.
We have done very well, in my opinion,
in Indonesia; perhaps not as startlingly
well as in Malaysia.
But if we permit Laos to go completely
down the drain, Thailand to go down the
drain, and Vietnam to go down the drain,
as some people would like to do?and
some people would like to have us en-
courage the promotion of a dual govern-
ment there?I do not think it will be long
before Southeast Asia will have become a
Communist strongold. When this occurs,
I think our position in the world will be
much more difficult; our position with
the Philippines will be much more diffi-
cult; our position with Indonesia will be
much more difficult; and our position
with Malaysia will be impossible.
When we formed the tripartite situa-
tion in Laos, I said at the time it would
not work. It has not worked. Today we
find that the Plain of Jars in Laos is
pretty much overrun by the Viet Minh.
If I may have the attention of the
Senator from Kentucky particularly as
I make this remark, I do not want to see
commitments made for ground troops in
this area any more than he does. He is
no more sincere in his belief than I am.
But I am sure he knows that we have air
bases in Thailand. He knows that we
have a naval base in Thailand. That is
no secret. He knows of our activities
now?which I shall not mention?in
Laos, activities which do not involve
ground troops.
I have read his amendment. I say in
all sincerity, looking down the road to
what I think could happen if the Sen-
ate keeps on with this sort of frenetic
pattern it has established during the last
few days and'weeks, that I am afraid we
shall be sending a good portion of the
world down the rain. I have had the
clerk write out the Fulbright amendment
as modified. The amendment, so modi-
fied reads, in pertinent portion:
Not to exceed $2.5 billion of the funds au-
thorized for appropriation for the use of the
Armed Forces of the United States under
this or any other Act are authorized to be
made available for their stated purposes to
support: (1) Vietnamese and other free
world forces in Vietnam, (2)?
And this is where the Senator's
amendment comes in?
to provide materiel, supplies, equipment, and
maintenance thereof to local forces in Laos
and Thailand.
Have I quoted the Senator's amend-
ment correctly?
Mr. COOPER. Correctly.
Mr. ALLOTT. In my opinion, what the
Senator from Kentucky's amendment
could mean is that we could not put
supplies in Laos or Thailand to maintain
our forces, or supplies to protect our air-
ports, our Air Force, our naval bases, or
anything else that we have there. The
legislative history is quite clear, I think,
as it pertains to every Senator, that none
of us wishes to engage in more ground
warfare in Southeast Asia or, for that
matter, anywhere else.
But I cannot read his amendment in
any way except as being a totally un-
acceptable and crippling burden upon
the Secretary of Defense and the Presi-
dent. I know the Senator's concern. I
know he is sincere. I have never seen
him do anything in his life which was
not sincere. He does not play games with
people and he does not play games with
legislation. He is completely a sincere,
honest, and straightforward man.
But just as strongly, I would hope he
would not press his amendment because
I think it places a burden on our Presi-
dent with respect to the protection of our
forces in those areas, which is something
that no one, if he understood it as I inter-
pret it, would wish to do.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. ALLOTT. I yield..
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I wish
to ask the Senator if it is not true that
the President inherited the problems in
Vietnam. I know the wish is shared by
all of us that there had been another way
to solve that problem. I know all of us
wish that there was some way to solve
it now without withdrawing from our
commitments and without doing some-
thing that would not be in the best in-
terests of our country.
However, is it not true that the
President said on several occasions
there will be no more Vietnams in his
administration?
Mr. ALLOTT. That is my understand-
ing of what he has said.
Mr. MURPHY. Would it not be con-
sidered responsible that this man who
has been in public life for many years
and who has been elected by the people
of this country be given the confidence
without trying to write into an authori-
zation bill for military procurement pro-
visions that might be a detriment to the
protection of American people, Ameri-
can troops, and American property?
Mr. ALLOTT. I fully believe so; yes.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I have
listened patiently to the discussion. As I
said at the outset, and as the distin-
guished Senator from Florida stated, this
entire discussion has been a filibuster.
This entire discussion has taken place at
the wrong time and under the wrong set
of circumstances. It should not be a part
of this particular bill. I made that state-
ment on the first day we considered the
bill.
I assure the Senate that the work of
this committee was carefully and
thoughtfully done. It was properly done.
But now it is being shredded, twisted,
and torn up. The more I hear this dis-
cussion, the more I am certain discus-
sion on our foreign policy, present and
future, should take place in this body,
and I would enjoy taking part in it.
However, it would seem to me, and I
hope the Senator agrees, that this eve-
ning, at this stage, in this protracted dis-
cussion this is an unfortunate attempt to
place restrictions on a new President who
has been doing a magnificent job, as far
as I know, in bringing about solutions to
problems that he inherited. By taking a
good hard look at them he will be able
to find solutions.
Mr. ALLOTT. I thank the Senator for
his contribution. I am appreciative of
the Senator's statements.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. ALLOTT. I yield.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I think
this is a dangerous amendment. I think
it is potentially mischievous and very
unnecessary for us to vote on it tonight
when it has not been printed and no one
has had a chance to look at it. There is
no copy available except what has been
scratched in pencil on a piece of paper.
I think the matter requires extensive
debate.
I spent a great deal of time in Laos and
Thailand. I know what we are engaged
in and I know the extent to which we are
involved.
If a rigid interpretation were applied
to the amendment of the Senator from
Kentucky it could seriously jeopardize
the lives of American men. I am not pre-
pared to vote willy-nilly on something
that we know nothing about. We do not
know the reaction of the Department
of Defense to the amendment or how
they would interpret it.
If extended discussion is required on
the matter tonight I am prepared to dis-
cuss it at length as long as anyone is
prepared to sit and listen.
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Mr. STENNIS and Mr. FULBRIGHT
addressed the Chair.
Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I assured
the Senator from Mississippi I would not
retain the floor for more than a few min-
utes. I have no intention of holding the
floor further.
I wish to say to the Senator from Mis-
sissippi that the statement made by the
Senator from California is true. Senators
can rest assured that any matter coining
out of the committee of the distinguished
Senator from Mississippi has had the
most meticulous scrutiny, observation,
discussion, and thought.
While I do not desire to retain the floor
against the wishes of the distinguished
Senator from Mississippi, I felt some of
these things had to be said before this
matter was voted upon because I am
convinced this amendment would wreak
a lot of havoc.
There can be no question in anyone's
mind after this legislative history that
the amendment agreed to a few moments
ago was never intended to put ground
troops in Laos and Thailand.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. Prez,ident, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. ALLOTT. I yield to the Senator
from Missouri.
Mr SYMINGTON. I thank the Senator.
Mr. President, I would hope we could
get on with the bill. I respectfully point
out to the Senate the fact that the lan-
guage was agreed to by the chairman
of the Committee on Armed Services and
the chairman of the Committee on For-
eign Relations. I thought that the lan-
guage agreed to was eminently satis-
factory and that we could have gone
ahead at least 1 hour ago and gotten
through with this part of the bill.
Mr. ALLOTT. I yield the floor.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I ap-
preciate the contribution of the Senator
from Kentucky I feel this section is old
law. It already has a meaning. It has
been followed these 2 years. It would be
far better to keep this section now, as
used heretofore, with the ceiling we have
prepared. If the Senator from Kentucky
wants to pursue his thoughts further, I
know what a draftsman he is and that
he does not need anyone particularly, but
if he would put anything he has in mind
in a separate amendment, it would be
helpful to see what others thought.
I am glad now to yield to the Senator
from Kentucky.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I have
taken up a good deal of time tonight. I
must say that I have not filibustered.
Mr. STENNIS. No,
Mr. COOPER. I have taken some -time
because I considered this to be an impor-
tant matter, much more important than
merely reducing the amounts involved,
with due regard to in friend from Ar-
kansas and my friend from Mississippi.
We are dealing with an entirely different
concept: The question of whether funds
can be spent for the use of our Armed
Forces in fighting in support of local
Laos and Thailand forces without a com-
mitment by the President or the Con-
gress or both, which might_ lead to war.
I would therefore urge that the ques-
tion is much more important than the
matter of dollars and cents.
I want to thank my friend from Colo-
rado (Mr. Arzorr) for his statement. I
know him. I know that he has deep feel-
ings about these matters. He does sit
quietly at times, but I know how deep
his feelings run and he speaks with con-
viction courage and force. I appreciate
very much what he has said, and for his
kind remarks about me.
Perhaps I may be sincere, but some-
one else might say that I may be sincere,
but I may not be always right or too
bright about things. Sincerity does not
always make up for those qualities.
My amendment has not been printed.
I had thought about it but as we were
coming to the close of the debate in these
2 days before we recess, I did not expect
to bring it up until after the recess. But
when the Senator from Arkansas offered
his amendment, I knew that mine should
be offered.
I will not press for a vote tonight. I
know that I can withdraw, and offer this
amendment later, but I ask a parliamen-
tary question because I want to be cer-
tain: Mr. President, in the event the
Senator from Kentucky withdraws his
amendment this evening, would it be
Possible for him to submit the amend-
ment at a later date?
The PRESIDING OloioiCER. Yes. That
would be completely in order.
Mr. COOPER. I thank the Chair. I
will withdraw the amendment but I will
bring it up again. I hope that by the
time I bring it up again, the Senator
from Mississippi will have consulted with
the Defense Department to see if they
would be willing to offer language in
title IV conforming to the Senator from
Mississippi's understanding that it was
their intention. The Senator has said it
was intended that funds were to be used
for supplies, equipment, and such. We
have absolute confidence in the Senator
from Mississippi, but the Department of
Defense should spell out clearly the pur-
pose of title IV relative to Laos and
Thailand.
Mr. President, we have been talking
about the President, President Nixon is
my President. He is a Republican Presi-
dent. I do not want to go back into his-
tory, but members of my family have
been Republicans since the Civil War?
longer than some others have been, and
some fought in the Civil War as Repub-
licans. I support the office of President,
I support the great responsibility it car-
ries, and I have great admiration for and
confidence in President Nixon.
But, I also respect this body. We have
responsibilities, too. I do not want the
President of the United States?and we
are talking about President Nixon?to be
hindered in his efforts by the same mis-
takes which have been made before.
It is rather curious that before 1966,
when this item had been carried in the
foreign aid bill for years, it was used
for military assistance, meaning equip-
ment, supplies, maintenance, food, and
money. Then it was changed, and placed
In the Defense bill.
It is rather curious that after it had
been put in the defense bill, we began to
use helicopters in Laos and Thailand un-
der orders of the Department of Defense,
and I understand in railitary activities.
I cannot understand why the language
is not differentiated between funds to be
used in Lade arid Thailand and funds to
be used in Vietnam, It is exactly -the
same language. Perhaps fungi' are to be
used for some military activities such, as
for helicopters. Helicopters mai take
local forces to back areas. tiring on the
helicopters begins, as it did in Vietnam,
and war comes.
In 1963 or 1964?before the Gulf of
Tonkin resolution?I remember the for-
mer Senator from Oklahoma. Mr. Mon-
roney, came back from Vietnam and told
us that our helicopters were carrying men
up the mountains, that there were U.S.
riflemen on the helicopters who were
firing in defense of the helicopters and
the pilots, and that their fire was being
returned from the ground. That may be
what we are doing in Laos and Thailand
now.
The fact that some Senators have
stated we are engaged in fighting in Laos
and Thailand makes it more important
that we limit the funds in this bill, be-
cause if we do not, if we approve that
kind of activity, it may lead?I hope
not?but it may lead us into war.
The SEATO Treaty states that in the
event of armed aggression against any
of the parties thereto, Including the
protocol states, Laos, Cambodia, or Thai-
land, the parties thereto shall take ac-
tion according to their constitutional
processes.
Mr. President, what are the constitu-
tional processes?
It is not defined.
When Secretary of State Dulles testi-
fied before the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee on the SEATO Treaty?I have
read the testimony?he was asked what
constitutional processes, meant. He
replied that it meant the joint authority
of the executive branch arid the Con-
gress.
The national commitments resolution
was recently passed, expressing the same
sense.
If we are fighting in Thailand and
Laos now, we should know it.
The President of the United States?
whether he be President Nixon, Presi-
dent Johnson, or any President, in my
view, has no right to taka our country
into war without first coming to the
Congress and asking for ite authority.
If a situation should arise where our
forces were being attacked, of course, the
President has the constitutional right to
defend them and to protect the security
of our country. But I do not want war
to occur because of carelessness or fail-
ure to look ahead. If we get into war, I
believe that the Senate wants the deter-
mination to be made by the jelat au-
thority of the President and the Con-
gress.
Mr. President, that is the meaning of
my amendment.
I shall withdraw the amendment to-
night because many Senators have not
had the opportunity to read it and to
consider it. Unless the Armed Services
Committee and its chairman modify the
section by amendment?it has to be by
amendment?and by Interpretation so
precise that no one can think anything
to the contrary. I want to say that I will
bring up this admendraent again and we
can determine if this body wants to
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abide by the constitutional processes,
wants to abide by its national commit-
ments resolution and wants to disap-
prove funds for the use of our forces
which could lead us into another war
without the consent of Congress.
Mr. President, I withdraw my amend-
ment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Kentucky withdraws his
amendment.
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator
very much for his splendid remarks and
for what I think is a constructive step,
too, in withdrawing the amendment for
the time being. That is all I have to say.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I thank
the Senator, and I may add to my re-
marks that I shall ask for a rollcall.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I do
not know what the wishes of the leader-
ship or of the Senator from Mississippi
are. I have a very minor amendment,
which can go over until September, but
I wanted to inquire as to the wishes of
the Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, a parlia-
mentary inquiry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator will state it.
Mr. STENNIS. Has the amendment
been adopted?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment has been withdrawn. No
amendment is pending.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, in
other words, the one which I amended in
accordance with the Senator's amend-
ment has been adopted, according to my
understanding.
Mr. STENNIS. That is my understand-
ing.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, does
the Senator wish me to offer amendment
No. 111 at this time or not? The Sena-
tor is familiar with it.
Mr. STENNIS. I cannot agree to it.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thought the Sena-
tor had proposed an amendment to it.
Mr. STENNIS. No; that is the wrong
one. The Senator is referring to another
amendment. I have only seen the amend-
ment the Senator has handed me within
the last hour or two.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. This is No. 111.
Mr. STENNIS. I was handed the wrong
one.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am sorry the Sen-
ator was given the wrong amendment
by mistake. Amendment No. 111 was sub-
mitted and printed about a week ago.
Mr. STENNIS. I am ready for the
,Senator to present his amendment, if he
is agreeable to a proviso.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
'ie Senator yield briefly?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield to the Sen-
tor from Montana.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I do
feel I should let this occasion go by
without expressing my respect, regard,
and affection for the distinguished senior
Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER) .
What he tried to say and what he did was
and is in the minds and hearts of all of
us, and has been for almost half a decade,
If not longer.
I want him to know that I honor him
for his persistence as well as for his
sagacity and I am delighted that he is
going to introduce again the amendment
which he has withdrawn, because none
of us can alibi himself out of what he
did on the Tonkin resolution. It was
plain, clear, and legible, and every one of
us understood it, but that does not mean
many of us have not regretted it.
The reason why I am impressed by
what the distinguished Senator has said
is that he has tried, as best he knows
how, to exercise his responsibility as a
Senator of the United States, in the
hope that this body?the Senate of the
United States?will live up to its respon-
sibility, collectively as well as individ-
ually, and that we will participate, inso-
far as we can within the realm of the
Constitution, in making certain that we
act in line with what President Nixon
said just this past month, when he laid
down, in Guam, the Nixon Doctrine for
the Pacific.
He said, in effect, "No more Vietnams."
He said, in effect, we are a pacific na-
tion, with peripheral Asian interests in
the mainland. He said, in effect, we are
not going to get involved in internal dif-
ficulties. He said, in effect, we are not
going to go to war again unless it is nu-
clear and our security is at stake.
So I am delighted that, even though
the hour is late, the Senator from Ken-
tucky did bring up this question. It is
paramount. Everything that is happen-
ing and has been happening in Vietnam
has an indirect and a direct relationship
to many of the other troubles that con-
front this Republic today.
I agree with the Senator that we do
not want to get involved again in an area
which is not vital to the security of this
country, and in an area which has cost
this country over $100 billion?and the
end is not yet in sight?and not just 36,-
000, but altogether 44,000 dead?with
the end not yet in sight?and with
wounded of over 200,000?and the end
not yet in sight.
So I think the warning raised by the
distinguished Senator from Kentucky
should be and will be heeded.
I want him to know that I honor him
for what he has said, and I honor him
for what he has done in this body.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
would like to associate myself with every-
thing the majority leader has said about
the Senator from Kentucky. The Sena-
tor from Kentucky played a leading role
relating to the recent resolution with
regard to the responsibilities of the
Senate and the Congress. In offering this
proposal and in making the statement
he made, he was carrying into effect the
letter, and I think the spirit, of that
resolution. He has rendered a great
service.
I could go further and say that, as a
result of the efforts of the Senator from
Kentucky, I have noticed that the Senate
as a whole in recent weeks has shown a
greater sensitivity to its responsibilities
in this whole area than it has ever done
in the 25 years I have been in the Senate.
I think the Senator from Kentucky de-
serves the credit which the Senator from
Montana so appropriately expressed.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, if the Sen-
ator will yield, I wish to associate myself
with the remarks just made by my col-
leagues. The Senator from Kentucky is
a dear old friend of mine. I make the
practical suggestion that to articulate
this amendment properly it will take not
only the Department of Defense, but it
will take the State Department, which
have a role in trying to coordinate the
military and diplomatic activities of the
United States.
I think the majority leader's words give
added authority to the need for articu-
lating an amendment which will be upon
the level of the one we discussed so long
and which was decided so narrowly, but
which will truly seek to carry out a policy
of the United States. That is what this
amendment is really all about.
I know that I, as a member of the com-
mittee, and I am sure the chairman, will
cooperate with our colleague from Ken-
tucky, so that when he presents the pro-
posal it will truly represent the Senate
declaration as articulated, and which
raises the question which the Senator
from Colorado (Mr. ALLOTT) raised, all
of which is pertinent to our security re-
quirements.
Mr. COOPER. I thank the Senator.
Mr. JAVITS. I think he has rendered
a historic service.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President--
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, who has
the floor?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Mississippi yielded to the Sen-
ator from Arkansas. He had the floor
initially held by the Senator from
Mississippi.
The Senator from Arkansas.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I was going to yield
to the Senator from Kentucky.
Mr. STENNIS. I yield briefly to the
Senator from Kentucky.
Mr. COOK. Mr. President, I wish to
associate myself with the remarks made
by the majority, leader and would like to
say to my colleague that I would hope
he would do us the honor, when he re-
submits the amendment, to consider us-
ing the argument that is now in the
RECORD and disseminating it to the
Members of this body, and that he would
do many of us the honor of asking for
cosponsors to his amendment when it
may be submitted in the future.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield
to the Senator from Arkansas. If he
would rather have the floor, I yield the
floor.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Very well. I will
take the floor. I want to direct an inquiry
to the Senator.
Mr. President, I wish to take the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Arkansas.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is my under-,
standing the Senator from Mississippi
has prepared an amendment to my
amendment No. 111?a proviso, I should
say, at the end?which made the amend-
ment acceptable to him. Is that correct?
Mr. STENNIS. I may say to the Sena-
tor from Arkansas that an additional
question has arisen here about which I
think we ought to have a colloquy with
respect to possibly redrafting the
amendment of the Senator. lam in sym-
pathy with the amendment. I believe
we could work something out along that
line.
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Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does the Senator
wish to do that tonight or at a later
date?
Mr. STENNIS. If the Senator wishes
to briefly offer his amendment, I may
ask him some questions about it. We can
get to it rather quickly.
The amendment is relatively simple.
It would require the Secretary of De-
fense to make available to a congres-
sional committee, upon request, any
study or report prepared outside the
Department of Defense which was
financed in whole or in part by the M-
partment. The purpose is to insure that
the Congress is given access to research
studies performed by the so-called
"think tanks," the universities, or indi-
viduals whose work is paid for by the
taxpayers. The amendment recognizes
the issue of executive privilege and care-
fully specifies that the mandate applies
only to work performed outside?I em-
phasizing "outside"?the Department of
Defense.
This amendment is the outgrowth of
an effort by the Committee on Foreign
Relations to obtain a study prepared by
the Institute for Defense Analysis relat-
ing to the Gulf of Tonkin incident. It is
my understanding that the study con-
tains a review of what happened in the
Gulf of Tonkin, how communications
were handled, and in general how deci-
sions were made. The purpose of the
study, I was informed, was to determine
what lessons could be learned for future
crisis situations. I think that my col-
leagues will agree that there is much
that all of us can learn from that inci-
dent and its aftermath. The committee
has attempted several times to obtain
this study from the Department of De-
fense, but has been refused each time.
The Institute for Defense Analysis re-
ceives virtually all its feeds from the De-
partment of Defense. In fiscal year 1969
this organization receiVed $10,898,000
from the Department of Defense and
the Department proposes to give them
$11,150,000 in 1970.
I believe that the Congress, which im-
poses the taxes on the public to finance
this organization, and which authorizes
and appropriates the money for it, should
have the right to see how that money is
being spent. The issue here is far more
important than this one study?it is a
question of whether the Congress has the
power to obtain information, prepared
outside the Government with tax money,
for which no claim of executive privilege
has been made.
The Senate is beginning, at long last,
to reassert its constitutional prerogatives
and to restore the proper balance to our
system. Passage of this amendment will
be one small, but positive, step in that
direction.
So I do think that there is an impor-
tant principle involved here. The Senator
from Mississippi has proposed a modi-
fication, which I think is proper, but
whch he can discuss, which simply, as I
understand it, says that these reports
must be final in form?not tentative, or
unfinished reports?which is what I in-
tended. I am perfectly willing to modify
my amendment in accordance with that
suggestion.
With this stated, I may say that, as a
consequence of this morning's meeting, I
propose a further amendment which I
hope will be acceptable to the Senator
from Mississippi. I have not previously
prepared it, because it grew out of this
morning's meeting of the committee with
the representative of the Joint Chiefs. If
it is acceptable, I hope the Senator will
add it. If it is not, I will do the same as
the Senator from Kentucky, and reserve
it for further consideration. But if I may,
I should like to read it for the informa-
tion of the Senate. It is only one
paragraph.
I would add, if it is acceptable to the
Senator from Mississippi, the following
language:
The Secretary of Defense shall also provide
to the Conunittees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives a
copy of all bilateral contingency plans, signed
by a representative of the Department of
Defense and an official of a government of a
foreign country, involving use of United
States forces for the Joint defense of that
country.
I mean, of course, that foreign coun-
try. I thought this language might solve
or help solve a problem such as that
which presently confronts us. It speaks
for itself. If the Senator is willing to
accept, it I shall include it; if he is not.
I shall reserve it and see if we can work
out Something mutually acceptable at
a later date.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, address-
ing myself to the last point of the pro-
posal, this is a highly important matter.
It demands the most careful analysis
and consideration of the language, the
implications, and the complications in-
volved; so I very respectfully, at this
time, could not seriously consider ac-
cepting it.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. If the Senator will
yield, I do solicit his assistance, because
I know he has great influence in the
Department of Defense, in working this
matter out. I very deeply regret to have
a difference of view of this character
with the Department of Defense. It in-
volves exactly the same principle of the
right of Congress?and now, of course,
we are speaking of the Senate?to such
Information as "What is the status of
the agreement?"
So, in the interim between now and
the time when I shall offer it later, I
hope the Senator from Mississippi will
use his influence with the Department
of Defense to prevail upon their making
avalable to the committee the docu-
ments, with which he is familiar.
Mr. STENNIS. We will give the prob-
lem attention. It is a matter that the full
committee certainly ought to have a
chance to pass upon. It appears to me
that it is broad enough to include any
and all kinds of war plans that might be
made, or near war plans, so those mat-
ters would have to be taken care of.
Mr. FULBRIGIIT. I emphasize to the
Senator that I did not mean that. This
refers only to matters signed by the rep-
resentative of a foreign country, in this
case the Prime Minister of Thailand.
This is most unusual. I asked the De-
partment, "Is there any precedent? Is
there anything similar to it?" They were
unable to cite any other example of a
similar nature.
Mr. STENNLS. Mr. President, I am
not passing on the facts the Senator re-
fers to. I have not seen it, and know
nothing about the contents of it.
Back to the printed amendment,
though, with the proviso on it, my pro-
viso merely stated, "This shall apply
only to reports, studies, and investiga-
tions which are already or substantially
final and complete, and shall not be ap-
plicable to preliminary or tentative
drafts," and so forth, "and working pa-
pers."
But going back, now, to the substance
of amendment No. 111 as printed--
ANTFND1VrENT NO. 111
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, if
the Senator will yield, I believe I over-
looked calling up amendment No. 111.
I call up my amendment No. 111, and
ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be stated.
The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. The Senator
from Arkansas (Mr. FIMBRIGHT)
pro-
poses arid amendment (No. 111) as fol-
lows:
At the end of the Nil add a new section as
follows:
"SEG. 402. The Secretary of Defense shall,
in response to any request made to him in
writing by a committee of the Congress,
promptly submit to such committee a copy
of any report, study, or investigation re-
quested by such committee if such report,
study, or investigation was made in whole
or in part with Department of Defense funds
and was made by a person, organization,
foundation, association, corporation, or other
entity outside the Department of Defense."
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I do not
think this in any way would involve war
plans, because it pertains only to work
done by someone outside the Defense
Department. But I raise this question:
Why should it not apply to other entities
outside the Defense Department, or any
other department of the Government? If
we just say "Defense Department," other
departments could have these studies
made, and pay for them themselves, and
we would have no access to them. Per-
haps we would not want it.
But the main point is this: Suppose
the President of the United States has
an outside organization prepare some-
thing for him, and it should be thus paid
for? Suppose it is military, and very
properly paid for by the Department of
Defense? We could not afford to think ofr
having such an amendment here, requir
ing him to give us the report. That is
purely executive privilege.
Mr. FULBRIGAT. Well, of course
there is no problem. The President ha
executive privilege.
Mr. STENNIS. I think the Senate
should redraft this proposal, with th.
printed language modified to clearly ex-
clude matters of executive privilege, be-
cause there is an instance that just came
to mind a minute ago, that a President
could very well have a department, have
a study made, for himself and the de-
partment.
This executive privilege matter, I
think, is a very serious thing. I have been
through that. I am in sympathy with the
intent of the Senator's amendment and
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its general, primary purpose, but I really
think, with all due respect, it should be
withdrawn.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I be-
lieve I am correct in saying that the
President of the United States can at
any time?and of course he has pleaded
on many occasions?plead executive
privilege. We have never contested that
with him.
I do not see how that would be a real
problem. He is not the one who is with-
holding this. In fact, one request has
been made of the President. I do not
recall any incident with which I have
been associated in which it has occurred.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the
amendment merely provides that any
kind of study, report, or investigation
paid for with the Department of Defense
funds shall be subjected to the will of
Congress.'
I think that is too much. A redrafting
of it would make certain exclusions.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I un-
derstood that the Senator, with his pro-
viso, would accept it.
Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is correct.
I had indicated that. However, in the last
few minutes I have become concerned
about the matter of executive privilege.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, does
the Senator wish for us to proceed with
the debate and vote tonight on this mat-
ter, or does he wish it to go over until
September?
I do not think it is essential to the
survival of the Republic that we vote on
the matter tonight. It is perfectly all
right with me for it to go over.
I do not wish to give up on it. It in-
volves a very critical problem that we
are in the midst of, and particularly the
one I refer to with regard to the amend-
ment.
Mr. STENNIS. I think it has much
merit.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is what I un-
derstood the Senator to think.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr, President, I think
It should spell out clearly the matter
about executive privilege. I do not see
how we can do that tonight.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
want the suggestion of the Senator with
regard to spelling it out. It is not clear
as to how to accomplish what he has in
mind.
Under the circumstances, if I may do
so with the agreement of the Senator, I
will withdraw the amendment temporar-
ily with the assurance that I shall re-
submit it when we return in September.
Is that agreeable with the Senator?
Mr. STENNIS. That is what I had ex-
pected the Senator to do.
Mr. FTJLBRIGHT. Mr. President, is
that satisfactory with the Senator?
Mr. STENNIS. Entirely so.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I will also try to in-
corporate it with the provision and get
it to the Senator in advance.
Mr. STENNIS. That is entirely satis-
factory.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
withdraw the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment is withdrawn.
Mr. MANS/. Mr. President, do
understand correctly that the amend-
ment offered by the distinguished Sen-
ator from Arkansas has been withdrawn?
The PRESIDING 0.10.FiCER. The
amendment has been withdrawn.
The Senator from Wisconsin is recog-
nized.
Mr. PROXMTRE. Mr. President, I call
up amendment No. 108 and ask that it
be made the pending business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be stated.
The legislative clerk proceeded to
state the amendment.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the reading of
the amendment be dispensed with and
that the amendment be printed in the
RECORD.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment, ordered to be printed
In the RECORD, reads as follows:
On page 2, line 7, strike out "3,965,700,000"
and insert in lieu thereof "$3,432,700,000".
At the end of the bill add a new section as
follows:
"Ssc. 402. (a) None of the funds author-
ized to be appropriated by this or any other
Act may be expended for the procurement of
any C-5A aircraft in addition to those air-
craft for which a contract has been' entered
into prior to the date of enactment of this
Act, and in no event shall more than a total
of fifty-eight of such aircraft be purchased
until after the Comptroller General of the
United States has completed and submitted
to the Congress a comprehensive study and
investigation of the past and projected costs
of such aircraft. In carrying out such study
and investigation the Comptroller General of
the United States shall among other things,
consider?
"(1) whether the C-5A aircraft is an eco-
nomic replacement for the C-141 and other
aircraft in view of the great increase in both
the procurement and operating costs of the
C-5A aircraft;
"(2) whether the purchase of a fourth
squadron of C-5A aircraft would add sig-
nificantly to the deployment capability of the
military forces of the United States;
"(3) whether the purchase of a fourth
squadron of C-5A aircraft would 'make the
United States liable for all contractor losses
and termination costs if a total of six squad-
rons of such aircraft were not procured;
"(4) whether the purchase of a fourth
squadron of the C-5A aircraft would make
the United States liable for the cost of repairs
and modifications necessary to correct the
structural defect revealed in the recent fail-
ure of the C-5A wing;
"(5) the current cost estimates necessary
to complete?
"(a) Run A of the C-5A aircraft,
"(b) the first twenty-three units of Run
B of such aircraft, and
"(c) the remainder of Run B of such
aircraft, including spares and operating
expenses for such aircraft over the next ten
years; and
"(6) the cost results to the United States
of applying the repricing formula contained
in the C-5A procurement contract on the first
twenty-three units of Run B of such aircraft
and on the complete Run B of such aircraft.
"(b) In carrying out the study and inves-
tigation authorized by subsection (a) of this
section, the Comptroller General of the
United States shall consult with the Office of
Systems Analysis of the Department of
Defense.
"(c) The Comptroller General of the
United States shall submit the results of his
study and investigation, together with such
recommendations as he deems appropriate,
to the Congress not more than ninety days
after the date of enactment of this Act."
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, this
is the amendment that pertains to re-
ducing funds for the C-5A.
I stated on the basis of the colloquy
previously between the chairman of the
committee and the distinguished ma-
jority leader that the amendment would
not be voted on until we return in the
fall, but that it would be the first order
of business at that time.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, the Sen-
ator from California wants to confirm
his understanding that the pending busi-
ness when we return after the recess
has already been laid down.
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator from
California is correct. The C-5A amend-
ment presented by the distinguished
Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE)
will be the pending business.
Mr. MURPHY. That amendment will
be the pending business.
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is cor-
rect.
Mr. MURPHY. It is not the desire of
the Senator to pursue this matter to-
night, but to carry over on it; is that
correct?
Mr. PROXMIRE. I will make remarks
on the amendment tomorrow, but I un-
derstand that there will be no vote on it
until the fall.
Mr. MURPHY. I thank the Senator.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I un-
derstand that there will be no further
rollcall votes tonight. In all candor, there
will be none on tomorrow, either.
THE CALENDAR
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senate pro-
ceed to the consideration of Calendar
Nos. 349 to 358.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
MISS JALILEH FARAH SALAMEH
EL AHWAL
The bill (H.R. 1707) for the relief of
Miss Jalileh Farah Salameh El Ahwal
was considered, ordered to a third read-
ing, read the third time, and passed.
MISS MARIA MOSIO
The bill (H.R. 5107) for the relief of
Miss Maria Mosio was considered, or-
dered to a third reading, read the third
time, and passed.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed in
the RECORD an excerpt from the report
(No. 91-357) explaining the purpose of
the bill.
There being no objection, the excerpt
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
PFRPOSE OF THE BILL
The purpose of the bill is to facilitate the
entry into the United States, in an immedi-
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iagust 12,?1969
ate relative status of the adopted daughter
of a U.S. citizen.
BILL PASSED OVER
The bill (H.R. 3213) conferring juris-
diction upon the U.S. Court of Claims to
hear, determine, and render judgment
upon the claim of Solomon S. Levadi was
announced as next in order.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Over.
The PRESIDING 0./01010ER. The bill
will be passed over.
ANTHONY smmico
The bill (H.R. 8136) for the relief of
Anthony Smilko was considered, ordered
to a third reading, read the third time.
and passed.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed in
the RECORD an excerpt from the report
(No. 91-360), explaininz the purposts
of the bill.
There being no objection, the excerpt
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD.
as follows:
PURPOSE ?
The purpose of the propoiled legislation is
to credit the annual leave account of An-
thony Smilko, a General rvices Adminis-
tration employee, with 321 hours of annual
leave earned by him during the period begin-
ning April 1959, and ending December 1985,
inclusive which, through adiranistrative er-
ror, was not credited to his annual leave
account.
STATEMENT
The proposed legislation plas-ed the House
of Representatives May 20, 1969. The facts of
the case as stated in the accompanying House
Report 91-204 are as follow':
In its report to the committee on a similar
bill in the 90th Congress, tile General Serv-
ices Administration recomnianded the enact-
ment of the bill with correetions which are
now embodied in H.R. 8136.
Mr. Anthony Smilko served as an employee
of the general Services Adminiatration in the
period rrom April 1959 through the end of
1985 and in that period he was credited with
20 days of annual leave per year. However, It
was subsequently determined that in that
period he was, in fact, entitled to 26 days per
year. The error in crediting Iiis annual leave
occurred because the leave was computed on
the basis of a service computation date of
August 0, 1919, rather than the correct date
of April 5, 1944, which should have been used
for purposes of determining annual leave
computations. In the period In question Mr.
Smilko was credited with 1,1i7 annual leave
hours when he should haft been credited
with 1,438 hours. As a reshit, he was not
credited with 321 hours to which he was
entitled. This is the figure carried in the
bill H.R. 8136.
In its report to the committee, the Gen-
eral Services Administration observed that
this error can only be adjusted by legisla-
tion and, accordingly, it is reeen mended that
the bill providing for a credit in a separate
leave account be made to Anthony Smilko by
enactment of the bill. The Oeueral Services
Administration further stated that the Civil
Service Commission has indicated to the
General Services Administration that they
do not object to the enactment of private
legislation in this instance, for the leave
merely provides for a restoration of the leave
for use only and not for the purpose of a
lump-sum payment. It is also appropriate to
note that, whereas the Civil Service commis-
sion states that future cages ought to be
covered by general legislation, such leglisla-
tion would not normally grant retroactive re-
lief in Mr. Srnilko's case.
In agreement with the views of the Civil
Service Commission, the General Services Ad-
ministration, and the House of Representa-
tives, the committee recommends the bill
favorably.
BERNARD L. COULTER
The Senate proceeded to consider the
bill (H.R. 4658) for the relief of Bernard
L. Coulter which had been reported from
the Committee on the Judiciary with an
amendment on page 2, line
word "of" strike out "C
"Cook".
The amendmen
The amendm
engrossed and
time.
The bill
passed.
Mr. M
unanimo
the REC
No. 91-
the bill.
Ther
was or
as folio'
The
as amen
in settle
States a
of an ace
curred on
nerd L. Cou
motor vehic
as an employ
Justice. The p
bill would also
judgment and cos
ernment employee
the Circuit Court of
upon that accident.
?
e" and inser
as agreed to.
t was ordered to be
e bill to be read a third
S read the third time, and
WIELD. Mr. President, I ask
consent to have printed in
D an excerpt from the report-
55?explaining the purposes of
? being no objection, the excerpt
ered to be printed in the RECORD,
s:
PURPOSE
rpose of the proposed legislation,
sal, is to pay Richard S. Bell $313.66
ent of his claims against the United
Bernard L. Coulter arising out
ent in Chicago, Ill., which oc-
ecember 17, 1961, when Ber-
er was operating a Government
In the course of his duties
of the U.S. Department of
ment provided for in this
In full satisfaction of a
entered against the Gov-
a municipal court of
ok County, Ill., based
I I
?
?
STATEMEN
In its favorable report o the bill, the
Committee on the Judiciary the House
of Representatives set forth ?e facts of
the case and its recommendations ?s follows:
The Department of Justice in a report
to the committee on a similar b I dated
July 22, 1968, stated that it had e mined
the circumstances of the case and , con-
cluded that passage of the bill wou d be
equitable and that the Department ha. no
objection to its enactment.
The report of the Department of Jus ice
notes that had the accident occurred er
March 21, 1962, the effective date of he
Drivers Act Amendment to the Federal T
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2679 (b-e), the Gove n-
ment would have been substituted for r
nard L. Coulter as the sole party defend nt.
The result of this substitution would ave
been that any judgment would have t? have
been paid byathe Government. This end-
ment, which originated as a bill ore this
committee, was intended to otect em-
ployees such as Mr.
just such sit-
uations. Prior to the enactment of these
provisions, this committee had granted re-
lief such as that provided in H.R. 4658 in a
number of cases. It might also be noted that
had the other party electecl,. to bring an
action against the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, a recovery against
the United States would have barred any
action against the Government employee.
This is provided in section 2676 of title 28,
which provides as follows:
"? 2676. Judgment as bar
"The judgment in an action under section
1846(b) of this title shall constitute a com-
plete bar to any action by the claimant by
reason of the same subject matter, against
the employee of the Government whoee act or
omission gave rise to the claim."
In connection with the consideration of
this rnatterathe committee was supplied with
additional facts concerning the accident, It
appears that Mr: Coulter had stopped at
a stop sign at the intersection of 45th and
South Drexel Boulevard in Chicago, Ill., while
traveling in an eastbound direction. On De-
cember 17, 1961, there was Ice on the streets
and after starting the car, the Government
employee realized that due to the icy con-
dition, he was unable to accelerate the car
enough to clear the intersection and avoid
approaching traffic. He, therefore, stopped the
ar after proceeding 4 to 7 feet into the in-
section. The oncoming car continued to
ap roach and struck the Government vehicle
at that point.
The committee has carefully considered
the matter in the light of the recommenda-
tion of the Department and the facts of the
case and has determined that this is a proper
subject for legislative relief. The policy con-
siderations reflected in the provisions of the
Tort Claims Act as noted by the Department
of Justice further provide a basis for such
relief. Accordingly, it is recommended that
the bill, with the corrective amendment rec-
ommended by the Department, be considered
favorably.
The coramittee believes that the bill is
meritorious and recommends it favorably.
THE NAVAJO INDIAN IRRIGATION
PROJECT
The Senate proceeded to consider the
bill (S. 203) to amend the act of June 13,
1962 (76 Stat. 96), with respect to the
Navajo Indian irrigation project which
had been reported from the Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs, with an
amendment, on page 2, after line 3,
strike out:
"(d) The Secretary of the Interior shall
compensate the persons whose grazing per-
mits, licenses, or leases covering lands de-
clared to be held in trust for the Navajo
Tribe pursuant to section 8(a) of this Act
are canceled after the date this subsection
becomes effective. Sulah compensation shall
be determined in accordance with the stand-
ards prescribed in the Act of July 9, 1942, as
amended (43 U.S.C. 315q), and shall be paid
from the moneys received by the United
States from the Navajo Tribe for the full ap-
praised value of such lands under the pro-
visions of section 3(a)."
And, in lieu thereof, insert:
(d) Any permits, licenses, or leases that
have been granted on lands acquired and de-
clared to be held in trust for the Navajo
Tribe pursuant to section 8(a) of this Act
shall be canceled on the effective date of this
Act, except that permits, licenses, or leases
whose term has not expired at the time of
cancellation thereof by this Act, shall con-
tinue in effect for the term of the permit,
license, or lease under regulations for Indian
lands until the land is required for irrigation
purposes. When such lands are required for
irrigation purposes, the permittee, licensee,
or lessee shall be compensated by the Navajo
Tribe proportionately for the value of devel-
opments or irnproveinents made by such
permittee, licensee, or lessee and which sueh
permittee, licensee, or lessee was unable to
utilize fully because of the cancellation of
the permit, license, or lease, as determined by
the Secretary of the Interior.
So as to make the bill read:
S. 203
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of
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mal times involves two complete task
forces in reserve, thereby making the in-
vestment cost of placing one "on station"
three times $1.4 billion or $4.2 billion.
To build an airbase in the Pacific costs
$53 million; a civilian runway can be op-
erational for tactical air with a bare base
set for approximately $36 million.
Third. Because of their high degree of
vulnerability to enemy attacks, carriers
are far less effectiVe than land bases.
In recognition of the carrier's vulner-
ability to attacks by submarines, aircraft,
ship-to-ship and air-launched missiles,
one-half of the cost of a carrier task
force is for carrier defense.
About 25 percent of a carrier's aircraft
are held back for defensive purposes--
during the Korean war, 23 percent of
the total combat sorties flown from car-
riers were defensive, in contrast to 2.7
percent flown from land bases.
Because of its tremendous investment
in a carrier task force, the Navy is slow
to commit the carrier to combat; once
committed the carrier cannot effectively
launch air attacks when attempting to
evade enemy attack.
Rapid advances in missile technology
have produced the STYX and other
more advanced antiship missiles, mak-
ing the carrier's position untenable in
any conflict with a sophisticated enemy.
Fourth. Instead of reducing its carrier
fleet, thereby accepting the realities of
present and future defense needs, the
Navy has continued to augment this fleet.
The carriers which have joined the
fleet since the mid-1950's?eight Forres-
tal class, one Enterprise, and the CVAN-
68?the nuclear carrier which will enter
the fleet in 19'72?are almost double the
size of the older carriers, are equipped
with the most modern aircraft, and,
therefore, have far greater capability for
tactical air than the oldest carriers which
they replace. The Navy has stated that
the nuclear carrier air wing is tactically
more than twice as effective as that of
the World War II carriers.
Since the Navy has followed a "one
for one" replacement policy in the past,
the actual capacity of the carrier fleet
in terms of providing tactical air power
is far greater than 15 carrier' force level
would imply.
There is no reason why the Navy can-
not reduce the number of attack carriers
by retiring two of the older carriers as
each of the modern carriers joins the
fleet.
Since the large, modern carriers are
only effective in very limited conflicts,
the Navy should use some of its,antisub-
marine carriers, CVS, for attack pur-
poses; one of these carriers is now being
used in Vietnam as an attack carrier.
Fifth. The fact that our adversaries
and potential adversaries do not have at-
tack carriers further weakens the justifi-
cation for the present size of the U.S.
carrier fleet.
Neither the Soviet Union or China has
built a single attack carrier, and neither
plans to do so. The British and the
French are the only other nations with
an attack carrier in their fleet, and the
British have decided to phase out their
carriers.
Whether the U.S. goal is military Par-
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRI-
ATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970
FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT,
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT,
AND FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF
MISSILE TEST FACILITIES AT
KWAJALEIN MISSILE RANGE,
AND RESERVE COMPONENT
STRENGTH?AMENDMENT
AMENDMENT NO. 136
Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, on be-
half of myself and Senator CASE, I am
submitting .an amendment to the mili-
tary authorization bill, now before the
Senate.
This amendment withholds the $377.1
million authorized for laying the keel of
the nuclear attack carrier CVAN-69,
pending a full study and investigation by
the Comptroller General of the justi-
fication for building an additional attack
carrier.
The United States has 15 attack car-
riers, each requiring a task force of
escorts and logistical ships, and it has
maintained the same number?with few
exceptions?since the end of World War
No adequate rationale for a force
level of this size has ever been presented
by the Navy. That? 15 is. an arbitrary
number is indicated by the fact that the
United States has always had at least 15
capital ships since it was allotted this
quota under the Washington Naval Dis-
armament Treaty of 1921. When the at-
tack carrier replaced the battleship as
the capital ship, the Navy switched from
15 battleships to 15 carriers.
With the advent of Minuteman and
Polaris missiles, the attack carrier is no
longer part of our strategic nuclear
forces; its primary mission is to provide
tactical air power. The use of 15 attack
carrier task forces to carry out this mis-
sion is simply wasteful and inefficient.
First. The assignment of nine carrier
task forces in the Western Pacific and six
in the Mediterranean overlaps and dupli-
cates U.S. land-based tactical air
capacity.
The United States maintains some 138
squadrons of tactical fighters and bomb-
ers in active forces on land bases at home
and abroad, including 3,350 active air-
craft and 23 wings.
This capability for land-based tactical
air power is impressive, especially in light
of the fact that with modern mid-air
refueling techniques, the U.S.-based
tactical air forces can be operational in
a very short period of time.
The geographic spread of overseas air
bases operated by or available to the
United States is such as to sharply re-
duce the need for continually maintain-
ing attack carriers "on station" in the
Mediterranean and the Western Pacific.
The Air Force is developing a Bare
Base Support Program, which will enable
the United States to convert 1,000 avail-
able overseas civilian runways into mili-
tary airfields With the use of "pre-posi-
tioned" kits within less than 3 days.
Second. A carrier base is far more ex-
pensive than a land base.
The procurement cost of one nuclear
carrier task force?one carrier and four
destroyers?is a minimum of $1.4 billion,
and it can run much higher. But to keep
one such task force "on station" in nor-
ity or superiority vis-a-vis the navies of
other nations, it is obvious that we could
substantially reduce our carrier force lev-
el without any danger to national se-
curity.
In addition to these arguments, there
are serious foreign policy implications to
the "show of force" role of the carrier
in support of U.S. foreign policy com-
mitments. It is official naval doctrine
that one of the main advantages of car-
rier air power is that it can be employed
unilaterally, without involving third
parties and without invoking treaties,
agreements, or overflight rights. How-
ever, except where the United States it-
self is threatened, it is highly question-
able that we should be prepared to inter-
vene in conflicts unilaterally and with-
out making political arrangements.
If air power is needed to protect our
interests, naval doctrine ignores the
availability of land bases in most areas
of the world. If a "show of force" in the
form of U.S. naval presence is needed,
older attack carriers, antisubmarine
carriers, or other types of ships' will be
adequate.
In the face of these arguments, it
would be fiscally irresponsible to author-
ize an additional carrier at this time un-
til there is a full discussion of the role
of the attack carrier and the necessary
force level needed to carry out this role.
That is why our amendment calls for a
study by the Comptroller General, and
anticipates a full congressional debate
before continuing to spend billions of
dollars on this highly expensive and often
ineffective means of providing tactical
air power.
I ask unanimous consent that the text
of this amendment be printed in the REC-
ORD at this point.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be received and printed,
and will lie on the table; and, without
objection, the amendment will be printed
in the RECORD.
The amendment (No. 136) is as fol-
lows:
On page 2, line 16, strike out "2,568,200,-
000;" and insert in lieu thereof "2,191,100,-
000;"
At the end of the bill add a new section
as follows:
"Ssc. 402. None of the funds authorized
to be appropriated by this or any other Act
may be expended in connection with the pro-
duction or procurement of the nuclear air-
craft carrier designated as CVAN-69; and no
funds may be appropriated for any such pur-
pose until after the Comptroller General of
the United States has completed and submit-
ted to the Congress a comprehensive study
and investigation of the past and projected
costs and effectiveness of attack aircraft car-
riers and their task forces and a thorough re-
view of the considerations which went into
the decision to maintain the present number
of attack carriers. In carrying out such study
and investigation the Comptroller General
of the United States shall, among other
things, consider?
"1. What are the primary limited war mis-
sions of the attack carrier; what role, if any,
does it have in strategic nuclear planning;
"2. To what extent and in what way is the
force-level of on-station and back-up carriers
related to potential targets and the number
of sorties needed to destroy these targets;
"3. What is the justification for maintain-
ing on continual deployment 2 carriers in the
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S 9798 Approved For Repagene41410AlL qiimmallIBM?ilily.W030010000kkust 12, 1969
Charles S. Guy, of Pennsylvania, to be
U.S. marshal for the eastern district of
Pennsylvania for the term of 4 years,
vice James P. Delaney.
On behalf of the Committee on the
Judiciary, notice is hereby given to all
Persons interested in this nomination to
file with the committee, in writing, on or
before Tuesday, August 19, 1969, any
representations or objections they may
wish to present concerning the above
nomination, with a further statement
whether it is their intention to appear
at any hearing which may be scheduled.
Mediterranean and from 3 to 5 in the West-
ern Pacific;
"4. What is the over-all attack carrier
force level needed to carry out these primary
missions;
"5. Does the present `one for one' replace-
ment policy for these carriers have the effect
of maintaining or increasing this force level,
in light of the fact that the newer carriers
and their aircraft are more expensive and
have far more capability than the oldest car-
riers which they are now replacing;
"6. Would a policy of replacing two of the
oldest carriers with one modern carrier main-
tain a constant force level;
"7. How many, if any, attack carriers and
carrier task forces are needed to back-up a
carrier task force 'on-the-line';
"8. What efficiencies, such as the Polaris
'blue and gold' crew concept, can be utilizsd
to increase the time in which a carrier can
stay 'on-the-line';
"9. What type of military threats are faced
by the attack carrier; what proportion of the
costs of a carrier task force are allocated to
carrier defense; what is the estimated effec-
tiveness of carrier defense against various
types and levels of threats;
"10. To what extent does the carrier's vul-
nerability affect its capacity to carry out its
missions; what are the plausible contingen-
cies in which carriers may be committed;
"11. What type of resources should be de-
voted to carrier defense, considering the
range of threats, the costs and effectivenees
of the defense, and the plausible contingen-
cies in which a carrier can be effectively
used;
"12. To what extent can lend-based tacti-
cal air power substitute for attack carriers;
to what extent should the role uf the attack
carrier be restricted to the initial stages of a
conflict;
"13. What are the comparative mysteries
costs for land-based and sea-based tactical
air power, and what is their cOmparative coa
effectiveness;
"14. How is the attack carrier being used
in support of American feteign policy; if
there is a need for a 'show-of force' in sup-
port of foreign policy commitments, can this
need be met by smaller carriers or other types
of ships?
"The Comptroller General of the United
States shall submit the results of his study
and investigation, together with such recant-
mendations as he deems appropriate, to the
Congress not later than June 30, 1970."
GENERAL REVISION OF THE COPY-
RIGHT LAW, TITLE 17 OF THE
UNITED STATES CODE?AMEND-
MENT
AMENDMENT NO. 137
Mr. HART. Mr. President, for the la$1
60 years there has been no change in
the flat fee composers and authors of
musical works have received, under the
Copyright Act of 1909, for the use of their
creations by recording companies. The
fee, called a "mechanical royalty," is 2
cents for each selection recorded.
Although vast changes have occurred
since 1909 in the price of records, the
cost of living and technology in the rec-
ord industry, the composer and author
still get the same 2 cents.
The copyright revision bill S. 543, rec-
ognized the inequity of this and would
increase the mechanical royalty to 24
cents per selection. This is inequitable
since it does not take into consideration
changes in the prices of records by rec-
ord manufacturers. It would impose on
Congress a continuing responsibilitY of
fixing royalty payments.
This burden on Congress in order to
do equity to authors and composers can
be removed by substituting for a flat
cent rate royalty in S. 543 a flexible roy-
alty, namely a percent of the retail price
of the record suggested by the manufac-
turer. This would permit authors and
composers to share in the increased
prices at which records have said since
1909, for example the replacement of
$3.98 records by $4.98 records and by
stereo tape cartridges and cassettes sell-
ing for $6.98 and $7.98.
Mr. President. I am submitting now an
amendment to section 115 of S. 543
which would serve the purpose I have
stated.
The PRESIDING OisisiCER. The
amendment will be received and printed,
and will be appropriately referred.
The amendment was referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary.
NOTICE CONCERNING NOMINATION
BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY
Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, the
following nominations have been re-
ferred to and are now pending before
the Committee on the Judiciary:
Peter Mills, of Maine, to be 'U.S. attor-
ney for the district of Maine for the
term of 4 years, vice Lloyd P. LaFoun-
taM,
John H. deWinter, of Maine, to be U.S.
marshal for the district of Maine for the
term of 4 years, vice Adam J. Walsh.
On behalf of the Committee on the
Judiciary, notice is hereby given to all
persons interested in these nominations
to file with the committee, in writing on
or before Tuesday, August 19, 1969, any
representations or objections they may
wish to present concerning the above
nominations, with a further statement
whether it is their intention to appear
at any hearing which may be scheduled.
NOTICE CONCERNING NOMINATION
BEVORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY
Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President. the
following nomination has been re-
ferred to and is now pending before
the Committee on the Judiciary:
Wayman G. Sherrer, of Alabama, to
be U.S. attorney for the northern dis-
trict of Alabama for the term of 4 years,
vice Macon L. Weaver.
On behalf of the Committee on the
Judiciary, notice is hereby given to all
persons interested in this nomination to
file with the committee, in writing, on or
before Tuesday, August 19, 1969, any
representations or objections they may
wish to present concerning the above
nomination, with a further statement
whether it is their intention to appear
at any hearing which may be scheduled.
NOTICE CONCERNING NOMINATION
BEFORE THE COMMI rrEE ON THE
JUDICIARY
Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, the
following nomination has been re-
ferred to and is now pending before
the Committee on the Judiciary:
"SLUG" SULLIVAN, FOSTER
GRANDPARENT
Mr. MANSFIELD Mr. President, the
VISTA voluntary program has been ac-
tive in many areas of the State of Mon-
tana, and perhaps one of the most Pop-
ular has been the Foster Grandparent
program. This pis:gram is designed to
keep our senior citizens active in working
with the local schools and hospitals.
One of my oldest and closest associ-
ates in Montana, John L. "Slug" Sulli-
van, has become very active and one of
the leaders in the Foster Grandparent
program in Helena. "Slug" Sullivan is
78 years of age and has found his latest
endeavor most worthwhile and satisfy-
ing.
A recent feature story published in the
Independent Record dismisses the pro-
gram at some length and gives an ac-
count of John Sullivan's activities as a
Foster Grandparent. This group of elder
citizens help young people to overcome
feelings of inferiority and to develop self-
assurance and understanding.
"Slug" was one of my earliest political
mentors in Butte, Mont.
I found the article written by Robert
Sibley, a VISTA volunteer, most inter-
esting and ask unanimous consent that
it be printed in the REcom.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
ONCE A FIGHTER , Now A LOVING FosTin
ORANDPAIVENT
(By Robert Sibley)
(NoTE.?Bob Sibley, 25, aVISTA volunteer
from Washington, D.C., is using his master's
degree in journalism to aid the VISTA pro-
gram serving elderly persons in Montana.
Here he describes the Foster Grandparents
segment of the program.)
When Mike Mansfield was first deciding
to run for Congress, he asked his old friend
"Slug" Sullivan what he thought.
"Well, I think you don't know too many
people right ram" Slug answered. "But af-
ter they get to know you, they'll like you.
You should run this first time just to get
advertising for yourself, and next time you'll
probably make it."
Mike Mansfield was defeated in his first
race for Congress, but just as Slug predicted,
he won the second time he ran and has been
winning ever since.
John L. "Slug" Sullivan has a lot of
moments like this that b can recall as
though they happenes just a few hours ago,
even though they may have taken place
more than 40 years back.
"CLEAN rare"
Tan and healthy looking with an easy-
coming smile, Slug's appearance belies his
78 years; nevertheless, that's how old he is.
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August 11, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?
should SEN E S9519
also be designed to deal with the
consequences of new defense spending as
well as the curtailment of spending. In
short, I am suggesting that such a high-
level Commission should be designed to
deal not not only with the economic
problems associated with a reduction in
defense spending but also with all phases
of the relationship between the ongoing
military-industrial complex and the
economy. In regards to the general ques-
tion of conversion to a peacetime econ-
omy, I was pleased to hear President
Nixon state in his inaugural address:
We shall plan now for the day when our
wealth can be transferred from the destruc-
tion of war abroad to the urgent needs of our
people at home.
Following up on this pledge, the Pres-
ident has asked a subcommittee of the
Council for Economic Policy chaired by
Dr. Herbert Stein, to initiate policy plan-
ning for converting our economy to a
peacetime basis.
Mr. President, over the past few
months the military-industrial complex,
its meaning and its dangers, has been
the subject of far ranging, searching dis-
cussion and analysis. On the whole I
think this has been healthy. I hope that
the debate will continue. However, I also
believe that we have reached the stage
where we should do more than talk and
debate. We should begin to act. And in
this respect there are a number of meas-
ures Which the Congress could adopt in
the near future. I have pointed to several
such possible measures today. I again
urge their favorable consideration by the
Senate.
And in closing I would return to Presi-
dent Eisenhower's message. In citing the
dangers of the military-industrial com-
plex, President Eisenhower also stressed
the fact that the complex was the prod-
uct of necessity. Thus we cannot control
these dangers by destroying the complex
as some would seem to suggest. The mili-
tary-industrial complex is a fact of mod-
ern American life. No amount of wish-
ing will make it go away. At the same
time all must recognize that although
there are dangers inherent to the mili-
tary-industrial complex these dangers
are not inherently uncontrollable. In
other words we must keep the military-
industrial complex in a proper perspec-
tive. We must see both its essentiality
and also its potential for abuse. We must
have it, but we must control it. We must
be vigorous in our efforts to see to it that
It is a servant of peace and prosperity
rather than the servant of war and de-
struction.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. PEARSON. I am very pleased to
yield to my colleague from Kansas.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, first of all,
I commend My colleague from Kansas
for a general review of the so-called
military-industrial complex.
I feel that most of us will agree with
many things said. I wish to add that we
are fortunate in this administration to
have a man like Melvin Laird as Secre-
tary of Defense. I know of no one who
has gone to the Cabinet level so well
equipped.
As my colleague knows, Mr. Laird for
14 years was a member of the House
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee.
Mr. Laird was a prober. He was a critic.
He was a questioner. But, above all, he
understood the Defense Department. He
understood its responsibility, he tried to
make the Department responsive and
responsible when he could do so.
At the outset of this administration,
both Secretary Laird and Under Secre-
tary Packard had expressed the philos-
ophy that we should take a close look at
all of the programs and reexamine our
military requirements and validate the
need for any new major weapons system.
I would hope my colleague would agree
that in the span of 6, 7, or 8 months,
progress has been made by Secretary
Laird. I would cite only a few examples
of responsible progress under Mr. Laird.
First, Mr. Laird has established a De-
fense Systems Acquisition Review Coun-
cil within the office of the Secretary of
Defense to advise the Secretary of the
current status and the readiness of each
major system to proceed to the next
phase of efforts in its life cycle.
Second, and I think this very im-
portant, there has been the appointment
of a blue ribbon defense panel by the
Secretary. This is a matter that he pur-
sued with vigor while a Member of the
House of Representatives. A blue ribbon
defense panel has been appointed to re-
appraise the Defense Establishment,
There has been the cancellation of the
manned orbital laboratory. There has
been the termination of the Cheyene
helicopter program.
There have been new, frank, and can-
did reports to both the Senate and House
Armed Services Committees on major
weapons acquisitions.
Mr. Laird has attempted to provide
?Congress with more information. He has
done an excellent job getting facts so
that the Senate and the House can
make valid adjustments. He has also en-
dorsed as recently as July 31 the estab-
lishment of a Commission on Govern-
ment Procurement. He views the Com-
mission as another positive step in re-
porting on the methods of military pro-
curement.
There have been numerous improve-
ments in the management of weapons
acquisition process.
As recently as Saturday we find the
Secretary concurring in the judgment of
the Senate concerning chemical and
biological weapons. As an addition to the
remarks of my colleague from Kansas, I
want the record to show that we have a
Secretary of Defense who is just as dedi-
cated as anyone in the Senate or any-
one in Congress in saving the taxpayers'
money, and just as concerned about any
so-called military-industrial complex.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
GRAVEL in the chair) . Under the prior
unanimous-consent agreement, the Sen-
ate will now proceed to other business.
Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that I may continue
for an additional 5 minutes.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, I am constrained to object. This
unanimaous-consent request was made
last week, as I understand, and Senators
were put on notice that debate an the
pending McIntyre amendment would be
controlled and would last for 1 hour after
the unfinished business was laid down.
Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, I will
withdraw the request. I do appreciate the
situation of the leadership in this respect,
and they were very gracious to give me
time this morning. I can respond at an-
other time. (03424
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-
TIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR
MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RE-
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND
FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MIS-
SILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJ-
ALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RE-
SERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the
previous order, the Chair lays before the
Senate the unfinished business, which
will be stated.
The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A
bill (S. 2546) to authorize appropriations
during the fiscal year 1970 for procure-
ment of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels,
and tracked combat vehicles, and to au-
thorize the construction of test facilities
at Kwajalein Missile Range, and to pre-
scribe the authorized personnel strength
of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve
component of the Armed Forces and for
other purposes.
The PRESIDING 010.FiCER. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the amendment of
the Senator from New Hampshire.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield 1
minute to the Senator.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, this
Is getting to be a rather unusual pro-
cedure, to request unanimous consent
for a specific time for a speech and then
nobody can make a rebuttal.
The Senator made an excellent speech.
I do not agree with it in its entirety.
He used President Eisenhower's quota-
tions but he did not use enough of them.
If I have to wait until tomorrow or Sep-
tember, the point I want to make will
have lost its effectiveness.
I think I am going to start opposing all
unanimous-consent requests for this type
of presentation.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I thank
the Senator.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that a brief quorum call may be had
at this time.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the
Senator withhold his request for a
quorum call?
What was the unanimous-consent re-
quest? Did the Senator make a unani-
mous-consent request about limitation?
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. No. That
was made last week.
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, I ask unanimous consent that
there be a brief quorum call, the time to
be equally divided between both sides.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, I suggest the absence of a quorum..
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S 9520 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 11, 1966
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, I ask unanimous Consent that the
order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, I ask imanimoui consent that,
at the conclusicm of the vote on the pend-
ing amendment, the alSie chairman of
the Committee on Armed Services be
recognized.
The PRESIDING OtoricER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Who yields time?
Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, how
much time does the Senator desire?
Mr. McINTYRE. Ten minutes or so.
Mr. NELSON. I yield 10 minutes to the
Senator from New Hampshire.
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
Mr. McINTYRE, Mr. President, the
Senate today will consider amendment
No. 131, which I introduced last Friday
together with Senators YARBOROUGH,
PROXMIRE, HARTKE, PELL, NELSON, MON-
DALE, STEVENS, GOODELL, and HUGHES.
Had more time been available after
the introduction, I am certain many
other Senators would have joined in its
sponsorship.
On an associated point, Mr. President,
may I say that I was particularly pleased
with Defense Secretary Melvin Laird's
statement Saturday. This statement, ex-
pressing his concurrence with the goals
of this amendment, reflects an admirable
understanding on the part of the Secre-
tary of the need for improved manage-
ment and control of chemical and bio-
logical warfare programs.
Secretary Laird also deserves com-
mendation for recommending a National
Security Council study of these matters,
and President Nixon deserves much
praise for ordering the study.
Most helpful, too, in the present ex-
amination of CBW programs has been
the consistent, progressive leadership of
the distinguished chairman of the Com-
mittee on Armed Services, the Senator
from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) .
We are considering today a coordi-
nated effort to deal with a highly coin-
plex and unpopular part of our defense
structure in such a way as to achieve
the kind of congressional control and
national understanding we feel is needed,
while, at the same time, avoiding in-
volvement of the Senate in the lengthy
procedure which would be required were
we to take up a number of separate
amendments.
Moreover, by bringing together in a
single package a number of proposals
involving ? chemical and biological war-
fare programs, our consideration can be
all the more comprehensive.
The amendment introduced Friday
did not include a section covering one
particular area. The proposal dealing
with this particular area was originally
put forth by the distinguished Senator
from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE) I am happy
to say that since Friday we have reached
agreement on the language for this sec-
tion, a section relating to the subject of
so-called "back-door financing" of CBW
programs.
Mr. President, I send this section to
the desk and ask unanimous consent to
have it added to amendment No. 131, to-
gether with technical changes that have
been made to the original amendment,
No. 131; and I ask unanimous consent to
have it printed at this point in the
RECORD.
The PRESIDING OrtoICER Is there
objection? The Chair hears none, and it
is so ordered.
The modification is as follows:
At the end of amendment No. 131 add a
new subsection as follows:
"(g) (1) Except as provided in subsection
(g) (2) of this section, no funds authorized
to be appropriated by this, or any other later
enacted Act may be expended for research,
development, test, evaluation, or procure-
ment of any chemical or biological weapon,
including any such weapon used for in-
capacitation, defoliation, or other military
operations.
"(g) (2) The prohibition contained in sub-
section (g) (1) of this section shall not apply
with respect to funds authorized to be ap-
propriated by this Act."
On page 4, line 3, insert "will" between
"agente and "be".
On page 4, line 6, change "subsections
(e) (1) " to "subsections (d) (1)".
On page 4, line 7, change "(e) (2) " to
"(d) (2)".
On page 4, line 21, change "or an other"
to "or any other".
On page 5, line 2, insert "of the Public
Health Service" after "Surgeon General".
On page 5, line 3, delete "President" and
insert "Secretary of Defense".
On page 4, line 22, insert "or any" after
"lethal chemical agents,".
Mr. McINTYRE, Mr. President, a word
must be said at this point about the ex-
cellent work done by each of the Sena-
tors who have contributed sections of
this amendment. Their individual re-
search, the honing of their proposals to a
remarkable precision of language, and
the spirit of cooperation exhibited in
their willingness to consolidate their pro-
posals into a single amendment is in the
finest tradition of this great body.
As we take up consideration of the
amendment, let us keep in mind that al-
ready included in the overall legislation
before us is a $16 million reduction in
the Defense Department's budget for re-
search and development in lethal offen-
sive chemical and biological warfare.
This reduction was recommended by my
Subcommittee on Research and Devel-
opment and accepted by the full Armed
Services Committee.
I raise this thought so that, as we take
up consideration of the amendment, we
have a comprehensive picture of the ac-
tion we can take in regard to CBW pro-
grams.
Now let me identify each of the sec-
tions of this amendment. I will not go
into detail because I know other Mem-
bers intend to do that.
The first section (402) (a), also de-
veloped by our able colleague the Sen-
ator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE) , Calls
for a full and complete semiannual re-
port by the Secretary of Defense to the
Congress setting forth in detail the total
CBW research, development, test eval-
uation, and procurement program.
This, of course, would provide Con-
gress with the kind of detailed informa-
tion Congress and the public need in
order to understand the programs and
to determine future direction.
The second section (402) (b), developed
by the able $enator from Wisconsin (Mr.
Nztsost), and the able Senator from New
York (Mr. Goorista.), provides that no
funds can be used for the procurement of
any delivery system which is specifically
designed to disseminate lethal agents.
This section, Mr. President, makes
clear our opposition to the use of lethal
CBW agents as offensive weapons and
prohibits expenditure of funds for any
device designed to deliver these agents.
The third section, (402) (c) , expresses
the concern of many about the deploy-
ment or storage of lethal agents and
microorganisms Outside the United
States. Recent accounts of unfortunate
incidents involving such deployment or
storage have prompted new congres-
sional interest in what we may be doing
in this area of CBW activity.
This section will provide for a full
range of reports to the Interested Con-
gressional committees, and will also in-
sure consultation with foreign nations
before we deploy CBW agents on their
soil.
Mr. President, I believe that in gen-
eral we accomplish the substance of this
proposal, but the section makes unmis-
takably clear Congress' interest and de-
sires.
This section is another developed by
the Senator from Wisconsin, (Mr. NEL-
SON) and the Senator from New York
(Mr. GOODELL) .
The next section, (402) (d), also pro-
posed by the Senator from Indiana (Mr.
HARTKE) , relates to recent fears of many
about the possible dangers inherent in
the rail shipment of lethal cherncial and
biological agents.
Basically, this section covers three
areas. It requires the Surgeon General
of the Public Health Service to assure
that shipment will not be detrimental to
the public health.
It would give advance notice of such
shipments to the Congress and civilian
agencies.
And finally, it will bring about the de-
toxification of lethal agents before they
are shipped off for disposal. Again, some
of this already is being done, but this
section makes clear the Congress in-
terest and intent.
I would like to say at this point that
while I am completely in agreement with
this section I think we should always
keep before us the fact that it is not the
chemical and biological warfare service
alone that transports biological agents
around the country, nor Is this service
the principal shipper of such agents. The
National Institute of Health and other
public and private health agencies trans-
port an enormous amount of such agents.
We are not dealing with such agencies
In this particular legislation, to be true,
but we may want to consider this in
other legislation. I think a study would
show that the amount of potentially
dangerous biological agents shipped by
CBW is relatively small when measured
against the total shipment by all
agencies.
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August 11, 1969
The able Senator from Rhode Island
(Mr. PELL), proposed the next section
402(e). While the previous section
dealt with transportation of lethal chem-
ical and biological agents within the
United States, the section of the Senator
from Rhode Island, deals with transpor-
tation of such agents outside the United
States.
It also includes the matter of testing,
development, storage and disposal of
such agents outside the United States,
and it asks for the full consideration of
U.S. international responsibilities when
lethal CBW agents are moved, tested,
disposed of, or developed in foreign
areas.
This section places certain responsi-
bilities in the hands of the Secretary of
State to assure that we are not likely to
violate international law.
The succeeding section 402(f) , an ad-
ditional section developed by the Senator
from Wisconsin (Mr. NELSON) and the
Senator from New York (Mr. GOODELL)
is, perhaps, one of the most significant in
the proposal.
I am sure we have all been concerned
about incidents of the past several years
where outdoor testing of lethal agents
and micro-organisms have jeopardized
both animal and human life.
This particular section of the amend-
ment would eliminate open air testing
except in those instances when the Sec-
retary of Defense, under the direction of
the President of the United States, would
declare that our national security re-
quired such testing, and the Surgeon
General of the Public Health Service de-
termined that the public's health would
not be endangered.
Furthermore, this section would re-
quire that appropriate committees of the
Congress would be informed of all pro-
posed open air tests at least 30 days prior
to the date on which it is proposed to
hold them.
The final section of the amendment,
added by unanimous consent today,
would become section 402(g) (1) and (2) .
This section, proposed by the Senator
from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE) is another
step in congressional control over funds
that can be used in CBW efforts.
It would restrict the reprograming of
funds from other programs into CBW. I
am not aware that so-called backdoor
financing of CBW is presently taking
place, Mr. President, but with the adop-
tion of this section we would assure that
it does not.
In summary, this amendment will
serve the obvious public need to better
know and understand our chemical and
biological programs.
It will provide in-depth information to
the Congress in its continuing considera-
tion of this broad, complex, and frequent-
ly distasteful matter.
And it comes directly to grips with
those incidents that have so disturbed
the Nation recently?the severe illness
of two dozen CBW workers in Okinawa,
the death of the sheep at Dugway, Utah,
and the dangers inherent in moving
deadly CBW agents across the country.
I conclude, Mr. President, by pledging
my determination to make the chemical
and biological warfare program a prin-
cipal item on the agenda of the Researeh
and Development Subcommittee of the
Armed Services Committee during the
coming year.
We will want to examine in detail
every facet of the program.
We will be briefed by a full range of
scientists and other experts and receive
pertinent material from them.
We will want to hear from other
Members of the Senate who have a par-
ticular interest in CBW.
And we will want to survey the effects
of the actions proposed in this amend-
ment and in other sections of the cur-
rent authorization bill.
In short, when we return next year to
consider the 1971 version of the author-
ization bill I sincerely believe that the
recommendations we will? make will en-
able the Senate to meet problems that
may still exist in this program.
In the interim, Mr. President, I
strongly urge the adoption of this amend-
ment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, under
the agreement, who controls time?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The mi-
nority leader and the majority leader or
their designee.
Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, how much
time does the Senator from New York
desire?
Mr. GOODELL. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield to me for 10 minutes.
Mr. NELSON. I yield 10 minutes to the
Senator from New York.
Mr. GOODFT.L. Mr. President, before
I begin my formal remarks I wish to offer
my commendations to the distinguished
Senator from New Hampshire.
I would like to ask the Senator from
New Hampshire a question to make sure
a technical correction has been made in
the amendment. I refer to page 4, line 22,
of amendment 131.
Mr. McINTYRE. Is the Senator re-
ferring to the technical amendments I
offered this morning to the original
amendment?
Mr. GOODELL. Yes. I refer to that
point where reference is made to "lethal
chemical agents, disease-producing bio-
logical micro-organisms, or biological
toxins." It was my understanding there
might be some misinterpretation here be-
cause of the words which should read "or
any other."
Mr. McINTYRE. Does the Senator re-
fer to page 4, line 22, where the amend-
ment reads, "None of the funds author-
ized to be appropriated by this or any
other act shall be used for the open-air
testing of lethal chemical agents, disease-
producing biological micro-organisms, or
biological toxins"?
What is the question?
Mr. GOODELL. That is the way the
amendment reads?
Mr. McINTYRE. That is the way the
amendment reads at the present time.
Mr. GOODELL. I simply wanted to
clarify that point. I think it is a crucial
point. We are requiring this procedure of
lethal chemical agents that are tested
and all disease-producing biological
microorganisms, or biological toxins. Is
that correct?
Mr. McINTYRE. The Senator is cor-
rect.
Mr. GOODELL. Mr. President, the
omnibus anti-CBW amendment we are
presenting here today represents an im-
portant break with secrecy over chemi-
cal and biological weapons. It is a modest
measure to check the vast destruction
potential of our CRW arsenal. Still, it
is a significant measure.
It is significant for it opens up the
secrecy which has cloaked the spiraling
gas and germ weapons program. It
checks the weapons spiral. It minimizes
international repercussions over CBW. It
provides for public health and safety by
guarding against the perils in transport,
storage, and disposal of CBW. It puts up
a barrier to future outdoor testing of
CBW. It encourages congressional re-
view.
The distinguished chairman of the
Committee on Armed Services has called
this omnibus anti-CBW amendment a
solid start on the problem, and he is
quite certainly right.
I should like to commend Senator
STENNIS and the members of the Armed
Services Committee for taking the first
major step in controlling the CBW pro-
gram. The committee cut $16 million
from the Pentagon's request for funds
earmarked for research and develop-
ment on offensive lethal chemical and
biological weapons. This significant step
has set in motion other steps to control
the CBW program.
I would like to start today by consider-
ing open-air testing of deadly gas and
disease-producing? germs. It was with
great reluctance that I agreed to modify
the "flat ban" amendment originally in-
troduced by the Senator from Wiscon-
sin (Mr. NELSON) and myself. A flat
ban on outdoor CBW testing would
eliminate the threat that a test cloud of
deadly gas and germs might drift from
the test site to our cities and towns. The
moratorium postpones but does not elim-
inate this threat. We felt we could make
a significant step forward at this time.
On the assurance of the Senator from
New Hampshire that his subcommittee
was going to look intensively at this en-
tire program we have great confidence
he will do so and that we can move for-
ward in the future with greater restric-
tions consistent with national security.
There are pluses and minuses in the
test ban revision. The minus side leaves
the option open for future tests. The
plus side puts congressional control over
testing. The burden of proof is on the
Pentagon if any further tests are to take
place due to national security. I believe
there is agreement here today that no
longer will these tests take place on a
routine basis. There must be a high-level
determination that such tests are directly
Involved with the national security. That
determination must be made by the Sec-
retary of Defense under guidelines pre-
scribed by the President and must be
agreed to by the Surgeon General with
reference to the procedures to be fol-
lowed.
It is my view that it should be unnec-
essary in the future for us to engage in
any outdoor testing, but we do leave
the door open for the very unusual?
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S 9522 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE
August 11, 1969
and I emphasize very:, unusual?sittute duced land designated as "permanent
tion that might arise In the national se- biocontaminated area."
curity.
What next is in store from such CBW
While we are studying this problem in open air testing?
the next year, such tests Might take place As we debate the wisdom of banning
under very careful regulations and safe- open air testing of lethal gas and any
guards. The burden of assurance that disease-producing bacteria or toxin, the
no health hazard will result from any very testing of deadly nerve gasses con-
test rests with the U.S. Surgeon General. tinues. It is of little comfort to me to
In each case, Congress 'will have the eel- hear from the Defense Department that
portunity for hard questioning. On bal- there are no irrunediate plans to conduct
ance, then, the moraterium is accept- outdoor tests of lethal biological agents.
able at this beginning stage of CBW re- It is of little comfort that the Q-fever
view,
field tests at Dugway have been corn-
If the moratorium is to be meaningful, pletecl and now research will shift to the
we simply must be guided by the princi- laboratory to evaluate results.
pie that the security of this Nation be- While the specter of future open air
gins with the health and safety of our tests for disease-producing bacteria
people. Pentagon requests based on na- hangs over us; while outdoor testing of
tional security simply blest be 'viewed such deadly nerve gasses as VX, Tabun?
in this context. If not, tire moratorium GA?Sarin?GB?and Soman?GD---
on outdoor testing wottel be relatively continues; when any open air test of
meaningless. If CBW tests are requested, deadly gas or any disease-producing bac-
every effort must be made to confine teria takes place, the issue of public safe-
them to the laboratory, 'This point cannot ty remains of grave concern.
be emphasized enough. We all know the If just one accidental release of dead-
example at Dugway Provine Grounds in ly nerve gas or disease-producing bac-
Utah where thousands of sheep were teria spreads to our cities and towns,
killed. Had the wind shifted farther a the toll in death and sickness would be
large city in the United States would indefensible. Every precaution must be
have been engulfed by deadly nerve gas, taken to assure the health and safety
VX?odorless and colorless. What a dis- of our people. Animals must be Pro-
aster that would have been. We must tected. Environment must be preserved.
not engage in such tests without the All these things must be done regardless
highest priority given the safety of our of how slight the danger.
people.
Consider the deadly effect of these
One example suffices to explain why chemical agents. Consider the vast de-
CBW testing should be confined to the struction potential of the disease-pro-
laboratory. It is an example which clear- clueing biologicals. Let us take a look at
ly demonstrates that hazards from open these agents in deciding whether in
air tests of chemical and biological terms of public safety alone, we should
weapons are not vague speculations, but ban lethal CWB from being tested out-
grim realities. The example is the new
well-known sheep-killing accident last doors.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
year, caused by an open air test of 'VX
sent to have printed in the RECORD a te-
at the Army's Dugway Proving Grounds ble of chemical and biological agents,
In Utah. Some say that safety rules for together with a table on planned open
CBW testing are sufficient. Safety rules, air testing at various sites including the
they may say, are enough to protect
against the fatal results possible when site at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah,
the Deseret Test Center in Utah, and at
deadly nerve gas is tested in the air. Be-
fore the sheep-killing ineldent and since -
that time, the Army has announced sate- There being no objection, the tables
ty regulations for CBW open air testing, were ordered to be printed in the
Are safety rules at the test site RECORD, as follows:
suf-
ficient for public safety? X simply cannot TABLE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL AGENTS
accept that they are. A freakish wind THE CHEMICAL AGENTS
shift or a poorly supervised test may Nerve gases
(VEE) kills less than 1 per cent of its victims
never occur. Let us consider, then, what GB: An odorless, colorless, volatile gas that and lasts as few as three days; Eastern equine
might otherwise happen, can kill in minutes in dosages of 1 milligram, encephalomyelitis (EEE) is fatal about 5 per
In the 1968 sheep-killing incident, the approximately 1/60 of a drop. In the U.S. cent of the time, if untreated, and can seri-
test at Dugway was to determine howsenal since the late 1940's, it is also known ously cripple the central nervous system of
as Sadn. The gas kills by paralyzing the survivors.
nerve gas VX distributes itself downwind nervous system.
5 to 25 miles per hour to the northeast. Plague: Acute, usually fatal, highly infec-
VX: Another odorless gas that, unlike GB, tious bacterial disease of wild rodents found
This was the information sought. Under does not evaporate rapidly or freeze at nor- in two forms?bubonic and pneumonic.
today's safety rules at Dugway, the teat mal temperatures. Becausee of its low vole- Sypmptoixis of bubonic plague include small
would be limited to winds 15 miles per tatty, it is effective for a longer period of hemorrhages, and the black spots that led the
hour. Even so, would this Prevent another time. VX also is capable of killing in 1 mini- disease to be commonly known as the "black
nerve gas accident? Consider what hap- gram doses and, like GB, paralyzes the ner- death" during the massive epidemics of the
pened in the sheep-killing incident. The vous system in minutes. past. Pneumonic plague is highly infectious
test started. The jet opened its tanks and Incapacitating agents because it is spread from man to man via
began spraying nerve gas over the test BZ: A gas that is either a psychoc,hemical coughing. Symptoms include, fever, chills,
area. After a few seconds the tanks were rapid pulse and breathing, mental dullness,
or a strong anesthetic which can produce
to close and the plane pull up. But the intemiltazorvairy paralysis, blindness, or deafness coated tongue, and red eyes.
Psittacosis: Viral infection in birds that is
BZ has also been k
transmissible to man, with symptoms of high
tanks did not close; the tanks stayed
cause maniacal behavior. Its precise makeup fever, muscle ache, and disorientation. Dis-
open. The plane pulled up with nerve le secret.
gaS still spraying. Then over 6,000 sheep Blot control gases ease can be mild, and last less than a week,
or can cause death in upwards of 40 per cent
Regardless of safety regulations, field grant odor similar to apple blossoms. The may take months.
tear gas that also acts as an irritant to the
upper respiratory system.
Ca: An improved, more toxic tear gas that
quickly causes tearing, coughing, breathing
difficulty, and cheat tightness. C antempo-
rarily incapacitate men in twenty seconds.
Heavy concentrations cause nausea. It Is now
used in Vietnam.
Harassing agents
DM: A pepper-like arsenical gas that causes
headaches, nausea, vomiting, chest pains for
up to two or three hours. It can be lethal in
heavy doses and has been blamed for some
deaths since its first use to. Vietnam in 1964.
DM is widely known as adamsite and was used
in World War I.
HD: A pale yellow gas with the odor of
garlic, popularly known as mustard gas.
Causes severe burns to eyes and lungs and
blisters skin after exposure, but onset of
symptoms is delayed from four to six hours.
Can kill in heavy concentrations. Mustard,
like VX, is not volatile and is usually effective
for days after its use. It caused ons-fourth
of the U.S. gas casualties in World War I.
Defoliants and herbicides
2,4-D: A weed-killing compound known as
dichloropheri-oxyacetic acid that has rela-
tively short persistence in the soil and a rela-
tively low level of toxicity to man, if prop-
erly dispersed. Heavier concentrations can
cause eye irritations and stomach upsets,
however. Dangerous to inhale. Usually used
in Vietnam along with 2,4,5-T (trichloro-
phenoxyametic acid), which has similar?al-
though somewhat more toxic?properties. Ef-
fective against heavy Jungle.
Cacodylic Acid: An arsenic-base compound
used against rice plants and tall grass. Strong
plant killer that gives quick results. One seri-
ous restriction on its use is the possibility
that heavy concentrations will cause arseni-
cal poisoning in humans. Widely used in
Vietnam. It is composed of 54.29 per cent
arsenic.
BIOLOGICAL AGENTS
Anthrax.' An acute bacterial disease that
is usually fatal if untreated when it attacks
the lungs (pulmonary anthrax). Death can
result in twenty-four hours. Found naturally
in animals, which must be buried or burned
to prevent contamination. Symptoms include
high fever, hard breathing, and collapse. Also
known as woolsorters' disease.
Brucellosis: Bacterial disease usually found
in cattle, goats, and pigs. Marked by high
fever and chills in humans. Also known as
undulant fever. Fatal in up to 5 per cent of
untreated oases. Symptoms can linger for
months.
Encephalomyelitis: Highly infectious viral
disease that appears in many forms and
gradations: it can be simply debilitating or
fatal. Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis
were killed.
ON: A non-lethal gas with a deceptive, fra- of those afflicted. Complete convalescence
testing of biologicals at Dug-way, has pro- agent, now in use in Vietnam, Is a fast-acting Q-/ever: Acute, rarely fatal rickettsial
dfls-
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Tularemia: A bacterial disease marked by
high fever, chills, pains, and weakness. Acute
period can last two to three weeks. Sometimes
causes ulcers in mouth or eyes, which mul-
tiply. Untreated, its mortality rate is between
5 and 8 per cent. Highly infectious, and
usually found in animals, fowls, and ticks.
Also known as rabbit fever.
Source: Chemical and Biological Warfare,
America's Hidden Arsenal, by Seymour H.
Hersh (Doubleday Co. 1969).
ease usually found in ticks, but also found in
cattle, sheep, gents, and some wild animals.
The Q-fever organism can remain alive and
Infectious in dry areas Tor years. Rarely fatal
but the resulting fever may last up to three
months.
Rift Valley Fever: Viral infection of sheep,
cattle, and other animals that can be trans-
mitted to humans, usually to the male.
Symptoms include nausea, chills, headaches,
and pains, but the disease is mild: despite
the severity of symptoms deaths are rare and
acute discomfort lasts only a few days. Also
believed to be more virulent among Asians.
Rocky Moutnain Spotted Fever: An acute
rickettsial disease transmitted to man by the
tick. One of the most severe of all infectious
diseases. Can kill within three days. Fevers
range up to 105 degrees F. Often found in
northwestern United States, but susceptibil-
ity to the disease in general. Highly respon-
sive to treatment.
PLANNED OPEN AIR TESTING?MARCH 1968-MAY 1969, DUGWAY PROVING GROUND, UTAH
Item Agent Agent amount
Quantity
M139 bomblet GB 1 round per trial (5 trials).
E139 bomblet GB 1 item per trial (8 trials).
105 milimeter projectile_ GB 1.5 pounds per round_ 1 round per trial (3 trials).
BLU 19/623 GB 1 round per trial (I trial).
Item Agent
Agent amount Quantity
M55 rocket GB
Spray boom (truck) GB
8-inch howitzer shell VX
Spray boom (truck) VX
1 round per trial (4 trials).
2 gallons per trial 3 trials.
143.h pounds per round__ _ 1 round per trail (5 trials).
2 gallons per trail 2 trials.
PLANNED TESTING, FOURTH QUARTER, FISCAL YEAR 1969: APRIL-JUNE 1969
Item Agent
Agent quantity per
item
Deseret Test Center, Utah (Dugway Proving Ground,
Utah):
United States Army:
8 inch shell, 50 foot release VX 15.4 pounds
E139 bomblet GB
Do GB
M55 rocket warhead GB
M23 land mine VX
Test fixture, ground release 1 VX 10 pounds
Test fixture, ground release 1 HD do
155-millimeter shell, ground release 1 GD 12.5 pound
Test fixture, ground release 1 GA 1.2 pounds
United States Navy:
Bomblet G-type
Defense system challenge, ground releasel_ GB or VX
United States Air Force: BLU-19 bomblet GB
3 pounds
do
Number of
items to be
teste
Item
Agent
Agent quantity per
item
Number of
items to be
tested
Edgewood Arsenal, Md.?all Army:
155 mm shell, ground release 1
Test fixture
Do
E139 bomblet (EOD test)
M23 land mine
E139 bomblet
i.
Test munition
Fort McClellan, Ala:8
Bulk agent, poured on a suitable surface for
detection and decontamination exercises.
VX
EA 1356
GB
GB
VX
GA
GB
GD
VX
HD
HD
HD
HD
HD
HD
GB
VX
VX
6.5 pounds
100 grams
50 grams
10 pounds
2 gallons
1 gallon
160 centimeters_
120 centimeters
80 centimeters
40 centimeters
42 centimeters_
42 centimeters
42 centimeters
.
08
?24
?20
1
3
114
8
039
2
1
5
1
1
6
5
5
5
8
4
4
4
4
6
3
3
10
16
6
3
4
LETHAL AGENT, OPEN-AIR TESTS SCHEDULED, FIRST QUARTER, FISCAL YEAR 1970?JULY-SEPTEMBER 1969
Height of
Item release Agent
Quantity
of item
Agent quantity to be
per item tested
Deseret Test Center, Utah (Dugway
Proving Ground):
United States Navy: V Bomblet____ Ground
United States Army:
55-gallon drum?portable water._ do
VX 1 pound 3
GB Less than 2 5
pounds.
HD
VX
M2XR XR 75
155 MI21 projectile GB 28
155 M121 projectile VX 28
155 M121 projectile GB 6
155 M121 projectile VX 6
4.5-inch mortar Ground HD 6 pounds 148
HT
155 do G 12 to 14 pounds___ 30
M23 Land mine VX 12
M56 Warhead (M55 racket). GB 10
United States Air Force:
Test fixture Ground HD 8 pounds 7
Item
Quantity
of item
Height of Agent quantity to be
release Agent per item tested
Edgewood Arsenal, Md. (All Army tests):
155 Howitzer shell Ground VX 6.5 pounds 7
Test fixture do EA1356 100 grams 24-
Do do EA1356 11 pounds 3
On do GB 50 grams 20
E139 bomblet (EN) test) GB 1
Test bomblet do VX 1 pound 8
M23 land mine VX 3
155 Howitzer canister do VX 3 pounds 9
Test spray 1 meter. GA 1.3 pounds 16
Fixture GB 1.3 pounds 8
GD 1.3 pounds 16
VX 10 pounds 2
GB 4
E139 bomblet GD 8
I Ground releases are statically detonated or functioned.
2 Te be conducted this quarter or next quarter, depending on availability of facilities.
a Chemical agent decontamination and detection exercises are conducted to train chemical
specialists in techniques for these operations. The specialists are subsequently assigned to Army
divisions and decontamination teams.
Source: Subcommittee on Conservation and Natural Resources, Committee on Government
Operations, U.S. House of Representatives.
Mr. GOODELL. Mr. President, let us
suppose that VX again escaped from a
testing site. Suppose instead of drift-
ing to a field of sheep, the nerve gas
drifted to a city or town of people. The
deadly nerve gas VX is colorless and
odorless. The protection required against
Its very rapid fatal effect is a gas mask
and protective clothing. First aid sug-
gested is atropine. What chances under
Note: Recent exchanges between Representative Henry Reuss, chairman of the House Conserva-
tion and Natural Resources Subcommittee and Army Secretary Stanley Resor give some idea
of the scheduling of open air tests of chemical agents, including nerve gas.
The unclassified data above lists item-by-item outdoor testing for the periods March 1968 to
May 1969 at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah; April to June 1969 at Deseret Test Center, Utah
(Dugway Proving Ground, Utah); at Edgewood Arsenal, Md.; and at Fort McCelllan, Ala.; July to
September 1969 at Deseret Test Center, Utah (Dugway Proving Ground, Utah) and at Edgewood
Arsenal, Md.
these circumstances would our people
have of surviving?
A ban on outdoor testing of lethal
chemical agents, including VX, would
prevent such circumstances from arising.
I simply cannot accept accidental
death, contaminated land, and the spread
of disease as a price for adding still
more to the already vast offensive capa-
bility of our CBW arsenal.
Mr. President, on Saturday, Secretary
of Defense Laird said that a chemical
warfare deterrent and a biological re-
search program are essential to national
security. He said that research and test-
ing of CBW agents should continue.
If I rightly understand, we can expect
Pentagon requests to break the proposed
"moratorium" on CBW open air tests.
If such Pentagon requests be made and
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311./INAL K SENATE Augwzt .11, 1949
agreed to, I fear we will be back again
where we started. That is, we will be
back with peril to the public health and
peril from a spiraling t7.13W program.
Mr. President, why, in view of the nu-
clear, and other deterrents, are chemical
warfare deterrence andan offensive bio-
logical research program essential to na-
tional security?
To date, research in biological war-
fare has already produced biological war-
heads for the Sergeafii; research has
brought germ warfare U3 the missile age.
Chemical deterrence1 has also found
shelter in the Sergeant. Still, we are told
by the Pentagon that research and test-
ing should continue.
What are we really_ contributing to
when we stockpile munitions filled with
lethal gas and disease-producing bac-
teria? Do we not contribute to that eerie
sense of doomsday? 'What do we mean
to accomplish with gas and germ weap-
ons? To prevent use? But what if the
net result is to proliferate use?
Mr. President, anything so infamous
as germ warfare should be deterred ulti-
mately by eliminating germ weapons.
Some will say that this is a dream. Some
will say that it cannot be achieved. I
cannot accept this reasoning to justify
germ weapons. Today, I call for the day
when we will dismantle can germ arsenal.
I look forward to the day, when the
United States will eliminate the means
by which civilizations of the world could
plunge into the abyss of epidemic and
mass death. I urge today, that we fight
germs with medicine; not with germ
weapons. Medical protection against
germs is reasonable, it is sane. To pro-
tect against germs with germ weapons is
folly; it is madness.
Deterrence with defensive equipment,
such as gas masks and vaccines, is more
reasonable than the deterrence offered
by military science and by hardware
which places gas and germs in grenades
and in nuclear warheads. Deterrence
with defensive equipment has the added
advantage of beneficial "spin-offs" for
peacetime medical applications gained
by gas and germ research It is still un-
clear to me why medical research of this
kind is done by the Defense Department
when such research can be done by the
Public Health Service.
Deterrence with weapons has the neg-
ative side effect of arms race competition
with other nations or indeed, with our
own self. Unilateral armament may be
the net effect, or perhaps is the goal of
our CBW program. Still, we cannot
ignore our contributions to proliferation
of CBW throughout the world.
Mr. President, how does our national
security benefit from CBW proliferation?
We have spent years to check nuclear
proliferation to nonnuclear nations. If
we succeed in nuclear nonproliferation,
then few nations will pose a nuclear
threat to the cities of this country.
Chemical and biological weapons are a
way that many nations can threaten our
cities.
Do we and should we encourage for-
eign nations to build up gas and germ
weapons as a deterrent to a potential
enemy? Should we train foreign officers
in gas and germ warfare? Should we have
CBW courses at Fort McClellan and in-
vite foreign officers to attend?
Mr. President, many people are un-
aware that in the past 20 years, con-
cerning CBW, and prior to 1951, we even
had a foreign officer training program
which trained military officers from
Egypt and Yugoslavia in the use of chem-
ical and biological agents. It has been
charged that, subsequent to that time,
Egypt used deadly gases in Yemen. We
have a share of the responsibility for
this tragic development in the history of
mankind,
Some 35 nations have received foreign
officer training in how to use CBW weap-
ons. This is truly a significant rung up
the balance-of-terror ladder for the
world, because chemical and biological
agents can be produced cheaply by
countries with very small resources.
Unlike nuclear weapons, chemical and
biological weapons which can wipe out
mankind can be produced by small
countries. We must move forward?cer-
tainly our country must?and should not
be a party to escalating an arms race in
this area of CBW.
Certainly it is difficult to look back at
different countries' activities in the past
20 years with any confidence that we
have done anything but contribute to
greater escalation.
It is particularly distressing to me that
our CBW program includes a foreign
officer training program in CBW. The
Army offers two courses in CBW open to
foreign officers at Fort McClellan. One
course is for a period of 9 weeks. The
other is for a period of 9 months. Since
1951, the Pentagon has provided CBW
training to officers from over 35 foreign
countries.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the RECORD two
charts showing the countries which have
participated in the Army's CBW train-
ing program.
There being no objection, the charts
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
ARMY'S CBW FOREIGN OFFICER TRAINING PROGRAM
PARTICIPATING COUNTRY LIST, FROM 1951 TO PRESENT
FOREIGN OFFICERS TRAINING PROGRAM-I..
9 WEEK COURSE
Fiscal year-
1969 1970
Japan
Korea
Philippines
Taiwan
Thailand
South Vietnam
Iran 1
Lebanon
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia 5 4
France
Germany 2 2
Greece 5 4
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom 3 3
Yugoslavia
Canada 1 2
Argentina
Mexico
Australia 2
Source: Department of Defense
FOREIGN OFFICERS TRAINING PROGRAM-36 WEEK COURSE
Fiscal year
1969
Australia
Japan
Korea
Phillipines
Taiwan
Thailand
South Vietnam
Iran
2
Iraq
Jordan
Lebanon
Pakistan
Egypt!
Austria
Denmark
Germany
Greece
Italy
Norway
Switzerland
Turkey
Yugoslavia I
Canada
Argentina
Brazil
Venezuela
Israel
I Terminated since early 1950's. -
Source: Department of Defense.
Mr. GOODELL, Mr. President, officers
have come here to learn about CBW.
They have come from Europe, from Latin
America, from the middle East and from
Southeast Asia. This year, emphasis has
been given to training officers from Viet-
nam, Thailand, Korea, Taiwan, and the
Philippines.
I am concerned that such training of
foreign officers could inspire an wipe-
tite for acquisition of these insidious
weapons of war. I am disturbed that
knowledge and acquisition of CBW could
propel nations of the world to use CBW
in war. Have we learned nothing from
Yemen? Indeed, sharp review of this
foreign officers training program in Cl3W
is long overdue.
I urge that the Senate Armed Services
Committee make a complete review of
this aspect of the OEM' program. The
question to be faced is whether these
study courses should be continued or
abandoned in the name of reason.
If we fail to halt chemical and bio-
logical weapons spread and build-up
now, what will be in store for future gen-
erations? While we now pause on the
present rung of the CBW balance-of-ter-
ror ladder, we see that we are in a near
perfect model of weapons escalation. If
we have "overkill" in nuclear weapons;
we have "superkill" in chemical and Mo-
logical weapons. If the Pentagon has
asked us to deploy an ABM for defense
against nuclear attack, it is just a matter
of time that the Pentagon will ask us for
funds to deploy an ACBM, an anti-chem-
ical and biological monitoring system?
We simply must guard against the
dangers inherent in the very existence of
chemical and germ weapons. There is
danger in any outdoor testing of lethal
gas and any disease-producing bacteria
and toxin. There is danger in CBW esca-
lation and proliferation. There is danger
in the use of gas and germs in warfare.
Today, we can start to check the
dangers posed by CBW by acting favor-
ably on the omnibus anti-CBW amend-
ment. We can begin today with what
promises to be a very long and difficult
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August 11, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECuKll ? &CNA S9525
road to additional review and further
control of chemical and biological weap-
ons both in this country and throughout
the world.
Yet to be done is a review by the whole
Congress of many general areas of
inquiry:
Why do we have a gas and germ ar-
senal? Is the Pentagon's retaliation in
kind a valid justification given the nu-
clear deterrent?
How does our CBW program contrib-
ute to the proliferation of CBW through-
out the world?
What is the U.S. policy on use of these
weapons in combat?
What steps are the United States will-
ing to take in CBW arms control?
Let us give deep consideration to the
grave moral issues which arise when we
stockpile munitions filled with lethal gas
and disease-producing bacteria. Let us
think deeply on this as we move further
in our review ot CBW from the stand-
points of deterrence, proliferation, use
in combat, and targets for further dis-
armament.
More steps can be taken to control
chemical and biological weapons. These
include:
Presentation of the Geneva Protocol
by the President to the Senate for rati-
fication. The United States signed, but
never ratified, the 1925 Protocol outlaw-
ing use of gas and germs in war.
A report by a nongovernmental Scien-
tific and Medical Advisory Committee on
CBW. This report could focus on scien-
tific, medical, and arms-control aspects
of chemical and biological weapons. The
report should be presented to both the
President and to Congress. Paralleled
with congressional examination and that
of the National Security Council, such a
report could be an important contribu-
tion M options for charting a long-range
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I deterrent and our biological research pro-
should like to respond to the Senator gram, both of which are essential to na-
tional security," the statement said.
from New York and commend him for Senate Armed Services Committee Chair-
the fine work he has done in this area man John Stennis (D-Miss.) said Friday he
of CBW, and to commend also the Sena- would probably support the amendment and
tor from Wisconsin (Mr. NELSON) and predicted its approval.
others, and their staffs, for their close The compromise language, which the or-
cooperation and the fine work they have iginal supporters?said would not harm the
done in trying to bring together and con- amendment, would allow open air testing of
solidate the thinking on control matters
CBW agents only when the Secretary of De-
fense certified that it was necessary for na-
concerning the CBW program. tional security, the U.S. Surgeon General
To this point I would say that all of certified that it would not be hazardous to
these Senators have cooperated. The health or the environment and congressional
compromise may not please everyone; committees had been notified in advance.
but, as the Senator from New York
There are no restrictions on such testing
stated, it represents a beginning of con-
now. The original amendment would have flatly banned it.
trol that Congress should have over this The compromise version was worked out
program. Friday in a meeting between Dr. John S.
Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I thank Foster, Pentagon research director, and Sen.
the Senator from New Hampshire. As Thomas J. McIntyre (D-N.H.) , chairman of
chairman of the subcommittee, along an Armed Services subcommittee that had
with other Senators and their staffs, they already recommended deletion of all funds
did a superb job in working out the com-
for development of offensive CBW weapons.
bined amendment. CONCERN CITED
I should like to mention that a num- Laird said that when he took office in Jan-
ber of us have offered amendments of uary he "became concerned with the manage-
various kinds to the budget. It is ap-
ment and control of our chemical warfare
propriate to mention that the original
and that i
biological resesarch programs" i n e " and "felt
eorfe needede se programs."
budget on January 14 was $23,151,660,000. man-
agementin aonvd con
ement control
That was reduced by Secretary Laird's On result of this concern, he said, was
recommendations to $21,963,060,000. And President Nixon's directive in April ordering
then through the efforts of the chairman, the National Security Council to make a
the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STEN- thorough study of CBW activities.
NIS), the budget was cut another almost "Pending the completion of the NSC
$2 billion, down to $20,059,500,000. study," Laird said, "I believe it is prudent
It should not go unnoted that the
that we act jointly with Congress and take
actions, wherever possible, to improve the
chairman and his committee did an ex- management and control of chemical war-
cellent job in reducing the budget. The fare and biological research programs."
fact that a number of us have other Laird emphasized that research and test-
amendments should not cause us to ig- ing of CBW agents should continue even
nore the fact that the chairman did a though the United States has stated it would
fine and conscientious job. use them only in self-defense, because "fail-
ure to maintain an effective chemical war-
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- fare deterrent would endanger national se-
sent to have printed in the RECORD a curity."
news story from the Washington Post of The amendment would also require semi-
yesterday, Sunday, August 10, 1969, on a annual reports to Congress on CBW spend-
course of action on gas and germ weap-
statement by the Secretary of Defense, ing and would bar procurement of further
ons. Mr. Laird, as well as the statement by CBW delivery systems, CBW activities found
These are some more steps we can take Mr. Laird made on August 9, 1969, re- hythteSeci law,
of Statetviolatewithinw-
to control CBW in addition to the omni- garding the CBW amendment pending. le
r
agents iowna within tiiernU?st nited shiptnieatens ts an ndf CBW
to
anti-CBW amendment we are con- There being no objection, the news -
trans-
port to foreign countries without approval
sidering today. article and statement were ordered to be of the foreign nation and notification to
Mr. President, I am not completely printed in the RECORD, as follows: Congress. ?
$2.5 BILLION SPENT
1969]
satisfied with the compromise, but I [From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Aug. 10,
think it is a significant breakthrough. . Since 1960, the Pentagon has spent about
I want to commend particularly the CBW CURB ENDORSED By LAIRD $2.5 billion on CBW activities with little
Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. NELSON) The Defense Department announced un- congressional scrutiny or public knowledge.
The amendment ththtatywo would procurement be at attached bill,
to which for his cooperation in working with me expectedrir yesterday that it would support
$20-b
and others in developing these amend- has been on the Senatefloor for five weeks.
germ warfare weapons.
efforts for strict congressional controls on
the testing and production of chemical and
ments, particularly the three originally Nearly a dozen other amendments are await-
cosponsored by us. I would also like to The announcement by Defense Secretary ing action and Senate leaders said Friday
commend the Senator from New Hamp- Melvin R. Laird virtually insures Senate ap- the bill would probably not come to a final
shire for his continuing concern and in- proval Monday of a revised but still broad vote until September.
terest in this area, and for his coopera- amendment drawn up by critics of the Sen. Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis.), a sponsor of
Pen-
ton in working out the amendment tagon's past activities in the CBW field. It the CBW amendment, released this list of
colleges and universities engaged in Pentagon
would, among other restrictions, ban most
which we expect will be carried through CBW contracts:
open air testing of the lethal agents.
in conference and not diluted further. ri approved, the CBW amendment would "Boston Univ., Brooklyn College, Buffalo
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, will be the second major victory for critics of the Univ., Univ. of California at Berkeley, Univ.
the Senator from Wisconsin yield me Pentagon since they failed by two votes last of California at Los Angeles, Univ. of Chicago,
1 minute? week to block initial deployment of the Univ. of Connecticut, Cornell Univ., Delaware,
Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, how much Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system. George Peabody College, George Washington
time remains to me? The Senate's liberal bloc won approval Univ., Georgia Institute of Technology, Hah-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Pour mm- Thursday of a potentially far-reaching nemann Medical College, Harvard, Univ. of
Illinois at Urbana, Illinois Institute of Tech-
amendment that would give the General Ac-
utes remain to the Senator from Wis- counting Office greater powers to audit de- nology.
consin. tense contracts. Also, Indiana Univ. Foundation, Iowa State
Mr. NELSON. I yield 1 minute to the .1 am in agreement with the goals of the Also,
Johns Hopkins, Kansas State Univ.,
Senator from New Hampshire. (CBW) amendment," Laird said yterday Univ. of Maryland and its medical and dental
es
schools, Univ. of Massachusetts, Massachu-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- in a statement released by the Pentagon. setts Institute of Technology, Univ. of Michi-
ator from New Hampshire is recognized "I believe this revised amendment will gan, Univ of Minnesota, Univ. of North Caro-
for 1 minute. allow us to maintain our chemical warfare Una, Ohio State Univ., Univ. of Oklahoma,
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S 9526 CO
NGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 11, 1969
Univ. of Oregon, Univ. of Pennsylvania, Univ.
of Pittsburgh, Polytechnic Institute of
Brooklyn.
"Also, Rutgers, St. Louis Univ., Stanford
Research Institute, Univ. of Tennessee, Univ.
of Texas at Austin, Texas AeirM, Univ of Utah,
Utah State Univ., Medical College of Vir-
ginia, Univ. of Washington, Washington
State Univ., Western Reserve Univ., College
of William and Mary, Univ. of Wisconsin and
Yale."
MEMORANDUM FOR CORRESPON?wNTS, AUGUST 9,
1969
Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird today
issued the following statement in response to
queries about the DoD position on the pend-
ing McIntyre amendment.
On assuming the office of Secretary of De-
fense in January, I became concerned with
the management and control of our chemical
warfare and biological research programs. I
felt that improvements were needed in the
management and control of these programs.
That is why in April I requested and the
President ordered a National Security Council
study of these matters. This study Is in
progress.
Pending the completion Of the NSC study,
I believe it is prudent that we act jointly
with Congress and take actions, wherever
possible, to improve the 'management and
control of chemical warfare and biological
research programs.
Members of my staff, principally Dr. John S.
Foster, Jr., Director of Research and Engi-
neering, have been working in recent days
with Senator Thomas J. iliferntyre of New
Hampshire, and with other members of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, on a re-
vised amendment to the pending Defense
Authorization Bill.
I am in agreement with the goals of the
new amendment, which the Senate is sched-
uled to consider on Monday.
I believe this revised amendment will allow
us to maintain our chemical warfare deter-
rent and our biological research program
both of which are essential to national
security.
The history of the use of lethal chemical
warfare agents has demonstrated on three
notable occasions in this country that the
only time military forces have used these
weapons is when the opposing forces had no
immediate capability to deter or to retaliate.
This was true early in World War I, later
in Ethopia and more recently in Yemen.
Clearly, failure to maintain an effective
chemcial warfare deterrent would endanger
national security.
Because it would not always be possible to
determine the origin of attack by biological
agents, the deterrent aspects of biological
research are not as sharply defined. A con-
tinued biological research program, however,
is vital on two other major ?mints.
First, we must strengthen our protective
capabilities in such areas as vaccines and
therapy.
Secondly, we must minimize the dangers of
technological surprise.
It is important that the American people
be informed of why we must continue to
maintain our chemical deterrent, conduct
biological research, and how we propose to
improve the management and control of these
programs.
Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, how much
time do I have left?
The PRESIDING OFiviCER. The Sen-
ator from Wisconsin has 2 minutes re-
maining.
Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to hare printed in
full in the RECORD the report of the Sec-
retary General on chemical and bacterio-
logical weapons and the eirects of their
possible use.
There being no objection, the repor
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD
as follows:
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
Jusre 30, 1969.
DEAR M. SECRETARY-GENERAL: I have the
honour to submit herewith a unanimous re-
port on chemical and bacteriological (bio-
logical) weapons which was prepared in pur-
suance of General Assembly resolution 2454
A (XXIII).
The Consultant Experts appointed in ac-
cordance with the General Assembly resolu-
tion were the following:
Dr. Tibor Bakacs, Professor of Hygiene, Di-
rector-General of the National Institute of
Public Health, Budapest.
Dr. Hotse C. Bartlema, Head of the Micro-
biological Department of the Medical-Bio-
logical Laboratory, National Defense Research
Organization TNO, Rijswijk, Netherlands.
Dr. Ivan L. Bennett, Director of the New
York University Medical Center and Vice-
President for Medical Affairs, New York Uni-
versity, New York.
Dr. S. Bhagavantam, Scientific Adviser to
the Minister of Defense, New Delhi.
Dr. Jiri Franek, Director of the Military In-
stitute for Hygiene, Epidemiology and Micro-
biology, Prague.
Dr. Yosio Kawakita, President of the Uni-
versity of Chiba, Professor of Bacteriology,
Chiba City, Japan.
M. Victor Moulin, Ingenieur en chef de
armement, Chef du Bureau Defense chimi-
que et biologique, Direction technique des
armements terrestres, Saint Cloud, France.
Dr. M. K. McPhail, Director of Chemical
and Biological Defense, Defense Chemical,
Biological and Radiation Laboratories, De-
fense Research Board, Ottawa.
Academician O. A. Reutov, Professor of
Chemistry at the Moscow State University,
Moscow.
Dr. Guillermo Soberon, Director, Institute
de Investigaciones Biomedicas, thaversidad
Nacional Autonama de Mexico, Mexico City.
'Dr. Lars-Erik Tarrunelin, Chief of Depart-
ment for Medicine and Chemistry, Research
Institute for National Defense, Stockholm,
Dr. Berhane Teourne-Lessane, Medical Co-
Director and Head of Department of Viruses
and Rickettsiae, Imperial Central Laboratory
and Research Institute, Addis Ababa.
Colonel Zbigniew Zoltowskl, Protestor of
Medicine, Epidemiologist and Scientific Ad-
viser to the Ministry of National Defense,
Warsaw,
Sir Sony Zuckerman, Chief Scientific Ad-
viser to the Government of the United King-
dom, Professor Emeritus, University of Bir-
mingham.
The report was drafted during sessions
held in Geneva between 20 and 24 January
and between 16 and 29 April, and finalized
at meetings held in New York between 2 and
14 June 1969.
The Group of Consultant Experts with to
acknowledge the assistance they received
from the World Health Organization, the
Food and Agriculture Organization, the In-
ternational Committee of the Red Cross, the
Pugwash Conference on Science and World
Affairs (Pugwash) and the International In-
stitute for Peace and Conflict Research
(SIPRI) , all of which submitted valuable in-
formation and material for the purposes of
the study.
The Group of Consultant Experts also wish
to express their gratitude for the valuable
assistance they received tram members of
the United Nations Secretariat.
I have been requested by the Group of
Consultant Experts, as their Chairman, to
submit their unanimous report to you on
their behalf.
Yours sincerely,
WILLIAM EPSTEIN,
Chairman, Group of Consultant Experts
on Chemical and Bacteriological (Bio-
logical) Weapons.
QUESTION OF' GENERAL AND COMPLETE
DISARMAMENT
[Illustrations not printed in the Recone]
(Report of the Secretary-General on chem-
ical and bacteriological (biological)
weapons and the effects of their possible
use)
Pursuant to General Assembly resolution
2454 A (XXIII) of 20 December 1968, the
Secretary-General has the honour to trans-
mit herewith to the General Assembly the
report on chemical and bacteriological (bio-
logical) weapons and the effects of their
possible use, prepared with the astistance
of qualified consultant experts.
In accordance with paragraph 4 of the
resolution, the report is also being trans-
mitted to the Security Council (8/9292) and
the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Com-
mittee on Disarmamenti as well as to the
Governments of Member States.
FOREWORD DT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
During the past few years, I have become
increasingly concerned by developments in
the field of chemical and bacteriological
(biological) weapons and have given expres-
sion to this concern on several occasions.
A year ago, I stated publicly that "the inter-
national community was not sufficiently
conscious of the dangers inherent in this new
type of weapon of mass murder", and that
"due attention had not been focused on this
very serious problem". In the introduction
to my annual report on the work of the
Organization, in September 1968, I stated:
"While progress is being made in the field
of nuclear disarmament, there is another
aspect of the disarmament problem to which
I feel too little attention has been devoted
in recent years. The question of chemical and
biological weapons has been overshadowed by
the question of nuclear weapons, which have
a destructive power several orders of magni-
tude greater than that of chemical and bio-
logical weapons. Nevertheless, these too are
weapons of mass destruction regarded with
universal horror. In some respects, they may
be even more dangerous than nuclear weap-
ons because they do not require the enormous
expenditure of financial and scientific re-
sources that are required for nuclear weap-
ons. Almost all countries, including small
ones and developing ones, may have access
to these weapons, which can be manufac-
tured quite cheaply, quickly and secretly in
small laboratories or factories. This fact in
itself makes the problem of control and in-
spection much more difficult. Moreover, since
the adoption, on 17 Jane, 1925, of the Geneva
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in
War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of War-
fare, there have been many scientific and
technical developments and numerous im-
provements, if that is the right word, in
chemical and biological weapons, which
have created new situations and new prob-
lems. On the one hand, there has been a
great increase in the capability of these
weapons to inflict unimaginable suffering,
disease and death to ever larger numbers of
human beings; on the other hand, there has
been a growing tendency to use some chemi-
cal agents for civilian riot control and a
dangerous trend to aceept their use in some
form in conventional warfare,
"Two years ago, by resolution 2162 B (XXI),
the General Assembly called for the strict
observance by all States of the principles and
objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 1925,
condemned all actions contrary to those ob-
jectives and invited all States to accede to
the Protocol. Once again, I would like to add
my voice to those of others in urging the
early and complete implementation of this
resolution.- However, in my opinion, much
more is needed. . . ."
"By a letter dated 1 July 1969 from the
Secretary-General to the Co-Chairmen of
the Conference.
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S 9527
At its twenty-third session, by resolutionmeans of warfare; the possible ?long-term logical (biological) agents intended for pur-
2454 A (XXIII), the General Assembly re- effects on human health and ecology; and poses of war were to end if they were elimin-
quested me to prepare, with the assistance the economic and security implications of ated from all military arsenals.
of qualified consultant experts, a report on the development, acquisition mid possible "If this were to happen, there would be a
chemical and bacteriological (biological) use of chemical and bacteriological (biologi- general lessening of international fear and
weapons in accordance with the proposal cal) weapons and of systems for their de- tension. It is the hope of the authors that
contained in the introduction to my an- livery, this report will contribute to public aware-
nual report on the work of the organization The consultant experts to whom I conveyed ness of the profoundly dangerous results if
(A/7201/Add. 1), and in accordance with the these terms of reference accepted them as these weapons were ever used, and that an
recommendation contained in the report of the basis for their study. aroused public will demand and receive as-
the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Corn- It was my intention that the Group of surances that Governments are working for
mittee on Disarmament of 4 September 1968 Consultant Experts should survey the en- the earliest effective elimination of chemical
(A/7189). tire subject from the technical and sof- and bacteriological (biological) weapons."
In pursuance of this resolution, I ap- entiflc points of view, so that the report I have given the study prepared by the
pointed the following group of fourteen con- could place these weapons in proper per- consultant experts my earnest consideration
sultant experts to assist me in the prepara- spective. It was also my hope that an au- and I have decided to accept their unani-
tion of the report: Dr. Tibor Bakacs, Profes- thoritative report could become the basis mous report in its entirety, and to transmit
sor of Hygiene, Director-General of the Na- for political and legal action by the Mem- it to the General Assembly, the Security
tional Institute of Public Health, Budapest; bars of the United Nations. Council, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on
Dr. Hotse C. Bartlema, Head of the Micro- As the report was to be made available Disarmament and to the Governments of
biological Department of the Medical-Bio- by 1 July 1969, very concentrated efforts by Member States, as the report called for by
logical Laboratory, National Defence Re- the consultant experts were required in resolution 2451 A (XXIII).
search Organization TNO, Rijswijk, Nether- order to cover this extensive field. The mem- I also feel it incumbent upon me, in the
lands; Dr. Ivan L. Bennett, Director of the bars of the Group, acting in their personal hope that further action will be taken to
New York University Medical Center and capacities, carried out this demanding task deal with the threat posed by the existence
Vice-President of Medical Affairs, New York at three sessions between January and June of these weapons, to urge that the Members
University, New York; Dr. S. Bhagavantam, 1969. of the United Nations undertake the fol-
Scientific Adviser to the Minister of Defence, The Group had the benefit of valuable lowing measures in the interests of enhanc-
New Delhi; Dr. Jirl Franek, Director of the submissions from the World Health Organi- ing the security of the peoples of the world:
Military Institute for Hygiene, EpidemiologV zation, the Food and Agriculture Organize- 1. To renew the appeal to all States to
and Microbiology, Prague; Dr. Yogic. Kama- tion, the International Committee of the accede to the Geneva Protocol of 1925;
kite, President of University of Chiba, Pro- Red Cross, the Pugwash Conference on Sci- 2. To make a clear affirmation that the
lessor of Bacteriology, Chiba City, Japan; M. ence and World Affairs (Pugwash) and the prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol
Victor Moulin, Ingenieur en chef de l'arm- International Institute for Peace and Con- applies to the use in war of all chemical,
ement, Chef du Bureau Defense chimique at filet Research (SIPRI). I wish to express my bacteriological and biological agents (includ-
biologique, Direction technique des arme- grateful appreciation to all the consultant ing tear gas and other harassing agents) ,
ments terrestres, Saint Cloud, France; Dr. experts for their dedicated work and to the which now exist or which may be developed
M. K. McPhail, Director of Chemical and Bio- organizations and bodies who co-operated in the future:
logical Defence, Defence Chemical, Biologi- in the preparation of the study.
cal and Radiation Laboratories, Defence Re- The Group has submitted me to a unani-
search Board, Ottawa; Academician 0. A. mous report embodying its findings and con-
Reutov, Professor of Chemistry at the Mos- elusions. I wish to avail myself of this
cow State University, Moscow; Dr. Guillermo opportunity to express my gratification for
Soberon, Director, Instituto de Investiga- the very high level of competence with which
ciones Biomedicas, Universidad Nactional the consultant experts have discharged their
Autonoma de Mexico, Mexico City; Dr. Lars- mandate. In a very short period of time, they
Erik Tainmelin, Chief of Department for have produced a study, which, in spite of
Medicine and Chemistry, Research Institute the many complex aspects of the subject
, for National Defence, Stockholm; Dr. Ber- matter, is both concise and authoritative. It
bane Teoume-Lessane, Medical Co-Director is a document which, I believe, provides
and Head of Department of Viruses and valuable insights into the grave dangers that
Rickettsiae, Imperial Central Laboratory tuid are posed by the production and possible
Research Institute, Addis Ababa; Colonel use of these dreaded weapons.
Zbigniew Zoltowski, Professor of Medicine, I am particularly impressed by the con-
Epidemiologist and Scientific Adviser to the
. elusion of the consultant experts wherein
Ministry of National Defence, Warsaw; Sir they state; ,
801131 Zuckerman, Chief Scientific Adviser to "The general conclusion of the report can
the Government of the United Kingdom, thus be summed up in a few lines. Were
Professor Emeritus, University of Birming- these weapons ever to be used on a large scale
ham. in war, no one could predict how enduring
Mr. William Epstein, Director of the Die- the effects would be, and how they would
armament Affairs Division, Department of
Political and Security Council Affairs, served
as Chairman of the Group of Consultant
Experts. Mr. Alessandro Corradini, Chief of
the Committee and Conference Services Sec-
tion, acted as Secretary of the Group. He
was assisted by members of the Disarmament
Affairs Division.
After giving due consideration to the terms
of the resolution and to the views expressed
and the suggestions made during the dis-
cussion of the question at the twenty-third
session of the General Assembly, I reached
the conclusion that the aim of the report
should be to provide a scientifically sound
appraisal of the effects of chemical and bac-
teriological (biological) weapons and should
serve to inform Governments of the con-
sequences of their possible use. Within this
over-all framework, the report would fur-
nish accurate information in a concise and
readily understandable form on the follow-
ing matters: the basic characteristics of
chemical and basteriological (biological)
3. To call upon all countries to reach agree-
ment to halt the development, production
and stockpiling of all chemical ond bacterio-
logical (biological) agents for purposes of
war and to achieve their effective elimination
from the arsenal of weapons.
INTRODUCTION
1. In accordance with the resolution of the
General Assembly 2454 A (X.XIII) the Secre-
tary-General was asked to prepare, with the
assistance of qualified consultant experts, a
report on chemical and bacteriological (bio-
logical) weapons and on the effects of their
possible use. Specifically the experts were
asked to provide a scientific appraisal of the
characteristics of the chemical and bacterio-
logical (biological) weapons which could be
used in warfare; of the effects they could
have on military personnel and civilians; as
well as of their long-term effects on health
and our physical environment. They were also
asked to provide a statement about the eco-
nomic and security implications of the de-
affect the structure of society and the en- velopment, acquisition and possible use of
vironment in which we live. This overriding such weapons and associated weapon sys-
danger would apply as much to the country tems. The report which follows is confined to
which initiated the use of these weapons as these objectives.
to the one which had been attacked, regard-
2. No form of warfare has been more con-
less of what protective measures it might
demned than has the use of this category of
have taken in parallel with its development
weapons. The poisoning of wells has been re-
of an offensive capability. A particular danger
garded from time immemorial as a crime in-
also derives from the fact that any country
compatible with the rules of war. "War is
could develop or acquire, in one way or
waged with weapons, not with poison"
another, a capability in this type of warfare,
("Armis belle non venenis geri"), declared
despite the fact that this could prove costly.
the Roman jurists. As the destructive power
The danger of the proliferation of this class
of arms increased over the years, and with it
of weapons applies as much to the develop-
the potential for the widespread use of
ing as it does to developed countries.
chemicals, efforts were made to prohibit
"The momentum of the arms race would
through international understandings and by
clearly decrease if the production of these
legal means the use of chemical weapons. The
weapons were effectively and unconditionally
Brussels Declaration of 1874 and the Hague
banned. Their use, which could cause an
Conventions of 1899 and 1907 prohibited the
enormous loss of human life, has already
use of poisons and poisoned bullets and a
been condemned and prohibited by inter-
national agreements, in. particular the
separate declaration of the Hague Conven-
tion of 1899 condemned "the use of projec-
Geneva Protocol of 1925, and, more recently,
tiles the sole object of which is the diffusion
in resolutions or the General Assembly of
of asphyxiating or deleterious gases".
means of warfare; the probable effects of the United Nations. The prospects for gener
chemical and bacteriological (biological) and complete disarmament under effective 3. The fear today is that the scientific and
weapons on military and civil personnel, both international control, and hence for peace technological advances of the past few
protected and unprotected; the environ- throughout the world, would brighten. sig- decades have increased the potential of
mental factors affecting the employment of nificantly if the development, production chemical and bacteriological (biological)
chemical and bacteriological (biological) and stockpiling of chemcial and bacterio- weapons to such an extent that one can con-
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TE August ii, i99
ce ve of
their use catviing casualties on a
scale greater than one Would associate with
conventional warfare. At the moment most
of our knowledge confierning the use of
chemical weapons Is band upon the wiper-
ience of World Wax I. Gas was first used in
1914 and the first big attack in 1915 claimed
5,000 human lives. It is eatimated that from
then until the end of the War in 1918, at least
125,000 tons of toxic chemicals were used,
and according to official reports gas casual-
ties numbered about 000,000, of which
about 100,000 were fate/. The agents which
were used in this war ante much less toxic
than those, in particular nerve agents, which
could be used today, and they were dispersed
by means of relatively primitive equipment
as compared with what is now available, and
In accordance with battletield concepts of a
relatively unsophisticated kind.
4. It is true that a conelderable effort has
also been made to develop chemical agents
which have as their pure not to kill but
to reduce a mares capadity to fight. Such
agents are used by civir authorities of a
number of countries in eater to suppress dis-
orders and to control riots, but when used in
warfare they would inevitably be employed
as an adjunct to other forms of attack, and
their over-all effect might be lethal.
5. Since World War II. bacteriological
(biological) weapons hales also become an
increasing possibility. But because there is
no clear evidence that these agents have
ever been used as modern military weapons,
discussions of their characteristics and po-
tential threat have to draw heavily upon
experimental field and laboratory data, and:
on studies of naturally occurring outbreaks
and epidemics of infectious disease, rather
than on direct battlefield experience. Their
potential importance in warfare can be
sensed when one remembers that infectiouti
disease even as late as World War II caused
numerous casualties.
6. The greater threat posed by chemical
weapons today derives from the discovery and
manufacture of new, more toxic compounds.
On the other hand, bacteriological (bio-
logical) agents already exist in nature and
can be selected for use in warfare. Some of
these agents, notably bacteria, have been
known for several decades, but there Is a
vast number of other possible agents, es-
pecially viruses, which have been discovered
only recently, and some of these also possess
characteristics which make their use pos-
sible in war. Increases in potency of these
various types of agent have been made pos-
sible by scientific and technological advances
in microbial genetics, experimental pathology
and aerobiology.
7. As is well known, the use of toxic gases
in World War I generated so powerful a
sense of outrage that countries were en-
couraged to adopt measures prohibiting both
chemical and bacteriological (biological)
weapons. The result was the fieneva Protocol
of 17 June 1925, which prohibits the use in
war of asphyxiating, poisonoW or other gases
and of all analogous liquids, materials or de-
vices, as well as bacteriological methods of
warfare. This established a custom and hence
a standard of international law, and in
practice most States have adhered to the
principle that no one should resort to the
use of such weapons. But despite the adhor-
rence in which they have always been held
by civilized peoples, chemical weapons have
none the less on occasion been used. For ex-
ample, mustard gas was used in Ethiopia in
1935-36, causing numerous casualties
amongst troops and a civilian population
which was not only completely unprotected,
but which lacked even the itest elementary
medical services. It should also be noted that
the existence of the Geneva Protocol of 1925
may have helped as a deterrent to the use
of chemical or bacteriological (biological)
weapons in World War II, even though the
belligerents in that conflict had developed,
produced and stockpiled chemical agents for
possible use. The International Tribunal at
Nuremberg brought into the open the fact
that amongst the new agents which had been
produced and stockpiled during the course
of the war were such highly lethal agents as
Tabun and Sarin. Since then the validity and
effectiveness of the Geneva Protocol have
been reinforced by the approval, by the
General Assembly of the United Nations,
Without a single dissenting voice, of resolu-
tions 2162 B (XXI) of 5 December 1966 and
2454 A (xxin) of 20 December 1968, calling
for "strict observance by all States of the
principles and objectives" of the Geneva
Protocol, and inviting all States to accede
to it.
8. It is simple to appreciate the resurgence
of interest in the problems of chemical and
bacteriological (biological) warfare. Ad-
vances in chemical and biological science,
while contributing to the good of mankind,
have also opened up the possibility of ex-
ploiting th
cal and bacterio-
logical (biological) warfare weapons, some
of which could endanger man's future, and
the situation will remain threatening so long
as a number of States proceed with their
development, perfection, production and
stockpiling.
9. The report, as is noted in the General
Assembly resolution, is designed to submit
to peoples and governments, Ma form easily
understood by them, information on the ef-
pfeerotigileornsf connected possible
bacteriologicse ec(bteiod eflogiuscale) of
ai eeapthonsmai,ncasald re
as to promote a further consideration of
bac-
teriological (biological) weapons. Informa-
tion about the nature of chemical and bac-
teriological (biological) weapons, about their
increase and diversification as technology
has advanced, about their long-term effects
on human beings, animals and vegetation,
and about environmental factors which con-
dition these effects, is provided in Chapters
I to IV of the Report, In Chapter V. which
deals with the economic and security im-
plications of chemical and bacteriological
(biological) warfare, the experts have in-
terpreted the worst "security" to mean both
security in the narrow military sense, and
security in terms of the adverse and long-
term effects which these weapons, given they
were ever used, could have on the framework
of civilized existence.
10. As the present report shows, the out-
standing characteristics of this class of
weapons, and particularly of bacteriological
(biological) weapons, is the variability,
amounting under some circumstances to un-
predictability, of their effects. Depending on
environmental and meteorological condi-
tions, and depending on the particular agent
used, the effects might be devastating or
negligible. They could be localized or svide-
ipread. They might bear not only on those
attacked but also on the side Which initi-
ated their use, whether or not the attacked
military forces retaliated in kind. Civilians
would be even more vulnerable than the
military. The development, acquisition and
deployment of chemical and bacteriological
(biological) weapons--quite apart from ques-
tions of protection--constitutes a real eco-
nomic burden which varies in extent for dif-
ferent countries. Above all their acquisition
could not possibly obviate the need for other
weapons,
11. As chapters I and V of the report in-
dicate, it would be enormously costly in re-
sources, and administratively all but iinpos-
Bible, to organize adequate protection for a
civilian population against the range of pos-
sible chemical agents. Even military person-
nel, if locally engaged in a particular oper-
ation in which chemical and/or bacteriologi-
dal (biological) weapons were used and
where they had the advantage of protective
measures, would be unlikely to escape the
wider-spread and longer-term effects on their
country at large. These might arise, for ex
ample, from the ampractleability of protect
lug soil, plants, animals and essential focal
crops against short and long-term effects
12, To appreciate the risks which bacterio-
logical (biological) warfare could entail, one
has only to remember how a natural epi-
demic may persist unpredictably, and spread
far beyond the initial area of incidence, even
when the Most up-to-date medical resources
are used to suppress the outbreak. The
difficulties would be considerably increased
were deliberate efforts made, foe military
reasons, to propagate pathogenic organisms.
Mass disease, following an attack, especially
of civilian populations, could be expected
not only because of the lack of timely warn-
ing of the danger, but also because effective
measures of protection or treatment simply
do not exist or cannot be provided on an
adequate scale.
13. Once the doer was opened to this kind
of warfare, escalation would in all likelihood
occur and no one could say where the process
would end. Thus the report concludes that
the existence of chemical and bacteriological
(biological) weapons not only cantdbutes to
international tension, but that their further
development spurs the Rams race without
contributing to the security of any nation.
14. The present report will, in accordance
with resolution 2454 A (XXIII), be sub-
mitted to the Eighteen-Nstion Committee on
Disarmament to the Security Connell and
to the General Assembly at its twenty-
fourth session. We hope that it will con-
tribute to the implementation of measures
Which, in the final analysis, will eliminate
chemical and bacteriological (biological)
weapons from all military arsenals.
CHAPTER /. THE BASIC CHARAOIERLSTICS OP
CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL)
MEANS OF WARFARE
15. Since World War I, When chemical war-
fare was first resorted to on a lerge scale,
the variety and potency of chemical and bac-
teriological (biological) weapons has grown
steadily, and there has been a corresponding
increase in the capacity to deliver them to a
target area. The particular threat posed by
chemical weapons today- derives from the
existence of new, and far more toxic, chem-
ical compounds than were known fifty years
ago. Since bacteriological /biological) agents
exist naturally, their increased potency as
weapons has resulted from a process of se-
lection rattier than from the production of
entirely new agents. As Is explained in later
sections of this report, selection has been
made possible by advances in our knowledge
of the genetics of microbes, and through ad-
vances in experimental aerobiology.
16. The most significant result of these
technical developments is the great variety
of %injurious effect which these agents can
induce, and the consequent increase in the
number and types of situation in which
ere might be a temptatoia to use them for
military purposes.
A. Characteristics of chemical and bacterio-
logical (biological) weapons
17. For the purposes of this reports chem-
ical agents of warfare are taken to be chem-
ical substances, whether gaseous, liquid, or
solid, which might be employed because of
their direct toxic effects on man, animals and
plants. Bacteriological (biological) agents of
warfare are living organisms, whatever their
nature, or infective material derived from
them, which are intended to cause disease or
death in man, animals or plants, and which
depend for their effects on their ability to
multiply in the person, animal or plant
attacked.
18. Various living organisms (e.g. rick-
ettsia,e, viruses and fungi), as well as bac-
teria, can be used asi weapons. In the con-
tent of warfare all these are generally recog-
nized as "bacteriological weapone". But in
order to eliminate any poasible ambiguity,
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the phrase "bacteriological (biological)
weapons" has been used throughout to com-
prehend all forms of biological warfare.
19. All biological processes depend upon
chemical or physico-chemical reactions, and
what may be regarded today as a biological
agent could, tomorrow, as knowledge ad-
vances, be treated as chemical. Because they
themselves do not multiply, toxins, which are
produced by living organisms, are treated in
this report as chemical substances. We also
recognize there is a dividing line between
chemical agents of warfare in the sense we
use the terms, and incendiary substances
such as napalm and smoke, which exercise
their effects through fire, temporary depriva-
tion of air or reduced visibility. We regard
the latter as weapons which are better classi-
fied with high explosives than with the sub-
stances with which we are concerned. They
are therefore not dealt with further in this
report.
20. Finally, we recognize that both chemi-
cal and bacteriological (biological) agents
are designated either as lethal agents, that
is to say, agents which are intended to kill,
or as incapacitating agents, that is to say,
agents which are intended to cause dis-
ability. These terms are not absolute, but im-
ply statistical probabilities of response which
are more uncertain with bacteriological
(biological) than with chemical agents. Not
all individuals will die from an attack with
a given lethal agent, whereas some, for
example infants and people weakened by
malnutrition, disease or old age, as well as
a high proportion of individuals in special
circumstances, for example following irradi-
ation, might succumb to an attack with
incapacitating chemical or bacteriological
(biological) agents. With a few chemical
agents, notably some tear gases (lachry-
mators) , there is a negligible probability of
any fatal outcome, and these have been used
by many Governments to quell riots and
civil disorders. When used in this way they
are called riot control agents. Lachrymators
have also been widely used in warfare as
harassing agents, in order to enhance the
effectiveness of conventioxial weapons, or to
facilitate the capture of enemy personnel.
1. Differences Between Chemical and
Bacteriological (Biological) Warfare
21. Although there are some similarities
between chemical and bacteriological (bio-
logical) agents regarded as weapons of war,
they differ in certain important respects.
These differences are related to (1) potential
toxicity; (2) speed of action; (3) duration of
effect; (4) specificity; (5) controllability;
and (6) residual effects.
Potential toxicity
22. Although more toxic than most well-
known industrial chemicals, chemical war-
fare agents are far less potent on a weight-
for-weight basis than are bacteriological
(biological) agents. The dose of a chemical
agent required to produce untoward effects
in man is measured in milligrams (1/1,000
of a gram), except ,for toxins which may be
in the microgram (1/1,000 of a milligram)
range. The corresponding dose for bacteri-
ological (biological) agents is in the picogram
(1/1,000,000 of a microgram) range.
23. This difference reflects the fact that
bacteriological (biological) agents, being
alive, can multiply, and its significance is
that, weight-for-weight, bacteriological (bio-
logical) weapons could be expected to inflict
casualties over very much more extensive
areas than could chemical weapons.
24. Being living organisms, bacteriological
(biological) agents are also very much more
susceptible to sunlight, temperature, and
other environmental factors than are chem-
ical agents. A bacteriological (biological)
agent disseminated into a given environment
may retain its viability (ability to live and
multiply) while losing its virulence (ability
to produce disease and injury).
Speed of action
25. As a class, chemical agents produce
their injurious effects in man, animals or
plants more rapidly than do bacteriological
(biological) agents. The time between ex-
posure and significant effect may be minutes,
or even seconds, for highly toxic gases or ir-
ritating vapours. Blister agents take a few
hours to produce injury. Most chemicals used
against crops elicit no noticeable effect until
a few days have elapsed. On the other hand,
a, bacteriological (biological) agent must
multiply in the body of the victim before
disease (or injury) supervenes; this is the
familiar "incubation period" of a disease, the
time which elapses between exposure to in-
fection and the appearance of symptoms of
illness. This period is rarely as short as one
or two days, and may be as long as a few
weeks or even longer. For both chemical and
bacteriological (biological) agents the speed
of , action is affected by the dose (i.e., the
quantity absorbed) but this secondary fac-
tor does not obscure the basic difference be-
tween the two classes of agents in the time
they take to manifest their effects.
Duration of effect
26. The effects of most chemical agents
which do not kill quickly do not last long,
except in the case of some agents such as
phosgene and mustard, where they might
continue for some weeks, months or longer.
On the other hand, bacteriological (biologi-
cal) agents which are not quickly lethal
cause illness lasting days or even weeks and
on occasion involve periods of prolonged con-
valescence. The effects of agents which act
against plants and trees would last for weeks
or months and, depending on the agent and
the species of vegetation attacked, could re-
sult in death.
Specificity
27. While both classes of agents can be
used to attack men, animals or plants, indi-
vidual biological agents have in general a
much greater degree of host specificity. In-
fluenza, for example, is essentially a disease
of man; foot-and-mouth disease mainly af-
fects cloven-hoofed animals; and rice blast
is a disease confined to rice only. On the
other hand, some diseases (for example, bru-
cellosis and anthrax) occur both in man and
animals. However, chemical agents are much
less specific: nerve agents can affect mam-
mals, birds and invertebrates (e.g., insects).
Controllability
28. By controllability is meant the ability
to predict the extent and nature of the dam-
age which chemical and bacteriological (bi-
ological) agents can cause. This is a most
important consideration in their use as
weapons. The most likely means of deliver-
ing chemical and bacteriological (biologi-
cal) agents is by discharge into the atmos-
phere, relying on turbulent diffusion and
wind currents to dilute and spread the agent
over the area being attacked. Control is thus
possible only to the extent that the meteor-
ological situation can be predicted.
29. Because they infect living organisms,
some bacteriological (biological) agents can
be carried by- travellers, migratory birds, or
animals, to localities far from the area orig-
inally attacked.
30. The possibility of this kind of spread
does not apply to chemical agents. But con-
trol of contamination by persistent chemical
agents could be very difficult. Should large
quantities of chemical agents penetrate the
soil and reach underground waters, or should
they contaminate reservoirs, they might
spread hundreds of kilometres from the area
of attack, affecting people remote from the
zone of military operations. Although we
know of no comparable substance likely to
be used as a chemical warfare agent, the
spread of DDT over the globe illustrates, in
an extreme form, how man-made chemicals
can spread. This chemical insecticide is now
found in the tissues of creatures in all parts
of the world, even in places in which it has
never been used. For example, as a result of
its transfer through food chains, it is even
found in the tissues of the penguins which
live in Antarctica.
Residual effects
31. In circumstances which favour their
persistence, herbicides, defoliants and per-
haps some other chemical agents, might
linger for months, stunting the growth of
surviving or subsequent plant life, and even
changing the floral pattern through selec-
tion. Following repeated use, certain chemi-
cal agents could even influence soil struc-
ture. The risk of residual effects with some
bacteriological (biological) agents is poten-
tially greater, mainly because they could
lead to disease, which might become epi-
demic if man-to-man transmission occurred
readily. Bacteriological (biological) agents
might also find unintended hosts in the ani-
mals and plants of an area, or be trans-
ported by infected individuals over great
distances to new environments.
2. Technology of Chemical and Bacteriologi-
cal (Biological) Warfare
32. The technological problems associated
with chemical and bacteriological (biological)
warfare are of two kinds; (1) those associ-
ated with the production of the agents and
the weapons needed for their dissemination
and (2) those which concern the provision of
the protective equipment and defenses nec-
essary to protect military forces and civilian
populations. Any nation whose chemical,
pharmaceutical and fermentation indvstries
are well advanced could produce chemical
and bacteriological (biological) agents on a
scale commensurate with its other military
capabilities. The assurance of safety in the
production of bacteriological (biological)
agents, problems associated with the syn-
thesis of complex chemical agents, and decid-
ing on the best weapons to disseminate them,
are examples of some of the relevant tech-
nological difficulties. A special problem asso-
ciated with the development and main-
tenance of an offensive capability in bac-
teriological (biological) warfare relates to the
fact that some agents are viable for only a
short time (a few days) after manufacture.
This period can be extended by refrigeration
of the agent or by freeze-drying it before
storage. The drying processes, however, are
very complex and difficult where large quanti-
ties of highly pathogenic agents are involved.
The problems which relate to defence are far
more difficult, for as with most weapons, ef-
fective defence calls for much more stringent
training, and demands far more manpower
and monetary resources than does the of-
fence. For example, alarm systems against
chemical attack are very complex electro-
mechanical devices whose production de-
mands a highly technologically based indus-
try. They cannot be maintained except by ex-
pert and highly trained personnel.
3. Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological)
Weapons Systems
33. The use in warfare, and the possible
military effectiveness, of chemical and bac-
teriological (biological) agents cannot be ap-
preciated if they are thought of simply as
poisons and plagues. They need to be con-
sidered in the context of the weapon systems
of which they would be part.
34. A weapon system comprises all the
equipment and personnel, as well as the or-
ganizational structure? required to maintain
and operate a military device. By itself, for
example, a cannon is not a weapon system.
Only when it is integrated into an artillery
battery, together with trained crew, ammuni-
tion, vehicles, supplies, spare parts, firing
table, forward observer, communications and
command organization does it constitute a
weapon system. Correspondingly, artillery
shells filled with mustard gas or nerve agents
and guns to fire them, or an aircraft with a
spray tank filled with a bacteriological (bio-
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S 9530 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE August 11, 1969
logical) agent, are not by themselves weapon
systems.
35. Many complex technological problems
have to be overcome in transforming a chem-
ical or bacteriological (biological) "agent"
into a "weapon system". A "weapon" is of
little military value if it is not dependable
and if it cannot be delivered to a target with
certainty. This means that In the develop-
ment of a chemical and bacteriological (bio-
logical) weapon system it is not only neces-
sary to consider matters such as mass pro-
duction, storage, transportation, and means
of delivery, but also the limitations on use
set by terrain and weather prediction.
36. In addition, considerations affecting
defense need to be taken into account. Masks,
protective clothing, detection alarms, spe-
cial medical supplies, augmented logistic
facilities and, above all, thoroughly trained
military and civilian personnel. are necessary
parts of chemical and bacteriological (bio-
logical) weapon systems. The concept of a
fully developed chemical or bacteriological
(biological) weapon system is thus exceed-
ingly complex, and implies as much technical
capability and as high a degree of training as
does the operation of any other advanced
weapon systems. While chemical and bac-
teriological (biological) weapon systems are
cheaper and more readily attained than nu-
clear weapons, and while they may in some
circumstances be more effective militarily
than conventional weapons, they are highly
complex systems which for their development
and operation call for sizeable resources and
considerable expertise. But the possibility al-
ways exists that by choosing a single agent
and a simple means of delivery, a nation
could equip itself relatively cheaply to attack
a limited area with a reasonable chance of
success.
B. Concepts of the use of chemical and bac-
teriological (biological) weapons in war
1. Chemical Weapons
37. Chemical weapons could be used either
within the zone of contact of opposing
forces; or against military targets such as
airfields, barracks, supply depots, and rail
centres well behind the battle-area itself; or
against targets which have no immediate
connexion with military opera tions; for ex-
ample, centres of population, farmland, and
water supplies. The circumstances in which
they could be used within a zone of contact
are many anti varied?for example, to achieve
a rapid and surprise advantage against a
poorly trained, ill-equipped military force
which lacked chemical protective equip-
ment; to overcome troops tri dug-outs, fox-
holes, or fortifications where they would be
otherwise protected against fragmenting
weapons and high-explosive; to remove foli-
age, by means of chemical herbicides so as
to improve visibility and to open up lines of
fire, and to prevent ambush; to create bar-
riers of contaminated land on or in the rear
of the battlefield to impede or channel move-
ment; or to slow an enemy advance by forc-
ing them to use protective clothing and
equipment. Such equipment undoubtedly re-
stricts mobility and impedes normal activi-
ties. It is thus highly probable that once one
of two well-equipped sides had been at-
tacked with chemical weapons. it would re-
taliate in kind, in order to farce its opponent
to suffer the same penalties of restriction.
In all such operations civilians who had not
fled from the battle-area might become casu-
alties, as they also would if, while not in the
battle-zone, vapours or aerosols drifted to-
wards them with the wind, or if they strayed
at a latter date into areas contaminated
with a persistent agent. The risk of civilian
casualties would obviously be greater if
chemical attacks were made on military tar-
gets well in the rear of the zone of contact,
and would be very serious in- the case of at-
tacks on centres of population.
2. Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons
38. There is no military experience of the
use of bacteriological (biological) agents as
weapons or War and the feasibility of using
them as such has often been questioned. One
issue which has frequently been raised con-
cerns the validity of extrapolations made
from laboratory experience to military situa-
tions in the field. Some recent investigations
under field Conditions throw light on this
point.
39. In one field trial, zinc cadmium sul-
fide (a harmless powder) was disseminated
in particles two microns (one micron is
1/1,000,000 of a metre in. diameter, from a
ship traveling 16 kilometres offshore. About
200 kilograms were disseminated while the
ship travelled a distance of 260 kilometres
parallel to the coastline, The resulting aero-
sol traveled at least 750 kilometres, and cov-
ered an area of over 75,000 square kilometres.
40. This observation provides an indica-
tion of the size of area which might be cov-
ered by a windborne aerosol, but It does not
tell whether the bacteriological (biological)
agents which might be spread in an aerosol
would still retain the ability to produce dis-
ease. All bacteriological (biological) agents
lose their virulence or die progressively while
travelling in an aerosol and the distance of
effective travel of the cloud would depend
on the rate of decay of the particular agent
in the particular atmospheric conditions
prevailing.
41. Some idea of the relative size of areas
which can be covered by bacteriological (bio-
logical) and chemical aerosols can be gained
from this same experiment. Had the parti-
cles that were carried been a bacterial or
viral agent, they would not have caused cas-
ualties over as large an area as the one
covered, because of decay of the agent while
in the aerosol state. However, depending on
the organism and its degree of hardiness,
areas of 5,000 to 20,000 km2 could have been
effectively attacked, infecting a high propor-
tion of unprotected people in the area. If
the same means are applied to a hYpothetical
chemical attack using the most toxic chem-
ical nerve agent, then about 0.8 kg of agent
would have been released per km. The down-
wind hazard from this, in which some cas-
ualties might be expected, would not have
extended more than one kilometre, and prob-
ably less, unless meteorological conditions
were extremely favourable (see chapter III).
The area covered by such a chemical attack
might thus have been 50 to 150 km., as com-
pared with the 5,000 to 20,000 km2 for the
bacteriological (biological) attack.
42. For purposes of sabotage or covert
(secret, as in sabotage actions behind enemy
lines) operations, small aerosol generators
for bacteriological (biological) agents could
be built, for example, into fountain pens or
cigarette lighters. It is also possible to con-
ceive of the distribution of bacteriological
(biological) agents by hand to poison either
water supplies or ventilation systems, espe-
cially in a situation of breakdown of sani-
tary facilities due, say, to military mobiliza-
tion, or to a nuclear attack. In addition to
producing casualties, such an attack could
produce severe panic. If half a kilo of a
culture of Salmonella (a group of bacteria,
many species of which produce severe intes-
tinal infections, including gastro-enteritis,
food ("ptomaine") poisoning, paratyphoid
fever and typhoid fever) had been added to
a reservoir containing 5 million litres of
water, and complete mixing had occurred,
severe illness or disability would be suffered
by anyone drinking 1 decilitre (about 3
ounces) of untreated water.
43. The same degree of poisoning as would
be produced by half a kilo of Salmonella
culture could be achieved with 6 kilos of
botulinum toxin (see chapter II), 7 kilos of
staphylococcal enterotoxin (see chapter II),
or 50 kilos of V-nerve agent, or in the case of
common industrial chemicals, with five tons
of sodium fluoroacetate (used as a roden-
ticide) or ten tons of potassium cyanide.
C. Chemical and bacteriological (biological)
agents
Chemical Agents
44. Chemical agents are usually described
in terms of their physiological effects and are
characterized as foliates:
Agents affecting man and animals
Nerve agents are colourless, odourless,
tasteless chemicals, Of the -same family as
organophosphorus insecticides. They poison
the nervous system and disrupt vital body
functions. They constitute the most modern
war chemicals known; they kill quickly and
are more potent than are any other chemical
agents (except toxins).
Blister agents (vesivants) are oily liquids
which, in the main, burn and blister the
skin within hours after exposure. But they
also have general toxic effects. Mustard gas
is a good example. Blister agents caused more
casualties than any other chemical agent
used in World War I.
Choking agents are highly volatile liquids
which, when breathed as gases, irritate and
severely injure the lungs, causing death from
choking. They were introduced in World War
I and are of much lower potency than the
nerve agents.
Blood agents are also intended to enter
the body through the respiratory tract. They
produce death by interfering with the utili-
zation of oxygen by the tissues. They, too, are
much less toxic than nerve agents.
Toxins are biologically produced chemical
substances which are very highly toxic and
may act by ingestion or inhalation.
Tear and harassing gases are sensory irri-
tants which cause a temporary flow of tears,
irritation of the skin and respiratory tract,
and occasionally nausea and vomiting. They
have been widely used as riot control agents,
and also in war.
Psycho-chemicals are drug-like chemicals
intended to cause temporary mental disturb-
ances.
Agents affecting plants
Herbicides (defoliants) are agricultural
chemicals which poison or dessicate the
leaves of plants, causing them to lose their
leaves or die. The effectiveness of different
chemical warfare agents against man, ani-
mals and plants is shown in table I. The vari-
ous specific chemical agents are listed and
described in chapter 2.
Methods of delivery
45. Chemical munitions are designed to ful-
fill three objectives: (1) to provide a con-
tainer for the agent so that the agent/muni-
tion combination can be delivered to its
target; (2) to attain an effective distribution
of agent over the target area; and (3) to re-
lease the agent in active form. In the case of
Incapacitating and riot control agents, it is
necessary that the munition itself should
not cause injury or death, and that it should
not start fires. This is particularly important
for devices used in the control of riots.
46. The munitions to be used would depend
on the method of delivery, the shape and size
of the target area, and other variables.
Ground-to-ground munitions include gre-
nades, shells, rockets; and missile warheads;
air-to-ground munitions include large
bombs, dispensers, spray tanks, and rockets:
emplaced munitions Include generators and
mines.
47. Ground-to-ground munitions. Small
ground-to-ground munitions (grenades,
shells and small rockets) function much like
their conventional counterparts. Upon im-
pact in the target area, they would either ex-
plode or burn, and so expel the agent to form
a cloud which Would diffuse and drift down-
wind, resulting in an elongated elliptical area
within which casualties would occur, This
represents a paint source Of dissemination
(chapter II).
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TABLE 1.?CATEGORIES OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS
S 9531
Physical state at 2V C.
Persistency
Main state of aggregation
in target
Effective route of entry Effective against
Nerve agents
Blister agents
Choking agents
Blood agents
Toxins
Tear and harassing gases
Inca pacitants
Herbicides (defoliants) do
Liquid Low to high Vapour, aerosol, liquid Lungs, eyes, skin Man, animals.
Liquid, solid High do do Do.
Liquid Low Vapour do Do.
Liquid, vapors do do Lungs Do.
Solid do Aerosol, liquid Lungs, intestinal tract Do.
Liquid, solid do Vapor, aerosol Lungs, eyes On.
do do Aerosol, liquid Lung , skin Do.
Low to high do Foliage and roots Plants!.
I Some herbicides, particularly those containing organic arsenic are also toxic for man and animals. -
48. Small rockets would frequently be fired (c) be effective regardless of medical coun- to have any potential in bacteriological (bio-
in "ripples", and artillery shells in salvos, ter-measure; logical) warfare.
resulting in a group of impacts over the (d) be able to cause a large number of 65. Protozoa are one-celled microscopic
target area. This would constitute an area casualties (this would imply that any agent organisms which cause several important hu-
source of dissemination (chapter II). chosen would be highly infectious, but man diseases, including malaria. Because of
49. Large ground-to-ground (as well as whether the agent chosen would also be their complex life cycles, they too appear
aerial munitions and missile warheads) easily transmissible from man-to-man, would to have little significance in the present
might carry a number of small submunitions depend upon an intent to initiate an epi- context.
as well as agent in bulk. The parent muni,- demic spread). 66. Parastic worms such as hook-worm, and
tion, upon functioning, would disperse the Agents affecting man . the filarial worms have very complicated
submunitions over the target area. These life cycles. They cause illness and disability
59. All the diseases under consideration
would then disseminate the agent over a only after long exposure and repeated in-
occur naturally, and the causative organisms
wide area rather than a single point of im-
with few exceptions, are known to scientists ,
fection and would be extremely difficult to
pact, as in the case of bulk munitions.
throughout the world. Incapacitating agents
? produce in quantity, to store, to transport,
50. Another military concept is to use or disseminate in a weapon. Insects are also
are those which, in natural outbreaks, cause
large warheads filled with several hundred
illness lout rarely death. If the natural dis- difficult to conceive of as weapons. Some,
Such a warhead, burst at a suitable altitude ease has an applicable mortality, the agent
kilos of an agent of low vapour pressure.
would produce a shower of droplets, effec- is regarded as a lethal one. However, these
tively contaminating everything on which it agents when used as aerosol weapons might
fell. A number of such weapons could bb cause more severe disease than occurs nat-
used to assure that the target was covered. urally.
51. Air-to-ground munitions. Bombs 60. Different populations have varying de-
dropped from aircraft are larger than most grees of resistance to the diseases produced
shells, and consequently would result in a by bacteriological (biological) agents. An in-
higher concentration of the chemical near the fectious disease which might be only mildly
point of ground impact. Bombs bursting incapacitating in one population might prove
close to the ground could be used to achieve disastrous to another. For example, when
a wider dissemination of the agent, especially measles was first introduced into the Hawai-
with chemical agents. ian Islands, it caused far more deaths than
52. A dispenser is a container for submu- in the relatively resistant populations of
nitions, which, after opening, could remain Europe. A bacteriological (biological) weapon
attached to the aircraft. The submunitions which might be intended only to incapacitate
could be released simultaneously or in suc- could be highly lethal against a population
cession. where resistance had been lowered as a re-
53. Small rockets or missiles could also be sult of malnutrition. Conversely, a weapon
used to deliver chemical agents from aircraft. which was intended to spread a lethal disease
The pattern of dispersal would be much might only cause occasional mild illness in
the same as that produced by ground-to- people who had been given a protective vac-
ground rockets or missiles. eine or who had become immune as a result
54. Ground-smplaced munitions. Ground- of natural infection. The history of epi-
emplaced munitions comprise generators and demiology is rich with surprises.
mines. The generator is a tank containing 61. Viruses are the smallest forms of life.
a chemical agent, a source of pressure, and Most of them can be seen only with the
a nozzle through which the agent is forced. electron microscope, and must be grown
Generators would be placed upwind of the on living tissue (tissue cultures, fertile eggs,
target, and then activated by a suitable de- etc.) Genetic manipulation of the whole
vice, virus or chemical manipulation of its nu-
55. Chemical mines would be placed in dela acid, might be used to acquire strains
areas of anticipated enemy activity, and of higher virulence or greater stability to en-
such as the mosquito and the tick are trans-
mitters of disease, and as "vectors", have to
be looked upon as having potential military
significance. Higher forms of life, such as
rodents and reptiles can be dismissed in the
context of the present discussion.
Agents affecting animals
67. Bacteriological (biological) anti-animal
agents, such as foot-and-mouth disease and
anthrax would be used primarily to destroy
domestic animals, thereby indirectly affect-
ing man by reducing his food supply.
68. Outbreaks of contagious disease in
animal populations, knows as epizootics, may
spread much more readily than do epidemics
among human beings. Viral infections are
probably more serious for animals than those
caused by other classes of micro-organisms.
69. Most of the bacterial diseases of ani-
mals which could probably be used in war-
fare are also transmissible to man. Human
beings would be expected to get the disease
if they were affected by the attacking aerosol
cloud, and occasional individuals might con-
tract the disease from infected animals.
Agents affecting plants
70. The natural occurrence of devastating
plant diseases such as the blight of potatoes
in Ireland in 1845, the coffee rust of the
18708 in Ceylon, the chestnut blight of 1901
in the United States of America, and the
widespread outbreaks today of cereal (cape-
would be activated by pressure or trip wires, vironmental
cially wheat) rusts has suggested that plant
62. Rickettsiae are intermediate between pathogens might be used for military pur-
2. Bacteriological (Biological) Agents
the viruses and bacteria. Like the viruses, POSes. There are four major requirements for
56. Like chemical agents, bacteriological they grow only in living tissue. Judging by the deliberate development of a plant disease
(biological) agents may also be classified in the scientific literature, research into the into epidemic (epiphytotiC), proportions:
terms of their intended use, whether de- genetics of rickettsiae has been less intense large amounts of the host plant must be
signed to incapacitate or to kill human be- than into that of viruses and bacteria, present in the region; the agent should be
ings, to incapacitate or kill food and draft 63. Bacteria are larger than viruses, ran.?
?,._ capable of attacking the particular varieties
animals, or to destroy food plants and in- of host plant that are grown; adequate quan-
ing in size from 0.3 micron to several ml-
crops. crons. They can be easily grown on a large tities of the agent must be present; and the
57. Bacteria, viruses, fungi, and a group scale employing equipment and processes environmental conditions within the region
of microbes known as rickettsiae are by far similar to those used in the fermentation should be favorable for the spread of the
the most potent agents which could be in- industry, but special skills and experience disease. An epiphytotic cannot develop if
corporated into weapon systems. There is would be needed to grow them in quantity in any one of the above requirements is not
no assurance, however, that other living or-satisfied.
the particular state in which they readily
ganisms may not in the future become more cause disease. Although many pathogenic Methods of delivery
important as potential agents for warfare. (disease-producing) bacteria are susceptible 71. Bacteriological (biological) agents can,
The selection of agents for use in warfare to antibiotic drugs, antibiotic-resistant in principle, be loaded into the same type of
58. The number of bacteriological (biolog- strains occur naturally, and can be selected munitions as can chemical agents. Other
ical) agents which could potentially be used or obtained through the use of suitable than for covert or "special-purpose missions",
in warfare is far fewer than those Which methods of genetic manipulation. Similarly, bacteriological (biological) weapons, if de-
cause naturally-occurring disease. To be ef- it is possible to select strains with increased veloped for military purposes, would in all
fective for this purpose they should: resistance to inactivation by sunlight and probability be delivered by aircraft or by large
(a) be able to be produced in quantity; drying. ballistic missiles. Aircraft (including cruise
(b) be capable of ready dissemination in 64. Fungi also produce a number of die- missiles and drones) could drop a large
the face of adverse environmental factors; eases in man, but very few species appear number of bomblets from high altitude, or
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spray from a low altitude. Because a small
amount of agent will cover relatively large
areas, bombs would probably be small (1
kilo or less) and dispersed over as wide an
area as possible. They could be released from
clusters or from dispensers in the manner of
chemical weapons, but probably from a high-
er altitude.
72. An aircraft could establish a line of
agent which, as it traveled downwind, would
reach the ground as a vast elongated infec-
tive cloud (see chapter II). The effectiveness
of such a procedure would be highly depend-
ent on weather conditions, but the larger the
area, the larger the weather front involved,
the greater the chances that the predicted
results would be achieved. A small relative
error might, however, involve a country net
in the conflict.
73. It is conceivable that bacteriological
(biological) weapons, probably bomblets,
could be packaged in a laalltstic missile. The
bomblets could be released at a predeter-
mined altitude to burst atetound level. The
effect would be the same as rablet delivery
by aircraft except that it would be more
costly,
74. Unless transmitted by insects, bac-
teriological (biological) agents have little
power to penetrate the intact skin. Infections
through the respiratory tract by means of
aerosols is by far the most likely route which
could be used in warfare.
75. Many naturally-occurring diseases (e.g.
influenza, tuberculosis) are spread by the
aerosol route, and some of them, notably
influenza, can generate into large epidemics.
When an infected person sneezes, congas, or
even speaks, an aerosol is formed which
contains particles ranging widely in size. The
larger particles are usually of little impor-
tance because they fall to the ground. But
small particles (3 microns or less in diame-
ter) dry out rapidly in the air, and are the
most infectious. They may rarain suspended
in the atmosphere for a lot* time. Animal
experiments have shown that a great many
infectious agents (including ins ny which are
transmitted otherwise in nature) can be
transmitted to animals by aerosols of small
particle size. Laboratory accidents and ex-
periments on volunteers have confirmed the
effectiveness of the aerosol route of infec-
tion for man,
76. If bacteriological (biological) warfare
ever occurred, the aerosol technique would
thus be the one most likely to be used, sim-
ply because the respiratory tract is normal-
ly susceptible to infection by many micro-
organisms; because of the Wide target area
which could be covered in a single attack;
and because ordinary hygienic measures are
ineffective in preventing the airborne route
of attack. Since the particle size of an
aerosol is crucial to its ability to penetrate
into the lung (see chapter III for detailed dis-
cussion) , the method for aerosolizing a bac-
teriological (biological) agent would have
to be controllable so as to assure the dissemi-
nation of a large proportion of particles less
than 5 microns in diameter.
77. Aerosols of bacteriological (biological)
agents could be formed by three general
methods. Agents could be disseminated by
explosive means in much the same way as
chemical agents. However, the size of the
resulting particle is hard to control by this
method, and much of the agent may be de-
stroyed by the heat and shock of the ex-
ploding munition. Particles could also be
formed by using pressure to force a suspen-
sion of the organisms threugh a nozzle,
Particle size is determined by tae amount of
pressure, the size of the diselairge orifices,
the physical characteristics of the agent, and
atmospheric conditions. Size eon trol of solid
particles (dry form of agent) can be achieved
by "pre-sizing" before dissemination. Aerosol
particles could also be produced by a spray
by releasing the agent in liqUid suspension
into a high velocity air strewn. This principle
can be applied to spray devices for use on
high performance aircraft.
D. Defence of man against chemical and
bacteriological (biological) agents
78. A comprehensive defensive system
against attacks by chemical or bacteriological
(biological) agents would have to provide for
deteotion and warning, rapid identification
of agents, protectioti of the respiratory tract
and skin, decontamination, and medical
prophylaxis and treatment. Some aspects of
such a system could be dealt with by fairly
simple equipment. Others would necessitate
highly sophisticated apparatus. But the
Whole complex would necessitate a very effec-
tive organization manned by well-trained
personnel. While military units and small
groups of people could be equipped and
trained to protect themselves to a significant
extent, it would be impracticable for most (if
not all) countries to provide comprehensive
protection for their entire civil population.
1. Medical Protection
Chemical attacks
79. No general prophylactic treatment ex-
ists which could protect against chemical
attacks. Antidotes (atropine and oximes) to
nerve agents of value if administered within
half an hour before or within a very short
time after exposure. Atropine is itself toxic,
however, and might incapacitate unexposed
individuals given large doses. Skin can be
protected from the vapours of blister agents
by various ointments, but they are not ef-
fective against liquid contamination.
Bacteriological (biological) attacks
80. Vaccination is one of the most useful
means of protecting people from natural
infective disease, and the only useful means
available for prophylaxis against bacterio-
logical (biological) attacks. The protective
value of vaccines against small-pox, yellow
fever, diphtheria, and other diseases is fully
established, although the protection they
afford can be overcome if an immunized in-
dividual is exposed to a large dose of the
infectious agent concerned. It is probable,
however, that even those existing vaccines
which are effective in preventing natural in-
fectious diseases might afford only limited
protection against respiratory infection by
an agent disseminated into the air in large
amounts by a bacteriological (biological)
weapon. Moreover, whole populations could
not be vaccinated against all poSsible dis-
eases. The development, production, and
administration of so many vaccines would
be enormously expensive, and some vaccines
might produce undesirable or dangerous re-
actions in the recipients.
81. This picture is not significantly al-
tered by certain new developments in the
field of vaccination: e.g. the use of living
bacterial vaccines against tularemia, brucel-
losis and plague; or aerosol vaccination,
which is particularly relevant to vaccination
of large numbers of people. There have been
recent advances in the control of virus
diseases, but at present none of these is
practicable for the protection of large popu-
lations against bacteriological (biological)
warfare.
82. Prophylaxis against some diseases can
also be provided by the adrinnistration of
specific anti-sera from the blood of people
or animals previously innoculated with
micro-organisms, or -products derived from
them, to increase the anti-body levels (im-
munity) in their blood. Tetanus anti-toxin
is used in this manner, and until more ef-
fective methods replaced them, such anti-
sera were used for many diseases. It would,
however, be impossible to prepare specific
anti-sera against all possible bacteriological
(biological) agents and to make them avail-
able for large populations.
83. Other possibilities, for example the use
of therapeutic materials before symptoms
appear, are equally remote from practical
realization. They include immune serum,
gammaglobulin, or drugs such as antibiotics
or sulfonamide drugs. The use of gamma-
globulin to prevent, or mitigate the severity
of, disease may be useful for individuals
known to have been exposed. But since gam-
maglobulin is made by separation frem
human blood, stocks could never be avail-
able except for isolated eases. In theory,
chemoprophylaxis (the use of drugs and
antibiotics to prevent infection) might also
be useful in the short term for small groups
operating at especially high risk. But it would
only be prudent to assume that the bacteri-
ological (biological) agents which an enemy
might use would be those which were re-
sistant to such drugs.
2. Detection and Warning
84. The requirement is to detect a cloud
of a chemical or a bacteriological (biological)
agent in the air sufficiently quickly for
masks and protective clothing to be donned
before the attack can be effective. Usually
the objective would be to try and detect the
cloud upward of the target so that all those
downwind could be warned. There are also
requirements for the detection of ground
contairnanation with chemical agents and
for detection equipment to enable those
under attack to decide when it would be safe
to remove their protective equipment.
Chemical attacks
85. In World War I it was possible to rely
upon odour and colour as the primary means
of alerting personnel that a chemical a"6-
tack had been launched. The newer more
toxic chemical agents cannot be detected in
this way. On the other hand, presumptive
evidence that such weapons had been used
would none the less still be Of value as warn-
ing. Once an enemy had used chemical wea-
pons, each subsequent attack would neces-
sarily have to be presumed to be a possible
chemical attack, and protective measures
would have to be instituted immediately. In-
dividuals would have to mask not only in the
air attack in which spray was used, or when
there was smoke or mist from an unknown
source, or a suspicious smell, or when they
suffered unexpected symptoms such as a
runny nose, choking and tightness in the
chest, or disturbed vision, but whenever any
bombardment occurred. But because of the
uncertainty, it would be clearly desirable to
devise and provide a system of instruments
which can detect the presence of toxic chem
icals at concentrations below those having
psysiological effects, and which would give
timely and accurate warning of a chemical
attack. It would also be advantageous to have
test devices, collectors and analytical labora-
tory facilities in order to determine whether
the environment was safe, as well as to
identify accurately the specific chemical
agent used in an attack.
86. The first and essential component of a
defensive system would be an instrument
Which could detect low concentrations of a
chemical agent. However low the concentra-
tion, a person could inhale a toxic amount in
a short time because he breathes 10-20 litres
of air per minute. Since the human body can
eliminate or detoxify Very small amounts of
many toxic materials, there is no need to
consider very long periods of exposure?the
concern is with the exposures of only a fetv
hours. This is often referred to technically as
the Ot (concentration time) factor. Essen-
tial requirements of a method of detection
suitable for use by military or civil defence
personnel are that it be simple, specifie,
sensitive and reliable. Typical detector kits
contain sampling tubes and/or reagent but,
tons, papers, etc. After being exposed to par-
ticular chemical agents, these detectors
change colour or exhibit some other changes
easily observable without special insturraents.
Chemical detection kits could also be used
to decide when it Is safe to remove proteca
tire masks or other items of protective cloth-
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bag. Obviously, laboratories, whether mobile
or fixed, can perform more elaborate chem-
ical analyses than can detection kits.
87. Warning devices which have been de-
vised incorporate sensitive detectors that ac-
tuate an automatic alarm which alerts indi-
viduals to take protective action before a
harmful dose of agent is received. They are
of two trends: point sampling devices, which
sample the air at one location by means of
an air pump, and area scanning devices,
which probe a specific area for chemical
agents. The disadvantage of point source
alarms is that they must be placed upwind
of the area that has to be protected, and a
rather large number may be needed. If the
wind shifts, they have to be repositioned.
Successful area scanning alarms have not yet
been developed.
88. It must be recognized that in spite
of instrumental warning systems, personnel
near the point of dissemination of a chemical
agent might still not have sufficient time
to take protective action.
Bacteriological (biological) attacks
89. Unlike chemical weapons, bacteriologi-
cal (biological) weapons cannot readily be
distinguished from the biological "back-
ground" of the environment by specific chem-
ical or physical reactions, and much lower
aerosol concentrations of bacteriological (bi-
ological) agents are dangerous than of chem-
ical agents. The problem cal early detection
and warning is thus even more difficult than
for chemical weapons. A partial solution to
the problem has been achieved with certain
non-specific but very sensitive physical de-
vices such as particle-counters and protein
detectors (protein is a typical constituent of
micro-organisms). Presumptive evidence of
a bacteriological (biological) attack might
be obtained if there is an unusual deviation
from the normal pattern of material in the
air recorded by the instruments. The eleva-
tion of such a deviation, however, would
necessitate intensive and prolonged study of
the normal pattern in a given location. This
subject is discussed further in annex A.
3. Physical Protection
90. The primary objective is to establish
a physical barrier between the body and the
chemical and bacteriological (biological)
agents, and especially to protect the skin
and the respiratory tract. Without this no
warning system, however effective, has the
slightest value. Protection could be achieved
by using various types of individual protec-
tive equipment or by means of communal
shelters.
Individual protection
S 9533
casualties because of lack of training, fail- ferred to nutrient media, where sufficient
ure to keep the mask in good condition, growth may take place to permit identifica-
growth of beard, or ' because facial in- tion of some kinds of bacteria within fifteen
juries prevent a good fit, etc. The amount hours. Another method, the fluorescent anti-
of leakage that can be tolerated with bac- body technique, can be highly specific, and
terriological (biological) agents is much less is applicable to bacteria and some viruses. In
because of their greater potency. some cases, it allows of specific identification
9$. Since mustard gases and the nerve within a few hours. But despite all, these
agents of low or intermediate volatility can recent developments, laboratory identifica-
penerate the unbroken skin, even through tion of biological agents is still a complicated
normal clothing, the whole body surface must and unsatisfactory process.
be protected by some form of special cloth- 4.. Decontamination
ing, of which there are two kinds, one which Chemical agents
is impermeable to liquid agents, and the 98. Prolonged exposure to weather and
other which, though permeable to air and
moisture, has been treated so as to prevent sunlight reduces or eliminates the danger of
most chemical agents, which are slowly de-
chemical agents from getting through. Rub-
ber coated fabrics, made into protective suits, composed by humidity and rain. But one
could net rely on natural degradation to
constitute the first, while normal clothing,
eliminate the risk and, in general, it would
treated with chlorimides or absorbents, is an
be essential to resort to decontamination.
example of the second. In addition, some
This would reduce the hazard but it is a
form of impermeable cover, ground sheet or
cape, can be used to protect against gross time-consuming process and would greatly
liquid contamination. Feet and hands are haxnper military operations.
99. A wide range of chemicals could be
usually protected by special gloves, and
used as decontaminants, the choice depend-
either by boot covers or treated boots. ing on the particular agent which has to be
94. Together with a mask, protective cloth- neutralized, the type of surface that needs
ing, properly worn and in good condition, to be treated, the extent of contamination,
will afford excellent protection against known and the amount of time available. Decon-
chemical and bacteriological (biological)
taminants range from soap and detergent in
agents. The greatest degree of protection is water, to caustic soda, hypochlorite and var-
provided by the impermeable type but ,when lows organic solvents, and their successful
worn continuously it becomes very burden-
use calls for large numbers of people, a cop-
some because of heat stress, particularly in ions supply of water, and appropriate equip-
warm environments. Permeable clothing al- ions
lows somewhat greater activity, but even so,
100. Decontaminating solutions, powders,
physical activity is impaired. applicators and techniques have been de-
Collective or communal protection veloped for decontaminating skin, clothing,
95. Collective protection takes the form of personal equipment and water. These would
fixed or mobile shelters capable of accom- need to be used immediately after an at-
modating groups of people, and has been de- tack.
vised not only for civilians but also for ape- 101. Unless food has been stored in metal
cial groups of military personnel (e.g. corn- cans or other containers which were imper-
mend posts, field hospitals). Collective pro- meable to chemical agents, it would have to
tection is the most effective physical means be destroyed. Decontamination of complex
of protection against all forms of attack. equipment and vehicles is a difficult and
Sealing or insulating the shelter will provide ttme-oonsurning procedure. Special pres-
protection only for a limited time, because of suxized sprayers to disseminate powdered
lack of ventilation. Sealing plus a supply of and liquid decontaminants have been de-
oxygen and a means of eliminating carbon veloped for this purpose, as have paints or
dioxide is better, but once again the time of coatings to provide a smooth impermeable
occupancy is limited. The shelter could be surface to preclude the penetration of chem-
none the less safe even though surrounded ical agents.
by fire or high concentrations of carbon 102. Decontamination might even need to
monoxide. The best kind of shelter provides be extended to roads and selected areas. This
ventilation with filtered air to maintain a would involve the removal of contaminated
positive pressure relative to that outside. soil by bulldozing, or covering it with earth,
This positive internal pressure prevents the using explosives to spread a powdered de-
penetration of airborne agents, and permits contaminant over a wide area.
entry or exit of personnel and equipment Bacteriological (biological) agents
without contamination of the interior of the
shelter. Extended periods of occupancy are 103. Decontamination procedures for bio-
logical agents are similcr to those used for
possible. toxic chemical agents. Aeration and exposure
96. These principles of collective protection -to strong sunlight will destroy most micro-
as applicable to all enclosures arranged for organisms, as will also exposure to high tem-
human or animal occupancy. They have been peratures. Thoroughly cooking exposed food,
used to provide protection by: hastily con- and boiling water for at least fifteen minutes
structed or improvised field shelters, mobile will kill almost all relevant micro-organisms.
vans and armoured vehicles, and permanent Calcium hyprochlorite and chlorine can also
or fixed shelters designated for housing be used to purify water. Certain chemical
civilian or military personnel. compounds, such as formaldehyde, ethylene
97. Once a bacteriological (biological) at- oxide, calcium and sodium hypochlorites,
tack had been suspected or detected, it would sodium hydroxide and betapropiolactone, can
be necessary to identify the specific agents be used to decontaminate materials and
involved so that proper protective measures work areas. A hot, soapy shower is the best
could be taken and chemo-prophylaxis and way to decomtaminate human beings.
91. Protective masks are the first line of
defense against all chemical and bacteriolog-
ical (biological) agents. Although protective
masks differ in appearance and design, they
have certain features in common: a fitted
facepiece, made of an impermeable material
soft enough to achieve' an effective seal
against the face, and some means of holding
it in place, such as a head strap, and a filter
and absorption system, in canister or other
form, which will remove particulate (aero-
sol) agents by mechanical filtration. The
canister also contains activated charcoal,
sometimes impregnated to react with agents
in the vapour state, but which in any case
will absorb toxic vapours. Some masksare
made so as to permit the drinking of water treatment planned. Identification would also
while the individual is masked, or attempts help to predict the incubation period and
at resuscitation measures on casualties hence the time available for remedial meas-
without unmasking them. Civil defense urea to be taken. At present the only means
masks are often less elaborate versions of of identifying specific micro-organisms is by
the military mask. Gas proof protectors can normal laboratory procedures. Many routine
be provided for infants, laboratory methods of identification require
92. A protective mask, properly fitted and as long as two to five days, but some recent
in good working condition, will provide corn- developments have reduced this time appre-
plete respiratory protection against all known ciably. It is possible to collect the particles
chemical and bacteriological (biological) from large volumes of air and concentrate
agents. However, a Certalo percentage of them in a small amount of fluid. Bacteria can
masked personnel can be expected to become then be trapped on special filters and trans-
E. Protection of domestic animals and
plants against chemical and bacteriologi-
cal (biological) attacks
1. Chemical Attacks
104. The widespread protection of domes-
tic animals and plants from chemical at-
tack would be impracticable. Once a crop
had been attacked with herbicides there Is
no effective remedial action. The damage
could be made good only by a second plant-
ing of either the same or another crop,
depending on the season.
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2. Bacteriological Biological) Attacks
Animals
105. Animals or flocks could be protec
by collective shelters, although the cost
would be great and, in the absence of an
matic warning devices, it would be impose
ble to assure that the creatures would b
sheltered at the time of attack.
106. The ideal means of protection f
animals would be vaccination. Vaccines hay
been developed, and many are routinely pro
duced, for foot-and-mouth disease rinde
pest, anthrax, Rift Valley fever, hog cholera,
Newcastle disease and others. Vaccination of
animal herds by aerosols Is a promising area
of investigation.
Plants
107. The only hopeful approach would be
to breed disease resistant plants. This Is a
regular part of most national agricultural
programmes, and has as its object the in-
crease of crop yields. But unless the exact
identity of the bacteriological (biological)
agent which might be used were known well
in advance (possibly years), it would not be
feasible to apply this principle to provide
protection to crops against this kind of
attack.
108. Efforts devoted to spraying fungicides
and similar preparations to reduce loss after
attack do not appear to be economically
effective. In most cases the best procedure Is
to utilize available manpower and machines
In planting second crops.
ANNEX A : EARLY WARNING SY,A EMS FOR AIR-
BORNE BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) -AGENTS
An ideal automatic system for early warn-
ing against an attack with bacteriological
(biological) agents would comprise the fol-
lowing components:
(1) a device to collect large volumes of air
and concentrate the particulate matter ob-
tained, in a small volume of fluid or on a
small surface;
(2) a device to quantify and identify the
collected material;
(3) a mechanism to assess the results and
to initiate an alarm if necessary.
To collect and identify bacteriological
(biological) agents and to initiate an alarm
so that protective measures can be taken in
sufficient time to be,useful is extremely diffi-
cult This is so because, firstly, identification
of agents is generally time-consuming and,
secondly, large and fluctuating quantities of
bacterial and other organic materials exist
in the atmosphere at all times. Thus if
pathogens from a cloud released by an ag-
gressor were collected, the device would need,
not only to determine whether the quantity
collected was significantly above the normal
amounts that might occur, but also what the
agent was, or at least that- in the amount
collected, it vras highly dangerous to man.
At present, warning devices are available
which are sensitive but non-specific and
these, unfortunately, would give an unac-
ceptably high proportion of false alanne.
Others are being developed which attempt to
incorporate both rapid respOnse with high
specificity, but none to date thin the produc-
tion stage. Research on this bisportant prob-
lem is being continued and some of the ap-
proaches and techniques that are being used
in this study are listed below.
Classification of automated biodetection
approaches ?
General category: Physical.particle detec-
tion.
Suggested approach: magnification, light
scattering, volume displacement,
General category; key biochemical compo-
nents.
ted Suggested approach: antigen detection by
fluorescent labelling, dyes and staining, bio-
to- lumineecence and iluorescences, optical activ-
ity, pyrolysis products detection, ATP detec-
tion, proteins, nucleic acids, or others.
General category: Biological activity.
Suggested approach: Growth (increase in
or cell mass or numbers), CO. evolution, phos-
e phatase activity, substrate change (pH, Eh,
r 0. interchange), Pathogenic effects,,
-
? Adapted from Greene, WI'S. "Biodetect-
ing and Monitoring Instruments Open New
Doors for Environmental Understanding",
Environmental Science Technology, F'ebru-
ary 1968, pp. 104-112.
CHAPTER I/. THE PROBABLE EFFECTS OF CHEM-
ICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL)
WEAPONS ON MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PER-
SONNEL, BOTH PROTECTED AND 'UNPROTECTED
A. The effects of chemical agents on individ-
uals and populations
109. The effects of chemical warfare agents
on humans, animals and plants depend on
the toxic properties of the agent, the dose
absorbed, the rate of absorption and the
route by which the agent enters the orga-
nism. Toxic agents may enter the body
through the skin, the eyes, the lungs, or
through the gastro-Intestinal tract (as a re-
sult of eating contaminated food or drinking
contaminated liquids) .
110. For a given agent absorbed under the
same conditions, the effect will be propor-
tional to the dose absorbed. This is why It is
possible to define for each agent certain
characteristic doses, such as the dose which,
under given conditions, will on average
cause death In 50 per cent of the individuals
exposed (the 50 per cent lethal dose, or "LD
50"), or the dose which will cause 50 per
cent non-fatal casualties, or the dose which
will have no appreciable military effect.
These are expressed in milligrams of agent,
with reference to a healthy adult of average
weight. They may also be given In terms of
milligrams per kilogram of body weight.
111. For purposes of evaluation it is con-
venient to express the same idea somewhat
differently in the case of gases, vapours and
aerosols absorbed through the respiratory
passages. Here the absorbed dose depends
on the concentration of the agent in the
r, on the respiration rate of the subject,
and on the duration of the exposure, If, for
the sake of Illustration, it is assumed that
the average respiration rate for groups of in-
dividuals engaged in various activities re-
mains relatively constant, it follows that
the dose, and therefore the effect produced,
will be directly proportional to the product
of the concentration of the agent in the
air (C in milligrams/cubic metre) and the
exposure time (t in minutes). This is called
the dosage (or Ct factor), certain charac-
teristic values of which (for example the LD
TABLE I.?GENERAL CHARACTERISTI
Type
50) are used in particular situations for
quantitative estimates of the effects pro-
duced.
112. For toxic agents acting on or through
the skin, the dose absorbed by contact will
often be related to the "contamination rate,"
expressed in grams/square metre, which indi-
cates to what extent surfaces are contami-
natde by the liquid.
113. The consequences of an attack on a
population are a combination of the effects
on the individuals in it, with both the con-
centration of agent and the susceptibility of
individuals varying over the whole area ex-
posed to risk. Different individuals would
respond differently to an attack, and might
have different degrees of protection. Possible
long-term contamination of personnel from
chemical warfare agents persisting on the
ground and vegetation may add to the im-
mediate, direct effects.
314. Protective masks, protective clothing
and shelters and, to a certain extent, de-
contamination when applicable, give sub-
stantial protection against all chemical War-
fare agents. But, as already emphasized, the
mere possession of a means of protection by
no means constitutes an absolute safeguard
against contamination by poisons. Alarm
and detection equipment is important, soil-se-
times vital, because without It timely warn-
ing, which is essential to the proper use of
protective equipment, would be lacking.
Since protective measures are most effective
when performed by trained personnel works
ing effectively in units, military personnel
are more likely to be provided with adequate
protection than a civilian population. In any
event, the civilian population in most coun-
tries is simply- not provided with protection
against chemical warfare.
115. Several chemical warfare agents which
were known during World War I, and others
developed since, have been reported on in
the scientific literature. However, the effects
of the more lethal modern chemical weapons
have not been studied under conditions of
actual warfare. Furthermore, no complete
and systematic field Studies of the use of de-
foliants, herbicides and riot control agents
are available. The following descriptions of
the probable effects of chemical weapons,
based both upon evidence and on technical
judgment, must therefore be regarded as
somewhat conjectural.
1. Effects of Lethal Chemical Agents on
Individuals
116. Table 1 provides a classification of
the most important lethal chemical agents,
and notes some of their characteristics in
terms of the effects they produce. More de-
tails are given in annex A.
CS OF LETHAL CHEMICAL AGENTS
Mechanism Time for onset of effects
Examples
Nerve agent G Interferes with transmission
of nerve impulses.
Nerve agent V Interferes with transmission
of nerve impulses.
Blister agent Cell poison
Choking agent Damages lungs _
Blood agent Interferes with all respiration_
Toxin Neuromuscular paralysis
Very rapid by inhalation (a few Tabun, Sarin, Soman.
seco nds).
Very rapid by inhalation (a few VX.
seconds); Relatively rapid through
skin (a few minutes to a few hours).
Blistering delayed hours to days; Sulfur mustard.
eye effects more rapid. Nitrogen mustard.
Immediate to more than three hours___ Phosgene.
Rapid (a few seconds or minutes)_.. _ __ Hydrogen cyanide.
Variable (hours or days)__ Botulinum toxin.
117. Lethal chemical agents kill in rela-
tively small doses, and ate a rule the amount
that causes death Is only slightly greater
than that which causes incapacitation.
Death may occasionally be caused by high
doses of presumed incapacitating agents and,
conversely, minor effects could be caused by
low doses of lethal agents. Blister agents are
considered with the lethal agents, since a
small but significant fraction of the person-
nel attacked with such agents may die or
suffer serious injury.
Nerve agents
118. These lethal compounds are readily
absorbed through the lungs, eyes, skin and
inteatinal tract without producing local ir-
ritation, and they interfere with the action
of an enzyme (cholinesterase) essential te
the functioning of the nervous system. The
nerve-agerut casualty Who has been exposed
to a lethal dose will die of asphyxiation
Within a few minutes if he is not treated
swiftly by means of artificial respiration and
drugs each as atropine or =iamb. Otherwise
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recovery is generally rapid and complete. Oc-
casionally, it raay take several weeks, but
will be complete unless anoxia or convul-
sions at the time of exposure were so pro-
longed as to cause irreversible brain damage.
119. The route of entry of the agent into
the body has some influence on the appear-
ance of symptoms. Mute develop more
slowly when the agent is absorbed through
the skin than when it is inhaled. Low dosages
cause a running nose, contraction of the
pupil of the eye and difficulty in visual
accommodation. Constriction of the bronchi
causes a feeling of pressure in the chest. At
higher dosages, the Skeletal muscles are af-
fected-weakness, fibrillation, and eventually
paralysis of the respiratory muscles oc-
curring. Death is usually caused by respira-
tory failure, but heart failure may occur. It
is estimated that the most toxic nerve gases
may cause death at a dosage of about ten
mg min/m3.* Less toxic ones are lethal at
dosages of up to 400 mg min/m3.
Blister agents or vesicants A
120. Mustard is a typical blister agent
which, like other members of this class, also
has general toxic effects. Exposure to concen-
trations of a few mg/m 8 in the air for sev-
eral hours results at least in irritation and
reddening of the skin, and especially irri-
tation of the eyes, but may even lead to
temporary blindness. Exposure to higher con-
centrations in the air causes blisters and
swollen eyes. Severe effects of this kind also
occur when liquid falls on the skin or into
the eyes. Blistering with mustard is compar-
able to second degree burns. More severe
lesions, comparable to third degree burns,
may last for a couple of months. Blindness
may be caused, especially if liquid agent has
entered the eyes. Inhalation of vapour or
aerosol causes irritation and pain in the up-
per respiratory tract, and pneumonia may
supervene. High doses of blister agents cause
a general intoxication, similar to radiation
sickness, which may prove lethal.
121. The first step in treating a person who
has been exposed to a vesicant or blister
agent, is to wash it out of the eyes and de-
contaminate the skin. Mild lesions of the
eyes require little treatment. The blisters
are treated in the same way as any kind of
second-degree burn.
Other lethal agents
122. Phosgene and compounds with sim-
ilar physiological effects were used in World
War I. Death results from damage to the
lungs. The only treatment is inhalation of
oxygen and rest. Sedation is used sparingly.
123. Hydrogen cyanide in lethal doses
causes almost immediate death by inhibiting
cell respiration. Lower doses have little or no
effect.
124. Most of the so-called blood agents
contain cyanide, and all act rapidly. The
casualty would either die before therapy
could begin, or recover soon after breathing
fresh air.
125. Botulinum toxin is one of the most
powerful natural poisons known, and could
be used as a chemical warfare agent. There
are at least six distinct types, of which four
are known to be toxic to man. Formed by
the bacterium Clostridium botulinum, the
toxin is on occasion accidentlly transmitted
by contaminated food. The bacteria do not
grow or reproduce in the body, and poisoning
is due entirely to the toxin ingested, It is
possible that it could be introduced into the
body by inhalation.
126. Botulism is a highly fatal poisoning
characterized by general weakness, head-
ache, dizziness, double vision, dilation of the
pupils, paralysis of the muscles concerned
in swallowing, and difficulty of speech. Res-
piratory paralysis is the usual cause of death.
*A dosage of one mg min/m3 consists of an
exposure of one minute to gas at a concen-
tration of one milligram per cubic metre.
After consumption of contaminated food,
symptoms usually appear within twelve to
seventy-two hours. All persons are suscep-
tible to botulinum poisoning. The few who
recover from the disease develop an active
immunity of uncertain duration and degree.
Active immunization with botulinum toxoid
has been shown to have some protective
value, but antitoxin therapy is of limited
value, particularly where large doses of the
toxin have been consumed. Treatment is
mainly supportive.
2. Effects of Lethal Agents on Populations
127. As already indicated, the possible ef-
fects of an attack on populations with lethal
chemical warfare agents would depend upon
the agent used, upon the intensity of the
attack, whether the population was mainly
under cover or in the open, on the avail-
ability of protective facilities, on the physi-
ological state of the individuals affected, and
upon the meteorological conditions, which
might differ from what had been predicted,
and alter during the course of an attack.
128. The importance of meteorological con-
ditions on the spread of agent from its point
or area of release is illustrated by Figures
1(a), 1(b) and 1(c) which show in an ideal-
ized diagramatic form the type of dosage
contours to be expected from a point source,
from multiple sources and from a linear
aerial source respectively when exposed to
the effects of wind.
129. Figure 1 (a) shows the shape of the
zone travelled by the chemical cloud pro-
duced by a point source (for example, one
isolated munition), at the far left of the
innermost cigar-shaped figure under condi-
tions of a strong wind (say, 5-20 km/h) in
the direction indicated.
130. The number on each line indicates
the dosage (Ct = concentration times time)
on the line. The dosage at any point inside
the area delimited by the curve is greater
than the number indicated. On the basis
of these data, it is possible to estimate the
casualties when the characteristic dosages
of the agent used are known. For example, if
the LD 50 value of the agent were 30 milli-
gram-minutes/cubic metre, there would be
more than 50 per cent fatalities in the area
inside the contour marked 30.
131. This figure applies to a volatile agent
such as Sarin, which is usually released in
the form of a vapour or an aerosol cloud.
In the case of a non-volatile liquid released
in the form of droplets which fall onto the
ground and contaminate it, a corresponding
map could be drawn for the level of contam-
ination of the soil (expressed in milligrams/
square metre).
132. Figure 1 (b) shows the same phenome-
non in relation to an area source such as
would result, for example, from attack by
a missile warhead filled with small bombs
or by an artillery salvo.
133. In the case of a volatile agent released
in the form of a vapour or aerosol, the re-
sulting cloud, carried downwind, covers a
zone whose general shape is the same as in
the case of a point source (Figure 1 (a) ), but
its dimensions are obviously much larger and
the dosage values are also larger.
134. If a non-volatile agent were released
In the form of droplets, the hazard would be
very great in the impact area because all sur-
faces (skin, clothing, vehicles, equipment,
vegetation, etc.) would be contaminated. The
downwind hazard caused by the drift of the
most minute particles would extend over a
much smaller area than in the previous case
because only a relatively small number of
minute particles would be carried by the
wind.
135. Figure 1(c) shows the zone covered
by a linear aerial source, as in the case of
dissemination of a non-volatile agent from
an aircraft.
136. The emitted cloud is carried by the
wind and does not touch the ground until it
has travelled some distance away from the
line of flight of the disseminating aircraft;
this depends on the altitude of the aircraft
and on the wind velocity. Since the cloud has
already been subjected to the influence of
turbulent diffusion before reaching the
ground, the dosage values or contamination
rates will be highest some distance away from
the zone boundary nearer the source.
137. Because of meteorological and other
variables, it is impossbile to make general
statements about the quantitative effects of
chemical weapons on populations. The fol-
lowing hypothetical examples, therefore, are
intended merely to Illustrate what might
happen and the degree to which protective
measures could reduce casualties. To provide
representative illustrations, the examples
chosen include the different hazards created
by nerve agents used in a battle zone, on
military targets in the rear and on civilians -
in a town.
Effects of nerve gas on protected
troops in combat
138. A heavy attack with air-burst muni-
tions dispersing non-volatile liquid nerve
agent would create concentrations on the
the ground that could rage from one-tenth
of a gram to ten grams of liquid per square
metre, giving a mean value of about five
grams. This would be extremely hazardous.
At the same time, aerosol concentrations
would be created over almost the entire
impact area (dosages about twenty mg.
min/m3). This would produce casualties
even if there were no liquid hazard.
139. To counter this type of attack, pro-
tective measures of a very high order of
efficiency, including protective masks, light
protective clothing, means for decontamina-
tion, detection systems, antidotes and medi-
cal care, would have to be available. Pro-
tective clothing and rapid utilization of gas
masks would give a certain measure of
protection. But in this case, subsequent de-
contamination and medical care would be
necessary to avoid heavy lethal losses.
Effects of nerve gas on a military
target in the rear
140. An attack from the air with a volatile
nerve agent against a military installation
in a rear area would cause an intense liquid
and vapor hazard in the installation itself,
and a vapour hazard downwind in the sur-
rounding area. As suggested in figure 1(b),
the impact area would be very heavily con-
taminated; gas dosages inside and close to
the impact area would be very high. Further
downwind the gas concentration would de-
crease gradually, and finally become in-
nocuous. A general picture of the way cas-
ualties would occur in a downwind area is
indicated in figure I (a) .
141. After an attack in which tons of
Sarin were used against an area of one square
kilometre, the impact area and the area
immediately downwind from it would be
highly lethal to all unprotected personnel.
Lethal casualties would occur at dosages
above eighty mg. min/m3 and severe casual-
ties down to thirty mg. min/m3. Some very
light casualties would result at dosages
around five mg. min/m3. The distance be-
tween the impact area and the area of lowest
effective dosage would depend on the local
topography and on weather conditions, but
would rarely exceed a few tens of kilometres.
112. Personnel provided only with gas
masks, but not wearing them at the moment
of the attack, would suffer substantial losses
in and close to the impact area, both because
of the effects of the liquid and because of the
high gas concentration inhaled before they
could don their masks. Further downwind,
masks would give essentially complete pro-
tection if warning were provided reasonably
quickly.
Effects of a nerve gas attack on a town
143. The population density in a modern
City may be 5,000 people per square kilometre.
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A heavy surprise attack with non-volatile
nerve gas by bombs exploding on impact in a
wholely unprepared town wcadd, especially at
rush hours, cause heavy losses. Half of the
population might become cainzalties, hall of
them fatal, if about one ton of agent were
disseminated per square kileraetre.
144. If such a city were epared for at-
tack, and if the preparations Included a civil
defence organization with adequately equip-
ped shelters and protective Isn.sks for the
population, the losses might be reduced to
one half of those which would be anticipated
in conditions of total surprise.
145. Although it would be very difficult
to achieve, if there were a high level of pre-
paredness, comprising adequate warning and
effective civil defence procedures, it is con-
ceivable that most of the population would
be sheltered at the time of the attack, and
that very few would be in the streets.
146. Given a town with a total population
of 80,000, a surprise attack with nerve gas
could thus cause 40,000 casualties, half of
them fatal, whereas under ideal circum-
stances for the defence, fatalities might num-
ber no more than 2,000. It is inconceivable,
however, that the ideal woUld ever be at-
tained.
3. Effects of Incapacitating Chemical Agents
147. Incapacitating chemicels, like tear
gases and certain psychochemicals, produce
in normal health people a temporary, rever-
sible disability with few if any permanent ef-
fects. In your children, old people and those
with impaired health, the effects may some-
times be aggravated. They 'are called in-
capacitating because the ratio between the
lethal and incapacitating doses is very high.
The types which could have a possible mili-
tary use are limited by requirements of safe-
ty, controlled military effectiveness and eco-
nomic availability.
Tear and harassing gases
148. Many chemical compounds fall into
this category, of which a-chloaaeetophenene
(CN), ortho-chlorobenzylid :enemalononitrile
(CS), and adamsite (DM) are probably the
most important. They are sands when pure,
and are disseminated as aerosols. _
149. Either as vapour or in areosol, tear
and harassing gases rapidly produce irrita-
tion, smarting and tears. These symptoms
disappear quickly after exposure ceases. The
entire respiratory tract may also be irritated,
resulting in a running nose aria pain in the
nose and throat. More severe exposures can
produce a burning sensation in the trachea.
As a result, exposed persons experience dif-
ficulty in breathing, attacks of coughing and
occasionally, nausea and headaches.
150. Extremely high dosages of tear and
harassing gases can give rise to pulmonary
edema (fluid in the lungs). Deaths have been
reported in three cases afters extraordinary
exposure to sachloracetophenone (CN) in a
confined space.
151. The effects of adamsite (nM) - are more
persistent. Nausea is more severe and vomit-
ing may occur.
152. Results of experiments on various
species of animals (see annex B) and some
observations of human responses lead to the
following tentative conclusions First, CS IS
the most irritating of these gases followed
by adamsite (DM) and sachloracetophenone
(CN). Second, the tolerance limits (highest
concentration which a test subject can toler-
ate for one minute) of DM and CS are about
the same. Third, the least tax- lc of the tear
gases is CS, followed by Datt- and then Cia.
Fourth, human beings vary In their sensi-
tivity to, and tolerance of, tear and harass-
ing gases. And finally, the toxicity of these
gases varies in different animal species and
in different environmental conditions.
153. The symptoms caused by tear gases
disappear, as tears wash the agent from the
eyes, and if the victim gets Out of the tear
gas atmosphere. Some, however, cause red-
dening or rarely even blistering of the skin
when the weather is hot and wet.
Toxins
154. Staphylococcus toxin occurs naturally
in outbreaks of food poisoning?which is the
only medical experience with this toxin. The
symptoms have a sudden, sometimes violent,
onset, with severe nausea, vomiting and diar-
rhea. The time from ingestion of the toxin
to the onset of symptoms is usually two to
four hours, although it may be as short
as a half hour. Most people recover in 24-48
hours and death is rare. Treatment is sup-
portive and immunity, following an attack,
is short-lived. The toxin is resistant to freez-
ing, to boiling for thirty minutes, and to
concentrations of chlorine used in the treat-
ment of water. Staphylococcus toxin could
be. considered as an incapacitating chemical
warfare agent. Symptoms can be produced
in animals by intravenous injection, and
the toxin may also be active by the re-
spiratory route.
Psychochemicals
155. These substances have been suggested
for use in war as agents which could cause
temporary disability by disrupting normal
patterns of behavior. The idea cannot be
accepted in its simple form, since these sub-
stances may lead to more permanent changes,
particularly in individuals who are mentally
unbalanced or who are in the early stages
of a nervous and mental disease. Moreover,
very high doses, which would be difficult to
exclude during use in war, can cause ir-
reversible damage to the central nervous sys-
tem or even death. Psychochemicals could
also have particularly severe effects on
children.
156. Compounds such as LSD, mescaline,
psilocybin, and a series of benzilates which
cause mental disturbance?either stimula-
tion, depression or hallucination?could be
used as incapacitating agents. Mental dis-
turbance is, of course, a very complex phe-
nomenon, and the phychological state of
the person exposed to a psychochemical, as
well as the properties of the agent, would pro-
foundly influence its manifestations. But,
despite the variation in responses between
individuals, all those affected could neither
be expected to act rationally, nor to take
the initiative, nor make logical decisions.
157. Psychochemicals do more than cause
mental disturbance. For example, the general
symptoms from the benzilates are interfer-
ence with ordinary activity; dry, flushed
skin; irregular heartbeat; urinary retention;
constipation; slowing of mental and psy-
chical activity; headache, giddiness; disor-
ientation; hallucinations; drowsiness; occa-
sional maniacal behaviour; and increase in
body temperature. While these effects have
not been fully studied, there would be a
significant risk of affected individuals, par-
ticularly military personnel, becoming sec-
ondary casualties due to unco-ordinated be-
haviour. A single dose of 0.1 to 0.2 mg
L6D25 will produce profound mental dis-
turbance within half- an hour, the condi-
tion persisting for about ten hours. This dose
is about a thousandth of the lethal dose.
158. Treatment of the symptoms of pay-
chochemicals is mainly supportive. Perma-
nent psychotic effects may occur in a very
small proportion of individuals exposed to
LSD.
159. It is extremely difficult to predict the
effects which an attack with psychochemical
agents would produce in a large population.
Apart from the complication of the varying
reaction of exposed individuals, there could
be strange interactions within groups. A few
affected individuals might stimulate their
fellows to behave irrationally, in the same
way as unaffected persons might to some ex-
tent offset the reactions of those affected.
Since the probability of fatal casualties re-
sulting directly from exposure is low, some
normal group activity might be sustained.
Protective masks would probably provide
complete protection since practice/1y all po-
tential psychochemical agents, if used as of-
fensive weapons, would be dessiminated as
aerosis.
4. Other Effects of Chemical Agents
Effects on aniznals
160. The effects of lethal chemical agents
on higher animals are, in general, similar to
those on man. The nerve agents also kill
insects.
Effects on plants
161. A variety of chemicals kill plants, but
as already indicated, little is known about
their long-term effects. The effective dose
ranges of defoliants vary according to the
particular species of plant attacked, its age,
the meteorological conditions and the de-
sired effect: e.g., plant death or defoliation.
The duration of effect usually lasts weeks or
months. Some chemicals kill all plants indis-
criminately, while others are selective. Most
defoliants produce their effects within a feW
weeks, although a few species of plant are
so sensitive that defoliation would occur in
a period of days.
162. An application of defoliating herbi-
cide* of approximately 3 gallons (32 pounds)
per acre (roughly 36 kg per hectare) can
produce 65 per cent defoliation for six to nine
months in very densely forested areas, but in
some circumstances some species of trees
will die. Significantly lower doses suffice for
most agricultural and industrial uses
throughout the world. Defoliation is, of
course, a natural process?more common in
trees in temperate zones than in the tropics.
Essentially what defoliants do is trigger
defoliation prematurely.
163. Desiccation (the drying out) of leaves
results in some defoliation, although usually
the leaf-drop is delayed, and the plant would
not be killed without repeated application
of the chemical. Chemical desiccants cause a
rapid change in colour, usually within a few
hours.
B. The effects of bacteriological (biological)
agents on individuals and populations
164. Mankind has been spared any experi-
ence of modern bacteriological (biological)
warfare, so that any discussion of its pOssible
nature has to be based on extrapolation frosts
epidemiological knowledge and laboratory
experiment. The number of agents which
potentially could be used in warfare is limited
by the constraints detailed in chapter I. On
the other hand, the variability which char-
acterizes all living matter makes it conceiv-
able that the application of modern knowl-
edge of genetic processes and of selection
could remove some of these limitations. Some
species of micro-organisms consist of a num-
ber of strains characterized by different
degrees of virulence, antigenic constitution,
susceptibility to chemotherapeutic agents,
and so on. For example, strains of tularaemia
bacilli isolated in the TJnited States are gen-
erally much more virulent in human beings
than those found in Europe or Japan. Foot-
and-mouth disease virus is another well-
known example of an organism with various
degrees of virulence. The situation with
bacteriological (biological) weapons is thus
quite different from that of chemical weap-
ons, where the characteristics of a given com-
pound are more specific.
1. Effects on Individuals
165. Bacteriological (biological) agents
could be used with the intention of !tilling
people or of incapacitating them either for
a short or a long period. The agents, how-
ever, cannot be rigidly defined as either lethal
or incapacitating, sins* their effects are de-
*For example, the commonly used "2,4-Ds
and "2,4,5-T" which are the butyl esters of
(2,4-dichlorophenoxy) acetic acid and (2,4,5-
triohlorophenoxy) acetic act&
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August 11, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RE.CORD ? A
pendent upon many factors relating not only
to themselves but also to the individuals they
attack. Any disease-producing agent intended
to incapacitate may, under certain condi-
tions, bring about a fatal disease. Similarly,
attacks which might be intended to pro-
voke lethal effects might fail to do so. Exam-
ples of naturally occurring lethal disease are
shown in table 2 and representative incapac-
itating diseases in table 3. A detailed list
of possible agents, NVith a brief description of
their salient characteristics is given in an-
nex C.
166. A number of natural diseases of man
and domestic animals are caused by mixed
Infections (e.g., swine influenza, hog chol-
era). The possible use of two or more differ-
ent organisms in combination in bacterio-
logical (biological) warfare needs to be
treated seriously because the resulting dis-
eases might be aggravated or prolonged. In
some instances, however, two agents might
interfere with one another and reduce the
severity of the illness they might cause sepa-
rately.
167. The effects of some forms of bacterio-
logical (biological) warfare can be mitigated
by chemotherapeutic, chemoprophylactic
and immunization measures (for protec-
tion see chapter I and annex C of this chap-
ter). Specific chemotherapeutic measures are
effective against certain diseases, but not
against those caused by viruses. But it may
not always be possible to apply such meas-
ures, and they might not always be success-
ful. For example, with some diseases early
therapy with antibiotics is usually success-
ful, but relapses may occur. Moreover, re-
sistance against antibiotics may develop in
almost all groups of micro-organisms, and re-
sistant strains may retain full virulence for
man as well as for animals.
TABLE 2.?EXAMPLES OF AGENTS THAT MIGHT BE USED TO CAUSE DEATH
Agents
Diseases
Incubation
period
(days)
Effect of
specific
therapy
Likelihood of
spread from
man to man
Viruses
Rickettsiae
Bacteria
Eastern equine encephalitis__ 5 to 15 Nil
Tick-borne encephalitis 7 to 14 do
Yellow fever 3 to 6 do
Rocky Mountain spotted fever_ 3 to 10 Good
Epidemic typhus 6 to 15 do
Anthrax 1 to 5 Moderate
Cholera do Good
Plague, pneumonic 2 to 5 Moderate
Tularaemia 1 to 10 Good
Typhoid 7 to 21 do
NiI.I
Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.
Low.
High.
Do.
Low.
High.
I Unless vector present.
TABLE 3.?EXAMPLES OF AGENTS THAT MIGHT BE USED TO CAUSE INCAPACITATION
Agents
Diseases
Incubation
period
(days)
Effect of
specific
therapy
Likelihood of
spread from
man to man
Viruses
Rickettsiae
Bacteria
Fungi Coccidioidomycosis
Chikungunya fever 2 to 6 Nil Nil.'
Dengue fever 5 to 8 do Do.
Venezuelan equine 2 to 5 do Do.
encephalitis.
Q-fever 10 to 21 Good Low.
Brucellosis 7 to 21 Moderate Nil.
7 to 21 Poor Do.
I Unless mosquito vector present.
Possible bacteriological (biological) agents
168. Victims of an attack by bacteriological
(biological) weapons would, in effect, have
contracted an infectious disease. The diseases
would probably be known, but their symp-
toms might be clinically modified. For ex-
ample, apart from the deliberate genetic
modification of the organism, the portals of
Infection might be different from the natural
routes, and the disease might be foreign to
the geographical area in which it was de-
liber6tely spread. Possible bacteriological
(biological) agents representing diseases
caused by the main groups of relevant micro-
organisms are:
169. Anthrax: Under natural conditions,
anthrax is a disease of animals, the main
source of infection for man being cattle and
sheep. Its vernacular synonym "wool sorter's
disease" indicates one way men used to con-
tract the disease. Depending on the mecha-
nism of transmission, a cutaneous (skin)
form (contact infection), an intestinal form
(alimentary infection), or pulmonary form
(airborne infection) may develop. The lung
or respiratory form is most severe, and un-
less early treatment with antibiotics is re-
sorted to, death ensues within two-three
days in nearly every case.
170. Antibiotic prophylaxis is possible, but
would have to be prolonged for weeks, since
it has been shown that monkeys exposed to
anthrax aerosol die if antibiotic treatment is
discontinued after ten days. In certain coun-
tries, several types of vaccines are employed,
but their value has not been fully evaluated.
of the illness, and can be significant for
proper diagnosis. Treatment presents great
difficulties.
174. Plague: Under natural conditions,
small rodents, from which the disease is
transmitted by fleas, are the main source of
human infection with plague. This is hoW
"bubonic" plague develops. If the plague
microbes are inhaled, pneumonic plague de-
velops after a three-to-five-day incubation
period. The patient suffers from severe gen-
eral symptoms and if untreated, normally
dies within two to three days. A patient with
pneumonic plague is extremely contagious
to contacts.
175. Preventive vaccination is moderately
effective against bubonic, but not pneu-
monic, plague. If administered early, strep-
tomycin treatment may be successful.
176. In a study of experimental pulmonary
plague in monkeys, it was found that an
average dose of only 100 bacteria caused fatal
disease in half the animals tested. Animal
experiments have also show that particles of
1 micrometre diameter (1.25,000 of an inch) ,
containing single microbial cells, can cause
primary pneumonia, with a rapid and fatal
outcome. If the aerosol is formed by larger
particles (5-10 micrometres diameter) micro-
bial cells are deposited in the nose and other
regions of the upper respiratory tract, and
primary foci of the disease develop in the
corresponding lymphatic nodes. A fatal gen-
eralized infection may then follow.
177. A large mass of plague bacteria could
be grown, and probably lyophilized (freeze-
dried) and kept in storage. The agent is
highly infectious by the aerosol route and
most populations are completely susceptible.
An effective vaccine against this type of dis-
ease is not known. Infection might also be
transmitted to urban and/or field rodents
and natural foci of plague may be treated.
178. Q-/ever: Under natural conditions, Q-
fever is a disease a animals, the main sources
of infection to man being sheep, goats and
cattle. The infection is transmitted most fre-
quently by the air route.
179. An incubation period of two to three
weeks follows the inhalation of the infectious
material. A severe attack of influenza-like ill-
ness follows, with high fever, malaise, joint
and muscle pains, which may be followed in
five to six days by pneumonia. In untreated
cases, the illness lasts two to three weeks;
the patient feels exhausted and is unable to
do normal work for everal weeks. But the
disease can be successfully treated with broad
spectrum antibiotics (tetracyclines). Prophy-
lactic vaccines have been prepared in some
countries, but have not yet been proved suit-
able for large-scale use.
180. The agent causing the disease is a
rickettsia, and is extremely infectious for
man. An epidemic of Q-fever once occurred
due to contaminated dust which was carried
by the wind from a rendering plant some ten
kilometers away. Q-fever is also a coinmon
and significant laboratory hazard, even
though it is only rarely transmitted from
man to man. The high susceptibility of hu-
mans to this agent has been demonstrated in
volunteers.
181. Q-fever rickettsiae are extraordinarily
resistant to environmental factors such as
temperature and humidity. Very large
amounts can be produced in embryonated
chicken eggs (20,000 million mirco-organisms
par millilitre) and can be stored for a lung
period of time. A Q-fever aerosol could pro-
duce an incapacitating effect in a large pro-
portion of the population of an attacked area.
The infective agent could persist in the en-
vironment for months and infect animals,
possibly creating atural foci of infection.
182. Tularaemia: Under natural conditions,
tularaemia is a disease of wild animals, the
source of human infection being rodents,
especially rabbits and hares. When it occurs
naturally in human beings, who are very
susceptible to the disease, skin lesions with
swelling of the lymph nodes are its usual
171. The anthrax bacillus forms very re-
sistant spores, which live for many years in
contaminated areas, and which constitute
the most dangerous risk the disease presents.
From epidemiological observations, the in-
halation, infectious dose for man is estimated
at 20,000 spores. Experiments on animals
show that anthrax can be combined with in-
fluenza infection or with some noxious
chemical agent, and that the susceptibility of
the animal to airborne anthrax infection is
then markedly enhanced.
172. With suitable expertise and equip-
ment large masses of anthrax bacilli can be
easily grown, and heavy concentrations of
resistant anthrax spore aerosols can be made.
Such aerosols could result in a high propor-
tion of deaths in a heavily exposed popula-
tion. Immunization could not be expected to
protect against a heavy aerosol attack. The
soil would remain contaminated for a very
long time, and so threaten live-stock farm-
ing.
173. Coccidioidomycosis: This disease,
which is also called desert fever, is caused
by a fungus found in the soil of deserts in
the United States, South America and the
USSR. The spores of the fungus are very
stable, and can easily be disseminated as an
aerosol. If they are inhaled, pneumonia with
fever, cough, ague and night-sweatinig, and
muscle pains follow after an incubation
period of one-three weeks. In most cases,
recovery from the disease occurs after some
weeks of illness. An allergic rash sometimes
breaks out during the first or second week
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manifestation (infection by contact with sick
and dead animals, or by way of ticks and
other vectors). Infection can also occur
through the eye and the gastro-intestinal
tract. The pulmonary form (airborne infec-
tion) is the more serious. Pulmonary tula-
raemia is associated with general pain, irri-
tant cough, general malaise, etc., but in
Europe and Japan mortality due to this form
of the disease was never higher than 1 per-
cent even before antibiotics became avail-
able. American tularaemia strains in the
other epidemics have been associated with a
mortality rate as high as 20 )ercent despite
antibiotic treatment. Usually treatment with
streptomycin or tetracycline is highly effec-
tive. A tularaemia vaccine developed in the
Soviet Union is also highly effactive.
183. The agent causing the disease is a
microbe which is very sensitive to common
disinfectants, but which is able to survive
for as long as a few weeks in contaminated
dust, water, etc.
184. Aerosols of tularaemia have been
tested on volunteers. The inhalation infec-
tious dose for man is about ten to twenty-
five microbes, and the incubation period five
days. By increasing the inhaled dose a hun-
dred times, the incubation period shortens
to two to three days. Owing to its easy aerosol
transmission, tularaemia has often infected
laboratory workers.
185. The microbiological characteristics are
similar to those of the plague bacillie (al-
though antibiotic treatment and vaccination
prophylaxis are effective). Both lethal and
incapacitating effects are to be expected. The
disease is not transferred front man to
man, but long-lasting natural foci might be
created.
186. Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus
(VEE): In nature, VEE ia an infection of
animals (equines, rodents, birds) transmitted
to man through mosquitos Which have fed on
infected animals.
187. The disease has sudden onset, with
headache, chills and fever, nausea and vomit-
ing, muscle and bone pains, with encephalitis
occurring ha a very small proportion of cases.
The mortality rate is very low and recovery
Is usually rapid after a week, with reSidual
weakness often persisting for three weeks.
No specific therapy is available. The vaccine
Is still in the experimental stage.
188. NUMerOUS laboratory Infections in hu-
mans have been reported, most of them air-
borne. In laboratory experiments, monkeys
were infected with aerosolized virus at rela-
tively low concentrations (about 1,000 guinea
pig infectious doses).
189. Since the virus can be produced in
large amounts in tissue culture or embryo-
nated eggs, and since airborne infection read-
ily occurs in laboratory workers, concentrated
aerosols could be expected to incapacitate a
very high percentage of the population ex-
posed. In some areas, persistent endemic in-
fection in wild animals would be established.
190. Yellow fever: In nature, yellow fever
is primarily a virus diseaat of monkeys,
transmitted to man by variety of mosquitos
(Aedes rtegypti, Aedes simpsoni, Hamagogus
species, etc.). After an incubation period of
three-six days, influenza-like aymptoras ap-
pear with high fever, restlessness and nausea.
Later the liver and the kidneys may be seri-
ously affected, with jaundice and diminished
urinary excretion supervening. The very se-
vere forms end in black vomitus and death.
In a non-immune population. mortality rates
for yelloW fever may be as high as 30-40 per
cent. There is no specific treatment, but pro-
phylactic vaccination, being highly effective
is widely used in yellow fever endemic areas.
2. Effects on Populations
191. Other than for sabotage, the use of
aerosol clouds of an agent is the most likely
form of attack in bacteriological (biological)
warfare. For example, material can be pro-
duced containing infective Micro-organisms
at a concentration of 10,000 million per gram.
Let us suppose that an aircraft were to spray
such material so as to produce an aeronsol
line source 100 kilometres in length across
a 10 kilometre per hour wind. Then, assum-
ing that 10 per cent of organisms survived
aerosolization, and that subsequent environ-
mental stresses caused them to die at a rate
of 5 per cent per minute, about 5,000 square
kilometres would be covered at a concentra-
tion such that 50 per cent of the unprotected
people in the area would have inhaled a dose
sufficient to infect them, assuming that the
infective dose is about 100 micro-organisms
per person, This particular calculation is
valid for agents such as those which cause
tularaemia, plague, as well as for some vir-
uses. The decay rate of the causative agents
of Q-fever, anthrax and some other infections
is much lower and the expected effect would
be still greater.
192. The effects of bacteriological (biologi-
cal) attacks would obviously vary according
to circumstances. Military personnel equip-
ped with adequate protective measures, well
trained In their use and provided with good
medical services could, if warned of an at-
tack, be able to protect themselves to a
considerable degree. But effective early warn-
ing and detection systems do not yet exist.
On the other hand, attacks on civil popula-
tions are likely to be covert and by surprise
and, at present no civilian populations are
protected. Unprotected military or civilian
personnel would be at complete risk, and
panic and irrational behaviour would com-
plicate the effects of the attack. The heavy
burden which would be imposed on the med-
ical services of the attacked region would
compound disorganization, and there would
be a major risk of the total disruption of
all administrative services.
193. In view of the extensive anti-person-
nel effects associated with agents of the
kind with which this report is concerned, it
is useful to view them against the area of
effect of a one-megaton nuclear explosion,
which as is well redognized, would be suffi-
cient to destroy utterly a town with a popu-
lation of a million. It should of course be
emphasized that direct comparisons of the
effects of different classes of weapons are,
at best, hypothetical exercises. From the
military point of view, effectiveness of a
weapon cannot be measured just in terms of
areas of devastation or numbers of casualties.
The final criterion will always be whether a
specific military objective can be achieVed
better with one than another set of weapons.
The basic hypotheses chosen for the com-
parison are rather artificial; and in particu-
lar, environmental factors are ignored. But
despite this limitation, table 4 gives data
that help to place chemical, bacteriological
(biological) and nuclear weapons in sorne
perspective as to size of target area, numbers
of casualties inflicted, and cost estimates for
development and production of each type of
weapon. The figures speak for themselves.
TABLE 4.?COMPARATIVE ESTIMATES OF DISABLING EFFECTS OF HYPOTHETICAL ATTACKS ON TOTALLY UNPROTECTED
POPULATIONS USING A NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, OR BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPON THAT COULD BE CARRIED
BY A SINGLE STRATEGIC BOMBER
Criterion for estimate
Type of weapon
Nuclear (1 megaton)
Chemical (15 tons of
nerve agent)
Bacteriological (biological)
(10 tons a)
Area affected Up to 300 km 2
Time delay before onset of Seconds -
effect.
Damage to structures Destruction over an area of
100 km.2
Other effects Radioactive contamination in an
area of 2,500 km.2 for 3-6
months.
Possibility of later normal 3-6 months after attack
use of affected area after
attack.
Maximum effect on man____ 90 percent deaths
Multiyear investment in $5,000-10,000 million
substantial research and
development production
capability.2
UP to 60 km2
Minutes
None
Contamination by persistence
of agent from a few days to
weeks.
Limited during period of con-
tamination.
50 percent deaths
$1,000-5,000 million
UP to 100,000 km I.
Days.
None.
Possible epidemic or estab-
lishment of new endemic foci
of disease.
After end of incubation period
or subsidence of epidemic.
50 percent morbidity; 25 percent
deaths If no medical
intervention.
$1,000-5,000 million.
It is assumed that mortality from the disease caused by the agent would be 50 percent if no medical treatment were available.
2 it is assumed that indicated cumulative investments in research and development and production plants have been made to
achieve a substantial independent capability. Individual weapons could be fabricated without making this total investment.
3. Effects on Animals
194. The way bacteriological (biological)
weapons might be used against stocks of
domestic animals would probably be the same
as that used in attacks against man. Rep-
resentative diseases and their characteris-
tics are shown in table 5.
195. Viral infections probably cause the
most important diseases of domestic animals
and could have more devastating effects than
diseases produced by other types of patho-
gens. Since many of the organisms which
cause infectious diseases in domestic animals
are also pathogenic for man, and since some
of them may also be readily transmitted from
animals to man, either directly or by vectors,
such attacks might also affect the human
population directly. Attacks upon livestock
would not only result in the immediate death
of animals, but also might call for compul-
sory slaughter as a means of preventing the
spread of infection.
196. Covert bacteriological (biological) at-
tack during peacetime directed against do-
mestic animals could give rise to serious
political and economic repercussions if large
numbers of stock were affected. For example,
African swine fever occurs endemically on the
African continent as a subclinical disease of
warthogs. In 1957 it was accidentally brought
from Angola to Portugal, and then in 1960
to Spain. Despite strict and extensive veteri-
nary measures that were enforced, losses in
pig breeds were estimated to amount within
a single year to more than 89,000,000.
197. Isolated attacks against stocks of do-
mestic animals during wartime would have
only a nuisance value. However, if a highly
infectious agent (e.g,, foot-and-mouth dis-
ease) were used, even a local attack could
have very widespread effects because of
spread by the normal commercial movement
of animals, particularly in highly developed
countries. Extensive attacks with travelling
clouds could, however, lead to a disastrous
state of affairs. The history of myxamatosis
(a rabbit disease) in Europe provides a par-
allel. Not only did it drastically reduce the
rabbit population in France, into which it
was first introduced; it immediately spread to
other countries of Europe, including the
United Kingdom. The risk of the uncon-
trolled spread of infection to a number of
countries is an important consideration in
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August 11, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
the use of some bacteriological (biological)
weapons.
198. The possibilities of protecting domes-
tic animal stocks against bacteriological (bio-
logical) attacks are so remote that they are
not worth discussing.
of protection. Advanced countries might, as
a precautionary measure exchange suscep-
tible plants by more resistant strains. This
would be difficult for countries whose agri-
cultural standards were not high, and which
would be the most vulnerable to bacterio-
logical (biological) attacks on their crops.
TABLE S.?EXAMPLES OF DISEASES THAT MIGHT BE USED
TO ATTACK DOMESTIC ANIMALS 7ABLE6.?EXAMPLES OF DISEASES THAT MIGHT BE USED TO
ATTACK PLANTS
DISEASE ANIMALS ATTACKED
Viruses:
African swine fever
Equine encephalitis
Foot-and-mouth disease_ _ _
Fowl plague
Hog cholera
Newcastle disease
Rift Valley fever
Rinderpest
Vesicular stomatitis
Ricksettsiae:
Veldt disease
Q-fever
Bacteria:
Anthrax
Brucellosis
Glanders
Fungi:
Lumpy jaw
Aspergillosis
Hogs.
Horses.
Cattle sheep, hogs.
Chickens, turkeys,
Hogs.
Chickens, turkeys.
Cattle, goats, sheep.
Cattle, sheep, oxen, goats,
water buffaloes.
Cattle, horses, mules, hogs.
Cattle, sheep, goats.
Do.
Cattle, sheep, horses, mules.
Cattle sheep, goats, hogs,
horses.
Horses, mules.
Cattle, horses, hogs.
Poultry, cattle.
4. Effects on Plants
199. Living micro-organisms could also be
used to generate diseases in crops which are
economically important either as food or as
raw material (e.g., cotton and rubber). Sig-
nificant food crops in this respect include
potatoes, sugar-beet, garden vegetables, soya
beans, sorghum, rice, corn, wheat and other
cereals and fruits. Obviously the selection
of the target for a biological attack would
be determined by the relative importance of
the crop in the national diet and economy.
Deliberately induced epiphytoties (plants dis-
ease epidemics) could in theory have serious
national and International consequences.
200. The fungal, bacterial, or viral agents
which could be used against plants are shown
in table 6.
201. With a few minor exceptions, the plant
viruses could be cultured only in living plant
systems, the causal agent being found only
in the plant tissues and juices. Virus diseases
are transmitted principally by insect vectors
and to some extent by mechanical means.
202. Bacterial agents which attack plants
can persist for months on or in the plants.
All of them can be cultured on artificial
media. Normally, plant bacteria are not dis-
seminated to any great extent by winds; the
principal methods for spread in nature are
insects, animals (including man) and water.
Rain can spread bacteria locally, while in-
sects and animals are responsible for their
more extensive spread. It is conceivable that
bacterial plant pathogens could be adapted
for deliberate aerial dissemination.
203. Plant fungi, which cause some of the
most devastating diseases of important agri-
cultural crops, are disseminated mainly by
winds, but also by insects, animals, waterand
man. Many fungal pathogens produce and
liberate into the air countless numbers of
small, hardy spores which are able to with-
stand adverse climatic conditions. The epi-
demic potential of a number of fungal patho-
gens is considerable.
204. In theory there are measures which
could protect crops against bacteriological
(biological) attacks; but at present their po-
tential cost rules them out in practice. There
is no essential difference between the coun-
ter-measures which would have to be intro-
duced to counter bacteriological (biological)
weapons and those employed normally to con-
trol plant diseases in peacetime. But the use
of bacteriological (biological) weapons to de-
stroy crops on a large scale would imply that
the attacker would choose agents capable of
overcoming any known, economical method
Diseases
Liklihood
of spread
Viruses Corn stunt High.
Ho)a blanca (rice) Do.
Fiji disease (sugar cane) Do.
Sugar beet curly top Do.
Potato yellow dwarf Do.
Bacteria Leaf blight (rice) Do.
Blight of corn Do.
Gummosis of sugarcane Low.
Fungi Late blight (potato) Very high.
Cereal rusts Do.
Rice blast Do.
Corn rust High.
Coffee rust Very high.
5. Factors Influencing the Effects of Bacteri-
ological (Biological) Attacks
Exotic diseases
205. Any country which resorted to bac-
teriological (biological) warfare would pre-
sumably try to infect, with a single blow, a
large proportion of an enemy population with
an exotic agent to which they had not be-
come immune through previous exposure.
Such exotic agents would lead to the appear-
ance of diseases which normally had not oc-
curred before in a given geographical area,
either becauSe of the absence of the organism
involved (e.g., foot-and mouth disease in
North America or Japan), and/or of natural
vectors (e.g., Japanese or Venezuelan ence-
phalitis in Europe, Rocky Mountain spotted
fever in many countries). In addition, a dis-
ease which had been controlled or eradicated
from an area (e.g., urban or classical yellow
fever from many tropical and sub-tropical
countries, epidemic typhus from developed
countries) might be reintroduced as a result
of bacteriological (biological) warfare.
Altered or new diseases
206. Deliberate genetic steps might also be
taken to change the properties of infectious
agents, especially in antigenic composition
and drug resistance. Apart from genetic
changes that could be induced in known
organisms, it is to be expected that new in-
fectious diseases will appear naturally from
time to time and that their causative agents
might be used in war. However, it could not
therefore be assumed that every outbreak
of an exotic or new disease could necessarily
be a consequence of a bacteriological (bio-
logical) attack. The Marburg disease, which
broke out suddenly In 1967 in Marburg,
Frankfurt and Belgrade, was a good example.
It was acquired by laboratory workers who
had handled blood or other tissues of vervet
monkeys which had been recently caught in
the wild, and by others who came into con-
tact with them. Because the outbreak oc-
curred in medical laboratories it was very
skillfully handled. In other circumstances, it
might have spread widely before it was con-
trolled.
Epidemic spread
207. As already emphasized, a wide variety
of agents can infect by the inhalation route,
so that in a bacteriological (biological) at-
tack a large number of persons could be in-
fected within a short time. From the epi-
demiological point of view, the consequences
would differ depending on whether the re-
sultant disease was or was not transmissible
from man to man. In the latter case the
result would be a once-for-all disaster, vary-
ing in scale and lethality according to the
nature of the organism used and the num-
bers of people affected. The attack would
S 9539
undoubtedly have a strong demoralizing ef-
fect on the unaffected as well as the affected
population, and it would be in the nature
of things that were would be a breakdown
of medical services.
208. If the induced disease were easily
transmissible from man to man, and if it was
one against which the population had not
been effectively immunized, it is possible to
imagine what could happen by recalling say,
the Periodical appearance of new varieties
of influenza virus, e.g. the 1957 influenza
pandemic. In Czechoslovakia (population
about 14 million), 1,500,000 influenza pa-
tients were actually reported; the probable
total number was 2,500,000. About 50 per
cent of the sick were people in employment
and their average period away from work was
six days. Complications necessitating further
treatment developed in 5-6 per thousand of
the cases, and about 0.2 per thousand died.
Those who axe old enough to remember the
1918 influenza pandemic, which swept over
most of the world, will judge the 1957 out-
break as a mild affair.
Susceptibility of population
209. A very important factor in the effec-
tiveness of an aerosol attack is the state of
immunity of the target population. Where
the population is completely lacking in spe-
cific immunity to the agent which is dis-
seminated, the incidence and severity of dis-
ease are likely to be exceptionally high. Nat-
urally occurring examples of very severe epi-
demics in virgin populations are well known
(e.g. measles in Fiji, poliomyelitis and in-
fluenza in the Arctic). A similar result fol-
lows the introduction of a suspectible popu-
lation (often a military force) into an al-
ready infected area. Thus there was a high
prevalence of dengue fever in military forces
operating in the Pacific in World War II?
sometimes affecting as many as 25 per cent
of the operational strength of a unit. The
local population suffered relatively little from
the disease because they had usually been
infected early in life, and were subsequently
immune.
Populations of increased vulnerability
210. Malnutrition: Recent statistical
studies reveal a clear association between
malnutrition and the incidence of infectious
diseases. FAO, WHO and UNICEF have
pointed out that in developing countries, a
shortage of nutritious food is a major factor
in the high mortality rate due to infectious
diseases, particularly in children.
211. Housing and clothing: Primitive hous-
ing and inadequate clothing would lead to
an increased vulnerability to bacteriological
(biological) and more particularly chemical
weapons. Millions of people live in houses
which are permeable to any sort of airborne
infection or poison, and millions are inade-
quately clothed and walk farefooted.
212. Other conditions which characterize
poor populations have a definite influence
on the spread of infections. Large families
increase the opportunities for contagious
contact. Inadequate housing, lack of potable
water and, in general, bad sanitation, a low
educational level, numerous vectors of in-
fectious disease (e.g. insects), and, of course,
lack of medical services are factors which
also favour the spread of disease. The agents
used might also persist in the soil, on crops,
grasses, etc., so that delayed action might
need to be taken into account.
Social effects and public health measures
213. A basic factor which influences the
risk of epidemic situation during every war
is a rapid impairment of standards of hy-
giene. Widespread destruction of housing and
of sanitary facilities (water works, water
piping, waste disposal, etc.), the Inevitable
decline in personal hygiene, and other diffi-
culties, create exceptionally favourable con-
ditions for the spread of intestinal infec-
tions, or louse-transmitted disease, etc.
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214. The importance a adequate public
health services is well illustrated by an ex-
plosive water-borne epidemic of infectious
hepatitis in Delhi in 1955-1956, which af-
fected some 30,000 persons, and which oc-
curred because routine water treatment was
ineffective. This epidemic was caused by the
penetration into the water supply of waste
waters heavily contaminated with hepatitis
virus. However, there was no concurrent in-
crease in the incidence of bacillary dysentery
and typhoid fever, showing that the routine
treatment of the water had been adequate to
prevent bacterial but not viral infections.
215. Air streams, migrating animals and
running water may transport agents from
one country to the other. Refugees with con-
tagious diseases pose legal and epidemiologi-
cal problems. In areas with multinational
economies, losses in livestock and crops may
occur in neighbouring countries by the
spread of the disease through regional
commerce.
216. The experiences from fairly recent
smallpox epidemics can also be used to illu-
strate the social effects of an accidentally in-
troduced, highly dangerous airborne infec-
tion. In New York (1947) one patient started
ANNEX A.-CHEMICAL PROPERTIES, FORMULATIONS AND TOXICITIES OF LETHAL CHEMICAL AGENTS (EXCERPT FROM MATERIAL SUPPLIED BY WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION)
-10? C., (b) at 20? C.; (6) approximate duration
sunny, light breeze, (c) -10? C., sunny, no wind,
: breathing rate ca. 15 liters /min.); (9) estimated
an epidemic, in which twelve persons became
ill and two died. Within a month more than
5 million persons were revaccinated. Similarly
in Moscow, in January 1960, a smallpox epi-
demic of forty-six cases (of whom three died)
developed, caused by a single patient. At that
time 5,500 vaccination teams were set up and
vaccinated 6,372,376 persons within a week.
Several hundreds of other health workers
searched a large area of the country for con-
tacts (9,000 persons were kept under medical
supervision, of these 662 had to be hospital-.
ized as smallpox suspects).
Key to table:(1) Trivial name; (2) messy classification; (3) approximate solubility in water at 20? C.; (4) volatility at 20? C; (5) physical state (a) at
of hazard (contact, or airborne foflowing evaporation) to be expected from ground contamination (a) 10? C., rainy, moderate wind, (b) 15? C.,
settled snow; (7) casualty producing dosages (lethal or significant incapacitating effects); (8) estimated human respiratory LC40 (n.C1c1 activity
human percutaneous toxicity.'
(1) Sarin
(2) Lethal agent (nerve gas). Lethal agent (nerve gas). Lethal agent (blood gas). Lethal agent (blood gas). Lethal agent (lung
(f53)) 100 percent 1 to 5 percent
(a) Liquid 3 to 18 mg/m3
Liquid 873, 000 mg/ms 3, 300, 000 mg/m3 6, 370, 000 mg/m3
_ irritant).
4) 12,100 mg/m8 100 percent 6 to 7 percent Hydrolysed
(b) do do Liquid Solid Liquid_
do
(0 (aVapour
(b) )1. to 1 boor._ _ 1 to 12 hours Few minutes Few minutes
34 to 4 hours ?_ 3 to 21 days do
(c) Ito 2 days 1 to 16 weeks 1 to 4 hours
>5 mg.-min./m.1 >0.5 ma-minim 0 >2,000 ma-minim
100 mg.-min./m.8 _ 10 mg.-min./m.1 5,000 mg.-min./m , 11,000 mg -min /rn 1 3 200
(9) 1,500 mg./man _ 6 mg./man
vx
Hydrogen cyanide Cyanogen chloride Phosgene
Mustard gas
Lethal agent (vesicant)._ Lethal agent.
Botulinal toxin -A
0.05 percent Soluble.
630 mg/ma _ Negligible.
Solid Solid.
Vapour
Liquid Do.
Few minutes 12 to 48 hours__
do do 2 to 7 days
3,4' to 4 hours to 1 hour 2 to 8 weeks
.3 >7,000 mg.-min./m.3 >1,600 mg.-min./m.3 >100 mg.-min./me
0.001 mg. (oral).
. _ , mg.-min./m.3 1,500 mg.-min./m.3 0.02 mg.-min./
m.s
(7)
(8)
4,500 mg./man
'A drop of mustard weighing a few milligrams can produce a sedans blister which will be incapacitating if it interferes with the normal activities of an individual.
_
ANNEX B?TEAR AND 110.ASSING GASES
Three parameters will be used to qualify
the effects of tear gases. These are defined as
follows:
Threshold of irritation is the atmospheric
concentration of the substance (in mg per
ma), which, in one minute of exposure, causes Tear ass Lethal index
irritation.
(mg.min/m9
Tolerance limit is the highest atmospheric
-
Adamside (DM)
concentration (in mg per 01?) which a test Ethyl bromacetate_ 0. I 2-5 15, 000-30, 000
subject can tolerate during one minute of Bromacetone 5 5-50 25, 000
exposure. Omega-chloracetophenone (ON) 1.5 10 30, COO
Lethal index Is a dosage, and thus the .05-. I 1-5 40, 000- 75, 000
0-chlorbenzylidene malononitrile (CS) O. 3 -1. 5 5-15 8, 500-25, 000
product of the concentration in the air (in
ANNEX C.-SOME BIOLOGICAL AGENTS THAT MAY BE USED TO ATTACK MAN
mg per ni,) and the time of exposure (in The data given under "Lethal index" are
minutes), which causes mortality. Data for from animal experiments with various
various tear gases are given in the following species.
table.
T reshold of Tolerance
irritation limit
(mg/m8) (maims)
Disease
Viral:
Chikungrinyna fever Probably high_ None R to 6 days_ 2 weeks tea few Very low (less than 1 percent)._ None None.
months.
Dengue fever .iiiah do 5 to 8 days... A few days to weeks do
Eastern equine encephalitis do do do Do.
5 to 15 days__ 1 to 3 weeks
. High (greater than 60 do Under development.
Tick-borne encephalitis do dopercent).
Venezuelan equine encephalitis do do Ito 2 weeks_ 1 week to a few months.. Variable up to 30 percent do_. Do.
Influenza do do 2 to 5 days... 3 to 10 days Low less than 1 percent) do Do.
1 to 3 days... 3 to 10 days Usually low, except for de Available.
Yellow fever complicated cases.
Smallpox ..... do
do High do 3 to 6 days... Ito weeks High (up to 40 percent) do Do.
7 to 16 days 12 to 24 days Variable but usually high (up do Do.
to 30 percent).
Transmis- Incubation
- Infectivity I sibilitys period,
Duration of illness 5 Mortality3 Antibiotic therapy Vaccination
Ricksettsial:
Q-fever do None or
10 to 21 days Ito 3 weeks Low (usually less than 1 Effective Under development
negligible. (sometimes
percent.)
shorter).
Psittacosis to Moderately 4 to 15 days_ 1 to several weeks
high Moderately high do None.
Rocky Mountain spotted fever do None 3 to 10 days 2 weeks to several
months. Usually high (up to 80 percent.) do Under development.
Epidemic typhus do chi_ 6 to 15 days_ A few weeks to months Variable but usually high (up do Available.
to 70 percent).
Bacterial:
Anthrax (pulmonary) Moderately Negligible_ _ __ 1 to 5 days... 3 to 5 days Almost invariably fatal Effective if given very Do.
high. -
Brucellosis We None early.
Cholera High 1 to 3 weeks . Several weeks to months_ Low (less than 5 percent) Moderately effective Under development
Glanders h None 1 to 5 days_ _ Ito several weeks Usually high (up to 80 percent) do Available.
Melioidosis do dO 2 to 14 days_ 4 to 6 weeks Almost invariably fatal Little effective. None.
Plague (pneumonic) do High 1 to 5 days._ 4 to 20 days Almost 100 percent fatal Moderately effective Do.
2 to 5 days__ 1 to 2 days do Moderately effective if Available.
Tularemia .... do given early.
Negligible_ 1 to NI days 2 to several weeks Uusually low sometimes high Effective Do.
Typhoid fever f up to 60 percent).
Moderately Moderately 1103 weeks A few to several weeks_ Moderately high up to (10
high. high. Moderately effective Do.
percent).
Dysentery
Nigh High 1 to 3 days A few days to weeks Low to moderately high de- Effective None.
Fungal: Coccidioido mycosis pending on strain.
-. do None__ 1 to 3 weeks.. A few weeks to months_ Low. None Do.
. Infectivity: indicates the potency of the parasite to penetrate and multiply in the host's orge- agent, resistance of the host and many other factors. It also should be noted that if the agents
_
nism, regardless of the clinical manifestation of illness. In fact, there are several agents by which concerned would be deliberately spread in massiVe concentrations as agents of warfare, the in.
great majorityof the exposed population will be infected without developing clinica symptoms. cubation,periods might be shorter and the resulting symptoms more serious. As to mortality, this
of any arthropod vector.
8 Transmissibility: This refers to direct transmission from man to man without the intervention refers to the ratio between the number of fatalities to the number of diseased (not to that of in-
5 The figures listed under incubation period, duration of disease, and mortality are based on 4 The availability of vaccines is no indication of their degree of effectiveness.
fected) individuals, if no treatment is given.
epidemiological data. They vary, according to variations in virulence and dose of the infecting
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 9541
CHAPTER III. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS AFFECT-
ING THE USE OF CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGI-
CAL (BIOLOGICAL) CONSIDERATIONS
A. General considerations
217. Extraneous factors influence the be-
haviour of chemical and bacteriological (bio-
logical) weapons to a far greater extent than
they do any other kind of armament. Some,
such as wind and rain, relate to the state of
the physical environment, and to a certain
eitent can be evaluated quantitatively.
Others, which reflect the general ecological
situation, and the living conditions and
physiological state of the populations ex-
posed to the effects of the weapons, are more
difficult to define; their influence?though
they could be considerable?cannot be quan-
tified.
218. This limitation applies particularly to
bacteriological (biological) weapons. The
natural course of infectious diseases?for
example in influenza epidemics?shows that
they are governed by so many uncontrollable
factors that the way they develop cannot as
a rule be foreseen. This would also be prob-
ably true of pathogenic agents which were
deliberately dispersed. On the other hand,
the knowledge gained through the study of
epidemiology, and in the study of artificial
dispersions of bacteriological (biological)
agents, both in the laboratory and the field,
has shed some light on some of the factors
concerned.
219. The ecological problem is the main
theme of chapter IV. The factors which con-
cern the variability of the human target, e.g.
physiological and living conditions, and levels
of protection, have already been described
in chapters I and II. This chapter is con-
cerned with physical environment (climate,
terrain).
1. Phenomena Associated With the Dispersal
of Chemical and Bacteriological (Biologi-
cal) Agents
220. It has already been pointed out that
chemical substances and living organisms
capable of being used as weapons are ex-
tremely varied in their nature and in their
effects. On the other hand, regarded solely
from the standpoint of their physical state
after dispersion in the atmosphere, they can
clearly be placed in one or the other of the
following categories:
Liquid drops and droplets of varying size;
(diameters greater than about 10 Microns).
More or less finely divided liquid and solid
aerosols; (diameters less than about 10 Mi-
cron.$).
Vapours.
221. Almost always, moreover, especially in
the case of liquid chemical agents, the result
of dispersion is a mixture of these different
phases; thus, a liquid dispersed by an ex-
plosive charge gives rise to a mixture of
aerosol and vapour, while aerial spraying
may produce a mixture of droplets and aero-
sols. Solid chemical substances will be in
aerosol form, and this will also be true, as
has already been pointed out, of bacterio-
logical (biological) agents.
222. Thus, chemical attacks would usually
take effect simultaneously in two forms:
Contamination of the ground at, and in
the immediate vicinity of, the target by di-
rect deposition of the agent at the time of
dispersion, and by subsequent settling of
large particles;
Formation of a toxic cloud consisting of
fine particles or droplets, of aerosol, and
possibly of vapour.
223. Most bacteriological (biological) at-
tacks would be designed primarily to create
an infectious aerosol as an inhalation haz-
ard. Some ground contamination might,
however, also result when infectious par-
ticles settled on the ground.
224. Both ground contamination and toxic
or infectious clouds would be immediately
subject to the physical action of the atmos-
phere.
225. If the soil contaminants are liquid
chemical agents, they would either evapo-
rate, producing a sustained secondary cloud,
or be absorbed by the ground, or diluted or
destroyed by atmospherical precipitation. If
they were solid agents, whether chemical or
biological, they might be returned to a state
of suspension by air currents, and perhaps
carried out of the initially contaminated
zone.
226. As it becomes formed, the toxic or
infectious cloud is immediately exposed to
atmospheric factors, and is straightaway
carried along by air currents. At the same
time, the particles within it are deposited at
different rates according to their mass, and
reach the ground at varying distances from
the point of emission, depending on wind
velocity (up to several kilometres in -the case
of particles less than a few tens of microns
in diameter) . The mechanically stable frac-
tion of the aerosol (particles under 5 mi-
crons in diameter) remains in suspension,
and may be carried along for considerable
distances.
B. The influence of atmospheric factors on
clouds of aerosols or vapours
227. The movement of a toxic or infectious
cloud after its formation depends chiefly on
the combined effects of wind and 8,t1n0S-
pheric conditions. The cloud is carried a
longer or shorter distance by the wind; at the
same time it is dispersed and diluted at a
faster or slower rate by turbulence of the
atmosphere and by local disturbances of
mechanical origin resulting from the rough-
ness of the ground.
228. The cloud may rise rapidly in the at-
mosphere or remain in the immediate vicin-
ity of the ground, thus retaining its de-
structive power for a greater or lesser time
depending on whether the air layer in which
it is released is in a stable or unstable state.
1. State of the Atmosphere
229. The state of the atmosphere plays
such an important role in the behaviour
of aerosol clouds that one might almost say
that it is the predominant factor in de-
termining the outcome of an attack, the ef-
fect of which could be considerably reduced,
or almost nullified, were the atmosphere
very unstable, or very serious if it was in a
state of pronounced and prolonged stability.
For this reason the mechanisms governing
the turbulent movements of air, caused by
differences in temperatures between super-
imposed air layers require some explanation
(see fig. 2) .
230. Disregarding the frictional layer of
air close to the ground, where mechanical
turbulence resulting from friction between
the air and the rough ground over which
it moves creates special conditions, air tem-
perature in the troposphere decreases on
average at the rate of 0.64? C for every 100
metres of altitude. Very frequently, how-
ever, as a result of thermal exchange between
the air and the ground, a cooler air layer
may be formed beneath a mass of hot light
air; in such conditions, the lower air layer,
with its greater density, does not tend to rise
and the atmosphere is said to be in "stable
equilibrium".
231. The situation, in which the vertical
temperature gradient becomes inverted, is
known as "temperature inversion", while the
air layer affected by the phenomenon is
termed as "inversion layer". When present it
is eminently favourable to the persistence
of toxic clouds.
232. After a day of sunshine, the surface
of the ground cools rapidly, with the result
that the layer of air close to the ground
cools more rapidly than those above it. Both
the intensity of the inversion and the thick-
ness of the air layer involved increase to a
maximum towards 4 a.m., and then decrease
again, finally disappearing shortly after
sunrise. This variation is very marked when
the sky is clear, and in favourable conditions
the inversion may last from fourteen to
eighteen hours a day, depending on the
season.
233. Very often, however, especially in
winter or in overcast weather, when the rays
of the sun are not sufficiently intense to
heat the surface of the ground, the temper-
ature inversion may last' for several days.
This condition has characterized all the dis-
asters caused by industrial pollution; for
example, the smog which claimed 4,000 vic-
tims in London in 1952 took its toll during a
period of atmospheric stability which lasted
for seven days.
234. Figure 2 shows the evolution of a toxic
cloud depending on the state of the atmos-
phere. (Fig. 2 not printed.)
235. Apart from this kind of low-altitude
inversion, which is most important in the
context of this report since it governs the
behaviour of toxic clouds released close to
the ground, similar process may take place
on a large scale at higher altitudes (hundreds
of thousands of metres) whenever a cool
air layer is formed beneath a hot air mass.
This may take place over large, cold expanses
(i.e. large expanses of land or sea, cloud or
fog masses, etc.). Because of the high alti-
tude at which they form, these inversion
layers have little effect on toxic clouds
released at ground level; but in the case
of the long-distance transfer of spores they
may act as a screen or reflector.
236. The configuration of the surface of
the earth in a particular area, which alters
the thermal exchange pattern, may also be
conducive to the formation of an inversion.
For example, inversions are a customary
phenomenon in winter in deep valleys sur-
rounded by high peaks, and occur more fre-
quently in the neighbourhood of slopes fac-
ing the north than on southern slopes. This
? also occurs whenever hills of any size en-
close a plain or basin, interrupting the gen-
eral flow of air and preventing mixing from
taking place. It is interesting to note that
apart from the periodic appearance of smog
in London, all the other major accidents re-
sulting from air pollution have occurred in
regions where the land configuration fits this
description. For example, the small town of
Donora, in the United States, lies in a rela-
tively narrow plain bordered by high hills.
In 1948 air pollution in the course of an
inversion lasting five days led to twenty
deaths and 6,000 cases of illness among the
town's 14,000 inhabitants.
2. Urban Areas
237. The case of urban built-up areas is
more complex, and it may even be said that
each one possesses its own micro-climate,
depending on its geographical situation, its
topography and the layout and nature of its
buildings.
238. Because the materials from which
they are constructed are better conductors,
and because their surfaces face in very varied
directions, buildings Usually capture and
reflect solar radiation better than does the
natural ground. Urban complexes therefore
heat up more quickly than does the sur-
rounding countryside, and the higher tem-
perature is still further augmented by do-
mestic and industrial heating plants. The re-
sults in a. flow of cool air from the neigh-
bouring countryside towards the hot centre
of the town, beginning shortly after sunrise,
decreasing at the beginning of the afternoon
and then rising again to a maximum shortly
before sunset. This general flow, which is of
low velocity, is disturbed and fragmented at
ground level by the buildings, forming local
currents flowing in all directions.
239. This constant mechanical turbulence,
to which is added the thermal turbulence
caused by numerous heat-generating
sources, should prevent the establishment in
towns of a temperature inversion at low al-
titude. In fact, however, inversions do occur,
when conditions are otherwise favourable,
but the inversion layer is situated at a higher
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S 9542 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE August 11, 1969
altitude than over the surrounding country-
side (30 to 150 metres).
240. At night, local inversions may be gen-
erated at low altitude as a result of rapid
radiation from the roofs of houses; thus in
a narrow street lined with buildings of equal
height, an inversion layer may be created
at roof-top level which will persist until
dawn.
241. Fog is more frequent over towns than
over open country (+30 per cent in summer
and +100 per cent in winter). The process
of fog formation is accelerated by the parti-
cles, dust and smoke which form a dome
over the town. At night these particles act
as nuclei around which the fog oondenses,
the fog contributing in its turn to the re-
tention of the particles in the dome. Fog
will obviously have the same concentrating
effect on particles originating in toxic clouds.
242. One final point which should be noted
is that toxic aerosols and Vapours may take
some time to penetrate enolbised spaces. Once
they have done so, they niWy continue as a
hazard for very long unless adequate ventila-
tion is provided.
3. Effect of Wind and Topography
243. The wind carries and apreads the toxic
or infectious cloud, which is simultaneously
diluted by turbulence. The distance which
the cloud travels before its concentration has
fallen to a level below which it is no longer
harmful depends on the velocity of the wind
and the state of the atmciaphere. Since to-
pography also produces changes in the nor-
mal wind pattern, it too plays an important
part in determining the direction of travel
of toxic clouds, sometimes focusing their ef-
fects in individual areas. Local winds may
also be established as a result of differences
In the heat absorbed by, and radiated from,
different ground surfaces.
244. These local, surface winds, which af-
fect the air layer nearest the ground up to
300 metres, are frequent and widespreati in
mountain ranges and near sea coasts. There
are slope breezes, valley breezes, sea breezes
and land breezes; and they could shift a toxic
cloud in directions which cann.ot be pre-
dicted from a study of the general meteo-
rology of the area. The breezes develop ac-
cording to a regular cycles Luring the day,
under the influence of solar-radiation, the air
moves up the valleys and slopes, and moves
from the see, towards the land; at night these
currents are reversed. In temperate climates
land and sea breezes are predominant during
the summer; but they are masked by the
general wind pattern during the other sea-
sons of the year. They are predominant in
subtropical and tropical regions through-
out the year.
4. Example of Combined Effects of Wind and
the State of the Atmosphere on a Cloud
245. There is some similarity between the
evolution of toxic blonds Which could be
produced by chemical and bacteriological
(biological) attacks and that of clouds con-
taining industrial pollutants, so much so
that the mathematical models developed for
forecasting atmospheric pollution can be ap-
plied, with a few modifications, to toxic
clouds. But the initial characteristics of the
two are as a rule different. Characteristic
features of chemical or bacteriological (bio-
logical) attacks are the multiplicity and high
yield of the sources of emission and their very
short emission time, all of which are factors
making for a greater initial concentration
in the cloud than the concEntration of pol-
lutants in industrial clouds.
246. Figure 4 indicates the order of magni-
tude of these phenomena, and demonstrates
the schematic form, and for different at-
mospheric conditions, the size of area which
would be covered by toxic clouds originat-
ing from a chemical attack using Sarin, with
an intensity arbitrarily chosen at 500 kg/km.
It shows that the theoretical distance of
travel by the cloud, determined for bare and
unobstructed ground, may exceed 100 km.
In practice the atmosphere must remain
stable for more than ten hours in order
to enable the cloud to travel such distances,
a condition which, although certainly not ex-
ceptional, is fairly uncommon. (Figure 4 not
printed.)
247. This figure illustrates the effect of
atmospheric conditions on the distance a
toxic cloud can be carried by the wind.
248. The example chosen is that of a
medium-intensity (500 kg) attack with
Sarin on a circular objective 1 km in diam-
eter. The wind velocity is 7 km/h.
249. Each of the lines represents a con-
tour of the hazard zone, i.e. the zone in
which any unprotected person would be ex-
posed to the effects of the agent.
250. Under highly unstable conditions (for
example, on a very sunny day), this hazard
zone is no greater than the area of objective
aimed at (the circle at the left end of the
figure). On the other hand, in any other
situation?(1) slightly unstable, (2) neutral,
(3) slightly stable, (4) moderately stable or
(5) highly stable?the distance traveled will
be greater, and it may extend almost 100 km
if conditions remain highly stable for a suf-
ficiently long time. It must be noted, how-
ever, that the distance of 100 km could be
reached only if a very marked inversion
persisted for about fourteen hours (100+7) ;
such a situation is quite rare.
251. Corresponding evaluations cannot be
made for an urban area, since the parameters
Involved are too numerous and too little
understood. But it may be presumed that
most of the characteristics of the urban
micro-climate would tend to increase the
persistence of chemical clouds. This is seri-
ous cause for concern, when it is remembered
that in highly industrialized countries 50 to
90 per cent of the population live in urban
areas
252. To sum up, a stable or neutral atmos-
phere in equilibrium might cause a toxic
cloud produced by a chemical or bacterio-
logical (biological) attack to persist for hours
after it had exercised its military effect,
which could generally be expected to mate-
rialize in the first few minutes following the
attack. These conditions could obtain not
only at night, but also during long winter
periods over vast continental expanses. If a
neutral atmosphere in equilibrium were as-
sociated with a light wind irregular in direc-
tion, then the area affected could be rela-
tively large, and, assuming an adequately
heavy initial attack, the concentrations
Would be high.
5. Special Features of Bacteriological
(Biological) Aerosols
253. So far as physical phenomena are
concerned (horizontal and vertical move-
ments, sedimentation, dilution, etc.), bacter-
iological (biological) aerosols would be
generally affected in the same way as chem-
ical clouds of aerosol and vapour, but not
necessarily to the same extent. But since
the effective minimum does for bacteriologi-
cal (biological) agents are considerably
smaller than for chemical agents, bacterio-
logical (biological) aerosols would be ex-
pected to remain effective even in a very
dilute state and, consequently, that they
could contaminate much larger areas than
could chemical clouds. An example is given
In chapter II.
254. There would be no limit to the hori-
zontal transport of micro-organisms, if there
were none to the capacity of the organisms
to survive in the atmosphere. Thus if the
microbial aerosol particles were so small that
their speed of fall remained close to the
speed of the vertical air movements in the
frictional layer (under average conditions
this is on the order of 10 cm/s), the agents,
whether alive or dead, would remain sus-
pended and travel very considerable dis-
tances. Even if bacteriological (biological)
clouds were to move only in the air layer
nearest the ground, they could cover very
large areas. For example, in one experiment
600 litres of Bacillus globigii (a harmless
spore-forming bacterium which is highly re-
sistant to aerosolization and environmental
stresses) were released off shore; bacteria
were found more than 30 km inland. Organ-
isms were found over 250 kin, which was
the entire area within which there were
monitoring stations during the trial. The ac-
tual area covered was much more extensive.
255. On the other hand, most pathogenic
agents are highly vulnerable when outside
the organism in which they normally repro-
duce, and are liable to biological inactiva-
tion, which is sometimes rapid, in the aerosol
state. This inactivation process is governed
by several factors (such as temperature,
humidity, solar radiation, etc.) which are
now the subject of aerobiological research.
256. The size of the infective particles in
a bacteriological (biological) aerosol is
highly significant to their ability to initiate
disease as a result of inhalation. It has been
established that the terminal parts of the
respiratory tract are the most susceptible
sites for infection by inhalation. As with
chemical agents, the penetration and reten-
tion of inhaled bacteriological (biological)
particles in the lungs is very dependent on
particle size, which is primarily determined
by the composition of the basic material
and the procedure of aerosolization, as
pointed out in chapter I.
257. The influence of particle size of aero-
sol infectivity is illustrated in table 1, which
shows that there is a direct relationship be-
tween the LD5, and particle diameter of an
aerosol of Franciscella tularensis.
TABLE 1.?NUMBERS OF BACTERIA OF FRAN-
CISCELLA TilLARENSIS REQUIRED TO
KILL 50 PERCENT OF EXPOSED ANIMALS
? ?
Numbers of bacterial
cells LDg,
Diameter of particles Guinea Rhesus
(microns) pigs monkeys
3 17
7 6,500 240
12 20,000 540
22 170, 000 3,000
C. Influence of atmospheric factors on
chemical agents
1. Influence of Temperature
258. An attack with a liquid chemical
agent, as already pointed out, would be as
a rule result. in the formation of a cloud of
small droplets, aerosol and vapour in vary-
ing proportions, as well as in ground con-
tamination, all of which would be affected
by air temperature.
259. Influence on. droplet and aerosol
clouds: Only particles having dimensions
within certain limits penetrate and are re-
tained by the lungs. The larger ones are
trapped in the upper part of the respiratory
tract (e.g. nose and trachea), whereas the
smaller ones are exhaled. Penetration and
retention have maximum values in the sive
range of 0.5 to 3 microns.
260. Liquid chemical agents exercise their
effects both by penetrating the skin and by
inhalation. The material absorbed by the
lungs acts immediately, whereas there is a
delay before the effects become manifest
from an agent absorbed through the skin or
the mucous membrane of the upper air pas-
sages.
261. A high temperature favours the evap-
oration of particles which will decrease in
size and thus reach the lungs, contributing
to the immediate effect; an additional quan-
tity of vapour is produced which contributes
to the same effect.
262. Effect on ground contamination: The
temperature of the air, and even more that
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of the ground, have a marked effect on the
way ground contamination develops and
persists. The temperature of the ground,
which depends on the thermal characteris-
tics of its constituent materials and on the
degree of its exposure to the sun, either in-
creases or reduces evaporation, and conse-
quently decreases or increases the duration
of contamination. The surface temperature
Is extremely variable from point to point,
depending on the type and colour of the
soil; a temperature difference of 20? has
been noted between the asphalt surface of
a road and the surrounding fields. The tem-
perature gradient also varies during the
course of the day; in clear weather the dif-
ferences may range from 15 to 30? C. in a
temperate climate, and up to 50? C. in a
desert climate. High temperatures of both
air and ground favour the rate of evapora-
tion, thus reducing the persistence of sur-
face contamination; wind, because of the
mechanical and thermal turbulence it
creates, has a similar effect.
263. To illustrate the effect of these vari-
able factors, it is worth noting that the con-
tamination of bare ground by unpurifled
mustard, at a mean rate of 30 g/m2, will
persist for several days or even weeks at
temperatures below 10? C at medium wind
velocities, whereas it lasts for only a day and
a half at 25? C. Furthermore, because of ac-
celerated evaporation at high temperatures,
the cloud produced is more concentrated, and
the danger of vapour inhalation in, and
downwind of, the contaminated area becomes
greater.
2. Influence of Humidity
264. In contrast to high temperature, high
relative humidity may lead to the enlarge-
ment of aerosol particles owing to the con-
densation of water vapour around the nuclei
which they constitute. The quantity of in-
halable aerosol would thus diminish, with a
consequent reduction in the immediate ef-
fects of the attack.
265. On the other hand, a combination of
high temperature and high relative humidity
causes the human body to perspire pro-
fusely. This intensifies the action of mustard-
type vesicants, and also accelerates the trans-
fer through the skin of percutaneous nerve
agents.
3. Influence of Atmospheric Precipitation
266, Light rain disperses and spreads the
chemical agent which thus presents a larger
surface for evaporation, and its rate of evap-
oration rises. Conversely a heavy rain dilutes
and displaces the contaminating product,
facilitates its penetration into the ground,
and may also accelerate the destruction of
certain water-sensitive compounds (e.g.
lewisite, a powerful blistering agent).
267. Snow increases the persistence of con-
tamination by slowing down the evaporation
of liquid contaminants. In the particular
case of mustard gas, the compound is con-
verted into a pasty mass which may persist
until the snow melts.
268. Soil humidity, atmospheric precipita-
tion and temperature also exercise a powerful
influence on the activity of herbicides, which
are much more effective at higher humidities
and temperatures, than in dry weather and
at low temperatures. This applies equally to
preparations applied to plants and to those
introduced into the soil.
4. Influence of Wind
269. As vapors emanating from ground
contaminated by liquid chemical agents be-
gin to rise, the wind comes into play. The
distance the vaport will be carried depends
on the wind velocity and the evaporation
rate of the chemical, which will itself change
with variations in ground and air tempera-
tures. The distance is maximal (several kilometres) when there is a combination of
the conditions promoting evaporation (high
soil temperature) persistence of the cloud
(stable atmosphere) and dispersal of the
cloud (gentle winds). These conditions exist
in combination at the end of a sunny day, at
the time when a temperature inversion
exists.
5. Influence of Soil?Dependent Factors
270. Nature of the soil. The soil itself,
through its texture and the porosity of its
constituent materials, plays an important
role in. the persistence of liquid chemical
contaminants, which may penetrate to a
greater or lesser extent, or remain on the
surface. In the former case the risk of con-
tamination by contact is reduced in the
short term, but persistence will be increased
to the extent that factors favourable to
evaporation (temperature, wind) are pre-
vented from acting. In the latter case, when
the contaminant remains on the surface, the
danger of contact contamination remains
considerable, but persistence is reduced. Thus
persistence in sandy soils may be three times
as long as in clay.
271. Vegetation. Vegetation prevents a
liquid contaminant from reaching the soil
and also breaks it up, thus encouraging
evaporation. But at the same time the short-
term danger is enhanced because of the
widespread dispersibn of the contaminant
on foliage, and the consequently increased
risk of contact contamination.
272. The canopy of foliage in dense forests
(e.g., conifers, tropical jungle), traps and
holds a considerable portion of a dispersed
chemical agent, but the fraction which none
the less reaches the soil remains there for a
long time, since the atmospheric factors in-
volved in the process of evaporation (tem-
perature, wind, over the soil, turbulence)
are hardly significant in such an environ-
ment as compared with open spaces.
273. Too little is known about the absorp-
tion and retention of toxic substances by
plants to make it possible to assess the re-
sulting danger to the living creatures whose
food supply they may constitute. Like cer-
tain organic pesticides, it is probable that
other toxic chemicals may penetrate into
plant systems via the leaves and roots. Cases
could then arise where all trace of contami-
nant had disappeared from the soil but with
the toxic substance presisting in vegetation,
274. Urban areas. It can also be assumed
that, in spite of a surface temperature which
is on the average higher, contaminants might
persist longer in built-up areas than over
open ground. There are two reasons for this.
Structural, finishing and other building ma-
terials are frequently porous, and by absorb-
ing and retaining liquid chemical agents
more readily, they increase the duration of
contamination. Equally the factors which, in
open country, tend to reduce persistence
(sunshine, wind over ground) play a less
important part in a built-up city.
275. Climate, in general, may exercise an
Indirect influence on the effect of percutane-
ous chemical agents, simply because of the
fact that in hot climates the lightly clad
inhabitants are very vulnerable to attacks
through the skin.
276. The predominating influence of cli-
matic factors and terrain on the persistence
of contamination Indicates that the a priori
classification of chemical agents as persistent
or non-persistent, solely on the basis of dif-
ferent degrees of volatility, is somewhat ar-
bitrary since, depending on circumstances,
the same material might persist for periods
ranging from a few hours to several weeks,
or even months.
D. Influence of atmospheric factors on bac-
teriological (biological) agents
277. Infectious agents, when used to infect
by way of food and water, or by means of
animal vectors are, of course, hardly subject
to the influence of climatic factors. But any
large-scale attack by bacteriological (bio-
logical) agents would probably be carried
S 9543
out by aerosols, in which the agents would
be more susceptible to environmental influ-
ences than chemical agents.
278. Physioo-chemical atanospheric factors
have a destructive effect on aerosol-borne
micro-organisms. Their viability decreases
gradually over a period of hours or days at a
progressively diminishing rate. Some decay
very rapidly: for example, certain bio-aerosols
used for pest control in temperate climates,
and dispersed under average conditions in the
cold and transitional seasons, show a rate of
decay of 5 per cent per minute.
279. This apparent vulnerability of micro-
organism in aerosols might cast some doubt
on the possible effectiveness of bacteriological
(biological) attacks. However there are var-
ious means by which the rate of decay in the
aerosol can be considerably reduced. For ex-
ample: the use of very high concentrations
of agent; the use of suitably "modeled" path-
ogenic strains; or the protection of aerosol
particles by encapsulating them in certain
organic compounds.
280. These procedures, which prolong the
survival of micro-organisms in air, could pre-
sumably also be applied to potential agents
of bacteriological (biological) warfare. Means
are also available for prolonging the survival
of micro-organisms in water, soil, etc.
1. Influence of Temperature
281. The effect of temperature on the sur-
vival of micro-organisms in bacteriological
(biological) aerosols is not highly significant
in the temperature ranges generally encoun-
tered. As a general rule, aerosol-borne bio-
logical agents will be destroyed more rapidly
the more the temperature rises. On the other
hand, in some circumstances high tempera-
tures may act on bacteriological (biological)
aerosols in the same way as on chemical aero-
sols, that is to say, particle size will be di-
minished by evaporation, and thus their rate
of entry into the lungs will be enhanced.
2. Influence of Humidity
282. Relative humidity is the most impor-
tant of the atmospheric conditions which af-
fect the rate of decrease of viability of micro-
organisms in the air. The extent of its effect
varies with different micro-organisms, with
the nature of the suspending fluid from
which the aerosol is disseminated, with the
manner of its dissemination (as a spray or as
a dry powder). As a general rule, the rate of
inactivation is greater at lower relative hu-
midity although with some organisms maxi-
mum inactivation occurs in the middle range
of relative humidity (30-70 per cent). The
rate of inactivation will, however, tend to
decrease with time, and may become ex-
tremely low when a state of equilibrium (sta-
bilization) between the particles and their
environment has been established. This im-
plies that irrespective of relative humidity
values, the final infective concentration of a
stabilized aerosol may still be above the
threshold minimum dose for infection by in-
halation. Even SO, microbial survival in a
stabilized aerosol may be further reduced by
sudden variations in atmospheric humidity.
283. The effectiveness of aerosol-borne
bacteriological (biological) agents depends
not only on their capacity to survive in the
air. Also important is their low rate of sedi-
mentation, combined with the capacity of
the micro-organisms to spread and penetrate
into buildings, so contaminating surfaces
and materials indoors as well as outdoors.
The possibility that some infective agents
can survive for a long time in such condi-
tions, and the fact that environmental duet
particles may exercise a protective influence
on organisms have been demonstrated on
many occasions. Studies made in hospitals
have shown that surviving micro-organisms
can be dispersed from sites which have come
to be called "secondary reservoirs", and that
they may become sources of new infections,
carried either through the air or by contact.
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3. Influence of Solar Radiation
284. The ultra-violet part of the solar
spectrum has a powerful germicidal effect.
Bacterial spores are much less sensitive to
this radiation than are -either viruses or
vegetative bacteria, and fungal spores are
even less sensitive than baoterial spores. The
destructive effect of solar radiation on micro-
organisms is reduced whensrelative humidity
is high (over 70 per cent). Air pollution
including a high proportign of atmospheric
dust, also provides some erotection.
285. Ultra-violet light exercises its destruc-
tive effects on micro-orgastisms through the
structural degradation of Vie nucleic acids
which carry the genetic Informations Most
research on this subject hale been carried out
on microbes in liquid suspeissions, but the
results of studies of aerosOl-borne microbes
seem to lead to similar conclusions.
286. The germicidal effeeit of ultra-violet
radiation has been known foe a long time and
used in combating airborAe infections in
schools, military builclinge and hospitals.
The problem of proper radiation dosage, and
proper techniques, owever, still remain to
be salved.
287. The lethal effect of sainlight on micro-
organisms is less marked, although still ap-
parent, in diffuse light. This is why a bac-
teriological (biological) attack, if one ever
materialized, would be more probably under-
taken in darkness:
4. Influence of Atmospheric Precipitatidn
288. Rain and snow have relatively little
effect on bacteriological (biological) aerosols.
5. Influence of the Chemical Composition
of the Atmosphere
289. Little is known about the influence on
the viability of mirco-organienis of the chem-
ical compounds present in the atmosphere.
Oxygen promotes the inactivation of aerosol-
borne agents, particularly in conditions of
low humidity, and recent studies have also
demonstrated that an unstable bactericidal
factor (formed by combination between
ozone and gaseous combustion products of
petroleum) is present in the air, particularly
downwind of heavily populated areas.
6. General Effects of climate
290. Climate may also have a general and
considerable influence on the development of
epidemics and epizootics, in so far as the pro-
liferation of vectors which spread disease
may be encouraged, given the right condi-
tions. This is indicated by the way myxoma-
tosis developed in Australia. Although several
attempts in 1927, and then from 1936 to 1943,
to impart the disease to Australian rabbits
failed, the epizootic spread rapidly from 1950
onwards, apparently for the sole reason that
the summer, which was particularly rainy
that year, was associated with an exceptional
proliferation in the flooded Murray River
valley of the mosquitoes which carry the
disease.
291. Atmospheric humidity and tempera-
ture also have a strong influence on micro-
organisms acting upon vegetation.
CHAPTER IV. POSSIBLE Loisc-resier EFFECTS OF
CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGIdAI, (BIOLOGICAL)
WARFARE ON HUMAN HEALTH AND ECOLOGY
A. Introduction.
292. So far this report has dealt essentially
with the potential short-torm effects of
chemical and bacteriological (biological) war-
fare. The possible long-term effects of the
agents concerned need to be considered
against the background of thetrends whereby
man's environment is being constantly modi-
fied, as it becomes transformed to meet his
ever-increasing needs. Some Of the changes
that have occurred have been unwittingly
adverse. The destruction of forests has
created deserts, while grasslands have been
destroyed by over-grazing. The air we breathe
and our rivers become polluted, and chemical
pesticides, despite the good they do, also
threaten with undesirable secondary effects
The long-term impact of possible chemical
and bacteriological (biological) warier
clearly needs to be considered within an
adequate ecological framework.
293. Ecology may be defined as the study
of the interrelationships of organisms on
the one hand and of their interactions with
the physical environment in which they are
*found an the other. The whole complex of
plants and animals within a specific type
of environment?a forest, a marsh, a savan-
nah?forms a community comprising all the
plant life and all the living creatures?from
the microorganisms and worms in the soil, to
the insects, birds and mammals above the
ground?within that environment, and the
understanding of their interrelationships also
necessitates a knowledge of the physical
characteristics of the environment which
bear on the living complex. Ecological com-
munities are normally in dynamic equilib-
rium, which is regulated by the interaction of
population density, available food, natural
epidemics, seasonal changes and the compe-
tition of species for food and space.
294. Man has his special ecological prob-
lems. His numbers are multiplying fast, and
increasing population requires commensurate
increases in food production. The production
and distribution of adequate food for the
population which is predicted for the latter
part of this century, and which will go on
increasing through the next, will allow no
relaxation in the effort which has already
proved so successful. Food production has
increased phenomenally in the past fifty
years, primarily because of (1) improved agri-
cultural practices, and particularly because
of a marked increase in the use of chemical
fertilizers and pesticides; (2) the develop-
ment of genetically improved plants, herbs
and flocks; and (3) increased industrializa-
tion of food-producing processes. There is
hope that steps such as these will continue to
bear fruit.
295. But while the use of fertilizers, herbi-
cides and pesticides has brought about a
massive increase in food production, it has
a.sio added to the pollution of soil and water,
and as a result has altered our ecological
environment in an enduring way. So too
have other features of our industrial civili-
zation. The motor car has been a very potent
factor in increasing air pollution in towns
and cities. The increasing population of the
world creates unprecedented wastes, and the
methods used to dispose of it?burying it,
burning it, or discharging it into streams
or lakes?have further polluted the environ-
ment. The remarkable development of syn-
thetic and plastic materials in recent years
has also added a new factor to the short-
and long-term biological effects on man.
Every new advance on our technological civ-
ization helps to transform the ecological
framework within Which we evolved. From
this point of view the existence and possible
use of chemicals and bactriological (biologi-
cal) agent in warfare have to be regarded
as an additional threat, and as a threat
which might have enduring consequences, to
our already changing environment.
B. Consequences to man of upsetting the
ecological equilibrium
. tilizers and more productive hybrid seeds
came widespread, the increase was eleven
e quintals. This is characteristic of What has
happened everywhere where fertilizers have
been used on a large scale.
297. The beneficial effect of the use of
modern chemical pesticides also does not
need spelling out. It is estimated that the
present annual world loss in production due
to weeds and parasites is still approximately
460 million quintals of wheat and 360 mil-
lion quintals of maize, and that to eliminate
this waste will mean the use of even more
pesticides than are now being consumed,
298. What has to be realized about modern
agricultural practices is that without them
the increases in the output of food which the
world needs could never be achieved. Unless
production mounts everywhere, those who
have not yet cast off the burdens of living in
a primitive agricultural world will never
reach the level of civilization to which all
aspire.
299. But, as already indicated, the grew'
increase in the use of fertilizers, pesticides
and herbicides does have deleterious side
effects. For example, in Switzerland, sur-
face waters and springs have been contam-
inated in times of high rainfall by excessive
amounts of fertilizers corresponding to 0,3-
0.5 kg of phosphorous and 45 kg of nitro-
gen per hectare per year. This kind of thing
occurs elsewhere as well, and it cannot but
help transform -for all we know adversely..
theenvironment in which living matter in-
cluding fish otherwise thrive.
300. The dangers of the side effects of
modern pesticides are also beginning to be
appreciated, and are already beginning to
be guarded against in advanced countries.
Except in high dosage, these substances act
only on lower organisms, although some
organophosphorous compounds are toxic to
man and other vertebrates. Less selective
agents may be toxic to soil bacteria, plank-
ton, snails and fish. Chlorinated hydrocar-
bons, such as DDT, are toxic only in un-
usually high dosages, but accumulate in
fat, and deposit in the liver and the central
nervous system. Following surface applica-
tion, pesticides enter the soil and seep into
underground waters; or become washed by
rain into rivers, lakes and reservoirs. It is
theoretically possible that in some situa-
tions, in which non-selective chemical pesti-
cides are used, disruption of the ecological
equilibrium could lead to the long-term sup-
pression of useful animals and plants. These
are dangers which only constant vigilance
will avert.
301. Detergents are another modern chem-
ical development whose use has had to be
regulated, since they have a direct short-
term effect on certain types of natural food
such as daphniae and the algae which are
eaten by fish. The first detergents which
came on the market led to enormous quanti-
ties of foam on river, and this in turn re-
duced the supply of oxygen for organisms
living in the water. They also damage the
earth by affecting soil bacteria. Such de-
tergents, which resist destruction even by
the most modern water treatment Methods,
have all but disappeared from use and have
been replaced by others, which can be al-
most completely destroyed by waste water
treatment.
302. In the context of the possible long-
term effects of chemical and bacteriological
(biological) weapons, we have finally to note
that towns and cities are growing all over
the world, and that in the developed coun-
tries, conurbations (fusion a cities with
loss of suburbs) have reached population
levels approaching 50 million. Such great
concentrations of people require very com-
plicated arrangements for supply of food,
water and other materials, transport and
general administration. The use of chemical
or bacteriological (biological) weapons
against cities would undoubtedly have an ex-
296. The chemical industry doubled its
output between 1953 and 1960 and it is still
growing fast but the useful results of its
continued development are none the less of
the utmost importance to man's future. The
good effects on food production of the use of
artificial fertilizers alone far outweigh any
secondary deleterious consequences of their
use. The facts are too well known to need
spelling out. It is enough to point out, as one
example, that maize production in the United
States increased between 1923 and 1953, a
thirty-year period, by barely four quintals
per hectare, but that in the ten years be-
tween 1953 and 1964, when the use of fer-
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ceptionally severe disorganizing effect, and
the full re-establishment of the services
necessary for health, efficient government,
and the smooth operation of industry might
take a very long time,
C. Possible long-term effects of chemical and
bacteriological (biological) means of war-
fare on man and his environment
303. Chemical weapons, in addition to their
highly toxic short-term effects, may also
have a long-term effect on the environment
in which they are disseminated. If used in
very high- concentration they might cause
damage by polluting the air, by pointing the
water supplies and by poisoning the soil.
304. Bacteriological (biological) weapons
could be directed against man's sources of
food through the spread of peraistent plant
diseases or of infectious animal diseases.
There is also the possibility that new epi-
demic diseases could be introduced, or old
ones reintroduced, which could result in
deaths on the scale which characterized the
medieval plagues.
1. Chemical Weapons
305. There is no evidence that the chemical
agents used in World War I?chlorine, mus-
tard, phosgene, and tear-gas?had any un-
toward ecological consequences. As already
observed, over 120,000 tons of these agents
were used during that war, and in some areas
which were attacked, concentrations must
have added up to hundreds of kilograms per
hectare. Theae regions have long since re-
turned to normal and fully productive use.
306. The organophosphorous, or nerve,
agents have never been used in war, and no
corresponding experience is available to help
form a judgment about their possible long-
term effects. But since these agents are toxic
to all forms of animal life, it is to be expected
that if high concentrations were dissemi-
nated over large areas, and if certain species
were virtually exterminated, the dynamic
ecological equilibrium of the region might
be changed.
307. On the other hand there is no evi-
dence to suggest that nerve agents affect
food chains in the way DDT and other pesti-
cides of the chlorinated hydrocarbon type do.
They hydrolyze in water, some of them
slowly, so there could be no long-term con-
tamination of natural or artificial bodies of
water.
308. The use of herbicides during the
course of the Viet-Nam conflict has been re-
ported extensively in news media, and to a
lesaer extent in technical publications. The
materials which have been used are 2,4-
dichlorophenoxyacetic acid, 2,4,5-trichloro-
phenoxyacetic acid, eacodylic acid and
picloram.
309. Between 1963 and 1968 these herbicides
were used to clear forested areas for mili-
tary purposes over some 9,100 km2. This may
be divided by forest type as shown in the
following table.
TABLE 1.?TYPE OF FOREST AND EXTENT AND AREA
TREATED WITH HERBICIDES IN SOUTH VIETNAM, 1963-68
Type of forest
Extent Area treated
kilometers 2 kilometers 2
Open forest (sem ideciduous)___
Mangrove and other aquatic__
Coniferous
50, 150
4, 800
1,250
8, 140
960
0
Total 56, 200 9,100
310. South Viet-Nani is about 172,000 km2
in area, of which about one-third is forested.
The area treated with herbicides up to the
end of 1968 thus amounts to abput 16 per
cent of the forested area, or a little over 6
per cent of the total.
311. There is as yet no scientific evalua-
tion of the extent of the long-term ecological
changes resulting .fram these attacks. One
estimate is that some mangrove forests may
need twenty years to regenerate, and fears
have been expressed about the future of the
animal population they contain. Certain
species of bird are known to have migrated
from areas that have been attacked. On the
other hand, there has been no decline in
fish catches, and as fish are well up in the
food chain, no serious damage would seem
to have been done to the aquatic environ-
ment.
312. When a forest in a state of ecological
equilibrium is destroyed by cutting, secon-
dary forest regenerates, which contains fewer
species of plants and animals than were
there originally, but larger numbers of those
species which survive. If secondary forest is
replaced by grassland, these changes are even
more mraked. If one or more of the animal
species which increases in number is the host
of an infection dangerous to man (a zoon-
oats) , then the risk of human infection is
greatly increased. This is exemplified by the
history of scrub typhus in South-East Asia,
where the species of rat which maintains the
Infection and the vector mite are much more
numerous in secondary forest, and even more
no in grassland, 50 increasing the risk of
the disease being transmitted to people as
forest is cleared.
313. In high rainfall areas, deforestation
may also lead to serious erosion, and so to
considerable agricultural losses. Deserts have
been created in this way.
2. Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons
Against man
314. New natural foci, in which infection
may persist for many years, may be estab-
lished after an arosol or other type of bac-
teriological (biological) attack. This possible
danger can be appreciated when one recalls
the epidemiological consequences of the acci-
dent introduction of rabies and other veter-
inary infections (blue-tongue, African swine
fever) into a number of countries. The spred
of rabies in Europe following World IT, as a
consequence of the disorganization caused by
the war, shows how an epidemiologically
complicated and medically dangerous situa-
tion can emerge even with an infection which
had long been successfully controlled, In
1945 there were only three major foci of
infection in Czchoslovakia. In the following
years, foxes multiplied excessively because
farms were left unworked, because of the
increased number of many kinds of wild
creatures, and also because of the dis-
continuation of systematic control. Foxes
also came in from across frontiers,
and the epizootic gradually worsened. In the
period 1952/1966 a total of 888 foci were re-
ported, 197 new ones in 1965 alone. Bringing
the situation under control demand extra-
ordinary and prolonged efforts by the health
service: in 1966 alone, 775,000 domestic ani-
mals were vaccinated in affected areas of the
country. Non the less, the disease has not
yet been stamped out. Natural foci cannot be
eliminated without organized and long-term
International co-operation.
315. Arthropods (insects, ticks) also play
an important part, along with other crea-
tures, in the maintenance of pathogenic
agents in natural foci. A man exposed to a
natural focus risks infection, particularly
from arthropods, which feed on more than
one species of host. A bacteriological (bio-
logical) attack might lead to the creation of
multiple and densely distributed foci of in-
fection from which, if ecological conditions
were favourable, natural foci might develop
in regions where they had previously never
existed, or in areas from which they had been
eliminated by effective public health meas-
ures. ?
316. On the other hand, the large-scale use
of bacterological (biological) weapons might
reduce populations of suscepitibIe wild spec-
ies below the level at which they could
continue to exist. The elimination of a species
or group of species from an area would create
in the ecological community an empty niche
S 9545
which might seriously disturb its equili-
brium, or which might be filled by another
species more dangerous to man because it
carried a zoonosls infection acquired either
'naturally or as a result of the attack. This
would result in the establishment of a new
natural focus of disease.
317. The gravity of these risks would de-
pend on the extent to which the community
of species in the country attacked contained
animals which were not only susceptible to
the infection, but were living in so close a
relationship to each other that the infection
could become established. For example, not
all mosquito species can be infected with
yellow fever virus, and if the disease is to
become established, those which can become
vectors must feed frequently on mammals,
such as monkeys, which are also sufficiently
susceptible to the infection. A natural focus
of yellow fever is therefore very unlikely to
become established in any area lacking an
adequate population of suitable mosquitos
and monkeys.
318. Endemics or enzootics of diseases (i.e.
infections spreading at a low rate, but in-
definitely, in a human or animal population)
could conceivably follow a large-scale at-
tack, or might be started by a small-scale
sabotage attack, for which purpose the
range of possible agents would be much
wider, and might even Include such chronic
infections as malaria.
319. Malaria is a serious epidemic disease
In a susceptible population, but it is difficult
to envisage its possible employment as a
bacteriological (biological) weapon, because
of the complex life cycle of the parasite.
Drug-resistant strains of malaria exist in,
for example, areas of Asia and South Amer-
ica, and their possible extension to areas
where mosquitos capable of transmitting
the disease already exist, would greatly com-
plicate public health measures, and cause
a more serious disease problem because of
the difficulties of treatment.
320, Yellow fever is still enzootic in the
tropical regions of Africa and America.
Monkeys and other forest-dwelling primates,
together with mosquitos which transmit the
virus, constitute natural foci and ensure
survival of the virus between epidemics.
321, Importation of this disease is possible
wherever a suitable environment and sus-
ceptible animal and mosquito hosts exist.
This occurred naturally in 1960 when a pre-
viously uninfested area of Ethiopia was in-
vaded by yellow fever and an epidemic re-
sulted in about 15,000 deaths. Because of the
inaccessibility of the area, some 8,000-9,000
people had died before the epidemic was
recognized. The epidemic was extinguished
but it is likely that a permanent focus of
yellow fever infection has been established
in this area, previosuly free of the disease.
It might be extremely serious if the virus
were introduced into Asia or the Pacific Is-
lands where the disease appears never to
have occurred, but where local species of
mosquito are crown to be able to transmit
it. Serious problems could, also arise if the
virus were Introduced into the area of the
United States where vector mosquitos still
exist, and where millions of people live in
an area of a few square kilometers.
322. Another consideration is the possible
Introduction of a new species of animal to
an area to cause either *long-term disease
or economic problems. For example, mon-
gooses were introduced many years -ago to
some Caribbean islands, and in one at least
they have become a serious economic pest of
the sugar crop, and an important cause of
rabies. The very large economic effect on the
introduction of rabbits to Australia is well
known. Certain mosquito species (a yellow
fever mosquto, Aedes aegypti, and a malaria
mosquito, Anopheles gambiae) have natu-
rally spread to many areas of the world from
their original home in Africa, and have been
responsible for serious disease problems in
the areas that have been invaded. It is con-
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S 9546 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE August 11, 1969
ceivable that in the war the introduction of
such insects on a small (ital.? might be tried
for offensive purposes.
323. In addition to the development of
new natural foci, another long-term hazard,
but one which is very much more speculative
than some of the possibilities mentioned
above, is that of the establishment of new
strains of organisms of altered immunolo-
gical characteristics or increased virulence.
This might occur if large numbers of people
or other susceptible animal species became
infected in an area through a bacteriological
(biological) attack, thus providing oppor-
tunities for new organisms to arise naturally.
The appearance from time 1.0 time of immu-
nologically different forms of influenza shows
the type of thing which might happen. Such
altered forms of agents might cause More
severe and perhaps more widespread epi-
demics than the original attack.
Against domestic animals
324. Foot-and-mouth disease is a highly
Infectious but largely nen-fatal disease of
cattle, swine and other cloven-footed animals
It is rarely transmitted front a diseased ani-
mal to man, and when it is, the order is a
trivial one.
325. The milk yield of diseased cows de-
creases sharply and does not reach its normal
yield even after complete recovery. Losses
range from 9 to 30 per cent of milk yield. In
swine, loss from foot-and-mouth are esti-
mated at 60-80 per cent among suckling pigs.
Foot-and-mouth is endemic in many coun-
tries and breaks out frouCtime to time even
In countries which are normally free of the
disease. Some countries let it run its course
without taking any steps to control it; others
try to control it by the use of vaccines; and
some pursue a slaughter policy in which all
affected animals and contacts are killed.
326. It is obvious that a large epizootic
could constitute a very serious economic bur-
den, for example, by bringing about a serious
reduction in the supply of milk. It is in this
context that foot-and-mouth disease could
conceivably serve as a bacteriological (bio-
logical) weapon, especially since war condi-
tions would greatly promote its spread. Effi-
cient prevention is possible through active
immunization, but the immunity is rather
short-lived and annual vaccination is re-
quired.
327. Bruce/Zosis is an example of chronic
disease which could possibly result from
bacteriological (biological) weapon attacks.
There are three forms known, which attaffic
cattle, swine and goats respectively. Any of
these may be transmitted to man, in whom it
causes a debilitating but rarely fatal disease
lasting for four to six mon he or even longer.
It is enzootic in most countries of the world,
and an increased incidence of the disease re-
sulting from its use as a Weapon could be
dealt with, after the initial blow, In the
same way as is the natural disease. But the
cost of eliminating disease suela as brucellosis
from domestic animals is very high.
328. Anthrax was described in chapter II
and what concerns us here as that if large
quantities of anthrax spores were dis-
seminated in bacteriological (biological)
weapons, thus contaminating the soil of
large regions, danger to domestic animals and
man might persist for a very long time. There
is no known way by which areas could be
rendered safe. The use of large quantities of
anthrax as a weapon might therefore cause
long-term environmental hazards,
Against crops
329. The rust fungus, as already noted, is
one of the most damaging of natural path-
ogens which affects wheat crops. Each rust
pustule produces 20,000 uredospores a day
for two weeks, and there may be more than
100 pustules on a single infected leaf. The
ripe uredospores are easily detached from the
plant even by very weak air currents. The
spores are then carried by the wind over die-
tances of many hundreds of kilometres. It is
estimated that the annual total world loss
of wheat from rust is equivalent to about
43500 million.
330. Weather plays a decisive role in the
epiphytotic spreading of rust. Temperature
influences the incubation period and the
rate of uredospore germination. Germination
and infection occur only when there is a
water-saturated atmosphere for three to four
hours. Thus, epiphytotic spread occurs when
there are heavy dews and when the tem-
perature is between 10? and 30* C. The prin-
cipal means of prevention is to destroy the
pathogen and to breed resistant species.
Recently, ionizing radiation has been em-
ployed to develop resistant strains.
331. The cereal rusts die out during winter
unless some other susceptible plant host,
such as barberry, is present, and therefore
their effect on crops would be limited to a
single season. As they are capable of reducing
man's food reserves considerably, rust spores
could be extremely dangerous and efficient
bacteriological (biological) weapons, especi-
ally if deployed selectively with due regard
to climatic conditions. Artificial spreading
of an epiphytotic would be difficult to recog-
nize and delivery of the pathogen to the
target would be relatively simple.
332. Rust epiphytotics might have a very
serious effect in densely populated develop-
ing countries, where the food supply might
be reduced to such an extent that a human
population already suffering from malnu-
trition might be driven to starvation, which,
depending on the particular circumstances,
might last a long time.
333. Another conceivable biological wea-
pon, although neither a practical nor a
bacteriological one, is the potato beetle.
To use it for this purpose, the beetle would
have to be produced in large numbers, and
Introduced, presumably clandestinely, into
potato growing regions at the correct time
during maturation of the crop. In the course
of spread the beetle first lives in small foci,
which grow and increase until it becomes
established over large territories. The beetle
is capable of astonishing propagation: the
progeny of a single beetle may amount to
about 8,000 million in one-and-a-half years.
334. Since beetles prefer to feed and lay
their eggs in plants suffering from some viral
disease, they and their larvae may help
transmit the virus thereby increasing the
damage they cause. The economic damage
caused by the beetle varies with the season
and the country affected, but it can destroy
up to 80 per cent of the crop. Protection is
difficult because it has not been possible to
breed resistant potato species and the only
means available at present is chemical pro-
tection.
335. Were the beetle ever to be used suc-
cessfully for offensive purposes, it could
clearly help bring about long-term damage
because of the difficulty of control.
3. Genetic and Carcinogenic Changes
336. The possibility also exists that chem-
ical and bacteriological (biological) weapons
might cause genetic changes. Some chemicals
are known to do this. LSD, for example, is
known to cause genetic changes an human
cells. Such genetic changes, whether induced
by chemicals or viruses, might conceivably
have a bearing on the development of cancer.
A significantly increased incidence of cancer
In the respiratory tract (mainly lung) has
been reported recently among workers em-
ployed in the manufacture of mustard gas
during World War IL No increased preva-
lence of cancer has been reported among
mustard gas casualties of World War I al-
though it is doubtful if available records
would reveal it. However, most of these cas-
ualties were exposed for only short periods
to the gas whereas the workers were con-
tinuously exposed to small doges for months
or years.
CHAPTER V. ECONOMIC AND SECURITY IMPLICA-
TIONS OF THE DEVELOPMENT, ACQUISITION AND
POSSIBLE USE OF CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGr-
CAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS AND SYSTEMS OF
THEIR DELIVERY
A. Introduction
337. Previous chapters have revealed the
extent to which developments in chemical
and biological science have magnified the
potential risks associated with the concept of
chemical or bacteriological (biological) war-
fare. These risks derive not only from the
variety of possible agents which might be
used, but also from the variety of their effects.
The doubt that a chemical or bacteriological
(biological) attack could be restricted to a
given area means that casualties could occur
well outside the target zone. Were these
weapons used to blanket large areas and
cities, they would cause massive loss of hu-
man life, affecting non-combatants in the
same way as combatants, and in this respect,
they must clearly be classified as weapons of
mass destruction. The report has also empha-
sized the great problems and cost which
would be entailed in the provision of pro-
tection against chenaical and bacteriological
(biological) warfare. It is the purpose of this
final chapter to explore in greater depth the
economic and security implications of mat-
ters such as these.
B. Production
1. Chemical Weapons
338. It has been estimated that during the
course of the First World War, at a time when
the chemical Industry Was in a relatively
early stage of development, about 180,000
tons of chemical agents were produced, of
which more than 120,000 tons were used in
battle. With the rapid development of the
industry since then, there has been an
enormous growth in the potential capacity to
produce chemical agents.
339. The scale, nature, and cost of any
progamme for producing chemical weapons,
and the time needed to implement it, would
clearly be largely dependent on the scientific,
technical and industrial potential of the
country concerned. It would depend not only
on the nature of the chemical industry itself,
and on the availability of suitably trained
egnineers and: chemists, but also on the level
of development of the chemical engineering
Industry and of the means of automating
chemical processes, especially where the pro-
duction of highly tox