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November 5, 2004
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August 13, 1969
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Approved For Release 2004/11/30 ?CJA-RDP71%)364R000300100001-3 August 13 1.969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENA was gathered as he taxied the ship up to the grand stand. While passengers told re- porters, "We've never been more comfort- able or less wearied," Gloria Swanson chris- tened the plane from New York with another bottle of grape juice. In two days and two nights, 20 people in two airplanes had crossed the continent- 2,343 miles by air and 970 miles by rail. No other scheduled passenger carrier had ever done that before. And so it all began with fanfare, signals flashing across the country and movie stars. A few years later, the diary writer noted, "if we can believe what they are telling us about new planes coming along, some- day another young Lindbergh, flying in a fast jet-propelled or rocket ship will make the trip so fast that he'll get there before he started." And so it may be in the '70s? because of the three-hour difference on the clock, a supersonic transport will arrive in Los Angeles before it leaves New York. RECESS Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Presi- dent, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess, subject to the call of the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. (At 12 o'clock and 29 minutes p.m., the Senate took a recess, subject to the call of the Chair.) (At 12 o'clock and 48 minutes p.m., the Senate reassembled, when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. EAGLETON in the chair.) Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres- ident, I suggest 'the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The bill clerk proceeded to call the S 9965 it I and ordering conceive it as an from Wisconsin planned to debate . changing had already made some other plans imaginary instrument and then moving concerning other matters that I must from that imaginary stage into the re- look into in my home State. alities of the hardware and the putting I called the Senator from Wisconsin together of the pieces and the creation this morning and explained the situation. of a powerful item, like this plane, that We had an understanding that each of will really operate. We have to imagine this crisis over a 6- or 7-year period and the changes that will come about, the competition for the engineering talent and the scientific talent, the competition for various kinds of metals, the competition even in the skilled labor field and all of the things that go over a 6- or 7-year period. That is the time over which this contract has run. I point out in the beginning that I strongly support the items now in the bill and the C-5A. However, I do not approve of the kind of contract that This was first us would proceed when we could. So in view of these other pressing matters, I am going to proceed, and I hope that the Senator from Wisconsin will be here be- fore too long. I believe that he will. Mr. President, the pending amendment concerns what we call the C-5A, which is a new, large cargo-carrying plane. The aircraft carries Army men and cargo as well as for the Air Force. It has just reached the point where we are close to having the production line product roll out, ready for use. Mr. President, earlier in life one of my favorite teachers?one that I have re- membered all of these years, not only for what she was, but also for many things that she said?laid down a cardi- nal guideline for her students in a spe- cial talk one day when she said, "Always keep your eye on the ball." Regardless of all the things that may come up about the contra& who nego- tiated it, who signed it, who proposed it, and who went into the matter, the ball that we must keep our eye on is our na- tional security. The C-5A aircraft is an essential part In these modern times of the military plan for our national protection and our national security. Part of that plan for our national security is that we think it Is necessary to protect certain other areas of the world as part of our front line was used in this case. s was large trial that that type of contract had. It will be fully explained later in the debate. I am just debating the matter now to hit the high points for the RECORD so that it might be read during the recess. That contract will be explained fully and critically by each side of the debate, I think, but certainly I do not defend it. I know it has been proven to be a bad type of contract, a type that should not be employed any further. Perhaps one of the reasons it worked so badly in this case was because, without having prior use, it was used for one of the largest contracts that we have ever gone into. At any rate, it did not work out for this case. It was bad for the Government and It was bad for the contractor, too, as will defense. very readily appear. roll. This large cargo plane will replace The point I want to emphasize is that Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I ask others that we have in use at the present we must keep our eye on the ball. Ac- unanimous consent that the order for time that are not as adequate and do not cording to all the testimony, I believe the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without have the qualities this one possesses. This we have a good product. We have a good isa modern plane. plane. We have one that is beyond the objection, it is so orde As a member of the Armed Services expectations of the Air Force, beyond Committee and the one member of thatthe requirements of the specifications. It AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA- committee with special responsibility at TIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 this time, I have been disappointed re- FOR MILITARY PROCURMENT, RE- peatedly this year by the lack of sur- SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND veillance over several contracts that has FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MIS- been exhibited by our Department of SILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJ- Defense. I have not only been disap- ALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RE- pointed in it, but frankly, I have been SERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH greatly surprised. The Senate resumed the consideration I have said several times during the of the bill (S. 2546) to authorize appro- last several years that whatever might be priations during the fiscal year 1970 for said about the past Secretaries of De- procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval fense concerning their judgment, the vessels, and tracked combat vehicles and acts they performed or did not perform, to authorize the construction of test and what advice they gave or did not facilities at Kwajalein Missile Range, and give to the President, I thought that we to prescribe the authorized personnel were superb in our standing at the buss- strength of the Selected Reserve of each ness table, at the contract table. Reserve comronent of the Armed Forces, I really have been greatly surprised by and for other purposes. the lack of surveillance and lack of at- Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, what is tention given a number of these larger the pending business? contracts. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. I emphasize that if we really want to ALLEN in the chair). The pending busi- understand the matter, we must get on ness is amendment No. 108 offered by the the ground and appreciate the great Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE) . problems that go with acontract to cre- Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Chair. ate something that is not in being, to Mr. President, this matter was made create a new concept of a plane, a mis- ' the pending business yesterday. It was sile, a ship, or a submarine, to conceive my impression at that time that there it in our minds from the beginning and would be no debate on the amendment. get it on paper, and finally, through trial However, I learned later that the Senator and error, starting and stopping, and has had its usual bumps during the trial-and-error period, but there is no evidence that it is not going to come through in a fine way, and its per- formance is beyond expectations and requirements. I refer to one witness, the Senator from Arizona. I requested him to go down there and go through this plane, go over it, and I was very much pleased when he returned with his report. He not only looked at it but also flew it, and he will give a report on that. We move now to this amendment. The amendment, Mr. President, seeks to strike from this bill $533 million for the procurement of 23 of these aircraft and certain lead funds. We have what we call the No. 1 run, run A. That is composed of 58 planes in all-5 for research, development, and testing, and 53 for regular type, the finished product. All that has been taken care of by money that already has been authorized and appropriated. It is not involved in this bill. So that moves us over to run B, under the contract referred to as run B, and that will consist of 57 planes in addi- tion to the 58 I have mentioned; but this bill contains money for only 23 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 oionsig&r-a DP71B00364R000300100001-3 CORD ? SEN S 9966 Approved For Relem planes out of run B. At issue Is the sum of $533 million for 23 C-5A aircraft. What would be the effect of taking this money out of the-bill with the adop- tion at this amendment? It should be understood that we do not have a single plane yet for use; but they are on the assembly line; they are moving. If this amendment is adopted. it would require a report from the GAO in 90 days; but that is purely incidental. It would take away the money for the plane. At the very best, we would, lose 1 year. There would be a delay in the entire program. More money must benautherized by Con- gress; otherwise, the production lines will soon come to a grinding halt. We will have a standstill, That is just a fact of life regarding this fine product which is just coming to fruition and which wanted. If we were to cut on the money, if we ever were to get any planes for use, the company would have to proceed solely with its own money to complete the first run of 58 planes, run A It is estimated that if this should happen, the company would sustain a loss of at least $600 mil- lion. I doubt that any company can Stand such a loss. Incidentally, I wish to point out that no one estimates that this company is going to make a great deal of money even if it gets all the contract?the planes beyond the number called for by this bill. Various estimates have been made. The Air Force has estimated that the com- pany will lose a certain amount, and the company says they will lose less than that. But all agree that there will be a loss to the company under either situa- tion. According to the contractor, Lockheed, if all the aircraft in run B are bought, its loss would be in the neighborhood of $13 to $15 million. The Air Force says that if we buy all it is possible to buy under run A and run B. they think the Lockheed loss will be in the neighbor- hood of $285 million. I mention that just to indicate that by no kind of figuring or estimates is this a contract in which the contractor is going to make money. There will be a loss either way it goes. We talk about a 90-day investigation by the GAO?whatever that may mean. I will return to that later. But what the amendment really does is to take the en- tire project out of the bill and disallow e money. There is one thing fui ther about the number of planes involved, and it is not in the bill, and it does not have to be decided now. If the Senate keeps the money in the bill?as I trust it will do? there still will be a question of whether or not we are going to buy 34 additional planes at a later date. That is a matter that would be left up LI the Defense Department initially. I do not know what their decision will be. I do not know what their recommendation will be. We cannot decide that now. That is just another rnileboard down the road. We cannot possibly come to it now. It is not involved in the bill. That is a judgment to be made by the Secretary of Defense. It would be up to him to make that judgment and to give Con- gress a recommendation Mr. President, if this program is killed now as a result of the failure to provide funds in the bill for the 23 aircraft now in question, additional Government costs will be over $100 million because there will be termination costs of at least $30 million and $72 million in long- lead funds approved last year and al- ready committed. Those are costs that are involved in the termination of a contract. Sometimes we have to incur them in the termination of contracts. However, it is a necessary part of any contract involving manufacturing of extensive products like this. It is a cost of doing business. It certainly is to be considered and measured when we get into the question of whether or not we are going to terminate the manufacture of a product that is more than good, it is essential, and a product that we ac- tually need in the years to come. Mr. President, when these planes are placed in operation they will replace other planes and actual savings will be had in connection with the operation. In connection with the matter about the General Accounting Office?and I mention this with all deference to that fine agency of the Government that is certainly a great deal of help to the Committee on Armed Services?they have advised me that this amendment provides for them to make a study and to report in 90 days. They have inform- ally advised me that at the best, any study would take at least 6 months, even in connection with those items they are competent to study. They are not com- mitting themselves by any means to say- ing they are competent and have the type men with the type training that would be necessary to carry out all of the requirements. Mr. President, just a word about a matter that was in the newspapers lately. I wish to pause at this point to say that I think the Senator from Wis- consin has done a lot of fine work in this matter. He is diligent and he always pursues a matter. He is frank, clear, and forceful in giving a report to the Senate about his work. I am proud he is that type man. It is a pleasure to work with him in the Senate. There has been a great deal of pub- licity and many fancy names used about this contract. They have called the C-5A contract the Golden Handshake, and so on. However, let us remember that the main questions are whether it is a good plane and whether we need it. There has been a crack in the wing in the testing A crack occurred in the wing in a static test on July 13. I am advised over and over by those who know?and other members of the committee would be more competent to speak on this mat- ter than I am?that that is a normal expectation in every aircraft develop- ment. The failure occurred at 125 percent of the load for which the airplane was designed. Every aircraft wing, as I understand it, is tested upward and upward to the point of breaking. That is how they find out the terminal point. Where does the strength of this mighty wing stop after ? all? ATE August 13, /969 In this case it did not crack mitt' it had reached the point of 125 percent of the weight for which it was designed. As I said, almost all aircraft, partic- ularly the heavier ones, have experienced failures of some components during static testing. 'That Is what static test- ing is for. To determine the amount of stress and learn its breaking point Wieg failure occurred on the B-52A, our present so-called big bomber, at 139 per- cent of the design load. In the C-130A it occurred between 127 percent and 135 percent; in the C-1-0B it occurred at 139 percent; in the F-1040 It occurred at 135 percent; and the C-141 had a math landing gear frame failure at 129 percent of loan, a vertical tall failure at 135 per- cent, a fuselage failure at 120 percent, and a men landing gear failure et 145 percent. Many additional examples could be cited. Failures of this kind are not unex- pected. In fact, it is a part of the de- velopment and testing process regular- ly to be expected. They reveal these pos- sible weaknesses in the structures at an early stage of development to permit design modifications in the production of aircraft. We have had much debate here about the amount of money in this bill for re- search and development. This is an il- lustration of how Par removed from real research, as we ordinarily term this, is this testing we have been talking about. Over and over again a good part of the money for research and develop- ment is really research, development, test, and evaluation. If I have any bearing at all with the Department of Defense when they bring over the recommendations next year, they will have this research and devel- opment account, as they call ft. broken down with more commonsense and divided up into categories where Sena- tors will have at better opportunity to know what they are passing on. What is the need for the C-5A? Certainly that has already been estab- lished, Or there never would have been such a plane devised and contracted for. Six squadrons of the C-5A's will per- mit the phasing out of such obsolete and inefficient aircraft as the C-124's and the C-133's. "C" means here "cargo," Mr. President. With the C-5,A's we will reduce the number of airlift aircraft in the fnrce by one-half while providing more than three times the transport capability. Mr. President, that is the key fact in this whole debate. Times have changed. Modern aircraft are altogether different. Versatility of the C-5A is greater and its capability more. Thus, I repeat, with the C-5A', we will reduce the number of airlift aircraft in the force by one-half, while providing more than three times the transport capability. When we reduce the number of aircraft by one-hail, we also reduce the number of pilots, navigators, and the rest of the crew members, including maintenance men?all will be reduced, including repair parts and all other items that go to Make up the expensive line of operation. At the Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 ? CIA-RDP7MQQ3_64R000300100001-3 August 13, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RtCURD? SEN ATE S 9967 same time, we will have three times the transport capability. Second, the C-5A's operating cost per ton-mile will be way lower than any other airlift aircraft. It will be 2.9 cents for the C-5A against 5.3 cents for the C-141. That is the operating cost per ton-mile. It will be almost one-half as much for the C-5A as it is for the C-141 that is now in such extensive use. Three, under any theory, the 23 air- craft in the fiscal year 1970 request are needed. They are ready now to start com- ing off the assembly line. These will take us only to four squadrons?the number I am talking about-81 aircraft versus the six squadrons of 120 aircraft, to be approved as a minimum requirement by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is under review by the Joint Chiefs all the time. As I pointed out a few minutes ago, that will be a determination for the Sec- retary of Defense, as to whether the last purchase is made. It is not before us now. If he decides to quit at the end of the 81 aircraft that the bill will build up to, that is a matter of judgment, and also a matter of judgment for Congress whether to approve it, if the Secretary of Defense does recommend it. But this is no time to stop on a good plane just as the first ones start coming off the line for use. Mr. President, despite cost overruns, every indication is that the Air Force will get an aircraft with fine performance characteristics. It is the only aircraft which can carry weapons and equipment of any Army division; namely, tanks, bridge launchers, armored personnel carriers, and helicopters, concurrently with the personnel associated with the equipment. If the C-5A is used to carry only man- power, light equipment, and the lighter weapons, it is so large that it can carry an enormous load with great rapidity of movement. Mr. President, we have heard a great deal of talk about overruns. I am going to be quite brief on that matter, but the idea is false that there can be a cer- tainty and a fixed final figure in a con- tract like this, without running into a lot of big money, and it would cost just as much to the Government in dollars, even though not called overruns. This contract had a form of sliding scale. If there had not been a sliding scale as to cost, any contractor, in order to protect himself, would have required a fixed amount, in much larger propor- tions, in order to provide a cushion of protection, even before we get to the concept of profits. I have already mentioned profits. As I pointed out, so many changes came about that it not only caused the so- called overruns, but absorbed chances for profit. I would in no way try to defend over- runs as such in any kind of contract. I point out, however, that one reason for the genuine overruns has been the in- flation which has been raging in our eco- nomy since 1964. There was a clause in this contract which covered part of the inflation, but we had an extraordinary situation existing during those months and years, which made the situation different from what it had ever been. I covered this point in my opening remarks on this entire bill, and I would like to restate my remarks at this time, which occurred on page S7702 of the CONGRES- SIONAL RECORD of July 8. MAIN REASONS FOR OVERRUNS The committee has found as a general proposition that the principal reasons that the original cost estimates in these programs have been invalid in recent years are as follows: First. Subsequent to the original esti- mates there were changes in the weap- ons programs, that is, revision to the total number of weapons to be produced and the schedule at which they would be produced, both factors causing an increase in the unit cost. It is possible to alter these two factors in such a manner that unit costs will be reduced. However, such decisions in re- cent years have resulted in increasing the costs of these programs. The assumptions on which original estimates were made were therefore invalidated to the extent of these changes. I think we have moved too rapidly from research into procurement with re- spect to some of these goods. In some cases, the need exists, accentuated by the war. So we had to move forward regardless of cost. Second. The military services them- selves have requested changes in the weapons through either a change in technology or a policy decision which caused an increase over the original estimate. Third. There appears to have been a lack of sufficient management supervi- sion over these various programs to take timely action to either correct or recog- nize, early, the overrun problem. Fourth. There has been the fact of abnormal inflation since 1964, which has reduced the Defense procurement dollar to a substantial degree. There is no pre- cise index on the effect of the. Vietnam war on the procurement dollar itself. Some estimates, however, indicate that the overall loss of purchasing power of the defense procurement dollar would approximate 25 percent. Inflation since 1964 has affected not only Defense moneys but many other activities in the economy. Between 1964 and 1968 the interest rate on 3 months Treasury bills rose from 3.5 to 6.15 percent or an increase of 75 per- cent; the interest yield on FHA home mortgages from 5.45 to 8.05 percent, or an increase of 48 percent; services?less rent?rose 21.6 points from 117 to 138,6 or an increase of 18 percent; the cost of food rose 12.9 points from 106.4 to 119.3 or an increase of 12 percent. I point this out not by way of excuse. I am not defending any of those con- tracts. The military as such and civilian groups as such were given some of the hard reasons why some of the increase occurred and have been given some com- parison. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, without attempting to fully cover all the ramifi- cations of the contract and the plane, I have presented the high points of what the original conception was, the need for the plane, the contract, and the type of contract which was entered into in 1964. I have covered the fact that it proved to be the wrong type of contract. I think one reason why the Depart- ment of Defense got into the contract for this large plane, involving so many millions of dollars, was that it just did not take time to try out that type of contract on smaller missions or smaller projects. If it had, these defects in it would have shown up. But that is all be- hind us now, and nothing can be done about it. We have to start from where we are. This program is in fine form now, right to the point where the planes are going to start coming off the assembly line. We certainly will need the ones we have already appropriated money for. The number is 58 in run A; and, by all standards, we are going to need the 23 out of run B, as provided in the bill. A great deal of testimony on this sub- ject was taken by another committee. It is entitled to consideration, of course. We considered this item from every view- point. Then for all of the public who were interested, we had 2 full days of hearings, in which that testimony was taken. Nothing came out, either in public or private, that attacked the plane, or the product. Nothing came up that ques- tioned the motives or questioned the im- partiality of the Defense Department in awarding the contract. All the evidence is that, whichever way it goes, it is not going to be a profitable contract for the company. It is going to lose money, ac- cording to its own estimates and accord- ing to the Air Force. It is going to cost more money than we or they thought it would. We regret that, but it is another illustration that, over these long periods it is impossible to foresee what the future holds. Who can contract with certainty about the cost, particularly with things moving forward as rapidly as they are now in the field, for example, of elec- tronics. It has gotten to the point where over half the cost of a plane is in elec- tronics. In preparation of this vast matter, we prepared a series of questions that re- lated to the financial status of the pro- gram and the developments and effect of various lines of effort. We sent those questions to the Department of Defense for answers. I have the questions in my hand. The questions are ours. The an- swers are those of the Department of Defense. Having checked through those an- swers, I believe they are substantially correct. The staff believes they are gen- erally and substantially correct. For the information of other Senators and all interested parties, I ask unani- mous consent that the questions of the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the answers of the Department of Defense thereto be printed in the RECORD at this paint. There being no objection, the ques- tions and answers were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: Question No. 1: Financial Status of the Program: (a) How much has been obligated to date? Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9968 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 ,? CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE August 13, 1969. (b) How much has been expended to date? (a) On what date will present funds be expended? Specify these funds by fiscal year and those under the continuing resolution. AS OF JUNE 30, 1969 [Dollars in millions] R. & D. Aircraft procurement Fiscal sear Obligations Expendi- Expendi- tures Obligations tures 1964 1965 10.0 42.0 10.0 42.0 1966 158.9 158. 9 1967 278.6 278. 6 1968 340.7 314. 2 196) 123.6 68. 7 Total _ 953.8 872.4 385. 6 383. 7 414. 2 394. 7 443.7 414. 2 I. 243.5 1, 192. 6 On July 28, 1969, the Department of De- fense, under the authority of the continu- ing resolution for FY 1970, approved addi- tional funding in the amount of $100 million to protect production continuity. Of the $100 million, $80 million has been obligated. The difference of $20.0 million will be obli- gated to the most urgent requirement con- sistent with the financial management of the total program. Based on the present rate of expenditure, presently available funds may be exhausted by 1 October 1969. Question No. 2: Provide a summary of funds that have been authorized prior to fiscal year 1970 and indicate how they have been ex- pended or obligated. Answer: R. & D. AND PROCUREMENT AS or JUNE 30, 1969 [Dollars in millions' Fiscal year Program Expended 1964 10.0 10.0 1965_ 42. 0 42. 0 1966 _ 158.9 158.9 1967 667. 0 662.3 1968 781.9 708.9 1969 624.7 482.9 Total 2, 284. 5 2, 065. 0 Question No. 3: Provide a summary of the effect on the present 0-5A aircraft program If no fiscal year 1970 procurement funding is forthcoming and the program is delayed one year. Answer: Failure to provide FY 70 pro- curment funding would Void the current contract option commitments for Run B. The contract options between Lockheed and Gen- eral Electric and their subcontractors and suppliers would lapse. The Air Force would be obligated to pay the $30.5 million Run B termination liability if requested by Lock- heed. The $225 million over ' target funds re- quested for FY 70 would still be required to fund the contracts from target to cell- sag for Run A. Additional funds would be required because of the additional target and ceiling associated with the repricing appli- cation of the Run B option exercise in Jan- uary 1969. These additional funds would not finance Lockheed until FY 1971 funds could be made available. IS is doubtful that Lockheed would be able to finance on its own the coats of continuing the Run A pro- duction during this time period. As a result, there is a substantial likelihood that the contractor would be forced to default the contract for the Run A aircraft. If it is assumed that the costs of continu- ing the current Run A production could be sustained by the ootnractor there would still be a production gap of about 18 months between Runs A and B. During this gap, as many as 40,000 employees could be affected. Hp to 20,000 at Lockheed would probably be laid off and 20,000 involved with subcontrac- tors and vendors either laid off or put on other work. The rehire and/or retraining of these people would be extremely difficult. Negotiation of the prices of the Run B air- craft after this delay would be in a sole source environment with no contractual commitments or price options available. A rough estimate of the cost increase is from $400-$550 million for Run B. Reduction in the Run A production rate In order to stretch Run A and avoid a pro- duction gap would void the existing contract. Neogtiation of the stretch in Run A produc- tion would probably permit Lockheed to recover most of its presently projected losses on RDT&E and Run A. This. negotiation would be essentially sole source and again with no contractual commitmente or price options. It is likely that the program cost increase would equal or exceed the cost in- crease associated with the gap in the produc- tion line discussed earlier. In addition, while the total number of employees affected would be reduced, the lower production rates would require almost immediate lay-offs of people by both Lockheed and their subcontractors and vendors. Question No. 4: What have we received for this money so far? How many airplanes will be delivered from prior appropriations? Answer: Thus far, the bulk of the R&D ef- fort has been completed. Five R&D aircraft have been completed and about 600 hours of flight testing have been accomplished. About nineteen production aircraft are in various stages of assembly. A substantial amount of maintenance and operational training equipment has been delivered. The first operational aircraft is scheduled for delivery in December 1969. We have high confidence of securing a much needed stra- tegic airlift capability with the delivery of an aircraft that will meet all of its performance guarantees. Fifty-eight (58) aircraft are con- tractually required to be delivered from prior year appropriations. Question No. 5: Give a complete statement of the effect of the repricing formula and the reverse incentive on the procurement of the 23 aircraft proposed in the bill. Answer: Our interpretation of the present contract is that the repricing formula came into effect when we exercised the Run B op- tion in January 1969. It will apply to the 23 Run B aircraft requested for FY 70 and will result in a new target cost and ceiling price for the 76 production aircraft. This means that some, but not all of the contrac- tor's RDT&E plus Run A over-ceiling condi- tion will be eliminated. This over-ceiling re- lief would be only a fraction of that which would obtain by applying the repricing for- mula to all 57 Run B aircraft. No reverse incentive (see questions 10 and 20) exists with the 23 aircraft being re quested for FY 70. We are negotiating with Lockheed to eliminate the possibility of a reverse incentive, before more than the 23 FY 70 Run B aircraft are procured. Question No. 6: What could the Air Force be expected to receive in the way of opera- tional C-5A aircraft in the event no addi- tional funds other than the $225 million for over-target costs on Run A in the present bill and prior year funds were available? Answer: Contractually, the Air Force can expect to receive 58 aircraft when the $225 million is added to the Run A contracts. Realistically, in view of Lockheed's projected loss on the sale of only 58 aircraft, it is questionable whether the contractor could proceed if a decision were made not to buy any Run B aircraft. If the contractor de- faulted the contract, it is possible some 10 to 20 airplanes could be delivered. Lockheed is contractually committed to provide the 58 R&D and Run A aircraft. The Government is committed to provide the $225 million over-target funds requested in the FY 70 Budget plus whatever additional costs may result from the application of the repricing formula relative to our exercising the Run B option in January 1969, If Run B were terminated, an additional $30.5 million of termination liability would be also required. Question No. 7: Is the company not legally committed to furnish 68 aircraft under Run A? Answer: The company is committed to furnish five test aircraft under RDT&E and 53 operational aircraft under production Run A, a total of 58 aircraft. This commitment is legally binding so long as the Government meets its commitments. This means that funds must be provided in a timely manner for the allowable costs associated with pro- ducing these 58 aircraft. Question No. 8: What changes, if any, are being considered in the contracting methods, i.e., repricing formula, abnormal escalation, etc.? Answer: It is the Air arce's intention to change the C--5A Lockheed contract as fol- lows: a. Remove the reverse incentive possibility feature from the repricing clause, which does not arise until more than four squadrons are procured; b. Incorporate a new delivery schedule in the contract; c. Modify the methods Of procuring/pric- ing spare parts; d. Negotiate the disagreement as to the intended application of abnormal escalation. Other secondary issues and attendant mat- ters will be clarified and resolved within the overall negotiation package_ e. Negotiate the scope and operation of the Correction of Deficiency Clause so as to better clarify its meaning and to facilitate Its administration. Question No. 9: Summarize in simple terms the cost elements of Run A. Answer: The cost elements for R&D plus Run A may be expressed in the following way. These are based on the assumption that only three squadrons are procured and no repricing is involved. Cost to Cost to Government produce Lockheed-Georgia Co __ 1,764 2,436 General Electric Co 534 558 Other program costs 214 214 Initial spares 201 201 or R. 8.1. & E 1,003 1,246 Procurement 1,509 1,962 Initial spares _ _ 201 201 2, 713 3, 409 2,713 3,409 Question No 10: ?tarnish a graphic analy- sis of how the reverse incentive operates. Answer: Price adjustment in accordance with Air Force position: (Applicable Run A actual cost $1526M, Run A target cost $832M). Increase in Increase in Overall con- overall tract ceiling contract for each $1 Quantity of Run a ceiling price over run A Aircraft (millions) ceiling AT-23 AT-33: AF position ___ 393 Lockheed position 558 AT 57 680 $292 0.66 .89 I. 01 1.54 Reverse incentive No. Na. "yes. Yes. Question No 11: Can the Air Force give assurance that the reverse incentive pro- vision will be deleted frorn the contract? Ex- plain the manner in Which the repricing Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 August 13, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE S) formula will operate on the proposed pro- curement of 23 aircraft.' Answer: As Dr. Seamans publicly stated, the nature of the Air Force commitment beyond the 4th squadron is dependent upon the results of negotiations. In large meas- ure, these revolve around the deletion of reverse incentive feature in the contract. This deletion is a prime negotiation objec- tive of the Air Force prior to procurement of the balance of Run B aircraft. Presently, operation of the reverse incentive on the proposed FY 1970 buy of 23 aircraft depends upon whether or not we procure the fifth squadron. If we stop at 23 aircraft, repricing of the contract Orget cost and ceiling will be made only on the basis of the items actually ordered. The total amount of Run B costs to be treated in the repricing formula will be just the target cost associated with the 23 aircraft and associated support. It is specifically noted that the procure- ment of the 23 aircraft does not involve any reverse incentive feature when the repric- ing formula is applied. Question No. 12: Explain in precise terms the elements of the C-5A aircraft contract which will be controlled by military person- nel and those elements controlled and ad- ministered by civilian* personnel. In other words, what is the chain of authority for the contracting and administration of the pro- gram? Answer: Authority and responsibiity for procurement decisions concerning major Air Force systems, such as the C-5, rests com- pletely with the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Air Force. Military people evaluate technical material, selection data and procurement approaches and make rec- ommendations when required. Final deci- sions clearly and completely rest with the statutory civilian appointees with the De- partment of Defense. Statutory procurement authority for ex- ecuting contracts for the government within the Air Force flows from the Secretary of the Air Force through the Chief of Staff to the Deputy Chiefs of Staff (Research and Devel- opment) and (Systems and Logistics) and to the Director of Procurement Policy in Air Force Headquarters and then to Air Force Systems -Command and Air Force Logistics Command. Under this authority the Deputy Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Procurement Policy are responsible for providing the Commands with broad policy and procedural guidance resolving issues beyond Command jurisdic- tion, assessing Command compliance with established policy and guidance, and for supporting the Air Force Secretary in con- nection with his statutory and administra- tive responsibilities to Congress. In the C-5 aircraft and engine procure- ment, the Air Force followed its standard source selection procedures. The Air Force Secretary was the Source Selection Author- ity. The Source Selection Advisory Council and Evaluation Board functions were carried out by senior military members of the Aero- nautical Systems Division and C-5 System Program Office respectively at Wright Field, Ohio. Contractors submitted proposals cov- ering all elements in great detail. Proposals were evaluated by a large, highly skilled group of specialists specifically picked for the task. Recommendations of these Source Se- lection bodies were reviewed at appropriate levels in the Command chain up to the Air Force Secretary. Based on a detailed review of these recommendations plus those of the major Commanders and Chief of Staff, the Air Force Secretary determined that the rec- ommendation of General Electric for the en- gine would be accepted and the award of the airframe contract to Lockheed was in the best interest of the Government. The Air Force Secretary provided a detailed report to the Secretary of Defense. In addition to source selection decision, others are required during regularly sched- uled program reviews, program change re- quests, or when a program varies from the cost schedule or performance requirements of the contract. Again, these decisions are made by the Secretary of the Air Force or Defense. Question No. 13: The current cost esti- mate under which you are operating is based on a study culminating in late October which Is now ten months old. Lockheed and the Air Force have serious disagreement about cer- tain provisions of the contract and how they apply. The question is, if the October 1968 estimates should be substantially wrong? substantially lower?and the alleged ambi- guities in the contract should be decided in favor of Lockheed, how does the Government exposure change? Answer: The Government exposure will Increase if our October estimate to complete production Run A (53 aircraft) is substan- tially low. This is so because in exercising the Production Run B option in January 1969 we activated the price adjustment clause. The Government exposure is the contract ceiling price and the price adjustment clause adjusts the contract ceiling price. Opera- tion of the price adjustment clause and the resultant increase in ceiling price, is dic- tated by (1) the cost to complete Run A air- craft, and (2) the total number of Run B aircraft procured. In addition, if the abnormal economic escalation estimates increase, the contract ceiling would increase further by that amount. The current negotiations with Lockheed are being conducted with a view toward mu- tual resolution of all of the ambiguities presently in the contract. One of the prin- cipal ambiguities relates to the use of the abnormal escalation in the repricing formula. Should we be unable to resolve these ambi- guities in negotiation, the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) and/or the courts would be resorted to. A judgment favorable to the contractor in these cases would also increase the Government ex- posure. Question No. 14: Based on the October cost data, what was the estimated cost per aircraft (a) Under Run A with 53 aircraft? (5 R&D not included) (b) Under Run A plus 23 aircraft of Run B? Answer: The procurement cost for the 53 Run A aircraft (assuming completion of the Run B buy) was estimated at $1,901 million for an average cost of $35.9 million per air- craft. If we had decided at that time not to buy Run B, the repricing formula would not have become effective. The procurement cost of the 53 aircraft would have been $1,509 million for an average cost of $28.5 million. It is very unlikely that this cost would be valid if we decide now (after exercising the Run B option in January) not to buy Run B. The cost of the Run A aircraft would probably be decided in court, if the aircraft were produced at all. The average price would probably be substantially higher than $28.5 million. As noted earlier, however, there is no assurance that Lockheed would be able to complete Run A if Run B is eliminated. If we procure Run A plus only 23 aircraft of Run B (76 production aircraft), consid- ering the effect of the price adjustment clause, the average procurement (flyaway plus AGE, training, and data) cost for the 76 aircraft would be about $29.9 million. Question No. 35: On page 24 of the C-5A study the following appears: "It should be noted that the costs to the Government reflected above are based on the detail cost review completed in October 1968. There is a distinct possibility that costs may continue to increase. A quick look cost re- view is now in the process of being completed by the Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD). Preliminary information from this cost re- view indicates that the estimated cost to complete the program (i.e., the contractor's cost) may increase above the October 1968 estimates." Furnish some estimate as to what the maximum cost to completion will be, based on the information now available. Answer: A revised cost estimate is now be- ing completed by the System Program Office. Preliminary information indicates a poten- tial increase in the two to four percent range for the six squadron program. Part of this increase is associated with the schedule slip. The October 1968 estimate was based on a Run B production rate of four aircraft per month. The Air Force changed to three per month in order to extend the decision time for the fifth and sixth squadrons pending more definitive cost data. That action ex- tended the production period several months and results in some increased cost in Runs A and B. These factors combined with in- creased inflationary trends contribute to the potential cost increase. Question No. 16: How will the spares be provided and how will it affect the contract? Answer: We are now negotiating with the contractor to determine specifically how the spares are to be provided and how their pro- curement will effect the contract. Our in- tent is to get good spares at reasonable prices.' We intend in our negotiation to establish a reasonable break-out of the spares and in- sure that we procure from Lockheed only those spares and equipment that cannot ef- fectively be procured directly from the sup- plier. We do not intend for the procure- ment of the spares from Lockheed to off-set the losses expected to be incurred as a re- sult of their RDT&E and Run A efforts. Question No. 17: Is the aircraft meeting all performance specifications, specifically, the sink rate, the lower flap speeds, and wing failure? Answer: The aircraft is predicted to meet or exceed all of its mission performance guarantees. Its weight empty is projected to be exceeded by less than 1%. However, the aircraft is more streamlined (less drag) than required and this more than offsets the slight additional weight and permits it to meet or exceed the performance guarantees. Some minor changes were made to some specifica- tions. This was done to produce a better air- plane through a more balanced design and to reduce cost to the Government. No deg- radation of safety or mission performance resulted. Equitable consideration was re- ceived by the Government. The sink rate, flap speeds, etc., all meet established mili- tary standards. Critics who do not under- stand the technical details may allege the Air Force reduced criteria to "help" the con- tractor. This is not the case. For instance the sink rate was changed from 10 feet per second maximum to nine feet per second. The FAA standard is 10 FPS; but the FAA allows a lower weight for 10 FPS. The Air Force nine FPS at a higher weight is equiv- alent to the FAA standard of 10 FPS at its lower weight. The flap speed criteria change affected only the use of full flaps. The criteria for use of partial and take-off flaps were not changed. Since the flaps on the C-5 are not consid- ered a braking device, the reduced speed for use of full flaps will impose no diverse limit- ation on operation or performance. The static test failure in the wing of the test article was not related in any way to any specification changes made. This failure was not unusual for the static test program the purpose of which is to demonstrate the aircraft capability to withstand flightloads up to 150% of its design limit load. Question No, 18: How many significant Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9970 1 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 131969 changes have been made and have any of them resulted in a degradaZion of the per- formance specifications? Answer: Only minor changes have been made in the specifications as outlined in the answer to Question 17. None have resulted in any degradation of the mission perform- ance of the airplane. Question No. 19: How real is the threat Of termination if no funds are available by the end of August? Answer: The contract, as amended, permits Lockheed to request termination if Run B funding is not provided before 1 September. The contract also permits equitable cost and schedule adjustments associated with the funding delays. The purpose of these provi- sions is to maintain program continuity and to protect vendor commitments. The risk of termination, depends largely on the con- tractor's confidence that ry 70 funds will be ultimately provided. Both contractors have a number of subcontractor funding commitments which must be met. The Air Force would attempt to assist in this interim funding problem. It is likely, however, that there would be a cost increase to the program. If funds were delayed for several months after the 1 September date, it is probable that a number of the vendors and subcon- tractors commitments would lapse. There would be a substantial cost increase and a schedule slip. The General Electric contract does not permit them to request termination if funding is delayed but price and schedule adjustment could result, depending on the extent of the delay. Question No. 20: Define in simple terms: (a) The meaning of the repricing formula (b) The reverse incentive as it applies to the repricing Answer: (a) The intention of the repricing formula was to preclude catastrophic losses to the contractor. A formula was devoloped In rec- ognition of the early commitment to opera- tional aircraft prior to development. The clause provided that if the actual costs as- sociated with the production of Run A air- craft exceeded the contract target costs for that effort by a specified amount or greater, the contractor is entitled GO an adjustment in the overall target and ceiling price. The amount of this adjustment and the changes to the contract prices are determined pur- suant to the application of the formula. Un- til the target for Run A aircraft are exceeded by 130%, the repricing formula is not in- voked. (b) A point can be reached where, for each additional dollar of oast occurring in the production of Run A aircraft, the result is an increase in total contract target and ceiling of more than a dollar. This potential could encourage a contractor to add costs to Run A so as to reduce his overall loss on both the Run A and the Run B production. Question No. 21: What would be the im- pact of delaying appropriation of FY 70 funds for procurement of the Run B aircraft until after completion of a 90 day review of the program? Answer: The Air Force has requested $533 million for the 23 FY 70 aircraft of Run B. In the event the appropriation of FY 70 funds is delayed 90 days, the actual delay in applying these funds to the C-5 contract would probably amount to four or more months. The Lockheed contract as amended requires FY 70 fun& for the 23 aircraft to be on contract by 1 September 1969. The contract stipulates that if such funds are allotted after 1 September, an equitable ad- justment in the price, delivery schedule, Or both may be made provided the contractor has incurred additional costs or delay due to the funding delay. Further, the contrae- tor can request termination for convenience of the Government in the event funds are not allotted by 1 September. There would be a substantial impact as- sociated with this funding delay. Existing contract options between Lockheed and Gen- eral Electric and their subcontractors and suppliers would be voided. As a result, pro- duction costs would increase by about $140 to $170 million depending on whether the Run A delays were stretched to preclude a production line gap or not. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, for the time being, that will conclude my re- marks. I believe they are the main high points. Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Virginia, a valuable member of our committee. Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr-President, I would like to say a fey words with re- gard to the Senator from Mississippi. This is the sixth week that the Senate has been debating the pending legisla- tion. During all this time the Senator from Mississippi has been on the floor and he has carried the burden of answering the many questions?proper questions-- which have been put to him as commit- tee chairman. I doubt if there have been any commit- tee chairmen in recent years who have been under such intense pressure in re- gard to work here on the floor for such a long period of time as has the distin- guished Senator from Mississippi in han- dling on the floor of the Senate this very important and very difficult bill. When the legislation was first sub- mitted, the budget request sought by the Johnson administration totaled $23 bil- lion. Then the new administration came into office, and the budget request was revised somewhat to $22 billion. Then the Committee on Armed Services, of which the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) is chairman, went over this proposal in great detail. The bill which finally came before the Senate represents, in round figures, a total of $20 billion for procurement of military weapons for the fiscal year 1970. So the committee brought about that reduction and now recommends to the Senate that the budget request of the Nixon administration be reduced by $2 billion. I favor such a reduction. That is, in round figures, a 10-percent reduction. The committee is aware of the need to carefully scrutinize all items in the budget, whether it be a budget for the Defense Department, or a budget for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, or any of the other departments of the Government. The committee went into these matters very carefully and, as I mentioned be- fore, has recommended to the Senate that the authorizations for military pro- curement be reduced from the amount originally requested by $2 billion. That is a substantial reduction, but I think it is one that can be sustained. I think that we can accomplish, with the reduced amount of money, all that Is necessary to be done to protect the security of the United States. I say again, Mr. President, that I have great admiration for the way the dis- tinguished chairman of the committee, the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) has handled this legislation on the floor of the Senate during 6 difficult weeks. The hours have been long each day, and there has been a keen debate. I say to those whose viewpoints have differed from those of the Senator from Mississippi and the Senator from Vir- ginia that I think it is important and desirable that Senators do just what they have done for the past 6 weeks: go into these budgeted figures item by item, and require justification. I believe that the Senator from Mis- sissippi has fully Justified what the com- mittee has recommended, and I state again that I am pleased to be astociated with the distinguished Senator. I com- mend him on his handling of a very dif- ficult problem over a long period of time. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Virginia for his gra- cious remarks. What little I have done required much help, and help was forth- coming from many different sources, in- cluding the Senator from Virginia. He played an important part in the making of this bill, in tearing it apart, as it were, and then putting it back together. We all owe him a debt of gratitude for his fine work; I do, particularly as chairman of the committee. / appreciate his state- ment, and I give him fair warning that I am looking forward to getting a lot more work out of him. Mr. President, I yield the floor. Mr. PROXIVIIRE. Mr. President, be- fore I yield to the Senator from Indi- ana, which I shall do in a moment, I wish to say that I concur in everything the distinguished Senator from Virginia has just stated about the distinguished Senator from Mississippi. This has been a very difficult and trying 6 weeks for him. He has done a magnificent job. I, as one who has disagreed occasionally with the Senator from Mississippi, can say that he has been most helpful and accommodating, though he has certainly been under unusual pressure. Rarely in the 12 years I have been in the Senate has any chairman, had to meet chal- lenges as often as las the Senator from Mississippi on this measure; and he has done the great job of meeting them. I agree wholeheartedly that this de- bate is certainly in the national inter- est, as well as in the interest of a more intelligent and healthy fiscal policy. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Wisconsin. There has been a little effort, from some sources, to try to drive a wedge between Senators who might have differing viewpoints. I am proud of the Senator from Wiscon- sin for not letting them do it. I, too, did my Part in not letting them do it. After all, we are all here working for the same cause. I do not deserve any credit for the days I have spent on this floor; for It is a privilege to be a Member of this body. It has been a little bit rugged at times, but it is a privilege, and I think trying to do our duty is reward enough for all of us. Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I think every Senator is proud of the way Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 200411100 ? CIA:RDPUBOR64R0003oo100001-3 August 13, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? StiNA that the Senator from Mississippi has done his duty and handled his work on this measure. I yield now to the Senator from In- diana. Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, before I begin my prepared remarks, I, too, would like to express my appreciation for the outstanding work done by the Senator from Mississippi. He is well versed and well informed, and takes the debate in his stride, in a manner he might not do if he did not have the feeling that the debate on the Senate floor is entirely sincere on both sides, and with good purpose, and that differ- ences of opinion do not necessarily mean that those who hold them are disagree- able otherwise. The Senator from Mis- sissippi has stood up extremely well un- der the strain, and I compliment him, before he leaves the floor for a well deserved recess, for the fine work he has done. Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator from Indiana. He has always been an important contributor to the debate on these matters. F?I4 : A $25 BILLION MONUMENT TO THE PAST? Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, the pending military procurement bill con- tains a $239 million authorization for the purchase of a new Navy fighter plane, the F-14A. This item is significant be- cause it marks the first procurement re- quest for a new fighter system which may run to a cost of nearly $25 billion over the next decade. In this year of the taxpayers' revolt, I believe that no new system of such major proportions should escape close congressional scrutiny. My own interest in the F-14A has been heightened by some disturbing news?I have been informed that according to a recent cost comparison study conducted by the Pentagon, the relative cost of carrier-based fighter strength far ex- ceeds the cost of comparable land-based strength. The F-14A, a carrier-based fighter, will require reevaluation if these high costs can indeed be avoided by bas- ing our air strength on land. At any rate, our consideration of the F-14A should be undertaken with full knowledge of these cost relationships, and so I am re- questing today that the Defense Depart- ment release to the Congress this most recent study of the problem, which clari- fies the economy of land-based air strength and which adds measurably to the doubts which already surround the proposed F-14A. I have sent a letter to the Secretary of Defense requesting the immediate release of this revealing cost comparison study. It will be difficult, of course, for the U.S. Senate to conduct its own study of the F-14A. This new fighter aircraft is an enormously complicated weapon, just as complicated as the ABM or the MBT-70. The features of the F-14A must be described in a technical jargon which requires our closest attention; the need for the F-14A must be measured in un- certain probabilities about the future; and the high cost of the F-14A must be judged against the far higher cost of in- adequate military preparedness. But we must not let these difficulties prevent us from taking a hard, critical look at the F-14A. Whenever the ex- penditure of so much money is at issue, the Congress has a responsibility to do no less. Accordingly, I shall outline some of my own doubts about the F-14A, and suggest some alternatives to the blank- check approval of that weapons system which is found in the bill as it reads today. In the words of Secretary of the Navy John Chafee, the current F-14 program is an outgrowth of the cancellation of the F-111B, the Navy version of the ill-fated TFX tactical fighter-bomber. In fiscal year 1969 .Congress appropriated $130 million to finance engineering develop- ment of this new plane; and now, for fiscal year 1970, the Senate Armed Serv- ices Committee has recommended ap- proval of the $224.6 million F-14A pro- curement request, with an additional advance procurement of $14.4 million. These funds represent new obligational authority for development only?techni- cally, real production of the aircraft will not begin until fiscal year 1971, accord- ing to Assistant Secretary of the Navy Robert A. Frosch. This year's money will be spent building airplanes, but test and evaluation models only, not full-scale production models. The F-14, when fully developed, will be a multipurpose carrier-based fighter. The A model, designed to become opera- tional in 1973, will be a swing-wing, tan- dem seating, supersonic aircraft?with a new airframe design incorporating the engine and the avionics of the now abandoned and ill-fated F-111B. It was envisioned as a replacement of the Navy's F-4 Phantom, to perform a fleet air- defense mission, carrying the yet-to-be- developed Phoenix air-to-air missile. The F-14B and F-14C models will be- come operational in the middle and late 1970's as advanced technology engines and advanced avionics become available to replace the older component systems planned for the F-14A. Doubts about the wisdom of producing the F-14A in quantity stem in part from this mismatch between a new airframe and an old engine. By producing the F-14A, the Navy hopes to replace our F-4's by 1973, 2 years before the F-14B is scheduled to become operational. This may be a worthy goal, but it is not yet clear that a hybrid aircraft such as the F-14A is the proper means to reach that goal. By rushing the F-14 airframe into production before its engine and avionics components are fully developed, the Navy may find itself saddled with an expensive, low-performance substitute for what it really needs, resulting in the worst of both worlds. Surprisingly, well-known flaws in the F-14A design are not even mentioned in the committee report. That report de- scribes the F-14A as an aircraft of "su- perior range, endurance, and maneuver- ing performance over the F-4, allowing greater utilization of its supersonic capa- bilities in the combat situation." This evaluation is misleading because it does not mention the fact that the air combat performance of the F-14A has been com- promised by its multipurpose specifica- tions and its hybrid design. The airframe of the F-14A was not designed to carry S 9971 the heavy weight of the F-111B engine, and when fully loaded with the 1;000- pound Phoenix missiles, the aircraft will not be capable of anything approaching "superior performance." I have learned that the acceleration of the F-14A, when it finally becomes operational in 1973, will be less than the best Soviet fighter in operation today, in 1969. The committee report also fails to mention the serious difficulties which have plagued the Phoenix missile, the complement to the F-14A. I have learned that the Phoenix, which has been under study and development since 1957, was tested live for the first time only last year. These tests, however, did not meas- ure the capability of the weapon against maneuvering targets, multiple targets, or jamming. The Phoenix missile is fan- tastically complicated?five times as complex as our next most sophisticated radar missile?and we must not take its successful development for granted. Finally, and perhaps most important, the committee report failed to mention the conceptual flaws of the F-14A sys- tem. Technical difficulties aside, it is simply not clear that a carrier-based fighter is needed in the 1970's. This brings me back to my point about the relative costs of land and sea based air strength. But it also raises the question of just what mission the F-14A would perform. The F-14A was originally de- signed to protect the fleet from a Soviet bomber attack, but as we know, the Soviet bomber threat has never ma- terialized. Chairman MAxoN of the House Appropriations Committee made this point clearly enough during hearings in 1968 when he said: The bomber threat against the fleet, as you know, has been predicted by Navy offi- cials for some time. It has not, of course, developed to date. I understand that Chairman MAHON has expressed concern again about the substances of this, even as late as today. Later in 1968, a report on the U.S. tactical air power program by the Senate Armed Services Preparedness Investi- gating Subcommittee, made a similar as- sessment of the Soviet bomber threat, and drew the obvious conclusions with regard to the F-14A when they said: The F-111B was designed primarily for fleet air defense against Soviet supersonic bombers. But that threat is either limited or does not exist; 'and therefore, we believe the Navy should re-examine the prime re- quirement for the VFX-1 (F-14A) as to its most important role, in the light of the most predictable threat to the fleet. If our fleet were to come under Soviet attack in a conventional war situation, of course, Soviet submarines would pose the most predictable and by far the greatest threat to our carrier force. As unlikely as that contingency may be, it Is clear that the F-14A will not be of much help in meeting the danger of a submarine attack. Clearly, the F-14A deserves a more critical appraisal than it has received to date. My own assessment of the F- 14A suggests two alternatives to blank check approval. First, we could prohibit the purchase of any production model F-14A's. Second, we should deal with the Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 G972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-- SENATE August 11, 1969 conceptual as well as the technical flaws in the system. We should admit to our- selves that a multipurpose carrier-based fighter is never going tote able to provide superior air combat performance. It has been 20 years since the United States has developed a single purpose, air-superiority fighter; in those same 20 years the Soviets have developed four such fighters. Our air superiority over the Soviet Union could be threatened if we continue to develop .110K-type multi- purpose designs. The proposed Air Force F-15 shows more promise than the F-14A for this very reason. There has been a firm deter- mination, reinforced by a directive from the Air Force Chief of Staff, not to com- promise air-superiority capability of the F-15 through corollary mission require- ments. Unlike the F-14A, the F-15 will be a single seat, fixed wing aircraft with a thrust-to-weight ratio of better than 1 to 1. I believe it is a mistake to assume that anything less will provide us with adequate air combat strength, and I be- lieve that we must pass judgment on the F-14A with this comparison in mind. In conclusion, Mr. President, I hope that my remarks will stimulate a more thorough review of this $25 billion wea- pons system. I intend to continue my discussion of the F-14A until all relevant information has been made available to the Congress, and until the troublesome issues which I have raised are fully clarified. I ask unanimous consent to have print- ed at this point in the RECORD a letter written by me to Secretary of De- fense Melvin Laird under date of August 13, 1969. There being no objettion, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: AUGUST 13, 1969. Honorable MELVIN LAIRD, ' Secretary, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As the Senate con- tinues to review the pending military pro- curement bill, it will be helpful to insure Congressional access to all relevant informa- tion detailing comparative out and advan- tages of various weapons systems under consideration. Accordingly, I would like to request the release of a cost comparison study, con- ducted in the Office of Systems Analysis, which measures the relatiVe cost of carrier- based and land-based air strength. Sincerely, Mr. HARTKE. my friend, the from Wisconsin, VANCL FIARTICE, U.S. Senator. Mr. Pre,sident, I thank distingue,hed Senator for yielding. C-5A : AN UNNECESSARY PLANE?A FISCAL DISASTER Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Indiana, and I thank him especially for the substance of his remarks. I think it is most desirable that this very expensive, new plane which is of highly questionable value be critically examined, as the Senator intends to ex- amine it. I think this has a great deal of merit. It is an example of how we can save a great deal of money. Certainly, by means of fiscal pressure, the Senator from In- diana and I will try to hold down the budget and decrease the immense amounts being spent in the military area. I think the Senator has found one area in which we can make substantial savings without any real loss. Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I thank my friend, the Senator from Wisconsin. He is well known for his diligence in pursuing such matters. He is trying to cut down on the Government expenses where it can be done without threatening our national security. C-5A: AN UNNECESSARY PLANE, A FISCAL DISASTER Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I thank the Senator. Mr. President, the purchase of the C-5A by the Air Force from the Lock- heed Corp. already represents one of the greatest fiscal disasters in the history of Federal procurement. The purpose of my amendment is to make the best of a bad situation, to suspend pouring good money after bad, to permit an investiga- tion based on current data and the latest analyses. WEAK CONTRACT The C-5A contract is one in which there is now every evidence of a "buy in" bid. That is a deliberate low bid, im- possible of fulfillment, in order to get the award of a major contract. It is a contract in which the target cost has been greatly exceeded. It is a contract in which the "ceiling cost" has also been broken. It is a contract in which there is a $2 billion overrun. The planes are being built in a Government-owned plant, with large amounts of Government-owned machin- ery, and where huge "progress payments" are made which in effect supply the working capital. The Federal Government investment in this matter is very great. The Lock- heed investment is minimum. REVERSE INCENTIVE But, in addition, it is a contract which has a repricing formula in which there Is a blatant reverse incentive. If the costs of the first 58 planes exceed the original estimates, the contractor is rewarded. Each additional plane will cost -more, not less. The contract gives incentives for excessive costs and inefficiencies. Just think of that: the contract gives incen- tives for excessive cost and inefficiency. It is a contract in which the "reverse incentive" becomes effective if any part of the second run of planes beyond the original 58 is authorized. This is the "golden handshake" in which millions are at stake in my amendment. It is a contract under which there is already a 6-month delay in delivery. MODIFIED SPECIFICATIONS It is a contract in which the original specifications have already been modi- fied and reduced. FAA requirements are not to be met. The landing sink rate has been modified. The wing stress failed to meet specifications. It is a contract in which the contractor has thus far failed in meeting key re- quirements in some aspects of quality, timely delivery, and costs; and, under its outrageous terms, the contractor will be rewarded for inefficiency if my amendment is not adopted. HEARINGS BY COMMITTEES The Subcommittee on Economy in Gov- ernment first looked into the C-5A last November. Since that time at least three other congressional committees have held hearings and heard testimony about this contract. In addition, a recent study has been conducted by the Air Force, The Air Force study, entitled "Review of the C-5A Program," was released or July 28, 1969. The striking fact, however, is that none of the investigations of the costs of the C-5A since last year have been able to proceed on the basis of any significant and substantial information gathered since the hearings before the Subcommittee on Economy in Govern- ment in November, 1968. The fact is that even the recent Air Force review. published only a few weeks ago, failed to gather any new cost data. I quote from the Air Force study: It should be noted that the costs to the Government reflected above are based on the detailed review completed in October 1968. The information gathered by the Sub- committee on Economy in Government was also based on the cost review com- pleted in October, 1968. That informa- tion led the subcommittee to conclude that there would be a cost overrun in the C-5A program of approximately $2 billion. Mr. President, I point out that only five of these planes have been produced out of 120, and they already have an overrun of $2 billion in a contract that originally was to call for $3.4 billion. It is costing $2 billion more than that. SPe- cifically, according to testimony received by the subcommittee, the original esti- mate of the cost of 120 C-5A airplanes was $3.4 billion. Because of cost over- runs mainly being experienced in the performance of the Lockheed contract, actual costs would total $5.3 billion. These estimates included the cost of spare parts. I will come back to the sub- ject of spare parts later, because I am sure there will be a dispute on the floor with respect to this matter when we re- turn in September; and there was a dis- pute when I was briefed by the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Mr. Whit- taker, as to the actual size of the over- run. The difference is that, somehow, the Air Force does not want to include all the spare parts, including replenishment parts. When they are questioned on it, they admit that the spare parts are es- sential parts of the plane. They have to be purchased. They should be included both in the first estimate and in the last estimate, and that is what I have done. EMBARRASSING FACTS At first the Air Force refused to com- ment on the C-5A cost overruns. I can well understand this refusal. In light of earlier Air Force assertions and repre- sentations to Congress about the C-5A, it must have been extremely embar- rassing for the Air Force when these facts came to light. Only a few months prior to our hearings, the Air Force had testified before another committee of Congress that the current costs of the Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 ? MDPORklit4R000300100001-3 0 veiugust 13, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL REC ? S 9973 C-5A were within the original cost esti- to the performance of the C-5A as well tation programs which are desperately mates?in other words, no cost overrun, as to the costs. Both of the Air Force needed. For example, on March 6, 1968, Alex- spokesmen to whom I have referred also DOUBLE HOUSING FUNDS ander H. Flax, Assistant Secretary of the testified that the plane would be delivered It is almost double all the funds we Air Force for Research and Development, on time, and that the first delivery was intend to spend in 1970 for low- and testified before the House Subcommittee scheduled for June 1969. They also testi- moderate-income housing by HUD. on the Department of Defense, of the Bed of their high expectations of the The overrun on the C-5A is more than Committee on Appropriations. Secretary performance of the plane. Now we know twice as much as we intend to spend in Flax was asked whether C-5A program that these claims were also overopti- this entire fiscal year for low- and mod- was within the original cost estimates. mistic. The fact is that a substantial erate-income housing for the entire He replied: delivery slippage has occurred. The Air country. If there is one economic shame We believe it is within the range between Force was to have its first C-5A's last in this country, where we have really the target and ceiling costs at the moment. June. They were not delivered. In other fallen down, it is in low- and moderate- Secretary Flax went on to say: words, the contractors have already income housing. failed to meet their delivery schedule. It is only slightly less than all the $2.3 in the program office the contractor is in the The first deliveries are. now scheduled billion in the fiscal 1970 budget for Fed- According to the best estimates of people range where he should be between the tar- for next December a slippage and de- eral outlays to elementary and second- get and the ceiling costs, lay of 6 months. ary education. Whether the plane when it is finally The C-SA overrun would virtually pay Secretary Flax added that the aver- delivered will perform according to the for all non-service-connected pensions age weapons systems cost of the first 53 contract specifications is also a clues- for the U.S. veterans for fiscal year 1970. production aircraft would be $22 million tion, in my opinion. For we have learned It is more by $300 million than all the each and that the average weapons sys- t the C-5A has developed a wing money we spend on veterans' hospitals tems cost for the first 115 aircraft would be $18.6 million per copy. To be generous with Secretary Flax, his testimony was wildly overoptimistic. SECOND TESTIMONY On May 8, 1968, the Air Force again testified to Congress, this time before the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations for the Department of Defense. General Robert G. Ruegg, Deputy Chief of Staff, Systems and Logistics, was asked to de- scribe the C-5A program. He responded: The design, development and manfacture of the C-5A aircraft is progressing very sat- isfactorily and is generally on schedule. General Ruegg then stated that the current average weapons systems unit cost for the approved program of 120 C-5A aircraft was $19.6 million per plane. It should be noted that there is a slight discrepancy between the testi- mony of Secretary Flax before the House Subcommittee on the Department of De- fense of the Committee on Appropria- tions and the testimony of General poor families for an entire year. eu weof the American people on t e ot er, Ruegg before the Senate Subcommittee are having trouble getting the full $100 the time has come to call a halt to such on Appropriations for the Department million for that program. The $100 mil- outrageous excesses. of Defense. The discrepancy amounts to lion needed for the program for the en- a mere $1 million per plane. Secretary tire country is only one-twentieth the $2 AIR FORCE PRESS RELEASE Flax testified that the cost would be billion overrun on this one plane. As I stated, at first the Air Force would $18.6 million for 115 aircraft, while Gen- COMBAT TROOPS not officially comment on the disclosure eral Ruegg testified that the aircraft Mr. President, the $2 billion, at $10,000 of the overrun. Finally on November 19, would cost $19.6 million for 120 aircraft. per man per year, would finance the pay 1968, a week after the disclosure wasmade before the Subcommittee on Econ- It seems strange that the unit cost of and allowances and associated personnel omy in Government, the Air Force did 120 aircraft would be more than the costs for 200,000 combat troops or more make a statement in the form of a press unit cost of 115 aircraft. But this dis- than 10 combat divisions for a full year. release. The press release stated as crepancy and this confusion in the wake That is why many of us say this coun- follows: of the real facts as we now know them try would be stronger if we spent defense C-5 is neither here nor there, unless one funds more efficiently. The prime contract for the C-5, with Lock- were to expect consistency and accuracy The $2 billion overrun on one plane heed Aircraft Corporation for the airframe on the part of the Air Force with re- and one contract would finance all the and General Electric Company for the en- gard to the costs of its weapons systems. economic assistance or AID funds in gines, were the first on a "Total Package" Again to be generous to General Ruegg, the fiscal 1970 budget of $1.973 billion, basis, which was an innovation in Govern- his testimony on the costs of the C-5A The $2 billion is five times the amount ment procurement. Under these contracts, was also wildly overoptimistic, in the budget for rural electrification, designed to check the large cost increases COST AND DELIVERY SLIPPAGE It is more than five times the amount of the past, the competing contractors made commitments with respect to production C-5 The point is that the Air Force has the Interior Department will spend on airplanes prior to their development. been asserting as recently as 6 months all forms of recreation. In view of the great risks inherent in such before the hearings before the Subcom- The $2 billion excess to be spent on commitments, which embraced a period of mittee on Economy in Government--my the C-5A is almost 20 times the $212 seven years, the contracts contained safe- subcommittee?that there was no C-5A million in the Department of Transpor- guards both for the Government and thecontractors. The Government is protected by overrun, and the Air Force assured Con- tation budget for urban mass transpor- contractual provisions which create increased gress that the program was proceeding tation to which the President addressed motivation for the contractors to produce satisfactorily. These assurances, by the himself with such vigor in the past few technically superior equipment on time at way, related to the delivery schedule and days?and high-speed ground transpor- the lowest cost possible. For example, the crack during static testing in the last and medical care. few weeks. Just how serious this wing The $2 billion overrun on the C-5A is crack is and how it relates to, the over- almost three times the $742 million in all strength or weakness of the C-5A air- the Federal budget in fiscal year 1970 for craft has not been publicly disclosed so law enforcement, justice, and civil rights. far. What kind of priority system is that In any event, one can well understand when our cities are burning, when our the embarrassment of the Air Force to Courts are jammed, when the crime rate see the public disclosure of the $2 billion has risen, and when millions of Amen- overruns in November 1968. cans still suffer the stigma and indig- HUGE FUNDS AT STAKE nities of second-class citizenship? Mr. President, $2 billion is a phe- These are among the reasons this con- nomenal amount of money. These are tract is outrageous. What kind of pri- not the funds for the yearly procure- orities do we have when we spend $2 ment of an entire military service. Two billion more on one single plane than for billion dollars is the amciunt of money any one of the programs I have men- by which costs will exceed the estimates tioned aboVe? on one weapon system alone. That is the The alarming thing about it is the Air hard, shocking, scandalous fact. Force performance. They have backed Look at the alternatives to spending and filled. They have tried to hide the the money on the overrun. facts. They have atempted to cover up Two billion dollars would pay for the the excesses. housing subsidy under the new home- CHANGE PRIORITIES owners section of the 1968 Housing Act, For the sake of the security of the for some 3% million housing units for country on the one hand, and the welfare Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9974 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 13, 1969. contractors pay 2O-SOc of every dollar above the target price of 2B$. The Government is get an investigation to determine wars and one minor "brushfire" war. whether that was desirable. That is we assume, not that we might not obligated to pay anything above the ceiling price of 2.4B$ for the first 58 airplanes Why would not the 58 C-5A's present- have to fight these two wars in succession including their engines atoll the research and 13r authorized, funded, and under con- or in a relatively short space of time; development. Similarly, should the Govern- struction not meet whatever military re- rather, we assume that we might have to ment proceed with a follow-on buy, the con- quirements exist? wage the wars all at once, simultaneously. c tract contains a formula whi+la would reduce My information indicates that the I might add, that how this farfetched and but not eliminate large lOsses that the on- tractors might incur on the nrst 58 airplanes, Air Force and the military already have questionable assumption crept into our by increasing the target cost of the follow-on more than adequate aircraft capability defense policy and our foreign policy is airplanes. All of these terms were contained with the cargo planes in its inventory, a mystery to me and until a relatively , In the original competivelv awarded con- In addition, the Air Force has access to short time ago, very few Members of the tracts, the cargo capability of private carriers. Congress, on the basis of my information, The Government is nate considering the The Air Force has traditionally utilized knew that there was such an assumption, question of ordering c-5 aiepl.ines beyond the private carriers for its airlift needs. This In any event the military requirement original 58, but no decision has been made, seems to me to be an eminently sound for the C-5A, and specifically for the full The incentive for the contractors to reduce costs remains in effect; and any such order policy. But with the addition of the C-5A 120 aircraft, is based on the 2-plus war and the excess cargo airlift capability contingency Plus the McNamara rapid will provide continued posit,ive motivation. ? . . ? - to maintain cost control. which it would bring to the Air Force, I deployment strategy. At the beginning of this pr,-Tam over three predict that there will be a change in this years ago, the Air Force estimated that the Policy. Already there are signs that the LS IT COST EFFECTIVE? cost of development and production of the military is cutting down on its use of In my judgment, the 23 aircraft from first 58 airplanes would be $1.3 billion. The private carriers. I think this is unf or- run B cannot be justified even if we ac- corresponding estimate for the 120 airplanes tunate, that it represents a mistake in cent the assumption that we must be ultimately contemplated was $3.1 billion. judgment, and that it will impair our prepared to engage in two major con- ng private carrier fleet. ventional wars and one minor war, siuml- ? lation and all other factors, ;,re $3.25 billion Current estimates, includi economic esca- THE 58 PLANES WOULD BE PRODUCED taneously, which, as I have indicated, and $4.3 billion, indicating increases of 41 . and 39% respectively. strikes me as an unrealistic if not irra- Now let me explain that my amend- tional assumption. These additional costs result from: (1) increased costs for labor and materials result- ment would not end the C-5A program I do not say that the United States ing from the combination of a significant war altogether. Fifty-eight planes has been should not have any rapid deployment effort and an unprecedented demand for authorized and are under Construction, Capability. No doubt some rapid deploy- civilian aircraft, both of which occurred after as I have stated. My amendment does not ment capability is desirable. That is not, the original estimates, (2) the introduction apply to the 58 aircraft under construe- the question here. The 58 C-5A's now of new technology, and (3) modifications to tion. These aircraft are known as first under production will give us substantial overcome technical difficultiv.; inherent in the development of all new aircraft. production run, or run A. A second pro- rapid deployment capability. What is at Based on flight experience to date, the duction run is also contemplated by the issue is the question of whether the 23 C-5 will exceed its technical rfor Air Force. In fact, the Air Force may be additional C-5A's will add significantly guarantees. contemplating several subsequent pro- to our deployment capability. In my duction runs, judgment, it will not. The 23 additional What all that verbiage means is that The second production run is known aircraft will add only the capability to the Air Force was admitting that the as run B. The total number of aircraft move the equipment for half an Army 120 C-5A's would cost approximately $1.2 in run B is 62 units. The authorization division to Europe in 3 weeks and for less billion more than the original 1965 esti- bill before us today contains funds for than one-quarter of a division to Asia in mates. This concession, although it did 23 aircraft from the second production the same period. not represent the whole kWh, indicated rim, or run B. This is a very small capability con- part of the magnitude of the problem. My amendment applies only to the 23 CONGRESSONAL RESPONSI aILITY sidering the very large price we are being aircraft in run B. The funds that my asked to pay. I would also add that the 'The problem revealed by the C-SA case amendment would strike from the bill McNamara rapid deployment concept is goes far beyond the cost of a single weap- are the funds earmarked for the 23 air- questionable because the C-5A is justi- ons system, even though the cost prob- craft. The amendment provides that no fled only during the very early move- lem alone is very great. The problem is more than 58 C-5A's, meaning run A, ment requirements following the out- whether the Congress is willing and shall be purchased until after the Comp- break of hostilities. Only for the 1- to 3- ready to exercise its full responsibility to troller General of the United States has week period following the beginning of a the American people with regard to the completed and submitted to the Congress war can the C-5A be justified. At any military budget. In my view, military a comprehensive study and investiga- later period, that later than 3 weeks, spending for many years has been out tion of the projected costs of the C-5A's. ships become a much more efficient and of control so far as the Con aress is con- Among the facts the Comptroller Gen- effective means of moving men and cerned. The Congress, in short, has failed eral should gather are those which would equipment. Ships, of course, can move to properly exercise its constitutional allow us to judge, whether the purchase many more men and much larger ton- responsibility to provide fOr the common of the 23 aircraft from run B would add ages than aircraft. defense. This responsibility should not significantly to the deployment capa- signify the complete abdication of au- bility of the military forces of the United As an example, if we plan to move our military forces to Europe from the thority by the Congress over the military States. This in effect is the military United States in a period of 2 weeks, budget in general and military weapons requirement, systems in particular. ships become more economically efficient The essence of the military require- than C-5A's. If we plan to deploy our The C-5A program symbolizes the fail- ment Justification for the C-5A concerns forces to Asia during a 314-week period, ure and the breakdown of the present the rapid deployment strategy envisioned ships are more economically efficient system, by the former Secretary of Defense, than C-5A's. way A 0-5A? Robert McNamara. This strategy con- In the first place, Congress unthink- templated the availability of military SHIPS LESS EXPENSIVE ingly permitted the military to sell the forces for very rapid deployment. It The question should be asked, what is C-5A concept to it. Is there a real mill-our realistic readiness capability? The would therefore depend upon a strategic tary requirement for the C.-5A? What is deployment force which could deliver the fact is that our military has never dem- the nature of this military requirement? necessary military forces with unpre- onstrated the capability to assemble and Why do we need 120 C-5A's? even assum- cedented speed, deploy more than one or two light air- ing that there is a real requirement? TWO AND ONE-HALF WAR STRATEGY borne or marine divisions in a matter of a few weeks. Any plan we may have to I may emphasize that my amendment All of us have now heard of the 21/2 assemble, transport, and reassemble for would permit 58 C-5A's, already author- war contingency. This means that our combat 12 or more heavy, mechanized ized. It would simply mean that the ad- entire defense strategy is based on the or armored divisions in a period of a ditional 23 C-5A's--or going to 81 C- assumption that we might have to fight few weeks is completely unrealistic based 5A's?would be held up until we could simultaneou sly two major conventional on our experience and our peacetime Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 1969 Approved Est1feitminett1ReabRIDIn$pic+164R000300100001-3 S 9975 Augusf 13, training. If we take our experience into account and allow for the relative readi- ness capabilities of peacetime troops, ships are far more inexpensive than the C-5A for equal deployment capability in a 2-month period after D-Day. Accord- ing to information that I have received, ships are one-half to one-sixth as ex- pensive as the C-5A for such a period. In other words, if 23 additional air- craft are not purchased there will be only a minor impact at best on our over- ? all rapid deployment capabilities. This is because of the relatively minor incre- mental advantage to be gained from the purchase of the 23 additional planes, considering their cost. The fact is that we already have more than an adequate aircraft capability from our available C-141's, C-130's, and our civilian reserve aircraft. Indeed this aircraft caPability is already adequate even assuming the 21/2 war contingency. According to my information currently procured air- craft forces are adequate even for emer- gency wartime supply. SYSTEMS ANALYSIS STUDY SAYS PLANE NOT JUSTIFIED I recently asked Philip N. Whittaker, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Installations and Logistics, to brief me on the military requirement for the 23 additional aircraft or for the 120 aircraft. Mr. Whittaker replied that the military requirement is based on classified infor- mation. I can well understand the Air Force's reluctance to discuss the military requirement publicly. I have learned that the most recent study by the Office of Systems Analysis into the C-5A program concludes that the 23 follow-on aircraft cannot be justified on either military or economic grounds. Mr. President, I suspect that this is probably the most important statement I shall make this afternoon, and I wish to repeat it. I think if all Senators know of this statement, very considerable question will arise in their minds as to whether they should vote for this C-5A; and I think it would be very persuasive to many Senators to vote for my amend- ment. Let me, therefore, repeat it: The most recent study by the Office of Sys- tems Analysis into the C-5A program concludes that the 23 follow-on aircraft cannot be justified on either military or economic grounds. That is an analysis by the Office of Systems Analysis, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I do not know how we can get a better qualified authority, and it is especially persuasive in view of the fact that the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Department have asked for these aircraft and yet their own analysis shows they cannot be justified on either military or economic grounds. TWO BILLION DOLLAR OVERRUN The second major issue in the C-5A procurement is the matter of costs. I have indicated that the conclusion of the Subcommittee on Economy in Govern- ment was that the cost of 120 aircraft will be about $2 billion more than was estimated when this contract was en- tered into in 1965. This brings us to a discussion of the C-5A contract. Since the largest portion of the overrun and the problems revealed so far deal with the Lockheed contract, I will refer to it. The contract entered into by the Air Force with Lockheed was a negotiated, fixed price incentive con- tract. It was the first contract utilizing the so-called total package procurement concept?TPPC. When the Air Force announced the award of this contract, it did so very proudly. It was proud of the contract as a new concept in procure- ment, that is, the total package procure- ment concept which was supposed to achieve two major objectives. Because the C-5A contract gave birth to this new concept, it is important to understand what it was supposed to do. FAILURE OF TOTAL PACKAGE PROCUREMENT First, total packaging was supposed to act as a deterrent against cost overruns in less than promised performance. To accomplish this objective, all develop- ment, production, and as much support as is feasible of a system throughout its anticipated life, was to be procured in a single contract, as one total package. The contract for the C-5A includes price and performance commitments by the contractor, which is supposed to motivate him to control costs, perform to specifica- tions, and produce on time. In view of the enormous overrun and the 6-month delay in the delivery schedule, at least two of the three criteria for performance of the contract show negative results. It has been our experience that contractors have often bought into an R. & D. con- tract by offering to perform it at a low price and making other promises, often unkept, in order to place themselves in a position to be the prime contractor or the sole source contractor for the production. The production of a weapons system, of course, is usually the more lucrative end of the job. INEFFECTIVE METHOD Second, total packaging was supposed to motivate contractors to design for economical production and support of operational hardware. In May of 1966, several months after the award of the C-SA contract, the Air Force published a description of the total package procurement concept. This de- scription contains the following pas- sages: Most simply stated, the TPPC as conceived by the Air Force, envisions that all antici- pated development, production, and as much support as is feasible of a system through- out its anticipated life is to be procured as one total package and incorporated into one contract containing price and performance commitments at the outset of the acquisition fees of a system procurement. In other words, the C-5A contract with Lockheed included R. & D. production, and support; that is, spare parts. The contract also contained priceand per- formance commitments. PAST FAILURES In explaining why the Air Force felt the need for this new contractual device, It stated: Thus, the history of defense procurement is replete with cost overruns and less than promised performance which were, at least in part, the results of intentional "buy in" bid- ding where cost estimates are understated and performance and scheduled estimates overstated on the initial contract and this has been the case even where there has been no substantial increase in the then state of the art. The principal benefits enumerated by the Air Force in this publication are that the contract: First, requires a tightening of design and configuration and discipline. Second inhibits the unrealistic sales- manship or buy in bidding, includes overestimates of performance as well as underestimates of cost. Third, motivates the contractor to de- sign initially for economical production, and should produce not only lower costs on the first production units, but also a lower takeoff point on the production learning curve, thus, benefiting every unit in the production run. Fourth, permits the Department of Defense to negotiate with a contractor on the basis of binding commitments concerning the performance and the price of what is really required?opera- tional equipment. OBJECTIVES -:17NOBTAINED These were the expressed objectives of the total packaging concept as embodied in the C-5A contract. They are desirable objectives. Unfortunately, none of them were obtained in the C-.-5A contract. There is considerable evidence, in my judgment, that Lockheed engaged in un- realistic salesmanship and that its intent was to buy into the C-5A. It did this by underbidding the Boeing Corp. which was also a candidate for the C-5A by $300 million. Lockheed also underbid its nearest competitor in price, the Douglas Corp. by $100 million. The enormous cost overruns cast Lockheed's low bid in a new perspective. In light of what we now know, Lockheed's low bid is ludicrous, and it can be reasonably concluded that Lockheed knew or had reason to know that its bid was unrealistic. The proposal submitted by the Boeing Corp. by the way, was considered superior on tech- nical design grounds than the Lockheed proposal by the Air Force Source Selec- tion Board. The Air Force assertion that this con- tract was based on binding commitments concerning the performance and price is especially foolish or deceptive in view of what we now know. This brings us to a discussion of the now famous repricing formula and it also brings us to the sub- ject of spare parts which I said earlier I would more fully discuss. REPRICING FORMULA The repricing formula contained in the contract was first publicly disclosed in hearings last November. The repricing formula is the most blatant reverse in- centive in Government contracting that I have ever encountered. It provides, in effect, that the second production run, run B, is to be repriced, on the basis of the actual cost of the first production run, run A, and in accordance with a specific formula. The effect of using the repricing formula is to renegotiate with the contractor over the price of the follow-on production, run B. It means that in the event the actual costs of the first 58 planes exceed the original esti- mates, the contractor receives a higher price for the follow-on production. In Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 1$, 1969 other words, the higher the cost to pro- duce the first 58 planes, the higher the prices goes for the follow-on aircraft. As can be seen, there is a very limited incentive to control the costs. Instead of being penalized for exceeding these cost estimates, the contractor in this case is awarded a higher price for the follow-on production. NO BINDING COMMITMENT ON COST How firm, therefore, are the firm price commitments which the Air Force has claimed for the C-5A contract? I asked this question of the then Assistant Secre- tary of the Air Force, Robert H. Charles-- the father of the package procurement, and some Senators say he wrote the book on it?when he testified before the Sub- committee on Economy in Government on January 16, 1969. The colloquy with Mr. Charles on this point follows: Mr. PROXMIRE. Do we really have binding commitments on the C-5A price if the con- tract is repriced for future production runs in order to take care pf cost overruns in the initial production? Do we not lose one of the main advantages of the total packaging? MT. CHARLES. No, I think not. Chairman PROXM/RE. I do not see how we can have binding commitments, on the one hand, on price and a repricing projection at the same time. Mr. CHARLES. I do. It is a binding clause In the contract. Any contract adjustment is made pursuant to a formula to which the competitor bids. I see nothing non-binding about it. In other words, to the Air Force a con- tract clause provides for a firm price commitment even though another clause in the contract provides for a waY to increase the price. It seems to me that under that kind of arrangement, the only party committed is the American taxpay- er and he is committed to pay any price, no matter how high and excessive it might be, once the Air Force decides it wants a new weapons system. AIR FORCE NOW ADMITS MISTAKE But even the Air Force has recently admitted that the repricing formula was a mistake. The Air Force states in its recent review of the C-5A program: This provision was well intentioned but poorly comprehended at the time of award. In operation it is beset with ambiguities, complicating its implementation and rais- ing the prospect of a reverse incentive. Un- der a selected set of conditions, the point can be reached where, for each additional dollar of cost occurring in the production of Run A aircraft, an increase of total con- tract target and ceiling of more than a dollar could result. This potential could encourage the contractor to add costs to Run A so as to reduce overall loss on both the Run A and Run B production. GOLDEN HANDSHAKE Contrary to Air Force claims at the early stages of this program, when it was being sold to the Congress and to the public, the contract has not produced lower costs for the first production units. The costs for the first production units are greatly exceeding the original esti- mates. Thus, instead of a lower takeoff point on the production of learning curve, benefiting every unit in the production run, we have a higher takeoff point on the production learning curve, thus in- flating every unit in the production rim. On top of all this, we have the repricing formula, which has been called the "golden handshake," which further in- flates the cost of the run B aircraft. The Subcommittee on Economy in Govern- ment concluded in its unanimous report the following: Not only were the price increases made possible by the repricing formula, but the cost overruns which are resulting in the higher prices may very well have been en- couraged by the existence of the formula and by the nature of the formula. For the mere fact that a repricing provision existed in the contract constituted a built-in get- well remedy for almost any kind of cost growth. According to this provision, the price of the second increment (run B) could be increased ori the basis of excessive actual costs on the first increment (run A). The motivation, if any, of the incentive feature of the contract is thereby largely nullified, provided the contractor is confident that the Government will exercise the option. Why bother to keep coats down if their increase forms the basis for a higher price? Addi- tionally, because of the nature of the for- mula, the higher the percentage of overrun over the original contract ceiling price on the first increment, the higher the per- centage by which the second increment is repriced. As I have indicated, the Air Force itself now recognizes that the repricing for- mula was a serious mistake. The mistake was so serious that the Air Force says it would now like to renegotiate the con- tract to remove the reverse incentive fea- ture. The Air Force review of the C.-5A program calls for such a renegotiation. The problem, however, cannot be so easily resolved. Revising the contract to eliminate or modify the repricing form- ula will not make this a good contract nor will it necessarily reduce the cost of the C-5A to the Government. And the cost is what is at issue here. SHOULD STOP AFTER FIRST RUN There is no way, in my judgment, to get out from under the huge cost of this program without curtailing it at this point. If the program is. ended at the completion of the first 58 aircraft, Lock- heed would be forced to absorb the cost of overruns for which they are responsi- ble, over and above the ceiling price in the contract. There is no reason for Lock- heed not to absorb the costs over and above the ceiling price. And these costs, by the way, would in- clude the possibly extensive costs brought about by the recent failure of the C-5A wing to meet structural strength require- ments. I might add here that the failure of the C-5A to meet the structural strength requirements in the contract is a serious matter. It is no excuse to say that the plane is satisfactory to 100 per- cent of its designed load limit, and that it only fails to meet 150 percent of the designed load limit. The fact is that the 150 percent provides for a safety feature which is absolutely essential before any plane can be deemed airworthy. The FAA, according to my understanding, would require this plane to meet 200 percent of its designed load limit. But the Air Force has decided for some reason which it has not made known, not to seek FAA certi- fication, although the contract provides for FAA certification. In addition, the fact that the plane failed to meet the static tests indicates that it would more than likely fail under dynamic condi- tions. Static tests only simulate dynamic conditions. The static tests that occur on the ground do not create the same kind of stresses on an airframe that is created during the dynamic conditions that occur in the air. LETTER TO SECRETARY On this point I wrote a letter to Robert Seamans, Secretary of the Air Force, on July 18, 1969, inquiring about the report- ed crack in the C-5A wing. I also ad- dressed certain questions to the Secretary relating to recent changes in the C-5A specifications which seem to represent degradations in its performance stand- ards. So far I have had no response from the Secretary of the Air Force to my letter, although I wrote him on July 18! However, I believe that what I said to him was pertinent to this discussion: JULY 18, 1969. The Hon. ROBERT C. SEAMANS, Jr., Secretary of the Air Force, Department of Defense, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. DEAR Ma. SECRETARY: I have noted the re- cent announcement by the Air Force that tests of a C-5A aircraft produced a crack in one of its wings. This development seems to me to raise ad- ditional questions about the C-5A program. You may be aware of recent testimony by Mr. A. E. Fitzgerald before the Subcommittee on Eat:moray in Government with regard to certain changes in the C-5A specifications. One of the changes, according to Mr. Fitz- gerald, is a decrease in the maximum speed for lowering flaps on landing from 205 knots to 180 knots. Another change is a decrease In the maximum allowable sink rate at land- ing. It occurs to me that both of these changes represent degradations in the C-SA specifications. What are the reasons for lowering the standards of the C-5A specifications? Have wing cracks, fuselage cracks, or any other substantial defects been produced in the C-SA prior to July 13, 1969, by ground static tests or other tests or usage of this aircraft? Were the performance standards for the C-&A lowered because defects were produced in previous tests? Would you be normally advised of any defects produced from the C-SA during tests? Will the delivery schedule for the C-5A be affected by the current difficulty? If the delivery schedule will be delayed, please esti- mate the amount of the delay. Please estimate the cost of fixing the cur- rent difficulty (the cracked wing). Who will pay the cost of necessary modifications, the Government or the contractor? In the event that Congress does not auth- orize the purchase of the Run B aircraft, who would pay the costs of the modifica- tions made necessary by the cracked wing? In the event that Congress does authorize the purchase of Run B, who would pay the costs of the modifications? Your early response to these questions will be appreciated. Sincerely, WILLIAM PROXM/RE, Chairman, Subcommittee on Economy in Government. IS GOVERNMENT LIABLE FOR REPAIRS4 The question that we also need an- swered is whether the purchase of the 23 additional aircraft would make the Gov- ernment liable for the cost of repairs and modifications necessary to correct the structural defect. This is one of the ques- tions which my amendment seeks to an- swer. In the amendment, the Comptrol- Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2011/31tiEbeffP7gmaptR0003ooi 00001-3 August 13, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL ? A ler General is instructed specifically to seek an answer to this question. I should add here that according to the lawyers for the contractor, the Govern- ment would be liable not only for the costs of repairing the cracked wing and making whatever modifications are nec- essary, but would also be liable for all contractor losses and termination costs if the full 120 aircraft are not procured. This view is based on the fact that the Secretary of the Air Force early this year exercised the option to purchase the fol- low-on aircraft. The exercise of this option was an- nounced on the morning of the January 16, 1969, hearings before the Subcom- mittee on Economy in Government, of which I am chairman. This announce- ment came in spite of my request to the Secretary of Defense that the Govern- ment not commit itself to purchase the Run B aircraft until a complete investi- gation of the cost overruns could be com- pleted. The investigation I asked for was not even started on the morning of Jan- uary 16, when the announcement of the Government was made. COST OF SPARES The amendment I have introduced ad- dresses itself to several other cost issues, including the cost of spares. The Air Force has consistently tried to gloss over and obscure the huge cost increases that have occurred on the spare parts. It has even attempted to create the impression that the original contract did not include the cost of spares. This is not true. The contract entered into in 1965 with Lock- heed did not include the cost of spares. Now the Air Force claims that the ori- ginal contract included only the cost of Initial spares as distinguished from re- plenishment spares. The difference, as it has been explained to me by the Air Force, is that the initial spares would be comparable to the first set of tires on an automobile needed to replace the ori- ginal tires, while the replenishment spares would be the second and third set of new tires. The question, then, is whether the ori- ginal contract estimates included the cost of the replenishment spares. REPLENISHMENT SPARES IN CONTRACT In answering that question, I would first point out that the contract itself contains a provision covering the costs of replenishment spare parts and repair spare parts. Secondly, it has always been assumed by persons familiar with the contract from its origin that replenish- ment spares were included in the orig- inal contract estimates. This assump- tion is based on the description of the to- tal package contract described by the Air Force in 1966 and on an early brief- infl document written in 1965. The Air Force's description of total packaging, as I stated earlier, indicated that all anticipated development, production, and as much support as is feasible was to be included in the total package con- tract. This would include spare parts, whether initial or replenishment. Further, the briefing document which I referred to states explicitly that re- plenishment spare parts are to be in- cluded as part of the C-5A package. I will now read from this briefing docu- ment. On the title page is the following: Contract AF 33(657) 15053 FPLF-VP, C-5A, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Lockheed? Georgia Div. On page 3 of this document, which was prepared by the Air Force, is the follow- ing: What we bought: Item A?RDT&E, Sys- tem Integration and Assembly ACFT/Mis- sion Kits, Training/Training Equipment, AGE, System Test, System Management, Data and Reports. On page 4, this list of what the Air Force bought continues: What we bought: Item B?Production, ACFT/Mission Kits, Training & Train- ing Equipment, AGE, Contract Technical Services. Provisions for: Initial Spare and Repair Parts, Replenishment Spare and Repair Parts, Up Dating/Modification Changes. It will be noted, of course, that the list of what the Air Force bought with the C-5A contract included initial spare and repair parts as well as replenishment spare and repair parts. In my judgment, the Air Force is in- tentionally attempting to confuse the Congress and the people on the subject of spare parts. Mr. President, I go into the detail on replenishment spare parts because again and again we have had different esti- mates as to the original cost of the C-5A and as to its present cost. Repeatedly, those who have argued that the overrun is not $2 billion but some lesser figure It is $1.4 or $1.3 billion?have said that in the initial estimates, replenishment spare parts were not included, and that by adding the cost of replenishment spare parts in the present estimates, we are not comparing the same things. I go into this detail today to estabilsh beyond any question the documentation to show that I am comparing the same things, that the replenishment spare parts are included in both, and that on that basis there is a $1.9 billion to $2 billion overrun. Rarely has there been a case with so much concealment and obstruction on the part of a Government agency with respect to its handling of public funds that has been so well demonstrated and documented in public hearings. The cal- lous and devious treatment by the Air Force of one of its employees, Mr. A. E. Fitzgerald, well illustrates this point. FITZGERALD CASE Mr. Fitzgerald has been the deputy for Management Systems, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, for almost 4 years. His responsibilities until recent months included development of the management controls used on the C-5A program. He was also a member of the steering committee reviewing the financ- ing of the C-5A. He was first asked to testify before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government last November because of his recognized expertise in the area of management systems and cost controls. Mr. Fitzgerald's problems began when he was invited to testify. The Air Force first attempted to deny his appearance before the subcommittee altogether. Only S 9977 after repeated urgings by my office did the Air Force finally relent and grudg- ingly permit him to appear. However, the Air Force notified me that Mr. Fitz- gerald was to appear only in the capacity of a "backup" witness. The main witness was to be someone else. But this some- one else was an individual with whom the subcommittee was not familiar and whom it had not invited. In other words, the Department of De- fense was attempting to dictate to the Subcommittee of Congress who was to be its principle witness: and the Depart- ment of Defense had taken it upon itself to inform us of the appearance of some- one who was not invited, while relegating the individual who was invited to "backup" status. Of course, the subcom- mittee insisted on hearing from Mr. Fitzgerald, and we did. However, the Air Force denied Mr. Fitzgerald the opportunity to prepare a written statement, although the sub- committee had requested a written state- ment from him in our letter of invitation. A written statement permits the witness to organize his testimony in an orderly way, and to prepare statistical data, charts, and other materials. It also provides a committee with a chance to become familiar with the testimony in advance of the hearing, to prepare thoughtful questions, and to have a more fruitful dialog with the witness. But the subcommittee was denied this oppor- tunity because of tbe directive to Mr. Fitzgerald not to prepare a written statement. The only explanation, in my judgment, is that the Pentagon was attempting to interfere with this witness' testimony by gagging him as much as possible. This explanation is amply supported by the events that followed Mr. Fitz- gerald's oral testimony in November. In his oral testimony, responding to direct questions from me, he conceded the fact that there would be a cost overrun on the C-5A, possibly as high as $2 billion. COMPUTER ERROR Less than 2 weeks after his testimony, he was notified of his loss of Civil Service tenure. Imagine that. Less than 2 weeks after this man testified before a congres- sional committee and simply answered a question put to him--and as far as we know he answered it honestly?he was notified of the loss of his civil service tenure by the Air Force. The Air Force claims that this action was only coinci- dental to the fact that he had recently testified before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government about the C-5A. It was called a "computer error." We checked on the basis of the latest testi- mony and found that the,computer made very few errors. It had made two errors before that were similar to this one, al- though it made some 50,000 decisions. Whether the Air Force's action in strip- ping Fitzgerald of his job protection was a coincidence may be judged from the events that followed. For the subcommit- tee subsequently obtained a copy of a memorandum to the Secretary of the Air Force from the Secretary's administra- tive assistant. The memorandum was dated January 6, 1969. Approved For Release 2004/11/30 CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9978 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 18, 1969 GET RID OF )11ZGRRALD The intriguing feature of this memo- randum is that it concerns ways in which the Air Force could get Ad of Mr. Fitz- gerald. I think the Members of this body ought to think about this a few minutes. Here was the Secretary of the Air Force, Harold Brown, receiving an interoffice memorandum from his administrative assistant. The subject of the memoran- dum was ways by which the Air Force could get rid of one of its civilian em- ployees. The civilian employee happened to be Mr. A. E. Fitzgerald. The civilian employee happened to have testified be- fore a committee of Congress on the costs of the C-5A cargo plant. The civilian employee testified that there would be a $2 billion cost overrun oh -this program. Previously the Air Force had gone to great lengths to hide the costs of the overruns. Less than 2 weeks after his testimony the civilian employee was stripped of his Civil Service public ten- ure. A few weeks later a memorandum is prepared by the administrative assist- ant on how to get rid of the civilian em- ployee. Is this still a coincidence? The memorandum itself explained for the benefit of Secretary Brown three separate actions "which could result in Mr. Fitzgerald's departure" They were, first, adverse actions for cause. Second. reduction in force. Third, conversion of Mr Fitzgerald's position from an ex- cepted category to career service, and then eliminating him in subsequent com- petitive procedures. To etplain the last possibility, the memorandum contains this example of Air Force ethical constraints: This action is not recommended since It is rather underhanded and Would probably not be approved by the Civil Service Com- mission, even though it is legally and pro- cedurally possible. A coincidence? I have done everything in my power to prevent the Air For oe from taking punitive action against Mr. Fitzgerald. In my view, he is a dedicated, loyal Fed- eral employee and citizen, whose conduct is beyond reproach. His only offense is that he is cost conscious. His job is to control costs, to save the taxpayers' money. He works at this job conscien- tiously and tries to save as much of the taxpayers' money as possible. He is extremely competent in this area. He is one of those rare persons who is highly gifted and who has had the char- acter and the strength to persist in what is an unpopular job of trying to hold down costs. This is the kind of conduct which engenders real hostility on the part of contractors and others who worked with him in the Air Force and the Pentagon. COLD CLIMATE FOR F/TZGERALD Unfortunately, there are those in high places in the Air Force and in the De- partment of Defense who do not agree with this approach to Government spending. And these persons have been responsible for the peculiar coincidences affecting Mr. Fitzgerald's job. Even now they are attempting to hound and dis- credit him. His major responsibilities have been taken away from him. Instead of the major weapons systems for which he was formerly responsible, his new job is to look into the cost overruns on a bowl- ing alley in Thailand. But perhaps the most reprehensible and dangerous acts committed by the Air Force in connection with Mr. Fitz- gerald's appearance before the subcom- mittee relates to the supplemental testi- mony the subcommittee requested last November. The subcommittee had asked Mr. Fitzgerald to prepare certain cost data and other information in writing, to be submitted to the subcommittee fol- lowing the close of oral testimony. Among other things, the? subcommittee had asked for a breakdown of the C-5A cost overruns. The request was made on No- vember 13, 1968. DELAYED TRANSMITTAL Not until December 24, 1968, did the subcommittee receive the materials from Mr. Fitzgerald, and only after the sub- committee has raised strenuous objec- tions to the delay in transmitting the supplemental testimony. In fact, as the subcommittee later learned, Mr. Fitz- gerald had prepared his supplemental testimony within a few days of the No- vember 13 apeparance and had turned it over to the Air Force for transmittal to the subcommittee. The Air Force had held on to the supplemental testimony and intentionally delayed its transmittal for more than 4 weeks. The materials received on -December 24, were labeled "Insert for the Record testimony of A. E. Fitzgerald." How- ever, upon checking with Mr. Fitzgerald, the subcommittee learned that the mate- rials received on December 24 were not the same materials prepared by Mr. Fitz- gerald. They had been altered by the Air Force. More importantly the Air Force had altered the C-5A cost esti- mates prepared by Mr. Fitzgerald. The alterations made it appear that Mr. Fitz- gerald's figures corresponded with the official Air Force figures contained in its November 19 press release. The subcommittee advised the Air Force that it would not accept the mate- rials received on December 24 as the testimony of A. E. Fitzgerald. We in- sisted on our right to receive the true and accurate testimony of the witness, unaltered and uncensored by the Air Force. The subcommittee finally, on January 15, received Mr. Fitzgerald's au- thentic and uncensored testimony. The Air Force's attempts to muzzle, interfere and alter the testimony of Mr. Fitzgerald cannot be justified. They ap- pear to have been almost desperate and panic stricken in their efforts to prevent public disclosure of the C-5A overrun. The Air Force testimony in two separate committees of Congress in March and May of 1968 that there was no C-5A overrun should be considered in this con- nection. LATE REPORTING OF OVERRUN What also needs to be considered is the fact that they began to learn of the C-15A overrun as early as November 1966. During that month an Air Force team, which included Mr. Fitzgerald, vis- ited the Air Force plant in Marietta, Ga., where the C-5A was being pro- duced. The review team found overruns of up to 100 percent in key segments of the program. That was in 1966, a year and a half before Mr. Flax testified before an ap- propriations subcommittee of the House that there were no overruns, and that the costs were between the cost and the ceiling. The second visit 3 weeks later con- firmed the initial observation. The over- run in the C-5A program grew steadily in late 1966. Yet, according to the evi- dence received by the subcommittee, evi- dence of its existence began disappear- ing from Department of Defense internal reports. In 1968 evidence of the over- runs also disappeared from internal Air Force reports. In fact, the Air Force re- ports had been changed by directive from higher headquarters to eliminate the evidence of the C-5A overruns. Mr. Fitz- gerald requested an audit to determine the true facts about the C-5A costs but it was never performed. Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. PROXMIRE. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Virginia. Mr. BYRD of Virginia. The Senator from Wisconsin mentioned that the rec- ords were altered, and I believe he said by higher authority. Could the Senator identify the higher authority more pre- cisely? Mr. PROXMIRE. I cannot identify it other than by saying that the informa- tion, the testimony of Mr. Fitzgerald, was sent to us and we received it. We then checked with Mr. Fitzgerald and he said that that was not his testimony, that it had been changed by persons in the Air Force. Unfortunately, at the present time, I do not know and I cannot tell the distinguished Senator from Virginia who it was that changed that testimony. I will do my best to determine the identity of that person, or persons, and provide it for the RECORD. Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I was not so much concerned about that as whether it was done within the Air Force or by a higher echelon; namely, the Depart- ment of Defense as differentiated from the Air Force. Mr. PROXMIRE, Again, I would have to say to the distinguished Senator from Virginia that I am not sure. I think he makes a good point. It could come from either source. It would not be fair to the Air Force to assume that it was likely they, because it might very well have come from the Department of Defense. Mr. Fitzgerald worked insthe office of the Secretary of the Air Force. His superior was in the office of the Secretary of the Air Force. On the other hand, he did work with the Department of Defense in this, and it could have come from either area, both of which, of course, would be higher headquarters than Mr. Fitzgerald. Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I have had great concern about this contract, just as has the Senator from Wisconsin. I shall not further interrupt the Senator at this time, but when he finishes his address, I should like to go over a few points with him. Mr. PROXMIRE. Very good. Mr. President, I believe that the evi- dence in the case indicts the Air Force Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 August- 13, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE S 9979 and Department of Defense for its han- dling of the C-5A program. The C-5A has been mismanaged and public funds have been mishandled. The Air Force has shown its great disregard for the heavy responsibility it has over the use of public funds, and it has shown serious disrespect for Congress by its high- handed conduct. MISMANAGED WEAPONS SYSTEM I might point out that the Air Force is not alone in this regard. The House investigation of the Army Sheridan tank program revealed similar disclosure problems, deceptions, and mismanage- ment on the part of the military. The Aerospace Daily and Executive Report, a trade newspaper, on July 30, 1969, com- mented on certain aspects of the tank and the C-5A cases. I believe what the Aerospace Daily has to say on this mat- ter is significant because that journal can by no means be labeled as critical of military spending or of the aerospace industry. I will therefore read excerpts from what the Aerospace Daily has to say: Pentagon internal reporting has come un- der fire and suspicion as an outgrowth of findings of the House Army tank investiga- tion and Congressional hearings on the C-5A jet transport cost overrun. In the $2.5 billion Army tank procurement, House Armed 8ervices Committee investiga- tors found internal reports misleading, in- accurate and deliberately optimistic. Officials connected with the program were criticized for failing to provide objective information to high command upon which logical and sup- portable decisions could be made. In the now $4.6 billion C-SA Galaxy trans- port procurement, Air Force admits that it deliberately did not report for two years initial and continuing cost growth which showed up only five months Into the eight- year program. In the fl7st case, Army claimed it wrote optimistic reports on development of the M-551 Sheridan light assault reconaissance vehicle and its Shillelagh weapons system because at every reporting period developers "believed" serious deficiencies were shortly to be corrected. The House investigation shows they were not in many cases, despite 10 years of work. In the second case, Air Force said it with- held cost growth because it did not want to jeopardize the financial condition, in the stock market and elsewhere of its only C-5A supplier. As a result of these faulty reports, Con- gressmen and Senators charged with respon- sibility for authorizing and appropriating De- fense funds have been abashed to discover they are the last persons to find out about unsolved developmental problems and cost overruns. In a time of inflation, high taxes and serious Federal budget constraints, they are placed in a tenuous position vis a vie their constituents. The article then points out that the Senate Armed Services Committee has requested quarterly reports on cost, schedule, and performance on 31 major weapons systems and that it is consider- ing having the General Accounting Office monitor contracts, The Aerospace Daily continues: How effective this step will be has to be seen. House tank investigators found that GAO was denied access to Army records, a procedure which the Pentagon can invoke under "executive privilege" precedents. Fur- ther complications are caused by differing record-keeping and auditing procedures used by the services and by their contractors. A price example is the fact that in the C-5A procurement Air Force estimates that contractor Lockheed Air Craft will lose $285 million. Lockheed estimates it will lose $13 million but make a profit after spares are ordered. The systems analysts in Laird's of- fice have still another set of figures. It remains that the Pentagon's veracity has been hurt by the findings of Congressional inquiries into the tank and transport pro- curements. Members of Congress can forgive and forget if they feel they made a bad de- cision based on objective information. But if the information they received was not honest, they will look at future Pentagon reports askance, and take them with a very large grain of salt. TIME TO CALL A HALT What all of this adds up to, in my judgment, is that the Congress must call a halt to Pentagon shenanigans. The C- 5A case symbolizes the worst aspects of military procurement. The Air Force has been managing this program since 1965 and it has utterly failed to do a good job. Public funds have been squandered on a program of dubious value which will cost at least $2 billion more than Congress originally agreed to pay. Where are the C-5A overruns leading? The recent Air Force report admits that "there is a dis- tinctive possibility that costs may con- tinue to increase." I believe that this statement means that the Air Force is putting the Congress on notice that it will come in at a later date to ask for even more money for the C-5A. Mr. President, let me add that when Assistant Secretary Whittaker briefed me in my office a few days ago he said that, too. He said that there is evidence of further cost growth, that we have not seen the end of the overruns on the C-5A, that we cannot say that $2 billion is the limit; it could be more. There is every Indication that it will be more. As a mat- ter of fact, the Air Force now is being franker in predicting overruns than it has been at any time. The American people deserve a better accounting of its tax money with respect to the C-5A program than we can now give. My amendment will at least place the Congress in a position of knowing what the real military requirements for the 23 additional aircraft are and what the economic justification for them is. The amendment asks the General Ac- counting Office for an investigation of the facts and to submit its findings with recommendations to the Congress within 90 days. NEED MORE KNOWLEDGE Clearly it is not unreasonable to re- fuse to authorize any additional C-5A's until we know more about this program. Furthermore, if it is determined that there is a military requirement for the 23 additional aircraft, then I believe we ought to know what they will cost and whether their costs will be ballooned by the re-pricing formula. I therefore urge the adoption of the amendment. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that sections from the.Subcommit- tee on Economy in Government Report on the Economics of Military Procure- ment, on the C-5A overruns, which in- eludes a table on the cost overruns, be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the excerpts were ordered to be printed in the REC- ORD, as follows: 2. COST OVERRUNS: THE C?CA CARGO PLANE The Air Force selected the Lockheed Air- craft Corp. as the airframe prime contractor for the C-5A, a large, long-range, heavy logistic aircraft, on September 30, 1965, after proposals had been received in response to Requests for Proposals (RFP) from 5 firms, and preliminary contracts had been entered into with 3 of them in 1961. It is not clear, from the evidence, how much price compe- tition had to do with the selection. Secretary Charles testified that there was competition among the firms. But when asked how low Lockheed's bid was compared to the others, he refused to disclose the figures on the grounds that "this is company proprietary information". A similar procedure resulted in the selection of General Electric as the engine manufacturer. The contract with Lockheed is a negotiated, fixed price incentive fee contract. It is also the first contract utilizing the total pack- age procurement concept (TPPC). Two major objectives of the concept, according to the Defense Department, are to discourage con- tractors from buying in on a design and de- velopment contract with the intention of re- covering on a subsequent production con- tract, and to motivate contractors to design for economical production and support of operational hardware. Thus, TPPC is sup- posed to act as a deterrent against cost over- runs and less-than-promised performance. To accomplish this, all development, pro- duction, and as much support as is feasible of a system throughout its anticipated life, Is to besprocured in a single contract, as one total package. The contract includes price and performance commitments to motivate the contractor to control costs, perform to specifications, and produce on time, As the C-5A is an incentive contract (TPPC 'does not necessarily result in incentive contract- ing) it contains the usual financial rewards and penalties associated with incentive con- tracting. The C-SA contract for the airframe pro- vides for five research, development, test and evaluation (R.D.T. & E.) aircraft plus an ini- tial production run of 53 airplanes (the total of 58 planes is called run A), and a Govern- ment option for additional airplane. The present approved program for the C-5A is 120 airplanes comprised of run A (58 air- planes) plus run B (57 airplanes) plus five airplanes from run Cl. The testimony received during the No- vember 1968 hearings indicated a cost over- run in the C-5A program totaling as much as $2 billion. A "cost overrun" is the amount in excess of the original target cost. Accord- ing to the testimony, the program originally called for 120 C-5A airplanes to cost the Government $3.4 billion, but because of cost overruns mainly being experienced in the performance of the Lockheed contract actual costs would total $5.3 billion, Following the November hearings, Senator Proxmire asked GAO to investigate into the causes and amount of the C-5A overruns and other matters relating to the contract. On November 19, 1968, the Air Force an- nounced, in a press release, that the original estimate for 120 C-5A aircraft was $3.1 bil- lion, compared to the current estimate of $4.3 billion. Subsequently, in response to a request by the subcommittee, Mr. Fitzger- ald, who was responsible for the develop- ment of a management controls used on the C-5A and who was on a steering committee directing a financial review of the C-5A, supplied a breakdown of the estimates of C-5A program cost to completion. This data showed Air Force estimates for 120 airplanes Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9980 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP711300364R000300100001-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 13I 1969 was $3.4 billion in 1965, and $5,3 billion in cal advances beyond the state of the art, dismayed to learn that this decision was 1968, indicating an overran of about $2 bil- The inflation argument, which is supposed made before the completion of the GOO in- lion. The difference between the Air Force to account for $500 million of the cost vestigation and without a full disclosure of press release and the data supplied by Mr. growth, appears questionable. The contract the reasons for the cost overruns. The public Fitzgerald seecos to be accounted for in the contains an inflation provision to protect the interest in economy in Government was not figures for spare parts. The data supplied by contractor from unforeseeable price changes served by this precipitous decision, an- Mr. Fitzgerald shows $0.3 billion for spares in the economy, to go into effect 3 years after flounced a few hours before the start of a estimated in 1965, and $0.0 billion in 1968. the issuance of the initial contract, that is, congressional hearing and a few days before If the figures for spares are celded to the esti- October 1, 1968. The initial 3-year period the inauguration of the new President, mates in the Air Force press release, the tele was supposed to be considered &normal busi- sets of figures are close to another. new riek. The Air Force official explanation Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, In the January 16 follow up hearing, GAO of this provision states: "The contract thus will the Senator from Wisconsin yield? reported on its investigation, the nature of included in the price an amount which re- Mr. PROXMIRE. I am happy to yield Which is discussed below on page 40. Briefly, fleeted a projection of the mounting cost to the Senator from Virginia. GAO transmitted to the subcommittee lig- trend in the economy of labor, materials, urea supplied by the Air Force 2 days prior equipment, and subcontract prices." If fu- Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I do not want to the hearing. These figura; indicated a sub- ture inflation for at least 3 years was in- at this time, to comment on the amend- to overrun but a smaller total cost for eluded in the price, it is hard to see why ment offered by the Senator from Wis- the overall C-5A program than the $5.3 bil- inflation should be a major factor in later consin because I want to give it more lion figure shown in the November hearth. s increasing the price. Without a more study than I have had the opportunity The reason for the lower total was the orals- thorough investigation of the Go5A program, to give it up to this point. However, I sion by the Air Force at the COatS Of the the technical problems encountered, the commend him for going so fully and into spares, failure to anticipate them at the time of the Nevertheless, testimony and other en- negotiation, and operations of the inflation such detail in regard to the C-5A con- dence received in the course of the hearings provision, the subcommittee cannot form any tract. confirmed the existence of the approximately firm conclusions about the reasons for the It seems to me the Senator from WiS- $2 billion overrun in the CaiA program, the enormous overrun. consin has rendered both the Senate and reverse incentives contained in the repric- A repricing formula built into the contract the American people a real service. lag formula, and large overruns in other Air was also revealed in the November testimony. I have been deeply concerned with re- Force programs. The latest estimate of the The repricing formula is one of the most gard to this contract, which appears to total cost of 120 C-5A's, including spares, blatant reverse incentives ever encountered me to be so flexible and so ambiguous provided by Secretary Charles., is $5.1 billion, by this subcommittee, it should be recalled This is close to the estimate previously sup- that the Coco contract is supposed to repre- that either party can do almost anything plied by Mr. Fitzgerald, and about $2 billion sent an important step toward cost control. it might wish to do. more than was estimated in 1965. The eel- An Aix Force manual on the total package In that connection, I ask unanimous lowing table shows the estimates supplied procurement concept dated May 10, 1966, consent to insert In the RECORD at this by Mr. Fitzgerald, the Air Force press re- states that "It should produce not only lower point some inquiries that I put to the lease of November 19, 1468, and Assistant Costs on the first production units, but, in Secretary Charles: president of Lockheed and other officials turn, a lower take-off point on the produc- of Lockheed when they appeared before COMPARISON OF ESTIMATES OF C 5A PROGRAM tion learning curve, thus benefiting every the Committee on Armed Services. That unit in the production run." The facts about Iln billions of dollar A the C-5A axe just the reverse. Costs for the testimony begins on page 2150, beginning Whether the actual performance of the t.-D& Fitzgerald Air,Forre relcasel Charles 1965 1968 1965 1968 1965 1968 120 aircraft: ROT. & E. plus production AFLC 2 invest- $3.1 $4.4 $3.1 $4.3 p.3 ment .3 .9 .8 Tote: 3.4 5.3 3. 1 4.3 5,1 with, "Senator BYRD of Virginia. Thank first production units are greatly exceeding original estimates, resulting in higher take- you, Mr. Chairman," and goes through off point on the production learning curve, page 2152, ending with, "Senator BYRD thus inflating every unit in the production of Virginia. Thank you very much." run. In addition, the contract is supposed to There being no objection, the extract provide the Government with binding COM- was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, mitrnents on price and performance. Obvi- as follows: ously, there is in fact no binding comm.. rnent on price if the price can be modified Senator Byrd? upwards, as is being done in the C-5A, be- Senator BYRD of Virginia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, cause cause actual costs are exceeding estimates. lives up to its promise remains to be shall not attempt to second-guess either the Air Force or Lockheed on this contract. seen. On the matter of delivery, it is Necessarily it is a very interesting complicated one. It 1 The Air Force press release of Nov.19.1968, did not provide to note that the Air Force announced on does seem to one after 2 days at hearings it is cost breakdowns between RAT. & E. (iesearch development, February 25, 1969, a 6-month delay in the a very flexible one and a very ambiguolis one testing, and engineering), production ruus, and AFLC invest- first operational C-5A aircraft from June I woud like to get an understanding of a meat. The figures given seem to omit Atia investment. 1969 to'Deceinber 1969. couple of things. by Fitzgerald includes spare parts; that submitted by Charles 2 AFLC (Air Force Logistics Command) investment submitted Not only were the price increases made As I recollect Mr. May's chart, Lockheed includes initial spares, replenishment .pares, and support. possible by the repricing formula, but the says that the cost to the Government when Table submitted by Secretary Charles (heilings, pt. 1, p. 311) cost overruns which are resulting in the high- Mr. MAY. Yes, sir. the contract is completed will be $3.2 billion. does not include estimates for 1965. er prices may very well have been encouraged The cost growth in the 0-5/1 program can by the existence of the formula and by the Senator BYRD of Virginia. Now the Air be seen in the table. The figures supplied nature of the formula. For the mere fact Force testified yesterday, said I checked my by Fitzgerald show an ineeease from $3.4 that a repricing provision existed in the memory a little while ago, that the cost to billion in 1965 to $5.3 billion in 1968. The contract constituted a built-in get-well rem- the Government will be $4.3 billion, or a Air Force press release can be reconciled with edy for almost any kind of cost growth. difference of more than $1 billion, and could the Fitzgerald figures if the AFSLC inveet- According to this provision, the price of the it be explained where that $1 billion is? meat (spares) is added to each of the esti- second increment (run B) could be increased Mr. MAY. Senator Byrd, I think we have to mates. Thut, the $3.1 billion estimate for on the basis of excessive actual costs on the recognize that the Air Force estimates are 1965 would total $3.4 billion, and the $4.3 first increment (run A), The motivation, if for the total program, including the Govern- billion estimate for 1968 would total $5.2 any, of the incentive feature of the contract ment-furnished engines. Our projections that billion. Secretary Charles' own figures far is thereby largely nullified, provided the con- we showed you are only for that portion of 1968 total $5.1 billion. The subcommittee re- tractor is confident that the Government the cost that Lockheed is responsible for, jects the attempts of Air Force spokesmen will exercise the option. Why bother to keep and this involves primarily the airframe. to minimize the size of the program or the costs down if their increase forms the basis Now that differential that you speak of, as size of the overrun by removing spares 8.8 for a higher price? Additionally, because of best I can understand it consists therefore an item of oost. Spares are an integral part the nature of the formula, the higher the of items that are not within the framework of the Co5A program and shOuld be included percentage of overrun over the original con- of our contract, plus the difference in esti- in any consideration of costs, tract ceiling price on the first increment, the mates that exist between what the Air Force According, to the Air Force, tile coat growth higher the percentage by which the second feels our mete will be and what we feel they in the Ch-&A program has resulted from nor- increment is repriced. will be for 115 airframes. mal development problems associated with The subcommittee learned, on the morn- Senator BYRD of Virginia. You feel that complex weapons and inflation However, the ing of the January 16, 1969, hearing, that the your cost will be a great deal less than the subcommittee notes that the C--543 was Air Force had exercised the run. B option Air Force believes your cost will be? chosen for the first application of the total for 57 additional C-5A aircraft, apparently Mr. MAY. I think the Air Force estimate is package procurement concept partly for the committing the Government to spend at least approximately $200 million higher than ours complex weapon system requiring technologi. reason that it was not considered a highly $5.1 billion an aircraft originally estimated through 115 airplanes, and that the differ- to cost $3.3 billion. The subcommittee was ence in those numbers that you are citing Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved Foj&zasesatilaiapP7A9i3j6t, R000300100001-3 S 9981 'August 13, 1969 is accounted for by the prime contract with the General Electric Co. for the furnishing of their TF-39 engines. Senator BYRD of Virginia. Then the cost to the Government, if you take Lockheed's figure, is not $3 billion which your chart shows? That is only your part of the contract? Mr. MAY. Yes. We feel that is the only por- tion that we are competent to testify about. Senator BYRD of Virginia. Yes, I agree with that, but I wanted to get clear that the total contract, the total cost to the Government will not be $3.2 billion for the total con- tract. It will be $3.2 billion if you are correct insofar as Lockheed's share is concerned. Mr. MAY. That is correct, sir. Senator BYRD of Virginia. You have a dif- ference between the Air Force and the Lock- heed Company, there is a difference of about $272 million, as I understand the figures. The loss would be 285 if the Air Force is cor- rect, while it would be roughly $13 million if Lockheed's figures are correct. Mr. MAY. Yes, sir. Senator BYRD of Virginia. How much has Lockheed actually spent_on the C-5A pro- gram to date? Do you happen to have those figures? Mr. MAY. The number is approximately $1.5 billion, Senator, and we will supply the precise number for the record if we may. Senator BYRD of Virginia. You will supply the precise figure for the record? Mr. MAY. Yes, sir. (The information furnished is shown below.) "Through May 30, 1969, Lockheed has ex- pended $1,372,112,173. In addition unliqui- dated progress payments to subcontractors amounted to $197,580,196. In total, through May 30, 1969, the amount was $1,569,682,369." Senator BYRD of Virginia. Now, how much has Lockheed received from the Federal Gov- ernment up to this point? Mr. MAY. I will have to supply that for the record, sir. (The information furnished is shown below.) "Cash receipts from the Government through May 30, 1969, are as follows: "Final billing for contract line items delivered $494, 878, 575 "Progress payments to Lock- heed for work in progress 827, 609, 140 Total 1, 322, 577, 715 "Progress payments to sub- contractors for work in progress 197, 580, 196 "As additional information, through May 30, Lockheed had incurred $91,966,571 in un- reimbursed work in process costs." Senator BYRD of Virginia. I am not sug- gesting that this be done at all, but if the contract were canceled at the end of Run A, do you have an estimate as to what Lock- heed's profit or loss would be? Mr. HAUGHTON. We do not hal4 such an estimate, Senator, and we think that it is past the time when it would be canceled at Run A, because we already have funding on Run B, so Rttn B would have to be included now. Senator BYRD of Virginia. And as I under- stand from your reply to one of Senator Symington's questions, Lockheed feels that it has a contract for 155 C-5A aircraft. Mr. HAUGHTON. Subject to certain funding requirements, yes, sir. Senator BYRD of Virginia. Of course Con- gress has not approved the funding, but Lockheed feels that it does have a contract for 115 aircraft, provided the Congress funds the 115 aircraft? Mr. HArrorroN. Right, yes, sir. Senator BYRD of Virginia. Now it was testi- fied yesterday that Lockheed is 6 months be- hind schedule. Does Lockheed concur in that assertion? Mr. HAUGHTON. Yes, sir. Senator BYRD of Virginia. The contract pro- vides for a penalty up to a total of $11 mil- lion for schedule delays. As I understand it, no penalties have been determined or assessed at this point. Mr. HAUGHTON. That is right. There have been no penalties assessed, because the oper- ational aircraft are not required for delivery as of this time. Senator Bran of Virginia. Yesterday the Air Force testified that it is not, at this time, able to estimate as to what the Government would lose if the program were terminated at the present time. Does Lockheed have an estimate as to what the Government loss would be if the program were to be termi- nated? Mr. HAUGHTON. No, sir; we do not, because it goes out into termination clause for all the suppliers of the program, and I do not have that figure. I think that figure would be very difficult to develop with any accuracy. Senator BYRD of Virginia. The next ques- tion may be one that you would prefer not to answer and I will not press it if you feel that way for business reasons, but what percent of the business of the Lockheed Corp. does the C-SA program represent? Mr. HAUGHTON. Well, there Is going to be 2 or 3 years in here when it is going to ap- proximate 25, close to 25 percent of our total sales. Our sales last year ran $2.2 billion, and I think our sales average on the C-5 over a 3- or 4-year period would be about $500 million a year. Is that about right, Torn? Mr. MAY. A little higher than that, but substantially 25 percent. Mr. HAUGHTON. About 25 percent, maybe a little more, give or take a little. Senator BYRD of Virginia. Thank you very much. Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, may I ask the Senator from Wisconsin his estirnate as to the total cost to the Government if and when the contract is completed. Mr. PROXMIRE. The total cost to the Government, on the basis of the evidence we have now?and, as I said, my esti- mate would have to be conservative be- cause the Air Force tells us it is going to be higher?is $5.3 billion for the 120 planes. Mr. BYRD of Virginia. As I understand It, that is the estimate which the Sena- tor and his staff made. It is not the Air Force estimate? Mr. PROXMIRE. I understand the Air Force estimate is $5.2 billion. Mr. BYRD of Virginia. The Air Force estimate for the completed contract is $5.2 billion? Mr. PROXMIRE. $5.2 billion. Mr. BYRD of Virginia. And the esti- mate of the Senator from Wisconsin is what? Mr. PROXMIRE. $5.3 billion. Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Through May 30 of this year, Lockheed has expended, in round figures, $1.570 billion, accord- ing to testimony submitted on page 2151 of the committee hearings. Lockheed has received, during the same period of time, up to the date of May 30, $1.520 billion, in round figures, on this contract from the Government. Mr. PROXMIRE. This is an important colloquy. The Senator is pointing out that Lockheed has received almost 100- percent reimbursement?not quite, but very close to it. Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Lockheed has received practically 100-percent reim- bursement, which means Lockheed has been operating on Government money. Would the Senator not agree? Mr. PROXMIRE. The Senator is abso- lutely correct, not only with respect to progress payments, but the Government owns the plant in which Lockheed is building the plane. $150 million worth of equipment is also owned by the Govern- ment. Therefore, Government capital, the capital supplying the equipment, is largely, but not entirely, Government capital; a great deal of it is; and almost all of the working capital cost is pro- vided by the Government. Mr. BYRD of Virginia. So Lockheed has had the benefit, I calculate, of some- where around $150 million in interest. If the Government had not put up the money and Lockheed had had to go on the market to borrow the money, Lock- heed would have been billed for that money and would have had to pay it. Mr. PROXMIRE. The Senator has made a point that escaped me. That point should be made. $150 million is just about right. It may be a little more than that in view of what has happened to interest rates, but it is close to that. Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I would like to make a further study? Mr. PROXMIRE. If the Senator will yield, I want to make the point that interest payments are not reimbursable. They are not allocable. So the point is well made that it would have had a great effect on Lockheed. Mr. BYRD of Virginia. So Lockheed has had the benefit of $150 million of otherwise nonreimbursable cost that has been paid by the taxpayers. Mr. PROXMIRE. That is correct. Mr. BYRD of Virginia. So when we speak of the total cost of the contract, I think it is well to consider the interest charges, as well as the other figures the Senator gave, to make up the total. Mr. PROXMIRE. I agree wholeheart- edly with the Senator. Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I would like to read into the RECORD at this point one paragraph of the statement I made be- fore the committee last June when the officials of Lockheed appeared before the committee. Now, just another brief comment or two. Mr. Haughton has mentioned the lack of flexibility in the contract. Lockheed had been complaining of lack of flexibility. Continuing the statement: I admit I find the contract very difficult to understand, but it seems to me that here is a great deal of flexibility in that contract, and a great deal of ambiguity in the contract, to the extent of at least $272 million worth, because that is the difference between what the Air Force figures the final figure will be and what the company figures it will be, so it seems to me there is a great deal of flexibility, and the taxpayers will be called upon to pay somewhere between those two figures, the one mentioned by the Air Force of 285 million and the other by the company of $13 million. In the way of flexibility, while I say I do not fully understand the contract, it seems to me there is a great deal of flexibility in this contract and a great deal of am- biguity, The question lam suggesting is wheth- er the public interest is being adequately protected by the Department of Defense, Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 18, 1969 particularly the Department of the Air Force. It is not Lockheed's responsibility to protect the taxpayer, but it is the Air Force's responsibility to protect the tax- payer. The Air Force is a Government organization. It is part of the Depart- ment of Defense. It receives all of its money from the taxjaayerS. It is the responsibility of the Government--the Air Force in this case?to say that any contract made on behalf of the Govern- ment adequately and /Fully protects the general public and the tax funds that come out of the pockets of the wage earners of our country. What passed through my mind, as I was listening to the distinguished Sena- tor from Wisconsin as be spoke on the Senate floor this afternoon and bro'ught out many facts and figUres, just as went through my mind during the committee hearings, was whether the Air Force in its procurement practices is adequately protecting the taxpayers. I think it is Important that all Government agencies handle their contracts in a way that will adequately protect the taxpayer. Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the Senator from Virginia. His point is well taken. We should be concerned not only with the Lockheed contract. That is only one. The Air Force spends billions and billions of dollars of the taxpayers' money every year. It is important to focus attention on the practices which have been high- lighted by the way the-Lockheed situa- tion was handled. No matter what action Is taken on my amendment, the im- portant lesson we should learn from the Lockheed contract is that the Air Force simply must handle its procurement practices more honestly as far as Con- gress is concerned and_ ft must handle them with far greater regard for the American taxpayer than it has in the past. I think that is the point made by the Senator from Virginia, and it was made extremely well. I think it was the most important point Of all made with reference to the Lockheed contract, in terms of what we can save in the future. Mr. BYRD of Virginia. The Senator from Wisconsin has rendered a splendid public service in focusing attention upon this fact. As he pointed out a moment ago, it concerns not just the C-5A con- tract or just the Air Fbrce, but all de- partments of Government, and partic- ularly the Defense Department, because that is where the greatest spending oc- curs and that is where these large con- tracts are. It is important that the De- partment of Defense promulgate prac- tices and procedures which will protect the tax dollars taken from the pockets of the wage earners. What the Senator from Wisconsin has been doing in recent weeks in this regard, and what he is d0- ing today on the floor, I believe will contribute substantially toward the pro- tection of the dollars of the American taxpayers. Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the Senator from Virginia. I assure him that our sub- committee has just started hearings, which will continue through the recess, into the spending of a number of GOT- emment agencies?not the Defense De- partment alone. Mr. President, the current issue of Life magazine, on August 15, 1969, contained an article entitled "The New Math of Inflation," which should be a lesson for everyone in politics, particularly those who serve our country in the Senate and the House of Representatives. It says: For a decade it's been called "the affluent society," but suddenly the U.S. public is be- ginning to think all those dazzling statistics and ever-rising curves are a giant con game. Between inflation, which today is at an an- nual rate of 7.2%, and the relentless in- crease in Federal, state and local taxes, we are all running to stand still. In fact, many have begun to fall behind, and the average citizen is furious about it. The Life Poll, conducted by the opinion research firm of Louis Harris and Associates, Inc., reveals that 86% of a nationwide cross section 4:4 young and old, rich and poor, rural and city dweller assess their anger at current tax policies as either "high" or "very high." Eighty-two percent of them want major cuts in federal spending now, and a surprising 56% are even ready to see wage and price controls imposed to stabilize prices. Twenty- one percent claim they are ready to take part in a tax revolt, and another 22% who could never openly oppose their government said they could sympathize with those who did. The Bureau of the Budget made an analysis last year of controllable and uncontrollable spending. They found that about $100 billion of our Federal spending is controllable. We obviously cannot control such items as interest on our national debt; we could pass all the resolutions in the world, and still could not do it. We cannot cut social security payments. But 80 percent of all our na- tional spending is in the budget. As the Life magazine article points out: The potential savings in the post-Vietnam defense budget are estimated by the August 1 Fortune at $17.6 billion out Of $78.7 bil- lion. . . . To get this monstrous 40% of all federal spending under control would be the biggest single step toward a more rational schedule of national priorities. In this connection, Mr. President, I call to the attention of the Senate a series of very thoughtful and revealing articles in the current issue of Look magazine, which I shall ask to have printed in the RECORD. The articles are entitled as follows: "The Defense Establishment," writ- ten by Charles W. Bailey and Frank Wright. "Defense Contract: The Money Web," written by Gerald Astor. "Generals for Hire, written by Berke- ley Rice. "The Waste," written by David R. Maxey. "How to Cut the Budget," written by David R. Maxey. "The University Arsenal," written by Ruth Gelmis, showing how the univer- sities have become involved and en- meshed, and what the effect has been. A fine epilog by Averell Harriman, entitled "Our Security Lies Beyond Weapons." I ask unanimous consent that the arti- cles which I have listed, published in Look magazine for August 26, 1969, be printed in the RECORD at this point. There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: Tale DEFENSE ESrABLISHMENT (By Charles W. Bailey and Frank Wright) For the first time in 30 years, the American defense establishment is on the defensive. Not since the 1980's?before World War the cold war, the Korean War, Vietnam-- have those who build and manage our mili- tary machine been seriously challenged. The argument this year in Washington has been centered mainly on the ABM?the anti- ballistic-missile system that President Nixon proposed to defend our own intercontinental missiles and bomber bases against surprise attack. But the issue has become much broader: What is the proper place of the nation's de- fense establishment in the Government and in American society? Has the military ma- chine grown so large that it threatens to throw that society critically out of balance? Once again, critics are raising the specter of the "military-industrial com.plex"-- -the shorthand label for that combination of political, military and economic pressures that influence U.S. security policy, military strategy, armed forces and defense spending. The Vietnam war has dragged on for years, and military victory, despite repeated predic- tions by the nation's civilian and military leaders, is now admittedly beyond our grasp. Military spending has grown steadily until it swallows almost $80 billion a year?more than 40 cents of every dollar in the Federal budget?and requests for new and more cost- ly strategic weapons may offset any savings that would result from a cease-fire in Viet- nam. Pressures are rising for greater Federal out- lays to meet the dcanestac needs of -a nation whose multiplying urban problems are com- pounded by racial, social and economic stresses. The voices of concern do not sing in unison, sad most of them recognize both the complexities of the keue and also the high motivse of those with whom they dis- agree. The chorus is rising nonetheless. "I don't question the patriotism of any- one," says Sen. Mike Mansfield of Montana, majority leader of the VB. Senate. "But I do question the judgment of creating a mili- tary-industrial-labor complex which exer- cises such great power. You have to control the money?control the spigot?and then you can get into philosophy." Former Vice President Hubert Humphrey says, "It isn't as if bad men were conspiring against good people. It is that events com- bine to bring about a preponderant alloca- tion of resources to defenee. That preponder- ance inevitably affects national polities, in- evitably brings a looseness of control, and feeds on itself." Walter F. Mondale of Minnesota, a young Democratic liberal in his fifth year in the Senate, sees the issue as one of national pri- orities: "I've watched every fiscal dividend be dribbled away. There's not a dime left for people. We ought to write a book on our- selves. The first chapter ought to be what we think we are as white people. The rest should be on what we really are and what we do to people who can't defend them- selves?the Indians, the blacks, the Mexican- Americans. Then we call them animals be- cause they don't react right after we've beat them fiat. If you Want to destroy the defen- sive capacity' of our nation, just keep it up the way we've been going. If these young militants on campuses anti in the political parties are going to be the leaders?and someday ithey are?they aze not going to be interested in keeping this kind of society together." John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, who speaks for anti-ABM Republicans in the Senate, recalls his early efforts to question big defense outlays: "You couldn't find out anything. The Armed Services Committee would say, 'It's classified,' or 'We've gone into this already and have more information than you'." Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 pe FoEiNtakts2sCIMAeClarcloiti9E_'7Afik0AttER000300100001-3 August 13, 196Vrovd S9983 Another anti-ABM spokesman, Democratic Sen. George McGovern, knows firsthand the kind of pressures that can be generated. Some of his South Dakota constituents urged him to try to get an ABM site in the state because of the economic benefits it would bring. "I don't think there's any con- spiracy between the military and industry," he says, "but it does develop a momentum. Even the clergymen know their congrega- tions are swollen by defense installations. There's a subtle influence on labor unions, business, community groups." The defense establishment is complex. It Is huge. It is also one of the most pervasive institutions in the nation: one out of every ten Americans who works for a living is part of the defense establishment. In the fiscal year just ended, an estimated $78.4 billion was spent on defense?nearly nine percent of the gross national product. There are 500 major military installations in the continental United States, and 6,000 smaller ones. The Defense Department con- trols 45,000 square miles of land?an area the size of Pennsylvania. Overseas, we have 3,400 big and little bases in 30 foreign countries, Hawaii and Alaska. Some 22,000 U.S. corporations are rated "major" defense contractors, and another 100,000 or so get a piece of the action through subcontracts. One example of the geographic spread of the defense dollar: When Lock- heed Aircraft Corp. got the contract to build the C-141 Starlifter jet transport for the Air Force, it bought parts and services from 1,200 other firms. Just one small part for the plane?a fuel-pump switch?required ma- terial from New York, Connecticut, Illinois, Ohio, California, Wisconsin and Massa- chusetts. The major share of defense spending?$44 billion last year?goes for weapons and other equipment. Two-thirds of that went to the 100 biggest defense contractors, and a whop- ping one-quarter of the total?$11.6 bil- lion?was paid out to these ten: General Dynamics, Lockheed, General Electric, United Aircraft, McDonnell-Douglas, American Tele- phone & Telegraph, Boeing, Ling-Temco- Vought, North American Rockwell and Gen- eral Motors. Even the university campus can be a big defense contractor. Last year, both MIT and Johns Hopkins University were among the top 100. Some states do better than others. Cali- fornia got one out of every seven defense- procurement dollars last year?or $6.5 bil- lion. Texas was second with $4.1 billion. The rest of the top ten are: New York, Connecti- cut, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Massachusetts, Mis- souri, New Jersey, Indiana. How did it all start? And how did the de- fense establishment get so big? There are many reasons for its growth?but only one for its birth: We live in a dangerous world. At the end of World War II, the nation rushed?as it had after every war?to dis- mantle it,s armed forces and turn its atten- tion to the search for the good life. Suddenly, however, the U.S. faced an unprecedented military and ideological challenge. The Soviet Union sought to expand its dominion west- ward across Europe and southward into Iran, Turkey and Greece. In Asia, another Com- munist government came to power in a bitter civil war In China. The United States hesi- tated?and then, in an extraordinary series of basic policy decisions, moved to check the Communists. The rationale was "contain- ment," which came to mean a U.S. commit- ment to meet, if necessary with armed force, any Communist encroachment on independ- ent nations that asked for our help. This required our nation for the first time to maintain a large peacetime military force. Beyond this, there was another reason for the pyramiding growth and cost of defense: atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs, jet airplanes and, finally, intercontinental missiles made the tools of war astronomically costly. The complexities of these weapons dictated years of research and dayelopment before they could be ready. Their capacity to strike a single, sudden, devastating blow meant that a nation committed by political decision to constant readiness for conflict could no longer wait until war began to beat its plowshares into swords. There are other reasons?some of them un- related to either high policy or the march of science?why defense spending has grown. Neither Congress nor the White House has been able to find ways of exercising any- thing like the critical scrutiny that is routinely applied to much smaller domestic programs. Many congressmen are reluctant to vote against anything for "our boys in service." Secrecy labels applied to many proj- ects hinder those who do raise questions. Finally, there is "pork"?the economic bene- fits that defense spending can bring to a community. There are positive factors too. By and large, the Pentagon and its industrial allies have done all they can to encourage congressional permissiveness. This year, there are 339 De- fense Department employees assigned to "legislative liaison"?the bureaucratic eu- phemism for lobbying. That works out to two Pentagon agents for every t.hree members of Congress; no other special-interest group comes close to having so many. Defense Department lobbyists don't limit themselves to pushing the Pentagon's legis- lative program. They also spend much of their time currying favor with congressmen in other areas?passing advance word of con- tract awards so members can get political credit for "announcing" them, or handling inquiries about the problems of constituents in service. They also give special attention to con- gressmen who hold major influence over defense affairs. The South Carolina district of Chairman L. Mendel Rivers of the House Armed Services Committee is chock-full of Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps bases. Georgia?home of Sen. Richard B. Russell, for years, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and now head of the Appropriations Committee?is loaded with armed services installations and defense Industry. The congressional military barons get some personal benefits too. The Air Force routinely provides planes from its "VIP" fleet to ferry them around the country. And one night this spring, the Defense Department not only turned out its top brass for a Mis- sissippi testimonial dinner for Chairman John Stennis of the Senate Armed Services Committee but also flew in the entertain- ment?a Navy choir from Florida, an Army WAC band from Alabama and an Air Force string ensemble from Washington, D.C. - - If the Pentagon can bring heavy pressures and blandishments to bear on Congress, the defense industry?companies and unions alike?can exert massive leverage on both. Its lobbyists, ranging from high-priced vice presidents to clerks, do most of their work In private, staying out of public debate over weapons systems or budgets. Industry's influence in Congress is some- times magnified by outside help?from cham- bers of commerce, state and local officials or labor unions eager to impress on con- gressmen the benefits of defense bases or contracts. A study two years ago of 27 firms slated for prime contracts on the ABM sug- gests the potential for this kind of pres- sure; the firms operate more than 300 plants In 172 congressional districts spread across 42 states. Thus, at least 256 senators and representatives had some economic stake? direct or indirect?in the ABM. A recent estimate that 15,000 firms, including subcon- tractors and suppliers, would share in ABM spending suggests that the impact is even broader. At the Pentagon, several factors combine to bolster industry's standing. First, the grow- ing complexity of modern weapons has made it ever harder for Government to keep its provisioners at arm's length. No longer does a service simply decide what it wants, design It, and then advertise for somebody to build it; now, industry's "sss men"?strategic- systems salesmen?and engineers play a major role in military-weapons design. Industry and the military join hands in other ways too. There are the service as- sociations, to which active and retired officers as well as industry representatives belong. The groups are large (the Air Force Associa- tion counts 100,000 members) and often rich?upwards of $2 million yearly income In some cases, with industry providing much of it through dues and advertising in as- sociation magazines that advocate bigger and better weapons. Another factor is the ease with which some men move from defense industry to the Defense Department, and vice versa. Secre- taries of Defense, and lesser officials, have come from industry, and returned to it. Re- tired military officers flock to defense in- dustry, often going to work for a firm whose operations they had monitored while on active duty. When industry and the Pentagon go hand- in-hand to Congress, they find powerful friends awaiting them. A few senior mem- 'hers control congressional action on mili- tary matters; four committee chairmen?all Southerners, all conservatives, all well along in years, all with over 20 years of service? make up the elite: Rivers, 63, a congressman for 28 years, chairman of the House Armed Services Com- mittee. George Mahon of Texas, 68, .a congress- man for 34 years, chairman of the House Ap- propriations Committee. Stennis of Mississippi, 68, a senator for 21 years, chairman of the Senate Armed Serv- ices Committee. Russell, 71, whose 36 years of service make him the Senate's senior member, chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee. These men are strong and talented in their own right. But the primary source of their power lies in the seniority system, in the way members are chosen for advance- ment, and in the structural and jurisdic- tional tradition of Congress. The Southern flavor of the defense posi- tions?one official calls it "the South's re- venge in perpetuity for Gettysburg"?is a self-feeding process. Warm weather and ease of year-round operation lead the military to spend much of its money in the South. Mem- bers of Congress from Dixie therefore gravi- tate to the committees that deal with mili- tary affairs, and because it is relatively easy for them to get reelected, they build up se- niority and thus control the committees, This process is even more marked in the Senate, where the smaller membership al- lows senators to serve on more than one major committee. The result has been the creation of interlocking directorates; the three topranking members of Armed Serv- ices?Stennis, Russell and Republican Mar- garget Chase Smith of Maine?are also on Appropriations. Such dual membership and parallel inclinations almost always produce the same result: Armed Services approves Pentagon proposals and Appropriations pro- vides the money to finance them. There are more personal ties to the Pen- tagon too. Two members of the Senate Armed Services Committee hold commis- sions as major generals in the Reserve forces, a third is a retired two-star Reserve gen- eral. The man who writes the military-con- struction appropriation bill each year?Rep. Robert L. E. Sikes of Florida?is a major general in the Army Reserve. A 1967 Minne- apolis Tribune survey of the entire Congress Approved For.Release 2004/11/30 :"CIA-RDP71B00364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9984 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August IS,- 1969' turned up 82 senators and 107 representa- tives with Reserve COMMiSs11113s. One reason military ccentattees generally have their way is the systeM itself; If you attack the other fellow's committee on the floor, he may do the same Ws yours. Armed Services and Appropriations members defend their bailiwicks with relentless zeal against either indivdual attack or jurisdictional raids by other committees. The bulk and com- plexity of programs, the frequent censoring of reports and hearings records for "security" reasons, and the traditionally one-sided na- ture of the testimony that is_published?all these also inhibit Opposition to military out- lays. The debate on the defense establishment has been highlighted this year by a new round of "horror stories" atout Pentagon mismanagement and inefficiency: $2 billion increase in the cost of a new_tiant jet trans- port; the belated cancellatiga of a contract for a new helicopter that was badly flawed. Such disclosures of waste are only ancillary to the basic issues in the rising debate over the proper role and size of the nation's de- fense establishment. But saving a billion here and a billion there hes its merits? especially in the light of the military's post- Vietnam "shopping list" of hew and even more costly weapons. The new weapons list is long and varied. It includes a replacement for_the Minuteman missile, now the backbone of our strategic force; multiple warheads to boost the strik- ing power of missiles; a long-range bomber to replace the 5-52; fighter planes for the Navy and Air Force; three nuclear-powered aircraft carriers at a half-billion dollars each. There are dozens of others. All of these systems would cost money. But critics argue that some of them? especially the Multiple Inapendently-tar- geted Reentry Vehicle (MIRV), as the multi- ple-warhead project is called could also seriously escalate the U.S.-Soviet arms race. To some in Congress and elsewhere, MIRV is a greater menace than the ABM. The case of MIRV points up the critical Importance of how decisioni are made on whether or not to build a Weapons-system. The crucial decisions are male, in the end, by only one man: the Preaclent. But the coinage of presidential actions is often minted long before it is issued by the White House. Proposals for foreign and defense policy, for military strategy and for the spending to implement them come to the President's desk from many sources: the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Coun- cil, the Budget Bureau, the Congress. Policy- making decisions should, in theory, flow in an orderly sequence: first, basic foreign policy, defense policy to support it, military strategy to implement defense policy, mili- tary forces to carry out the strategy; finally, budget decisions to pay for the forces. But, in fact, it sometimes goes the other way: money decisions determine force levels, these in turn affect strategy, strategy influences defense policy?and defense policy then dic- tates foreign policy. One man who served two Administrations in a top national-security sae puts it this way: "What is needed is a counter to the parochially presented programs and deci- sions of the Defense Department. No other part of our society functions with so little check and balance. This is not a plot?it is the failure of the rest of our society to de- velop the expertise to permit reasoned deci- sions on basic policies." Can this be done? Many people who know the problem firsthand are gWomy. But the effort is going to be made. A half-dozen pro- posals for study of the defense structure, and its implications for future national pol- icy, are under way or about to start?includ- ing several in the Defense Department it- self. The suggestions cover the waterfront and include privately financed research cen- ters to review programs, a new joint Senate- House committee with a strong grant of au- thority to review national priorities, a new independent defense-review office to analyze military spending, expansion of the Budget Bureau's staff. Some think that a deter- mined, open fight will have to be made on the floor of the House and Senate over every major defense issue. Even with much stronger congressional control, the President will have the key role. "The question in defense spending is 'how much is necessary?'" President Nixon said In June. "The President of the United States is charged with making that judgment." Still, questions of costs and priorities per- sist. None of the answers will come easily, especially in a world where nations build great military forces not to make war but to deter it?a world where weapons are built, as one scholar suggests, "not to be used but to be manipulated." But however hard the questions, they are at least being asked, some for the first time in 20 years, some for the first time ever. Upon the course of the debate that has just barely begun, and upon the kind of answers that emerge, may depend the place of the United States in the next decades -or the next century. DEFENSE CONTRACT: THE MONEY WEB (By Gerald Astor) The Pentagon has long been able to jet combat troops to fight 5,000 miles from American shores if a President decided to apply kill power there. But heavy equip- ment?tanks, cannons, helicopters, portable bridges and trucks?all traveled slow water freight. So the word went out from the Pen- tagon to U.S. industry: build us a really big bird. Lockheed won, and the droopy-winged C-5A Galaxy, 247 feet in length, is the big- gest bird yet to get off the ground. In one load, the four engines will lift an M-48 bridge launcher (128,420 pounds), four quarter-ton trucks with trailers, two ambulances, two five-ton trucks with trailers, two three-quar- ter-ton trucks with trailers plus 52 soldiers to erect the bridge and drive the vehicles. The C-5A gives the U.S. armed forces mas- sive airlift power, but when it grabs its maxi- mum gross weight of 762,000 pounds and flings itself into the air, a lot more than mili- tary hardware goes into the wild blue yon- der. In the three and a half years since Lock- heed got the contract, it has added 10,000 workers to its Marietta, Ga., plant. Chubby C. U. Dixon, Jr., a mason who earned $5.55 an hour, signed on for $3.75 an hour to stuff C-SA wings with electrical gear. "Outside, there's no vacation, no retirement, no credit, and it don't rain in here," says Dixon point- ing to the 76 acres of U.S. Air Force Plant B-1. Perhaps another 9,000 Lockheed-Georgia people who worked on other projects have moved on to the C-SA along with the new recruits. In fact, of Lockheed's $6 million weekly payroll, approximately $4 million goes to C-5A workers. For 15 years Gene Amos has been drawing paychecks from Lockheed. "I'm one of the lucky ones, never been laid off," says Amos, a troubleshooter on the produc- tion line. "It's a funny thing," he goes on, "but when the union's negotiating a con- tract, businesses in the area all seem to raise their prices just before the contract's signed. So all you keep are the fringe benefits." Employees of Lockheed-Georgia spend their money In 85 counties, and most of them pass along their dollars in the Atlanta area and Cobb County, where Marietta is. Gray-haired Len Gilbert, director of the Cobb County Chamber of Commerce, crosses one leg over the other and says, "What does Lockheed mean to us? A heckuva lot, In 1961, a low point when they had about 13,100 employees, the total wages for a quarter in Cobb County amounted to $33 million." He paused to locate the figures. "In the last quarter of 1968, Cobb County showed a pay- roll of $85 million." Corresponding figures for 1961 and 1968 show an increase in retail sales from $133 inillion to $368 million. "A payroll dollar turns over seven times," points out Gilbert, making the C-SA responsible for a big chunk of those sales. While the popu- lation of Marietta shows only a slight in- crease since the 1960 census figure of 25,000, suburban Cobb County has added 66,000 folks to the 114,000 that lived there then. Marietta Mayor L. Howard Atherton remem- bers when the former tenant of the factory, Bell Aircraft, stopped making B-29's in 1945, and 32,000 people lost their jobs. "It felt like the end of the world, but it wasn't so bad. When Bell shut down, the people left town. It was a transient population. Now, it's dif- ferent. Lockheed is culturally and economi- cally a part of Marietta. Lockheed people are much more solid, they pay their bills, par- ticipate in the community life. They couldn't just move away." Atherton, who is a drugstore owner, believes that even in the unlikely event that Lock- heed should go the way of Bell, his com- munity would survive. "There's been so much building in the last few years, con- struction's had a bigger effect than Lock- heed." In the next breath, Mayor Atherton calls the company "vital not only to Marietta but the whole state." Some local citizens agree with him. The head of a jewelry outlet says business is up, and not just because of the aircraft workers. "But I often say if Lockheed goes, every- thing goes. Yet there is a helluva lot of new industry around." The manager of a small- loan company says, "We're not solely de- pendent upon Lockheed, and with Atlanta coming out this way, it wouldn't be that bad if there were a outback." The C-&A spins a web of money that touches far beyond Marietta-Atlanta or even the rest of Georgia. Through subcontracts. the money flows to people in 44 states plus Canada and the United Kingdom. One large satellite effort belongs to Avco in Nashville, Tenn., which builds the 223-foot wings. Avco also makes fuselages for Bell heli- copters, wings for other Lockheed planes and metal office furniture. But the largest num- ber of employees, 1,500, work on the droopy C-5A wing, making it, in effect, the largest project in Nashville industry. Few workers joined Avco for this particular job?most sifted over from other assignments. Avco's $125 million C-5A contract sounds like handsome business, but General Man- ager and Vice President Charles Ames says, "We couldn't live on programs like the C-5A." When and if Lockheed goes ahead with the L-10-11 air bus for civil transport. Avco expects to add workers. One smaller subcontractor operates out of an abandoned shopping center in Caldwell. N.J. Nash Controls, Inc., a subsidiary of Sim- monds Precision, turns out small actuating devices. Business dropped when the Pentagon canceled production an Lockheed's Cheyenne helicopter but picked up with the C-5A. Sen- sitive to recent congressional rumblings an the "overrun" in the C-5A price (perhaps $2 billion extra), Lockheed officials blame the higher costs on severe inflation in their in- dustry and production-capacity shortages. Whether one talks to executives, assembly- line workers or local officials, the fears of the military-industrial complex get midget shrift. "We gat enough problems building the C-5A," says Gene Amos, "without worrying about that." "It's all a lot of nonsense," says Avoo's Charles Ames. "The civilians I know in the Department of Defense are very dedi- cated, have the highest integrity. There's no desire to perpetuate any military-industrial complex." Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved FoEggInsfsilMT1AletittE&Ft9P7MQ9MR000300100001-3 August 13, 1969 S 9985 GENERALS FOR HIRE and colonels at Lockheed makes one wonder around. The salesmen take care of selling, about their objectivity. but if you don't have an intro like me, you (By Berkeley Rice) There are same limits on what kind of work waste your time with underlings who don't For those who have trouble understanding these men may do when they retire. Federal have any power. If I want a contract, I know the complexities of the military-industrial laws prohibit retired officers frsm selling to exactly who to go to. Some other guys may complex, one graphic illustration is the traffic the Department of Defense for three years know the technical stuff, but I know the in retired military officers who join the de- after retirement and to their own service for people. That's my expertise." Such expertise may raise questions about conflict of interest, but not to most retire officers who have joined the defense industry. Says Pete Higgins, "You take a man who retires around 45 to 50, with his kids ready for college, and he's got a problem. Ile can't do it on his retired pay. He's got to have a second career. Many of these men have no other marketable experience. Where the hell else do you want them to go!" No one seems to know, but as they con- tinue to go into the defense industry the contracting process may suffer. One Defense official claims, "the fact that these lucrative job opportunities exist cannot help but in- fluence those who deal with defense contrac- tors. I remember trying to hold down costs on a large contract once, and a general work- ing with me said, 'I must be out of my mind, trying to cut the overhead on this company. I'll be part of that overhead in a few years.'" When military men spend much of their careers dealing with companies they may eventually work for, they naturally develop some concern for the company's point of view. When 90 percent of the major defense contracts are negotiated in such a congenial atmosphere, price and the public interest can easily become secondary considerations. A normal buyer-seller relationship has a built-in check against this sort of thing, because the buyer must spend his own money. The services do not, a fact which Pentagon officials and procurement officers often seem to forget. Despite all the criticism of defense spend- ing, most military men look on the growing traffic betweeti the services and the defense industry as natural and proper. An admiral who has bade the transition himself claims, "It's good for the military, It's good for the company, and it's good for the country." tense industry. More than 2,000 retired gen- life. However, the laws are vague about what erals, colonels, Navy admirals and captains constitutes "selling." Since 1962, the Depart- now work for the 100 largest defense con- ment has taken action in only one case in- tractors. Their numbers have tripled in tale volving a major contractor. Asked why, a last ten years. The top ten firms employ more Defense Department legal officer comments, hen half of the 2,000. Many of these had ?I doubt if anybody here is vigorously beat- been involved in the contracting process on major weapons systems. Their decisions often meant millions of dollars to companies for whom they now work. Sen. William Proxmire (D., Wis.) calls this a dangerous and shocking situation." While not charging anyone with corruption, he claims the trend represents "a distinct threat to the public interest." The threat, he says, is twofold: high-ranking retired officers may be using their influence at the Pentagon to affect decisions on contracts with their com- panies; active officers involved in procure- ment may be influenced by the prospect of jobs with companies they are buying from. Defense contractors, of course, deny the charges of influence-peddling, and insist they hire ex-military men because of their expertise, and not in reward for past favors. Despite these denials, research on the em- ployment of retired officers reveals some in- triguing patterns. Take the Minuteman II missile program, which has climbed from an original price of $3.2 billion to $7 billion. One of the major subcontractors is North Ameri- can Aviation ($669 million in 1968 defense contracts). Its autonetics division produces the missile's guidance system for the Air Force. Two Air Force plant representatives and a project officer for the contract recently retired and joined North American auto- netics, one as division manager. Lt. Gen. W. Austin Davis, ex-chief of 'USAF's Ballistic Systems Division, which handled the con- tract, is now a vice president of North Amer- ican. His chief procurement officer also joined of 104 ing the bushes trying to discover violations of the selling laws." Since the purpose of defense companies is to sell to the Defense Department, some ob- servers feel the question as to which em- ployees are engaged in sales is ridiculous. Anyway, most large firms now call their sales- men "marketing men." As defense companies, many of the marketing men are retired offi- cers, but they do not sign the contracts. W. T. "Pete" Higgins, a former Navy officer, Is "marketing manager for naval programs" for an electronics company. "I come with the team that makes the presentation," he admits, "but only as an adviser. With my background in naval electronics, I know damn well I'm helping the company get con- tracts." Does this mean using his influence? "That's nonsense," says Higgins. "Anything of significance goes through ten to fifteen levels in the chain of command before a final decision. Only peanuts are settled on a single level that could be influenced by personal interest." Helping the company get defense contracts is a popular non-selling job for high-ranking retired officers. They usually have titles like "assistant to the president" or "director of advanced planning," but they are known in the trade as "rainmakers." Regardless of how much clout they have at the Pentagon, they bring to their companies valuable inside knowledge of service plans for future weap- ons systems. When a general or admiral who has been involved in planning or research on the company, which employs a total a big project retires, defense contractors bid high-ranking retired officers, including sev- for his services as eagerly as any professional eral other Air Force generals. football team after a top college quarterback. Asked if this employment pattern is un- When Maj. Gen. Harry Evans retired in 1967 usual, a senior Pentagon official remarked, "It as vice director of the Air Force's $3 billion happens all the time. Almost all the officers Manned Orbiting Laboratory program, he was who have anything to do with procurement immediately hired as vice president and gen- go into the business. Naturally, they go to eral manager of Raytheon's Space and Infor- the companies they've had the most contact mation Systems Division. In 1966, Bell Aero- with. If you check the history of any missile space Corporation, the Army's largest sup- or weapon program you'll find the same Pifer of helicopters, hired Gen. Hamilton story." Howse, former chief of Army Aviation, as The story usually ends with the Defense vice president for product planning. Department paying far more than the origi- Most of the large defense companies have nal estimate. When the Navy contracted with high-ranking ex-officers in their Washington Pratt & Whitney for 2,000 engines for the offices, Everyone denies that they have any controversial TFX, or F-111, the original bid influence on defense contracts, but they are was 6270,000 per engine. By 1967, when pro- obviously there because they know their way duction began, the price had risen to more around the Pentagon. One of them is Lt. Gen. than $700,000 apiece. The man who signed William Quinn, former Army Chief of Pub- the production contract was Capt. Patrick lie Information, arid now in charge of "Wash- Keegan, the Navy's plant representative at ington operations" for Martin Marietta, which Pratt & Whitney. Soon afterward, he retired Produces many of the Army's missiles. "We from the Navy and joined P. & W. as special maintain liaison with Defense," says General assistant to the executive vice president. Quinn, "but I don't go over to the Pentagon Sharing his office was another special assist- on any sales matters." Asked about using his ant, a former colonel who until his retire- influence, he admits he knows "half the peo- ment had been in charge of engine purchases pie in the hierarchy over there," but claims for the Air Force, he never uses his contacts for business. "Be- The problem of plant representatives is lieve me," says Quinn, "this operation is as crucial, for they are the watchdogs who sup- clean as a hound's tooth. Our real contribu- pos,edly guard against delays, failures and tion is in maintaining a dialogue between our cost overruns on a contract. At Marietta, Ga., companies and the military people." where Lockheed Aircraft Corporation ($1.8 Just how retired officers can help to "main- billion in 1968 defense contracts) is turning tam n a dialogue" can be seen in the work of out the giant C-5A jet transport, 230 Air an ex-Navy officer who prefers to remain Force officers watch over production. Despite anonymous. He retired in 1968 from the all this supervision, however, the C-SA is well Bureau of Naval Weapons, where he had been behind schedule, and the final price on 115 involved in the selection of contractors. He planes has climbed from the original bid of now works for one of them as a $200-a-day $1.9 billion to $3.2 billion. The fact that some consultant in Washington. "I know a lot of of these Air Force production supervisors will Navy, people here," he says, "and I sort of probably join the 210 other retired generals help the company's men find their way It's certainly good for the companies thriv- ing on defense contracts. It may be good, or at least comforting, for the military to deal with former comrades who understand their problems and look forward to jobs in in- dustry. But as defense costs continue to drain funds desperately needed for domestic pro- grams, some AMeriCallS are beginning to wonder if "it" is really good for the country. THE WASTE (By David R. Maxey) Remember Robert Goodloe Harper? No? He's the prophet who said, in 1798, "Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute." We haven't let Bob down. Harper's hyper- bole, now puffed to $80 billion annually, is still part of the American way of life. Con- gress has traditionally watched domestic spending like a hawk, but focused loosely on defense. Here are some examples of looseness that have stirred interest. How do you like them? DIVE! DIVE! In 1964, the Navy planned to buy 12 Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicles. Purpose: to lend aid to disabled submarines. Cost: $3 mil- lion each. In June, hideous new cost esti- mates surfaced. Now, the Navy will buy six vehicles for $80 million each. Cost increase: 2,666 percent. Since the 1920's, we have had one submarine accident at which the DSRV might have had a chance of being useful. One. THE RUSSIANS WERE COMING, THE RUSSIANS WERE COMING! The threat of Soviet bombers in American skies caused us to build a gigantic air-de- fense system. One estimate of cost: $18 bil- lion. The Russians failed to uphold their part of the bargain by not building enough bomb- Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9986 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August ers to be a real threat. We ahould be grateful for that, because our air-afense system does not work very well. Now h*r this testimony: Senator Cannon: "In osfter words, the Air Defense Command agrees that if the Soviets sent over (deleted) heavylrombers now, we would only knock down (deleted) out of the (deleted) ?" Dr. Foster [of the Defense Department]: "I cannot speak for the Air Defense Com- mand, sir; but I am not the least bit stir- prised. (Deleted)." Senator Cannon: "I am shocked at that." Senator Symington: "Inteedible." The system maligned abeee costs annually at least $124 billion to operate, with out- siders betting on $2 billion. DIS/NGENUITY WALTZ Gordon Rule, Director of Procurement Con- trol and Clearance, U.S. Navy, told Sen. William Proxmire at a meeting of his eels- committee recently why defense-procure- ment programs so often cost much more than estimated: "We play games. The contractors know if they tell the Department of Defense how much a system will really cost, they'll scrub it. The Department of Defense knows If they tell the Congress the real cost, they'll scrub it. You start in with both sides know- ing its's going to met more." Proxmire shouted that was dishonest. Rule replied that he preferred to call it disingenuous. BALLAD OF ERNIE FITZGERALD In November, 1968. A lernest Fitzgerald. Deputy for Management Systems for the Air Force, told the Proxmire itibeommittee he estimated the Lockheed a-BA cargo? plane would cost about $2 billion more than the Air Force had originally estinsated. Pentagon executives became cross with Fitzgerald for his candor. Twelve days later, he found that his Civil Service status had been revoked. "Computer error" was blamed for giving him that status in the first plaee. Senator Prox- mire then unearthed a memo to Assistant Secretary of the Air Force Robert Charles. The memo discussed ways 'eel fire Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald still has a shriveled version of his job, but cost control on large weapons pro- curements is not part of it, The Air Force has since verified that Fit raid's estimate of a $2 billion overrun on the C-5A is very close to right. Lockheed first estimated that it would lose $13 million on the C-5A, then allowed it might make a feW bucks. THE LITTLE HELICOPTER THAT COULDN'T Helicopters are crafts of real beauty only when they work. The Cheyenne helicopter was never beautiful. It was to be a gunship, built as such from the grolund up. Willis Hawkins, then Assistant Soseretary of the Army for Research and Development, sup- ported the idea. Hawkins had mine to the Army in 1983 from a vice president's job at Lockheed. It took time to decide what firm should build the Cheyenne Experts first rated Vertol, Bell, Lockheed and Sikorsky in that order. A Source Selection group a generals made changes, rating Lockheed first, then VerboI, Sikorsky and Bell. A final pier gave the con- tract to Lockheed. Why? "Stronger manage- ment." "What general," rips a critic, "could rate Lockheed's management anything but high when he knows that the Assistant Sec- retary came from Lockheed?" On March 23, 1966, Lockheed got the re- search-and-development cOntract. Three months later, Willis Hawkins resigned and save $450 million. Benson also proposed billion assumption, was never debated in returned to Lockheed. The first Cheyenne shortening basic training for soldiers not appeared in May, 1967, followed by nine more. the Congress, even though the Defense De- aimed at combat roles?that is, most of Test flights began. In March. 1969, a Chey- partment has made it vrey, very clear that them. Saving: $50 million a year. The Air enne off California threw three rotor blades it is covering the possibility of such a war. Force and the Navy have already short- and plunged, killing the pilot. In April, the Once our contingencies are agreed on, ened basic training for their men. And why, Army threatened to cancel the contract for Schultze said, we take the step of asking asks Benson, should every Army officer be lack of satisfactory performance. Estimated what force levels we need to handle them, shuttled around as if he were in training to costs had soared all the way from $138 mil- How many men? Then, what weapons sys- be Chief of Staff? Right now, men move lion to $186 million for 15 ships. In May, 1969, tems should we buy? on the average of once a year. Benson shows the Army canceled the Cheyenne, after So. An orderly process, from commitment savings of $500 million if assignment changes spending $159 million, to contingency to force level to weapons could be lowered by 25 percent 137 1969 BUT IT WORKS ON PAPER Systems. Schultze cautions that every de- A study by Richard Stubbing of the Bu. cision along the way needs fresh scrutiny, erau of the Budget said we're getting worse, because, for instance, the decision to be ready not better, in the design and application of for two and a half wars does not make the electronics system for aircraft and missiles, force level needed to fight them obvious and Strubbing listed 13 major Air Force and Navy unchangeable. Schultze delights in the ex- aircraft and missiles produced since 1955, ample of the Navy's aircraft carriers. Cur- pointing out that only four had electronics renter, the Navy has 15. Why 15? One tea- systems that were over 75 percent reliable, son is that the Washington Naval Disarrna- Eleven other systems, which coat $25 billion, ment Treaty of 1921 ladled out national sputtered below the '75 percent standard, quotas of capital ships. The U.S. got 15. After Four programs were either canceled or phased World War If, the Navy saw that the 15- out for low reliability. Stubbing said we'd battleship force was obsolete. The aircraft do better to ask systems contractors to build carrier became the new capital ship, but we working models rather than promising re- cling to the magic number still. liability based on paper estimates. He also' Carriers are what one critic calls hide- thought competition between contractors ously vulnerable" to air attack. They work would concentrate their minds wonderfully, best, when the U.S. has unquestioned air THE HIGH COST OF ABORTED MISSILES superiority, such as in Vietnam. But does their vulnerability, and the number of dry- Sen. Stuart Symington of Missouri pointed land fields, justify having 15? It the force out last March that over $4 billion had been could be cut to 12, say, the U.S. would Save Spent since 1944 for missiles that never got about $360 million. And the direct cost of Into position to be fired. They all perished building one new carrier is about $540 million. Schultze comes down hard on the mili- tary tendency, logical only in a werld of limitless wars and money, to plan for every possibility, remote or not, and build forces and weapons systems to meet it. Currently, we are planning AWACS, the Airborne Warning and Control System, to add to our existing air-defense system. The logic of air defense tortures the mind. We built the system to shield us from Russian bombers, which the Russians never really got around to building. Now, we spend to improve it in order to discourage Russia from getting around to building bombers. Pro- ponents of AWACS say it will warn us of Kamikaze-style attacks from Soviet medi- um-range bombers. How likely is that? And would it feel better to know that if our cities crisp in a nuclear war, we'd be burned by missiles instead of bombers? There is. by the way, much reason to doubt that AWACS will work any better than the cur- rent system. In June, 1968, Congressional Quarterly, putting civilian and military officials off the record to elicit candor, did an exhaustive reporting job on the Defense budget. CQ found Pentagon Insiders estimating that, aside from savings on weapons systems we don't need, around $4.2 billion could be excised by cutting the size of the armed services. That estimate did not assume an end to the Vietnam war, but only a reduc- tion in the proportion of support troops to combatants (now about three to one), and a drop in the number of men in the "tran- sient" category?men budgeted in excess of force requirements because they'll be travel- ing, not working. Nine months later, Robert Benson, for- merly of the Comptroller's Office, Defense Department, wrote in Washington Monthly that he saw another $1.5 billion in savings from troop reductions in Europe. We have over 300,000 there now, plus 200,000 depend- ents. Benson argued that the U.S. will not send troops into Eastern Europe anyway during the research-and-development phase of their lives. Big as that figure is, it's smaller than if those missiles had been produced and depolyed, then found to be technically sick or obsolete. Fifteen other missiles did get into position, then were scrapped. Cost: $18.8 million. How To Cue THE BUDGET Vietnam is a giant teaching machine. Without the mind-riveting pain it causes, we might still be leery of questioning the operations of the Department of Defense. We might still be dreaming that since our military establishment is the finest in the world, the running of it is better left to military experts, well-supplied with money. Such dreams have faded. Congress, less afraid of being labeled unpatriotic, is asking penetrating questions. And the answers prove beyond imagining that if to err is human, the Pentagon is full of mortals. From that finding, it is only a step to asking Whether we can't have sufficient defense at lower cost, and perhaps use the savings for programs with lower priorities, like healing our cities and making poverty an anachron- ism. The answer to the first part of that question is yes. The Defense budget can be cut without radically thinning our blood. Some of the best thinking about the military budget has been done by Charles Schultze, former Director of the Bureau of the Budget and now a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, Schultze, a rational man, hopes that our defense planning proceeds logically. First, we examine what our commitments around the world are. For instance, we now have in force better than 40 mutual-security agreements involving the U.S. in the defense of large chunks of Earth. Should we be all that involved? Do some pacts need re- thinking? Given those commitments, what kind of fight might we get into? What threats should we plan for? This June, Schultze reminded Sen. Wil- liam Proxmire's Subcommittee on Economy (witness Hungary, Czechoslovakia), so the in Government that our contingency plan- forces can be reduced without critically ning now says that we should be able to diluting the American, presence. start fighting, simultaneously, a major Benson found further savings in people. "NATO" war in Europe, a major war with He figures that if annual leave time for a China in Southeast Asia, and a minor scuffle serviceman were cut from 30 days to 20 in Latin America, such as our last trip to (to more nearly match civilian vacations), it the Dominican Republic. Schultze pointedly would slice manpower requirements enough said that the China war contingency, a $51,0 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 u rt 13, 1969A pproved Fotin: 00001-3 Between them, Benson and the Congres- .sifytal'Quarterly staff agreed on a cut in the Defense budget of $9 to $10 billion a year, Vietnam or no Vietnam. Benson's estimate includes a 15 percent increase in the effic- iency of defense contractors. That might take some doing. In the broadest terms, and with examples almost too fierce to mention, the Proxmire subcommittee found that there never has been much interest in cost control, either on the part of contractors or their customers in the armed services. Ernest Fitzgerald, who first identified the $2 billion cost "overrun" on the Lockheed C-5A jet transport that cost control is seen as "antisocial aeivity." He cited the case of the Mark II avionics sys- tem, a "black box" for the navigation gear and radar on the F-111 fighter-bomber. Costs on the system, experts bet, have risen from a planned $610 million to $2.5 billion. In June, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, doing some digging of his own, pro- duced a study of 12 weapons systems that showed cost overruns ranging from 0.2 per- cent to 194 percent on nine of them. The latter increase was on SRAM, the Air Force's Short Range Attack Missile, now expected by the Pentagon to cost $313.9 million more than was estimated. Outsiders bet the SRAM bloat is worse than that. Laird dryly noted that $1.4 billion of the nine overruns was due to "optimistic original cost estimates" on the part of weapons contractors. But contractors suffer from more than simple optimism. They sometimes underesti- mate their costs deliberately, in order to bid low and grab a contract. This practice is called "buying in." It is based on the as- sumption, valid historically, that the cus- tomer services will pay the costs no matter how they creep. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Charles could not recall for Proxmire when he'd last seen a major defense contractor lose money on a contract. That, in spite of the fact that over 90 percent of all weapons systems end up costing twice what the contractors' original estimate said they would. Fitzgerald has some ideas of how to bring an atmosphere of candor and concern for cost into the military-industrial dialogue. In the process of explaining them, he has made public a privileged language. For instance, when a manager of a weapons-system pro- curement finds that costs are outrunning the money Congress gave him, he has a "funding problem." In other words, costs are not too high, his funds are too low. Fitzgerald re- ports that since he's been in the Pentagon, he has never heard of cost reduction as an answer to a funding problem. A? "credible" cost estimate is one high enough so that actual costs do not produce an embarrass- ing overrun. What Fitzgerald and others are telling us is that bargaining and cost control, twixt military and contractor, is not gimlet-eyed jockeying in the best sense of free enterprise. It is more the murmuring of lovers. Fitzgerald would like to see the Pentagon use what are known as "should-cost" studies. These studies, sharp penciled by efficiency experts, try to answer what a weapons system should cost, assuming for one sweet, fleeting moment that the con- tractor operates in a reasonably efficient way. The Government would function as a management consultant to show the com- pany how to hold costs down. Previous should-cost studies found considerable waste motion and superfluous workers, sometimes overstaffed up to 60 percent for the work needed. Taken together with hard-nosed devotion to economy on the part of top Pentagon offieials, should-cost studies and other techniques, Fitzgerald thinks, could result in the saving of billions. Think that over. Billions. We should lay to rest now the notion that defense cuts would damage the economy. Arjay Miller, ex-Ford Motor Co. vice chair- man, told LOOK Senior Editor Al Rothen- berg: "I think a reduction in military ex- penditures . . . would have a plus effect on the economy. When rumors of peace break out, the stock market goes up...." If the Pentagon moves sharply to slash costs, the size of the Defense budget will depend all the more on the decisions made in the White House and Congress about how ambitious the country's defense policy should be. Charles Schultze is not impressed with the idea that a well-organized mili- tary-industrial complex has been siphoning cash out of the Treasury with evil design. Rather, he said, the American people "have pretty much been willing to buy anything carrying the label 'Needed For National Security.'" Schultze talked about involv- ing the Bureau of the Budget, traditionally the President's watchdog, more deeply in the writing of the Defense budget. Previously, the Department of Defense was less scru- tinized than any other Cabinet department. President Richard Nixon recently took Schultze up on that, giving Budget Director Robert Mayo what Mayo called his "march- ing orders" to examine Defense thoroughly. All the talk of cost-cutting now, of reduc- ing the Defense budget, echoes down the road to a time when the bad dream of Vietnam will be over. Then, we will find out what kind of "peace dividend" we'll get, i.e., how much money will be available for use in domestic programs or for paying out to taxpayers in the form of lower taxes. Projecting tax gains from a growing economy and the savings from not being in Vietnam against the auto- matic increases in domestic programs and the growth in non-Vietnam defense spend- ing, Schultze forecast a cumulative fiscal dividend of $35 billion by 1974. That sounds large, until we note that increases in military spending already planned will use up the $20 billion' a year we save from leaving Vietnam. The Defense budget can go marching on without the war. Whatever fiscal dividend we do get will come from the gain in tax reve- nues from a full-tilt economy. And Schultze's projection does not include the costs of large new weapons systems, or an escalation in the arms race. Those would poison the dividend. The Nixon Administration has already cut $1.1 billion in expenditures from the 1970 Johnson Defense budget. Recently, the Man- ned Orbiting Laboratory, a project on every- one's list of extraneous matter, was un- manned. Future savings from that surgery will be at least $1.5 billion, perhaps more. And Laird has given every indication that his study of nine weapons systems would not be the last hunt for waste. But we also have the word of Robert Moot, Defense Department Comptroller, that the Pentagon expects no significant cutbacks be- low the $80 billion budget, even after Ameri- can forces move out of Vietnam. He guessed $75 billion would be somewhere near right, unless "our commitments and our missions can be cut back." And the responsibility for thinking about that, aside from the Presi- dent's, lies with a Congress now somewhat awake to the chances of saving some dollars for domestic consumption. THE UNIVERSITY ARSENAL (By Ruth Gelmis) Angry students and newly formed groups of concerned faculty are raising some tough questions on college campuses. The Ameri- can multiversity, it seems, is fast on its way to becoming a docile Pentagon pet, depend- ent on military financing and deeply en- meshed in the defense establishment. On March 11, more than 1,400 students crammed into Stanford University's Memo- rial Auditorium to demand the facts about that school's involvement in war research. (Stanford ranked 46th last year among the nation's defense research-and-development contractors.) The answers were to come from S 9987 five university trustees. One was William Hewlett, president of Hewlett-Packard, whose defense sales last year totaled $34 million. Hewlett is also a director of Chrysler ($146 million in defense contracts) and FMC Cor- poration ($185 million) . Another trustee was Charles Ducommun, a director of Lockheed ($1.9 billion) . Among the trustees who were not there were the president of Northrop Aircraft and the 'chairman of General Dynamics. A trustee began, "I don't think it's fair to say that the university is participating in the war." The audience groaned. He con- tinued, "Many people within the university are actively opposing the war." "It's very nice," a student shouted, "to view the university as an open -place where I do my thing and you do your thing, only your thing happens to be doing research on weapons of destruction and death in the name of the university." The two-hour confrontation turned very nearly into a rout, as the trustees' answers became progressively inadequate, irrelevant and evasive. At one point, Hewlett flatly de- nied a charge that FMC manufactured nerve gas. The students presented evidence; Hew- lett countered that his source was the presi- dent of the corporation. Finally he admitted FMC had been making nerve gas up to six months earlier. The trustees' performance at that meeting radicalized a good many students, including Mike Sweeney, a former editor of the Stan- ford Daily who was sufficiently respected by the administration to have been appointed two important student-faculty committees. Sweeney walked in a liberal and walked out a radical. Now he pickets and demonstrates. "I've lost all my credit with the Establish- ment. It doesn't matter; you no longer care that much whether your future is going to be destroyed, whether you're imprisoned, whether you'll be physically endangered? because there's no alternatives." The Stanford University trustees appoint the Board of Directors of the Stanford Re- search Institute. SRI was created in 1946 as a nonprofit "wholly-owned subsidiary" of Stanford to "improve the standard of living and the peace and prosperity of mankind." It does nearly half its research ($29.7 million) for the Defense Department. Ten percent of its work ($6.2 million) is military research directly related to Southeast Asia. SRI oper- ates top-secret counter-insurgency projects in Thailand, including a new $1.8 million contract accepted last December. It has also done secret counterinsurgency research in Vietnam, Honduras and Peru. One classified project is summarized as "considering the advantages and disadvantages of providing U.S. operational assistance to the armed forces of the Government of Peru engaged in counterinsurgency operations." SRI'S board includes: Ernest Arbuckle, chairman. Arbuckle is a Stanford trustee, a director of Hewlett-Pack- ard and a director of Utah Construction & Mining .Utah built B-52 bases in Thailand, and its affiliate, Marcona Corp., mines iron ore in Peru. Edmund Littlefield, also a Stanford trus- tee, and president of Utah. Malcolm MacNaughton, president of Cas- tle & Cooke, which owns 55 percent of Thai- America Steel and 84 percent of Standard Fruit. Standard Fruit imports bananas, nearly half its supply from Honduras. Edgar Kaiser, chairman of Kaiser Alumi- num, part owner of Thai Metal Works. Kaiser also has an 80 percent interest in the phos- phate deposits of the Sechura Desert in Peru. Fred L. Hartley, president of Union Oil of California, which has drilling rights off the Thai coast. Gardiner Symonds, chairman of Tenneco, which now has extensive concessionary rights. in.Indonesia. Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 1; 19? Counterinsurgency is not the brainchild of these directors, but it protects their in- terests very well. Jerry Dick, a young physicist and father of two, is opposed to the Vietnam war. In Feb- ruary, at a meeting sponsored by the Stan- ford chapter of the American Association of University Professors, Dick heard SR/ Presi- dent Charles Anderson argue that no re- searcher was forced to take on any project he found morally objectionable, Dick stood up: "Sir, I was pressured into doing chemical-warfare research." That can- dor, he learned later, nearly cost him this security clearance. I went looking for Dick, and an employee told me, "I think he's still here, but he may not want to see you." Couldn't I talk to him on the telephone? "Well, that might net work either. It's clear that they can bug the switchboard, and a lot of us here think they probably do." I asked Weldon "Hoot" Gibson, execu- tive vice president of SRI, If Dick was still working there. His face flushed with anger. "I don't know. I really don't. Have you seen him? Don't bother. . . . People like that have a decision to make?do they want to _ support the organization or not?" When I found Jerry Dick, he'd been fired. William Rambo is associate dean of the Stanford School of Engineering and director of the Stanford Electronics Laboratories target of a nine-day student sit-in in April. The labs held $2.2 million la classified con- tracts, primarily in electronic-warfare re- search, before the faculty senate di- rected on April 24 that the contracts be phased out. Shocked faculty mem- bers learned meanwhile, from the sit-in stu- dents, that contract titles and summaries had been carefully edited to delete military references, apparently to faellitate approval of the contracts by a watchdog committee on classified research. "Applied Research in Electronic Warfare Techniques," for ex- ample, became "Applied Research in Elec.. tromagnetics." Rambo is on the board of, and holds stock in, Itek, an electronics firth that held over $80 million in defense contracts at the end of last year. He is also a member of sEVLial military ad- visory committees, including the Defense De- partment Advisory Group on Electronic War- fare and ECOM?the Army Electronics Com- mand. In other words, he is called upon as an expert to advise the Defense Department on the usefulness of the kinds of equipment Itek supplies. Rambo, in all sincerity, stt yS he wonders "how much talent we are denying the Gov- ernment by this sensitivity regarding con- flicts of interest." In a 1966 memo, Hubert Heffner, then Stanford's dean of research a ad now Nixon's deputy science director, aeknowledged that it was "not uncommon" for faculty mem- bers to be directors of private firms, and, de- clining to set rules, urged teachers to be "sensitive" to potential conflicts of interest. Sensitive or not, professors acrass the nation sit on the boards of defense industries and advise military committees. MIT'S research budget for the academic year 1967-68 was $174 million, and 95 per- cent of this came from the Federal Govern- ment, with $120 million from the Defense Department alone. Such heavy dependence on one source wor- ries many university administrators, includ- ing Cornell's former preddent, Jamee Per- kins, who warned that the "acceptance- of Government work and corporate donation has been known to result in a slowing down of the university's critical faculties." One laboratory director may already be In trouble because of his Cautiously critical views. Dr. Wolfgang Panofsky, who directs the AEC-funded $30-mil1ionea-year Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (SLAC), believes university scientists ought to play a crucial role as an independent source of public re- view of defense policy: "It can't come from people who work directly for the Defense De- partment because they're obligated to live by official policy. It can't very well come from the contractors whose living depends on the Defense Department. So the universi- ties are the only places with the technologi- cal expertise left. The real problem is how do you keep the universities from becoming captive in the process of furnishing this ad- vice?" One answer, he says, is that "the live- lihood of the university must in no way de- pend on Defense Department support." A professor at the Center, arguing that "the director of a laboratory Is not a free man," attributes SLAC's current funding dif- ficulties to political reprisals. "This lab is not being pleasant politically anymore. Most of the people here have come out against the ABM, so the Center has begun to lose a few of its friends in Congress. And the way you get a budget increase is, you have friends on the AEC, friends on the Joint Atomic Energy Committee." A few months ago, as if deliberately to substantiate that charge, Francisco Costag- liola, who was at the time an AEC Commis- sioner, wrote to Stanford and MIT threaten- ing that should the schools decide against doing classified research, he would press for withdrawal of all AEC research money. Sidney Drell, another SLAC professor, found himself in an awkward position when he addressed the Stanford March 4 Convoca- tion. (Stanford and more than 30 other universities held convocations that day to raise the issue of war research.) Drell care- fully avoided taking a public stand on the ABM that day because he felt constrained by his position as a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee. He is an op- ponent of the ABM. Money, or the lack of it, has boxed a num- ber of university administrators into a corner. Some admit a desire to pull back from de- fense work and reorient research priorities, but complain there is simply rio alternate source of comparable financing. The one agency specifically charged with supporting basic research, the National Science Founda- tion, has only enough in its till to support 12 percent of that research. But the Defense Department, NASA and the AEC do support a good deal of basic research, partly because they can more easily get appropriations. When pressure on the Defense Department compelled it to cut back on some of its con- troversial foreign-country projects, it offered to transfer $400,000 of its own $7.8 billion research budget to the State Department. The Department of State's current budget for research contracts is $125,000. Stanford's President Kenneth Pitzer com- plains, "Our national priorities are wrong." But when he needs funds for university re- search programs or expansion, where is he to go? The new Stanford Space Engineering and Science Building, for example, was made pos- sible by grants of $2,080,000 from NASA and $992,000 from the Air Force. Universities have learned that it doesn't hurt to have a Pentagon man on your staff. When the president of the California Insti- tute of Technology, Lee DuBridge, left for Washington to become Nixon's Science Ad- viser, he was replaced by Harold Brown, then Secretary of the Air Force. Last year, Caltech received $3.5 million from the Defense De- partment, much more than its entire student tuition. NASA and the AEC supplied an addi- tional $5 million. Caltech also operates the nearby $214-million-a-year Jet Propulsion Laboratory for NASA. A year ago, the University of Rochester, whose defense contracts increased from $1 million in 1966 to $13 million in 1968, hired as its vice president and provost, Robert L. Sproull. Sproull is the current chairman of the Defense Science Board, the top Pentagon science-advisory committee. The University of California. holds $17 mil- lion in defense-research contracts and ad- ministers the $250-million-a-year missile- development and testing laboratories at Livermore and Los Alamos. Its new president is a former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Charles Hitch. The -university also maintains an $80,000-aeyear office irrWashington. MIT chose Jack Ruins to be vice president in charge of the Lincoln and Instrumenta- tion laboratories, -which do most of their business ($92 million) with the Defense De- partment. A former Pentagon official, Ruina Is a pragmatist: "You can say you'll with- draw the labs [from military work], but who's going to pay their sedary?" The heavy investment in military research has a snowballing effect. As one professor complains, "The trouble is, when you de- velop it, somebody will want to build it." The researcher who takes on a military con- tract because that'a where he can most easily get funding, and then develops a new tech- nique or weapon, frequently starts a new "spin-off" corporation to produce it. Route 128 around MIT and Harvard and the 900- acre industrial park owned by Stanford Uni- versity are crowded with hundreds of aero- space and electronics spin-offs, most of them doing most of their business with the De- fense Department. In recent years, 160 new firms have spun off from MIT alone. The new corporations in turn hire univer- sity consultants (MIT professors may con- sult one day out of five) and graduating students. For that one-third of MIT's grad- uate students who support themselves as re- search assistants, future careers are deter- mined by the kind of research they do while In graduate school. In 1968, 45 percent of MIT's industry-bound graduates took jobs with the top 100 prime defense contractors. Many still receive draft deferments for work- ing in a defense plant. Every new employee of a defense-oriented corporation has a vested interest in a swol- len defense budget. His livelihood depends on it. Half of all U.S. research and development is military in nature. Last year, the U.S. spent four times as much an chemical and biological warfare as it did on cancer re- search. The man who invented napalm was not a Dow employee but a Harvard profes- sor working in a Harvard lab. Universities and nonprofit research institutes received $665 million from the Defense Department in 1968, for work on the ABM and MIRV. for research on aerial-weapons systems, anti- personnel bombs, chemical and biological warfare, incendiary weapons, counterinsur- gency, and such mind-teasers as the cla,ssi- fied contract titled "Beliefs and habits of cer- tain foreign populations of significance for psychological operations." Talent and funds that could be applied to problems of urban blight, disarmament, pol- lution, poverty, and disease are drained into newer, bigger, better weapons systems. Dr. James Killian, chairman of the MIT Corporation (he was the nation's first pres- idential Science Adviser), has recommended to a Senate subcommittee that an ad hoc task force be created to review our weanons technology and strategic policies. Scientists thus "free 03 organizational loyalties" could make recommendations "without being con- strained by any departmental commitments or biases." Such a task force is not even in the plan- ning stage. l'Ugh t now, if the President wants a detailed study of, say, Russia's strategic capabilities vis-a-vis the U.S., he asks the Defense Department to ask the Air Force to ask the Rand Corporation to do the study. There is no large-scale, eivilian-sUpported "think tank" to which the public or Con- gress or even the President can go directly Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 PAugust 13, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE for advice on strategic policy. The scientist's voice is captive, reaching us only after It has been filtered through Pentagon agencies and distorted by military interpretation. OTJR SECTIRITY LIES BEYOND WEAPONS (By W. Averell Harriman) Like Many other Americans, I am fearful about the present role of the military in our national life. Military men have as their pri- mary responsibility the defense of the nation, and they are miscast when they are expected to be omniscient on other vital national con- oerris. It is in some ways unfair to ask them to accept responsibility for decisions on which they are clearly unqualified to give a balanced judgment. I have worked closely with our military officers during the past three decades and respect them for their competence and dedi- cation to our country, I have held many of them in the highest esteem, among them General Marshall. I vividly recall Marshall explaining to President Roosevelt that his advice was given purely from a military standpoint. When military men advised extreme action In Vietnam, I am not sure that they fully realized the limited character of our objec- tives there. We are not there to win a war, but simply to stop the North from taking over the South by force, and .to permit the people of the South to decide their own fu- ture. I am not sure that all those advising the President fully understand how limited our objectives are. Somehow or other, there is a feeling that we are fighting the inter- national Communist conspiracy?rather than Vietnamese national Communists who do not Want to be dominated by either Peking or Mosoow. The international Communist sit- uation is quite different today than it was in the early postwar period. During those days, I was always on the side of those want- ing more arms for our nation. When South Korea was attacked, we had a military budget of only about $14 billion, and we suf- fered greatly from it. But today, we have a military budget of almost $80 billion, and have so many other requirements in our country that it is time to call a halt to our arms buildup. The war in Vietnam is an un- fortunate drain on our resources, and will, I hope, be brought to an early settlement. The money we spend there is urgently needed now to reunite our own divided country. It is not the military's job to know how that is to be done, and they cannot be ex- pected to weigh the technological require- ments of the military against the require- ments in our cities. The military today are asking for new weapons that in my judgment are clearly less important than other na- ' tional needs. We obviously must maintain nuclear ca- pability giving us a second strike force that would deter the Soviet Union or anyone else from hitting us. But that does not mean we have to be ahead in every aspect of nu- clear capability, nor does it mean that we must have many times the power to over- kill any enemy. In 1941, I was in -London as President Roosevelt's representative to Prime Minister Churchill and the British Government. Even then, I was struck by the difference in the role of the military in Britain and in the U.S. The British War Cabinet consisted of the political leaders of the country, and the ministers of the armed services were not even members of it. I am not suggesting that the British military leaders were not highly respected or that their views were not given full weight. But they were given weight within the Cabinet in balance with the other problems of the British nation. The military chiefs of staff were advisers to the Cabinet. The military establishment was in- tegrated into the policy-making procedures of the British Government. They had no contact with the Parliament, nor did they glee any public expression of their views. This is altogether different from our pres- ent procedures. Not only the Secretary of Defense but also the Chiefs of Staff go to the committees of the Congress and testify on all sorts of matters. As a result, a num- ber of senators and congressmen get an un- balanced view of our nation's needs from military men who are responsible for only one aspect of our national concerns. What I am suggesting is that we have a group of senators and congressmen whose attention is concentrated on military needs. That is why we had one member of the Congress saying a short while back that if we turned over the Vietnam war to the soldiers, they would win it in a month. Nothing could be more absurd than that statement. But it indicates the mind-set that some members of Congress get after steady bombardment by the views of our military. Their responsibility is the security of the nation, and they must look at the worst of everything. Those who see only the possible military threats would drive us into another world war. That is why isolated military judgments of political situations are not sound. Robert Kennedy wrote that during the Cuban missile crisis, he was struck by how often his brother's military advisers took "positions, which, if wrong, had the advantage that no one would be around at the end to know" how wrong they were. All of us abhor Soviet repression of free- doms at home and in Czechoslovakia, and their support for Communist subversion in independent countries. But I decry the at- tempt that is being made today by some in the Defense Department and Congress to scare the American people into believing that the Soviets are scheming to attack us with nuclear weapons. No one knows the intention of the Kremlin, but I can speak from my Russian experience that dates back over forty years. I am convinced that the Soviets are as anxious to avoid destruction of their country by nuclear war as we are of OUTS. It is particularly alarming that there ap- pears to be a new policy in the Pentagon, to have the civilian-directed offices of Interna- tional Security Affairs and Systems Analysis support the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and not question them. It is reassuring that the Congress is in- creasingly showing concern over military programs and exercising its independent judgments on decisions. I believe that negotiations we are now starting with the Soviets to control the nuclear arms race are the most important we have ever undertaken. They can be suc- cessful if we act wisely. From my talks with Mr. Kosygin and other Soviet officials, I am satisfied that they want to stop the nuclear arms race for two rea- sons. They don't want to divert further ex- penditures from their pressing internal needs. And they believe the U.S. and the Soviet Union should come to an understanding now to reduce the risk of nuclear war. This is a time of world opportunity?a split second in history. I have been told by my scientist friends that both sides can develop effective MIRV's (Multiple Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicles) in a relatively short time. It is vital that agreement be reached before this occurs. We can each tell the number of missile sites the other has but we cannot know the character of warheads fitted to the missiles without detailed on-site inspection. I was very much shocked to hear that the military had gone ahead to order these mul- tiple warheads without telling the Congress or the public that they had done so. There are advisers in our defense establish- ment who are on record as opposing an agreement with the Soviet Union on nuclear restraint. They are entitled to their opinions, S9989 but it would be inexcusable If actions Were taken that committed us to the arms race without the widest possible discussion. I am sure President Nixon believes that an agree- ment on nuclear restraint is of vital import- ance to our nation, and most Americans share this judgment. It Is interesting that it took eight years for the Congress and the public to understand what President Dwight Eisenhower was talk- ing about when he warned about the mili- tary-industrial complex. It is only recently that we have begun to question the new weapons programs, the wisdom of immediate deployment of the ABM, and testing of the MIRV. Until now, the pressure from the Con- gress has been to appropriate more money than the Administration requested for new weapons programs. Pressure comes now in the opposite direction, The turnaround is due largely to the unpopularity of the war and the urgency of domestic needs. We are be- ginning to recognize the danger of a mili- taristic attitude on the part of our country. Our security will not come from the number of our weapons. It will come from the strength of our moral force at home and abroad, from our economic and social strength, and from the unity of our people. Mr. PROXMIRE. In addition, Mr. President, I call attention to two editori- als, published in the New York Times of August 11, 1969, one entitled "Homage to the Astronauts," and the other entitled "Portrait of Mars." I read briefly from the first editorial, as follows: This background makes it particularly un- fortunate that the formal celebration planned this week has such a narrow, nationalistic cast. In the words of the plaque they left on the moon, the astronauts "came in peace for all mankind." Yet their visit to the United Nations next Wednesday will be very brief, while the rest of the day will be devoted to an American celebration of an American achievement. Perhaps it is not too late for more imagina- tive planning to emphasize the role of the astronauts as envoys of all humanity, emis- saries whose trip was made possible by con- tributions of knowledge from many nations over many centuries. Better than any men before them, after all, Armstrong, Aldrin and Collins know that this one planet is one world and that what unites men is far stronger and more important than the forces dividing them. I also wish to quote briefly from the followup editorial, on where we go from here, entitled "Portrait of Mars." After discussing what the remarkable shot we have seen in the last few days has re- vealed about Mars, the article says: Whether the Pimentel-Herr hypothesis is right or wrong, the case is strong for further intensive study of Mars by unmanned satel- lites?as against a precipitate switch to the much more costly alternative of manned exploration. A race to put men on Mars would be a moondoggle for whit% there is neither need nor justification. I hope when we look at the space authorization bill, which I understand will be before us shortly after we return, we will keep that in mind. The National Advisory Council advised some time ago that we can save a billion if, for the next 3 or 4 years, we limit our space exploration to unmanned exploration. Our voyage to the moon is the most remarkable achievement in centuries. Having accomplished that, our next step should be unmanned space exploration, A Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S9990 Approved For Re mas1a0A1ClietkE-IDOP;111300E64RAOTOE0300100001-3 August 1A 1,060 t get Up to a comfortable 70 degrees or so at penditure of at least $2 billion on re best, they descend at worst to hundreds of search, development, test and evaluation degrees below zero. For lovers of comfort, Mars is as uninviting as the THOM, and weii alone?before any of these aircraft enter over a hundred timet as far away. our strategic arsenal The irrepressible optimists who refuse to believe that earth alone has life in this solar system did get something to cheer about from Mariner 7. Professors Piznentel and Herr believe they detected methane and am- monia in Mar's south polar region, and they suggest this may have a biological origin, i.e., there may be some primitive form of life In that past of Mart. It is an exciting hypothesis worth further investigation, but for the moment the idea must be viewed as an extremely long shot. Methane and ammonia can arise from non- biological processes, Moreover, there are serious contradictions between some of the Pimentel-Herr conclusions and thote of other Investigators using different data sent hack by Mariner 7. Whether the Pimentel-Herr hypothesis is right or wrong, the case is stneng for fur- ther intensive study of Mars by unmanned satellites--as against a precipitate switch to the much more cottly alternative of manned exploration. A race to put men on Mars would be a moondoggie for which there is neither need nor justification. The fascinating close-approach photo- graphs sent back by the two Mariners covered only 20 per cent of the planet, and they offered no explanation for the changing pat- terns of dark and light that telescopes have shown on Mars for centuries. /additionally, Mariner 7 has uncovered an intriguing mys- tery by demonstrating that the bright area called Hellas is decidedly atypical in not having craters. That revelation immediately raiees the question of what processes have obliterated the craters that meteors must have created in Hellas too with less potential loss of life and a grew saving in funds. I ask unanimous consent that the New York Times editorials from which I have quoted be printed in the IlEcoae at this point. There being no objection, the edi- torials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, RS follows: HOMAGE TO THE Asteineenes By this morning, if all goes as planned, the three Apollo astronauts Wall have been re- leased from quarantine Wad reunited with their families. Then they Will begin receiving the world's homage for their historic accom- plishment in a celebration that will start with Wednesday's grueling cross country parade. Armstrong, Aldrin and Coning richly de- serve the heroes' acclaim they will receive in the days immediately ahead As no earlier feat has ever done, their aueeessful trip to and return from the moon captured the imagination of men and women almost everywhere. In the universal glow produced at least briefly by their suer-eel, many of the normal divisive barriers arineng men broke down. They were hailed in afiecow as Well as in Washington, in Cairo as Well as in Jerusa- lem, in New Delhi and Karaehi, in East Ber- lin and West Berlin. This background makes it particularly un- fortunate that the formal eelebration plan- ned this week has such a narrow, nationalis- tic cast. In the words of the plaque they left on the moon, the astronauts "came in peace for all mankind." Yet their visit to the United Nations next Wednead will be very brief, while the rest of thai day will be devoted to an American celebration of an American achievement. Perhaps it is not too late for more imagina- tive planning to emphasize the role of the astronauts as envoys of all reoinanity, emis- saries whose trip was made pessible by con- tributions of knowledge frcall many nations over many centuries. Better than any men before them, after all, Armstrong, Aldrin and Collins know that-this one planet Is one world and that hat unite: men is far stronger and more important than the forces dividing them. PORTRAIT OF MAR': On that eventual day when the first men walk on the surface of Mars, ',hey will fired much "magnificent desolation' akin to that seen by Neil Armstrong and Edwin Aldrin when they strolled on the mom last month. That virtual certainty emerges from the brilliantly successful exploration of the red planet just completed by Mariners 6 and 7. Their expedition lacked the human drama of Apollo 11, but the scienaile information they returned may well qinilify the two Mariners as the moat scientlfieally produc- tive enterprise men have yet e irried out in space. . Generations of science fictien writers? from H. G. Wells and Edgar Rice Burroughs to Ray Bradbury?were mistaken, it turns out, in their visions of human or nonhuman civilizations on Male. On thaeentrary, Mars it a bleak, arid wasteland, a gee----gist's night- mare of twisted plains and innumerable craters whose typical landscape is almost ene distinguishable from that of the moon. True, Mars has a thin atmosehere?whose ground-level pressure is about that found twenty or thirty miles above the earth?but it is composed mainly of caelion dioxide, and cauld never support any coMplex life fa- miliar here on earth. Woree yet, the Martian surface--or most of it anyway -is bathed daily in a deadly shower of ultraviolet radia- tion, and there is no equivalent of the life- saving protection provided by the atmos- 1 phere here. While Martian temperatures may I might say at this point, Mr. Presi- bomber, we are talkingenes1 ecord,c dent, that in talking about this new bomber, we are talking about a system the eventual cost of which could be as high as or higher than that of the Safe- guard anti-ballistic-missile system about which we have just debated for some 5 or 6 weeks. Moreover, it is contemplated, according to a recent issue of Aviation Week & Space Technokiey: Under the new schedule, USAF will select by November 1 a single contractor for the final development and production of the AMSA. We are clearly at the threshold of a major new expenditure, We should not be drawn into it little by little without having a clear idea of where we are going and why. I believe, therefore, that the time is at hand for a thorough exarnina- tion of our entire strategic bomber program. With the cosponsorship of the Senator from New York (Mr. GooDELL), the Sen- ator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD) , and the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROX- MIRE), who have been leading the effort to review our military outlays, have proposed an amendment to the pending bill which aims to hold AMSA to the fiscal 1969 spending level; in other words, to avoid an acceleration of work on the system. It would leave $20 million in the For the scientifically minded or even the pending authorization hill, to be e0M- merely curious, the rich harvest of the bined with $5 million in carryover au- Mariners can only whet the appetite for more thority from fiscal 1969 knowledge. ADVANCE MANNED STRATEGIC AIRCRAFT Mr. MeCIOVERN. Mr. President, the military procurement authorization bill, S. 2546, represents a significant increase for an advanced manned strategic air- craft. In fiscal 1969 the approved program for this project was $25 million. It is pro- posed that we spend $100.2 million in fis- cal 1970, for purposes outlined by De- fense Secretaries Clifford and Laird in their respective posture statements. Secretary Clifford raised the figure to $77 million, to "continue the competi- tive design phase initiated with fiscal year 1969 funds and to advance the development of the long leadtime avionics and propulsion systems." Secretary Laird added another $23 mil- lion, to "shorten the competitive design phase and permit the start of full-scale engineering development in fiscal year 1970. While no decision on produc- tion and deployment must be made now, the accelerated research and de- velopment effort could advance the initial operational capability?I0C--of this air- craft by 1 year." While we might take some small com- fort from the fact that we can avoid a final decision this year on a system es- timated to cost a minimum of $12 bil- kin, it is nevertheless important to rec- ognize that present plans call for the ex.- Mr. President, this would be the ef- fect of reducing by $80 nhilli the amount requested in the pending au- thorization bill for work on a new bomber. In the meantime I hope we can initiate a more extensive review of the alleged need and justification for any strategic bomber force at all and for this elaborate new system in particular. I am especially interested in learning more about the administration's contentions in this regard. For my own part, I must say that at the end of a substantial amount of study, including briefings from the Air Force officers in charge of the AMSA program, .1 have been unable to escape the conclusion that the many legs upon which the AMSA case rests, even in com- bination, cannot begin to support it. The case for retaining any kind of a bomber deterrent is almost as doubtful. I will call up my amendment for active consideration shortly after the recess. In preparation for discussion at that time, and so that all of us can develop a clear understanding of the Admin- istration's position, we have submitted to Defense Secretary Laird the following list of questions bearing on the strategic bomber program. Most of them have been discussed with Air Force oincials in both classified and unclassified terms. I have asked that they be answered in wilting for the public record, and that the re- sponse be supplied to me by the end of the recess. Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 :CIA-RDsF' A.1364R000300100001-3 August 12, 1969CONGRESSIONAL RECOR ? S 9725 ing and technical direction of system developments; operations analysis and long-range military planning; and gen- eral and continuing research and experi- mentation in support of military R. & D. Our study of the nonprofits, including a Defense Department briefing, indicates that there has been a general tightening of management and control of the de- fense FCRC's, including a noticeable re- duction in the fees which have been paid to the major FCRC's. However, the sub- committee took issue with the Defense Department criteria for determining the reasonableness of FCRC executive com- pensation rates. It does not seem appro- priate to the subcommittee that executive salaries for these nonprofit, no- risk Government-sponsored and Gov- ernment-funded activities should be equated to compensation for profitmak- ing organizations in private enterprise having the same operating budget or the same "sales." We found it difficult to jus- tify a salary of $97,500 for the chief executive of an FCRC when the salary of the Secretary of Defense is only $60,- 000. That was the basis for the recom- mendation by Senator HARRY BYRD Of the restrictive language in limiting such executive compensation. Senator BYRD'S amendment is contained in section 204(a) of the authorization bill. Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. McINTYRE. I am happy to yield to my colleague on the Armed Services Com- mittee and also my colleague on the Re- search and Development Subcommittee. Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, first may I congratulate the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire for the tremendous amount of work that he has put into the handling of this legislation as chairman of the Subcommittee on Re- search and Development. He has handled it with great ability and great industry. In regard to the amendment the Sen- ator from New Hampshire just men- tioned, I think we should emphasize for a moment just what it will do and what it will not do. It does not prevent the. payment of salaries in excess of $45,000, but it does make mandatory that any such salaries above the figure of $45,000 must be ap- proved by the President of the United States. As it is now, the salaries for these Government-sponsored, nonprofit orga- nizations are in effect determined by self-perpetuating boards of trustees, and then those salaries, set by the boards of trustees, must be approved by the De- partment of the Air Force or the appro- priate department in the Department of Defense. So this provision would take away from the Department of Defense the right to establish salaries in excess of $45,000, and would require that they have the ap- proval of the President of the United States. The reason why both the subcommit- tee and the committee felt such a pro- vision was desirable was that, as a prac- tical matter, all of the funds for the Govermnent-sponsored, nonprofit or- With these proposals, which I strongly urge the Congress to enact, we can en- hance America's human resources. By opening up the opportunity for man- power training on a large scale, we build a person's will to work; in so doing, we build a bridge to human dignity. RICHARD NIXON. THE WHITE HOUSE, August 12, 1969. MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE -.A message from the House of Repre- sentatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had agreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (HR. 10107) to continue for a temporary period the ex- isting suspensionf ty o ertain-istle. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA- TIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RE- SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MIS- SILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJA- LEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RE- SERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH The PRESIDING 0101,10ER (Mr. EA- GLETON in the chair). The Chair lays be- fore the Senate the unfinished business, which will be stated. The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (S. 2546) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1970 for procure- ment of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and to au- thorize the construction of test facilities at Kwajalein Missile Range, and to pre- scribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes. The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill. Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I yield myself 40 minutes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator from New Hampshire is recognized for 40 minutes. Mr. McINTYRE: Mr. President, I have a prepared statement here that defends and replies to the thrust of the amend- ment being offered by the distinguished Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT) . I want to make it clear that I do not plan to yield for questions or any col- loquy during the presentation of this proposed statement, with one exception. I shall be glad to yield to the distin- guished Senator from Virginia (Mr. BYRD) who is a member of the Subcom- mittee on Research and Development of the Armed Services Committee, since I will be referring directly to actions which took place in that subcommittee and in the full committee. Mr. President, this amendment would make a further reduction of $45,614,000 of the R.D.T. & E. portion of the au- thorization bill. I would call the Senate's attention to the fact that the bill, as re- ported by the Armed Services Commit- tee, has already reduced the $8.2 billion request by $1 billion and $43 million. This represents a total reduction of some 121/2 percent of the funds requested for R.D.T. & E. The areas in the field of military re- search that the Senator's amendment seeks to reach and further reduce over and beyond the committee's recommen- dation are: First, Federal contract research cen- ters; Second, DOD contracts with foreign research institutions; Third, policy planning studies with foreign policy implications; Fourth, the Themis program; and Fifth, Project Agile?R. & D. on low level conflict. The Armed Services Committee has al- ready cut this overall field of military science research by $50.5 million. Most of this cut will be absorbed by the five pro- grams under attack in the Fulbright amendment?about $40 million. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me? ? Mr. McINTYRE. I have already indi- cated that I do not plan to yield. Mr. FULBRIGHT. This is not for a question. I wanted to modify my amend- ment, so the Senator will know what I have in mind. Mr. McINTYRE. I yield for that pur- pose. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I wish to modify my amendment on page 3, line 24, to add the following new sec- tion: SEC. 205. None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be used to carry out any research project or study unless such project or study has a direct and apparent relationship to a specific mili- tary function or operation. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be so modified. FEDERAL CONTRACT RESEARCH CENTERS Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, let me first discuss the Federal contract re- search centers. These are the so-called "think tanks." These are one of the re- sources which gives the Department of Defense a capability to meet the chal- lenging requirements for new system concepts and their orderly and timely development into operational military systems. Other parts of the mix of re- sources for doing this job include in- house laboratories and contracts with profit-oriented industry. During the past 5 years the R.D.T. & E. funding for the nonprofits or Federal contract re- search centers has been decreased sig- nificantly in an orderly, but programed fashion. I would caution against a pre- cipitate reduction without proper plan- ing and laying of the groundwork for transfer of tasks being performed by these FCRC's to other scientists and en- gineers?either in-house or contractor employed. Large reductions without pre- planning will probably result in the dis- banding of talented teams of scientists and engineers with a consequent serious impact on many high priority programs. The time lost and the added cost of re- creating these teams at a later date would nullify the cost savings achieved by this reduction. It was the feeling of the subcommit- tee that these nonprofit corporations serve a useful purpose in three areas: System planning and systems engineer- Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30_,. CIA-RDP711300364R000300100001-3 S 9726 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 12, 1969 ganizations come from the American taxpayers. That being the case, the committee felt that the salaries shad be more in line with those paid by the Government for positions of great restionsibility, such as the Secretary of Defense and other Cab- inet officials. But the committee recognized that there are many technical experts whose services are needed, and in those cases higher salaries may be set if they have the approval of the President of the United States. I will take just one corporation, the Aerospace Corp. In fiscal 1969 its operat- ing budget was $71272,000. Of that amount, it received Its entire funding, $74,272,000, from the Tiedartment of De- fense. In regard to Aerospace, the informa- tion submitted to the- committee shows that there are 68 persons in Aerospace earning in excess of. $30,000 per year. There are 19 who earned in excess of $42,500. To give the Senate the range of sal- aries, the President was paid last year $97,500. A senior vice president was paid $66,000. A vice president for operations was paid $65,000. Another vice president for operations was paid $58,000. Another vice president and general manager was paid $55,000. Another vice president was paid $50,000. Another vice president was paid $50,000. Another vice president was paid $50,000. Another vice president was paid $50,000. Another vice president was paid $45,000. Another vice president was paid $45,500. The committee went into this matter very carefully. It felt that there should be some restraint with regard to what is done with respect to these 16 Govern- ment-sponsored, nonprofit research or- ganizations. With that in mind, the amendment which is included in the bill was devel- oped and was approved by the committee. I thank the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire for yielding to me at this point. Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I com- pliment the Senator from Virginia for his work, not only On the particular amendment he has been discussing, but generally for his help, counsel, and ad- vice on the subcommittee, and, of course, his activities on the full committee. It has been a pleasure to be associated with him, particularly as we have delved into this matter of research and development during the past year. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Presi- dent, will the Senator Veld? Mr. McINTYRE. For what purpose? Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I wish to compliment the Senator. Mr. McINTYRE, Oh. I always yield for that. The PRESIDING OPeICER. The Senator yields for a compliment. Mr. BYRD of West Vir iinia. Mr. Presi- dent, the Senator yields for a compli- ment that is well deserved. I have been greatly impressed by the presentations that have been made during the debate on this bill by the able junior Senator from New Hampshire. I think that he has been exceedingly diligent in his work as chairman of the subcommittee; and the statements that he has made, his participation in colloquies on the floor, and his answers to questions have indi- cated that he has a very thorough grasp of the subject matter. I know that one can only acquire the knowledge with re- spect to a bill that he obviously has ac- quired with respect to this bill through a great deal of hard work, effort, and dili- gence. It is gratifying to see Senators come to the floor who are so well pre- pared to present their case on a bill, and the Senator from New Hampshire has certainly set an extremely fine example. Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from West Virginia for his very kind remarks, but I would add that, as one of the so-called junior Senators, I have learned much and have profited greatly from watching my dis- tinguished colleague from West Virginia in his Presentations, because I think it is generally recognized that there is no harder-working Member of this body than my distinguished friend from West Virginia. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I thank the Senator. I think the Senate is in- debted to him, and he has done a great service for the country, on the subject matter of the legislation which his sub- committee has delved into. It is a very difficult subject matter, and I have lis- tened to his presentation with interest. I wanted to pay him this tribute be- cause I felt it was well deserved, and again I say the Senate is indebted to him. I congratulate him, and I know he will continue to do great work on the Committee on Armed Services. Mr. McINTYRE. I thank the Senator very much. Furthermore, the subcommittee felt that there should be a general reduction in the level of effort of FCRC's, par- ticularly since we see an overall reduc- tion in the total DOD research and development budget. In addition, we noted that the Defense Department has instituted a policy authorizing Defense- sponsored FCRC's to invite them to take up to 20 percent of their business from non-DOD sources. The subcommittee recognized that the total operating budget of the Federal Contract Research Centers is not neces- sarily, indeed not usually, funded from a single account. For example, the line item for Aerospace Corp. under Military Astronautics and related equipment is $24.7 million, whereas its operating budg- et planned for fiscal year 1970 is $78 million. The rest of the funding is pro- vided from various programs for which Aerospace Corp. provides system en- gineering and technical services. We rec- ognize the difficulty of identifying ap- propriate accounts to which a reduction should be charged. It is expected that the impact on the FCRC's will be in excess of the recommended cut. The efforts of the Federal Contract Research Centers are generally charac- terized by two attributes. First, each center has a "mission oriented" rather than a "scientific discipline-oriented" charter; that is, each center is given tasks directly connected to the Services' operational needs. To carry out these tasks, an FCRC must involve many kinds of scientists and engineers. Thus, the contributions of any one center are carte varied?in terms of scientific disciplines and areas of technology, and in terms of the duration and scope of effort lead- ing to a contribution. Second, many investigations are con- ducted concurrently within each center, and the culmination dates of investiga- tions are widely staggered. Thus, a small sampling of the contributions made by all FCRC's during a given short period of time is not representative of their long-term cumulative value. Because of these two characteristics, what I wish to point out is: First, a rather detailed listing of some of the important developments from one FCRC, the Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University; and second, a sam- pling of illustrative contributions by other FCRC's. This should provide a "feel" for both the range of the center's activity as well as the larger range of work accomplished by this entire cat- egory of R. & D. orga,nizations. APPLIED PHYSICS LABORATORY The Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University, working primarily for the U.S. Navy, has long been a pro- ductive member of the DOD's research and development team. The fiscal year 1967 DOD funding of this organization -was $31.4 million. The level of technical effort haS been reasonably constant over the past several years. In return for this Investment the Applied Physics Labora- tory has: Developed the basic surface-to-air missiles, Terrier, Tartar, and Tabs, which are now deployed on upward of 60 ships and has undertaken the job of improving the capabilities of these sys- tems against new threats, countermeas- ures, and other environmental factors. Released to production, in December 1966, design modifications for the Terrier and Tartar missiles to extend the capa- bilities of the missile. Mr. President, I am now talking about the missiles on our warships today, on the high seas of the world. Formulated testing methods and devel- oped the necessary ancillary test equip- ment to permit the rapid determination of the state of operability of the ship- board weapon systems of the Tartar and Terrier ships. A system dynamic tester has been developed that provides real- istic target simulation for the fire con- trol system and generates a test problem similar to that of engaging a stringent target. The functioning of the Ere con- trol system is automatically evaluated and a scoring is displayed. The first model of this equipment was successfully tested aboard the U.S.S. Berkeley in the fall of 1966. A further advance in oper- ability testing involved the design of automatic equipment for the evaluation of the Navy tactical data system com- puter complex already aboard Terrier ships of the DLG-26 class. This com- Priterized test program was successfully demonstrated aboard the U.S.S. Wain- wright and work is proceeding for the installation of the teat program aboard all the Terrier ships having the NTDS Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 August 12, 196 oved Fo 004/11/30 1tI3P LOIN iitc.E5Il.31N Idl7V.M.L7-- 017IN ACEIR000300100001-3 S9727 rr-Ralease,2, ,E4A,RDP7e1EMO system. The testing programs materially contribute to the online readiness of the DOD CONTRACTS WITH FOREIGN RESEARCH proposed project, and fourth, at least INSTITUTIONS one of the following special conditions is shipboard weapon systems. The amendment by the Senator from inherent in the proposed work. Conceived and developed the Navy Arkansas would reduce the authorization First. The research or development in- navigation satellite system. This sys- for Defense Department contracts at for- volves geographical, environmental, or ? tem provides extremely accurate navi- gation fixes for the Polaris submarine fleet, independent of weather conditions. The entire development, including the concepts, the computing programs, de- tailed satellite design, construction and checkout, the development of the ship- board navigation receivers and com- puters, and the development of the sup- porting ground system for tracking, com- manding, and controlling the satellite was accomplished by the Applied Physics Laboratory. AEROSPACE CORP. Aerospace Corp.: They devised a pro- gram for modifying formerly operational Atlas E and Atlas F missiles into configu- ration suitable for target vehicle boosters for the advanced ballistic reentry sys- tem program and the Nike ABM test pro- grams. The total projected cost saving of modifying 134 boosters over procure- ment cost of that many new target ve- hicle boosters is estimated at $1.47 billion. Within the past 2 years Aerospace Corp. has developed an analytic method for predicting radio frequency attenua- tion caused by the plasma-sheath sur- sounding reentry vehicles. This is a sig- nificant contribution, in the efforts to overcome the problems resulting from radar and telemetry signal attenuation during a critical portion of the missile or space capsule flight profile. HUMAN RESOURCES RESEARCH OFFICE Human Resources Research Office, George Washington University: During the last 12 months they have conceived and designed a radically new training device for aviators. This device will re- duce required instrument training flight time from the present 50 hours to 40 hours. The savings in projected flight costs are estimated as $1,700 million per year. or flora not eign institutions by $2 million, culturalcon ion , , The Department of Defense has con- found and not feasible to duplicate or tinning priority needs for certain se- simulate within the United States and its territories. Second. The work involves diseases, epidemiological situations, or availability or clinical material which are not present within the United States. Third. The work involves a unique re- search idea highly relevant to DOD needs. In this fiscal year 1970 budget the De- partment of Defense requested $5,700,000 for work in this impotant field of re- search, the field of research which is de- voted almost entirely to physical sciences, otherwise called the hard sciences. The Armed Services Committee has reduced this request by some $513,000 leaving a total authorization of approximately $5.2 billion. The amendment of the Sen- ator from Arkansas calls for a further reduction of $2,000,000 reducing this pro- gram to a figure of $3.7 million or in ef- fect practically gutting this type of work, for the reduction overall would be great- er than one-third. The reduction of one- third of these high priority research in- vestigations which can only be carried out abroad include, as I have said, in- vestigation of parasitic diseases of rele- vancy to naval and military personnel in foreign areas, to long-range global communications and of environment in foreign areas of importance to our mili- tary. A reduction of this scope would eliminate further progress on more than 100 projects planned for foreign investi- gators. Last year, fiscal year 1969, there were 451 research undertakings in 44 coun- tries at a cost of $9.2 million. The cost of this program of fiscal year 1970, after the committee reduction, has reduced it to $5.7 million, in which there will be 207 projects. This is the present plan but not all the projects have been approved and there rhay well be some changes in these numbers because of the cut already made. Of the $5.7 million only $300,000 at the very outside that could possibly be la- beled social and behavioral sciences and all these may not be programed during the year. I ask unanimous consent that a com- plete list of the projects planned for fis- cal year 1970?their contracts for re- search?for foreign institutions along with the nature of the research and the amounts of funds be printed in the REC- ORD. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the REC- ORD, as follows: lected foreign research and development projects. One very important area is that of long-range radio communications re- quired for our worldwide communica- tions network. Interaction of solar radia- tion with the earth's upper atmosphere produces global extent ionization of the region called the ionosphere. The rapidly changing conditions of the ionosphere affect in a primary way Defense com- munications. For this reason we support ionospheric and radio propagation re- search in Australia, Canada, and Nor- way to acquire essential data not obtain- able within the United States. A second area of prime importance is that of military medicine in foreign countries where our American troops are stationed or operating. Many diseases are endemic to a specific geographic locale and their presence greatly affects the force strength of our command and force units. It is not desirable nor feasible to pursue stateside research on many ?of these diseases since it is not desired to , bring them into the United States. Therefore Defense supports selected re- search projects in military medicine in such countries as Japan, Israel, Italy, and Brazil. A third area of key importance is that of environmental and meteorological phenomena related to the land, sea, and air that our Defense units operate on or over the globe. It is simply not possible to carry out the required research from stateside alone. Foreign investigators having a daily presence and long estab- lished experience in specific geograph- ical areas are important contributors to the basic knowledge that we require about terrestrial sciences in foreign lands, about the oceans and seas far dis- tant from the United States and about MITRE CORP. atmospheric weather phenomena in for- Mitre Corp.: They developed an inter- eign areas. To meet priority Defense re- q ferometer radar technique to provide auirements, selected research projects are supported in Berlin, Canada, Den- capability for rapid and precise deter- mark, Greece, and other countries. mination of satellite orbits and ballistic Defense has established stringent cri- missile trajectories and information re- teria for selection of research and devel- garding the physical configuration of opment projects by foreign performers. the target satellite or missile. All ongoing or further research and ex- This gives an idea of some of the tre- ploratory development by foreign per- mendous research advances that these formers shall be supported by DOD only so-called think tanks have come up when it has been determined that, first, with. it is clearly significant in meeting urgent I now turn my attention to the De- defense needs of the United States; sec- partment of Defense contracts with for- ond, it cannot be deferred for later ac- eign research institutions. This is an- tion; third, the proposed foreign investi- other area that the Fulbright amend- gator certifies that he is unable to obtain ment attacks. support from any,other source for the Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For R_Qlease 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9728 i,uNGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE August 12, 1969. Military department and contract agency Tine Argentina: N Universidad de Buenos Aires F Consejo National de Invest. Cient. F National University of L.a Plata. F Consejo Nacional He I nvesti- gaciones. Australia: A tVlonash University N University of Queensland__ _ _ F University of Sydney F University of Adelaide _ F University of Sydney Austria: A Institute of Hygiene, Univer- sity of Vienna. F University of Vienna Belgium: A Von Harman Institute F Von Karmen Institute for Fluid Dynamics, Rhode Saint/Genese. F Von Kerman Institute for Dynamics, Rhode Saint/ Genese, F Von Karmen Institute for Fluid Dynamics, Rhode SainVGenese. Do F Von Karmen Institute for Fluid Waterloorhode-St Genese, F University of Liege _ Born-Bunge Foundation Bolivia: D Colegio San Calixto . _ _ F San Andres University Brazil: A University of Sao Paulo A Minas Gerais University A Federal University of Bahia A Universidad Mackensie Do_ A Institute Adolfo Lutz N University of Sao Paulo F Comissao Nacional De Activi- dades Espac, J Dos Campos. F Fundacao Service Especial de Saude Publica. Canada: A York University A McGill University. A Royal Victoria Hospital A University of Manitoba N McGill University Do Do Do N Computing Devices of Canada_ A Manitoba University N Institute of Oceanography_... N British Columbia Research Council. N York University N McGill University N McGill University N University of Toronto N University of British Columbia. F Laval University D McGill University D Canadian Armament Re- search and Development Establishment. ? RCA Victor, Limited Ceylon: A Medical Research Institute. Funds planned for fiscal year 1970 Development of effective protective and thera- peutic drugs for radiation sickness. X-ray spectrometry of galactic sources from 7.76outhern Hemisphere. Wearch in stellar spectroscopy Wilecular mechanisms of steroids action on tespiratory systems, Microbiological and immunological studies of _pathogenesis and virulence in leptospirosis. Haute and pharmacological action in toxin from deadly jellyfish. *My of cosmic radiations at extremely high eil Reoevich directed toward propagation of solar pai iicles. Steliar intensity interferometer andentiology, virology, and immunology of tO-horne encephalitis and other tick- be. oe diseases. Cnmposition and content of meteorites Flow characteristics associated with V/STOL model testing in wind tunnel. The influence of cross flow on 2-dimensional sep iration. Applantion of the blunt-trailing edge blade to p 1. taesiiir separation in hypersonic flows Lem-density high-temperature gas dynamics__ E*i ,iental aerodynamics. High resolution atmospheric I R absorption and sky background emission interfermoetric Dead i ipment of sleep patterns, women doctor en,' use. Spech ,ii characteristics of infrasonic acoustic wa /vs and related seismic research: lay research at high altitude Control of ribonucleic acid synthesis in gian chromosomes. Schietosemiasis drug screening Pathogenesis of diarrhea in severe strongy- toidasis. Ai:atmospheric studies LA 60 Solar inicrowave radio emission LA61 Ariteuirus studies in Sao. Paulo, Brazil Mathematical investigations of problems of ocean surveillance of navigation. Measuiements of the earth's total magnetic Kehl and its variations. Epideiciological studies of Amapari virus Kictelo.i. of atmospheric constituents Extremely low frequency electromagnetic pheilemena. Investigation of pathogenesis and treatment of si jock. Shrift of factors influencing the passage of dreg.; into the malarial parasite plasmodium Be yir. Electric properties of ice Arctic plankton ecology_ HE audio absorption in ice Energy budget and other tropical microclima- tolovical research. Antehlatic detection and classification Investigations of pheromones as chemosteri- lent-. tor insects with special reference to synthetic queen substance and its analogs. Sydeimitics biology and hydrographic rela- tion or seine species of calanus. Mitine borer biology Brain nucleic acid changes during learning_ __ Mechanisms of polymer degradation High magnetic fields and insulators Very high altitude missile and decoy gas dynamics; missile aerodynamics for broad altiiiide ranges. , Fundamental air-sea exchange processes and then relation to wind wave generation: ()online turbulence. Nalizehemoral control of thyrotrophic activity. Psychological processes of the central nervous system. Hypervelocity Research program 10.0 24. 0 12.0 16. 0 18.0 12. 0 50. 0 25. 0 60. 0 20. 0 Military department and contract agency Title Chile: A Comisten Nacional de Investigacion. F Universidad de Chile__ F Catholic University of Chile__ F Catholic University of Chile F Comision Nactional de I nvestigacion Cientifica y Technologica. Colombia: F Universidad Nacional de Colombia. F Universidad del Valle Costa Rica: A University of Costa Rica Denmark: N Marine Biological Laborto_ F Danske Meteorologiske Institute. 17.0 Equador: On.. F Universidad Central del 10. 0 Equador. Finland: 15. 0 F Institute of Occupational Health. France: A Ecole Pratique des Hautes Estudes-Sorbonne, 15.0 A Institute for Cell Pathology. N Campagne de Recherches et d'Etudes Aeronautiques. F Observatorie de Paris F University of Lyon Germany: A Institute for Animal Phys- iology, J. W. Goethe Uni- versity. A Free University of Berlin . A Research Office for Physical Bioclimatology. A Rheinisch-Westfaifische Technische Hochschule. F Bochum Radio Observatory F Technische Hochschule Munchen, Munich. Ghana: F University of Ghana, Accra_ 20. 0 15. 0 20. 0 30. 0 50. 0 14, 0 15.8 12.0 5. 0 8. 0 5.0 15. 0 20. 9 7. 0 Greece: F University of Athens D Seismological Institute of 8. 0 Athens University. Iceland: N Surtsay Research Society..... India: A Bombay National History...... 12. 0 IS. 0 25. 0 20. 0 10.0 15.0 20. 0 20. 0 150.0 20. 0 13.0 10. 0 15. 0 26, 0 11.0 15.0 50, 0 15.0 140. 0 700 0 Radar 5ackscatter studies 100. 0 LeMnspirosis-A serological survey of occupa- 1.0 demi groups in Ceylon, F University of Calcutta Indonesia: A Lembaga Biologi Nasional Iran: D Pahlavi University Israel: A Structure function relationships inhuman and high elevation adapted mammal hemo- globin. _ Form and function invariants in the visual system. _ Nervous connections in the vestibular system_ Studies in synaptic mechanisms I3iochemical properties of nerve membrances_ Studies of ecology and disease transmission__ Disease ecology of tacaribe group viruses _ Physiological studies of leishmania _ Ecological investigations on bottom living marine animals. Ionospheric research using active satellite transmissions. Arctic geomagnetic observations Studies of psychotomimetics Funds planned ter fiscal year 1970 20. 0 21.0 8. 0 7. 0 8. 0 0.0 30. 0 7.0 10.0 14. 0 3.0 6, 0 Mathematical and electrical analogs of heat 10.0 transfer in man. Metabolic and sensory stimuli in the regula- tion of food intake-behavioral and electro- physiological study. Laser action on living cells Rheo-electricat apalogy: Supercavitating pro- peller design. Research directed toward the improvement of planetary phettogrammetrY. Neurophysielogical mechanisms of The states of sleep. Microcirculatory behavior In shock___ _ Daily analysis of circumpolar 30 and 10 mb maps E486. Atmospheric aerosols between 700 and 3,000 meters, [-1127. Measurement of thorny concentration of lower atmosphere. Ionospheric studies using active synchronous satellite t ra nsmissions. Investigation of spectral radiation properties of Atmosphere and earth. Ionospheric studies using active satellite transmiisions. 20. 0 20.0 10. 0 18, 0 10. 0 6,0 20 0 10,0 15.0 7.0 10.0 7.0 Ionospheric research using active satellite 15.0 transmissions. Aftershocks and crustal structure in Greece__ 20,-S Ecological succession of biota on a newly formed oceanic land mass. _ Studies of the bionomics and taxonomy of the birds of India, taxonomy of the birds of Bhutan. Radio, astronomical and satellite studies of the ionosphere. Migratory animal pathological sur- vern(gdnoesnieasia), avian studies in Nutritional studies -Iran_ Israel Institute of Applied Social Re- Investigation of leadership quail- search, ties of kibbutz-raised young men. A Rogoff-Wellcome Medicine Research In- Isolation of snake venom toxins stitute. and study of their mechanism of action. A Technion Institute of Technology Photochemistry of antimalarial drugs. N Institute of Technology Techn ion-Israel_ _ Cross-stresses In the flow of gases (Reiner-effect). Basic theories Inc nonnumerical data processing. Effects of heat sources on plane- tary circulation, Ionospheric research using Sat- ellites. Seismk source Identification tech- niques. Pharmacological and biochemical changes in animals made acres- sive by isolation. Immunological reactions in viral hepatitis. Hebrew University Hebrew University F National Commission for Space Research. D Weizmann Institute of Science Italy: A Pharmacological Research Institute A University of Genoa Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 25, 0 7.0 15.0 6.0 50, 0 20. 0 20. 0 15. 0 15. 0 20. 0 20. 10. 0 20, 0 15,0 20. 0 August 12, 1960proved FratefuVR9C1/3fig&BDID7sMetR000300100001-3 S 9729 Military.department and ? contract agency Title Funds planned for fiscal year 1970 Italy-Continued A Chemical Institute of University of Rome__ Individual activity coefficients of ionic species. F University Degli Studi di Pisa Comparative neurophysiology of F University of Ferrara Research on mechanics of breath- ing. F National Institute of Optics___ Problems in visual performance of pilots F University of Milan Neutron flux of earth's radiation environment__ F University of Sassari Identification of photodynamic systems in the retina. F Arcetri Astrophysical Ob- Solar radio spectroscopy and detection of sun servatory spectral lines. F University of Milan Physiology of cerebrospinal fluid Jamaica: Ionospheric studies using active satellite F University of West Indies. transmissions. Japan: A National Cancer Center Research Institute. Kyushu University A Institute of Microbial Chemistry. A Nara Medical College A _ Do A Kitasato University A Sasaki Institute A Nara Medical College A Japanese Foundation for Can- cer Research. A Kitasato Institute A National Institutes of Health A Do A Kitasato Institute A Yamashina Institute or Ornithology. A Kanazawa University Neuronal activities on the regu.ation of feeding. A Hokkaido:University Physiological activity of the brown adipose tissue. A Kumamoto University Biological reactions to cellular antibodies with special reference to their immune- pathological and immuno-chemical prop- erties. A Do Endogenous mechanism of response in inflammation, with special reference to biologic significance of specific permability factors and their inhibitors newly isolated from inflammed sites. A Kirume University Interaction between arbovirus and myxovirus_ A Shi-Ehime Preparatory of Life cycle and control of paragoniumus in Japan. Shikoku area. F Tokyo Medical and Dental Gamma-aminobutyric acid in sensory physi- University. elegy. F Kumamoto University Neural organization of sensory information for taste. Measurement of human complement com- ponents in dengue shock syndrome. Taxonomical and ecological studies on lung fluke, paragonimus in Pacific area; with special reference to Southeast Asia. Microbial drug resistance (genetics and evolu- tion of It factor and plasmids). Polymeric structure of hemoglobin and its relation to function. Localization by electron microscopy of several phosphatase activities. Nature and mode of action of local antibody in intestine. Investigation of cell component structural changes in homologous transplants com- pared with normal cells. Electron microscope studies on several phos- phatase activities in neurons and gliacytes infected with Japanese encephalitis virus. Differences in antigenic specificity and im- munogenicity of tissue transplants. Cytochemical studies on ultrastructures o1 toxoplasma gondii and allied organisms. Mode of infection of scrub typhus I mmunologica studies on scrub typhus and its center in Japan. Studies on encephaiitozoon (nosema cuniculi) infections in man. Migratory animal pathological survey Kenya: F College of Nairobi, Kenya__ _ Ionospheric studies of radio emissions Korea: A Seoul National University____ Multiplication and antibody formation of Jap- anese encephalitis virus in snakes. A Kyung-HEB University Migratory animal pathological survey(Korea)_ _ A Seoul National University_ _ Ecological survey and mass chemotherapy of filariasis on Cho Do, Korea. Malaysia: A University of Malya Mosquitoes of Malaysia 20.0 A Do Weathering of rocks under humid tropical 20.0 conditions. ? Netherlands: A International Training Center 4.0 for Aerial Survey. N Central Laboratory, T.N.O 20.0 10. 0 15. 0 10. 0 6. 0 10. 0 3. 0 10. 0 15. 0 4.0 10.0 7. 0 12.0 3. 0 3. 0 7.0 7. 0 3. 0 6. 0 10. 0 15. 0 15. 0 20. 0 5. 0 8. 0 6. 0 6. 0 12. 0 5. 0 5. 0 8. 0 5.0 10. 0 13. 0 5. 0 15.0 Role of image quality of photogrammetrjc pointing accuracy. Mechanical strength of filled elastomers of the types used as solid propellants in rocket motors. Antilymphocyte serum, homologous bone marrow transplantation and irradiation. F Radiobiological Institute of the Organization for Health Research. Norway: A Electroencephalographic Lab- Brain, behavior and intracerebral blood flow__ oratory. A University of Oslo Neuropsychological studies of mechanisms of visual discrimination. A Do Photochemical atmosphere model containing oxygen and hydrogen. . N Universityr of Bergen Degradation of marine surfaces by salt re- quiring bacteria. F Auroral Observatory Ionospheric studies using satellite transmis- sions. F University of Oslo The investigation of variable radio and optical solar phenomena. F University of Bergen X-ray and particle radiations at high altitudes in the auroral zone. D University of Bergen Detection seismology D Norwegian Defense Research Norwegian seismic system phase II Establishment. 15.0 20. 0 5. 0 5. 0 20. 0 10. 0 13. 0 15. 0 Military department and contract agency Title Funds planned for fiscal year 1970 Peru: A University Peruvian Caye- tam Heredia. A Do A Do A Do A Do A Do F Institut Geofisica Del Peru Lima. Do F Geophysical Institute of Peru_ F Institute Geofisico Del Pero_ _ D Institute Geofisica! Del Peru_ Philippines: A Mindanao State Univer- sity. A National Museum A University of Philippines A Do A National Museum A University of Philippines A Do F Manila Observatory Spain: F Observatory of Ebro_ F University of Salamanca_ Sweden: A Sahlgrens Hospital, Uni- versity of Goteborg. N University of Goteborg, Medical. F Stockholms Universitet Stockholm. F Kiruna Geophysical Ob- servatory, Kiruna. F Royal University of Uppsala. Do F Kiruna Geophysical Observatory. F University of Goteborgs D University of Uppsala Switzerland: A University of Lausanne A University of Basel A Physiklisch-Meteorologische Observatorium. F Universitat Bern F Universitat Zurich Taiwan: A Tunghai University A Kaohsiung Medical College___ A Tunghai University A National Taiwan University A Do Thailand: A Applied Scientific Research Corp. A Do A Medical Sciences University Facility for Tropical Medi- cine. A Bangkok School of Tropical Medicine. University of Medical Scien- ces. A Do D Applied Scientific Research Corp. United Kingdom: 35.0 A Liverpool School of Tropical 675.0 Medicine. Physiologic changes in the cardiopulmonary 15. 0 system by ascending to high altitudes. Endocrine alterations at high altitude 0.0 Coagulation studies in newcomers to high 5.0 ' elevations LA-134. Hormone metabolism in men exposed to high . 10.0 elevatien LA-128. Respiratory physiology on ascent to high 15.0 altitudes. . Role of adrenal cortex in process of acclima- 20. 0 tization to high elevation. Equatorial ionospheric effects study 10.0 Research directed toward the study of the 20. 0 . airglow at low latitudes. Radio solar measurements 9.0 Observations of earth magnetic field 5. 0 Observation and study of infrasonic waves in 30.0 the atmosphere. Migratory animal pathological survey (South .5.0 Philippines). Migratory animal pathological survey (North 5.0 Philippines). Filariasis studies in the Philippines 7.0 Fluorescent antibody test in ineasurement of 7.0 malarial immunity. Ecology. of Southern Samar 15.0 Determination of malaria vector on Pangut- 0.0 aran Island, Sulu Archipelago. Determination of choloroquine resistant P. 8.0 Falciparum Parasitas Impalawan and other Provinces of the Philippines. Conduct radio observations of the sun 30.0 Ionospheric studies using active satellite 3.0 transmissions. Morphobiochemical correlations involved in 6.0 the differentiation eye lens. Newer advances in treatment of shock in man 10.0 Effects of noise on inner ear cells 30. 0 Rocket sampling of solid particles in tlPe 2. 0 mesosphere. Study of characteristics of auroral ionosphere 10,0 and its irregularities. Research, design and development refraction 33.0 and gravity experiments. Evaluation of high latitude cosmic ray data_ _ _ . 7.0 High latitude geomagnetic data 4.0 Integrated nervous control of the cardiovascu- 10.0 lar and gastrointestinal systems. Seismic body waves and surface waves 15.0 Investigation on structure and biological activ- 12.0 ities of human immunoglobins M. & D. (IGM and IGD). Variation-resistant matrices and related 5.0 mathematical topics. Measure of direct solar radiation and sky- 5.0 brightness in UV and visible part of spec- trum. Pulmonary pathology of oxygen toxicity 12.0 Sugar and peptide intestinal digestion and ab- 10.0 sorption. Migratory animal pathological survey 5. 0 Biochemical studies on toxic nature of snake 10.0 venoms. Biology and pathophoricity of biting midges 7.0 (Diptera: Ceratopogonidae) in Taiwan. Hast-parasite relationships of Schistosoma 8.0 Japonicum in Taiwan. Studies of cardiotoxin and vasoactive sub- 20.0 stance releasing components of cobra venom. Migratory animal pathological survey (Thai- 8.0 land FE 315). Migratory animal patholog cal survey (Thai- 5.1) land FE 316). Investigation of filariasis in Thailand 10. 0 Leptospirosis in Thailand, with special ref- erence to epidemiology, pathology and C. Investigations on the patterns of epidemiology and endemicity of diseases occurring due to largescare environmental changes in north- east Thailand. Schistosomiasis in Thailand, studies on inci- dence, epidemiology, life cycles and its causing .cercarial dermatitis (carry-on and redirection of above). Reaearch? on tropical environmental data (trend)and basic environmental data (bend) in Thailand Chemotherapy of rodent malaria drug action against exoerythrocytic stages and drug resistant strains. Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 5. 0 10 0 20. 0 200. 0 20. 0 S 9730 Approved For Reamtn MIONTINi citffiti31-q?sYkiff?3ool0000tta ziugust, 12, 1.969 Military contract department and agency IC Funds planned for fiscal year 1970 United Kingdom?Continued A Maybridge Chemical Co A Royal College of Art F U. College F Imperial College N University of Cambridge, Department of Pathology. N Oxford University, Pharma- cology and Physical Chem- istry Departments. N Sir William Dunn School of Pathology, University of Oxford. N University of Sussex Potintial antimalariais based on quinoline-7- carboxylic acid. perimental cartography search for determination of air density temperature and winds at high altitudes. rigin of auroral primaries tyoprotective mechanism -Studies on decompression sickness and inert - gas narcosis. lielhods of protecting Navy personnel against - biological toxins. iiai pattern recognition in naval tasks 10.0 20.0 10.0 7.0 6.0 02.0 20.0 10.0 Military department and contract agency Title Funds planned far fiscal year 1970 United Kingdom?Continued N Royal College of Advanced The absorptiOn of sound by Polymer solutions_ 9.0 ech N University of Keefe Recombination reactions of importance it 7. 0 propulsion. N Cambridge Language Resi- Semantic research for automatized language 8.0 i dent Unit. translation and inforthation reBieval. F University of London F Kings College ion marls sPeCtrometry of the lower ionosphere_ 50.0 Gravitational physics 10. 0 N Trinity College, University of Body temperature regulation 10.0 Dublin. F University College, Dublin__ Radio and entice !emission from high energy 20.0 osmic rays. Uruguay: A Univeisidad de la Republica... Relationship between wild entourages and - 4.0 mycoses, especially S. American blastomy- cases. Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, the subcommittee and committee have gone over this list and scrutinized it carefully and find strong justification for the con- tinuation of this program at the level of $5.7 million as approved. Mr. President, I turn now to policy planning studies. The amendment of the Senator from Arkansas is also aimed at policy planning studies with foreign affairs implications carried out by DOD. The total requested for such studies was $6.4 million. The Armed Services Committee has al- ready recommended a cut of $0.7 million from this amount. The ndditional cut proposed by the Senator from Arkansas would reduce the program to $2.7 mil- lion, or a total cut of 58 percent. Clearly the cut suggested by Senator FULBRIGHT would severely curtail the policy plan- ning effort. Policy planning studies seek to insure that military strategy does not lag be- hind social and political change and be- hind weapons technology and weapons development. Through it we try to better understand the circumstances, situations, and en- vironments that may be controlling in the future application of military re- sources. Because this is such a nebulous area, it requires particularly intense, profes- sional exploration of the problems to ar- rive at judgments which materially en- hance national capacity and effective- ness. Yesterday and, I arti sure, on many other days, we heard the distinguished Senator from Arkansas talk about pro- grams, projects, and studies of the Turkish Revolution from 1916 to 1921, the Ataturk revolution. The Senator mentioned a program effort involving Ceylon. In the colloquy had between the Sena- tor and me, I tried tn point out that he was really nitpicking, picking on what I call horrible example so as to intim- idate the opponents and picture the en- tire program in a manner that I con- sider to be completely unfair. I point out for the RECORD that this is a sample I have chosen of some of the programs that would be considered under this area. The following are typical broad subject areas: PROJECT TTTLiO Japanese Rearmament, Nuclear, and Space Programs. PROJECT DESCRIPTION A study of factors and developments af- fecting the Japanese military contribution to the U.S. effort in Asia, including the security pact. PROJECT TITLE Soviet Military and Foreign Policy. PROJECT DESCRIPTION A continuing study of Soviet military doc- trine, use of military strength for political purposes, foreign policy, and political in- stitutions in the Soviet Union and East European states. PROJECT TITLE Strategic Analysis of Southeast Asia--1969 (SALA). PROJECT DESCRIPTION Includes analyses of Malaysian foreign policy, regional military cooperation, and Australian foreign and military policy. PROJECT TITLE Strategic Postures Study (SPOST). PROJECT DESCRIPTION Work supporting a continuing Army staff study effort to analyze and evaluate alterna- tive postures for the US, the USSR, and CPR in the 1968-80 period. PROJECT TITLE Navy Policy Planning Study. PROJECT DESCRIPTION To identify tasks the Navy would be re- sponsible for in the post-1975 period for im- proved inputs into the Navy Strategic Planning process. PROJECT TITLE Navy Role in Exploitation of the Ocean Resources. PROJECT DESCRIPTION To define the Navy's interests, objectiVes and options in the exploitation of the oceans' resources. PROJECT TITLE The Future Security Posture of Japan 1970-1985. PROJECT DESCRIPTION Assesses the likely security postures of Japan during 1970-85 and the implications for USAF long-range planning. PROJECT TITLE Strategy, Concepts and Military Objectives Studies to Support Air Force Long-Range Planning. PROJECT DESCRIPTION Analyzes future changing political eco- nomic and military trends to insure that the Air Force is responsive to U.S. security needs. PROJECT TITLE Sino?Soviet Economic Potential. PROJECT DESCRIPTION A continuing study of the economic back- ground of Soviet and Communist Chinese military power. Presently it includes studies of outlays, employment, and organizational problems in Soviet R&D, Soviet foreign eco- nomic relations and Chinese civil aviation. PROJECT TITLE European Security Issues. PROJECT DESCRIPTION An examination of a range of alternative security arrangements and the role of the U.S. presence in Europe. PROJECT TITLE Command & Control Problems for the Na- tional Command Authority. PROJECT DESCRIPTION A study of information and control facili- ties, system.% and procedures required for management of crises and control of conflicts. PROJECT TITLE Communist China. PROJECT DESCRIPTION A broad effort to correlate and evaluate data on Communist China's political, eco- nomic, military objectives and to determine the foreign policy implications for the U.S. These are the types of studies that chew up the money. These are not the funny, horrible examples that the Sen- ator from Arkansas dragged out last year and this year. These are the types of stud- ies and programs that I would think the present occupant of the chair or the Sec- retary of State would like to know are ongoing in the event a decision has to be made involving this area. I think I would want it. I cite these in order to present a better idea of just what this program Is about. It was clear to the committee that most of these studies are more properly a responsibility of Federal agencies other than the Department dr Defense. Specifi- cally, most of these policy planning stud- ies would appear to be more logically a responsibility of the Department of State. We have recommended that these projects be taken over expeditiously? this year?by the appropriate agency and that the Defense Department phase it- self out of this area of research except in cases that are direcly defense related. I think that the Senator from Arkansas should recognize that if the Defense funding for these studies is withdrawn the plans of the Armed Services Commit- tee to transfer rather than eliminate these studies will be thwarted. There would be no funds with which to continue many programs previously initiated, since it is too late this year to include them in any other agency's budget. As the Senator from Arkansas is aware, the Defense Department has made a Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 August 12,, 1969 ApprovestrieesassiVaniffijafkIREPAT364R000300100001-3 S9731 variety of efforts to decrease its role in programs which would have to be re- social science studies related to foreign ducecl OT cancelled in the event of an policy and to increase the role of other additional cut, which the Senator from agencies. These include cuts in the level Arkansas is suggesting, in the Agile funds of effort, curtailed field work overseas, include: offers to transfer funds to the Depart- A reduction in vital equipment devel- ment of State, and proposals for a high- opment and field experimentation in the level interagency committee under non- Small Independent Action Forces. This DOD leadership to develop priorities and is a system approach toward the need responsibilities for knowledge and analy- of patrol size operations being under- sis dealing with the external world. How- taken by Advanced Research Projects ever, the ability of the Department of Agency jointly with the Army and Ma- Defense to affect what other agencies do rine Corps. is appropriately limited.The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time I know that the Senator shares my be- of the Senator has expired. lief that our foreign and defense policiesMr. McINTYRE. I yield myself 5 adcli- need to be better informed about the ex- tional minutes. ternal world, not less. In recent hearings There is a great need for a systematic under his direction, the important point and integrated study of the small hide- was made that we need a strong effort pendent action force?the patrol?with a to understand how the world looks to view toward making this most hazard- ous, but vital, military operation a more effective and less risky venture. This program is examining the various com- ponents of the Small Independent Action Force?the man, equipment, environ- ment, techniques, and the interaction of these components to determine how they can be improved. The proposed reduction would have a serious impact upon a major element of the Agile budget, namely border control systems. Research in this critically im- portant area in order to advise friendly nations to effectively protect the inte- grity of their borders and desist from offensive actions is highly significant to the United States. For example, a major fraction of the current activity is related the Fulbright amendment is too drastic to Korea which is now facing increased and should be defeated. North Korean infiltration attempts THE AGILE PROGRAM which, if not halted, could embroil the The Senator from Arkansas would re- United States in an undesirable con- duce Agile by an additional $5 million. frontation. This effort which ARPA re- Agile is one of the elements of the budget cently initiated is a direct result of a activity which is "other equipment" in request for assistance from General the Defense agencies budget. The Armed Bonesteel, Commander of U.S. Forces in Services Committee reduced that budget Korea. The lessons learned could also be activity by $25 million. In making this applicable to other areas in support of reduction, the committee recognized that U.S. policy, if necessary. because, this budget activity funds a A third example of research which number of very high priority programs? would be adversely affected by a sub- I am now talking about the category stantial Agile reduction is the study, in , "other equipment"?the $25 million re- Thailand, of Communist terrorists' lines duction ordered by the Committee on of supply and their mode of operation. Armed Services would be reflected by In conversation with Dr. Foster yes-. substantial cuts in the Agile program. terday, which was substantiated today, "Other equipment" includes such pro- Dr. Foster, who is No. 3 in the Depart- grams as intelligence data-handling ment of Defense, the Chief of Research, systems, advanced sensors, cryptologic Testing, Evaluation, and Development, activities, and a number of classified pro- assured MO that if this further cut ad- grams which are vital to our national vanced by the Senator from Arkansas security. For example, one program (Mr. FULBRIGHT) is agreed to, it would which is included is the provision of $74 have a substantial impact on the Agile million for nuclear weapons effects tests. program. Senators will recall that this activity is These are directly relevant and im- part of the program to provide safe- portant applications of research to im- guards to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. proving our ability to cope with existing h t dvised and threats to our Armed Forces. I believe this are progressing satisfactorily and con- tributing significant new knowledge and techniques to established defense re- quirements. This would diminish the contributive research efforts of approxi- mately 60 university faculty members and 120 graduate students on important defense related research problems in 10 different universities and colleges. The issue here is whether it is desir- able to encourage new centers for re- search. A good start has been made in this direction by Project Themis, and the evaluation of results so far is promising. The Armed Services Committee did not believe that the Themis project should be completely canceled nor suffer such reduction as this amendment calls for. The Themis program for fiscal year 1970 requested $33 million. A 12-percent reduction of the Armed others and to avoid imposing our parte- Services Committee reduced this by ap- ular cultural views on others. I suggest proximately $4 million. The Fulbright that we miss the point when we limit our amendment would now add $8 million to efforts to curtailing the activities of the the $4 million reduction recommended Department of Defense alone. Instead, I by the full committee. invite the Senator from Arkansas to join This will reduce the program a total of with me and my colleagues on the Armed ? about $12 million, to a total of $21 mil- Services Committee to see to it that na- lion, and would cut it- 36 percent. tional needs for rational understanding In view of the fact that this is the last of the world are met by the government year of new starts for the program, the as a whole with an appropriately dimin- total reduction of $12 million will mean ished role for the Department of that there will be no new starts this year. Defense. I wish to state, too?with emphasis? THE THEMIS PROGRAM that the Themis program is concerned Mr. President, on the subject of the only with unclassified subject matter? Project Themis, which is the fourth area and deals exclusively in basic research. under attack in the amendment of the It is the opinion of the committee that distinguished Senator from Arkansas, this is a recommended cut in this amend- ment of some $8 million. I would want to put this proposed cut in the full con- text of what the Research and Develop- ment Subcommittee and full Committee of the Armed Services have already done. This program is based upon a 1965 Presidential request to all executive de- partments requesting more emphasis on establishing new centers of research ex- cellence at universities in fields relevant to the Department's missions. DOD's plan provided for starting 200 new uni- versity programs over' the four-year pe- riod from fiscal year 1967 through fiscal year 1970, an average of 50 new pro- grams each year. The university response was very enthusiastic; more than 1,000 proposals were submitted by universities in the first 3 years, from which 118 projects were selected and funded. In the fourth and final year of new starts in fiscal year 1970, 25 new starts are planned which require $10 million of funds. Since the cut in this amendment super- imposes itself on a reduction of some 12 percent already made by the Armed Serv- ices Committee, this cut of $8 million would cause: In 9 when First. The elimination?if it has not consented to the treaty it insisted that kind of research deserves our support. been eliminated already?of the 25 new these safeguards be instituted. I, per- Mr. President, the point here is that fiscal year 1970 starts. This will defer sonally, would not like to see our efforts Agile has already sustained a reduction the growth of research skills in the im- in this field reduced by action of the in its funding in this bill by action of the portant defense-related areas of detec- Senate. The Test Ban Treaty requires Armed Services Committee which tion and surveillance, structural me- these tests to be conducted underground, reduced the "other equipment" category chanics of defense vehicles, oceanog- and underground nuclear testing is ex- by $25 million. This additional reduc- raphy, and resuscitation and treatment pensive. It is one of the prices we pay tion now recommended would cut deep of the wounded. for the reduced tensions which grow into valuable programs. Second. Will also be the termination of out of limitations on atmospheric nuclear Mr. President, in summary, let me say approximately 10 of the 118 ongoing testing. that the amendment we are considering Project Themis contracts all of which Some of the research and development here would reduce research efforts by Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 s 9732 Approved For ReleaniM4/11/30 ? CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 RESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 12, 1969 - an additional $45 pillion. These same Mr. McINTYRE. I am happy to yield to Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is research efforts havd already been cut the distinguished chairman of the Corn- correct. by the Senate Armed. Services Commit- mittee on Armed Services. Mr. STENNIS. There really is not tee by more than $504nillion. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, in spite enough time. However, we cannot pass Many of the programs which are of of my contact with the subject already on these matters unless we hear the particular concern 10 the Senator from this year to sonic extent, I have been very arguments. Arkansas will be cdt in the reduction much interested in what the Senator has Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think the Senator made by the Armedaer vices Committee, had to say about these projects. is correct. It is my feeling, Mr. President, that I do not see how anyone could listen to Mr. McINTYRE. I yield the floor. further cuts in the littoral Contract Re- his statement of facts?and I know it is Mr. PULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I search Centers, beyarel those made by correct?without being most favorably yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Ben- the Senate Armed Se; vices Committee impressed with these programs. ator from Michigan, including the efforts made by the De- Like everything else these programs Mr. HART. Mr. President, first, I wish pertinent of Defense_ to further reduce need regulation, they need thorough sur- to repeat what I have said before the FCRC expenditures -by taking more of veillance, and they need annual review. Senator from New Hampshire. He has their income from non-DOD sources, is I appreciate the statement made by the done a magnificent job hi scaling down as far as we should go at this time. Senator that it is his purpose as the or, to use his own expression, scrubbing As with all of the questions raised in chairman of the subcommittee to eon- out or cleaning up, some of the aspects connection with the research programs tinue surveillance over the various pro- of the bill. We are all in his debt. The we have under considaration here, the grams and the multitude of other items taxpayers are in his debt. Having said Research and Development Subcommit- that are not included in the amendment. that, I wish to disagree with his chara,c- tee, which I chair, IX going to consider I thank the Senator, and I salute him terization of the action of our friend these programs in great depth during the and congratulate him for a very fine job from Arkansas (Mr. PULBR/GETT ) as "nit coming year. We will he in a better con- in a tedious and sticky area where it is Picking." dition at this time next year to provide very difficult to get the real merits of the I disagree completely that the Senator the Senate with a more comprehensive situation. from Arkansas yesterday, in comment- understanding of these programs and I also reiterate my interest with refer- lug on some of the research projects, their meaning to the total DOD mission. ence to all of these projects to see if the was trying to endanger the whole pro- But, continuing. This amendment executive branch cannot review them, gram unfairly. The programs that the would severely cut agray great parts of pick them out, and place some of them Senator from Arkansas discussed are a the research at foreign institutions, so that those they wish continued, can Part of the package. This is what we are Since 1968, the DOD-has cut the funds be placed somewhere else in the budget, being asked to authorize money for. If in for this research from $13.1 million to in some other department, so that better the eyes of any of us some of the items the $5.7 million requested this year. We surveillance over them can be had, make something less than good sense, need this research, Mr. President, be- I thank the Senator. ? then our responsibility is to talk about cause it involves conditions of geography, Mr. McINTYRE, Mr. President, eer- them. culture, disease and e-xpertise which are tainly under the leadership of the chair- Just as I have commended the Senator not possible of study in the United States man of the Committee on Armed Serv- from New Hampshire for scrubbing up or or not available in this country. ices, the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. scaling down, I commend the Senator This amendment proposes a $3 million STENNIS), the committee has given this from Arkansas for putting his finger on cut in policy planning research. The DOD military authorization bill the best study something that, to us, does not make Is quite willing to have much of this re- in depth I have seen in the short time sense. Nobody will be intimidated by search done elsewhere lad the imposition I have been in the Senate. that. of the cut made by the Senator from The Fulbright amendment attacks We are talking about an item of $7 Arkansas would elimTnate the research areas we have already acted on and billion-plus. We are suggesting that in and that would leave the DOD without where we continue to work, as the Sen- that reach of $7 billion is some money much valuable information which is ator has emphasized. It is apparent that that does not have to be authorized or available in no other place. these projects are being scrubbed down some proposal that need not be under- The amendment by the Senator from and scaled down. It is important that' the taken. Arkansas would kill al new starts in the Senator realizes that this matter has Each of us has a family budget. Unless Themis program arat severely hamper been looked into carefully, we are operating on the poorest poverty some of the ongoing programs. This pro- Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator base, we all know that the budget con- gram was established to provide new again. I express my regret that more tains some money that really does not centers of excellence with a broad Senators cannot be present to hear these have to be spent, and the survival of the geographical representation in fields matters discussed by each side in order family would not be destroyed or even relevant to the DOD mission. All of these to hear the arguments pro and con. I do seriously jeopardized if we did not spend advantages would be practically elimi- not see how it is possible to vote on a some of the money that we have set aside nated by the pending amendment. matter so involved as this matter with- to spend. The Agile program ha received a major out having a chance to hear more of the We might ask ourselves what it would s reduction from the action of the arguments, be like if we had a family budget of $7 Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will billion. Is it not likely that somewhere Armed Services Committee. The proposed amendment would reduce funds for Agile the Senator yield? there would be certain expenditures that by an additional $5 million. Since there Mr. McINTYRE. I yield, really need not be undertaken? One does Is only $27 million in Agile in the begin- Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I not have to be a Ph. D. in domestic sca fling, it is obvious that this additional cut - certainly agree with the Senator from ence, home economics, or general eco- Mississippi on what he has just said. nomics to know that if we are given $7 will severely cripple a program dealing billion a year, we probably do not have Some Senators have reverted to their old with counterinfiltraton systems, new ina to spend all of it, and that the economy customs too quickly. We were able to get trusion detection sensors, border control might even be stronger if we did not quite a bit of interest in connection with analysis, border area security systems, pacificationspend all of it. the ABM discussion, but now we have efforts, and village defense corps selection and training, the same attendance on these amend- The Senator from Arkansas yesterday meets that we used to have on the old gave a list of some projects that struck Mr. President, I urge that the end- bill. I wish Senators would remain in the him, and struck others of us, as examples meat by the Senator from Arkansas be Chamber. We would make much better of why it is not necessary to go all that defeated. We must- be austere. We have progress. I share the Senator's regret way. I think it is not an tmfairness to the been austere. We must not go beyond that more Senators are not present, program to hold that view. prudence. Mr. STENNIS, I thank the Senator. Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, will Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the However, I wish to add that they do have the Senator from Arkansas yield to me Senator yield? many other duties, on my own time? Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved Eff\iteifesssefeg9R110t6AtrIRDREIMp#64R000300100001-3 S 9733 August 12, 1969 atar from Michigan is recognized for 5 additional minutes. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does the Senator from Michigan yield to me for an obser- vation? Mr. HART. Indeed I do. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the Senator from New Hampshire does not deserve any criticism at all, even though the Senator from New Hampshire did cut these programs by 8 percent from the budget request, I believe. But the budget went up on most of these items, contrary to most Government programs that I am familiar with on the civilian side. The amount for Federal contract re- search centers, for example, in 1969, I am informed was $263.3 million. The 1970 request is $277.4 million. That is a 5-percent increase. On social behavioral science research, the 1969 figure is $45.4 million and for 1970 it is $48.6 million, a 7-percent in- crease. If I understand correctly, the Sen- ator from New Hampshire did cut back the budget request, but actual cut over what it was in actual expenditures last year is not quite that much. But, in any case, I agree with the Senator that it looks like nit picking when we are talk- ing about $45 million in a budget of $80 billion. But in practically any other pro- gram before this Congress,. $45 million would look like quite a substantial amount. $45 million would be a great deal for a project on the White River or the St. Francis River in my State, for example. My senior colleague, Mr. MC- CLELLAN, and I?he in particular?have often put out a great deal of energy to get $45 million for a natural resource development. Just because this is only a small part in such a huge appropriation request, only $45 million, we can call it peanuts or we can call it nit picking, but only in the sense that it is small in comparison to the total. But it is not small relative to any other standard in this country but the stand- ard of the Pentagon and the Defense Department. In a letter which I put in the RECORD yesterday, dated July 24, and which is from John S. Foster, Jr. of the Defense Department, it was stated, after con- siderable discussion, that it is not pos- sible to arrive at the cost of the projects. We are met with that argument very often. In reply to the Senator from New Hampshire's question as to why we do not discuss current projects, I asked Mr. Foster in my letter of June 10, why we could not get the cost. He said: The funding of these projects is based on a total project cost, with such multiple out- puts anticipated. Any effort to isolate a cost figure for a given report would be arbitrary and probably not represent the actual costs involved. Nor would such a cost estimate rep- resent a measure of the payoffs from the re- search. Then in the next paragraph, which is a significant one and which is the type ' of thing which is ongoing?I believe it is ongoing, in the words of the Senator from New Hampshire, and which I think ought to be stopped?Mr. Foster says: Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield. Mr. McINTYRE. Let me try to give an example to the distinguished Senator from Michigan. Mr. HART. Take the proposal that the distinguished Senator from Arkansas was discussing. Those are the ones I am say- ing were not used to intimidate any- one? Mr. McINTYRE. I do not know? Mr. HART. To respond to this. ? Mr. McINTYRE. Here are some of the 'programs discussed yesterday by the Senator from Arkansas: First. "The Attaturk Revolution in Turkey." Second. "Gandhi, Nonviolence, and the Struggle for Indian Independence." Third. "The Sinhalese Buddhist Revo- lution of Ceylon." Fourth. "The Egyptian Revolution, Nasserism, and Islam." Fifth. "Militant Hindu Nationalism: The Early Phase." Mi. HART. Now, with respect to that? Mr. MeINTYRE. All right. Just a min- ute now. I have the floor. There is ab- solutely not one nickel in the 1970 budget for these program& What is the Senator bringing them up for? What is he bring- ing them up for but to intimidate and scare the rest of Congress into thinking they are spending that money this fool- ishly? My statement has a number of ex- amples in it of the type of ongoing pro- grams and projects that we are making today; otherwise spotlighting these other programs the Senator from Arkansas has Mentioned, in my opinion, is nit picking. Mr. HART. I think we could more aptly say that he is talking about mis- takes we have already made. Does not the Senator agree with that? Mr. McINTYRE. I am not prepared to defend the 1968 budget here. I am here to talk about the 1970 budget. Mr. HART. Maybe we cannot agree on the characterization of the studies the Senator has just enumerated and which were discussed yesterday, but if we had to do it all over again, would we really buy a book on Ataturk? If we had it to do all over again, would we really do any of those things which, in my book, rep- resent the kind of thing that the national family budget really does not have to spend money on to get? Mr. McINTYRE. I cannot judge what determination was made prior to 1968. Those we talk about now have not been funded at all since 1968. Maybe if it seemed important to study the theories of revolution. It may well be interesting to have some scholarly expertise study into the Ataturk Revolution, or the rev- olutionary process in Ceylon. The point I want to make is that we are here talking about the fiscal year 1970 budget. Why do we not talk about the programs in 1970 instead of pulling these things out of the past trying to scare the rest of the Senate into voting against the bill? Mr. HART. What about providing em- pirical trade conclusions about ideolog- ical goals which support insurgency? We are funding that and that has been an ongoing one. That was mentioned. Mr. McINTYRE. Insurgency has been quite a problem for the Department of Defense during the past 3 or 4 years in a place called Vietnam. Mr. HART. Does the Senator think that the University of Massachusetts un- der this contract will either get us out of Vietnam or keep us out of another one like it by this kind of study? Mr. McINTYRE. I am not going to indulge in what the University of Mas- sachusetts can do. The able Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE) is now in the Chamber. Perhaps he can reply to that. Mr. HART. No; if there is still time remaining? Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield 5 additional minutes to the Senator from Michigan. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator from Michigan is recognized for 5 additional minutes. Mr. HART. Let me explain why I rose to react as I did. It is not nit picking. Whatever it is, it is a discussion of chap- ter and verse on projects which were authorized by Congress for the Depart- ment of Defense to undertake. There are those of us who hold a deep 'conviction that whatever else it is relevant for, or to, whatever agency of the Government, if any, should be buying the Military Establishment should not. If there is any nit picking, it is nit picking of ourselves because routinely over the years we have said to them, "Go- ahead, if you think you need it. Here is the money." The Senator from Arkansas and others are saying, and I too think it is not Inappropriate, in the review of military requests, to review what some of us be- lieve to have been mistakes made by the military. Heaven knows, when we come in here looking for money for school feeding programs, or when we try to get aid started or even to maintain it, we are lectured at considerable length about what happened last year and the year before with some of the money we gave them then. In a sense, that is what we are doing with the Department of De- fense right now. I think the Senator from Arkansas performs a very useful service in attempting to do just that. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Michigan yield? Mr. HART. I yield. Mr. FULBRIGHT. I appreciate what the Senator has said. I repeat, I think the Senator from New Hampshire has done a good job in undertaking to criti- cize it at all. It has never been done be- fore, to my knowledge. He has been a tower of strength in getting anything underway. But the situation here, as I see it, has been built up over a number of years before the Senator was even on the committee or even a Member of the Senate. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Arkansas has ex- pired. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield myself, or the Senator from Mich- igan, 5 minutes and then I will let him yield to me because I want him to par- ticipate in this colloquy. I yield 5 min- utes to the Senator from Michigan so that he may yield to me. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 .? CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9734 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 12, 1969 In the case of projects not yet completed available for R. 8z D. this current year wish to ask the Senator from Michigan and for which only into reports are avail- that it had the previous year. Looking at the request the Depart- a question? able, significant results can be expected in the future. In the case et tonapleted projects, Mr. BROOKE. No. the final report represattts only a portion af ment of Defense made for research this Mr. FULBRIGHT. 1 wanted, as a mat- the total output. For exalinple, in one project year, $8.2 billion, apparently the Depart- ter of fact, to continue a bit on what funded over a period of nine years, a total ment does not understand the meaning the Senator says, particularly as to uni- of 29 technical reports, 7f.2 scientific journal of the close vote on that amendment. versity research, This is one of the large publications, and significant contributions But, to its great credit, the Armed Serv- items. The budget request for university to a book were produced in addition to the ices Committee has responded in, I think, research for 1969 was $254.4 million, and final report Which you received, as has been said several times before, for 1970 $305.9 million, which is a 20 per- That is the sort of thing which I think very effective fashion. cent increase, is beyond the normal or proper activities The Defense Department this year re- As a matter of fact, we do know of, of the Department ofi)clense. It is not quested an authorization of $8.2 billion, and there is a great deal of evidence of, a literary institution Created to produce The committee reduced the figure to $7.1 the disapproval by many of the students books. In my view, it is not supposed to billion, more than $1 billion less than of the intrusion of the military program So out and produce research works on the Department sought, which is more into our universities. Ataturk or warlordisrit, or Islam, or the than $600 million less than authorized I ask unanimous consent to have Sinhalese Revolution-in Ceylon. These the last fiscal year and about $400 mil- printed in the RECORD, because it Is ex- studies are irrevelant to and beyond the lion less than was appropriated last fig- actly on this point, an article entitled proper scope of the Defense year. "Turned-Off Young Scientists Force That is the math point. Again I commend the committee for Major Cutbacks in Military Research," Actually, the cut ram proposing is its review and its recommendations, but written by Victor Cohn, and published relatively very small as compared with I think the further reduction, modest as in the Washington Post of May 12, 1969, the basic research total in the bill which it is, proposed by the Senator from which describes the attitude of young sel- ls $430 million. That is a large amount of Arkansas is possible. entists in the various schools. Under the money for basic research. By "basic" 1 None of us is sure what causes unrest headline it says, "Caution: The military- mean not related to any specific project on the campuses, but to the extent that industrial complex is armed and dan- in the Defense Department. Of course, the student knows that research and de- gerous. ABM is an Edsel," referring to the nonbasic research is far greater than velopment by the Federal Government is signs carried by physicists picketing the that. But basic researth is the type of overwhelmingly entrusted to the De- White House April 30. research we would expect to be done in partment of Defense-- There being no objection, the article a graduate school at Harvard or Yale The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, or Princeton, and so on, generally. It is ator's time has expired, as follows: sometimes called pure science. It has Mr. HART. Mr. President, will the Sen- - A. URNED-OFP YOUNG SCIENTISTS FORCE MAJOR nothing specific in mind. ator yield me 1 additional minute? CUTBACKS IN MILITARY RESEARCH SCIEN- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes. TISTS FORCE RESEARCH CUTBACKS of the Senator has expired. Mr. HART. That those engaged in re- (By Victor Cohn) Mr. FTJLBRIGHT. I yield myself 5 search, contrary to general assumptions, minutes more, are not the universities primarily, but "Caution. The military-industrial complex is armed and dangerous." 1 hope the Senator from New Harnp- the think tanks as the Senator from "ABM is. an Edsel."?Signs carried by shire and the Senator from Mississippi Arkansas has developed, if they see the physicists picketing the White House April 30 would inform me if there is anything ratio of the Federal Government's allo- In a less violent, but equally radical way that they especially do not like in the cations of research and development for science students, younger scientists and amendment. I would certainly entertain the military and then compares it to the many older professors of physics and physi- some revisions to it. Otherwise, I would amount of money the Federal Govern- ?logy have been raising their own hell on like to have a vote on it It is a worth- ment allocates for research in new tech- the campuses. while amendment. niques for housing, for antipollution ef- In the view of Prof. Don R. Price, Har- vard political scentist, this is "a new kind As I said before, it is the first time in forts, and so on, he gets a very obscure of rebellion," linked only in part with the 25 years that we have made a serious notion of our priorities. Perhaps, more activist kids and college students in general. effort to bring the whole authorization correctly, such students get an illustra- It is a rebellion of young and discontented for the Pentagon under review. tion of priorities which offend them and technologists?against the ABM and other outrage them. I was Just handed the annual report costly milltary-technological systems, against The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- "weaponeering" at secret laboratories on or of the Rand Corp., for 1968. Over ator's 1 minute has expired, near campuses and, in many cases, against 10,000 publications have been produced, Mr. HART. May I have 1 minute more? doing any research, secret or non-secret, to with some 500 new titles published each help the military. F Mr. ULBRIGHT. I yield 1 minute. year. It sounds like a big publishing it is a rebellion against computer (enters Mr. HART. When we say, "Let us put and social science projects serving the CIA. house such as they have in New York, first things first," what do we identify It is a rebellion against what one young publishing fiction and other paperback in our minds as having first claim? physicist called "the whole misuse of tech- books. Most of these titles that I have Look at this bill. Look at the bulk for nology to spoil rather than. save the country." read have nothing to do with the proper research. Look at the bill in its totality. Sometimes painstakingly logical, some- responsibilities of the Defense Depart- ment. So I hope the Smalor from New Then compare it with the programs, in times only emotional and shrill, this rebel- some cases of long standing, intended to test swbeeele in csn it hcaslion reasingly effective. In the Hampshire would consider going a little relieve hunger and to insure a broader further in his cut. Caused or helped cause giant Stanford ... availability of medical care. One does University--derided by the new dissidents as Mr. HART. Mr. President, of course I share that hope. not have to be a member of the SDS to the "Pentagon of the West"?to decide to The effort we are making to reduce the Jump up and scream, "Your allocations phase out half the secret military projects and your priorities are all out of whack." at its Stanford Applied Electronics Labora- authorization for research and develop- So can we not persuade ourselves, in tory. The Stanford rebellion was conducted ment and evaluation began actually addition to the reduction that the com- largely by undergraduates, but sympathetic more than a year ago. On April 18, 1968, mittee has made of more than $1 billion and vocal professors gave them vital meral the Senate defeated an areendment that for research, to add $45 million for the authority. I proposed reducing thedefense author- Made Stanford's trustees place a mora- reasons so eloquently assigned by the torium on new chemical and biological war- ization for those activities from the Senator from Arkansas? fare contracts at the nearby Stanford Re- committee-approved total of $7.8 billion The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time search Institute, nominally "independent" to $7.3 billion. That was a reduction of of the Senator has expired. but in effect owned by the university trustees. $508 million. That defeat was on a roll- Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, will the Caused huge Maasachusetts Institute of call vote, and we lost 28 to 30. Senator yield? Technology to call a moratorium on taking any new secret contracts at a pair of crack If the amendment had been approved, the Department of Defense would have Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, / radar and rocket guidance laboratories that yield myself 5 minutes, have supplied much of the brainpower be- had about the same amount of money Does the Senator from Massachusetts hind U.S. weaponry. Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved FetRoitygdwAyi /ft tgimppgg gglopp 4 Ro oo3oo 0000 -3 s 9735 August 12, 1969 Forced American University in Washington to cancel a partly secret Army research contract with the University's Center for Research in Social Systems. Seen physicists picketing the White House; professors buttonholing Senators and Rep- resentatives and organizations with many names but like purposes?Project Daisy, Ad Hoc Committee of Concerned Scientists? spring up at campus after campus. ?This movement and student protests in general have in the past year forced the Defense Department to cut in half?from some 400 to 200?its "classified" or in com- mon parlance secret research and develop- ment contracts on U.S. campuses. REPORT ON CONTRACTS This week Dr. John Foster, director of de- fense research and engineering, is expected to discuss the problem at a news conference. According to figures he has gathered, there are now such contracts or grants in effect at some 60 universities. He will say they now represent about $20 million worth of all the department's some $250 million this year in 5500 campus projects. In addition, the department finances what another official estimates to be $200 million in work?most of it classified?at "research centers" like MIT's Lincoln Laboratory and Instrumentation Laboratory, Caltech's Jet Propulsion Laboratory and Johns Hopkins' Applied Physics Laboratory. Most of these centers are operated by the universities on "not-for-profit" contracts, partly to keep secret work off the campuses themselves. Foster may also report that the principal concentrations of classified research (accord- ing to one of his staff) are at: MIT and Stanford. MIT's are entirely at the Lincoln and Instrumentation (or "I") Labs, neither of which MIT consider part of its teaching campus. There are no classified projects on the MIT campus proper, but the "I Lab" is on the campus fringe and both labs have close staff and graduate project connections. University of Michigan, many at a uni- versity facility at Willow Run. Despite wrenching 1967-68 protests by students and faculty, the university this academic year has rejected just one classified proposal and ap- proved 36 others. University of California at Berkeley, Uni- versity of Texas, Georgia Tech, Ohio State University and New Mexico State University. For well over a year the Defense Depart- ment has been straining to reduce classified work on the campuses. "We still have some that need not be classified," an official re- ports, "mainly where a contracting officer has just used that as an easy way to give investi- gators access to classified material. This is not the only way to do this, and we want to reduce unneeded classification to zero." There will then remain a hard core of still classified projects that both Defense officials and many professors and colleges consider proper and necessary. These deal with sub- jects like laser and maser detection (of dis- tant objects like missiles) , electronic coun- ter-measures, advanced radar, underwater sound?"things that in the national interest need to be kept secret" and need to be done for the country's defense, in the view of Dr. Charles Kidd, a deputy to Dr. Lee DuBridge, the President's science adviser. But DuBridge?though no activist?re- moved secret work from the Caltech campus as "inappropriate" 20 years ago. ONE-DAY STOPPAGE "Inappropriate" was a mild word on March 4, 1969, when MIT students?some of the country's brightest future scientists and ad- vanced engineers?joined turned-off faculty members to hold a "one-day research stop- page to protest "misuses of science." The University of Pennsylvania, the University of Rochester and some 30 other campuses saw similar demonstrations. And new organiza- tions began to proliferate. Some coalesced or merged loosely with a group started in New York City in February around a lanky elementary particle physicist from Stanford, Dr. Martin Pearl, as "acting secretary." This "Scientists for Social and Political Action" or SSPA quickly counted 500 or so members in "40 or 50" local chap- ters. Pearl?at age 42, standing between the young and the old in science?bows to the "atomic scientists" who first attempted polit- ical action after World War II, and in bitter battle helped win civilian control of atomic energy. "But now," he says, "these men are the scientific administrators. They have to be careful of what they say. Now a second, fresh voice is needed." NOT RESPONDING A younger associate, Brian Schwartz of MIT, is blunter: "These older men have lost contact with the real world. They're not re- sponding to the younger problems." The younger problems exploded at Stan- ford in early April. For nine days, student dissidents occupied the Applied Electronics Laboratory, site of some $2 million a year in defense research. The younger problems were hoisted onto picket signs in Washington April 30, when for the first time in history, it was stated?first time or not, it was rare-1'75 pale, variously bearded, bookish-looking physicists pick- eted the White House. Their target: the ABM. Their leaders: David Nygren of Columbia and Tom Kir ic of Harvard. The physicists were here for the American Physical Society's annual meeting. This usu- ally staid convention has boiled up into an indignation meeting over President Nixon's proposed Safeguard ABM system," said a news report. Wearing "Stop ABM" buttons, physi- cists prowled hotel and Congressional corri- dors. "Even the controversy over the security 'trail' of J. Robert Oppenheimer in the 1950s" wrote William Hines in the Chicago Sun- Times, "did not match this intensely politi- cal climate." MORATORIUM ARRANGED The younger problems boiled up again at both MIT and Stanford. At MIT, students marched into the office of President Howard Johnson for a sit-in and talk-out, especially about secret work on military helicopters and multiple-entry atomic missile guidance. All agreed to move to a lecture hall. Next the MIT faculty met. The upshot was a morator- ium on secret projects until a special 22-man group studies the whole role of the Lincoln and "I" Labs, sites of some $95 million a year in Pentagon contracts. At Stanford too there were more demon- strations and faculty meetings. The upshots there: (1) a start on an "orderly" phasing out (or conversion to non-secret) of some $2 million a year in secret contracts, represent- ing about a third of the Applied Electronic Labs' defense work; (2) a pledge to end chem- ical and biological warfare research and counter-insurgency studies at Stanford Re- search Institute (worth about $1.1 million a year). At both Stanford and MIT many professors have balked. Someone must defend the coun- try, they indignantly say. Someone must pro- vide the knowledge. And many of the best minds are on campuses. If universities sev- ered all Defense ,Department ties, says Jack Ruins, iv= vice president for the special laboratories, "the country would be left in the hands of the professional military and industrial group." At Stanford, Prof. 0. G. Villard Jr.?radar researcher and son of the late Oswald Garri- son Villard, crusading editor of the Nation? said: "As the son of a liberal who was a devoted pacifist, I have searched my con- science and always felt I have been com- pletely faithful to the pacifist traditions of my family. I have always considered that my research was 100 per cent directed toward saving human lives. This development essen- tially brings my research here to an end, and I believe the decision will have a most un- fortunate effect on the long-term viability of the School of Engineering and even of the university." These men were talking mainly about classified and directly linked military research. PENTAGON FINANCING But there is still another trend, against even open, non-secret basic study financed by any military or para-military agency. The Defense Department finances much basic re- search in physics, chemistary, electrical engineering and the like, partly because it knows that almost all such knowledge is ulti- mately needed; partly because it wants to maintain contacts With bright scientist- consultants. Of some $1.5 billion in Federal basic research money now going to colleges, some $247 million (16 per cent) comes from the Pentagon. Last month University of Maryland stu- dents picketed a computer center doing non- secret work on pattern recognition for the CIA. At MIT last week, disaffected students protested a Defense-financed, non-secret project to make new computer methods available to any social scientist?whether working on Vietnam peasantry or the succor of the American poor. At Stony Brook, the Students for a Democratic Society, stormed another computer center. The computer cen- ter may be fast becoming the American Bas- tille. To most young or old scientists, if not to their students, this is illogical. SYMPATHY FOUND Still, there is great sympathy among them for these many youths who are coming to consider almost all research "complicit" war research "for the system." An important answer to the very young, maintains Stanford's Martin Perl, is to turn much research to social purpose. "The un- controlled spawning of technology has pro- duced pollution and contributed to socially destructive conditions," says his new orga- nization. "Yet there is no real attempt to apply technical skills to improve life." "This is what we want to tell people," said one of the new scientists during the Physi- cal Society meeting here. "We're not very vio- lent types. We're not about to riot. We just want to exercise our democratic rights." Is all this the high-water mark of a tem- porary scientists' movement or is it a be- ginning of something larger? Only time will tell, but if the young scientists keep talking, there may be a new element in the American political dialogue. After years of relative si- lence, says Dr. Charles Schwartz of the Uni- versity of California, "a large number of sci- entists are coming out of their little dark laboratories," and things may never be the same. Mr. FULBRIGHT. On May 1, 1969, the Washington Post published another article entitled "MIT Curbs Secret Mili- tary Research," written by Victor Cohn. It was the MIT delegation of students and a professor who came to call on me, asking me what they could do to dis- associate to a much greater degree? they were not adamant that it be com- plete?the Massachusetts Institute of Technology from military research. They did not like their university being considered simply an adjunct of the Pentagon. I ask unanimous consent that Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9736 Approved For ReLedvapilgA18310ACItekENBM g3.64R0.0.0300100001-3 hiN A. Lb iiugu,4a 2, 1.Q69 research?as Dr. Edward Teller suggested last week?it plans to almost eliminate it on campuses and diminish aignificantly in the off-campus university laboratories. The Pentagon's ooncern about its mu ver- city research program, which accounts for one-third of its entire research effort, was heightened last month when two of the Nation's most prestigious institutions Stan- ford University and the Massachusetts Insti- tute of Technology---decided to begin cutting back their Defense involvement. In an effort to improve its image among the Nation's university students and young- er faculty to ward off new and more serious criticism and protect its valuable relation- ship with the institutions, the Pentagon has begun looking for ways to make accommoda- tions. Under the guidance of Dr. John S. Foster Jr., director of Defense Research and De- velopment, it has recently: Cut its classified research projects in uni- versities from 8 per cent of the total to 4 per cent and hopes to get down to 1 or 2 per cent. Urged Congressional committees at every opportunity not to take primitive measures? such as criminal legislation or fund outoffs? against student militants and radicals. In- stead the Pentagon recommends "leaving the initiative for solving the problem with the university administration." Emphasized that the scope of a university's defense research is a decision to be made independently by the university, and en- ootuaged and aided universities in diversi- fying their research in non-defense areas. Brought university scientists and admin- istrators to Washington to explain campus problems to the Defense officials who oversee the research activities. Accelerated the formerly combersome pro- cedures for Pentagon review and release for publication of papers prepared by university researchers In Defense-sponsored activities. The number of classified projects has been trimmed largely by declassifying, not by end- ing them. While the Pentagon insists publicly that this declassification is purely the result of an accurate application of existing security guidelines in areas where there was too much caution before, it is nevertheless clear that some relaxation of standards is involved. "We just make sure now that, indeed, the work is truly classified," one high Pentagon official said, "and that it's not a case where someone at a lower level decided to classify it just to be safe. Classified Projects are re- viewed now at the highest levels." Foster, speaking to the American Nuclear Society in Seattle lett Wednesday, said that "some applied research and development con- tracts funded by the Defense Department at universities?normally at separate off-campus labs?are and must remain classified." While the Pentagon's classified projects are a handy-target for campus militants, there is a question about how much of an issue they actually are. Since only 4 per cent of the total is classi- fied, Foster says, "I believe this issue Is over- rated, and many of the people at universities Who have investigated the facts agree." Rep. Lawrence Hogan (R-Md.), one of 22 GOP congressmen who toured campuses re- cently to determine the causes of student un- rest, said the problem was never mentioned to him, although there was a broad dissatis- faction with professors who spend more time on Defense projects than in dealing with stu- dents. A Pentagon official who deals with Univer- sity research says there has been no change in the number of proposals received from the institutions themselves for projects. POT every proposal it approves, the Pentagon re- ceives eight. One Pentagon official suggested that a small amount of classified work should be the article to which I have referred be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the REC- ORD, as follows: [From the Washington Post, May 1, 1969] MIT CURBS SECRET MILITARY RESEARCH (By Victor Cain) Massachusetts Institute of Technology? the Nation's leading science and engineer- ing university?has ordered -a temporary halt on accepting new secret military research at two famous laboratories-.- The action was in rsponse to mounting student and faculty protests against mili- tary research by U.S. universities?and against big new weapons systems like the anti-ballistic missile. As evidence of that growing movement, some 175 young anti-ABM physicists picketed the White House for 45 minutes yesterday, then presented Dr. Lee A. DuBridge, the President's science adviser, with a petition opposing the Safeguard ABM system pro- posed by President Nixon. The petition was signed by nearly 1200 members of the American Phycal Society now meeting here. Other physicists went to Capitol Hill to give Congressmen ang-Safeguard peti- tions signed by 729 colleagues at many uni- versities. versities. "A large number of scientists are earning out of their little dark laboratories" to give the public their opinions on weapons, Charles Schultz, a Univerffity of California physicist, told a group of House membess. Just such a coming out--starting with a one-clay research stoppage iSlarch 4--culmi- nated in MIT' decision to declare a morato- rium, perhaps until fall, on new classified projects at the two laboratories. A 22-member panel will review the labs' roles?and perhaps, said one MIT source, "recommend that they be sold or otherwise disposed of, to be operated with no MIT connection." REPORTS SOUGHT MIT President Howard rehnson asked the panel to make a temporary report by May 31 and a final one by Oct. 1. Panel Chairman Frank Pounds, MIT School of Management dean, said he will try to have the final report ready May 31. All work on present projects will continue in the meantime and the laboratories may accept "contract modifications." One of the affected labs is the Lincoln Laboratory, which has been doing missile detection studies important to ABM develop- ment, though not working on ABM system hardware. The other is the Instrumentation Laboratory, which is working on the guidance system for MIRV (multiple independently- targeted re-entry vehicles) Warheads for the sea-horse Poseidon missile. The Linooln Laboratory Cmn. buildings out- side Boston and in Cambridge) was estab- lished 18 years ago at Defense officials' "urgent" request?so MIT recalled?to de- velop radar and associated air defense sys- tems. Almost all its work is for the Defense Department. CONTROLS FOR ROCHETS The Instrumentation Laboratory (on the fringe of the MIT campus in Cambridge) works on guidance, navigation and controls for rockets and spacecraft. Three-fifths of its work is for the Defense Department, two- fifths for the civilian space effort. Together, the two labs have 3700 employes and a current annual budget of $116 million. Their scientists are not part of the MIT fac- ulty, and MIT has labored to keep their secret efforts at arm's length; there are no secret projects now on the MIT campus proper. Still the labs' staffs and MITs faculty have close links. And these links have been given much of the credit for the labs' high- quality work and high-quality staffs. MIT President Johnson initially named Pounds to head an 18-member panel includ- ing faculty, students, alumni, Lincoln and Instrumentation Lab staff members and MIT trustees. Among the panel members are Julius A. Stratton, former mrr president now board chairman of the Ford Foundation, and Dr. Victor Weisskopf, noted physicist and a member of the Union of Concerned Scientists that held the March 4 research stoppage. FOUR PANELISTS ADDED Pounds added four supplementary panel- ists, including Roam Chomsky, celebrated MIT linguistics professor and another March 4 protester. Protest against the ABM has been the loudest item of unofficial business during American Physical Society meetings here this week. Some 3000 physicists and their wives jammed a convention hall Tuesday night to hear an anti-ABM debate, and 1216 voted overwhelmingly against Safeguard in an informal ballot (76 per cent opposed it, 21 per cent favored it). Physicists have been visiting their Sen- ators all week carrying anti-ABM petitions. "Every swing Senator has been visited," said Martin Perl, Stanford physicist and an or- ganizer of Scientists for Social and Political Action. The Physical Society officially said its mem- bers have voted 8559 to 6405 to meet next January in Chicago, despite many members' protests over police handling of disorders during the Democratic Convention. The so- ciety also named a committee to seek ways for concerned physicists to examine scien- tists' role in society?a lesser response to demands for a new division on science and society. Mr. FULBRIGHT. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the following additional articles: An article entitled "Defense Research: Pentagon Declassifying Projects Studied in University Labs," written by Richard Homan, and published in the Washing- ton Post of June 23, 1969. An article entitled "MIT Curb on Se- cret Projects Reflects Growing Anti/mill- tary Feeling Among Universities' Re- searchers," written by William K. Stevens, and published in the New York Times of May 5, 1969. An article entitled "Dissident Scien- tists Brew Defense Program Tempest," written by John Lannan, and published in the Washington Star of February 5, 1969. There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: [From the Washington Post, June 23, 1969] DEFENSE RESEARCH?PENTAGON DECLASSIFY- ING PROPECTS STUDIED IN UNIVERSITY LABS (By Richard Homan) Faced with the threat of serious disruption of its research activities in universities, the Defense Department is making a determined effort to adjust them to the changed atmos- phere on the Nation's campuses. Within the past year it has cut by half the amount of classified defense research?a par- ticularly provocative reminder of Pentagon presence?done in universities. As a matter of policy, basic research proj- ects in universities are no longer classified and a program of high-level, stringent peri- odic review of applied research projects has been established to determine whether their classification is still justified. Although the Pentagon does not expect to do away with all classification of defense Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 August 12 r 1969 Approvedft1~33311(ggPAtilabAfria-D?RAGN64R000300100001-3 s 9737 kept on campuses?to provide a target for the most violent radicals so they wouldn't turn their attentions to unclassified projects. Until the reassessment of Pentagon-spon- sored activities by Stanford and MIT, only two serious challenges to classified research had arisen on campuses in more than a decade. In 1967, New York University and the University of Pennsylvania canceled projects dealing with chemical and biological war- fare. At a speech before the American Institute on Problems of European Unity last week, Dr. Teller, one of the world's foremost nu- clear physicists, complained that security classification was "scattering our scientists away from defense work." In a broad attack on all secrecy in research, Teller said, "we must adopt a policy of open- ness. We have classified everything; we have succeeded in a fabulous manner in confusing the American public, the Congress, by this secrecy. "Secrecy has not succeeded in slowing down Russian research, even in the most secret areas such as my own, nuclear ex- plosives. Secrecy does not hurt anybody ex- cept ourselves. I think a thoroUgh review of secrecy is needed." [From the New York Times, May 5, 1969] M.I.T. CURB ON SECRET PROJECTS REFLECTS GROWING ANTIMILITARY FEELING AMOITG UNIVERSITIES' RESEARCHERS (By William K. Stevens) The Massachusetts Institute of Technol- ogy, by declining temporarily to accept new programs of classified research from the Gov- ernment, has spotlighted a new stage in the evolution of what might properly be called the Federal-industrial-academic complex. This vast, interrelated social organism has been the main instrument of scientific in- quiry and technological advance in the United States since the instrument was born of wartime necessity, in total secrecy, three decades ago. Since then it has undergone successive mutations?first with post-World War II de- mobilization, then with the onset of the cold war and the start of the space age, and now with a rising tide of antimilitary feeling among university researchers. That feeling coupled with a growing inter- est in how science and technology might serve the nation's social needs, is said to have lent urgency to M.I.T.'s decision, announced last week, to place a moratorium on new secret research projects. PANEL TO REPORT The moratorium will last until Oct. 1, when a 22-man panel is to report on its re- examination of the institute's relationship to two of its semi-independent divisions, the Lincoln Laboratory and the M.I.T. Instru- mentation Laboratory, which are two of the country's major contractors for research sponsored by the military. The study of the two laboratories' roles was undertaken, M.I.T.'s president, Howard W. Johnson, said in an interview last week, as part of a continuing internal reassessment of the institute. But he said the laboratories were made the subject of a special separate study because of "widespread concern" about secret military research among M.I.T. pro- fessors and students. The ferment is rooted in fears of military- industrial dominance, in a deep sense of un- certainty about nuclear war as expressed in dissent over the antiballistic missile system and, especially, in the Vietnamese war, ac- cording to Dr. James R. Killian Jr., chair- man of the M.I.T. Corporation, who was a science adviser to President Eisenhower. "A SHIFT IN INTEREST" "There is now a shift in interest," Dr. Killian said in an interview in his office at M.I.T. "There was a period when the cut- ting edge of technology was in the areas of the military and space. But there is a feel- ing now that in terms of national need we ought to devote a larger proportion of work to other fields." He mentioned transportation, bioengineering, medical research and social problems generally. "I would lay great stress on this shift of mood," he said. Today's mood is far different from the one in which some of the nation's leading sci- entists found themselves in the fall of 1939 when Dr. James B. Conant, then president of Harvard University, invited them to his home to talk about the role of science and scientists in the war that had just begun. KISTIAKOWSKY IN GROUP "I was among them," Dr. George B. Kis- tiakowsky, the Harvard chemist who later succeeded Dr. Killian as President Eisen- hower's science adviser, said in an interview last week. "We talked of the possibility of offeringiour services to the British. We would also be learning the problems of warfare in case the United States should become in- volved." Separately, a group of American physicists had become concerned over the prospect of using nuclear fission to produce a bomb of vast destructive power. "In view of this situation," Dr. Albert Ein- stein wrote to President Roosevelt on Aug. 2, 1939, "you may think it desirable to have some permanent contact maintained between the Administration and the group of physi- cists working on chain reactions in Amer- ica." After the fall of France in 1940, Mr. Roose- velt gave the concerned scientists official power by chartering the National Defense Research Committee, headed by Dr. Vannever Bush. Its purpose: to organize American science and technology for war. COORDINATED EFFORT Expanded into the Office of Scientific Re- search and Development (0.S.R.D.) , the Bush group coordinated the country's over-all sci- entific effort throughout the war and over- saw the initial development of the atomic bomb until the Manhattan Project was set up separately. With the end of the war, 0.S.R.D. was de- activated, and most universities got out of the business of secret research. But the coun- try was left with an 0.S.R.D. legacy that is the basis of the country's scientific and tech- nological effort, and of the Federal-indus- trial-academic complex, to this day: the Gov- ernment contract as the main mechanism for financing private research. PATTERN ESTABLISHED Basic research had all but stopped during the war, and Government contracts let main- ly by the Office of Naval Research, under- wrote its rebirth afterward. Had it not been for this, Dr. Bush said the other day, the result for scientific research "would have been a catastrophe." Within a few years other Government agencies were financing research across the whole spectrum of scientific activities. For the most part, money to universities was for nonsecret basic research, and that re- mains the pattern. The Federal Government during the cur- rent fiscal year is spending more than 85-bil- lion for the support of research and nearly $11-billion for development, or the fashion- ing of new products based on the fruits of research. Of the 85-billion for research, about $1.5- billion is going to the colleges and univer- sities. Of this $1.5-billion, $247-million?or about 16 per cent?comes from the Depart- ment of Defense. Of the $247-million from the Defense De- partment, only about 4 per cent goes for secret research, Dr. Lee A. DuBridge, Presi- dent Nixon's science adviser, told the Senate Government Operations subcommittee last week. Ile said this was down from 8 per cent two years ago. Since shortly after World War II, few uni- versities have done secret research. And Dr. DuBridge said in an interview last Satur- day that almost all the money going from the Defense Department to universities for nonsecret projects was for basic research. He defined basic research as research in which the only goal is the pursuit of new knowledge, wherein "you can't tell in ad- vance whether it's going to be socially useful or not." Most of the disengagement from military- oriented research in the academic commu- nity, he said, is in the realm of applied sci- ence?that is, research directed toward a specific goal. M.I.T. SHARE LARGE However, most of the applied research in military matters is done in the Defense De- partment's own laboratories or by industrial contractors. The government this year is spending about $1.3-billion in these two categories. M.I.T. has a disproportionate share of military research contracts. Not only is it allocated more Federal research grants than any other university ($96-million worth in the fiscal year 1967, the latest year for which comparative figures are available), but near- ly half the amount?$47-million worth?is from the Department of Defense. By comparison, the recipients of the next four largest Federal allocations were: Uni- versity of Michigan, $56-million total, in- cluding $13-million from Defense; Univer- sity of Illinois, $52-million, $12-million De- fense; Columbia, $52-million and $11-mil- lion; University of California, Berkeley, $48.8-million and $7-million. M.I.T.'s high proportion of defense research funds can perhaps be traced to the Lincoln and Instrumentation laboratories. The Lin- coln Laboratory?created in 1951, early in the cold war, to develop early warning systems for the detection of incoming enemy bomb- ers an,d missiles?has spent $05-million, of which $64-million came from the Defense De- partment. The instrumentation Laboratory, which is the world's leading research center for self- oontained missile-guidance systems, received $30-million to develop the guidance systems for the Thor, Polaris and Poseidon missiles. In the fiscal year 1968 it spent $20-million for development of the guidance and naviga- tion system of the Apollo spacecraft under a contract from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Few of those interviewed believe the two M.I.T. laboratories will or should be closed clown. The main point at issue is their fu- ture form and relationship to the institute at large. "I hope this problem won't be solved by S.D.S. pressures," said Dr. DuBridge, refer- ring to Students for a Democratic Society. "It's important for universities to look at themselves when they're not in a period of crisis," Dr. Johnson of M.I.T. said, "and we're not." [From the Washington Star, Feb. 5, 19691 DISSIDENT SCIENTISTS BREW DEFENSE PROGRAM TEMPEST (By John Lannan) A new tempest is brewing in the national scientific community over whether the de- fense establishment absorbs too much of the oo-untry's scientific and technological energies. In New York this week several groups of younger physicists are pressing a host of proposals for political activism and at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology an activist step has already been taken?a day- long "research stoppage" has been called for March 4. Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9738 CARtglafAblf.R8A199s) -147iugusi 12, 1969 Approved For Rel yikeyNT1300100001 In Manhattan, the cans for action were fOr university research as between 1969 cost of -$71,600,000, which amounts to an heard during the aamrial meeting of the and 1970. average of $59,000 per man-year. American Physical Society. The research In Project Themis, which is generally That is quite a sizable sum to appro- stopPage at MIT has been scheduled by a newly formed Union of ncerned Scientists, called the Federal aid-to-education proj- priate, to turn over to an organization for at the Instigation of more vocal members in ect of the Pentagon, there is a 13-percent no specific purpose, in a sense to do with Oci the physics department. increase in the budget request. I am un- as they please, and at these rates. ?This is not a strike in terms of the able at this point to estimate precisely Rand, in turn, agreed "to perform a standard use of the word," said the union% what effect that has over the actual ex- program of study and research on the chairman, Prof. Francis T Low. "It's not penditure last year on these particular broad subject of aerospace power, with directed against MIT. It a psychological items. The Senator stated the overall the object of recommending to the U.S. amounts but it was not broken down into Air Force preferred methods, techniques, specific items. and instrumentalities for the develop- On this matter of social behavioral ment and employment of aerospace science research, the one which has at- power." tracted much of the criticism, there was I presume that out of that profound an increase of 7 percent between the 1969 research they came up with a project and 1970 budget requests. There was a like the C-5A. That is one example, I specific reduction of $1.5 million, as I un- presume; I hope it was not, but I do not derstand it, by the committee. know what they produced that has been As to the Federal contract research of great value. centers, there was a 5-percent increase. We were told yesterday, much to my This represents a very large amount; the surprise, by some Senators, that our air- actual amount, as to these research cell- planes are inferior. One of the Senators, ters, is $263.3 million in 1969, and $277.4 in the course of the debate, said they are million in 1970, a 5-percent increase. inferior. I do not believe that, myself; As I understand it, the committee ac- but it seems that whenever there hap- tion does not specifically cut these items; pens to be a problem and if they want it provides for an overall cut, which may more money, the argument is that the be applied, according to the report, in product is inferior. If we are talking on broad categories; and, of course, this is the Fourth of July, on the other hand, one reason why it is of no particular we have got the best planes and equip- significance to say, when the Senator is ment in the wOrld. It all depends on the defending this item, "you should specify circumstances how good the products the precise ones you have got." I do, not are. My guess is that our planes are as know that the committee specified ex- good as anybody's. We certainly have actly what they thought. If I correctly spent as much money as anyone on them. understand the report, on page 49, the Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the committee recommended reductions in Senator yield? the general areas as follows: The Army, Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield. $10 million; the Navy, $15 million; and Mr. MURPHY. Possibly the Senator is the Air Force, $12 million, which is very making reference to remarks made by much in the same pattern as my amend- me yesterday, in which I pointed out that ment. We more or less used the same ap- we had not had a new model fighter proach, but we went one step farther. plane laid down, I believe, since 1954, The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- and that the B-52's being used so effec- ator's time has expired. tively?thank goodness we have them? Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield myself 5 ad- are, many of them, 10 years old, and ditional minutes. some of them older than that. We went one step further in at least I do not think I used the word 'in- recommending, although the amend- ferior." I might have implied that we ment itself does not require it, cuts of could have had better planes had we specific amounts within the categories, had better planing in the Department of I am not at all sure that it is wise prac- Defense, in the background. I think tice for the Senate to go beyond that, somewhere along the line we have been other than as to some one very specific negligent; and I know my distinguished up political activism. At least item that might be called to our atten- colleague agrees with me that when we two and pos- sibly three groups are bent on making the tion, such as the ones we mentioned, the send our boys out to defend the security prestigious American Physical Society more Ataturk study and some of the others. of the country, we do not want to give responsive to what they say are the needs It is very hard to find out about those them second-class equipment. rather than the fears of people. until after the studies have been author- Mr. FULBRIGHT. I agree with the INVOLVEMES4 r SIGHT ized and are in process, or well along. In Senator, but I have never been under One group is trying to change the society's many cases, it is difficult to know what is the impression that they have had sec- constitution, (a move that failed almost two being done until the study is completed. ond-class equipment. to one last year,) to get it involved with On the "think tanks," the funding of The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- contemporary problems. AIP's constitution the "think tanks," it seems to me, is ex- ator's 5 minutes have expired. rather than public policy. tremely loose, Rand being one of the Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield myself 5 ad- now limits its activities to scientific issues Still another is trying to broaden the AIP's principal ones?a very large operation. I ditional minutes. role in the education, of the public to the wish to explain briefly why I think that The planes we have lost, for example, dangers as well as the benefits of scientific is a very loose way to control these in Vietnam, were not lost because they and technological advance. operations, were confronted by superior airplanes, Still a third is trying to establish some The financing of these research cen- but because they were shot down with sort of an action group ,uch as that spawned ters, commonly called "think tanks" is ground-to-air missiles and other ground by the MIT faculty. not on a project-by-project basis at all, fire, which I do not think a better plane, Mr. FULBRIGHT. Here is an area in but under agreements by the various if there was one, could have avoided. which the evidenceL is quite clear, I be- military agencies to provide long term They have not been outclassed in air lieve, that it is not in the interests of our support to the organizations they sport- battles. At least, such incidents have not universities nor, I think, in the long-term sor. The current Air Force contract with been brought to my attention. interests of the Pentagon itself, to Rand, for example, covers the 5-year pe- / read in today% newspaper that we alienate the young scientists or the young nod from 1966 to 1971, and is for a mini- have sent 72 more new Phantom jets to people of this country. Yet there is a 20- mum of 1,277.8 man-years of prates- Spain to impress the Spanish with what Percent Increase in the budget request sional scientific effort, at an estimated good planes we have. They are more protest." OTHER CAMPUSES PRESSED The MIT group is seeking to spread ite disaffection with the w4 things are to other campuses. "We've made contact with 10 to 20 others already," said Murray Ed n, a professor of electrical engineering. "We're sending letters to other institutions anil maybe a couple of hundred are going or have gone out." The letter-writing catriptign, LOW explain- ed, is a person-to-person one, faculty mem- bers at one institution writing to colleagues at another. Though each union member's goals may differ, the basic idea is the same: That the nation is dissipating on defense its scientific capabilities for bettering human life. The Vietnam conflict appears to be little more than a precipitating factor in bringing on the March 4 protest at the Defense De- partment's single largest research contractor amongst educational institutions. "I think we're all very unhappy about the Vietnam war," said Lou. "but that's not what we're protesting about." CONFIDENCE sHAEEN. But the 42 faculty members who signed the original statement of purpose nearly a week ago said Vietnam hes "shaken our con- fidence in (the government's) ability to make wise and humane decisions." They also pointed out that "there is also disquieting evidence of an intention to en- large further our immense destructive ca- pability." They said the response of the scientific community to these intentions "has been hopelessly fragmented." The union's proposals include a call to start "a critical and continuing examination of governmental policyln areas where science and technology are of actual or potential significance:" to turn research from defense- oriented to environmental-oriented projects, to start their students questioning their fu- ture professional commitments; to express opposition to the anti-ballistic missile sys- tem and, finally, to organize scientists into an effective and vocal political action group. In New York, several groups of younger, concerned physicists are busily drUrnming Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 August 12,-1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 9739 modern than the F-100's which they re- placed. However, that is not .exactly the point. The Rand Corp., the "think tank," has a free hand to spend $71 million during this period of 5 years at an average of $59,000 per man-year. I think this is loose accounting. And I protest strenuously under the present budget conditions and the difficulties we had in getting money for the education bill just recently passed, and for other bills. Efforts are made to cut items out of the education bill and other bills. I protest the disproportionate amount we are spending in these research proj- ects which have very questionable rele- vance to the mission of the Defense Department. They have nothing whatever, in my opinion, to do with the protection of the men in Vietnam. These are not research projects for a better plane. That is not what the Rand Corn is really doing. These are different proj- ects. They fall under a different cate- gory. All these behaviorial science re- search studies have nothing to do with the qualities of a plane or any other hardware. They have no relevance to the hardware used to fight. Some of the studies are designed, in my opinion, to assist in brainwashing either the enemy or our own soldiers or someone else, I guess, because they fall in the field of psychological research, which is an inter- esting subject but is unrelated to the mission of the Defense Department. The university research is sort of in a class by itself. Regardless of what ef- fect it may have upon the Pentagon ac- tivities, I do not want them to further undermine the integrity of our universi- ties or schools. This is a much more serious matter than whatever they may wish to do to the program of research of the Penta- gon itself. I feel the same way about research in foreign institutions. We are having enough trouble with our foreign rela- tions. This is an area with which we are all familiar. We know about the protests all around the world at our foreign re- search activities and the difficulties we have had. The President came back from one trip abroad and reported that everyone is en- thusiastic about the United States. If everyone is as enthusiastic about the United States, I think the enthusiasm is limited to the moon shot. It would be very strange indeed that the attitude toward many of the policies we are fol- lowing would be changed 'that quickly. The important thing is that to intrude our defense-sponsored research into the foreign institutions harms our relations with the foreign nations. There was a specific example of this in Sweden last year. The Swedes protested the program we had paid their universi- ties to undertake. We know what has happened in Japan. We know about the violence originating In university circles in Chile when the Camelot was brought to light. In India last year, approximately a year ago, we remember what happened there. I have an article entitled "India Sus- pects U.S. Scholars," written by Bernard D. Nossiter, who is one of the most re- ceptive and able reporters the Washing- ton Post has. The article was published In the Washington Post of August 15, 1968. I read the first paragraph: American scholars in India are again sus- pect after parliamentary explosion here over a Himalayan research program supported by Defense Department funds. Here we have an actual injury to our relations because we intrude with De- fense Department funds into foreign academic research. What we are doing is driving friendly countries away from us. They certainly simply do not like it. I do not blame them for that. They do not wish to be an appendage of the Penta- gon. I think they are quite justified. I think that that item, which is $5.7 mil- lion, should be eliminated. I do not see any excuse for our going abroad and subsidizing these people. I assume that originally there was some idea that we might cultivate them and that they would be ingratiated and would respond. Domestically, when we give a contract to people, they usually respond and are appreciative of the money. Perhaps the specific professor who got the contract abroad might even have been apprecia- tive. However, on balance, the people in the institutions and in the country do not like it. It is bad policy. The PRESIDING OlenCER. The time of the Senator has expired. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield myself an additional 2 minutes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator from Arkansas is recognized for an additional 2 minutes. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD the article to which I have just referred and also an article entitled "India Still Wary on U.S. Scholars," Written by Joseph Lelyveld, and published in the New York Times on August 14, 1968. There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: [From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Aug. 15, 1968] INDIA SUSPECTS U.S. SCHOLARS (By Bernard D. Nossiter) NEW DELHI, August 14?American scholars in India are again suspect after parliamen- tary explosion here over a Himalayan re- search program supported by Defense De- partment funds. The incident centers around the Himala- yan Border Countries (HBC), a project affili- ated with the University of California at Berkeley. The nature of the research ap- pears to be innocuous and of no military significance. But opposition politicians on the left and right have created a storm be- cause $282,000 is coming from the Pentagon. In reply to questions in Parliament last week, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi said she would "very carefully look into" the project. Her Minister of State for External Affairs, Bali Ram Baghat, said that the government views the program "with con- cern" and is "reviewing the advisability of permitting" it to continue. FOUNDATION ORDERED our India has already ordered the Asia Foun- dation here to pack up because it received ' money from the Central Intelligence Agency. In view of the rising wave of Indian national- ism, American researchers say they would not be surprised if the government now for- bade them to enter the sensitive Himalayan region near China and denied visas to scholars supported by military or intelligence money. The blowup was forecast last winter by a California professor of anthropology, Gerald 53. Berreman.. He resigned from the Hi- malayan project, writing its director, Leo Rose, a political scientist at Berkeley: "It seems unlikely that one would be per- mitted by the governments of host nations to pursue anthropological research (and pre- sumably most other social science research which takes place in the countryside) if it were known that the money came directly from the United States military establish- ment." OPPOSED TO VIET WAR Berreman also resigned on what he called moral grounds, citing his opposition to the war in Vietnam. He is now in India under a Fulbright-Hays fellowship, hoping to study urbanism in a northern city. Yesterday, offi- cials in the Ministry of External Affairs ques- tioned him about the Himalayan project. The program began in the late 1950s, sup- ported entirely by Ford Foundation money. When this source began drying up, Director Rose hunted up other outlets and found funds at the Defense Department's Advanced Research Project Agency, the Smithsonian Institution and elsewhere. The project has produced analyses of the relations between Tibet, India and China; the political system of Nepal; and other studies in linguistics, ethnology and anthro- pology. Berreman, who examined the Pentagon contract, says it places no curbs on the schol- ars. It enables them to choose their own projects and guarantees that none of their findings shall be classified. FOES IN PARLIAMENT The furor in Parliament was touched off by a member of the Revolutionary Socialist Party. Members of the Jana Sangh, a party of right-wing Hindu fanatics, and Communists suggested that the research is merely a cover for American espionage. The National Herald, a daily that usually reflects the government's line, said that per- mission for the scholars to work in the Hima- layas "should never have been approved by anyone alive to the nation's self-respect and security . . . Whichever organization in the United States finances it, research and in- telligence have been inextricably involved during the postwar period." Perhaps as a result of this affair, professors here say, there have been unusual delays in granting visas to other American researchers with grants from the Health, Education and Welfare Department's Fulbright-Hays pro- gram. Ironically, India appears to have dis- covered the military sponsorship of the Him- alayan project from hearings held last May by Sen. Fulbright's Committee on Foreign Relations. [From the New York Times, Aug. 14, 1968] INDIA STILL WARY ON U.S. SCHOLARS?. CONCERN OVER PENTAGON OR CIA IN- VOLVEMENT STRONG (By Joseph Lelyveld) ? NEW DELHI, August 13?Three months ago Prof. Gerald D. Berreman, a University of California anthropologist, applied for a visa to come to India for a year of research and teaching. Today he called at the External Af- fairs Ministry here to assure worried officials that he was not an operative of the Central Intelligence Agency. It is an assurance that Indian officials now feel they must have from all American schol- ars interested in their country. But there was a special irony in Professor Berreman's case Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP711300364R000300100001-3 ReleaetialagiN?alt-EME036gEIVA920100001-3 S9740 Approved For August 12, 1969 Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield. because he helped to start the controversy that made the Indians edgy. Last January he sent Senator J. W. Ful- bright, chairman of the Foreign Relations 'Committee, a copy of a letter he had written withdrawing from participation in a research project on the Himalayas. He felt that the project had been cendpromised by financial support from the Pentagon. The anthropologist Wryly describes himself as a wild-eyed opponent of the wax in Viet- nam. His letter explained that this was the basis of his "moral abler. lion" to taking the funds. It also cited what he termed a prac- tical objection?that the project and all other serious academic resejVcir by Americans in India could easily become controversial here as a result of the Defense Department's in- volvement Dr. Berreman, who later got a grant from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, discovered to his dismay how ac- curate his forecast was. In fact, the contro- versy that has blown up here has caused the Government to hold up on all visa applica- tions from Americans with any kind of aca- demic pursuit. Indians became conscious of the Penta- gon's support of scholarly research only a few weeks ago, when there were press reports of Congressional testimony by Adm. Hyman G. Rickover before Mr. Pulbright's committee. The outcry in Parliament was immediate. One member charged that the Pentagon and C.I.A. were busy infilhating spies into the Himalayas, not only as scholars but also as artists, bird-watchers and yogis. Privately, Inidan officials say they do not really suspect the scholar:, of being spies. But they make it clear that research underwrit- ten by the Pentagon has no future here. COOPERATION IN etlE PAST This is also ironic, for India's own Ministry of Defense has cooperated in the past with the Advanced Research Project Agency, which gave the Himalayan projek t a grant of $280,- 000. As Professor Berreman e ,plains it, the proj- ect was not an integrated program of re- search but a pot-pourri of diverse studies in several disciplines thrown together for the specific purpose of attracting funds. The anthropologist, who wrote an article last February for The Ne Lion decrying the "moral imperialism" of the Peace Corps,w as asked whether there was any clear moral dif- ference between taking money from the De- fense Department and taking it from the De- partment of Health, Educe tion and Welfare. "Oh, I know I can't be entirely consistent," he replied. "If I were to be entirely con- sistent, I wouldn't 134q my taxes and I wouldn't be teachin,; at the Uni- versity of California. Its not consistency that I want but impact?in the form of opposi- tion to the war." Professor Berreman, who is here on a two- month tourist visa now, hopes to return next month to do a study of urbanization in Deb- ra Dun, a town near the Himalayas but not in them. The author of a book called "Hindus of the Himalayas," he Atomised the officials he saw today that he would not try to do any further research in the mountains. Among others waiting for action on their visas are a dozen graduates of professional schools at the University of California who should already have arrived here for a year of further studies. A University of Wisconsin student of linguistics who Ed hoped to study Tibetan and Sanskrit in Darjeeling has been asked to move from the Himalayan resort to Benares. American officials say they are not unduly alarmed by the difficulties the scholars are meeting. "Remember," one said, "we've had i our moments of xenophobia and obscurant- ism too." Mr. HART. Mr. President, in the course of the discussion it has been sug- gested that there are certain research projects which more appropriately could be undertaken by other agencies and de- partments of the Government. How- ever, they are not doing it. The Defense Department is. Without the Senator's amendment, some of these worthwhile things would terminate. A willingness to assist in the transfer from the Defense Department to department X has been voiced. I ask the Senator if it is not true that If there are projects of a research na- ture which are trimmed back by agree- ment to the Senator's amendmdnt, proj- ects which are thought to be worthy as research projects, there is on the Senate calendar a bill to authorize appropria- tions for activities of the National Sci- ence Foundation. That bill in regular order will follow the disposition of this bill by the Senate. I know of no way in which we can operate here as jugglers. We will have to take a stand here at some time, and I hope that it is now. We will have to say no to some of these rather esoteric and certainly not directly defense-related re- search projects and cut them off and, happily, we are in a point of time in relation to the Senate bill in which the measures that will follow have value, and something may be picked up in the following bill. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield myself an additional 5 minutes. Mr. HART. We are ready to make the transfer. However, before we are in a po- sition to be able to transfer, we have to saw off the defense from that kind of research. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I agree with what the Senator says I am a cosponsor with the Senator from Okla- homa of a measure to create a founda- tion for research in the behaviorial sciences. That would be a perfectly prop- er place to transfer these behavioral projects, assuming that they are good projects. Mr. HART. Mr. President, that bill will follow the pending bill. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I agree with the Senator. I think that his Point is well taken. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent to have printed at this point in the RECORD for the information of the Sen- ate a list of a number of particular in- stitutions. This one is for the fiscal year 1968 from the Department of Defense. It gives the name of the contractor and loca- tion and the amount of money for the fiscal year 1968. I also ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD for Project Themis, a list of the universities that consist of both private and public universities. The list gives the funding for 1967, 1968, and 1969. That, of course, s the latest we have. this to show how extensive is the intrusion of the Defense Department into Practically all of the important institutions of the United States. Mr. HART. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? This again goes too far and lends cre- dence to the allegations of those who say that we are becoming a militaristic nation and that our civilian government and civilian life is being subordinated to the overwhelming influence of the military. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: SECTION Il?NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, FISCAL YEAR 1961 lExcerpt from Department of Defense listing of 500 contractor according to net value of mtary prime contract awards to research, development, test, mid evaluation work] Rank Name of contractor and location Thousand: of dollar 10 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. _ _ _ _ 119, 17! Cambridge, Mass - 31, 66, Lexington, Mass 87, 51. 20 Aerospace Corp 73, 33, El Segundo, Calif 73, 30 San Bernardino, Calf 3: 22 Johns Hopkins University 57, 61 Baltimore City, Md 2,71 Silver Spring, Md 54,90 -- 30 Mitre Corp., Bedford, Mass 35,71 36 Stanford Research Institute 28, 71 Ethiopia _ 19 Thailand 5 Homer Village, Alaska 1 Menlo Park, Calif__ 27,60 Stanford, Calif ....1. 32 Mercury, NeV 43 Cheyenne, Wyo- 7 40 Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Calif 19,13! 44 California, University of 17,39, Berkeley, Calif 5,76; D3Vis, Calif 12-i Irvine, Calif 61 La Jolla, Calif 5, 51( Los Angeles, Calif 1, 471 Point Mugu, Calif 12 Riverside, Galif 89 San Diego, Calif 3, 182 San Francisca, Calif_ 256 Santa Barbara, CaliL 870 Santa Cruz, Calif44 ? -., , 45 System Development Corp 17,372 Huntsville, Ala 414 Lompoc, Calif 700 Los Angeles, Calif_ 61 Santa Monica, Calif 13, 120 Washington, D.0 863 Belleville, Ill 350 Lexington, Mass 375 Rome, N.Y 191 Dayton, Ohio 303 Falls Church, Va 1, 226 Hampton, Va 234 Norfolk, Va 35 46 Stanford University 1 ,422 Palo Afto, Calif 218 Stanford, Calif 1 ,204 51 Rochester, University of Rochester, N.Y....._ 13,182 55 Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory, Inc 12, 500 57 60 64 65 Edwards, Calif 86 Buffalo, N.Y 11, 889 Wright-Patterson, Ohio 37 Fails Church, Va 448 ITT Research Institute 12,172 Chicago, III 7,017 Annapolis, Md 5,130 Wright-Patterson, Ohio.. 25 Institute for Defense Analysis, Arlington, Va 11,691 Pennsylvania Sate University, University Park, Pa 10,513 Research Analysis Corp 10,967 Iran 155 Vietnam 880 McLean, Va 9,273 Various &mettle ?241 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 August 12, 1969 APPr?vet6gditigiNteM414/119M3DICart-RINOTIM00001-3 S 9741 364R0003001 SECTION II-NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, FISCAL YEAR SECTION II-NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, FISCAL YEAR 1968-Continued 1968-Continued SECTION II-NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, FISCAL YEAR 1968-Continued Rank Name of contractor and location Thousands ot dollars Rank Name of contractor and location 66 Columbia University, New York, N.Y 70 Michigan, University of Honolulu City, Hawaii 1,600 Ann Arbor, Mich 6,947 Willow Run, Mich 734 Ypsilanti, Mich 197 71 Illinois, University of Chicago, Ill Urbana, Ill 72 Battelle Memorial Institute Germany_ _ _ Washington, 13.0 Columbus, Ohio Richland, Wash 78 U.S. National Aero Space Agency Edwards, Calif Moffett Field, Calif Pasadena, Calif Washington, D.0 Houston, Tex Ridgeley, W. Va Thousands of dollars Rank Name of contractor and location 9,929 147 Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pa 9,478 151 Harvard University Boston, Mass Cambridge, Mass Fort Davis, Tex 153 Minnesota, University of, Minneapolis, 8,583 Minn - 154 California Institute of Technology, Paso- 89 dena, Calif 8,494 155 Texas A. & M. Research Foundation, College Station, Tex 8,322 156 Purdue Research Foundation 85 Riverside Research Institute, New York, N.Y_ 92 Washington, University of, Seattle, Wash_ 94 Texas, University of 57 114 8,036 115 Lafayette, Ind West Lafayette, Ind 160 New York University Thousands of dollars 2,575 254 Smithsonian Institution 1,082 2, 524 Washington, D.0 1,067 182 Cambridge, Mass 15 2,182 160 260 Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind 1,044 261 Kansas, University of 1,044 2,507 2,487 2,475 2,455 2,442 13 Kansas City, Kans 18 Lawrence, Kans 1,026 262 American Institute of Research 1,038 Palo Alto, Calif 93 Silver Spring, Md 145 Camp Lejeune, N.0 54 Pittsburgh, Pa 746 2,304 265 Case Western Reserve University, Cleve- land, Ohio 8,011 266 Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, N.Y.. 1,001 267 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission ' 995 7,026 Bronx, N.Y 731 - New York, N.Y 1,513 25 Syracuse, N.Y 25 40 University Heights, N.Y 35 19 77 167 Maryland University of 2,100 155 6,710 Baltimore City, Md 703 College Park, Md 1,397 6,315 5,552 5,386 Alamogordo, N. Mex 10 Austin, Tex 4, 598 College Station, Tex 68 Dallas, Tex 43 El Paso, Tex 502 Galveston, Tex 135 Houston, Tex 30 96 Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, Woods 5,143 Hole, Mass. ' 175 105 Utah, University of 4,356 181 182 ' Dugway, Utah 283 Salt Lake City, Utah 4,073 107 Syracuse University Research Corp 4,172 Burlington, Mass 94 Syracuse, N.Y 4,078 117 Dayton, University of 3,610 Dayton, Ohio 3,358 Wright-Patterson, Ohio 252 118 Cornell University 3,595 Arecibo, P.R 1,585 Ithaca, N.Y 1,949 New York, N.Y 61 123 George Washington University 3,306 Washington, D.0 3,295 Alexandria, Va 11 128 Southwest Research Institute 3,149 Wright-Patterson, Ohio 226 Dallas, Tex 35 San Antonio, Tex 2,888 131 Denver, University of, Denver, Colo 2,902 133 Ohio State University Research Foundation_ 2,958 Columbus, Ohio 2,686 Wright-Patterson, Ohio 272 134 American University, Washington, D C 2,944 229 138 National Academy of Sciences 2,838 234 Washington, D.0 2,756 Watertown, Mass 47 National Academy of Sciences, Dover, NJ_ 35 139 Duke University, Durham, N.0 2,012 235 140 New Mexico State University Alamogordo, N. Mex 24 Las Cruces, N. Mex 640 University Park, N. Mex 1,612 White Sands MS., N. Mex 511 143 Alaska, University of, College Village, Alaska 2,695 146 Miami, University of 2,602 Coral Gables, Fla 1,141 248 Miami, Fla 1,461 252 172 New Mexico, University of 1,906 Albuquerque, N. Mex Sandia; N. Mex 174 New York State University of Washington, D.0 175 Germantown, Md 39 Las Vegas, Nev 270 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Albuquerque, N. Mex 451 Oak Ridge, Tenn 40 Richland, Wash 20 934 1,052 268 Illinois Institute Technology, Chicago, III__ 988 270 U.S. Commerce Department 985 1,982 Boulder, Colo 540 Albany, N.Y 1,538 Washington, D.0 324 Buffalo, N.Y 318 Gaithersburg, Md 46 New York, N.Y 115 Rockville, Md 10 Stony Brook, N.Y 11 Suitland, Md 65 1,969 271 Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J 983 Oregon State University, Corvallis, Dreg--- _ Florida, University of, Gainesville, Fla Princeton University, Princeton, N.J 184 Midwest Research Institute Kansas City, Mn Wright-Patterson, Ohio 186 Louisiana State University of, Baton Rouge, La 188 Georgia Tech Research Institute, Atlanta, Ga 195 Stevens Institute of Technology 1, 842 273 Southern Research Institute, Birmingham, 1,803 Ala 965 275 Colorado University 964 1,762 - - Boulder, Colo 706 1,615 Denver, Colo 258 147 277 Northeastern University, Boston, Mass 952 279 Washington University, St. Louis, City Me_ . 933 1,754 281 Brown University, Providence, R.I 932 282 Pittsburgh, University of 921 1, 596 Washington, D.0 195 Pittsburgh, Pa 726 Hoboken, N.J 1, 559 New York, N.Y 197 WisconsinAniversity of, Madison, Wis 204 Hawaii, University of Honolulu City, Hawaii 210 Analytic Services Inc., Falls Church, Va 212 Cincinnati, University of Cincinnati, Ohio_ _ _ 214 Oklahoma State University of Stillwater, Oklahoma. 218 Iowa, State Univ of Science and Technology, Ames, Iowa. 219 Chicago, University of Chicago, III Lemont, III 222 Florida State University, Tallahassee, Fla _ 225 Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colo_ 226 Kansas State University of Agriculture, Manhattan, Kans. 228 Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn, N.Y 1,274 Farmingdale, N.Y 30 Catholic University of America, Washington, 1,304 D.C. Research Triangle Institute 1,254 2,707 236 37 293 Missouri, University of 876 1,591 Columbia, Mo 798 1, 568 Kansas City, Mo 50 1,495 Rolla, Mo 28 1,446 1,422 296 Notre Dame, University of, Notre Dame, Ind _ 855 297 Oregon, University of 846 1,372 Eugene, Oreg 531 1,360 Portland, Dreg 315 1,320 298 Oklahoma, University of 840 40 Fort Sill, Okla 100 1,338 Norman, Okla 335 1,329 Oklahoma City, Okla 405 1,321 309 Virginia, University of, Charlottesville, Va 787 1, 304 316 Tennessee, University of 751 Iran Durham, N.0 Triangle Park, N.0 Georgia Institute of Technology Atlanta, Ga. New Mexico Institute Mining and Technol- ogy. China Lake, Calif Socorro, N. Mex 238 Syracuse University Syracuse, N.Y Utica, N.Y Pennsylvania, University of Philadelphia, Pa Rhode Island, University of, Kingston, R.I_ Knoxville, Tenn 520 Menphis, Tenn 64 Tullahoma, Tenn 167 317 Southern California, University of 749 Los Angeles, Calif 735 296 San Diego, Calif 14 606 352 319 Southern Methodist, University of, Dallas, Tex 735 1,220 321 Delaware, University of, Newark. Del 732 8,218 325 Georgetown University, Washington, D.C_. _ 714 328 Yale University 709 200 1,018 New Haven, Conn 684 Alamogordo, N. Mex - 25 1,197 334 Houston, University of, Houston, Tex 680 1,184 338 Auburn University, Auburn, Ala 657 13 339 University Corp. Atmospheric Research 655 Boulder, Colo -40 1,125 Sunspot, II. Mex 695 1,084 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9742 Approved For ReleaSeaglitilsgfaNW-Rp8511490_aes4L45193p0100001-3 Augusl 12, 1939 SECTION II?NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, FISCM. YEAR SECTION II?NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, FISCAL YEAR 1968?Continued 1968?Continued Thousands Rank Name of contractor and location of dollars 341 Dartmouth College, Hantiiir, N H ____ ____ 652 342 Arizona State University, emple, Ariz_ 649 348 American Society for Engineering, Wash- ington, D.0 621 351 Lowell Technical Institute 618 --- _ ? Billerica, Mass_ 40 Lowell, Mass 578 ? 0 352 Lovelace Foundation, Allhiuerque, N. Mex_ 613 354 Ohio University,Athens Jo 608 358 Northwestern liniversity,Iyaastos, Ill 590 357 American Institute for Reieatch 569 -- Washington, D.0 26 Pittsburgh, Pa 481 370 Mississippi State Universtr, 'alate College, Miss .. 564 371 Travelers Research Center Hartford, Conn__ 561 376 North Carolina State Untyamity, Raleigh, _ N. r C " 551 388 Massachusetts, University ot _ 511 --- - ? Amherst, Mass 493 Waltham, Mass 18 ---- - Rank Name of contractor and location Thousands of dollars 390 Arizona, University of, Tucson, Ariz__ 504 396 National Society Professional Engineers, Washington, D.0 493 418 Michigan State, University, East Lansing, 464 Mich. 427 Boston College 455 Chestnut Hill, Mass 318 Weston, Mass 137 . _ 428 South Dakota School of Mines and Tech- 454 I . . 444 Nevada, University of Reno, Neu 446 Flight Safety Foundation, Phoenix, Ariz ._ 462 North Carolina, University of, Chapel Hill, N.C. 464 U.S. Interior Department___ _ SECTION II?NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, FISCAL YEAR 1968?Continued Rank Name of contractor and location Thousands of dollars 468 Tufts University 380 ---- -- Boston, Mass 41 Medford, Mass 339 _ 478 Arctic Institute of North America._ 35:4 Canada_ _ 75 Washington, D.C___ 279 479 Alabama, University of... 351 426 Birmingham, Ala 176 423 Hontsville, Ala_ 102 390 University, Ala _ 73 aga 483 Utah State University of Agriculture Cccl applied science 344 Denver, Col 50 Washington, D.0 37 Bartlesville, Okla 85 Albany, Oreg Pittsburgh, Pa 165 467 Presbyterian Hospital, Chicago, III_ 384 Bedford, Mass------------- 62 Logan, Utah 82 485 Iowa, State University of, Iowa City, Iowa _ 342 487 Lehigh University, Bethleham, Pa 241 Total . 665.35 PROJECT THEMIS The list shows all the Themis piojects funded through fiscal year 1969. The original 4-year plan called for 50 new starts for each of fiscal years 1967,. 1968, 1989, and 1970 for a total of 200 programs. During the first 3 years only 118 of the planned 150 new starts were approved. The fiscal year 1970 budget request for $33 million provides tor (1) 25 additional new projects lobe started during fiscal year 1970 which would require $10 million, and (2) the renewal of the ongoing Themis programs which would require $23 million. PROJECT THEMIS PROGRAMS?FUNDING BY FISCAL YEARS ($1,000) Military Department State and institution Alabama: A Auburn University Al University of Alabama A Alaska: University of Alaska Arizona: N Arizona State_ AF Do AF University of Arizona AF University of Arizona at Tucson California: AF University of California, San Diego' N University of Cilifornia, Riverside Colorado: N Colorado State_ N Colorado State. AF Colorado State at Fort Collins_ Connecticut: University of Connecticut__ _ AF Delaware: A University of Delaware N University of Delaware at Newark _ _ District of Columbia: AF Georgetown University. N Catholic University _ N Catholic University N Catholic University Florida: Al University of Florida A University of Florida N Florida State_ A Florida State__ N Florida State Georgia: A Georg ?Tech. Al Georgia Tech N University of Geo iia at Athens.. Hawaii: N University of Hawaii Al University of Hawaii A University of Hawaii at Honolulu Illinois: Al Illinois Institute of technology. A Illinois Institute of Technology at Chicago Indiana: Al Indiana University N Notre Dame University Iowa: N Iowa State. Al do_ A University of Iowa N _do Kansas: A University of Kansas Al do Al Kansas State N do Al University of Kentucky A Kentucky University at Lexington Al do A University of Louisville Louisiana: A Louisiana State_. AF do Kentucky: Program topic Information processing Structural mechanics Human ecology Human performance in isolation Detection devices, techniques and theory Precision optical systems X-ray and XUV radiation physics Transport phenomena in flow systems Solar radiation effects Tropical weather disturbances, surface effects Predictability of low-altitude winds_ Effects of environment on sensors Structural fatigue Fluid mechanics and heat transfer _ Oceanography Laser technology Vitreous state structure and dynamics Dynamics of cable systems Underwater acoustics Solid state materials Logistics and information processing Geophysical fluid dynamics Prediction of tropical weather phenomena_ Computer aided instruction Low-speed aerodynamic Interface phenomena Statistical analysis and information retrieval Astronomy research On-line computer systems Vector-borne tropical diseases V-STOL aerodynamics Degradation of structural materials . Environmental hazards Deep sea engineering Automatic navigation and control Ceramic and composite materials Vibration and stability ot military vehicles . Application and theory of automata Remote sensing instrumentation Social and behavioral science Performance in altered environment_ Nuclear radiation effects on electronic components Fiscal year Fiscal year 1967 1968 343 404 380 171 202 ... 190 -- 409 409 398 200 500 430 410 563 281 404 400 340 600 202 386 402 200 170 300 500 460 339 170 350 195 350 175 409 409 400 198 400 200 400 449 400 400 400 Metal deformation processing Research in electrochemical processes Environmental stress physiology Performance assessment and enhancement Infectious and communicable diseases Digital automata 200 224 500 400 200 200 200 577 468 399 342 171 368 400 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Fiscal year 1969 120 400 200 203 460 522 400 250 215 400 205 280 480 202 193 201 500 200 170 350 250 230 170 200 215 220 205 400 205 400 200 200 200 225 750 200 200 200 200 288 204 460 400_ 200 170 200 Approved F ..etli**9431000A4111131COCRD-RDIRENME64R000300100001-3 August 1Z, 1969 PROJECT THEWS PROGRAMS?FUNDING BY FISCAL YEARS ($1,000)?Continued S9743 Military Department State and institution Program topic Fiscal year Fiscal irz 1967 Massachusetts: N University of Massachusetts Deep sea structures N Boston College Elementary chemical kinetics Michigan: AF Michigan State University at East Lansing Behavioral studies Minnesota: N University of Minnesota Infrared detector and laser technology N Gas turbine technology N __ do Organization performance and human effectiveness Mississippi: A Mississippi State Rotor and propeller aerodynamics AF University of Mississippi Biocontrol systems Missouri: A University of Missouri at Columbia_ Fluid transport properties N University of Missouri at Rolla Aqueous aerosols in atmospheric processes AF do Basic studies on electronic materials A do Terrestrial science research AF Washington University at St. Louis Control, guidance and information studies AF ___do_ Optimum detection systems AF Nevada: University of Nevada Cloud physics - AF New Hampshire: Dartmouth College Time-shared computing systems New Jersey: AF Rutgers University Fluid flow aerodynamics N Stevens Institute Nonlinear physics of polymers A do Cryogenic sciences and engineering A do .. Evaluation of terrain vehicle systems New Mexico: N New Mexico Institute M. & T Environmental sciences N University of New Mexico Radiation effects on electronics New York: AF SUNY-Albany Modification of environment N SUNY-Buffalo Environmental physiology A Rensselaer Polytechnic Electrochemical power sources N __do Radiation effects A __do Optimum digital signal processing N Yeshiva University, New York City Research on thin film materials North Carolina: North Carolina State Materials response phenomena Digital encoding systems North Dakota: A North Dakota State Control of vectors of diseases of military importance N University of North Dakota High pressure physiology Ohio: A Case-Western Reserve Research in R. & D. management A Ohio University Low-level navigation Kent State University Liquid crystal detectors University of Cincinnati Internal aerodynamics in air-breathing engines Oklahoma: A Oklahoma State Electronic description of the environment N University of Oklahoma Mechanism and theory of shock N Oregon: Oregon State On-line computer environmental research Pennsylvania: A Drexel Institute of Technology Powder metallurgy AF do Forecasting by satellite observations N Jefferson Medical College Pathogenesis of acute diarrhea! disease A Lehigh University Nonlinear wave propagation N _do Low-cycle fatigue in joined structures N do Fluid amplification N Hahnemann Medical College Bioamines in stress A Rhode Island: Rhode Island University at Kingston___ Photoelectronic imaging devices - A South Carolina: Medical College of South Carolina Resuscitation and treatment of wounded N South Dakota: South Dakota School of Mines Modification of convective clouds AF AF A Tennessee: 0 University of Tennessee at Knoxville AF _do AF A A A A A AF A AF AF A AF A Fiscal year 1969 360 180 380 190 400 200 278 139 409 446 400 399 460 400 324 342 406 370 399 600 199 290 200 162 171 460 180 440 400 190 200 415 140 204 220 200 400 400 400 400 250 290 162 170 200 203 268 185 185 199 300 460 .430 400 300 407 482 580 200 350 230 215 400 390 200 200 396 200 393 197 527 263 150 200 410 400 241 405 290 510- 408 390 400 400 Dynamic sealing Remote sensor research - University of Tennessee at Tullahoma MHD power generation Vanderbilt University Coating science and technology Texas: Texas A. & M Optimization research __do Meteorology research Aircraft dynamics of subsonic flight Texas Christian Human pattern perception University of Houston Information processing Rice University Coherent and incoherent EM radiation do ' Remote sensing of gamma ray signatures Southern Methodist Automatic navigation Statistics in calibration methods Texas Tech Performance and man-machine effectiveness Ai Utah: University of Utah Chemistry of combustion Vermont: University of Vermont Isolation and sensory communication Virginia: University of Virginia Learning control systems do Atomic interaction in gases do Cryogenic instrumentation Virginia Polytechnic, Blackburg Vehicle engineering and control V/STOL aerodynamics West Virginia: West Virginia University Total 368 260 130 300 400 430 272 380 150 408 400 550 200 215 388 100 190 350 400 398 200 502 470 200 410 342 171 408 416 150 200 205 200 240 202 290 255 204 195 200 200 400 520 400 184 100 150 204 200 275 155 215 194 135 190 175 400 200 296 235 200 255 170 200 400 400 208 19,375 28,180 29,239 Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if it is convenient to the Senator from Arkan- sas, would he be willing to allow the Senator from Massachusetts to speak at this time. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, that is agreeable. I yield to the Senator from Massachusetts. Mr. STENNIS. If the Senator from New Hampshire will yield time, Mr. Pres- ident? Mr. Mc1NTYRE. I yield 12 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Massa- chusetts. Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, if I may take a somewhat different approach to the proposal as set forth by the Sen- ator from Arkansas, let me first say that the policy and general philosophy as set forth by the Senator's proposal was shared and was considered by the Subcommittee on Research and Develop- ment of the Committee on Armed Serv- ices, under the able leadership of the distinguished Senator from New Hamp- shire. In fact, it is in keeping with the policy as mandated to that subcommit- tee by the distinguished Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the Senator from Mississippi. So the matters which the Senator from Arkansas raises are matters which the committee had before it in its deliberations and in its final decision, in its report to the full Armed Services Committee. Mr. President, I should like to analyze very briefly the contentions of the Sen- ator from Arkansas and then conclude by proposing certain questions to the Senator from Arkansas which I trust he will answer and which may be helpful in this debate. Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9744 Approved For Rele tifig4HIAftRATIM3 - gEN AB003RAPOM00100001-3 Attguat 12, 1969 Mr. STE/sINIS. Mr. President, may we have order, so that those of us who wish to hear may do so? The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. RELLMON in the chair). The Senate will be in order. Mr. BROOKE. The Senator from Arkansas proposes a $45.6 million cut, in- cluding a 10-percent, or $27 million, cut in Federal contract research centers; a $2 million, or one-third, cut in research by foreign institutions; a 20-percent, or $5 million, cut in project Agile, counter- insurgency work, which includes largely technological work, not just social and behavioral research; $3 million from other social science research; and $8 million, or 25 percent, from project The- mis, a program for university research. If the Department of Defense distrib- utes the committee's 12-percent cut in the research budget evenly across all categories, the Federal contract research centers will be reduced by more than Senator FULBRIGHT has proposed. All the categories that the Senator has men- tioned are subject to the large cut the committee has imposed already, unless the Defense Department considers them of such high priority that other pro- grams are reduced disproportionately. Moreover, social and behavioral re- search on foreign military environments and policy planning studies are specifi- cally cited by the committee as an area to be reduced by 12 Percent or by $1.5 million of the $13.3 million, and by the recommended transfer of approximately $4 million in projects to other agencies with responsibility in these areas. For ex- ample, some policy planning studies might go to State, ACDA, and AID; and some more basic research might go to the National Science roundation. Work in these areas already has been reduced by approximately 11 percent since fiscal 1968 and by the effects of inflation, which the Senator has not mentioned, and which I am sure he would want to take into consideration. Thus, a thorough pruning of work in this area is already assured by the com- mittee's action. Apparently, Senator FULBRIGHT has several concerns: allegedly worthless re- search; defense connections with the universities; the SUPPOSed hazards of do- ing research under defense auspices in foreign countries, on the assumption that it may lead to engaging in military ac- tion there at some time. Mr. President, many knowledgeable people agree that some of the research Involved might better be carried out un- der other auspices, and the committee has provided for this. But unless the State Department and other agencies obtain greater authorizations, this of course, will be impossible. Thus, the effect of adopting the Ful- bright amendment simply would be to reduce further what is widely recog- nized as an inadequate national effort in social and behavioral research. Surely, we should first seek to create better me- chanisms for funding work in this gen- eral field before we trim the limited ef- fort already underway. If it is insisted that all Defense re- search must be strictly tied to DOD mis- sions, we would have to cut out all basic research in physical sciences as well. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. BROOKE. I yield. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Did the Senator hear the Senator from Michigan state a moment ago that on the calendar is the National Science Foundation authoriza- tion, and it will be up very soon, and we could authorize an increase to be taken up?all the items about which the Sena- tor is talking? Assuming that they are justifiable research contracts, it would be a much more appropriate way to do it, it would seem to me. That bill is al- ready on the calendar. May I also say to the Senator that I told the Senate a moment ago?I do not know whether he heard it?that a dele- gation from one of the most prestigious Institutions in the country, and certainly in his State of Massachusetts, waited on me with respect to the problem of the instrusion of the military. They are not antimilitary. They simply were making the point that they hated to see MIT be- come dominated or too dependent, I will say, upon a military appropriation. I be- lieve that MIT last year had $119,175,000. This is an awful lot of money. In one sense, of course, it is a great compliment to MIT. These students, I was told by the professor who brought them, were among the best students they had. They were not dropouts; they were not in that sense. They were serious, very intelligent young men who did not wish to see MIT be con- sidered just a kind of dependency of the Pentagon. They had great pride in MIT's reputation as one of theworld's technological institutions. Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am sorry about it. I would have thought that the Senator, too, would be interested in preserving the great reputation of Harvard and MIT as among the leading educational institu- tions in the world. It was a great shock to me?and I think to the entire coun- try?to suddenly see an eruption on the campus of Harvard University, the oldest and I would say probably the most re- spected institution in America. I cannot, of course, prove that it was just because of this. Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think it contrib- uted to it. Mr. BROOKE. If the Senator would yield, I would say that that was caused primarily by ROTC, not defense research, of which the Senator is well aware. There may have been some contribution. But I was about to say, before the Senator asked his question, that universities themselves are in the process of gaining better control of defense research pro- grams. I had a conversation recently with James Killian and Howard Johnson of MIT. They are well aware of this prob- lem. What the Senator has said relative to the students at MIT is certainly shared by members of the faculty and of the administration. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes. Mr. BROOKE. They are aware of the problem, and they are trying to get on top of the problem, and I think we should give them an opportunity. I might also point out that the De- fense Department is cooperating in seek- ing better balance and in reducing classi- fied research to a minimum. These things are ongoing at the present time, as the Senator very well points out. Of course, I am interested in main- taining the integrity of MIT, Harvard, and the other institutions of higher learning in the Commonwealth and throughout the country; but I think these programs are now being given close scrutiny by the administration and the faculty as well as the student body. Mr. FULBRIGHT. If the Senator will permit me, I should like to read an AP dispatch from Washington dated May 15, 1969: Dr. John Foster, the Pentagon's research chief, told a Congressional committee Wednesday that he saw "no evidence of major adverse impact from student demonstrations against defense research at universities." Mr. President, I submit that Dr. Foster is just out of touch with the situation in this country. And it was not just Har- vard. I mentioned Harvard because it is such a great institution. Mr. BROOKE. The Senator mentioned Harvard specifically. Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator will re- call that at Berkeley, which is certainly also one of the great institutions, where there was a very clear protest about the participation at the university in IDA. The some situation prevailed at Cornell and at one university after another. I am not saying it is the only thing. The war is probably the greatest single contribu- tor, but they were also protesting about the participation of the university in IDA. There are many aspects to it. It is not just the military. In many cases it takes the attention and time of their leading pro- fessors to go off on these highly paid re- search projects and leave the teaching of the students. In other wilds, the stu- dents are being shortchanged. I know they are correct because the attention and time of the finest university profes- sors in many cases are directed and siphoned off in very large contracts that are given them. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent to have the article to which I referred printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: FOSTER BACKS U.S. RESEARCH AT UNIVERSITIES WasunvoroN.?Dr. John Foster, the Penta- gon's research chief, told a congressional committee Wednesday that he saw "no evi- dence of major adverse impacts" from stu- dent demonstrations against defense re- search at universities. Defending the research program, Foster said, "I hope you will not be misled by those who suggest that * * ? academic research [supported by the Defense Department] rep- resents a sort of sandbox for scholars, ir- relevant to defense missions, unproductive technically and, worst of all, inimical to the best interests of universities. It is more fundamental. "It is the great national advantage we possess because we are able to bring together essentially independent and well-informed people?from government, industries and Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 August 1R, 1969APProved F erCgtettgs2RNAFibcWt-Bg_'4itppCt4R000300100001-3 S 9745 universities?over long periods for voluntary work on our tough prOblems. This is the core of our capacity for technological superiority," As for demonstrations directed at Penta- gon research, Foster renewed his argument of a year that responsibility for dealing with them should be left with university adminis- trations. While Foster regarded "some of the current turmoil as irresponsible action," he added, "I still have confidence in the ability of the academic community, in the aggregate, to cope ultimately with the situation." Foster warned against congressional effort to curb such research at universities where demonstrations have taken place, saying, "We must not run the risk of eroding nation- ally important research by precipitate puni- tive action against features of university life that are essential to our future." The PRESIDING Or.VICER. The time of the Senator has expired. Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator has 27 minutes remaining. Mr. McINTYRE. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Massachusetts. Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I would appreciate it if the Senator from Arkan- sas would allow me a little time. I think the colloquy was very helpful and I am grateful to him for joining in. Mr. FULBRIGHT. I would be glad to do so. Mr. BROOKE. I think this is a healthy trend and creates an awareness on the part of the administration, the faculty, and the members of the student body. The Senator referred to Dr. Foster. Mr. FULBRIGHT. But he is not aware of it. Mr. BROOKE. He is not aware of it. Mr. FULBRIGHT. But he is the head of research. Mr. BROOKE. I think the Depart- ment of Defense is aware of the neces- sity for gaining better control of de- fense research on campuses. Mr. FULBRIGHT. But this is the man who hands out the money. That is the trouble. Mr. BROOKE. But he said this is not caused by defense contracts with the uni- versities. I think he is attributing this to the war in Vietnam and the chemical problems and, as we are all aware,. the ROTC matter. Mr. FULBRIGHT. They all contribute. I agree that no one thing does it; they all contribute. Mr. BROOKE. It is a healthy trend, but to carry it so far that university ties are severed would be, in my opinion, a very unwise move. Mr. FULBRIGHT. By my amendment we would not sever them. Mr. BROOKE. I think it would de- prive the universities of work on national defense. I am sure the Senator would agree that it would weaken one of our best guarantees that open and objective research and counsel, not alleged pres- sures of a "military-industrial" complex are shaping the defense policy. I am sure the Senator would agree that thus, uni- versities themselves should determine whether and under what circumstances they should engage in defense research. This is a matter we should leave up to the universities and not something we should establish as a matter of policy or mandate. Such programs should not be terminated by congressional fiat. Defense-sponsored social science re- search abroad is already down by 70 per- cent since fiscal 1968 and all proposals are now subject to thorough interagency review under State Department auspices. It is a highly dubious and antiintellic- tual proposition to assume that research on foreign areas somehow increases like- lihood of U.S. military involvement. With all due respect, I do not believe that is SO. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. BROOKE. I yield. Mr. FULBRIGHT. The point I was making is that the intrusion of our mili- tary into university life is offensive and it creates ill will. I believe there is evi- dence of it in the articles which I have had printed in the RECORD. I was not making the point we were more likely to become militarily involved, Mr. BROOKE. It could just as well de- crease it as increase it. Whether we involve ourselves mili- tarily is a matter of policy, not research, and that policy can be most wisely shaped if careful preliminary research is done. The reports subnlitted by the Senator from Arkansas yesterday, in my opinion, are hardly the whole story. Out of such policy studies have come many of the fundamental concepts and programs on which national security rests. Concepts and rationale of stable deter- rents, the first strike, second strike dis- tinction, the rationale for security through arms control rather than arms competition, the most informed critics of MIRV and ABM, have all been in- fluenced importantly by work done on these research efforts. Economies are also realized. Overseas bomber bases were reduced at savings of billions of dollars a year after studies in the midfifties revealed their vulner- ability to missile attack. These and other savings grew out of such analysis as the Senator from Arkansas attacks so cate- gorically, analysis costing only a pittance of the savings from the basic studies alone. If there is waste, payoffs from such research are sometimes so great as to . compensate many times over, especially in view of the relatively small fraction of the budget in these categories. It is also utterly misleading for the Senator from Arkansas to assert that no one knows the cost of studies he cites. As the letter of July 24, 1969, from the Department of Defense, printed in the RECORD at the request of the Senator from Arkansas at pages S9621?S9622, in- dicates, the cost of individual reports are not easily determined, but the costs of projects, from which many reports may emerge, are know. The costs of the projects from which the Senator from Arkansas has selected certain reports to question are specified by the Department as $11,530,408 over a period of 15 years. Many of the concerns voiced by the Senator from Arkansas are shared by a number of us. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired. Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 2 additional minutes. Mr. McINTYRE. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recog- nized for 2 additional minutes. Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, that is why the Subcommittee on Research and Development and the Committee on Armed Services took strong action in these several areas. However, the com- mittee's action is more than sufficient. Indeed; many observers will fear that too much damage has been done to the defense research effort by the reduction of more than $1? billion, and we should not go further at this time. Mr. President, it is for that reason that I urge that the Senate agree to the committee recommendation and reject the amendment offered by the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT) . Mr. President, I have some questions I would like to ask the Senator from Arkansas and I shall submit them to him inasmuch as the time of the Senator from New Hampshire is running out. Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Califor- nia (Mr. MURPHY) . Mr. MURPHY. I thank the distin- guished Senator from New Hampshire. would like to speak momentarily, on one aspect of the proposed amendment which has to do with the Federal Con- tract Research Centers. We have heard great approaches to many of these mat- ters in terms of dollars. The understand- ing, the use of the dollars, and the com- plexity of the operations concerned, sometimes have not been fully discussed or fully understood. I wish to express my appreciation to the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire for permitting me this time, and acknowledge the concern of the Senator from Arkansas about spending by our Department of Defense, which is widely known, and, of course, I join him. I think that great economies may be forthcoming in the future. I do believe, however, that some attention should be given to the kinds of Federal Contract Research Centers that we have, and the kinds of tasks that they perform. This is important since the Senator from Ar- kansas wishes to cut $27 million from the funding for these organizations whether or not they are engaged in the area of social sciences. As an example of the areas of respon- sibility in the FCRC's; eight are operated under the auspices of universities, each concentrating in the fields in which each respective university has specific strengths. Three others do analysis work and, sometimes rather loosely, I think, are called think tanks, because they have a concentration of very expert brains. In my hometown of Los Angeles, I be- lieve there are more Ph. D.'s than any other place in the world accumulated un- der one roof. They perform valuable review of our posture on a continuing basis. Two other Federal Contract Re- Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000300100001-3 S9746 Approved For RtieNtimicifisi caffigvilopm.pp 030010000173 August .c12, 12969 search Centers are engaged most spe- cifically in the systems management field. The latter two, it should be pointed out, were built up under the auspices of the Congress for the direct purpose of han- dling profoundly complicated technical programs on a nonprofit basis so as to be most scrupulous in avoiding conflicts of interest in all places wherever possible, in order to save the taatpayer's dollars. However, these and other FCRC's have been of other great benefit to the tax- payer. Because of the kind of work the FCRC's do there have been tremendous savings of dollars which, this Senator is convinced, could never have been achieved in any other way. For instance, it was documented some years ago to the satisfaction of the Secretary of Defense and the Congress that the Aerospace Corp., acting with its Military partner, the Air Force, had in fact effected a sav- ings of a billion and a half dollars in its ballistic missile progranis in its first 5 years of operation, and it is acknowl- edged that this same team has brought about the savings of at least another bil- lion since that time. While there are 16 FMC's, I believe he success of Aerosme Corp., is typical of them all and., 'Mr. President, it is easily documented fin' the purposes of our discussion here today. One of the most successful programs conducted by the Air Force and Aerospace Corp. has been the Titan III project which has en- joyed a tremendous run tit great savings to the Government. I have previously commented on this some weeks ago. The secret of this success hasTheen outstand- ing, professional technical management which brought about a situation whereby our Nation was able to place operational payloads on Titan III boosters which were originally supposed to be R. & D. vehicles. In other words, they cortibined-research and development with actual payloads at one time. Yet, and this is important, because of this professional management, about which I speak, the Titan HI took on operational missions_ while still an R. & D. vehicle with enorinous success and tremondous savings. I might add, parenthetically, that all of our space flights to date have been launched by boosters developed by or evolving from those built by the military. Another of the most valuable Federal Contract Research Centers, the Rand Corp., which has been mentioned today, has been responsible for sUbstantial sav- ings in numerous areas;There are two, however, which are typical of the kinds of economy these groups do effect. Rand's study of strategic air bases in fact developed a new coffeept of opera- tions which, by the Air Force's own esti- mate, resulted in net savings of $1 billion in installations alone, and was judged to provide the same or better security as other proposed systems Mating from $10 to $22 billion more over a 4-year period. So this is really not wasted money. What we are doing is buying an accumulation of the very best brains pessible. In a second typical example, because of Its noncompetitive status, tbe Rand Corp. was able to bring the industrial computer groups together on common ground to exchange technical information and to initiate computer sharing among them. This cooperative pooling of programing techniques, known as Share, is estimated by the Department of Defense to have saved military installations and defense contractors, and therefore the taxpayer, approximately $50 million. There is yet another example of the kinds of vital work carried on by these Centers which must be given notice. The Institute for Defense Analysis completed a test and evaluation study in mid-1968 only 1 short year after it was under- taken. This project was a comprehensive analysis of the testing requirements for the Minuteman III and Poseidon weapon systems. The spectacular results showed how to determine the actual performance of these systems by testing without the enormously increased casts the Depart- ment of Defense feared might be needed through the use of what up to that time were the only known testing techniques. This successful effort by the Institute for Defense Analysis was accomplished by forming a team of knowledgeable staff people along with military officers and highly qualified engineers from industry. In other words, they put together the very best brains. The work of this team resulted in the resolution of a severe problem which the Government itself had been unable to resolve even after re- peated attempts. In other words, Mr. President, if the Institute for Defense Analysis had not licked the problem, it probably would not have been done even today and I, for one, cannot put a price on that. While I ant mentioning this specific Center, I believe it is very important to note that of the total contract budget of the Institute for Defense Analysis, only 5 percent is allocated for foreign policy and social studies. Yet the Senator from Ar- kansas asks us to reduce the FCRC fund- ing by 10 percent. Mr. President, the Department of De- fense, again with the consent of the Con- gress, years aeo decided that it would be necessary to use the Federal Contract Research Center approach in extremely complex programs in problem areas. The PRESIDING Otees.CER. The time of the Senator from California has ex- pired. Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I yield 3 additional minutes to the Senator from California. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator from California is recognized for 3 additional minutes. Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, if I do not finish my remarks in that time, I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of them be printed in the RECORD because, obviously, because of this protracted dis- cussion which has taken place there will not be time for me to read it all. I ask this so that Senators who are not pres- ently in the Chamber may have the bene- fit, if they so desire, of reading what I think has been a rather carefully pre- pared explanation of the exact PucPe6e of these Centers, why they were put to- gether and what they do. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, as an ex- ample of the degree of expertise needed, the difference between the development of airplanes and large booster rockets applies. In the construction of an air- craft, you Can always taxi it down the runway, lift off to an altitude of 1 foot and settle back to the runway subse- quently analyzing problems within the machine and correcting them. However, in the case of the booster racket with its valuable payload, you have no such luxury. What is important here is the stark fact that the booster alone, without payload, frequently casts several million dollars. Therefore, it must work?and work right?the first time. The military simply does not have enough people trained in the manage- ment of such programs in-house to guar- antee, this kind of success. But, by using an FCRC's technical ability the job can be done, was done and must continue to be done. Mr. President, so far I have mentioned the successful story of only three of our Federal Contract Research Centers. But, the story with the rest is pretty much parallel. Yesterday, the distinguished Senator from Arkansas introduced an amendment which if I read it correctly, would have the effect of reducing FCR,C funding by $27 million across the board. Yet the thrust of his argument centers on the activities carried out by these groups under contract to the Depait- ment of Defense in the social sciences and foreign affairs. I submit that this is dangerous because it uses the area of foreign policy and social sciences as the target, but, aims at all disciplines within the FCRC's with a shotgun or broadside effect. That is the great danger of generalizations. There is an additional perspective to this question that has received too little attention here in this debate. It is the straightforward proposition that it is vital to our Nation's safety that the planners in the Department of Defense be aware of the far-reaching and serious military consequences of changes in for- eign governments. Certainly, no one in the Department of Defense nor in the FCRC's has any wish to interfere with the prerogatives of the State Depart- ment and from my conversations with them and my study of their work I can say with certainty they want no part of it. Yet, military implications of foreign governmental change do exist?they are real. Mr. President, it would be folly to ignore them with possible serious mis- calculations the result. It has been pre- viously demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Congress that the very best way to analyze such situations is via the exper- tise offered by the FCRC's and, while regrettable, we must see today's world as it is and not as we wish it to be. Thus, we have an obligation to our own safety and security to have the advantage of just this kind of analytical review. Perhaps, what the Senator is really saying is that these centers represent the military-industrial-scientific-educa- tional complex which he so greatly de- plores. We have heard much of this com- plex?I prefer the words "American team"?of late and we would do well to remember the gist of the thoughts of our Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved F&Mengs014/Ali/iikyythDPWItpkyk4R000300100001-3 August 1.2, 1969 beloved Gen. Douglas MacArthur who, as a part of his legacy, told us that the one great reliable strength of our Nation as it maintained its place in the world is our industry-military team which was and is called upon for our security every day of our lives. Certainly, by now it is not necessary to once again remind this body that retiring President Eisenhower actually pointed to this team with pride. Furthermore, those who are so con- cerned about this team would do well to remember that the Federal.Contract Re- search Centers do in fact serve as a buffer or governor on both the military and the prWate sector. They do not make a product. They pay no dividend" other than to the taxpayer.. The important safeguard which exists here is simple: Both military and industrial security in these installations are operated by the Department of Defense and because the Secretary has confidence in the FCRC's they are able to gather together all the very best proprietary data, gleaning and coordinating all the best information while protecting it from piracy, but of- fering it as an asset to our security. Nonetheless, we are told here that this amendment will reduce the authorization for the Federal Contract Research Cen- ters by $27 million because the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations S 9747 executives in enterprises such as the They will go up the street to large pri- major management consulting firms and vats industrial concerns like TRW, research organizations, both profitmak- Hughes, North American Rockwell, or ing and nonprofit. Many of these organi- Lockheed. zations do Government contract work, Surely, the distinguished Senator from and compensation in excess of $45,000 is Arkansas is well aware of the fees and common in most of these posts. Even in salaries that ability and a good rec- the case of university professors, there ord can draw. The Senator from Arkan- are a substantial number of senior peo- sas, being the great lawyer he is, has re- pie whose activities, including consulting, ceived in his lifetime career special fees bring them incomes in the $50,000 to because of his expertise and knowledge of $60,000 range. Again, much of this con- the law. suiting is paid for from Government con- Mr. President, I believe there is an- tract funds, including Department of De- other important factor worthy of our fense funds. profitmaking enterprises consideration today which applies to normally provide additional incentives, bath amendments. I refer to the social such as stock options, not available in and economic problems that loom so nonprofit organizations such as the large in America now. It is acknowledged FCRCs, and universities provide other that the most competent and successful fringe benefits in many cases. organizations created for the purpose In the case of most of the FCRC's, the of solving problems are those currently boards of trustees set the salaries of the engaged in defense and space work. They top personnel. These trustee constitute have developed a whole new concept an impressive roster of public-spirited called systems management. Lately a citizens, including leading public figures, new term has come into common use: I ex-public servants, university presidents refer to "civil systems" which simply and industrial executives. These men are means the application of the systems acutely conscious of their policy respon- management or systems engineering ap- sibilities and of the public interest nature preach to those enormous problems of the organizations. They are well able which face us from within. The great to judge the performance and quality of organizations we have created to solve the persons whose salaries they set. our defense problems since World War II These boards of trustees are keenly are in being?they are operating and in place. They could, in fact, be our most important national resource when we turn them to the problems of pollution, waste disposal, communications, crime, delinquency, transportation, urban re- newal, and the eradication of poverty, all of which are approaching crisis propor- tions as the distinguished Senator from Arkansas himself has often said. So far, Mr. President, the potentially most promising approach to the solution to these problems is through the appli- cation of systems management or the systems approach or civil systems, if you will, by our great concerns in the aero- space industry of which the Federal Contract Research Centers are such a vital part. It may well be that other de- partments of the Government will want to use the abilities of these centers to- ward the ends I have just outlined?and this Senator believes they should. It may also well be that the Department of State could profitably use their services, since is concerned about their work in e aware of the need to attract and to hold social sciences. Again we have the gen- individuals of the highest caliber in the eralization which is akin to the old top management position of the FCRC's apples and oranges?which is akin to if these organizations are to be able to lumping all the animal world together continue their effective performance in and saying all must wear horseshoes or? the national interest. The responsibilities In this case?all will have their rations are great; much of the work is pioneer- cut since there is a problem with horse- ing and its quality is extremely impor- shoes. Mr. President, what we are asked tent. Management judgment and talent to do here is to consider the social sci- is an absolute essential. For all of these ences, condemn the work the FCRC's are reasons a limitation such as the one doing in the social sciences, lump the proposed appears inappropriate and in social sciences together with architect fact harmful. engineering, weapons analysis, systems The present language, left as is, sug- management, and cut back on the whole gests that in the absence of Presiden- works. tial approval, some 20 officials of the Mr. President, I have the privilege of FCRC's would have to take a cut in total serving on the Subcommittee on Re- compensation back to $45,000, or leave search and Development chaired by the their jobs, or the FCRC's affected would very able Senator from New Hampshire. have to cease doing business with the I can tell the Senate that under Senator Department of Defense. MCINTYRE'S leadership, the subcommit- Mr. President, I am reminded that t into the question of the Federal many years ago I was called before a Contract Research Centers very thor- committee of this very body to explain oughly. When the Subcommittee on Re- just why the late Clark Gable could draw we all know how many problems that search and Development reported to the a salary of $7,500 a week. Many on the Department has had over the past 8 full Armed Services Committee on its committee asked "What does he do?" years, and the Committee on Foreign Re- work, my friend the distinguished Sena- "How can he be werth $7,500 a week for lations would wish to consider appropiate tor from Virginia offered an amendment what he does?" My answer was that he funding. which is included in the bill and would doesn't do anything, but he has an ex- However, it is extremely important limit the salaries of FCRC technical and pertise?he is an actor of supreme ac- that these organizations, these going management personnel. I did not co- complishment and in free and open corn- concerns, not be impeded or reduced or sponsor that amendment for numerous petition he can earn this much money. discouraged here as we consider defense reasons, but, I certainly understand Clark Gable's name in lights over a Procurement. As a matter of fact, that and congratulate Senator BYRD for his theater sells tickets and offers an in- so-called military-industrial complex we motives in offering it. come to all involved as the result of free are supposed to be so concerned about However, we should remember that the trade. could, through these self-same FCRC's, complexity and national importance of I do not mean that there is detailed turn out to be the best friend our advo- the work of the FCRC's require highly commonality between the motion pie- cates of domestic priorities ever had. talented and competent management. ture business and the FCRC's. I do mean, The importance of independence and The competition for top people in this however, that these people about whose objectivity in these organizations is field of endeavor is considerable. The salaries we are so concerned are among paramount, and has long been recog- major FCRC's are managed by people the finest technical people we have and nized as such. The FCRC's are for the who would otherwise be serving as senior they are dedicated to their country and most part engaged in highly important professional executives in industry or in- programs. Should they become discour- and complex research on matters of dustrial laboratories, as university ad- aged, I can say for certain they will not great significance to military planning ministraters or senior professors, or as go into $40,000-a-year Government jobs. and national security policy. More re- Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9748 Approved For ReemedfiglIAOACV&I&)Fit7r1BOOS3E64 cently, because of the major contribu- tions of these organizations in the field of national security, it has been urged by many, including the Secretary of De- fense, that they apply their skills and experience to other impost tent national problems such as those of the environ- ment and the cities. A number of them are doing so, and this is becoming a sig- nificant portion of their. work. It would seem unwise and inappropriate to inhibit the application of this national resource to domestic problems by placing special restrictions on them in a military pro- curement bill. Mr. President, the distinguished and highly respected Director of Defense Re- search and Engineering, Dr. John S. Foster, stated in his recent testimony be- fore the Committee on Armed Services that? Second, we have reconsidered recently an issue which has been brought up from time to time for several years?whether or not these primarily Defense-sponsored organiza- tions should be permitted or even encouraged to apply selectively their specialized capa- bilities to major domestic problems such as transportation, urban redevelopment, hous- ing, and medical services. We have concluded that when an FCRC has capabilities suitable to a non-Defense client, ia should be Per- mitted, to undertake non-Defense work. In short, we believe that the DOD has developed in the FCRC's a "national resource" which should be used as national priorities dictate, consistent with our needs in the national security area. Thus I have begun discus- sions with other parts of the Federal Gov- ernment and with the FCRC's to introduce this concept of "selective diversification." I must add, however, that we do not intend to fund programs designed to solve domestic problems, nor do we intend to act as a per- manent "middle man" in administering any such programs. Similarly, we do not intend to reduce or dilute our DOD funding to FCRC's for national security work, nor do we expect the FMC's to reduce or delimit their contribution to defense needs. Mr. President, it is important to this bill that there be no further reduction in funds authorized for Federal Contract Research Centers. I hope I have made some small contribution to erasing some of the misunderstandings that exist where they are concerned. I have seen first hand the work they are doing and I know the capabilities of their people. I can report with confidence, as can many of my colleagues, that many of our most advanced, most significant, and o most successful new ideas for our security t begin at these centers. These Centers are vested ith the tre- mendous responsibility for sNatems man- t agement, long range planning and the solutions to tomorrow's problems. While I wish today's problems made it possible for me to join with the Senator from s Arkansas in his amendment, I believe the examples I have just cited are so corn- w pelling as to leave us with the clear re- r sponsibility to support the funding of w these Federal Contract Research Centers as one of our great hopes for the future. w I depart from my prepared remarks for ? f a moment to point out that during the committee hearings concern was ex- s pressed over salaries in the FCRC's. I eci attempted to explain the reason. When the Federal Contract Research Centers se were put together, it was of extreme ne- $ cessity that the very best and the very finest brains be obtained. The PRESIDING OrviCER. The time of the Senator has expired. Mr. MURPHY. May I have 1 additional minute? Mr. -McINTYRE. Mr. President, I yield 1 minute more to the Senator. Mr. MURPHY. I know from practical experience that many of these scientists and administrators are working in these projects at a cost to themselves. I know they could go down the street from Air Research, for instance, and be hired at Thompson-Ramo-Woolridge at higher salaries. I know they could walk down the street and be hired at Hughes Air- craft or Hughes Tool and be paid a higher salary. I also pointed out that to get the sec- ond-best brains would be a mistake, be- cause these are the men who conceive the ideas, who draw the expert analyses for the Air Force and other services, to proceed at the greatest savings, in the most practical way. Because of my knowledge of the per- formance of the Federal Contract Re- search Centers, notwithstanding that I dislike to be in opposition to the amend- ment of the Senator, I shall be forced to oppose it. Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from California. He has been a very helpful member of the Research and Development Subcommit- tee and particularly with respect to this matter. Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield me 10 seconds, I have been on that committee, and I know the chairman of the committee agrees with me that there is a real lack of knowledge of what happens in these centers. I know he agrees with me that, as soon as we have the time, he will accept the invita- tion to come to my State. There are two of these Federal Contract Research Cen- ters in my State that I think would be very good to visit. lam sure we would like to visit them and have a look at close range and ascertain what is being ac- complished and exactly how the pro- grams works. If we do that, I think we will have a greater understanding of what we are discussing I am extremely happy to be a member f the Senator's committee, where, for he first time I believe a great scrutiny t these matters is being had. Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, will he Senator yield me a few minutes on matter?flother Mr. FULl3RIGHT. First, may I respond to the remarks of the Senator from Mas- achusetts for a moment? The Senator from Massachusetts anted to conserve his own time, He was unning short of time. He submitted in riting a number of questions to me. Before I proceed to the questions, I ish to say that I have great sympathy or the attitude of the Senator from Mas- sachusetts, because there are many re- earch projects in the universities or ucational institutions of his State. It is my understanding that Massachu- tts Institute of Technology, with over 119 million last year, is the largest sin- R000300100001-3 ATE August 1,2, 1,969 gle educational institution on the payroll of the Defense Department. Harvard, of course, has a much smaller alloctaion, but it is substantial, over $2.5 million. The University off.Maseachusetts, under the Themis program, had a substantial amount, $720,000. Boston College had $440,000. However, on the other side, in my view, is the impact these research programs may have on the celleges and universities. What I am more interested in is the preservation of the integrity of our edu- cational institutions, whether they are in my State or in any other State. The first question the Senator from Massachusetts asked was: Would the Fulbright amendment affect the $4 mil- lion recommended to be transferred to the Department of State for foreign pol- icy research?which is in the report? It would not affect it. As far as I know, there is no evidence that the Department of State wants these programs, nor is there any evidence that the transfer of the projects are of projects which are worthwhile of themselves. My own guess is that it would be better that they be discontinued. In any case, there is no evidence it would affect it at all. The second question of the Senator is: The Fulbright amendment would impose a further $2 million, or one-third, cut in research by foreign universities and in- stitutions. Is the Senator aware that this area has already been reduced by 70 per- cent since fiscal year 1968? I am aware of that. I already congratulated the Senator from New Hampshire for reducing it, but we still have contracts in 44 different foreign countries. I have already given my reason why I think it is bad policy, and it ought to be reduced to a bare minimum, if not eliminated. It is possible that there may be some unique situations in which a program would be Justified, but I am quite con- fident there is no justification to have them in 44 countries. I air not sure our foreign policy can stand that much inter- vention by the Defense Department. It ought to be kept at a minimum. Besides, If there are some unique situations in which research and development would be justified, I would strongly recommend that it be sponsored by some other agency, the National Science Foundation, or the National Institutes of Health, or the Department of Commerce, some agency other than the military. Surely, it ought to be obvious now to all Americans that military intrusions is offensive to small countries, or to any country. Military intrusion is much dif- ferent from intrusion by cultural or other institutions, because people are suspi- cious of the military, as going to their own security. We always run Into that danger. Tourists can go abroad without harm. People can live in another coun- try. But when soldiers are stationed in another country, traditionally it has al- ways caused suspicion. So I think there is a great difference, because it arises from fears of our own country, and I do not think it is good for our relations. Mr. IVIcINTYRE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that point? Mr. FULI3RIGHT. I yield. Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 August R, /9610Proved FotaktmeRsNeNAL3qttre6RPSFRRWAR000300100001-3 S 9749 Mr. McINTYRE. One thing that plagues me is that if the State Depart- ment and the Foreign Relations Com- mittee of the Senate and its counterpart in the House, and the President of the United States have had something to do with setting the foreign policy of this country and setting out the goals and set- ting out the objectives, once those objec- tives are made clear, or at least scaled down to somewhere along the lines the distinguished Senator from Arkansas would like to see, I think it would be no trouble for the Department of Defense to scale back the activities the Senator complains about. But the State Depart- ment and the Senator's committee and the Administration set the pace, and the Department of Defense is only trying to carry it out. Mr. FULBRIGHT. The other day I discussed the purpose of our country in this field in connection with the posture statement. I only wish to say that I have strongly disapproved of our tendency to intervention, and I have done that pub- licly, beginning with our intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965. I thoroughly disapprove of the ease with which we accept the responsibility to intervene in another country's affairs and tell them what to do and tell them what kind of government they ought to have, and so forth. The Senator is aware of my disagreement with our policy. It is true that I am only one Senator, but the Foreign Relations Committee has gone through quite a change in its atti- tude toward that policy. The foreign policy I am really complaining about is that of the previous administration, led by Secretary Rusk in the State Depart- ment. I thoroughly disagree with his definition of the mission of the United States. This we have discussed. Now with a new administration and with new of- ficials in the administration, I had hoped we would begin to follow a different ap- proach. This amendment is a small segment or part of that approach of downgrading our intervention and intrusion into for- eign countries; to treat other countries more as equals, with greater respect, and, hopefully, to cultivate better relations with them. The foreign programs I am talking about are one little aspect of it. I am doing my best to change our policy. I am doing the best I know how to get out of Vietnam and change our policy. ? The hearing we had this morning is in connection with a situation which we are very fearful may become another Vietnam. All I can say to the Senator is that I am doing the best I can to change it. I have not been very -successful, but that is all I can do. Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield briefly? Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield. Mr. McINTYRE. I hope the Senator from Arkansas appreciates the position the Armed Services Committee, with this authorization bill, is in. Since the Sen- ator from Arkansas does not set the for- eign policy of the United States, and the State Department and the administra- tion do, he will find that we, as we try to answer the questions and try to help him in understanding this particular bill, more or less find ourselves in a bind be- tween the position of the State Depart- ment and the attitude of the distin- guished Senator from Arkansas toward the foreign policy of this country. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I do not know whether the State Department has really approved these projects or not. On my inquiry last year, the Bureau of the Budget was not aware of most of the projects and had not examined them. They do not examine Defense Depart- ment programs as they do other pro- grams. I think the participation of the State Department in the program of the De- partment of Defense, if at all, is perfunc- tory. Even this contingency planning agreement with Thailand is not in the custody?or-the State Department. I re- quested it from the State Department, and they came back with the letter which I put in the RECORD the other day, say- ing, "We regret we cannot give it to you, because the Secretary of Defense is re- luctant to allow it outside of his control," which meant, in effect, that here is an agreement between Thailand and the United States, and it is not even in the hands of the State Department. So we have a lot of difficulties in this area, and I am not at all sure the State Department is a very free agent when it comes to such matters. The one agency, and the only agency in the Government, in my opinion, that can ever exercise any degree of restraint upon the Defense De- partment is the Senate, because of its peculiar characteristics, in that we are more independent than anyone else in the Government. We have longer terms, and that is why we were given longer terms. We represent our States, and thus represent larger constituencies than Members of the House of Representa- tives. I shall not describe our system of government further, but I think the Sen- ate is the only agency that can possibly bring its influence to bear upon the mili- tary establishment. It will be seen that this is not wholly imaginary, when you look around the world and look at all the other major countries, wherever they may be. Most of them are dominated by their military establishments. We have got to assume that the United States and the American people are gifted with some very special qualities, if we are to be able to avoid the same fate. The Senator can look at Rus- sia, or at China, or where have you; Latin America, Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and so on. I shall not call the rolls, but most of them are largely under the in- fluence of the military. There is a reason for it. I do not know; perhaps in the long run it is better. I do not think so, with the present state of my information. I prefer to maintain the dominance of the civilian authorities; and our Constitution, I think, was in- tended to provide for that. The next question the Senator from Massachusetts asked me is as follows: Many of the examples of "questionable" studies cited by the Senator from Arkansas were contracted 3, 4 or 5 years ago. Since then, DOD research has been subjected to muoh closer scrutiny. Does the Senator have .any knowledge of current or projected studies which would substantiate his fears? I may say that the studies I cited were the most current that the Defense De- partment would provide; and I will say again, as I have said often, that it is not easy to get some information out of the Defense Department. We are engaged, at the moment, as I say, in a very serious contest with them over this agreement with Thailand. In this case, we have used, in our statement and in the in- sertion, the latest information that the Defense Department was willing to pro- vide. I do not have the power of subpena on the Secretary of Defense or the Com- mander in Chief, and I cannot make them give me what the committee wants. I simply provided the best information we could get from them. I think the Senator from New Hamp- shire will admit that it is not always easy to get, neatly and efficiently, anything you want out of the Defense Department. It is a huge bureaucracy of millions of people. The Joint Chiefs of Staff itself, I think, now constitutes some several thousand people. All I can say is that I got the latest information that was avail- able. I asked for the latest, and this is what we were given. The Senator next asks whether I have any views of universities regarding this amendment. No, I have not submitted it to univer- sities. I do have views of universities about the intrusion of the Defense De- partment into their activities. I have already talked about that at length. I have views as to the reactions of the students and professors as to the extent of the intrusion by both research proj- ects, ROTC, IDA, and what have you. The Senator's fifth question is as follows: The Senator from Arkansas has cited many "horrible examples." Does he have any in- formation as to what percentage of actual research programs this type of prOgram represents? No; I have no idea how to arrive at a percentage. The examples I put into the RECORD speak for themselves;Some peo- ple do not think they are horrible ex- amples. I do not think they are horrible; that is not the word I used. I think they are wholly inappropriate to the functions of the Department of Defense. Some of them would be defensible as activities of the National Institute of Health, the Na- tional Science Foundation, or the De- partments of Commerce or State, but they have no relation to Defense, and the only reason as far as I can see why they were sponsored by the Defense De- partment is that the Defense Department has no difficulty getting any amount of money it wants, for this or any other project. That is the situation we seek to correct. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent to have printed in RECORD a com- munication from the Department of De- fense entitled "Behavioral Sciences Proj- ects Proposed for Funding in Fiscal Year 1970," issued as of July 22, 1969. This re- quest is partially in response to the Sen- ator's questions; although the informa- Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For ItSeAMC:WIRT: amp BREIR6M00300100001-3ff S 9750 ust 42, 1269 tion is not very specific, it gives some idea of the present attitude of the Defense Department in this area. There being no objection, the state- ment was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES PROJECTS PROPOSED FOR -FUNDING IN FISCAL MAR 1970 ARPA behavioral science research can be understood Most accurately as level of effort support for technical areas of special im- portance to the Department of Defense. In- dividual contracts vary widely in level of support and in duration. Frequently a con- tract is funded over a three-to-five year pe- riod, and rarely for a longer period of time. The best estimate of future support is a line extension of present level of effort for a tech- nical area, recognizing that individual con- tracts will change according to research progress. RATIONALE FOR MAJOR PROGRAMS We are terminating almOst all ARPA Be- havioral Sciences research work outside the U.S. ARPA has reoriented is behavioral science research work into a, direction where there is broad agreement in the research and defense community that more promise ex- ists?the interdisciplinary combination of the computer and behavioral seiences in spe- cific problem areas. The objective is ta pre- duce results to Defense user organizations within five years. Initially, we have extended support to three basic programs to be con- ducted at universities where unique talent now exists. Simultaneously, we began's, man- agement inquiry to determine how to use an applied research organization to apply the results of the basic research to specific and immediate DOD operational problems. As the work progresses, and to the extent that the results of our management analysis warrant, we plan to phase down ARPA sponsorship of university participation in the three pro- grams. The first university program is the Cam- bridge Project which seeks_ te provide tools needed to determine trend and interaction ef- fects in complex DOD systems. System ex- amples include designing hardware for effec- tive human operation, training and educat- ing personnel, organizing manpower, and al- locating resources. We have more than enough data, but we lack tools to enable Us to extract patterns and raw inferences from them. The work takes advantage of existing ARPA-funded interactive ocenputing capabil- ity at MIT and will have Wide participation by MIT and Harvard scientists. This effort will be supported at approximately $2,400,000 yearly. The second university program, the Center for Computer-Based Behavioral Studies at UCLA, seeks to construct a theory and prac- tice of gaming in order to improve substan- tially its realism for training and prediction. As a good example, many vital Don missions require that DoD people know how to bargain and negotiate effectively with counterpart members of other nations; help is needed in the appropriate training of. military advisors, defense attaches, and staffs of alliance com- mands. Faced with analogous problems in labor relations, major schools of business ad- ministration and major corporationii have turned increasingly to gaming (i.e., simula- tions) for training and predict ion. This effort will be supported at approximately $1,000,000 yearly. The third university program, Quantitative Political Science, seeks to develop quantita- tive tools and unclassified data bases to im- prove our ability to predict national security needs. The work is accomplished at the uni- versity of Michigan, the University of Hawaii. the University of Southern California and Yale University. The data archive at the Uni- versity of Michigan will be managed by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research which currently distributes other types of social science data to faculty and students at 120 member universities. If suc- cessful, the tools would help us to distin- guish between likely and unlikely future con- flict situations. DoD must try to predict fu- ture security situations and needs in order to plan for logistics, force structure, strategy, and research and development. Faced with analogous needs, government departments responsible for the domestic economy turned more than thirty years ago to the develop- ment of quantitative predictive tools and supporting data bases. DoD has made only fragmentary use to date of quantitative po- litical science for conflict and sociology. How- ever, even these limited efforts have been use- ful to JCS, DIA, and Service officials. The basic university work in building the tools will all be unclassified and the regults freely available. The later applications of the tools to operational DoD problems will probably be carried out elsewhere. This effort will be sup- ported at approximately $850,000 yearly. In addition, ARPA intends during FY 70 to support research in the following areas: Teaching and Learning?The Department of Defense must maintain a vigorous and broad set of education and training activities for its personnel. As external threats become more complex. U.S. personnel increasingly re- quire improved training to perform their jobs. Much of the new techrtolgy developed for other military purposes can also be applied to more effective training and education sys- tems. ARPA sponsored research in computer assisted instruction has resulted in prototype systems which permit the instructor to man- age teaching aids and resources with greater flexibility. These systems also promise to cut costs substantially under the terms of the instructional funds required for each student contact hour. The flexibility and economy of these systems will permit progress in de- veloping techniques and methods of instruc- tion which-are most effective with students whose learning styles and abilities vary widely. Further research is concerned with the constraints imposed by different classes of subject matter and modes of presentation. Support during FY 70 will be approximately $185,000. During FY 70 specific contracts will be funded at Bolt, Beranek and Newman, and the University of Texas. Human Performance?The attributes and evaluation of individual and group perform- ance is fundamental to the operations of the Department of Defense. AR.PA's research in this area is primarily concerned with estab- lishing rules to assess the relationship be- tween human capabilities to perform mili- tary jobs and basic abilities suoh as signal detection, memory, information processing and perception. Support during FY 70 will be approximately $360,000. During FY 70 specific contracts will be funded at the Uni- versity of Michigan and the University of Oregon. Human Communication?This research area is concerned with principles of human communication as they affect coordination of effort in the execution of military tasks. This effort is and will continue to include work on competence to learn and use foreign lan- guages and second languages. The knowledge gained will then be used to develop and test educational materials to improve cross-cul- tural communication. Support during FY 70 Will be approximately $550,000. ORDER OF BUSINESS Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from South Dakota. Mr. McCrOVIeteN. Mr. President, in view of the limitation on time, I should like to speak very briefly on two unre- lated matters, the first having to do with the President's welfare message as it re- lates to our food assistance program, and, second, to make some remarks on the prisoner information policy of North Vietnam. DOES THE NIXON WELFARE PRO- POSAL WEAKEN lets; FOOD AS- SISTANCE PROGRAM? Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, with regard to the President's historic mes- sage on last Friday, which he trans- mitted in greater detail to Congress yes- terday, there is one matter of very grave concern to me, and that is the apparent intention of the administration, as out- lined in that message, to phase out time food assistance program for those Per- sons who choope to participate under the newly proposed family assistance program. Mr. President, I have no objection-- in fact I rather welcome it?to the re- placement of some of our plethora of welfare programs with an income main- tenance program as suggested by the President. But if in fact the adminis- tration proposes to offer a family of four a maximum of $1,600 in cash, and then tell the family that chooses that option that they are exCluded from the food stamp program, it will be, in effect, de- creasing very substantially the amount of aid now being received by millions of Americans. My preliminary estimates lead me to believe that if this exclusion policy goes into effect, and we deny food assistance to those families who choose the income maintenance program sug- gested by the President, in 44 out of the 50 States we would actually lose, for many millions of people, the amount of assistance they are now receiving under a combination of food stamps or com- modity assistance plus the welfare pay- ments they now receive. Mr. President, it is a fact that it re- quires almost all Of the $1,600 that the President has suggested for income maintenance to provide a family of four with an adequate diet. So it is my in- tention as the chairman of the Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs that has been looking into the problem of hunger and malnutrition in the United States to call administration witnesses before our committee at a very early date to clarify the matter. I hope very sincerely that the Presi- dent will press his proposal for an in- come maintenance program, but that he will not press it to the inclusion of the food stamp program. We must do either one or two things. We must permit both of the programs to operate simultaneously or else we will have a very substantial increase in the income maintenance figure suggested by the President. Mr. President, last May, President Nixon pledged that his administration would put an end to hunger in America for all time. He then moved swiftv to accomplish this goal by sending to Con- gress a plan to expand and improve the food stamp program. In his historic welfare message of last Friday, the President added to his ear- lier pledge by Proposing a family as- Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 August 12, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE Three-stage deeentraNzation of administra- tive responsibilities First, State administration of 25 percent of apportioned funds when it designates a "lead agency" and develops comprehensive manpower planning capability and an ap- proved manpower plan; second, State admin- istration of 68% percent of the funds when it establishes (1) a Comprehensive Man- power Agency to operate the unified pro- grams in accordance with an approved plan, (2) a State manpower planning organization to coordinate all manpower related programs, and (3) arrangements to designate Mayors as area prime sponsors; and third, State con- trol of 100 percent of its apportioned funds when the State meets objective standards of exemplary performance in planning and carrying out its manpower service system. Allowances and wages The basic allowance to individuals enrolled in a manpower training program will be based on the average weekly wage In em- ployment covered by the State's unemploy- ment compensation law. In FY 1971 the basic allowance will be 40 percent of such average weekly wage, in FY 1972-45 percent and in FY 1973 and there- after-50 percent. Trainees with family re- sponsibilities will be allowed an additional $5 per week for each dependent, up to six de- pendents. In lieu of such allowances, public assistance recipients will receive an incentive and expense allowance of $30 per month in addition to their welfare payments during training. A completion bonus equal to twice the individual's weekly allowance, will be paid upon the successful completion of an au- thorized training course of 15 Weeks or more duration. Workers employed in "work experience" pro- grams will be paid wages at rates no lower than the lowest rate prescribed in the Fair Labor Standards Act. Workers undertaking employer compensated on-the-job training will be compensated at the higher of the applicable minimum wage rate or the pre- vailing wage rate for similar work in the locality. State apportionment of funds The Secretary of Labor would apportion at least 75 percent of the funds aPpropriated to carry out the Act (except its Job Corps, Job Bank and extended appropriation pro- visions) each year among the States in accordance with criteria which he would pub- lish. Metropolitan areas within States (Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas, or other designated areas) would be guaranteed apportionment of an amount in proportion to the numbers of persons in the labor force and number of disadvantaged indi- viduals residing in the area compared with the State total of such persons. Federal funds apportioned to the States under the regular program would be available to pay 90 percent of program costs. Incentive apportionment An amount equal to 5 percent of the funds appropriated will be available for supple- mental apportionments to States and areas which meet the exemplary performance standards. The Federal Government will con- tribute $2 for every dollar of available State funds. Federal program authority The remaining 20 percent of the funds will be available for expenditure directly by the Secretary to carry out the purposes of the Act. The Federal Government would be au- thorized to arrange directly for all or a por- tion of the operation of program activities when a State failed to assure its responsi- bilities under the Manpower Training Act or when it was only in partial compliance with provisions of the Manpower Training Act. In addition, such programs could be con- ducted directly with funds not apportioned to the States, in conducting research and demonstration programs under title III, the Secretary of Labor will consult fully with in- terested Federal agencies (including the Civil Service Commission with regard to the effect of the programs on the Federal service). Manpower training as an economic stabilizer In any fiscal year in which the national unemployment rate reaches 4.5 percent for three consecutive months, the Secretary of Labor could spend additional funds on au- thorized programs equal to 10 percent of the amount then appropriated under the Act for that year. When unemployment drops help* the trigger level, remaining unobligated funds will no longer be available. Computerized Job Bank A National Computerized Job Bank would be established in each State, or on a regional basis where sparsely populated States can be grouped together, to facilitate the placement of persons in employment for which they are qualified. The Bank would be operated with- in each State by the State Employment Beier.. ice. The Secretary would operate the interstate phase of the Bank's operation, col- lecting information from each State and making it available to all States. Information regarding both job applicants and joir orders would be processed through the system. To the extent that Federal agency vacancy in- formation may be required, the Secretary will consult fully with the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission in developing any reporting requirements. Federal vacancies will be filled in accordance with laws and regulations which apply to Federal employment. Advisory bodies The National Manpower Advisory Com- mittee will be continued. A new Intergovernmental Advisory Coun- cil on Manpower will be established_ It will be composed of representative Governors, Mayors, and other elected local officials, and will advise the Secretary on the Federal- State-local partnership established to admin- ister manpower programs. Other acts affected The Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 and Title V of the Economic Opportunity Act are repealed and replaced by the manpower services provisions of this Act. The provisions of Title of the Econornie Opportunity Act are also replaced by the manpower services provisions of this Act. A new Title I-B of the Economic Opportunity Act authorizes the Office of Economic Oppor- tunity to undertake experimental programs in the employment and employment-related problems of the poor. Title I-A of the Eco- nomic Opportunity Act (Jab Corps) is trans- ferred to the Manpower Training Act, and administration is placed directly in the Sec- retary of Labor. ze6/14 AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA- TIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MISSILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RESERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH The Senate resumed the considera- tion of the bill (S. 2546) to authorize ap- propriations during the fiscal year 1970 ler procurement of aircraft, missiles, na- val vessels, and tracked combat vehicles and to authorize the construction of test facilities at Kawajalein Missile Range, and to prescribe the authorized person- nel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes. S 9767 Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the amend- ment. The yeas and nays were ordered. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I yield myself two and a half minutes. 'Mr. President, I should like to sum UP the situation with which we are con- fronted in connection with the Fulbright amendment. The first thing I Wish to make clear to the Senate is that the Armed Services Committee already has cut research, de- velopment, test, and evaluation by over a billion dollars. The cut suggested by Senator Fulbright amounts to close to $46 million, in an area in which we al- ready have cut $50 million, of which $40 million will be falling on the same pro- grams about which the Senator from Arkansas is complaining so strongly. The committee has had the best of staff work, excellent staff work. This year, the chairman set up the R. & D. Subcommittee, and a hard and close scrutiny was conducted into these areas of the budget. Sometimes when we approach a prob- lem and try to cut in and reduce the expenditures, we suddenly become aware that if we cut too deeply, go a little too far, we may be doing more harm than good and may nullify any good that has been done. In 1970, we have been able to reduce this budget. We feel very strongly that when Senator FULBRIGHT suggests that some of these small programs be cut by 58 percent, by 36 percent, by 33 percent, he is in effect reducing these programs more than he should. So when we con- sider our own cuts, which have measured anywhere from 10 to 12 percent on these programs, it seems that it is piling on too much and that, in the interest of good budgeting and forward-looking work for the research and development and in the area of military research, the amend- ment of the Senator from Arkansas should be defeated, and defeated soundly. Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield myself 3 minutes. Mr. President, there is over $400 mil- lion for basic research or nonmission research, in the $7 billion research au- thorization for the Department of De- fense. I am proposing the following: to cut $45 million overall. It will reduce the funds for the so-called think tanks by 10 percent, or $27 million, which is much the largest item. There are 16 of these re- search centers called think tanks. It will reduce the research in foreign institutions by $2 million, which is one- third, which is the point the Senator meant. I think it should be cut out. It will cut behavioral and social research performed in other places by $3 million. An example of that is the Hudson Institute. It will hold the line on new starts under Project Themis by cutting the budget re- quest by $8 million. It will reduce the counterinsurgency research, Project Agile, by $5 million. All this amounts to $45 million. All I can say is that I apologize to the Senate for being so timid that I did not propose three or four times this amount, because Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9768 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE several of these programs should never have been started and should be stopped. The only excuse I can give for not pro- posing $145 million or $200 million is that, out of deference to the Senator from New Hampshire?he has made a good beginning?I thought I had better be as modest as I could and hope to get something beyond what he has done. He has done a good job, but not good enough, because a number of these projects should be discontinued. They are inap- propriate for the Defense Department. It does not necessarily mean that all of them are inappropriate for other agen- cies, but they are not related to the mis- sion of the Department of Defense. It is not a question of redefining the Depart- ment of Defense mission in this case. It Is in other areas that we discussed the other day, particularly in the field of hardware, but not in these research proi- ects, especially in foreign universities, in the behavioral sciences. I hope the Senate will continue to take the attitude that from now on we are going to subject the Department of De- fense appropriations or authorizations to the same kind of scriatiny which is given to other departments of the Gov- ernment. I may say that $45 million in any other department of the Govern- ment would not seem like a pittance. I agree that in this agency it seems very small. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired. Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am proud that the Senator from Oregon has cosponsored this amendment with me. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, a par- liamentary inquiry. The PRESIDING OnsiCER. The Sen- ator will state it. Mr. STENNIS. What is_ the situation as to time? The PRESIDING OrkiCER. Each side has 3 minutes remaining. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I will be pleased to yield to the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services the remainder of my time. Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator for his generosity. Mr. President, nothing has been gone over more carefully by a well-informed subcommittee, unusually well staffed, than the items about which we have been talking. That subcommittee recom- mended a 12-percent reduction in these items. That reduction was -adopted and brought here before the Senate. It is about $40 million. The amendment of the Senator from Arkansas would reduce the amount around $45 million more in those same categories. A great deal a what the Senator is talking about here is in the 1968 budget, or at least a part of it. A great deal of his criticism is that these items should be in some other depart- ments of Government. We state in our report that some of theist should be transferred to the Department of State. I suggested yesterday that the Senator pick out some of them and give them to the committee. We thought it was too late in fiscal year 1970 to dump them out in the waste basket without anyone having jurisdiction over them. There- fore, we dealt with the situation as best we could. In this group I am fully satisfied that the subcommittee intelligently and diligently made an effort to get a firm recommendation for the Senate. I hope the Senate takes the recommendation seriously and approves the work of the subcommittee with this understanding. We are sending a letter to the Depart- ment of Defense and any other depart- ment involved that all of these items are to be looked over and divided up and sent to us the next time so that they will come to us in more detailed form. Mr. Y017NG of North Dakota. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. STENNIS. I yield. Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr. President, I wish to point out to the Senator that the Committee on Appro- priations will also be making cuts. Mr. STENNIS. Yes. Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. In the past the argument was usually made for the foreign aid authorization pro- gram that it could be cut later and it usually was by the Appropriations Com- mittee. This is not the last committee that will review the matter. Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator. Any information we have will be passed on. Mr. FLTLBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. STENNIS. I yield. Mr. FULBRIGHT. What the Senator from North Dakota has said about for- eign aid certainly does not apply to the Military Establishment and never has over the years. Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. We rarely appropriate as much as the au- thorization provides. Our committee cut $1.5 billion last year over even the House action. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Is the Senator say- ing the percentage of the cut on the Military Establishment has been com- parable to that on foreign aid by the Committee on Appropriations? Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Yes, it is for other than military personnel costs. Mr. FULBRIGHT. I cannot remember that ever having been true. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, there is one additional point. I know the Senators are busy, and I am also busy and I am not able to be in the Chamber as much as I would like to. However, it is tragic to me to see all the work that has been done by this subcommittee slashed to pieces when during the fine debate on both sides attendance was limited to three or four Senators. Many Senators have not heard the real facts. I thank the Senator for yielding. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me for 1 minute? Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield all my time to the Senator from Mississippi. Mr. STENNIS. I yield. August n; 1969 " Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, the thing that is confusing and puling in this matter is that it has been admitted that there are some research programs included here that are not connected with defense. For the life of me, I cannot understand in view of this fact how a cut of $45 million is going to peopardize the country. I am going to vote for the cut. Ur. STENNIS. There is no mention of unworthy items in here. Mr. BYRD of Virginia subsequently said: Mr. President, as a member of the Subcommittee on Research and Develop- ment of the Committee on Armed Serv- ices, I supported a reduction of more than a billion dollars in the funds re- quested by the Department of Defense for research and development. As a mem- ber of that subcommittee and as a mem- ber of the Armed Services Committee, I supported a reduction of 12 percent in funds requested by the Department of Defense for research and development. Some feel that these cuts were too heavy; others feel that perhaps some additional reductions might be made. I am a little inclined to the latter view. I am a little inclined to think that perhaps we could further reduce, in a small way, the re- maining funds. But the majority of the committee felt that a 12 percent reduc- tion at this time is as far as we should go. Most of the members felt that a bil- lion-dollar reduction in these funds is as far as we should go at the present time. So, Mr. President, on the matter of funds for the Department of Defense, I feel that there can be and should be reductions in the amount requested; and I feel that the Armed Services Committee has taken an important step in this re- gard when it has recommended to the Senate that the requested funds for re- search and development be reduced by $1 billion, or 12 percent. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. PACK WOOD in the chair). All time has ex- pired. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Arkan- sas (Mr. Futsarear). In this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll. The bill clerk called the roll. Mr. KENNEDY. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Goat) is absent on official business. I also announce that the Senator from Nevada (Mr. BIBLE) , the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. EASTLAND) , the Senator from Utah (Mr. Moss), and the Senator from Texas (Mr. YARBOROUGH) are nec- essarily absent. I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Utah (Mr. Moss), and the Senator from Texas (Mr. YARBOROUGH) would each vote "yea." Mr. SCOTT. I announce that the Sen- ator from Ohio (Mr. SAXBE) IS necessarily absent and, if present and voting, would vote "yea." The Senator from Illinois (Mr. Peacv) is detained on official business and, if present and voting, would vote "yea." The result was announced?yeas 49. nays 44, as follows: Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 August 12, 1.969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE Aiken Bayh Boggs Burdick Byrd, W. Vs. Case Church Cook Cooper Cranston Dole Eagleton Ellender Fulbright Goodell _ Gravel Griffin Allen Allott Anderson Baker Bellmon Bennett Brooke Byrd, Va. Cannon Cotton Curtis Dirksen. Dodd Dominick Ervin Bible Eastland Gore [No. 79 Leg.] YEAS-49 Harris Hart Hartke Hatfield Hughes Inouye Javits Kennedy Mansfield Mathias McCarthy McGee McGovern Metcalf Mondale Nelson Packwood NAYS 14 Fannin Fong Goldwater Gurney Hansen Holland Hollings Hruska Jackson Jordan, N.C. Jordan, Idaho Long Magnuson McClellan McIntyre Pastore Pearson Pell Prouty Proxmire Randolph Ribicoff Schweiker Scott Spong Symington Tydings Williams, N.J. Williams, Del. Young, Ohio Mfllet Montoya Mundt Murphy Muskie Russell Smith Sparkman Stennis Stevens Talmadge Thurmond Tower Young, N. Dak. NOT VOTING-7 Moss Yarborough Percy Saxbe So Mr. FULBRIGHT'S amendment was agreed to. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I move - to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. AMENDMENT NO. 129 Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I call up my amendment (No. 129). The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment of the Senator from Arkan- sas will be stated. The legislative clerk read the amend- ment, as follows: On page 5, line 11, strike out the quota- tion marks and the word "Funds" and insert in lieu thereof the following: "Not to ex- ceed $3,000,000,000 of the funds". On page 5, line 17, strike out the words "the Secretary of Defense" and insert in lieu thereof the words "the President". Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator- from Washington (Mr. JAcxsoN) without losing my right to the floor. CONSTRUCTION, OPERATION, AND MAINTENANCE OF THE KENNE- WICK DIVISION EXTENSION, YAK- IMA PROJECT, WASHINGTON Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate a mes- sage from the House of Representatives on S. 742. The PRESIDING OFFICER laid be fore the Senate the amendment of te e House of Representatives to the bill, S. '742) to amend the act of June 12, 1948 (62 Stat. 382) , in order to provide fol- the construction, operation, and maintenance of the Kennewick division extension, Yakima project, Washington, and for other purposes, which was, on page 2, line 4, strike out "fifty-six-year", and insert "fifty-year". Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, the con- struction of the Yakima project was ini- tiated in 191)5. There are presently six operating divisions in the project. The Kennewick Division is the most recently constructed, having been authorized in 1948. S. 742 would authorize an extension to the Kennewick Division and would bring 6,300 acres of land under irrigation and provide wildlife and conservation benefits. When the Senate approved this bill last March, it was the fourth time the legis- lation had been passed by this body. The House of Representatives passed the leg- islation with minor amendments in June. However, at that time I received a com- munication from officials of the Yakima Indian Tribe expressing concern over whether this project, if approved and constructed, would jeopardize the water rights of the Yakima Tribe, and in addi- tion, whether the construction of this project in any way would adversely affect proposed Indian irrigation projects on the Yakima Reservation. I have discussed this matter with the Indians, and members of the staff of' the Committee on Interior and Insular Af- fairs have reviewed the questions raised by the Indians. In addition, the Secretary of the Interior and his staff have gone Into the issues very carefully to deter- mine if the Kennewick Extension would adversely affect the Indian projects or impair the water rights of the Indians in any way. By letter dated today, the Secretary of the Interior has assured me that hy drologically the authorization and s sequent construction of the Kenne ick extension would not affect adverse the water available to the tribe fo their projects. I quote from the 5 etary's letter: Further, in our view, the ? ? for, and desirability of, the three Indi: projects will not be affected by the Kenn- ick extension. These three projects must tend or fall on their own merits and ju ification. Finally, there is nothing in our .pinion, in the lan- guage of S. 742 or legislative history which we would cons e as adversely affect- ing the Indian inte is. We will, in the de- velopment of the , eject, make certain that any prior and s ? ?rior water rights of the tribe are fully .rotected and will require that these rig; be recognized explicitly in contracts en ed into pursuant to S. 742. ? Mr. Pr that the appear Th was as dent, I ask unanimous consent ull text of the Secretary's letter t this point in my remarks. e being no objection, the letter dered to be printed in the RECORD, 110WS: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, Washington, D.C., August 12, 1969. on. HENRY M. JACKSON, Chairman Committee on Interior and Insu- lar Affairs, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN': Your letter of June 4, 1969, enclosed for comment a telegram from Chairman Robert E. Jim of the Yakima Tribal Connell which expressed concern re- garding the effects of S. 742, a bill to au- thorize the Kennewick extension of the Yakima reclamation project in Washington, on Yakima Indian rights to the use of water for their reservation. The Department has received similar telegrams from Mr. Jim. S 9769 Since these telegrams were sent, the bill passed the House of Representatives with a ? minor difference?not in issue here?from the previously-passed Senate- version. The Kennewick project was authorized by the Act of June 12, 1948 (62 Stat. 382), which reserved capacity in the main canal for the future extension of irrigation to 7,000 acres of additional land. S. 712 would authorize this extension. Mr. Jim and the Yakima Tribe are con- cerned that this project will impair the water available to the tribe and lessen sub- stantially their chances of obtaining the nec- essary funding and authorization for three irrigation projects which they consider ex- tremely important to the economic develop- ment of the reservation. We can appreciate their concern and, for this reason, we met with them within the last few days in order to obtain a more complete un of their position on the legis try to alleviate their concern extent possible. ts fully the water avail Wapato Sates unit, t project which appropriation project. We The on th erstanding Ion and to the greatest The irrigation projects eh the Yakima Indians wish to cons in order to utilize to them are: the Satus Creek project, and the Toppenish eek project. The Wapato un Is an authorized Indian Id irrigate an estimated 5,000 acres at oat of about $500,000. No as been requested for this aye, however, agreed to revievi the props? far the purpose of considering such a r eat in the near future. er two projects would be located atus and Toppeniah Greeks, respec- tivel Authorization for these projects has not ? ? een requested by the Department to . We will review these projects and pro- e you with more information on them soon as possible, We have advised Mr. Jim and the tribe that the Department does not want to prej- udice their ability to gain approval at all or some of these projects in the near future, nor do we want to do anything that would Impair or infringe on their rights to water for all of these projects. We are satisfied, based on information fur- nished by the Bureau of Reclamation, that hydrologically the authorization and subse- quent construction of the Kennewick exten- sion would not affect adversely the water available to the tribe for the above projects. The project is not dependent on water from the Yakima Reservation. Further, in our view, the need for, and desirability of, the three Indian projects will not be affected by the Kennewick extension. These three pro- jects must stand or fall on their own merits' and justification. Finally, there is nothing in our opinion, in the language of S. 742 or its legislative history which we would con- strue as adversely affecting the Indian in- terests. We will, in the development of the project, make certain that any prior and su- perior water rights of the tribe are fully protected and will require that these rights be recognized explicitly in contracts entered into pursuant to S. 742. We hope that the expression of the De- partment's views herein will help to remove the deep concern expressed by the tribe and result in final passage of S. 742 as quickly as possible. It should be noted that the tribe has indi- cated that their concern is caused partially by some statements made by the Depart- ment on the project a few years ago. If you find any such statements in the record of this legislation which may have contributed to the concern of the tribe, we will be glad to clarify them. Sincerely yours, WALTER J. HICKLE, Secretary of the Interior. ? ? Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71B00364R0003001Q0001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9770 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 12, 1969 Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, in view agencies. It was the Office of Naval Re- peculiar jurisdiction of the Department of the assurances provided by the Secre- search that stepped into the vacuum left of Defense for basic research. The chair- tary of the Interior, I move that the by the wartime Office of Scientific Re- man, the Selaator from Arkansas (Mr. Senate concur in the amenoment of the search and Development to continue FULBRIGHT) said to him: House. Federal funding of research at our lead- It would seem that the National Science The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ing universities. The ONR, the Army, and Foundation, NM, or the AEC should have al- question is on agreeing to the motion of the Air Force all helped sustain the pace most exclusive jurisdiction to do basic re- the Senator from Wasingtoia, of postwar research and to build up the search as distinguished from applied re- search. Do you agree with that? The motion was 45,te41 immense national resource now repre- sented by our trained scientists and en- This is what the- admiral replied: gineers, by our laboratories, by the dis- I think the problem you have here is AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA- tinguished science faculties of many that the Department of Defense is able to TIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR public and private universities. This mil- get large funds for doing basic research while MILITARY PROCUREM ISNT, RE- oposesib had a le for discussion other itary support for research was in the this inotG?wveith rpineut SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND national interest during the decade that agencies I ee- FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MIS- saw the creation of the research retary of Defense McElroy on that subject, pro- SILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJA- and this- is the point he made. He said it grams of the National Institutes . of LEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RE- is important that basic research be done in Health, the Atomic Energy Commission, the United States. As I remember his words, SERVE COMPONENTSTRENGTH and the National Science Foundation he said it was not too important that the The Senate resumed the consideration Now the situation has changed. Defense Department do it, but that the work, of the bill (S. 2546) to authorize appro- There exists today a whole panoply of should be done, and since the Defense De- priations during the fiscal year 1970 for Federal departments and agencies each partment has the funds to pay for the work procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval with responsibilities for the funding of it is therefore being done by them. vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and research. The Bureau of the Budget in The ready accessibility of Defense research, development, test, and evalua- its special analysis Q for the fiscal year funds for research has kept the Defense tion for the Armed Forces, and to au- 1970 budget lists 14 separate departments Department in the role of a principal thorize the construction of test facilities and agencies with such responsibilities sponsor or patron. This then is the is- at Kwajalein Missile Range, and to pre- Their estimated obligations range from sue: Should our research scientists and scribe the authorized personnel strength $1.491 billion for NASA down to $7 mil- engineers continue to look to the defense of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve lion for the Department of Justice. The agencies for $1.3 billion out of a total component of the Armed Forces, and for range of their interests sweeps across the estimate of $5.2 billion of Federal obliga- other purposes of the life and physical sciences tion for research? Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, may and is beginning to extend to the social This is the issue that has attracted the I say that the next 2 amendments should sciences. They represent an existing attention of many college students and not require over 5 minutes' discussion, mechanism for civil agencies to assume contributed to campus unreSt. I hope Members of the Senate will re- more responsibility for the overall fund- Consider the recent first report of the main on the floor. ing of research so that the military can MIT Review Panel on Special Laboras I yield, without losing my i laid to the concentrate upon its proper functions tories, issued last May 31. Here the re- floor, to the majority leader, and responsibilities, view panel clearly expresses its concern Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. President, the What is our present situation? with heavy emphasis on defense-related Fanbright amendment which was just Yesterday, Senator PROXMIRE inserted research. It said; a - adopted by the Senate is in my opinion into the RECORD nine tables beginning at We find today a heavy emphasis on fie- of a most significant nature. It should Page 59629. Examination of these tables fense-related research and d,evelopment in have far reaching effects on realining shows how much our research has come the country at large, an emphasis which de- the Federal sponsorship of research at to depend upon the Defense agencies, tracts from similar efforts aimed at other all sources but especially at our academic Particularly basic research of the kind urgent needs of society. Although the em- institutions, I am particularly pleased that should be sponsored by civil agen- phasis on defense work cameabout a . response to perceived national needs, it has with the adoption of that part of the (tICS, especially by the National Science hampered the nation's ability to cope with amendment adding a new section 205. Foundation. If we look at table III, we the problems of the oontemporary world That new section should go a long way see that the Defense Department for As far as M.I.T. Is concerned, the nation's toward obtaining the needed readjust- the fiscal years 1966 to 1969 has funded emphasis on defense produces a bias toward ment of sponsorship, more research at colleges and imiversi- specific areas of research at the institute, I had prepared the following amend- ties than has the National Science Foun- and makes it more difficult to move in other ment in the event the Fulbright amend- dation. If we look at table IV, we see that directions. M.I.T. has a role to play in a t- ment were not successful: over these 3 fiscal years, the Defense tempting to redress this balance, not only Department in virtually every field of within itself but also at the national level. On page 3, line 25, insert the following new section: science is a major Federal sponsor and Many of you will recall the request "sm. 205. None of the funds authorized far outspends the NSF. Table V makes Made last year for current information to be appropriated by this Act may be used the case even stronger, for here the De- about ongoing research projects of Fed- to carry out any research project or study fense Department has been funding as oral departments and agencies. The re- unless such project or study has a direct and much or more basic research than the suiting 12 cartons have been men- apparent relationship to a specific military agency which Congress established for tioned many times in this Chamber. 1 function or operation." this very purpose; namely, the National must confess that trying to get an over- The amendment is identical with that Science Foundation. all grasp of this massive outpouring of part of the Fulbright amendment that What has happened is that research information has been no easy task, and I adds a new section 205. That section 205 has ridden on the coattail of military wonder, based on our experience, what is now apart of this bill, appropriations simply because that mon- mechanisms exist within the executive It should be emphasized again as the ey was easy to obtain, branch to grasp the whole of thess debate continues on this measure that Take basic research as a case in point, varied, diverse research programs. the vigorous give and take displayed which by definition cannot be closely, di- We have made two preliminary forays again today is not intended as an attack rectly and visibly linked to a given need into this massive collection of project upon the military. Rather it is serving or problem. If the linkage is direct and information. Taking one field of science, to raise and illuminate many important visible, then the work is probably applied chemistry, we counted 1,988 chemistry Issues, one of which is the extent the De- research, or engineering. A year ago last research projects reported by eight de- fense Department should fund research, April, the Senate Foreign Relations Com- partanents and agencies. Of these, the particularly research not directly and mittee held hearings on Department of top three agencies were DHEVV with 617 visibly linked to present and foreseeable Defense sponsored foreign affairs re- projects, NSF with 458, and DOD with military needs and responsibilities. messiah. At those hearings Admiral Rick- 392. The DOD projects represented costs The Nation's scientific community has over, who is given to calling a spade by of about $17.4 million for fiscal years a longstanding debt to the Defense Its Proper name, was asked about the 1987 and 1968. Of these, 124 Air Force Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP711300364R000300100001-3 "Augstst 12, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE projects were with universities and 1'7 with industry; 157 Army projects were with universities and one with industry; 21 Navy projects were with universities and five with industry. Taken together, of the 392 chemistry projects reported by DOD, 302 were in universities and educa- tional institutions, 23 were in industry, 53 were performed abroad, and 14 were with other kinds of organizations. These figures reveal how much re- search in chemistry has come to depend upon DOD funding. Turning to other fields of science, we looked at project information reported under the combined heading of be- havioral and socisd sciences. Here we find 280 DOD research projects reported representing obligations of $14.8 million for fiscal years 1967 and 1968 combined. Of these, 186 were going on at universi- ties: seven were funded by the Advanced Research Projects Agency; nine by the Army; 63 by the Air Force; and 107 by the Navy. Our initial screening identi- fied 11 subjects in which more than one Defense agency was sponsoring research; table I shows this information. Going further, an admittedly subjec- tive reading of these project titles for the behavioral and social sciences suggested that many could have been equally well funded by the National Science Founda- tion. In fact, of the 280 projects reported by DOD for behavioral and social sci- ences, as many as 212 representing obli- gations of $9.7 million out of a total of $14.8 million for fiscal years 1967 and 1968 combined, seemed appropriate for NSF and other civil agency support; table II gives the details. With the per- mission of the Senate, I would insert in the RECORD a list of the titles for Defense research projects reported in behavioral and social sciences that initial reading suggests are appropriate for funding by the National Science Foundation. The members can judge for themselves how directly and visibly related to de- fense needs are such research projects as "rate-controlled speech and mediat- ing variables in second-language learn- ing," funded by ARPA; or "the socio- economic aspects of command control in developing nations" by Army; or "organ pathology and prenatal-post- natal biochemical responses associated with early social-developmental rela- tionships" by the Air Force; or 'organi- zational, cultural and personal factors influencing work productivity" by the Navy. I cite these titles not to point a finger of ridicule, for we have no information as to the scientific quality of the work or the standing of the investigators. What I do intend is to question the relevance of subjects of these kinds to the military needs of the Nation, and to question why scientific research of this kind, if needed in the national interests, is not funded by other departments and agencies. Mr. President, this body can long de- bate the issue of Defense support for re- search that is more appropriate to other agencies without ever affecting what is going on. Debate can frame the issues, but only action can produce change. The change that national interests dictates is to relieve the military of its present funding of research not clearly, directly, and visibly linked to its responsibilities and functions. Whatever action we take will be painful, particularly if other members of this body who are concerned with funding of research by civil agen- cies under their jurisdiction are not persuaded to provide the funding so that DOD can transfer such work without dis- rupting too much of the ongoing re- search. Despite the pains of reductions, or ter- minations, or transitions, I propose that our national interests require us to act now and at least to begin the disengage- ment of Defense from funding of re- search not closely related to its needs. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent to have printed in the RECORD three tables which bear on this subject. S 9771 There being no objection, the tables were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: TABLE I.-RESEARCH SPONSORED BY MORE THAN 1 DEFENSE AGENCY Project Air Navy Force Army ARPA Learning foreign languages x x x Pattern recognition x x x Learning x x x Visual perception x x x Decisionmaking x x x Teaching complex material x x Effects of drugs on performance._ x x Behavior under stress x x Leadership x x Group interaction x x Memory x x TABLE II,-COMPARISON OF TOTAL NUMBER OF DEFENSE PROJECTS IN BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES FOR 1968 WITH THOSE POSSIBLY APPROPRIATE FOR SUPPORT BY THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION Number of projects Number of NSF type Fiscal year 1967 Funding for all behavioral and Per- social science cent research NSF type Fiscal year 1968 Funding for all behavioral and Per- social science cent research NSF Fur- typo cent ARPA 12 12 100 Army 22 18 81 Air Force 76 71 93 Navy 170 111 65 Total $611,683 849,045 1, 595, 000 5, 372, 000 280 212 75 8,427,728 PROJECTS IN THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL Scr- ENCES REPORTED BY THE DEFENSE DEPART- TN' 1968 THAT APPEAR APPROPRIATE FOR SUPPORT BY THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECT AGENCY Research on the psychological origins of revolution, fy '67, $39,000. Factors associated with cultural change in Middle Eastern countries, fy '68, $238,000. Research on behavior in international sys- tems, $0.1 Experimental study of the psychological processes involved in the use of language, $0. Handbook and casebook for practical eval- uators, fy '68, $32,000. Risk-taking and negotiation In leakier and delegate groups, fy '67, $36,483. On-line computer studies of bargaining behavior, fy '67, $216,000. Computer recognition of patterns of be- havior, fy '68, $89,775. The characteristics of incentive systems and their effect on individual behavior, fy '68, $95,000. Psychological processes of the central ner- vous system, fy '68, $200,000. Modes of organizing and presenting com- plex educational material fy '67, $110,800. Rate-controlled speech and mediating var- iables in second-language learning fy '67, $179,400. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY The relationship between subjective a,nd objective assessments of fatigue. fy '68, $7,850. The effects of psycho-active chemicals on cognitive social skills. fy '67, $10,688; fy '68, $1,840. Socio-economic aspects of command con- trol in developing nations. fy '67, $85,934; fy '68, $74,000. Temporal orientation and task perform- ance. fy '67, $19,528. Comparative studies of the central mech- anisms of sensory discrimation. fy '67, $24,912. Performance: vigilance-factors influencing I "$0" means a project is on-going in fy '67 and '68 but was previously funded. $611,603 100 1654, 775 $654, 775 100 744,673 87 343,825 340,242 99 1,554, 000 3,030, 000 97 56 1,020, 000 4, 440, 000 1,008,600 2, 824, 000 98 63 5,948,356 70 6, 456, 000 4, 827, 017 74 detection and monitoring. fy '67, $30,667; fy '68, $30,890. Effects of drugs on sensorimotor processes and mentation. fy '67, $32,586; fy '68, $30,321. Perceptual lag as a function of onset and offset visual stimulation. $0 either year. Stimulus factors in human timing be- havior. fy '67, $1,899; fy '68, $300. Remote detection of cortical unit spike dis- charge; is it possible? fy '67, $18,689. Sleep and dream research. fy '67, $28,063; fy '68, $22,500. Analysis of visual and pupillary function- ing. fy '67, $14,338. Basic studies of psycho-physic measure- ment theory applicable to human sensory processes. $0 either year. Adaptation to bodily rotation. fy '67, $16,436; fy '68, $1,791. Suppression and fusion in stereopsis. fy '67, $44,856. Development of a psychophysical photo quality measure. fy '67, $10,948. Interdisciplinary research iii learning con- trol systems and pattern recognition. fy '67, $341,500; fy '68, $170,750. Suppression and fusion in stereopsis. fy '67, $33,634. DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE An information system for an enclaved so- ciety. fy '68, $89,000. Military contribution to modernization- Middle East and North Africa. fy '67," $36,000. Decision making in situations of practical action. fy '67, $57,000. Persuasive communication in functional organizations. $0. Visual perception of movement. $0. - 'Research to improve language training/ Western Europe. fy '68, $49,000. Political development and moderization in Islamic countries-military planning, $0. Measurements of attitude and attitude change. $0. Ultrasonic determination of body compo- sition. fy '67, $28,000. An experimental study of the develop- ment of consensus. fy '67, $21,000. Studies of uncertainty, information search and decision-making. $0. Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9772 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE Theory and methods in the study of or- ganizational stress. fy '67, $112,000. A model for stimulus releva rice. $0. Performance and Wooten iical responses related to social changes veleus chemothera- py. fy '67, $38,000. Organ pathology and prenatal-postnatal biochemical responses asseciated with early social-developmental relatieleilliPs. $0. Spatial-temporal effects of high intensity point sources of light on the induction of apparent motion. fy '67, 821..000. Examination of short term :Ind long term memory processes/role of temporal lobe. fy '67, $16,000. Study of the narrative- review in pro- grammed instruction. $0. Human selective learning, fy eV, 318,000; fy '68, $20,000. Effects of physical and symbolic stressors on perceptual mechanistm.fy '67, $25,000. Social-cultural aspects of development. fy '67, $33,000. Emergent leaders in deeeleping nations. $0. Research in background imigery interpre- tation. fy '68, 316,000. Military implications of chnige: Commu- nist China. fy '67, $104,000. _ Predictive model for intra-geoup negotia- tion, fy '67, $26,000. Methodology for analysis_ re" internal so- cial movements. fy '67, $9,000. Innovation, social exch,ange and institu- tionalization. fy '67, $49,000. Measurement Of reactions to earees. fy '67, $33,000. Aerospace power and behavioral knowledge. fy '67, $105,000. Psycho-physiological measur ment of re- sponse to information overload et. complexity. fy '67, $68,000. Transfer of technology under military and related conditions-Japan and other coun- tries. $0. Social psychological aspects of stress. fy '67, $94,000. Rational models for strategic behavior. fy '67, $24,000. Movement, learning and behevior. fy '67, $30,000; fy '68, $36,000. Transformational and orgatite Lionel proc- esses in memory. fy '67, $14,000. Comparative study of nomad ive behavior among Japanese and American youth. fy '67, $34,000. Social-psyclaological factors in the devel- opment of new nations. $0. _ Influence of memory factors on sensory discrimination. fy '68, $15,000. Leadership, organizational effectiveness, and human resources. $0. The desire for group achievement: origins and effects. fy '68, $61,000. Operational description of behavioral laws, fy '67, $19,000. Cultural differences in task approach and optimal performance in a. trans. for task. fy '68, $400,000. Simulation studies of organiparional com- munication behavior under Stress. fy '67, $47,000; fy '68, $43,000. An analysis of group feedback effects. fir '67, 330,000. Allocation of resources in a multirnan- machine system simulation. fy '68, $40,000. Elementary processes In petite: n percep- tion. $0. Social mobility and professionel motiva- tion-application to Air Force manpower pool. fy '68, $11,000. Speech characteristics as indices of atti- tude, mood and motivational State. fy $47,000. Study of cognitive and affective attitudes. $0. Altered levels of consciousness and human performance. fy '67, $64,000. Psychophysiological baseline pattern an- alysis. fy '67, $83,000 fy '68, $32,000. Elite structure ancl elite tranaformation in totalitarian political systems. $0. Perception of dynamic stimuli, Sy '67, $38,000. The prediction of subject motivatibility in laboratory experimentation. fy '67, $29,000; fy '68, $19,000, A study in social science decision making. $0. Experimental study of the effects of sur- round brightness and size on visual perform- ance. fy '67, 079,600. Organization of information about human learning transfer and retention. fy '67, $25,000. Criteria for the design of new forms of organization. fy '67, $45,000; fy '68, $65,000. Remembering, forgetting and recovery of memory. fy '67, $30,000. Psycho-physical relations in perception of space, time and velocity. fy '67, $8,000. Executive decision making in organiza- tions under stress and crisis. fy '67, $47,000. Operational analysis of behavioral situa- tions, fy '67, $20,000. Political-idological systems and hostility patterns. $0. Movement and perceptual-motor perform- ance during atypical input conditions, $0. Individual differences in motor and verbal skills. fy '68, $62,000. Expectations of motivations related to power differences within groups. $0. Decisions and decision-makers: the effects of confidence, social risk and commitment fy '67, 329,000. Effects of supportive, close and punitive styles of supervision. fy '67, $5,000. Improvement of learning capabilities. fy '67, $87,000. A systematic investigation of contrast ef- fects related to vigilance tasks. fy '87, $17,000. Effects of task characteristics on perform- ance. fy '68, 350,000. T.T.S. DEPARTMENT OP THE NAVY Human engineering guide to equipment design and evaluation, fir '87, $15,000; fy $80,000. Experimental techniques for predicting performance of electronics personnel. fy '67, $20,000; fy '68, $37,000. Properties of visual displays and methods for evaluating the effectiveness of displays. fy '68, 320,000. Functional evaluation of electrolurnines- cent pictorial status displays. fy '67, $20,000. Psycho physiological problems of pilot pro- tection. fy '67, 340,000; fy '68, 330,000. An integrated system for measuring diver performance. fy '67, $26,000; fy '68, $50,000. Development of computer assisted instruc- tion procedures to aid in teaching complex concepts. fy '67, $70,000; fy '68, $70,000. Determination of the relationships be- tween the electrical activity of the human retina and the perception of form. fy '67, $15,000. The role of motivation in Naval leader- ship. fy '67, $57,000. Investigation of habit reversal techniques of potential use with Navy personnel. fy '67, $15,000; rY '68, $34,000i Image enhancement of Navy display sys- tems, fy '68, $11,000. Inducing cooperation between adversaries. fy '67, $41,000. Psycho physics mechanisms of atten- tion, memory, information processing and decision making, fy '67, $31,000; fy '68, $25,- 000, Dynamics of conflict and cooperation In small groups, teams, and crews. fy '67, 445,000. Speech as an indication of stress, $0. Recognition and discrimination of com- plex visual stimuli in continuous motion. fy '67, 355,000. Pattern recognition of EEG to determine level of alertness. fy '68, 346,000. New teehniquee for presenting human-en- August 12: 1969- gln.eering data to design engineering. fy '68, $20,000. Effect of cold water on divers. fy '67, $30,- 000; fy '68, 337,000. Systems analysis research on pilot land- ing performance. fy '67, 340,000; fy '68, $26,- 000, Development of techniques for using com- puters to administer and score psychologi- cal tests to Navy applicants. fy '67, $76,000; fy '68, $26,000. Computer-assisted instruction informa- tion exchange. fy '67, $47,000; fy '68, $56,000. Diver performance measures. fy '67, $30,- 000; fy '68 823,000. Machine augmentation of human strength and endurauee. fy '68, $400,000; fy 88, $167,- 000. Improving intelligibility of divers using helium-oxygen breathing mixtures, fy "68, $44,000. Comparison of different organizational structures in terms of crew effectiveness. fy '67 810,000. Psychological and physiological factors af- fecting team performance. fy '67 327,000. Effects of perceptual isolation on the hu- man Subject. fy '67 426,000; fy '68 $23,000. Inetractional strategies In computer as- sisted instruction. fy '67 357,000; fy '68 $71,- 000. _ Improving search and acquisition for tar- gets In peripheral vision. fy '67 $31,000; fy '68 $20,000. Computer classification of physiological responses in hazardous environments. fy '67 $34,000. Application of attitude change principles to equipment acceptance. fy '68 $39,000. Relationship between Navy vigilance tasks and body chemistry changes. fy '68 $40,000. The effects of persuasive communications on attitudes. fy '67 $38,000, Effects of drugs on stress and vigilance he- havior of Navy operators. fy '67 335.000. Drug enhancement ancement of performance on Na- val personnel under stress. fy '67 $22,000; fy ,68 322,o Electrical activity of human eye muscles under statin and dynamic viewing conditions. fy '67 316,000: fy '68 $16,000. Special methoris for resisting psychological warfare techniques. fy '67 $26,000; re '68 $65 Comparative study of electroencephal pat- terns. fy '68 $14,000._ Determination of the relationships among sensory and display interpretation factors in man-machine information transfer sit- uations. fy '67 $35,000; fy '68 335,000. Organizational, cultural and personal fac- tors influencing work productivity. fy '67 3131.000. Determination of the effects of high in- tensity light flashes on the eye and on visual perception. fy '67 $4,000; fy '68 $15,000. Survey of human factors and biotechnol- ogy research. fy '68 $22,000. Interaction of drugs with other factors determining human performance. $0. The measurement of stress and its rela- tionship to and effects on human perform- ance in mental and motor work. $0. Processing of information sequentially die- played by computer-driven cathode-ray tubes, fy '67 328,000. Work producing capabilities of underwater operators. fy '67 031,000; fy '68 330,000. Symposium on applied models of man- machine systems. fy '68 $4,000. Defining the conditions which control how well test material is learned and how long it is remembered. fy '67 $32,000. Row human beings acquire and evaluate Information in the process of Inu-kirg judg- inents and decisions. fy '88 $30,000. Military implications of modernization in the Far East. $0,. The study of leadership effectiveness in complex situations. fy 117 $15,000. Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000300100001-3 ? August 12, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-- SENATE S 9773 It is my further understanding that before the Senate concludes its business tonight, the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE) will lay down his amendment on the C5-A; that we will come in at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning; that the Senator from Wis- consin and other Senators will lay the foundation for the amendment. The amendment, however, would not be voted on tomorrow, but would be the pending business when the Senate re- turned on September 3. It is a very im- portant amendment, and it is hoped that a full attendance will be in the Senate at that time. In other words, to those of you who are interested in attending the state dinner at Los Angeles-and that is only one factor among many others-if we go through with what I have just dis- cussed, there will be no rollcall votes tomorrow; and all I can say, on that basis, is Godspeed. Sound conduction in the ear affecting milt- The measurement of speech intelligibility. tary communications. fy '67 $26,000. fy '68 $16,000. Group information processing and cleci- Leadership requirements in differing or- sion-making in complex situations. fy '67 ganizational settings. fy '67 $23,000; fy '68 $50,000. $30,000. Military implications of social change. fy Experiments on leadership, authority and '67 $140,000. , influence. fy '67 $22,000. Determination of the relationships between Theories and models of military group be- the responses of humans and the physical havior. fy '67 $37,000. dimensions of stimulation for the sense of Research on panic behavior. fy '67 $5,000; taste. $0. fy '68 $4,000. Research to improve methods of training in The influence of power on group produc- f oreign languages. fy '67 $19,000. tivity and morale. $0. Helium speech distortion correction using Reduction of hostility within groups to an analog simulation of the human ear. fy enhance team performance. fy '67 $20,000; '68 $35,000. fy '68 $20,000. Development of classification procedures to Studies of computer-assisted instruction; Identify pilot vertigo research. fy '68 $50,000. instructional strategies and behaviorally Biophysical changes affecting behavioral oriented language. fy '68 $68,000. performance. fy '67 $20,000; fy '68 $20,000. Conference on group decision making. fy Consulting and advisory services for the '68 $6,000. social and behavioral science. fy '67 $14,000; Effects of group interaction on problem fy '68 $17,000. solving. $0. Identification of variables which predict Identification of factors influencing the international conflict. fy '67 $26,000; fy '68 effectiveness of management and leadership. $24,000. fy '67 $28,000; fy '68 $45,000. Analysis of reward as a means of promoting Theory and measurement of international adult learning. fy '67 $29,000. conflict. fy '68 $165,000. Enhancement by drugs of Naval person- Research on how visually patterned stim- nel performance under stress. fy '67 $65,000; uli are classified by the nervous system. $0. fy '68 $49,000. Undersea work performance and psycho- Control of purposive movement through logical adjustment. fy '67, $22,000; fy '68 sequenced electrical stimulation of brain sites. fy '67 $121,000; fy '68 $51,000. $30,000. Research on factors involved in the de- Investigation of methods to reduce train- tection and identification of visual and audi- ing failures among intellectually able stu- tory signals. fy '67 $35,000. dents. fy '68 $25,000. Techniques of differential assignment of Effects of extreme environments on per- personnel. $0. formance of Navy teams and groups. fy '67 Comparative research on interpersonal per- $5,000. , ception. fy '68 $15,000. Mechanisms of human auditory localiza- Characteristics of Navy trainees that en- tion as related to Naval communications sys- hance or inhibit learning. fy '67 $44,000. terns. fy '68 $33,000. Comparative analyses of leadership prac- Techniques for improving human memory. tices. fy '68 $31,000. fy '68 $43,000. . Implications of organizational stability and Neural mechanisms involved in the proc- instability for psychological operations. fy essing of visual and auditory information. $0. '68 $150,000. Comparative studies of conflict and conflict Experimental analysis of aggressive be- resolution. fy '68 $36,000. havior. fy '67 $43,000; fy '68 $26,000. Analysis of the human behavior processes Brain nucleic acid changes during learn- involved in solving complex problems. fy '67 ing. fy '68 $26,000. $22,000; fy '68 $20,000. Basic mechanisms in. attention and vigi- lance of human operators. $0. Atlas of principles of group behavior for studies of crew Isolation and confinement. fy '67 $15,000; fy '68 $33,000. Speech analysis of men under stress. fy '67 $25,000; fy '68 $25,000. Determination of the factors influencing the perception of form and distance of un- derwater divers. fy '68 $7,000. Underwater work measurement techniques. fy '67 $25,000; fy 68 $34,000. PROGRAM ADJOURNMENT FROM AUGUST 13 TO SEPTEMBER 3, 1969 Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate turn to the con- sideration of House Concurrent Resolu- tion 315, with, of course, the proviso that the Senator from Arkansas does not lose his right to the floor. The PRESIDING .r.riCER. The con- current resolution 11 be stated by the clerk. The legislative cle k read the concur- rent resolution (H. Con. Res. 315) as follows: H. Coil. ES. 315 Resolved by the H (the Senate concu Houses shall adjourn 13, 1969, and that said day they sta o'clock noon on W 1969. se of Representatives ing), That the two on Wednesday, August hen they adjourn on adjourned until 12 nesday, September 3, Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, for have order? Mr. PROUTY. r. President, may we the information of the Senate, it is my intention shortly to call up House Con- The PRESID G OFFICER. The mo- current Resolution 315, but if the dis- tion is not deba ble. tinguished minority leader, in the mean- the floor? Mr. STENNIS Mr. President, who has time, has any questions, I will endeavor The PRESID G OFFICER. The ques- to answer them. tion before -th Senate is an adjourn- Biophysics of vision for design of optimal Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I would like to ask the distinguished majority ment resolutio and is not debatable. target displays. fy '68 $4,000. leader about the program for the balance Mr. PROU . Mr. President, I ask for Attitude change for the enhancement of of the day, but more particularly about the yeas and nays, then, if I cannot morale. fy '67 $30,000. speak. Improvements in underwater voice cora- the program for tomorrow, and whether The yeas a d nays were ordered. munication. fy '68 $34,000. or not there may be recorded votes on The PRESI sING OFFICER. The ques- Research on psychiatric effectiveness of fu- any amendments that may be submitted, tion is on : : eeing to the concurrent Research on physical and psychological fac- contingent will be going to the dinner resolution. e clerk will call the roll. ture weapon systems crews. fy '67 $54,000. knowing, of course, that a substantial tors involved in underwater speech commu- Mr. STEN S. Mr. President, a parlia- nication. fy '67 $50,000; fy '68 $57,000. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, it is mentary in. iry. . in California. Effect of noise on inner-ear cells. fy '67 The PRE- DING atoriCER. The Sen- $43,000; fy '68 $28,000. a good thing that the distinguished mi- ator will st: e it. Behavioral science inputs to the prediction nority leader raised that particular Mr. S i IS. What are we voting on? of conflict. fy '68 $275,000. question at this time. It is my under- The PRE IDING OFFICER. The clerk Conference on psychological problems in standing that the distinguished chair- will restate the resolution. large-scale change. fy '67 $7,000; fy '68 man of the Foreign Relations Commit- $24,000. tee, the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. The legi ative clerk read as follows: Automatic teaching systems; man-machine FULBRIGHT) , has two amendments whichResolved cc the House of Representatives interactions involving high speed digital (the Senat: concurring), That the two computers. $0. may not take too much time. Houses shal adjourn on Wednesday, Au- Effect of environmental restriction on per- It is my further understanding that gust 13, 19&, and that When they adjourn formance, fy '68 $4,000. there is a very strong possibility that a on said day they stand adjourned until 12 o'clock noo on Wednesday, September 3, Factors involved in modifying hostile at- yea-and-nay vote on House Concurrent 1969. titudes. fy '67 $2,000; fy '68 $36,000. Resolution 315, the resolution to ad- Comparative study of interaction between journ for 3 weeks, will be asked for; ideology and behavior. fy '67 $50,000. and, of course, if it is, it will be granted. ment of the pledge made by the joint Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71B00364R0003001(1) Mr. MANSFIELD. This is a fulfill- S 9774 leadership to all Senators, and about which all Senators were informed as long ago as last January, with no ob- jection at that time. The PRESIDING OFFI(ielt. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. KENNEDY. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee eMr. GORE), is absent on official business I also announce that the Senator from Nevada (Mr. BrseE), the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. EesTeeeie), he Senator from Utah (Mr. Moss), the Senator from Georgia (Mr. RUSSELL) , and the Senator from Texas (Mr. Yeretoeoueer) are necessarily absent. Mr. SCOTT. I announce that the Sen- ator from Ohio (Mr. Seem) is necessarily absent. The Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BELLMON), the Senator freer' Utah (Mr. BENNETT), and the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) , are detained on official business. If present and voting, the Senator from Utah (Mr. BENNETT), and the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCIa, would each vote "yea." The result was announced?yeas 76, nays 14, as follows: [No. 80 Leg.] YEAS-70 Gurney Montoya Hansen telnet Harris mphy Hart Muskie Hartke on flatileld PP ckwood Hollings EPerson Hruska PdU Hughes Proxmire Inouye aftlidolph Jackson Ribienff Javits achweiker Jordan, N.C. ainith Jordan, Idaho Saps rkraan Kennedy >g Long Sten nis Magnuson St, yens Mansfield Symington Mathias Th,irmond McCarthy tower McGee Tydings McGovern Williams, N.J. McIntyre Soong, N. Dak. Metcalf Too rig, Ohio Miller Mondale NAYS-14 Ervin Goldwater Holland McClellan Pastore NOT VOTING-10 Bellmon Gore Lambe Bennett Moss iborough Bible Percy Eastland Russell So the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 315) was agreed to. Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE August 12, 1969* Anderson Baker Bayh Boggs Brooke Burdick Byrd, Va. Byrd, W. Va. Cannon case Church Cook Cranston Curtis Dirksen Dodd Dole Dominick Eagleton Ellender Fannin Fong Pulbright Goodell Gravel Griffin Aiken Allen Allott Cooper Cotton Presty Scott Talmadge Williams, Del. ORDER OF BUSINESS Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield without losing his right to the floor? Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, may we have order? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ate will be in order. The Senator may proceed. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, for the information of the Senate, there may well be one or two rollcall votes this eve- ning before adjournment. I do not think that the debate on the next two amend- ments will take very long. I would suggest that in the interest of better procedure and a more expe- ditious departure, Senators stay as close to the floor as possible so that we can dispose of the amendments one way or the other. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I Point out that my statement will not take over 3 or 4 minutes. Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield me 1 minute? Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield 1 minute to the Senator from Wash- ington. JURISDICTION OF SENATE COM- MITTEES ON MASS TRANSIT MEASURE Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, yes- terday the administration sent up a proposed piece of legislation on mass transit that encompassed a great num- ber of transit problems and rapid tran- sit in urban areas. It goes back in some instances to the proposal contained in the original mass transit bill, the jurisdiction of which lies in the Banking and Currency Committee. Many of the suggestions contained in the bill are also within the province of the Commerce Committee. The distinguished Senator from Utah introduced a bill and had it referred to the Committee on Banking and Cur- rency. However, the distinguished chair- man of that committee and the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. COTTON) and I have an agreement that when they get through with that measure, it will be forwarded to the Commerce Committee so that we may consider the sections that properly belong within the jurisdic- tion of that committee. This is an all-Inclusive, pretty wide- ranging bill. I wanted the record to reflect this sit- uation. PROPOSED 1VIEETING OF FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMA:I-IV& Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, be- fore I make my statement on the pend- ing matter, there is one other matter that I should like to point out. Because of an unexpetted emergency, we were not able in the Committee on Foreign Relations this morning to vote on a pending matter. There was a rollcall in the Senate much earlier than we had expected. As soon as we dispose of the two amendments, If we can get a quorum, I would appreciate it very much if the committee members could come to the committee rooms so that we might have a very brief meeting. It should not take more than 5 or 10 minutes to dispose of the one remaining piece of business?the Peace Corps measure?before we ad- journ. Mr. President, I hope that the com- mittee members can come to the com- mittee room. I guarantee them that it will not take more than a few minutes. We will either do it or not do it within 10 minutes. / would appreciate it if after the disposal of these two brief amend- ments the members of the committee would come tAtivoinntittee room. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA- TIONS POR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RE- SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MIS- SILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJ- ALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RE- SERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH The Senate resumed the considera- tion of the bill (S. 2546) to authorize ap- propriations during the fiscal year 1970 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles and to authorize the construc- tion of test facilities at Kwajalein Missile Range, and to prescribe the authorized persoemel strength of the Selected Re- serve of each reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, amendment No. 129 does two things. First, it makes clear that no more than $3 billion of the funds appropriated for use of the Armed Perces of the United States may be used to support the forces of Vietnam and other free world forces In Vietnam, or local forces in Laos and Thailand. Second, this amendment require.s that the decisions as to the expenditures of these funds are to be the responsibility of the President rather than the respon- sibility of the Secretary of Defense. My purpose in proposing this amend- ment is to tighten up the provisions of this authorizaton bill. As it now stands, the Congress would be authorizing the Secretary of Defense "on such terms and conditions as he may determine" to spend, Without any limita- tion whatsoever, an amount that could be as high as $80 billion to pay the ex- penses of armed forces other than those of the United States. This, I know, is preposterous. The Vec- etary of Defense would do not such hing. But that is precisely what the lan- uage of title IV authorizes as I read it. There must be some limit on the mount we are expected to take from he use of our Armed Forces and give to ther free world forces. I guess I do not know what that limit My amendment specifies that not more an $3 billion may be spent on foreign rmed forces. That is more than we pend for economic foreign aid and for any domestic programs. It is but 10 ercent of the some $30 billion which the ietnam war costs the United States nnually. I know it will be said that there must a broad delegation of discretion in e expenditure of these funds because hope that South Vietnam forces will e over more and more of the burden. ut I suggest that the Senate is entitled least to have an estimate of how much xt year is to be used to pay for the rces of allies fighting with us in Viet- a Is th a 111. 13 V a be th we tak at ne fo Dam. If the chairman of the Armed Services Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 August 12, 196APProved FaffR6TORMSORM/3REMitRDPflritioAR000300100001-3 - Committee is not agreeable to the limit- I want to offer this substitute amend- Mr. STENNIS. I yield. ing figure of $3 billion for this purpose, ment now. Instead of saying "not to ex- Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I would be interested in receiving some ceed $3 billion," I think we should put there is'a $500 million difference here. As other estimate. it at $2.5 billion; and if more money is I understand the position of the distin- It does not make much sense to me to needed, they can get the authorization guished Senator from Mississippi, he hold elaborate hearings on the Defense for it. agrees with the principle of what is de- Department budget, to receive detailed So I do not think we should try to step sired by the distinguished Senator from estimates on the costs of various weapons on the President of the United States by Arkansas. We are in a fight in Vietnam, systems, and then to adopt language in requiring him to issue a certificate, and we are and have been taking mili- this bill which says in effect that not- My amendment, which reads as fol- tary action in Laos and Thailand. withstanding any other law authorizing lows, is offered as a substitute: I would hope that the able chairman of funds for the Armed Forces of the United On page 5, line 11, strike out the quotation the Committee on Foreign Relations States, the Secretary of Defense can marks and the word "Funds" and insert in would accept the proposal presented by spend whatever he desires to support lieu thereof the following: "Not to exceed the chairman of the Committee on other free world forces in Vietnam and $2,500,000,000 of the funds". Armed Services. On page 5 line 17, insert for the word "con- Mr. FULBRIGHT. I intended to do S 9775 local forces in Laos. ditions" the phrase "under Presidential The Congress must be cautious of such regulations". wide open delegations of authority. I hope the chairman of the Committee That will put it forth in the register. on Armed Forces will accept this amend- The President is responsible for what it ment. does, anyway. I think that will take care Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President and of the situation. members of the committee, I call special So I offer that as a substitute, and I attention to the situation with respect to thank the Senator from Arkansas very title 4. It may be that a rollcall vote will much for calling attention to that mat- not be required on the matter. ter. This language, if it is going to refer I will first make a brief_ explanation of to the other authorization bills, should title 4 of the bill. It covers what was once have a limit on it, and it is limited. Let called foreign military aid or foreign aid me repeat for clarity, that it is limited for the military. But this section is lim- to the forces in Vietnam, other free world ited to the South Vietnamese and other forces in Vietnam, and the local forces free world forces in Vietnam, local forces in Laos and Thailand. In Laos and Thailand, and for related Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will costs during the fiscal year 1970 on such the Senator yield? terms and conditions as the Secretary of Mr. STENNIS. I yield. Defense may determine. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Inasmuch as it does Mr. President, that is the identical deal particularly with the local forces in language that was used for last year in Laos and Thailand, two countries in the authorization bill as brought forward which, at least technically and legally, without any change and also for the we are not at war, does the Senator not year 1968. think it would be better that this respon- I am going to propose an amendment sibility be given to the President? We are as a substitute to the amendment of the now discussing before our committee a Senator from Arkansas. The funds now matter involving Thailand, and it seems in the bill for this purpose amount to to me that this is a matter of such con- only $147 million. That is in hardware sequence that it should be squarely the The authorization is merely for the Ap- President's responsibility to make a deci- propriations Committee, concerning such sion on a matter of this kind, as distin- other amounts as they may appropriate guished from the ongoing war in Viet- and for whatever purposes they may ap- nam. That is the part of it that struck propriate. The Appropriations Commit- me?that it should be a presidential re- tee now has authority to appropriate sponsibility in the law. items except military hardware for our Mr. STENNIS. I think it should be a A r Navy but they do not have au- presidential responsibility. He is respon- thority to appropriate even 0. & M. sible for it, anyway. Certainly, we can , funds?operation and maintenance trust him to make the regulations about have the presidential responsibility at funds?for the Army of South Vietnam. this matter, and then the Secretary of the very peak, but I think he should be So this would be a general authorization. Defense, acting under those regulations permitted to make the regulations, and When this matter came before us, my and our law and restrictions, I be- then the Secretary can act on them. best recollection is that in looking at it, lieve---- Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, a the Chief of Staff said that this is iden- Mr. FULBRIGHT. Customarily, I say parliamentary inquiry. tical to the matter of last year, and that to the Senator, under the foreign aid bill The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- was correct. We did not get to the figures which my committee has handled, the ator will state it. then, however, and they gave me the funds are made available to the Presi- Mr. FULBRIGHT. Is it proper for me figures later, and showed how it was dent. to accept the substitute or withdraw my spent last year for this purpose?$2.5 Mr. STENNIS. Yes. amendment? billion. For this year, it is estimated to Mr. FULBRIGHT. That has been tra- Mr. President, I modify my amend- be $2.26 billion for this purpose. ditional, since the beginning. Actually,..., ment as proposed by the Senator from On that point, I did not notice the open this is an item which has been in the Mississippi. end clause in here, which is the three or foreign aid bill, in foreign assistance, in Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the four words on pages 1-2 and 15: "under the past. In fact, some Members pres- Senator yield? this or any other- act." That gives it an ently are considering taking it back into open end, unlimited authorization. I have that bill. Mr. STENNIS. I do not understand. not favored that since we built the Air Therefore, I would suggest?I do not The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- Force Academy. I do not like us to make know that it is all that important?that ator from Arkansas has modified his open end authorizations unless it is it would still be more appropriate for the amendment. absolutely necessary. That is my record responsibility to be given to the Presi- Mr. FULBRIGHT. I modify my amend- on it. dent. ment in accordance with the suggested But I failed to point that out to the Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will words of the Senator from Mississippi. committee; I am sure I did. That is why the Senator yield? It is his proposal, and that disposes of it. that when I rose. I certainly accept the amendment of the Senator from Missis- sippi as to the amounts. His explanation of it is understandable. I say to the Senator from Missouri that the prosecution of the war, of course, is a military matter. But this involves far more than a military matter, as we found this morning; and it is the very matter into which the Senator from Missouri is looking. I think it is primarily a political matter as to how far we go in a commitment to support the local forces in Laos and Thailand in particular, as distinguished from Vietnam. Mr. SYMINGTON. I know of the legis- lative background incident to the matter we were discussing this morning, and as- certained that the Secretary of Defense believes the matter we discussed this morning, if implemented, would necessi- tate the approval of Congress. Again, it is my hope that the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations would take the language suggested by the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services. Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am willing to ac- cept the Senator from Mississippi's pro- posed amendment in place of mine and would, of course, support it. I merely brought that to his attention, in that I thought there might be a distinction be- tween the significance of the local forces in Laos. But if the Senator from Missis- sippi feels that strongly about it, I am perfectly willing to accept his amend- ment as a substitute for mine. Mr. STENNIS. It is my intention to Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S9776 Approved For Re The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is so modified. Mr. STENNIS. I want to discuss it a little further, but I yield to the Senator from Kentucky. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SPONG in the chair). Will the Senator send the amendment, as modified, to the desk. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Kentucky. Mr. FULBRIGHT. MiPresident, will the Senator yield to me first briefly? Mr. STENNIS. I yield. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Did the Senator suggest to strike "any other act" and only confine it to this act? Mr. STENNIS. No, that was done in marking it up. Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator does not wish to strike out "any other act." Mr. STENNIS. No, that is part of it. The ceiling is on it now. - Mr. FULBRIGHT Very-well. Mr. STENNIS. I yield to the Senator from Kentucky. Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I did not wish to intervene until the Senator from Arkansas and the Senator from Missis- sippi had agreed upon the questions which the Senator from Arkansas had raised. Now, I wish to raise another ques- tion on this section. I hope I may have the attention of the Senate for just a few minutes. When I first read title IV on page 5 of the bill, the thought came to me that it could be considered a commitment as defined in the national commitments resolution which was adopted almost unanimously by the Senate. I may attach too much importance to language, but I want to give the reasons for my think- ing in this direction. In Vietnam we are furnishing supplies and equipment to the South Vietnamese and to other free forces who are assisting the South Vietnamese. We are also using our troops in support of the South Viet- namese. The same situation may prevail in Laos and Thailand, as far as I know. We have authorized the supply of equipment and materiel to Laos and Thailand. Until a few years ago such supplies were author- ized under the military assistance section of the foreign aid bill; in 1967 the au- thority was transferred to the military authorization bill. My question goes to the meaning of the word "support." Is it intended in this section that support of free forces in Laos and Thailand is limited to equip- ment, materiel, and supplies, or is it in- tended that word "support" shall include the use of our own Armed Forces in sup- port of the local forces of Thailand and Laos. Mr. STENNIS. No. Mr. COOPER. If use of our forces is intended, article IV of the bill could be construed as a commitment of our Armed Forces. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the Sen- ator presents a very good question but I do not hesitate for one moment in answering. It does not include troop personnel of that kind. As a matter of fact, I shall have print- ed in the RECORD within just a few min- cataiGNIESBIODOAICIUMFM1B00afflcIA0t3300100001-2 flugust 12 1969 utes an itemization of these very items for fiscal year 1968, fiscal year 1969, and fiscal year 1970, prospectively. We are dealing here with $2,226,400 for fiscal year 1970 which includes no military construction at this time, but procure- ment for the Army, Navy, shipbuilding conversion, aircraft procurement, mis- sile procurement, and other procure- ment, and the operation and mainte- nance for the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. So it is strictly military matters, and military matters alone. Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I accept, of course, as all of us do, the statement and. intention of the Senator from Mis- sissippi, about his understanding of the matter. But it is important that we know the intention of the language which speaks of itself. I would ask if the Sen- ator from Arkansas and the Senator from Mississippi would be willing to modify paragraph (2) which now reads "(2) local forces in Laos and Thailand:" so as to insert before "local" the words: "to provide equipment, material sup- plies, and maintenance thereof to"; The additional language would remove any question of the intention?I do not know this is so intended; I hope it is not intended to use any of these funds for our forces to support the local forces of Laos and Thailand. Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. COOPER. I base my suggested language in part on a statement made by former Secretary of Defense McNa- mara when he asked that funds to assist Laos and Thailand local forces be taken out of the foreign aid bill and placed in the defense bill. He supported his request in a letter to Senator RUSSELL, chairman of the Armed Forces Committee. We are prepared to provide Laos and Thai- land the equipment and supplies they re- quire to combat the armed Communist forces which threaten their freedom. Therefore, the transfer itself implies neither escalation of conflict nor change in type or level of assist?. ance; it merely reflects the most effeotive manner to handle the problem. My amendment would limit the use of any of the funds, as far as Laos and Thailand are concerned, to equipment, material, and supplies Mr. STENNIS.The Senator might sup- ply his language on that point. With re- spect to equipment and supplies there, we already have a list in the RECORD of what is represented, Perhaps the language would provide this would not include any troops or U.S. forces. Maybe that would cover it. Mr. COOPER. "Other than U.S. forces." - Mr. MTTLFR. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. STENNIS. I yield. Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I would like to make a comment. Perhaps the Senator from Mississippi and the Sena- tor from Kentucky might indicate whether or not this is within the scope of the Senator's proposed language. My. understanding is that maintenance can be involved as well as the actual sup- plies and material. Mr. STENNIS. Yes. Mr. MILLER. If we are going to have maintenance, this could indicate con- tract maintenance, or it could indicate modifications of _equipment. So I cer- tainly think maintenance should be in this language if we are going to use spe- cific language. Mr. STNIS.n The word "mainte- nance is in the bill of particulars that I am going to have printed in the RECORD. It does include many things in addition to military hardware. It really has no place in this bill, strictly speaking, except $147 million. As a'inatter of convenience we put it in 2 or 3 years ago. I yield to the Senator from Arizona. Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I am certain I know what the Senator from Kentucky is getting at. I find my- self in favor of that but I have a question as to whether or not his exclusion would be so complete that we could not, for example, install radars in Laos or Thai- land, or electronic detection equipment, or electronic relay equipment that would require, at least for a time, personnel from the United IStates. These people might not be in uniform. They might be South Vietnamese. Would the idea of the Senator from Kentucky go that far? Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I shall try to make myself clear. I do draw a dis- tinction between operations, on the one hand, in Vietnam and in Laos and Thai- land, on the other. Whatever may be one's views on Viet- nam, we are assisting Vietnam in at least two ways: one by the supply of equipment and materiel; and the other, and of greateat importance, by the use of our Armed Forces in support of Armed Forces of Vietnam and other free forces. I have never voted against funds for these purposes. It has been said by former President Johnson that we have made a commit- ment for the use of our Armed Forces by the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. It has been debated and debated. In any case, we are in Vietnam, and we are at war. I do not know what is occurring in Laos or Thailand but I know it has not been declared either by the Executive or the Congress that we have a commitment in Laos and Thailand agatnst the Pathet Lao, or any insurgents in Thailand, or Loas. The United States is at least not at war in Laos or Thailand. My purpose is to be sure that we do not provide funds for the use of our Armed Forces in support of the local forces of Laos and Thailand and thus run the risk of be- coming engaged in war without joint authority, of the Executive and Congress. On June 25, the Senate passed a reso- lution which had been introduced by the Senator from Arkansas, which was later modified and passed almost unani- mously by the Senate. It states: Resolved, That (1) a, national commitment for the purpose of this resolution means the use of the Armed Forces of the United States on foreign territory, or a promise to assist a foreign country, government, or people by the use of the Armed Forces or financial resources of the United States, either im- mediately or upon the happening of certain events, and (2) it is the sense of the Senate that a national commitment by the United States results only from Edfirmative action taken by the executiveand legislative branch- es of the United States Government by Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP711300364R000300100001-3 August 12, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE S 9777 means of a treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution of both Houses of Congress specifi- cally providing for such commitment. Mr. President, this bill when enacted will become a statute. It will represent the action of both Houses of Congress. It leaves no doubt that we are ready to provide financial resources of the United States to local forces in Laos and Thai- land, but if we do not make certain by proper language that it does not provide funds for our Armed Forces to engage in fighting in support of the local forces of Laos and Thailand, it would be inter- preted that this statute does provide such funds for such use of our Armed Forces. This may be said to strain language, but if it is strained, we become involved in Vietnam by strained action, by the strained premises by the evolution of events which, I am sure, no one in the early years intended or thought would bring us into that war. I want to provide language in this sec- tion, that will insure that use of the funds involves only the financial re- sources of the United States. That means our money, our equipment, our materiel, our supplies and operations related thereto. It would prohibit the use of Armed Forces in support and combat support, of local forces fighting in Laos and Thailand. Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, per- haps we are missing a danger involved in all of this; namely, if we lend or sell equipment to the present Vietnam Gov- ernment, it is very possible that in the not too distant future, the North Viet- namese and the Vietcong could well be using that equipment against some of the countries which today are on our side; specifically, Laos and Thailand. That, I think, is a great danger, as evidenced by the fact that in the hear- ings conducted in the Foreign Relations Committee last year, relative to the sale of arms to other countries, we found there were some 6,000 American tanks which, in effect, were for sale if it could be arranged on the right basis to coun- tries in other parts of the world where the tanks were not considered obsoles- cent. With complete respect for the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Ken- tucky, there is no real secret about the fact that we have and are conducting military operations in Laos; also that we are conducting military operations from Thailand, I believe that it is important to recognize tonight if Americans are in danger in Thailand, or if Americans are in danger in Laos, because of actions taken over recent years, it is as im- portant for us to work to defend them in those countries as to defend them in South Vietnam. This morning, in a hearing conducted in the Foreign Relations Committee with respect to certain activities, the witness, not of high rank, testified that before anything occurred under the contingent agreement in question, the matter should be taken up with the Congress. That, to me, made considerable im- pression, because at least up to this ad- ministration, many things took place in Laos and Thailand which were not taken up with the Congress. So I checked the legislative history of the present Secretary of Defense when he was a Member of the other body, and found that he was forceful in stating such matters should be taken up with the Congress. I also found to my satisfaction that the reason this witness stated it should be taken up with the Congress was prob- ably because the Secretary of Defense believed it should be taken up with the Congress. I believe, therefore, that we are in a new era when it comes to the method and the nature of risking troops and utilizing equipment, in foreign countries. I would give full and great credit to the efforts which have been made by the chairman of the Foreign Relations Com- mittee so as to clarify this matter in these hearings. But, for these reasons and because of the position taken by the current man- agement of the Defense Department, I would hope that we would see fit to pass title IV as it is now in the bill. Mr. President, I regret implications? not made here on the floor of the Sen- ate?which would imply that we have no military operations in Laos. We know we are having them there; and we know we have built six major bases in Thai- land. I believe that title 4 is all right. I think this discussion has been constructive from the standpoint of the future. Mr. STENNIS. As it is, by adoption of the amendment of the Senator from Arkansas? Mr. SYIVIINGTON. That is right; the amendment of the able Senator from Arkansas, as modified by the amendment of the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee. We will have both committees working together, and this part of the bill will be settled. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the Sen- ator from Texas had asked me for recog- nition. I yield to him. Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I would like to associate myself with the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Mis- souri. I think the thrust of the amend- ment of the Senator from Kentucky would be to deny involvement of Ameri- can personnel. It should be roundly de- feated, To begin with, what we are talk- ing about when we talk about Thailand and Laos forces is paramilitary forces, re- garding counter-insurgency work. We are trying to give them the sophisticated equipment to do anything, for example, airlift and radar. If we cannot train them to use the equipment, it is pretty useless to give it to them. I might say that our bases in Thailand are defended by Thai troops. Is is pro- posed that they get no personnel support from the troops in Thailand? Are we going to get no support for the air bases that are supposed to be defended? The thrust of the amendment of the Senator from Kentucky would be to necessitate using American personnel for work that they would not have to do if we were to allow some support of Thai troops or paramilitary troops. Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I would like to hear from the Senator' from Arkansas. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if the Senator will excuse me just a minute, the Senator from Arkansas and the Senator from Indiana asked me to yield to them. I believe the Senator from Arkansas asked me first. I yield to him. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, as I said a moment ago on this particular amendment, it seems to me that, with the amendment of the Senator from Missis- sippi, it would be satisfactory. I think the matter raised by the Senator from Ken- tucky, however, is a very significant one, and I do not want, in any offhand way, to make what might be called a national commitment with regard to Thailand. In my next amendment as printed, No. 111, which deals with the question of the Secretary of Defense making available reports prepared by outside organiza- tions, I have in mind such things as "think tanks," and so on. That amend- ment is before the Senate. I have also prepared another section which I want to discuss as a modification to my amendment, which provides that? The Secretary of Defense shall also provide to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a copy of all bilateral contingency plans, signed by a representative of the Department of De- fense and an official of a government of a foreign country, involving use of United States forces for the joint defense of that country. It deals, in effect, with the point the Senator from Kentucky has raised. The point of the Senator from Ken- tucky is a very important one. I do not wish, through inadvertence, to see an- other Gulf of Tonkin resolution go through here without knowing it. I am inclined to believe that, with the explana- tion and interpretation given by the Sen- ator from Mississippi and the Senator from Missouri, it would be certainly an outrageous way to interpret it if it were done that way. I wonder if the Senator from Ken- tucky could not offer this amendment at a later date as his own amendment on this precise subject. I do not know wheth- er the next amendment would cover it. I think the Senator has a valid point, but I do not think it is necessary, with what has been said with regard to this amendment. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if I may say this, I think the Senator from Ken- tucky has made a contribution here. I have enjoyed getting his thought. This is purely a money bill. This is purely a spe- cial section here for foreign military aid. It has 2 years of use as a precedent. Ex- cept to put a ceiling on it, I believe we ought to proceed in that way. Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator be- lieves it would be an outrageous distor- tion to interpret it as authority for use of our military forces, apart from what they are presently doing? Mr. STENNIS. I do not see how it could be interpreted that way. It would be a real monstrosity. I yield to the Senator from Louisiana. Mr. 'FLI,ENDER. Mr. President, I do not think there Is any question that the amount is for military hardware and uses of that kind, and does not involve soldiers at all. But I rose to ask the Sen- ator this question; He earmarked $2.5 billion. During the hearings that were Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9778 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE August 12, 1969 held 2 weeks ago, the figure was $2.2 bil- lion instead of $2.5 billion. Mr. STENNIS. Thatis correct. Mr. ELLENDER. Would the Senator modify his amendmencto include that figure? Mr. STENNIS. No. I think there should be some latitude. The 0.2 billion, which I mentioned during the, debate, was ar- rived at when the budget was written up. We have already had a somewhat aug- mented program to aid tile Vietnamese to build up their military forces. I think that $2.5 billion figure is a real- istic one. Mr. ELLENDER. The reason why I raised the question is that we used the figure of $2.5 billion during all the hear- ings we had as being the amount of for- eign aid to be used for military hard- ware. Mr. STENNIS. It will not hurt at all to have this excess. I suggest that in the supplemental bills the extra amount of money will be used. It is better to have it done that way than to have the de- partment draw the money from some- where else and then mune before the Congress with a big defteit. I think we ought to accept the figure of $2.5 billion. Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, it is late and I do not want to detain the Senate. As I have said, I may be straining the point, but I do not think so. This is an important matter. For years we have been talking about_Vietnam, and cries of anguish have gone up because we did not look ahead and consider the end that the steps that were being taken could lead to-our involvement in war. This bill before us will become a statute-could be another step involving the United States much as the course of events led to our involveMent in Viet- nam. I would agree that it wOUld be a mon- strosity if the President of the United States, upon the language of this section, should consider the language of this bill as authority to enter war in Laos or Thailand. It would be a monstrosity, and I have full confidence in President Nixon, and that he would not do so, but that does not relieve us of our responsibility. It is admitted here by the chairman of the committee that these funds shall be used only for what has been termed miltiary assistance. . Is that correct? Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is correct, Mr. COOPER. And, as I understand that they shall not be used for our armed forces in support of fighting, or assisting fighting of the local forces of Laos and Thailand, other than for sup- plies. Therefore, I will propose another amendment. "Military assistance," I be- lieve, is a phrase of art. Is it not? Mr. STENNIS. Well, the Senator would know more about that than I would. Mr. FULBRIGHT. For years it was In the foreign aid legislation. I assume it Is still considered as such. Mr. COOPER. In the testimony of the Secretary of Defense before both the Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee in 196'1, he spoke of the transfer of military assist- ance from the foreign aid bill to the de- fense bill. He called it military assistance. Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is right. Mr. COOPER. That is what it had been termed when it was considered by the Foreign Relations Committee. I propose: On line 15 before "local" insert the words "military assistance" so as to read "Military assistance to local forces in Laos and Thailand." If these two items, Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand, were separated and distinguished there would be no problem of a misunder- standing. However, the same words are employed for the use of funds in Vietnam as for Laos and Thailand, and there could be a mistake about their meaning. I would urge that before "local" there be inserted the words "Military assistance." Mr. FULBRIGHT. I would think that would be all right. Mr. ,STENNIS. We are talking about money. We are talking about funds. The first sentence reads "Not to exceed $2.5 billion of the funds authorized for ap- propriation for the use of the Armed Forces," and so forth. We are talking about money, and that is all. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes. Mr. STENNIS. And it would not fit in there before the Senator's words "local forces," it seems to me. Mr. COOPER. I thoughtmy suggestion would help. I will offer the amendment I first proposed. Is it in order for me to offer an amendment? Mr. SYMINGTON. Will the Senator read it? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair rules that it is not in order for the Senator from Kentucky to offer an amendment at this point, except by unanimous consent. Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, a par- liamentary inquiry. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator will state it. Mr. COOPER. After the pending amendment is voted upon, as it has been modified would an amendment to the modified amendment then be in order? The PRESIDING OieloiCER, Will the Senator from Kentucky send his pro- posed amendment to the desk? The Chair would say, in answer to the inquiry of the Senator from Kentucky, that after the pending amendment, as modified, is voted upon, it would be in order that his amendment be considered. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I think the amendment has been fully explained. I ask unanimous consent that the table of funds to which reference has been made, the last item being $2.2 billion, be printed in the RECORD at this point. There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: ESTIMATED AMOUNTS INCLUDED IN MILITARY FUNCTIONS BUDGET FOR SUPPORT OF FREE WORLD MILITARY ASSISTANCE FORCES IN VIETNAM, LAOS, AND THAILAND AND RELATED COSTS, FISCAL YEAR 1970 INCLUDING THE AID/DOD REALINEMENT (In millions of dollars] BUDGE] Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal year year year 1968 1969 1970 Military personnel: Army 118. 0 114.2 116. 3 Navy .8 .6 .1 Marine Corps 15. 0 14. 8 14.2 Air Force .2 .2 .2 ' 134.0 129.8 030.8 Total, military personnel_ Operation and maintenance: Army 605.8 708, 0 632. 8 Navy 43.3 47. 5 53.7 Marine Corps _____ _ 6. 1 10, 7 10.3 Air Force 55.0 131. 8 157. 1 Total, operation and maintenance__ ___ 710. 2 898,0 853.9 Procurement: Army 552. 5 1, 243, 5 927. 3 Navy: Other procurement 5.8 10.2 4. 2 Shipbuilding and conversion_ __. 4. 5 6, 5 3.4 PAMN-Navy aircraft and missiles .2 Marine Corps 68. 5 50 8 88. 3 Air Force: Aircraft procurement__ _ 36.1 88.1 103.9 Missile procurement_ _ .... .1 Other procurement 67.4 85,4 114.4 Total, Procurement... 734.9 1, 484. 5 1,241.7 Military construction: Army 1.7 10.7 Navy 1.9 Air Force 9.0 1,5 Total, military construction 02.6 15.5 Grand total 1, 591. 7 2, 527. 8 2, 226. 4 Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I believe that for the information of Senators, the clerk should read the amendment of the Senator from Arkansas, as modified. The PRESIDING Olor.LCKR. The clerk will state the amendment of the Senator from Arkansas, as modified. The legislative clerk read as follows: On page 5, line 11, strike out the quota- tion marks and the word "Funds" and insert in lieu thereof the following: "Not to exceed $2,500,000,000 of the funds". Oct page 5, line 17, strike out the words "the Secretary of Derense" and insert in lieu thereof the words "the President". On page 5, line 17, insert after the word "conditions" the phrase "under Presidential regulations". The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques- tion is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Arkansas, as modified. The amendrnent, as modified, was agreed to. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Kentucky now call up his amendment? Mr. COOPER, Yes. The PRESIDING' OFFICER. The amendment will be stated. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved Fce&Mtift3R9M3ftEgteltEDPNENDA6NR000300100001-3 S 9779 August 12, 196u Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, in regard to the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. The Senator is very persuasive. It is a fact, even though I thought it was a monstrosity, that later the resolution was interpreted as it was by the President of the United States, that it was so inter- preted; and every time the matter came up it was thrown in our faces. I believe the Senator's amendment will make the Senate's intent clearer and more posi- itive. I do not really see how this can re- strict the President's obligations, and I hope the Senator from Mississippi will accept the suggestion of the Senator from Kentucky. What we are trying to do is protect ourselves from such a monstrous interpretation. That having happened within the memory of all of us here, I believe it would be a very healthy thing for it to be accepted. Mr. President, I am not sure; can I ac- cept it? I would be willing to do so, with the agreement of the Senator from Mis- sissippi. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the Sen- ate has voted on the other amendment. Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is right. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, a parlia- mentary inquiry. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator will state it. Mr. COOPER. I have the floor, but I will yield to the Senator for that purpose. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the amendment of the Senator from Arkan- sas has already been agreed to. Can any one Senator accept another amendment to that? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is the Senator from Mississippi asking that question as a parliamentary inquiry? Mr. STENNIS. Yes, of course. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair rules that it cannot be accepted. The On page 6, line 15, after (2) insert the following: "to provide equipment, material, supplies, and maintenance thereof to". Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, there has been a very good discussion, but I do want to have for the RECORD an interpre- tation of the section. I would not 13e so interested if I had not been conscious of the steps by which our country became involved in the war in Vietnam. I shall spend a minute or two on the subject. It all started very simply. Under Presi- dent Eisenhower, military advisers were sent to Vietnam. I do not know whether I should speak of a statement former President Eisenhower made when he is now dead, but I think it proper. He came here one day 2 years ago and talked to a number of us. He said? Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may we have order? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ate will be in order. Mr. COOPER. He said that the only commitment he had made, was to Pro- vide military assistance in the form of advisers, and to provide economic aid as long as South Vietnam made appropri- ate steps to help itself. I may say that, after searching the record, that is all I could ever find that he had promised. For years, he had our military advis- ers in Vietnam. We furnished equipment to Vietnam; we supported various regimes?it is hard to remember how many?and then, as the fighting in- creased in the outer areas, we began to send troops to those areas, to assist the South Vietnamese in actual fighting. They were finally fired upon, and it be- came a matter of national honor to de- fend them, as the President had the right to do, additional troops were sent to South Vietnam and step by step we had become involved in the war in Vietnam. amendment of the Senator from Arkan- I am sure that President Eisenhower, sas has been voted upon. This is new President Kennedy, or President John- matter. son never intended that we would be Mr. COOPER. I hope not, but it is pos- involved in war and certainly no major sible we may be in war in Laos or Thai- war. But we conveyed to South Vietnam land; and if we go into war with the con- the impression that we would stand with current authority of the President of the them and defend them. I believe we con- United States and Congress, we will un- veyed that impression throughout South- derstand where we are, and at least Con- east Asia. gress and the President will have made a Wars start from small beginnings. I determination that it is in our national have thought, and many Senators have interest. thought?it was definitely the expression We may become involved in war with- of the Senate in the adoption of the out such a determination at some point, National Commitments Resolution? with some 35,000 troops in Thailand, as that a likely way to become involved in a I recall. war is to put our armed forces in an- Mr. FULBRIGHT. There were 45,000 other country where there is a local at the last count, I think. war. And if we stay there long enough Mr. COOPER. If at some point we thus and send enough men there, they will became engaged in fighting, we may find be fired on some day, and then, as I have ourselves at war by the same process as said, it is a matter of national honor that by which we backed into war in and, because the President has the con- Vietnam. stitutional duty to protect our troops, we Again, I point out that the language will be involved in a war. of the amendment applies both to Viet- Mr. FULBRIGHT, Mr. President, will nam and to Laos and Thailand. It is the the Senator yield? identical language. Mr. COOPER. I yield. I read the language to which I refer: Mr. FITLBRIGHT. What the Senator uzit EetutnoreigegfzsagronatZf for rtatees has said does revive in my memory very under this or any other Act are authorized clearly what was said, and particularly to be made available for their stated pur- what I said, after having been briefed poses to support: (1) Vietnamese and other and informed by the Secretary of De- free world forces in Vietnam, (2) local forces fense, the Secretary of State, and the in Laos and Thailand; The same language is used for both countries. It is a possible interpretation that these funds could be used in the same way in Laos and Thailand as they are now being used in Vietnam. I have said that it would be prepos- terous if the Secretary of Defense or the President were to use the funds in Laos and Thailand as they are being used in Vietnam as a result of the language of title IV. However, it is our province and our responsibility to make certain that the funds are not treated in the same way. This is the purpose of my amend- ment. It is simply to provide that as far as Laos and Thailand are concerned, these funds will only involve material, equipment, supplies, and related costs. The term "related costs" is in the lan- guage of the bill. If this is what is intended by the spon- sors of the bill and the administration, I do not see why they should not accept my language. It would remove all doubt. Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. COOPER. I yield the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator from Missouri is recognized. Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I make two points. In effect, we have been In war in Laos for years, and it is time the Ameircan people knew more of the facts. Second, the present Secretary of De- fense states that, if this matter comes up again from the standpoint of any con- tingent agreement, he believes it is a matter which should be taken up with the Congress. Mr. ALLOT". Mr. President, I believe that the previous remarks of the distin- guished Senator from Missouri, as well as his just completed remarks, are well taken. Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I thank the Senator. Mr. ALLOT". Mr. President, I have been very quiet during the course of this debate. And, as I have listened to the de- bate, I find my emotions swelling up within me to the place where I think I would be hard pressed to express them in the period of 3 or 4 hours. I am not a warlike man, nor am I an unpeaceful man. But I find it difficult for anyone who was concerned with the vital committees of the Senate to stand on this floor and say he did not know in the spring of 1964 that we were becoming involved in the war in Vietnam. It is impossible for anyone not to have known it. Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, Senator yield? Mr. ALLOTT. I yield. Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, Senator referring to me? Mr. sALLOTT. I was referring to any- one who was e member of the Foreign Relations Committee or the Appropria- tions Committee at the time. Mr. COOPER. Let me say in response that during that debate I said that I knew what we might get into. I voted for the resolution, but I had no misap- prehension about its possibilities. The debate will show that on that day I said that It could lead us into war, but we will the was the Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9780 Approved For RgteanigNSIANNL: WitialtilpgRAw030010000,11713 gust 12, 1969 at war or anticipated that we would be Mr. ALLOTT. I apologize. I had my had confidence in the President that he would use his authority with Judgment. However, I do not want the United States to get into the tame situation again by the failure of the Congress to exercise its responsibility. Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I appre- ciate the situation of the Senator. And I ask him, and he can answer it in any way he wants to, if he does not be- lieve the Secretary of Defenae of his own party and if he does not believe his own President, because we have had assur- ances from both of them that we will not have any more commitrnerts of troops in the Far East. Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator let me respond? Mr. ALLOTT. The Senator may re- spond. Mr. COOPER. Mr. Presid, iit, I believe in the responsibility of the President, and I believe in President Nixon. He is my President whether he is Republi- can or Democrat. It happans that we are members of the same pat .y, of which I am proud. I understand and respect his respon- sibility. I believe that he will exercise it to the best of his ability, and he has great ability. I believe also in the responsibility of Congress, both the House Of Representa- tives and the Senate. I belieVe that we have a responsibility to determine also, whether the United States should go into war and whether we should become in- volved in situations which will send us into war--whether our national inter- ests, security and proper commitments are actually involved. We are talking about the future, and whether we will take step, or refuse to take steps that may prevent or inhibit the possibility of war. Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I under- stand the concern of the Senator about not wanting to become involved in another Vietnam. However, my state- ment was that there is no reason for anyone who was a member of the For- eign Relations Committee oe the eApa propriations Committee, and particular- ly the Defense Subcom.mittte, or the Armed Services Committee, not to have known in the spring and summer of 1964 that we were going to become involved in a war. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. Preskitnt, I yield for a question. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, it seems to me that repeating the state- ment is inviting comment upon a mat- ter which was discussed at length. And the Senator looks in this direction. I was there. It is true that in the spring of 1964, we had appioximately 15,000 or 16,000 soldiers in Vietnam. There had been a gradual escalation from the time that President Kennedy came in, when there were lesa than 800 men who were considered to bc advisers. They were not considered to be combat soldiers. Mr. ALLOTr. There were G36, if the Senator wants the exact figure. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I do not think anyone thought that we were at war there in the future, dates crossed. Mr. FULBRIGHT. The alleged inci- dents took place on the second and fourth of August, 1964. The resolution had been prepared long before that, I think. It was intreduced in the House and it was acted upOn almost instantane- ously. Mr. ALLOTT. Let me say to the Sen- ator that my mind played me a trick I thought it was before this. But I will still go back to the state- ment I made that in 1964 no member of the Armed Services Committee or the Appropriations Committee?particuarly the Defense Committee or the Foreign Relations Committee--should not have known that we were being committed to a war at that time. Now, Mr. President, I want to con- tinue? Mr. FULBRIGIIT. Maybe we should be a lot brighter than we are, but I did not know it, I am frank to say. Mr. ALLOTT. Well, I am not surprised. Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. ALLOTT. I yield. Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, having had some unpleasant personal experiences about that time in 1964, in- volving this subject, I can speak with some experience on it. I have made the charge repeatedly, and it has never been denied?and this information came to me before my cam- paign actually started?that we did not drift into this war. We had a small num- bers of advisers over there in 1960 and 1961, and suddenly 15,000 to 16,000 men were sent over, with explicit orders to shoot back. I tried to bring this to the attention of the American public; I could not get anybody to listen to me. r do not think it would have made a bit at difference. But we were at war when the Gulf of Tonkin incident took place. I remember begging for equal tine on television so I could present not the Republican side but this American side of the under- standing of what was going on in Viet- nam, and I never got any place. When you are shooting back in a situation such as that, you are in war; and although we had advisers over there who were ex- plicitly told never to fire on anyone, this advisory situation ended some time in 1962: when the troops were told to fire back. I suggest to the Senator from Ken- tucky that, unless I am badly mistaken, even his language could not prevent a President from giving the same orders or a Secretary of Defense frotn giving the same orders. So I have a feeling that what we are talking about now gets to the fact of whether or not we, as Senators, have faith, regardless of whether we are Re- publicans or Democrats, in the man who has been elected President and the men with whom he has surrounded himself as Secretary of State and Secretary of De- fense. I merely wanted to inject this because have not heard it brought up. I have never been challenged on it, and I have made it and made it and made It. President Eisenhower had been given the opportunity to go to war in Viet- nam and he rejected it?I think very wisely?on the advice of General Ridge- way and General Gavin. I certainly did not think we were get- ting into war when President Kennedy sent advisor personnel out there. It is my impression that at about the same time he sent troops to Germany because Khrushchev had threatened him, he believed, at the meeting at Vienna. I do not believe that he intended to get into war any more than he intended to get into war in Germany by sending those troops there. No action had been taken when it came to the Gulf of Tonkin incident it- self? Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, with all due deference to the Senator, I said that I would yield for a question. I have been listening to the distinguished Senator, without interrupting him for weeks now. I yielded for a question, not for a speech. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. Presfdent, I will put it this way. Has the Senator read the report of the Foreign Relations Com- mittee on the incidents of the Gulf of Tonkin? Mr. ALLOTT, Recently? Mr. FULBRIGHT. At any time. Mr. ALLOTT. Yes. Mr. leutiBRIGHT. Was the Senator not impressed with the fact that the representations given to that committee by the then Secretary of State, Secre- tary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff proved to be in error? Mr. ALLOTT. I am completely aware of that. And I was present during all of the Gulf of Tonkin debate. I am aware of the statements made by various Sen- ators at that time. Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is aware that the statements made by the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Com- mittee were based on information given to him which information proved to be in error. The question I ask the Senator is this: That being so, how can he make the statement that we all knew?and I as- sume he means by that intended to ac- cept?the Southeast Asia resolution was the equivalent of a declaration of war? ALLOTT. Mr. President, I have made no such statement. I have tried to make my remarks, and I am going to make them if we stay here until midnight, de- spite the Senator's loquacity. I never made the statement or implied the state- ment that when the Gulf of Tonkin reso- lution, for which I admit I voted, was passed, everybody knew we were going to get into war. That was not in 1964. The Gulf of Tonkin resolution was not passed in 1964. Mr. PASTORE. Yes; it was. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Unfortunately, it was in August of 1964. Mr. ALLOTT. I thought it was before that. I apologize. Mr. FULBRIGHT. I happen to know about that I was present Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 August 12, Approved For ittemtggglayAq, : ateekvinkoAcietwo3oo 00001-3 S9781 Mr. ALLOTT. I would say to the Sen- ator that I see no reason to challenge it, looking backward for 5 years now. Mr. STENNIS addressed the Chair. Mr. ALLOTT. I wish to continue. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield for this statement?it is 6 o'clock, and if we are going to have a vote tonight, I think we should vote, with all deference to the Senator from Colorado. I just want to give my opinion. Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I want to defer to the Senator, but I have kept very quiet during the past weeks. My remarks will be very short. The fact that I would like to speak for 3 or 4 hours does not mean I am going to do so or have any intention of doing so. Mr. STENNIS. I withdraw my request. Mr. ALLOTT. If the Senator will per- mit me to continue for a short time, I will be very grateful to him. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator from Colorado has the floor. Mr. ALLOTI'. Mr. President, looking sit the present amendment, I wish to say this: The thing that has concerned me about many of the rash of amendments that we have had?some of them have been meritorious?is that in my belief the Senate may be moving toward the position of creating a vacuum in South- east Asia. I know that the domino theory was discredited by all the intellectuals in this country several years ago. But whether the domino theory was discredited by the intellectuals or not, the fact is that if we do not preserve free governments in Southeast Asia, we are leaving a vacuum which is going to be filled faster than we can turn around by the Red Chinese and by the North Vietnamese. As long ago as 1962, I brought to the attention of the State Department? without any action or any acknowledge- ment in any way?the fact that Red Chinese troops were roaming at will through a good portion of northern Thailand. They still are, except that now they are actually engaging in acts of war. This is a large area. It is composed of many people, and with it a lot of the natural resource wealth of the world. We have done very well, in my opinion, in Indonesia; perhaps not as startlingly well as in Malaysia. But if we permit Laos to go completely down the drain, Thailand to go down the drain, and Vietnam to go down the drain, as some people would like to do?and some people would like to have us en- courage the promotion of a dual govern- ment there?I do not think it will be long before Southeast Asia will have become a Communist strongold. When this occurs, I think our position in the world will be much more difficult; our position with the Philippines will be much more diffi- cult; our position with Indonesia will be much more difficult; and our position with Malaysia will be impossible. When we formed the tripartite situa- tion in Laos, I said at the time it would not work. It has not worked. Today we find that the Plain of Jars in Laos is pretty much overrun by the Viet Minh. If I may have the attention of the Senator from Kentucky particularly as I make this remark, I do not want to see commitments made for ground troops in this area any more than he does. He is no more sincere in his belief than I am. But I am sure he knows that we have air bases in Thailand. He knows that we have a naval base in Thailand. That is no secret. He knows of our activities now?which I shall not mention?in Laos, activities which do not involve ground troops. I have read his amendment. I say in all sincerity, looking down the road to what I think could happen if the Sen- ate keeps on with this sort of frenetic pattern it has established during the last few days and'weeks, that I am afraid we shall be sending a good portion of the world down the rain. I have had the clerk write out the Fulbright amendment as modified. The amendment, so modi- fied reads, in pertinent portion: Not to exceed $2.5 billion of the funds au- thorized for appropriation for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States under this or any other Act are authorized to be made available for their stated purposes to support: (1) Vietnamese and other free world forces in Vietnam, (2)? And this is where the Senator's amendment comes in? to provide materiel, supplies, equipment, and maintenance thereof to local forces in Laos and Thailand. Have I quoted the Senator's amend- ment correctly? Mr. COOPER. Correctly. Mr. ALLOTT. In my opinion, what the Senator from Kentucky's amendment could mean is that we could not put supplies in Laos or Thailand to maintain our forces, or supplies to protect our air- ports, our Air Force, our naval bases, or anything else that we have there. The legislative history is quite clear, I think, as it pertains to every Senator, that none of us wishes to engage in more ground warfare in Southeast Asia or, for that matter, anywhere else. But I cannot read his amendment in any way except as being a totally un- acceptable and crippling burden upon the Secretary of Defense and the Presi- dent. I know the Senator's concern. I know he is sincere. I have never seen him do anything in his life which was not sincere. He does not play games with people and he does not play games with legislation. He is completely a sincere, honest, and straightforward man. But just as strongly, I would hope he would not press his amendment because I think it places a burden on our Presi- dent with respect to the protection of our forces in those areas, which is something that no one, if he understood it as I inter- pret it, would wish to do. Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. ALLOTT. I yield.. Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I wish to ask the Senator if it is not true that the President inherited the problems in Vietnam. I know the wish is shared by all of us that there had been another way to solve that problem. I know all of us wish that there was some way to solve it now without withdrawing from our commitments and without doing some- thing that would not be in the best in- terests of our country. However, is it not true that the President said on several occasions there will be no more Vietnams in his administration? Mr. ALLOTT. That is my understand- ing of what he has said. Mr. MURPHY. Would it not be con- sidered responsible that this man who has been in public life for many years and who has been elected by the people of this country be given the confidence without trying to write into an authori- zation bill for military procurement pro- visions that might be a detriment to the protection of American people, Ameri- can troops, and American property? Mr. ALLOTT. I fully believe so; yes. Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I have listened patiently to the discussion. As I said at the outset, and as the distin- guished Senator from Florida stated, this entire discussion has been a filibuster. This entire discussion has taken place at the wrong time and under the wrong set of circumstances. It should not be a part of this particular bill. I made that state- ment on the first day we considered the bill. I assure the Senate that the work of this committee was carefully and thoughtfully done. It was properly done. But now it is being shredded, twisted, and torn up. The more I hear this dis- cussion, the more I am certain discus- sion on our foreign policy, present and future, should take place in this body, and I would enjoy taking part in it. However, it would seem to me, and I hope the Senator agrees, that this eve- ning, at this stage, in this protracted dis- cussion this is an unfortunate attempt to place restrictions on a new President who has been doing a magnificent job, as far as I know, in bringing about solutions to problems that he inherited. By taking a good hard look at them he will be able to find solutions. Mr. ALLOTT. I thank the Senator for his contribution. I am appreciative of the Senator's statements. Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. ALLOTT. I yield. Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I think this is a dangerous amendment. I think it is potentially mischievous and very unnecessary for us to vote on it tonight when it has not been printed and no one has had a chance to look at it. There is no copy available except what has been scratched in pencil on a piece of paper. I think the matter requires extensive debate. I spent a great deal of time in Laos and Thailand. I know what we are engaged in and I know the extent to which we are involved. If a rigid interpretation were applied to the amendment of the Senator from Kentucky it could seriously jeopardize the lives of American men. I am not pre- pared to vote willy-nilly on something that we know nothing about. We do not know the reaction of the Department of Defense to the amendment or how they would interpret it. If extended discussion is required on the matter tonight I am prepared to dis- cuss it at length as long as anyone is prepared to sit and listen. Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S9782 Approved Forftitme01966/1A10kE.LibRpilppffifil?0003001000LIAy..,3.1 12, 1969 Mr. STENNIS and Mr. FULBRIGHT addressed the Chair. Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I assured the Senator from Mississippi I would not retain the floor for more than a few min- utes. I have no intention of holding the floor further. I wish to say to the Senator from Mis- sissippi that the statement made by the Senator from California is true. Senators can rest assured that any matter coining out of the committee of the distinguished Senator from Mississippi has had the most meticulous scrutiny, observation, discussion, and thought. While I do not desire to retain the floor against the wishes of the distinguished Senator from Mississippi, I felt some of these things had to be said before this matter was voted upon because I am convinced this amendment would wreak a lot of havoc. There can be no question in anyone's mind after this legislative history that the amendment agreed to a few moments ago was never intended to put ground troops in Laos and Thailand. Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. Prez,ident, will the Senator yield? Mr. ALLOTT. I yield to the Senator from Missouri. Mr SYMINGTON. I thank the Senator. Mr. President, I would hope we could get on with the bill. I respectfully point out to the Senate the fact that the lan- guage was agreed to by the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services and the chairman of the Committee on For- eign Relations. I thought that the lan- guage agreed to was eminently satis- factory and that we could have gone ahead at least 1 hour ago and gotten through with this part of the bill. Mr. ALLOTT. I yield the floor. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I ap- preciate the contribution of the Senator from Kentucky I feel this section is old law. It already has a meaning. It has been followed these 2 years. It would be far better to keep this section now, as used heretofore, with the ceiling we have prepared. If the Senator from Kentucky wants to pursue his thoughts further, I know what a draftsman he is and that he does not need anyone particularly, but if he would put anything he has in mind in a separate amendment, it would be helpful to see what others thought. I am glad now to yield to the Senator from Kentucky. Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I have taken up a good deal of time tonight. I must say that I have not filibustered. Mr. STENNIS. No, Mr. COOPER. I have taken some -time because I considered this to be an impor- tant matter, much more important than merely reducing the amounts involved, with due regard to in friend from Ar- kansas and my friend from Mississippi. We are dealing with an entirely different concept: The question of whether funds can be spent for the use of our Armed Forces in fighting in support of local Laos and Thailand forces without a com- mitment by the President or the Con- gress or both, which might_ lead to war. I would therefore urge that the ques- tion is much more important than the matter of dollars and cents. I want to thank my friend from Colo- rado (Mr. Arzorr) for his statement. I know him. I know that he has deep feel- ings about these matters. He does sit quietly at times, but I know how deep his feelings run and he speaks with con- viction courage and force. I appreciate very much what he has said, and for his kind remarks about me. Perhaps I may be sincere, but some- one else might say that I may be sincere, but I may not be always right or too bright about things. Sincerity does not always make up for those qualities. My amendment has not been printed. I had thought about it but as we were coming to the close of the debate in these 2 days before we recess, I did not expect to bring it up until after the recess. But when the Senator from Arkansas offered his amendment, I knew that mine should be offered. I will not press for a vote tonight. I know that I can withdraw, and offer this amendment later, but I ask a parliamen- tary question because I want to be cer- tain: Mr. President, in the event the Senator from Kentucky withdraws his amendment this evening, would it be Possible for him to submit the amend- ment at a later date? The PRESIDING OloioiCER. Yes. That would be completely in order. Mr. COOPER. I thank the Chair. I will withdraw the amendment but I will bring it up again. I hope that by the time I bring it up again, the Senator from Mississippi will have consulted with the Defense Department to see if they would be willing to offer language in title IV conforming to the Senator from Mississippi's understanding that it was their intention. The Senator has said it was intended that funds were to be used for supplies, equipment, and such. We have absolute confidence in the Senator from Mississippi, but the Department of Defense should spell out clearly the pur- pose of title IV relative to Laos and Thailand. Mr. President, we have been talking about the President, President Nixon is my President. He is a Republican Presi- dent. I do not want to go back into his- tory, but members of my family have been Republicans since the Civil War? longer than some others have been, and some fought in the Civil War as Repub- licans. I support the office of President, I support the great responsibility it car- ries, and I have great admiration for and confidence in President Nixon. But, I also respect this body. We have responsibilities, too. I do not want the President of the United States?and we are talking about President Nixon?to be hindered in his efforts by the same mis- takes which have been made before. It is rather curious that before 1966, when this item had been carried in the foreign aid bill for years, it was used for military assistance, meaning equip- ment, supplies, maintenance, food, and money. Then it was changed, and placed In the Defense bill. It is rather curious that after it had been put in the defense bill, we began to use helicopters in Laos and Thailand un- der orders of the Department of Defense, and I understand in railitary activities. I cannot understand why the language is not differentiated between funds to be used in Lade arid Thailand and funds to be used in Vietnam, It is exactly -the same language. Perhaps fungi' are to be used for some military activities such, as for helicopters. Helicopters mai take local forces to back areas. tiring on the helicopters begins, as it did in Vietnam, and war comes. In 1963 or 1964?before the Gulf of Tonkin resolution?I remember the for- mer Senator from Oklahoma. Mr. Mon- roney, came back from Vietnam and told us that our helicopters were carrying men up the mountains, that there were U.S. riflemen on the helicopters who were firing in defense of the helicopters and the pilots, and that their fire was being returned from the ground. That may be what we are doing in Laos and Thailand now. The fact that some Senators have stated we are engaged in fighting in Laos and Thailand makes it more important that we limit the funds in this bill, be- cause if we do not, if we approve that kind of activity, it may lead?I hope not?but it may lead us into war. The SEATO Treaty states that in the event of armed aggression against any of the parties thereto, Including the protocol states, Laos, Cambodia, or Thai- land, the parties thereto shall take ac- tion according to their constitutional processes. Mr. President, what are the constitu- tional processes? It is not defined. When Secretary of State Dulles testi- fied before the Foreign Relations Com- mittee on the SEATO Treaty?I have read the testimony?he was asked what constitutional processes, meant. He replied that it meant the joint authority of the executive branch arid the Con- gress. The national commitments resolution was recently passed, expressing the same sense. If we are fighting in Thailand and Laos now, we should know it. The President of the United States? whether he be President Nixon, Presi- dent Johnson, or any President, in my view, has no right to taka our country into war without first coming to the Congress and asking for ite authority. If a situation should arise where our forces were being attacked, of course, the President has the constitutional right to defend them and to protect the security of our country. But I do not want war to occur because of carelessness or fail- ure to look ahead. If we get into war, I believe that the Senate wants the deter- mination to be made by the jelat au- thority of the President and the Con- gress. Mr. President, that is the meaning of my amendment. I shall withdraw the amendment to- night because many Senators have not had the opportunity to read it and to consider it. Unless the Armed Services Committee and its chairman modify the section by amendment?it has to be by amendment?and by Interpretation so precise that no one can think anything to the contrary. I want to say that I will bring up this admendraent again and we can determine if this body wants to Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 August 12, 196Approved FoCONCRMSAW1136tFigalik/P74'&11313UR000300100001-3 S 9783 abide by the constitutional processes, wants to abide by its national commit- ments resolution and wants to disap- prove funds for the use of our forces which could lead us into another war without the consent of Congress. Mr. President, I withdraw my amend- ment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky withdraws his amendment. Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator very much for his splendid remarks and for what I think is a constructive step, too, in withdrawing the amendment for the time being. That is all I have to say. Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator, and I may add to my re- marks that I shall ask for a rollcall. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I do not know what the wishes of the leader- ship or of the Senator from Mississippi are. I have a very minor amendment, which can go over until September, but I wanted to inquire as to the wishes of the Senator from Mississippi. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, a parlia- mentary inquiry. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator will state it. Mr. STENNIS. Has the amendment been adopted? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment has been withdrawn. No amendment is pending. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, in other words, the one which I amended in accordance with the Senator's amend- ment has been adopted, according to my understanding. Mr. STENNIS. That is my understand- ing. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, does the Senator wish me to offer amendment No. 111 at this time or not? The Sena- tor is familiar with it. Mr. STENNIS. I cannot agree to it. Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thought the Sena- tor had proposed an amendment to it. Mr. STENNIS. No; that is the wrong one. The Senator is referring to another amendment. I have only seen the amend- ment the Senator has handed me within the last hour or two. Mr. FULBRIGHT. This is No. 111. Mr. STENNIS. I was handed the wrong one. Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am sorry the Sen- ator was given the wrong amendment by mistake. Amendment No. 111 was sub- mitted and printed about a week ago. Mr. STENNIS. I am ready for the ,Senator to present his amendment, if he is agreeable to a proviso. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will 'ie Senator yield briefly? Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield to the Sen- tor from Montana. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I do feel I should let this occasion go by without expressing my respect, regard, and affection for the distinguished senior Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER) . What he tried to say and what he did was and is in the minds and hearts of all of us, and has been for almost half a decade, If not longer. I want him to know that I honor him for his persistence as well as for his sagacity and I am delighted that he is going to introduce again the amendment which he has withdrawn, because none of us can alibi himself out of what he did on the Tonkin resolution. It was plain, clear, and legible, and every one of us understood it, but that does not mean many of us have not regretted it. The reason why I am impressed by what the distinguished Senator has said is that he has tried, as best he knows how, to exercise his responsibility as a Senator of the United States, in the hope that this body?the Senate of the United States?will live up to its respon- sibility, collectively as well as individ- ually, and that we will participate, inso- far as we can within the realm of the Constitution, in making certain that we act in line with what President Nixon said just this past month, when he laid down, in Guam, the Nixon Doctrine for the Pacific. He said, in effect, "No more Vietnams." He said, in effect, we are a pacific na- tion, with peripheral Asian interests in the mainland. He said, in effect, we are not going to get involved in internal dif- ficulties. He said, in effect, we are not going to go to war again unless it is nu- clear and our security is at stake. So I am delighted that, even though the hour is late, the Senator from Ken- tucky did bring up this question. It is paramount. Everything that is happen- ing and has been happening in Vietnam has an indirect and a direct relationship to many of the other troubles that con- front this Republic today. I agree with the Senator that we do not want to get involved again in an area which is not vital to the security of this country, and in an area which has cost this country over $100 billion?and the end is not yet in sight?and not just 36,- 000, but altogether 44,000 dead?with the end not yet in sight?and with wounded of over 200,000?and the end not yet in sight. So I think the warning raised by the distinguished Senator from Kentucky should be and will be heeded. I want him to know that I honor him for what he has said, and I honor him for what he has done in this body. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I would like to associate myself with every- thing the majority leader has said about the Senator from Kentucky. The Sena- tor from Kentucky played a leading role relating to the recent resolution with regard to the responsibilities of the Senate and the Congress. In offering this proposal and in making the statement he made, he was carrying into effect the letter, and I think the spirit, of that resolution. He has rendered a great service. I could go further and say that, as a result of the efforts of the Senator from Kentucky, I have noticed that the Senate as a whole in recent weeks has shown a greater sensitivity to its responsibilities in this whole area than it has ever done in the 25 years I have been in the Senate. I think the Senator from Kentucky de- serves the credit which the Senator from Montana so appropriately expressed. Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, if the Sen- ator will yield, I wish to associate myself with the remarks just made by my col- leagues. The Senator from Kentucky is a dear old friend of mine. I make the practical suggestion that to articulate this amendment properly it will take not only the Department of Defense, but it will take the State Department, which have a role in trying to coordinate the military and diplomatic activities of the United States. I think the majority leader's words give added authority to the need for articu- lating an amendment which will be upon the level of the one we discussed so long and which was decided so narrowly, but which will truly seek to carry out a policy of the United States. That is what this amendment is really all about. I know that I, as a member of the com- mittee, and I am sure the chairman, will cooperate with our colleague from Ken- tucky, so that when he presents the pro- posal it will truly represent the Senate declaration as articulated, and which raises the question which the Senator from Colorado (Mr. ALLOTT) raised, all of which is pertinent to our security re- quirements. Mr. COOPER. I thank the Senator. Mr. JAVITS. I think he has rendered a historic service. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President-- Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, who has the floor? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator from Mississippi yielded to the Sen- ator from Arkansas. He had the floor initially held by the Senator from Mississippi. The Senator from Arkansas. Mr. FULBRIGHT. I was going to yield to the Senator from Kentucky. Mr. STENNIS. I yield briefly to the Senator from Kentucky. Mr. COOK. Mr. President, I wish to associate myself with the remarks made by the majority, leader and would like to say to my colleague that I would hope he would do us the honor, when he re- submits the amendment, to consider us- ing the argument that is now in the RECORD and disseminating it to the Members of this body, and that he would do many of us the honor of asking for cosponsors to his amendment when it may be submitted in the future. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Arkansas. If he would rather have the floor, I yield the floor. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Very well. I will take the floor. I want to direct an inquiry to the Senator. Mr. President, I wish to take the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator from Arkansas. Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is my under-, standing the Senator from Mississippi has prepared an amendment to my amendment No. 111?a proviso, I should say, at the end?which made the amend- ment acceptable to him. Is that correct? Mr. STENNIS. I may say to the Sena- tor from Arkansas that an additional question has arisen here about which I think we ought to have a colloquy with respect to possibly redrafting the amendment of the Senator. lam in sym- pathy with the amendment. I believe we could work something out along that line. Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000300100001-3 S 9784 Approved For ReANGRISSIMIL atliqUilfe1-BCat6I4M0300100001Agust 12, 1969 Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does the Senator wish to do that tonight or at a later date? Mr. STENNIS. If the Senator wishes to briefly offer his amendment, I may ask him some questions about it. We can get to it rather quickly. The amendment is relatively simple. It would require the Secretary of De- fense to make available to a congres- sional committee, upon request, any study or report prepared outside the Department of Defense which was financed in whole or in part by the M- partment. The purpose is to insure that the Congress is given access to research studies performed by the so-called "think tanks," the universities, or indi- viduals whose work is paid for by the taxpayers. The amendment recognizes the issue of executive privilege and care- fully specifies that the mandate applies only to work performed outside?I em- phasizing "outside"?the Department of Defense. This amendment is the outgrowth of an effort by the Committee on Foreign Relations to obtain a study prepared by the Institute for Defense Analysis relat- ing to the Gulf of Tonkin incident. It is my understanding that the study con- tains a review of what happened in the Gulf of Tonkin, how communications were handled, and in general how deci- sions were made. The purpose of the study, I was informed, was to determine what lessons could be learned for future crisis situations. I think that my col- leagues will agree that there is much that all of us can learn from that inci- dent and its aftermath. The committee has attempted several times to obtain this study from the Department of De- fense, but has been refused each time. The Institute for Defense Analysis re- ceives virtually all its feeds from the De- partment of Defense. In fiscal year 1969 this organization receiVed $10,898,000 from the Department of Defense and the Department proposes to give them $11,150,000 in 1970. I believe that the Congress, which im- poses the taxes on the public to finance this organization, and which authorizes and appropriates the money for it, should have the right to see how that money is being spent. The issue here is far more important than this one study?it is a question of whether the Congress has the power to obtain information, prepared outside the Government with tax money, for which no claim of executive privilege has been made. The Senate is beginning, at long last, to reassert its constitutional prerogatives and to restore the proper balance to our system. Passage of this amendment will be one small, but positive, step in that direction. So I do think that there is an impor- tant principle involved here. The Senator from Mississippi has proposed a modi- fication, which I think is proper, but whch he can discuss, which simply, as I understand it, says that these reports must be final in form?not tentative, or unfinished reports?which is what I in- tended. I am perfectly willing to modify my amendment in accordance with that suggestion. With this stated, I may say that, as a consequence of this morning's meeting, I propose a further amendment which I hope will be acceptable to the Senator from Mississippi. I have not previously prepared it, because it grew out of this morning's meeting of the committee with the representative of the Joint Chiefs. If it is acceptable, I hope the Senator will add it. If it is not, I will do the same as the Senator from Kentucky, and reserve it for further consideration. But if I may, I should like to read it for the informa- tion of the Senate. It is only one paragraph. I would add, if it is acceptable to the Senator from Mississippi, the following language: The Secretary of Defense shall also provide to the Conunittees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a copy of all bilateral contingency plans, signed by a representative of the Department of Defense and an official of a government of a foreign country, involving use of United States forces for the Joint defense of that country. I mean, of course, that foreign coun- try. I thought this language might solve or help solve a problem such as that which presently confronts us. It speaks for itself. If the Senator is willing to accept, it I shall include it; if he is not. I shall reserve it and see if we can work out Something mutually acceptable at a later date. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, address- ing myself to the last point of the pro- posal, this is a highly important matter. It demands the most careful analysis and consideration of the language, the implications, and the complications in- volved; so I very respectfully, at this time, could not seriously consider ac- cepting it. Mr. FULBRIGHT. If the Senator will yield, I do solicit his assistance, because I know he has great influence in the Department of Defense, in working this matter out. I very deeply regret to have a difference of view of this character with the Department of Defense. It in- volves exactly the same principle of the right of Congress?and now, of course, we are speaking of the Senate?to such Information as "What is the status of the agreement?" So, in the interim between now and the time when I shall offer it later, I hope the Senator from Mississippi will use his influence with the Department of Defense to prevail upon their making avalable to the committee the docu- ments, with which he is familiar. Mr. STENNIS. We will give the prob- lem attention. It is a matter that the full committee certainly ought to have a chance to pass upon. It appears to me that it is broad enough to include any and all kinds of war plans that might be made, or near war plans, so those mat- ters would have to be taken care of. Mr. FULBRIGIIT. I emphasize to the Senator that I did not mean that. This refers only to matters signed by the rep- resentative of a foreign country, in this case the Prime Minister of Thailand. This is most unusual. I asked the De- partment, "Is there any precedent? Is there anything similar to it?" They were unable to cite any other example of a similar nature. Mr. STENNLS. Mr. President, I am not passing on the facts the Senator re- fers to. I have not seen it, and know nothing about the contents of it. Back to the printed amendment, though, with the proviso on it, my pro- viso merely stated, "This shall apply only to reports, studies, and investiga- tions which are already or substantially final and complete, and shall not be ap- plicable to preliminary or tentative drafts," and so forth, "and working pa- pers." But going back, now, to the substance of amendment No. 111 as printed-- ANTFND1VrENT NO. 111 Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I believe I over- looked calling up amendment No. 111. I call up my amendment No. 111, and ask for its immediate consideration. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated. The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. The Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FIMBRIGHT) pro- poses arid amendment (No. 111) as fol- lows: At the end of the Nil add a new section as follows: "SEG. 402. The Secretary of Defense shall, in response to any request made to him in writing by a committee of the Congress, promptly submit to such committee a copy of any report, study, or investigation re- quested by such committee if such report, study, or investigation was made in whole or in part with Department of Defense funds and was made by a person, organization, foundation, association, corporation, or other entity outside the Department of Defense." Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I do not think this in any way would involve war plans, because it pertains only to work done by someone outside the Defense Department. But I raise this question: Why should it not apply to other entities outside the Defense Department, or any other department of the Government? If we just say "Defense Department," other departments could have these studies made, and pay for them themselves, and we would have no access to them. Per- haps we would not want it. But the main point is this: Suppose the President of the United States has an outside organization prepare some- thing for him, and it should be thus paid for? Suppose it is military, and very properly paid for by the Department of Defense? We could not afford to think ofr having such an amendment here, requir ing him to give us the report. That is purely executive privilege. Mr. FULBRIGAT. Well, of course there is no problem. The President ha executive privilege. Mr. STENNIS. I think the Senate should redraft this proposal, with th. printed language modified to clearly ex- clude matters of executive privilege, be- cause there is an instance that just came to mind a minute ago, that a President could very well have a department, have a study made, for himself and the de- partment. This executive privilege matter, I think, is a very serious thing. I have been through that. I am in sympathy with the intent of the Senator's amendment and Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 August 12, 1964PProved Fceells11681S820041M3RECCIRIEDP-7$616MR000300100001-3 S9785 its general, primary purpose, but I really think, with all due respect, it should be withdrawn. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I be- lieve I am correct in saying that the President of the United States can at any time?and of course he has pleaded on many occasions?plead executive privilege. We have never contested that with him. I do not see how that would be a real problem. He is not the one who is with- holding this. In fact, one request has been made of the President. I do not recall any incident with which I have been associated in which it has occurred. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the amendment merely provides that any kind of study, report, or investigation paid for with the Department of Defense funds shall be subjected to the will of Congress.' I think that is too much. A redrafting of it would make certain exclusions. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I un- derstood that the Senator, with his pro- viso, would accept it. Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is correct. I had indicated that. However, in the last few minutes I have become concerned about the matter of executive privilege. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, does the Senator wish for us to proceed with the debate and vote tonight on this mat- ter, or does he wish it to go over until September? I do not think it is essential to the survival of the Republic that we vote on the matter tonight. It is perfectly all right with me for it to go over. I do not wish to give up on it. It in- volves a very critical problem that we are in the midst of, and particularly the one I refer to with regard to the amend- ment. Mr. STENNIS. I think it has much merit. Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is what I un- derstood the Senator to think. Mr. STENNIS. Mr, President, I think It should spell out clearly the matter about executive privilege. I do not see how we can do that tonight. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I want the suggestion of the Senator with regard to spelling it out. It is not clear as to how to accomplish what he has in mind. Under the circumstances, if I may do so with the agreement of the Senator, I will withdraw the amendment temporar- ily with the assurance that I shall re- submit it when we return in September. Is that agreeable with the Senator? Mr. STENNIS. That is what I had ex- pected the Senator to do. Mr. FTJLBRIGHT. Mr. President, is that satisfactory with the Senator? Mr. STENNIS. Entirely so. Mr. FULBRIGHT. I will also try to in- corporate it with the provision and get it to the Senator in advance. Mr. STENNIS. That is entirely satis- factory. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I withdraw the amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is withdrawn. Mr. MANS/. Mr. President, do understand correctly that the amend- ment offered by the distinguished Sen- ator from Arkansas has been withdrawn? The PRESIDING 0.10.FiCER. The amendment has been withdrawn. The Senator from Wisconsin is recog- nized. Mr. PROXMTRE. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 108 and ask that it be made the pending business. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated. The legislative clerk proceeded to state the amendment. Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with and that the amendment be printed in the RECORD. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The amendment, ordered to be printed In the RECORD, reads as follows: On page 2, line 7, strike out "3,965,700,000" and insert in lieu thereof "$3,432,700,000". At the end of the bill add a new section as follows: "Ssc. 402. (a) None of the funds author- ized to be appropriated by this or any other Act may be expended for the procurement of any C-5A aircraft in addition to those air- craft for which a contract has been' entered into prior to the date of enactment of this Act, and in no event shall more than a total of fifty-eight of such aircraft be purchased until after the Comptroller General of the United States has completed and submitted to the Congress a comprehensive study and investigation of the past and projected costs of such aircraft. In carrying out such study and investigation the Comptroller General of the United States shall among other things, consider? "(1) whether the C-5A aircraft is an eco- nomic replacement for the C-141 and other aircraft in view of the great increase in both the procurement and operating costs of the C-5A aircraft; "(2) whether the purchase of a fourth squadron of C-5A aircraft would add sig- nificantly to the deployment capability of the military forces of the United States; "(3) whether the purchase of a fourth squadron of C-5A aircraft would 'make the United States liable for all contractor losses and termination costs if a total of six squad- rons of such aircraft were not procured; "(4) whether the purchase of a fourth squadron of the C-5A aircraft would make the United States liable for the cost of repairs and modifications necessary to correct the structural defect revealed in the recent fail- ure of the C-5A wing; "(5) the current cost estimates necessary to complete? "(a) Run A of the C-5A aircraft, "(b) the first twenty-three units of Run B of such aircraft, and "(c) the remainder of Run B of such aircraft, including spares and operating expenses for such aircraft over the next ten years; and "(6) the cost results to the United States of applying the repricing formula contained in the C-5A procurement contract on the first twenty-three units of Run B of such aircraft and on the complete Run B of such aircraft. "(b) In carrying out the study and inves- tigation authorized by subsection (a) of this section, the Comptroller General of the United States shall consult with the Office of Systems Analysis of the Department of Defense. "(c) The Comptroller General of the United States shall submit the results of his study and investigation, together with such recommendations as he deems appropriate, to the Congress not more than ninety days after the date of enactment of this Act." Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, this is the amendment that pertains to re- ducing funds for the C-5A. I stated on the basis of the colloquy previously between the chairman of the committee and the distinguished ma- jority leader that the amendment would not be voted on until we return in the fall, but that it would be the first order of business at that time. Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield. Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, the Sen- ator from California wants to confirm his understanding that the pending busi- ness when we return after the recess has already been laid down. Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator from California is correct. The C-5A amend- ment presented by the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE) will be the pending business. Mr. MURPHY. That amendment will be the pending business. Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is cor- rect. Mr. MURPHY. It is not the desire of the Senator to pursue this matter to- night, but to carry over on it; is that correct? Mr. PROXMIRE. I will make remarks on the amendment tomorrow, but I un- derstand that there will be no vote on it until the fall. Mr. MURPHY. I thank the Senator. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I un- derstand that there will be no further rollcall votes tonight. In all candor, there will be none on tomorrow, either. THE CALENDAR Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate pro- ceed to the consideration of Calendar Nos. 349 to 358. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. MISS JALILEH FARAH SALAMEH EL AHWAL The bill (H.R. 1707) for the relief of Miss Jalileh Farah Salameh El Ahwal was considered, ordered to a third read- ing, read the third time, and passed. MISS MARIA MOSIO The bill (H.R. 5107) for the relief of Miss Maria Mosio was considered, or- dered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an excerpt from the report (No. 91-357) explaining the purpose of the bill. There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: PFRPOSE OF THE BILL The purpose of the bill is to facilitate the entry into the United States, in an immedi- Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9786 Approved ForREdmitailMONALWRRith1ROggitkpRO30010000'lzx3 iagust 12,?1969 ate relative status of the adopted daughter of a U.S. citizen. BILL PASSED OVER The bill (H.R. 3213) conferring juris- diction upon the U.S. Court of Claims to hear, determine, and render judgment upon the claim of Solomon S. Levadi was announced as next in order. Mr. MANSFIELD. Over. The PRESIDING 0./01010ER. The bill will be passed over. ANTHONY smmico The bill (H.R. 8136) for the relief of Anthony Smilko was considered, ordered to a third reading, read the third time. and passed. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an excerpt from the report (No. 91-360), explaininz the purposts of the bill. There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD. as follows: PURPOSE ? The purpose of the propoiled legislation is to credit the annual leave account of An- thony Smilko, a General rvices Adminis- tration employee, with 321 hours of annual leave earned by him during the period begin- ning April 1959, and ending December 1985, inclusive which, through adiranistrative er- ror, was not credited to his annual leave account. STATEMENT The proposed legislation plas-ed the House of Representatives May 20, 1969. The facts of the case as stated in the accompanying House Report 91-204 are as follow': In its report to the committee on a similar bill in the 90th Congress, tile General Serv- ices Administration recomnianded the enact- ment of the bill with correetions which are now embodied in H.R. 8136. Mr. Anthony Smilko served as an employee of the general Services Adminiatration in the period rrom April 1959 through the end of 1985 and in that period he was credited with 20 days of annual leave per year. However, It was subsequently determined that in that period he was, in fact, entitled to 26 days per year. The error in crediting Iiis annual leave occurred because the leave was computed on the basis of a service computation date of August 0, 1919, rather than the correct date of April 5, 1944, which should have been used for purposes of determining annual leave computations. In the period In question Mr. Smilko was credited with 1,1i7 annual leave hours when he should haft been credited with 1,438 hours. As a reshit, he was not credited with 321 hours to which he was entitled. This is the figure carried in the bill H.R. 8136. In its report to the committee, the Gen- eral Services Administration observed that this error can only be adjusted by legisla- tion and, accordingly, it is reeen mended that the bill providing for a credit in a separate leave account be made to Anthony Smilko by enactment of the bill. The Oeueral Services Administration further stated that the Civil Service Commission has indicated to the General Services Administration that they do not object to the enactment of private legislation in this instance, for the leave merely provides for a restoration of the leave for use only and not for the purpose of a lump-sum payment. It is also appropriate to note that, whereas the Civil Service commis- sion states that future cages ought to be covered by general legislation, such leglisla- tion would not normally grant retroactive re- lief in Mr. Srnilko's case. In agreement with the views of the Civil Service Commission, the General Services Ad- ministration, and the House of Representa- tives, the committee recommends the bill favorably. BERNARD L. COULTER The Senate proceeded to consider the bill (H.R. 4658) for the relief of Bernard L. Coulter which had been reported from the Committee on the Judiciary with an amendment on page 2, line word "of" strike out "C "Cook". The amendmen The amendm engrossed and time. The bill passed. Mr. M unanimo the REC No. 91- the bill. Ther was or as folio' The as amen in settle States a of an ace curred on nerd L. Cou motor vehic as an employ Justice. The p bill would also judgment and cos ernment employee the Circuit Court of upon that accident. ? e" and inser as agreed to. t was ordered to be e bill to be read a third S read the third time, and WIELD. Mr. President, I ask consent to have printed in D an excerpt from the report- 55?explaining the purposes of ? being no objection, the excerpt ered to be printed in the RECORD, s: PURPOSE rpose of the proposed legislation, sal, is to pay Richard S. Bell $313.66 ent of his claims against the United Bernard L. Coulter arising out ent in Chicago, Ill., which oc- ecember 17, 1961, when Ber- er was operating a Government In the course of his duties of the U.S. Department of ment provided for in this In full satisfaction of a entered against the Gov- a municipal court of ok County, Ill., based I I ? ? STATEMEN In its favorable report o the bill, the Committee on the Judiciary the House of Representatives set forth ?e facts of the case and its recommendations ?s follows: The Department of Justice in a report to the committee on a similar b I dated July 22, 1968, stated that it had e mined the circumstances of the case and , con- cluded that passage of the bill wou d be equitable and that the Department ha. no objection to its enactment. The report of the Department of Jus ice notes that had the accident occurred er March 21, 1962, the effective date of he Drivers Act Amendment to the Federal T Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2679 (b-e), the Gove n- ment would have been substituted for r nard L. Coulter as the sole party defend nt. The result of this substitution would ave been that any judgment would have t? have been paid byathe Government. This end- ment, which originated as a bill ore this committee, was intended to otect em- ployees such as Mr. just such sit- uations. Prior to the enactment of these provisions, this committee had granted re- lief such as that provided in H.R. 4658 in a number of cases. It might also be noted that had the other party electecl,. to bring an action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, a recovery against the United States would have barred any action against the Government employee. This is provided in section 2676 of title 28, which provides as follows: "? 2676. Judgment as bar "The judgment in an action under section 1846(b) of this title shall constitute a com- plete bar to any action by the claimant by reason of the same subject matter, against the employee of the Government whoee act or omission gave rise to the claim." In connection with the consideration of this rnatterathe committee was supplied with additional facts concerning the accident, It appears that Mr: Coulter had stopped at a stop sign at the intersection of 45th and South Drexel Boulevard in Chicago, Ill., while traveling in an eastbound direction. On De- cember 17, 1961, there was Ice on the streets and after starting the car, the Government employee realized that due to the icy con- dition, he was unable to accelerate the car enough to clear the intersection and avoid approaching traffic. He, therefore, stopped the ar after proceeding 4 to 7 feet into the in- section. The oncoming car continued to ap roach and struck the Government vehicle at that point. The committee has carefully considered the matter in the light of the recommenda- tion of the Department and the facts of the case and has determined that this is a proper subject for legislative relief. The policy con- siderations reflected in the provisions of the Tort Claims Act as noted by the Department of Justice further provide a basis for such relief. Accordingly, it is recommended that the bill, with the corrective amendment rec- ommended by the Department, be considered favorably. The coramittee believes that the bill is meritorious and recommends it favorably. THE NAVAJO INDIAN IRRIGATION PROJECT The Senate proceeded to consider the bill (S. 203) to amend the act of June 13, 1962 (76 Stat. 96), with respect to the Navajo Indian irrigation project which had been reported from the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, with an amendment, on page 2, after line 3, strike out: "(d) The Secretary of the Interior shall compensate the persons whose grazing per- mits, licenses, or leases covering lands de- clared to be held in trust for the Navajo Tribe pursuant to section 8(a) of this Act are canceled after the date this subsection becomes effective. Sulah compensation shall be determined in accordance with the stand- ards prescribed in the Act of July 9, 1942, as amended (43 U.S.C. 315q), and shall be paid from the moneys received by the United States from the Navajo Tribe for the full ap- praised value of such lands under the pro- visions of section 3(a)." And, in lieu thereof, insert: (d) Any permits, licenses, or leases that have been granted on lands acquired and de- clared to be held in trust for the Navajo Tribe pursuant to section 8(a) of this Act shall be canceled on the effective date of this Act, except that permits, licenses, or leases whose term has not expired at the time of cancellation thereof by this Act, shall con- tinue in effect for the term of the permit, license, or lease under regulations for Indian lands until the land is required for irrigation purposes. When such lands are required for irrigation purposes, the permittee, licensee, or lessee shall be compensated by the Navajo Tribe proportionately for the value of devel- opments or irnproveinents made by such permittee, licensee, or lessee and which sueh permittee, licensee, or lessee was unable to utilize fully because of the cancellation of the permit, license, or lease, as determined by the Secretary of the Interior. So as to make the bill read: S. 203 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 August 12, 19 6ApppysAjf oFfIgiEligSidatiniaige-WittP7 Mbi1SUR000300100001-3 S 9797 mal times involves two complete task forces in reserve, thereby making the in- vestment cost of placing one "on station" three times $1.4 billion or $4.2 billion. To build an airbase in the Pacific costs $53 million; a civilian runway can be op- erational for tactical air with a bare base set for approximately $36 million. Third. Because of their high degree of vulnerability to enemy attacks, carriers are far less effectiVe than land bases. In recognition of the carrier's vulner- ability to attacks by submarines, aircraft, ship-to-ship and air-launched missiles, one-half of the cost of a carrier task force is for carrier defense. About 25 percent of a carrier's aircraft are held back for defensive purposes-- during the Korean war, 23 percent of the total combat sorties flown from car- riers were defensive, in contrast to 2.7 percent flown from land bases. Because of its tremendous investment in a carrier task force, the Navy is slow to commit the carrier to combat; once committed the carrier cannot effectively launch air attacks when attempting to evade enemy attack. Rapid advances in missile technology have produced the STYX and other more advanced antiship missiles, mak- ing the carrier's position untenable in any conflict with a sophisticated enemy. Fourth. Instead of reducing its carrier fleet, thereby accepting the realities of present and future defense needs, the Navy has continued to augment this fleet. The carriers which have joined the fleet since the mid-1950's?eight Forres- tal class, one Enterprise, and the CVAN- 68?the nuclear carrier which will enter the fleet in 19'72?are almost double the size of the older carriers, are equipped with the most modern aircraft, and, therefore, have far greater capability for tactical air than the oldest carriers which they replace. The Navy has stated that the nuclear carrier air wing is tactically more than twice as effective as that of the World War II carriers. Since the Navy has followed a "one for one" replacement policy in the past, the actual capacity of the carrier fleet in terms of providing tactical air power is far greater than 15 carrier' force level would imply. There is no reason why the Navy can- not reduce the number of attack carriers by retiring two of the older carriers as each of the modern carriers joins the fleet. Since the large, modern carriers are only effective in very limited conflicts, the Navy should use some of its,antisub- marine carriers, CVS, for attack pur- poses; one of these carriers is now being used in Vietnam as an attack carrier. Fifth. The fact that our adversaries and potential adversaries do not have at- tack carriers further weakens the justifi- cation for the present size of the U.S. carrier fleet. Neither the Soviet Union or China has built a single attack carrier, and neither plans to do so. The British and the French are the only other nations with an attack carrier in their fleet, and the British have decided to phase out their carriers. Whether the U.S. goal is military Par- AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRI- ATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MISSILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RESERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH?AMENDMENT AMENDMENT NO. 136 Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, on be- half of myself and Senator CASE, I am submitting .an amendment to the mili- tary authorization bill, now before the Senate. This amendment withholds the $377.1 million authorized for laying the keel of the nuclear attack carrier CVAN-69, pending a full study and investigation by the Comptroller General of the justi- fication for building an additional attack carrier. The United States has 15 attack car- riers, each requiring a task force of escorts and logistical ships, and it has maintained the same number?with few exceptions?since the end of World War No adequate rationale for a force level of this size has ever been presented by the Navy. That? 15 is. an arbitrary number is indicated by the fact that the United States has always had at least 15 capital ships since it was allotted this quota under the Washington Naval Dis- armament Treaty of 1921. When the at- tack carrier replaced the battleship as the capital ship, the Navy switched from 15 battleships to 15 carriers. With the advent of Minuteman and Polaris missiles, the attack carrier is no longer part of our strategic nuclear forces; its primary mission is to provide tactical air power. The use of 15 attack carrier task forces to carry out this mis- sion is simply wasteful and inefficient. First. The assignment of nine carrier task forces in the Western Pacific and six in the Mediterranean overlaps and dupli- cates U.S. land-based tactical air capacity. The United States maintains some 138 squadrons of tactical fighters and bomb- ers in active forces on land bases at home and abroad, including 3,350 active air- craft and 23 wings. This capability for land-based tactical air power is impressive, especially in light of the fact that with modern mid-air refueling techniques, the U.S.-based tactical air forces can be operational in a very short period of time. The geographic spread of overseas air bases operated by or available to the United States is such as to sharply re- duce the need for continually maintain- ing attack carriers "on station" in the Mediterranean and the Western Pacific. The Air Force is developing a Bare Base Support Program, which will enable the United States to convert 1,000 avail- able overseas civilian runways into mili- tary airfields With the use of "pre-posi- tioned" kits within less than 3 days. Second. A carrier base is far more ex- pensive than a land base. The procurement cost of one nuclear carrier task force?one carrier and four destroyers?is a minimum of $1.4 billion, and it can run much higher. But to keep one such task force "on station" in nor- ity or superiority vis-a-vis the navies of other nations, it is obvious that we could substantially reduce our carrier force lev- el without any danger to national se- curity. In addition to these arguments, there are serious foreign policy implications to the "show of force" role of the carrier in support of U.S. foreign policy com- mitments. It is official naval doctrine that one of the main advantages of car- rier air power is that it can be employed unilaterally, without involving third parties and without invoking treaties, agreements, or overflight rights. How- ever, except where the United States it- self is threatened, it is highly question- able that we should be prepared to inter- vene in conflicts unilaterally and with- out making political arrangements. If air power is needed to protect our interests, naval doctrine ignores the availability of land bases in most areas of the world. If a "show of force" in the form of U.S. naval presence is needed, older attack carriers, antisubmarine carriers, or other types of ships' will be adequate. In the face of these arguments, it would be fiscally irresponsible to author- ize an additional carrier at this time un- til there is a full discussion of the role of the attack carrier and the necessary force level needed to carry out this role. That is why our amendment calls for a study by the Comptroller General, and anticipates a full congressional debate before continuing to spend billions of dollars on this highly expensive and often ineffective means of providing tactical air power. I ask unanimous consent that the text of this amendment be printed in the REC- ORD at this point. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be received and printed, and will lie on the table; and, without objection, the amendment will be printed in the RECORD. The amendment (No. 136) is as fol- lows: On page 2, line 16, strike out "2,568,200,- 000;" and insert in lieu thereof "2,191,100,- 000;" At the end of the bill add a new section as follows: "Ssc. 402. None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this or any other Act may be expended in connection with the pro- duction or procurement of the nuclear air- craft carrier designated as CVAN-69; and no funds may be appropriated for any such pur- pose until after the Comptroller General of the United States has completed and submit- ted to the Congress a comprehensive study and investigation of the past and projected costs and effectiveness of attack aircraft car- riers and their task forces and a thorough re- view of the considerations which went into the decision to maintain the present number of attack carriers. In carrying out such study and investigation the Comptroller General of the United States shall, among other things, consider? "1. What are the primary limited war mis- sions of the attack carrier; what role, if any, does it have in strategic nuclear planning; "2. To what extent and in what way is the force-level of on-station and back-up carriers related to potential targets and the number of sorties needed to destroy these targets; "3. What is the justification for maintain- ing on continual deployment 2 carriers in the Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9798 Approved For Repagene41410AlL qiimmallIBM?ilily.W030010000kkust 12, 1969 Charles S. Guy, of Pennsylvania, to be U.S. marshal for the eastern district of Pennsylvania for the term of 4 years, vice James P. Delaney. On behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary, notice is hereby given to all Persons interested in this nomination to file with the committee, in writing, on or before Tuesday, August 19, 1969, any representations or objections they may wish to present concerning the above nomination, with a further statement whether it is their intention to appear at any hearing which may be scheduled. Mediterranean and from 3 to 5 in the West- ern Pacific; "4. What is the over-all attack carrier force level needed to carry out these primary missions; "5. Does the present `one for one' replace- ment policy for these carriers have the effect of maintaining or increasing this force level, in light of the fact that the newer carriers and their aircraft are more expensive and have far more capability than the oldest car- riers which they are now replacing; "6. Would a policy of replacing two of the oldest carriers with one modern carrier main- tain a constant force level; "7. How many, if any, attack carriers and carrier task forces are needed to back-up a carrier task force 'on-the-line'; "8. What efficiencies, such as the Polaris 'blue and gold' crew concept, can be utilizsd to increase the time in which a carrier can stay 'on-the-line'; "9. What type of military threats are faced by the attack carrier; what proportion of the costs of a carrier task force are allocated to carrier defense; what is the estimated effec- tiveness of carrier defense against various types and levels of threats; "10. To what extent does the carrier's vul- nerability affect its capacity to carry out its missions; what are the plausible contingen- cies in which carriers may be committed; "11. What type of resources should be de- voted to carrier defense, considering the range of threats, the costs and effectivenees of the defense, and the plausible contingen- cies in which a carrier can be effectively used; "12. To what extent can lend-based tacti- cal air power substitute for attack carriers; to what extent should the role uf the attack carrier be restricted to the initial stages of a conflict; "13. What are the comparative mysteries costs for land-based and sea-based tactical air power, and what is their cOmparative coa effectiveness; "14. How is the attack carrier being used in support of American feteign policy; if there is a need for a 'show-of force' in sup- port of foreign policy commitments, can this need be met by smaller carriers or other types of ships? "The Comptroller General of the United States shall submit the results of his study and investigation, together with such recant- mendations as he deems appropriate, to the Congress not later than June 30, 1970." GENERAL REVISION OF THE COPY- RIGHT LAW, TITLE 17 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE?AMEND- MENT AMENDMENT NO. 137 Mr. HART. Mr. President, for the la$1 60 years there has been no change in the flat fee composers and authors of musical works have received, under the Copyright Act of 1909, for the use of their creations by recording companies. The fee, called a "mechanical royalty," is 2 cents for each selection recorded. Although vast changes have occurred since 1909 in the price of records, the cost of living and technology in the rec- ord industry, the composer and author still get the same 2 cents. The copyright revision bill S. 543, rec- ognized the inequity of this and would increase the mechanical royalty to 24 cents per selection. This is inequitable since it does not take into consideration changes in the prices of records by rec- ord manufacturers. It would impose on Congress a continuing responsibilitY of fixing royalty payments. This burden on Congress in order to do equity to authors and composers can be removed by substituting for a flat cent rate royalty in S. 543 a flexible roy- alty, namely a percent of the retail price of the record suggested by the manufac- turer. This would permit authors and composers to share in the increased prices at which records have said since 1909, for example the replacement of $3.98 records by $4.98 records and by stereo tape cartridges and cassettes sell- ing for $6.98 and $7.98. Mr. President. I am submitting now an amendment to section 115 of S. 543 which would serve the purpose I have stated. The PRESIDING OisisiCER. The amendment will be received and printed, and will be appropriately referred. The amendment was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. NOTICE CONCERNING NOMINATION BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, the following nominations have been re- ferred to and are now pending before the Committee on the Judiciary: Peter Mills, of Maine, to be 'U.S. attor- ney for the district of Maine for the term of 4 years, vice Lloyd P. LaFoun- taM, John H. deWinter, of Maine, to be U.S. marshal for the district of Maine for the term of 4 years, vice Adam J. Walsh. On behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary, notice is hereby given to all persons interested in these nominations to file with the committee, in writing on or before Tuesday, August 19, 1969, any representations or objections they may wish to present concerning the above nominations, with a further statement whether it is their intention to appear at any hearing which may be scheduled. NOTICE CONCERNING NOMINATION BEVORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President. the following nomination has been re- ferred to and is now pending before the Committee on the Judiciary: Wayman G. Sherrer, of Alabama, to be U.S. attorney for the northern dis- trict of Alabama for the term of 4 years, vice Macon L. Weaver. On behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary, notice is hereby given to all persons interested in this nomination to file with the committee, in writing, on or before Tuesday, August 19, 1969, any representations or objections they may wish to present concerning the above nomination, with a further statement whether it is their intention to appear at any hearing which may be scheduled. NOTICE CONCERNING NOMINATION BEFORE THE COMMI rrEE ON THE JUDICIARY Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, the following nomination has been re- ferred to and is now pending before the Committee on the Judiciary: "SLUG" SULLIVAN, FOSTER GRANDPARENT Mr. MANSFIELD Mr. President, the VISTA voluntary program has been ac- tive in many areas of the State of Mon- tana, and perhaps one of the most Pop- ular has been the Foster Grandparent program. This pis:gram is designed to keep our senior citizens active in working with the local schools and hospitals. One of my oldest and closest associ- ates in Montana, John L. "Slug" Sulli- van, has become very active and one of the leaders in the Foster Grandparent program in Helena. "Slug" Sullivan is 78 years of age and has found his latest endeavor most worthwhile and satisfy- ing. A recent feature story published in the Independent Record dismisses the pro- gram at some length and gives an ac- count of John Sullivan's activities as a Foster Grandparent. This group of elder citizens help young people to overcome feelings of inferiority and to develop self- assurance and understanding. "Slug" was one of my earliest political mentors in Butte, Mont. I found the article written by Robert Sibley, a VISTA volunteer, most inter- esting and ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the REcom. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: ONCE A FIGHTER , Now A LOVING FosTin ORANDPAIVENT (By Robert Sibley) (NoTE.?Bob Sibley, 25, aVISTA volunteer from Washington, D.C., is using his master's degree in journalism to aid the VISTA pro- gram serving elderly persons in Montana. Here he describes the Foster Grandparents segment of the program.) When Mike Mansfield was first deciding to run for Congress, he asked his old friend "Slug" Sullivan what he thought. "Well, I think you don't know too many people right ram" Slug answered. "But af- ter they get to know you, they'll like you. You should run this first time just to get advertising for yourself, and next time you'll probably make it." Mike Mansfield was defeated in his first race for Congress, but just as Slug predicted, he won the second time he ran and has been winning ever since. John L. "Slug" Sullivan has a lot of moments like this that b can recall as though they happenes just a few hours ago, even though they may have taken place more than 40 years back. "CLEAN rare" Tan and healthy looking with an easy- coming smile, Slug's appearance belies his 78 years; nevertheless, that's how old he is. Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 CIA-RDP71B_Q03_64R000300100001-3 August 11, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? should SEN E S9519 also be designed to deal with the consequences of new defense spending as well as the curtailment of spending. In short, I am suggesting that such a high- level Commission should be designed to deal not not only with the economic problems associated with a reduction in defense spending but also with all phases of the relationship between the ongoing military-industrial complex and the economy. In regards to the general ques- tion of conversion to a peacetime econ- omy, I was pleased to hear President Nixon state in his inaugural address: We shall plan now for the day when our wealth can be transferred from the destruc- tion of war abroad to the urgent needs of our people at home. Following up on this pledge, the Pres- ident has asked a subcommittee of the Council for Economic Policy chaired by Dr. Herbert Stein, to initiate policy plan- ning for converting our economy to a peacetime basis. Mr. President, over the past few months the military-industrial complex, its meaning and its dangers, has been the subject of far ranging, searching dis- cussion and analysis. On the whole I think this has been healthy. I hope that the debate will continue. However, I also believe that we have reached the stage where we should do more than talk and debate. We should begin to act. And in this respect there are a number of meas- ures Which the Congress could adopt in the near future. I have pointed to several such possible measures today. I again urge their favorable consideration by the Senate. And in closing I would return to Presi- dent Eisenhower's message. In citing the dangers of the military-industrial com- plex, President Eisenhower also stressed the fact that the complex was the prod- uct of necessity. Thus we cannot control these dangers by destroying the complex as some would seem to suggest. The mili- tary-industrial complex is a fact of mod- ern American life. No amount of wish- ing will make it go away. At the same time all must recognize that although there are dangers inherent to the mili- tary-industrial complex these dangers are not inherently uncontrollable. In other words we must keep the military- industrial complex in a proper perspec- tive. We must see both its essentiality and also its potential for abuse. We must have it, but we must control it. We must be vigorous in our efforts to see to it that It is a servant of peace and prosperity rather than the servant of war and de- struction. Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. PEARSON. I am very pleased to yield to my colleague from Kansas. Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, first of all, I commend My colleague from Kansas for a general review of the so-called military-industrial complex. I feel that most of us will agree with many things said. I wish to add that we are fortunate in this administration to have a man like Melvin Laird as Secre- tary of Defense. I know of no one who has gone to the Cabinet level so well equipped. As my colleague knows, Mr. Laird for 14 years was a member of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. Mr. Laird was a prober. He was a critic. He was a questioner. But, above all, he understood the Defense Department. He understood its responsibility, he tried to make the Department responsive and responsible when he could do so. At the outset of this administration, both Secretary Laird and Under Secre- tary Packard had expressed the philos- ophy that we should take a close look at all of the programs and reexamine our military requirements and validate the need for any new major weapons system. I would hope my colleague would agree that in the span of 6, 7, or 8 months, progress has been made by Secretary Laird. I would cite only a few examples of responsible progress under Mr. Laird. First, Mr. Laird has established a De- fense Systems Acquisition Review Coun- cil within the office of the Secretary of Defense to advise the Secretary of the current status and the readiness of each major system to proceed to the next phase of efforts in its life cycle. Second, and I think this very im- portant, there has been the appointment of a blue ribbon defense panel by the Secretary. This is a matter that he pur- sued with vigor while a Member of the House of Representatives. A blue ribbon defense panel has been appointed to re- appraise the Defense Establishment, There has been the cancellation of the manned orbital laboratory. There has been the termination of the Cheyene helicopter program. There have been new, frank, and can- did reports to both the Senate and House Armed Services Committees on major weapons acquisitions. Mr. Laird has attempted to provide ?Congress with more information. He has done an excellent job getting facts so that the Senate and the House can make valid adjustments. He has also en- dorsed as recently as July 31 the estab- lishment of a Commission on Govern- ment Procurement. He views the Com- mission as another positive step in re- porting on the methods of military pro- curement. There have been numerous improve- ments in the management of weapons acquisition process. As recently as Saturday we find the Secretary concurring in the judgment of the Senate concerning chemical and biological weapons. As an addition to the remarks of my colleague from Kansas, I want the record to show that we have a Secretary of Defense who is just as dedi- cated as anyone in the Senate or any- one in Congress in saving the taxpayers' money, and just as concerned about any so-called military-industrial complex. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GRAVEL in the chair) . Under the prior unanimous-consent agreement, the Sen- ate will now proceed to other business. Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may continue for an additional 5 minutes. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres- ident, I am constrained to object. This unanimaous-consent request was made last week, as I understand, and Senators were put on notice that debate an the pending McIntyre amendment would be controlled and would last for 1 hour after the unfinished business was laid down. Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, I will withdraw the request. I do appreciate the situation of the leadership in this respect, and they were very gracious to give me time this morning. I can respond at an- other time. (03424 AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA- TIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RE- SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MIS- SILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJ- ALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RE- SERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business, which will be stated. The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (S. 2546) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1970 for procure- ment of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and to au- thorize the construction of test facilities at Kwajalein Missile Range, and to pre- scribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces and for other purposes. The PRESIDING 010.FiCER. The ques- tion is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from New Hampshire. Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question? Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield 1 minute to the Senator. Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, this Is getting to be a rather unusual pro- cedure, to request unanimous consent for a specific time for a speech and then nobody can make a rebuttal. The Senator made an excellent speech. I do not agree with it in its entirety. He used President Eisenhower's quota- tions but he did not use enough of them. If I have to wait until tomorrow or Sep- tember, the point I want to make will have lost its effectiveness. I think I am going to start opposing all unanimous-consent requests for this type of presentation. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I thank the Senator. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that a brief quorum call may be had at this time. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator withhold his request for a quorum call? What was the unanimous-consent re- quest? Did the Senator make a unani- mous-consent request about limitation? Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. No. That was made last week. Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres- ident, I ask unanimous consent that there be a brief quorum call, the time to be equally divided between both sides. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres- ident, I suggest the absence of a quorum.. Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9520 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 11, 1966 The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres- ident, I ask unanimous Consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres- ident, I ask imanimoui consent that, at the conclusicm of the vote on the pend- ing amendment, the alSie chairman of the Committee on Armed Services be recognized. The PRESIDING OtoricER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Who yields time? Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, how much time does the Senator desire? Mr. McINTYRE. Ten minutes or so. Mr. NELSON. I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from New Hampshire. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE Mr. McINTYRE, Mr. President, the Senate today will consider amendment No. 131, which I introduced last Friday together with Senators YARBOROUGH, PROXMIRE, HARTKE, PELL, NELSON, MON- DALE, STEVENS, GOODELL, and HUGHES. Had more time been available after the introduction, I am certain many other Senators would have joined in its sponsorship. On an associated point, Mr. President, may I say that I was particularly pleased with Defense Secretary Melvin Laird's statement Saturday. This statement, ex- pressing his concurrence with the goals of this amendment, reflects an admirable understanding on the part of the Secre- tary of the need for improved manage- ment and control of chemical and bio- logical warfare programs. Secretary Laird also deserves com- mendation for recommending a National Security Council study of these matters, and President Nixon deserves much praise for ordering the study. Most helpful, too, in the present ex- amination of CBW programs has been the consistent, progressive leadership of the distinguished chairman of the Com- mittee on Armed Services, the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) . We are considering today a coordi- nated effort to deal with a highly coin- plex and unpopular part of our defense structure in such a way as to achieve the kind of congressional control and national understanding we feel is needed, while, at the same time, avoiding in- volvement of the Senate in the lengthy procedure which would be required were we to take up a number of separate amendments. Moreover, by bringing together in a single package a number of proposals involving ? chemical and biological war- fare programs, our consideration can be all the more comprehensive. The amendment introduced Friday did not include a section covering one particular area. The proposal dealing with this particular area was originally put forth by the distinguished Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE) I am happy to say that since Friday we have reached agreement on the language for this sec- tion, a section relating to the subject of so-called "back-door financing" of CBW programs. Mr. President, I send this section to the desk and ask unanimous consent to have it added to amendment No. 131, to- gether with technical changes that have been made to the original amendment, No. 131; and I ask unanimous consent to have it printed at this point in the RECORD. The PRESIDING OrtoICER Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. The modification is as follows: At the end of amendment No. 131 add a new subsection as follows: "(g) (1) Except as provided in subsection (g) (2) of this section, no funds authorized to be appropriated by this, or any other later enacted Act may be expended for research, development, test, evaluation, or procure- ment of any chemical or biological weapon, including any such weapon used for in- capacitation, defoliation, or other military operations. "(g) (2) The prohibition contained in sub- section (g) (1) of this section shall not apply with respect to funds authorized to be ap- propriated by this Act." On page 4, line 3, insert "will" between "agente and "be". On page 4, line 6, change "subsections (e) (1) " to "subsections (d) (1)". On page 4, line 7, change "(e) (2) " to "(d) (2)". On page 4, line 21, change "or an other" to "or any other". On page 5, line 2, insert "of the Public Health Service" after "Surgeon General". On page 5, line 3, delete "President" and insert "Secretary of Defense". On page 4, line 22, insert "or any" after "lethal chemical agents,". Mr. McINTYRE, Mr. President, a word must be said at this point about the ex- cellent work done by each of the Sena- tors who have contributed sections of this amendment. Their individual re- search, the honing of their proposals to a remarkable precision of language, and the spirit of cooperation exhibited in their willingness to consolidate their pro- posals into a single amendment is in the finest tradition of this great body. As we take up consideration of the amendment, let us keep in mind that al- ready included in the overall legislation before us is a $16 million reduction in the Defense Department's budget for re- search and development in lethal offen- sive chemical and biological warfare. This reduction was recommended by my Subcommittee on Research and Devel- opment and accepted by the full Armed Services Committee. I raise this thought so that, as we take up consideration of the amendment, we have a comprehensive picture of the ac- tion we can take in regard to CBW pro- grams. Now let me identify each of the sec- tions of this amendment. I will not go into detail because I know other Mem- bers intend to do that. The first section (402) (a), also de- veloped by our able colleague the Sen- ator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE) , Calls for a full and complete semiannual re- port by the Secretary of Defense to the Congress setting forth in detail the total CBW research, development, test eval- uation, and procurement program. This, of course, would provide Con- gress with the kind of detailed informa- tion Congress and the public need in order to understand the programs and to determine future direction. The second section (402) (b), developed by the able $enator from Wisconsin (Mr. Nztsost), and the able Senator from New York (Mr. Goorista.), provides that no funds can be used for the procurement of any delivery system which is specifically designed to disseminate lethal agents. This section, Mr. President, makes clear our opposition to the use of lethal CBW agents as offensive weapons and prohibits expenditure of funds for any device designed to deliver these agents. The third section, (402) (c) , expresses the concern of many about the deploy- ment or storage of lethal agents and microorganisms Outside the United States. Recent accounts of unfortunate incidents involving such deployment or storage have prompted new congres- sional interest in what we may be doing in this area of CBW activity. This section will provide for a full range of reports to the Interested Con- gressional committees, and will also in- sure consultation with foreign nations before we deploy CBW agents on their soil. Mr. President, I believe that in gen- eral we accomplish the substance of this proposal, but the section makes unmis- takably clear Congress' interest and de- sires. This section is another developed by the Senator from Wisconsin, (Mr. NEL- SON) and the Senator from New York (Mr. GOODELL) . The next section, (402) (d), also pro- posed by the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE) , relates to recent fears of many about the possible dangers inherent in the rail shipment of lethal cherncial and biological agents. Basically, this section covers three areas. It requires the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service to assure that shipment will not be detrimental to the public health. It would give advance notice of such shipments to the Congress and civilian agencies. And finally, it will bring about the de- toxification of lethal agents before they are shipped off for disposal. Again, some of this already is being done, but this section makes clear the Congress in- terest and intent. I would like to say at this point that while I am completely in agreement with this section I think we should always keep before us the fact that it is not the chemical and biological warfare service alone that transports biological agents around the country, nor Is this service the principal shipper of such agents. The National Institute of Health and other public and private health agencies trans- port an enormous amount of such agents. We are not dealing with such agencies In this particular legislation, to be true, but we may want to consider this in other legislation. I think a study would show that the amount of potentially dangerous biological agents shipped by CBW is relatively small when measured against the total shipment by all agencies. Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved FtratinA29iii.AF3Rt&MID_PWOWEIR000300100001-3 S 9521 August 11, 1969 The able Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL), proposed the next section 402(e). While the previous section dealt with transportation of lethal chem- ical and biological agents within the United States, the section of the Senator from Rhode Island, deals with transpor- tation of such agents outside the United States. It also includes the matter of testing, development, storage and disposal of such agents outside the United States, and it asks for the full consideration of U.S. international responsibilities when lethal CBW agents are moved, tested, disposed of, or developed in foreign areas. This section places certain responsi- bilities in the hands of the Secretary of State to assure that we are not likely to violate international law. The succeeding section 402(f) , an ad- ditional section developed by the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. NELSON) and the Senator from New York (Mr. GOODELL) is, perhaps, one of the most significant in the proposal. I am sure we have all been concerned about incidents of the past several years where outdoor testing of lethal agents and micro-organisms have jeopardized both animal and human life. This particular section of the amend- ment would eliminate open air testing except in those instances when the Sec- retary of Defense, under the direction of the President of the United States, would declare that our national security re- quired such testing, and the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service de- termined that the public's health would not be endangered. Furthermore, this section would re- quire that appropriate committees of the Congress would be informed of all pro- posed open air tests at least 30 days prior to the date on which it is proposed to hold them. The final section of the amendment, added by unanimous consent today, would become section 402(g) (1) and (2) . This section, proposed by the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE) is another step in congressional control over funds that can be used in CBW efforts. It would restrict the reprograming of funds from other programs into CBW. I am not aware that so-called backdoor financing of CBW is presently taking place, Mr. President, but with the adop- tion of this section we would assure that it does not. In summary, this amendment will serve the obvious public need to better know and understand our chemical and biological programs. It will provide in-depth information to the Congress in its continuing considera- tion of this broad, complex, and frequent- ly distasteful matter. And it comes directly to grips with those incidents that have so disturbed the Nation recently?the severe illness of two dozen CBW workers in Okinawa, the death of the sheep at Dugway, Utah, and the dangers inherent in moving deadly CBW agents across the country. I conclude, Mr. President, by pledging my determination to make the chemical and biological warfare program a prin- cipal item on the agenda of the Researeh and Development Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee during the coming year. We will want to examine in detail every facet of the program. We will be briefed by a full range of scientists and other experts and receive pertinent material from them. We will want to hear from other Members of the Senate who have a par- ticular interest in CBW. And we will want to survey the effects of the actions proposed in this amend- ment and in other sections of the cur- rent authorization bill. In short, when we return next year to consider the 1971 version of the author- ization bill I sincerely believe that the recommendations we will? make will en- able the Senate to meet problems that may still exist in this program. In the interim, Mr. President, I strongly urge the adoption of this amend- ment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, under the agreement, who controls time? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The mi- nority leader and the majority leader or their designee. Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, how much time does the Senator from New York desire? Mr. GOODELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me for 10 minutes. Mr. NELSON. I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from New York. Mr. GOODFT.L. Mr. President, before I begin my formal remarks I wish to offer my commendations to the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire. I would like to ask the Senator from New Hampshire a question to make sure a technical correction has been made in the amendment. I refer to page 4, line 22, of amendment 131. Mr. McINTYRE. Is the Senator re- ferring to the technical amendments I offered this morning to the original amendment? Mr. GOODELL. Yes. I refer to that point where reference is made to "lethal chemical agents, disease-producing bio- logical micro-organisms, or biological toxins." It was my understanding there might be some misinterpretation here be- cause of the words which should read "or any other." Mr. McINTYRE. Does the Senator re- fer to page 4, line 22, where the amend- ment reads, "None of the funds author- ized to be appropriated by this or any other act shall be used for the open-air testing of lethal chemical agents, disease- producing biological micro-organisms, or biological toxins"? What is the question? Mr. GOODELL. That is the way the amendment reads? Mr. McINTYRE. That is the way the amendment reads at the present time. Mr. GOODELL. I simply wanted to clarify that point. I think it is a crucial point. We are requiring this procedure of lethal chemical agents that are tested and all disease-producing biological microorganisms, or biological toxins. Is that correct? Mr. McINTYRE. The Senator is cor- rect. Mr. GOODELL. Mr. President, the omnibus anti-CBW amendment we are presenting here today represents an im- portant break with secrecy over chemi- cal and biological weapons. It is a modest measure to check the vast destruction potential of our CRW arsenal. Still, it is a significant measure. It is significant for it opens up the secrecy which has cloaked the spiraling gas and germ weapons program. It checks the weapons spiral. It minimizes international repercussions over CBW. It provides for public health and safety by guarding against the perils in transport, storage, and disposal of CBW. It puts up a barrier to future outdoor testing of CBW. It encourages congressional re- view. The distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services has called this omnibus anti-CBW amendment a solid start on the problem, and he is quite certainly right. I should like to commend Senator STENNIS and the members of the Armed Services Committee for taking the first major step in controlling the CBW pro- gram. The committee cut $16 million from the Pentagon's request for funds earmarked for research and develop- ment on offensive lethal chemical and biological weapons. This significant step has set in motion other steps to control the CBW program. I would like to start today by consider- ing open-air testing of deadly gas and disease-producing? germs. It was with great reluctance that I agreed to modify the "flat ban" amendment originally in- troduced by the Senator from Wiscon- sin (Mr. NELSON) and myself. A flat ban on outdoor CBW testing would eliminate the threat that a test cloud of deadly gas and germs might drift from the test site to our cities and towns. The moratorium postpones but does not elim- inate this threat. We felt we could make a significant step forward at this time. On the assurance of the Senator from New Hampshire that his subcommittee was going to look intensively at this en- tire program we have great confidence he will do so and that we can move for- ward in the future with greater restric- tions consistent with national security. There are pluses and minuses in the test ban revision. The minus side leaves the option open for future tests. The plus side puts congressional control over testing. The burden of proof is on the Pentagon if any further tests are to take place due to national security. I believe there is agreement here today that no longer will these tests take place on a routine basis. There must be a high-level determination that such tests are directly Involved with the national security. That determination must be made by the Sec- retary of Defense under guidelines pre- scribed by the President and must be agreed to by the Surgeon General with reference to the procedures to be fol- lowed. It is my view that it should be unnec- essary in the future for us to engage in any outdoor testing, but we do leave the door open for the very unusual? Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9522 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 11, 1969 and I emphasize very:, unusual?sittute duced land designated as "permanent tion that might arise In the national se- biocontaminated area." curity. What next is in store from such CBW While we are studying this problem in open air testing? the next year, such tests Might take place As we debate the wisdom of banning under very careful regulations and safe- open air testing of lethal gas and any guards. The burden of assurance that disease-producing bacteria or toxin, the no health hazard will result from any very testing of deadly nerve gasses con- test rests with the U.S. Surgeon General. tinues. It is of little comfort to me to In each case, Congress 'will have the eel- hear from the Defense Department that portunity for hard questioning. On bal- there are no irrunediate plans to conduct ance, then, the moraterium is accept- outdoor tests of lethal biological agents. able at this beginning stage of CBW re- It is of little comfort that the Q-fever view, field tests at Dugway have been corn- If the moratorium is to be meaningful, pletecl and now research will shift to the we simply must be guided by the princi- laboratory to evaluate results. pie that the security of this Nation be- While the specter of future open air gins with the health and safety of our tests for disease-producing bacteria people. Pentagon requests based on na- hangs over us; while outdoor testing of tional security simply blest be 'viewed such deadly nerve gasses as VX, Tabun? in this context. If not, tire moratorium GA?Sarin?GB?and Soman?GD--- on outdoor testing wottel be relatively continues; when any open air test of meaningless. If CBW tests are requested, deadly gas or any disease-producing bac- every effort must be made to confine teria takes place, the issue of public safe- them to the laboratory, 'This point cannot ty remains of grave concern. be emphasized enough. We all know the If just one accidental release of dead- example at Dugway Provine Grounds in ly nerve gas or disease-producing bac- Utah where thousands of sheep were teria spreads to our cities and towns, killed. Had the wind shifted farther a the toll in death and sickness would be large city in the United States would indefensible. Every precaution must be have been engulfed by deadly nerve gas, taken to assure the health and safety VX?odorless and colorless. What a dis- of our people. Animals must be Pro- aster that would have been. We must tected. Environment must be preserved. not engage in such tests without the All these things must be done regardless highest priority given the safety of our of how slight the danger. people. Consider the deadly effect of these One example suffices to explain why chemical agents. Consider the vast de- CBW testing should be confined to the struction potential of the disease-pro- laboratory. It is an example which clear- clueing biologicals. Let us take a look at ly demonstrates that hazards from open these agents in deciding whether in air tests of chemical and biological terms of public safety alone, we should weapons are not vague speculations, but ban lethal CWB from being tested out- grim realities. The example is the new well-known sheep-killing accident last doors. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- year, caused by an open air test of 'VX sent to have printed in the RECORD a te- at the Army's Dugway Proving Grounds ble of chemical and biological agents, In Utah. Some say that safety rules for together with a table on planned open CBW testing are sufficient. Safety rules, air testing at various sites including the they may say, are enough to protect against the fatal results possible when site at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, the Deseret Test Center in Utah, and at deadly nerve gas is tested in the air. Be- fore the sheep-killing ineldent and since - that time, the Army has announced sate- There being no objection, the tables ty regulations for CBW open air testing, were ordered to be printed in the Are safety rules at the test site RECORD, as follows: suf- ficient for public safety? X simply cannot TABLE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL AGENTS accept that they are. A freakish wind THE CHEMICAL AGENTS shift or a poorly supervised test may Nerve gases (VEE) kills less than 1 per cent of its victims never occur. Let us consider, then, what GB: An odorless, colorless, volatile gas that and lasts as few as three days; Eastern equine might otherwise happen, can kill in minutes in dosages of 1 milligram, encephalomyelitis (EEE) is fatal about 5 per In the 1968 sheep-killing incident, the approximately 1/60 of a drop. In the U.S. cent of the time, if untreated, and can seri- test at Dugway was to determine howsenal since the late 1940's, it is also known ously cripple the central nervous system of as Sadn. The gas kills by paralyzing the survivors. nerve gas VX distributes itself downwind nervous system. 5 to 25 miles per hour to the northeast. Plague: Acute, usually fatal, highly infec- VX: Another odorless gas that, unlike GB, tious bacterial disease of wild rodents found This was the information sought. Under does not evaporate rapidly or freeze at nor- in two forms?bubonic and pneumonic. today's safety rules at Dugway, the teat mal temperatures. Becausee of its low vole- Sypmptoixis of bubonic plague include small would be limited to winds 15 miles per tatty, it is effective for a longer period of hemorrhages, and the black spots that led the hour. Even so, would this Prevent another time. VX also is capable of killing in 1 mini- disease to be commonly known as the "black nerve gas accident? Consider what hap- gram doses and, like GB, paralyzes the ner- death" during the massive epidemics of the pened in the sheep-killing incident. The vous system in minutes. past. Pneumonic plague is highly infectious test started. The jet opened its tanks and Incapacitating agents because it is spread from man to man via began spraying nerve gas over the test BZ: A gas that is either a psychoc,hemical coughing. Symptoms include, fever, chills, area. After a few seconds the tanks were rapid pulse and breathing, mental dullness, or a strong anesthetic which can produce to close and the plane pull up. But the intemiltazorvairy paralysis, blindness, or deafness coated tongue, and red eyes. Psittacosis: Viral infection in birds that is BZ has also been k transmissible to man, with symptoms of high tanks did not close; the tanks stayed cause maniacal behavior. Its precise makeup fever, muscle ache, and disorientation. Dis- open. The plane pulled up with nerve le secret. gaS still spraying. Then over 6,000 sheep Blot control gases ease can be mild, and last less than a week, or can cause death in upwards of 40 per cent Regardless of safety regulations, field grant odor similar to apple blossoms. The may take months. tear gas that also acts as an irritant to the upper respiratory system. Ca: An improved, more toxic tear gas that quickly causes tearing, coughing, breathing difficulty, and cheat tightness. C antempo- rarily incapacitate men in twenty seconds. Heavy concentrations cause nausea. It Is now used in Vietnam. Harassing agents DM: A pepper-like arsenical gas that causes headaches, nausea, vomiting, chest pains for up to two or three hours. It can be lethal in heavy doses and has been blamed for some deaths since its first use to. Vietnam in 1964. DM is widely known as adamsite and was used in World War I. HD: A pale yellow gas with the odor of garlic, popularly known as mustard gas. Causes severe burns to eyes and lungs and blisters skin after exposure, but onset of symptoms is delayed from four to six hours. Can kill in heavy concentrations. Mustard, like VX, is not volatile and is usually effective for days after its use. It caused ons-fourth of the U.S. gas casualties in World War I. Defoliants and herbicides 2,4-D: A weed-killing compound known as dichloropheri-oxyacetic acid that has rela- tively short persistence in the soil and a rela- tively low level of toxicity to man, if prop- erly dispersed. Heavier concentrations can cause eye irritations and stomach upsets, however. Dangerous to inhale. Usually used in Vietnam along with 2,4,5-T (trichloro- phenoxyametic acid), which has similar?al- though somewhat more toxic?properties. Ef- fective against heavy Jungle. Cacodylic Acid: An arsenic-base compound used against rice plants and tall grass. Strong plant killer that gives quick results. One seri- ous restriction on its use is the possibility that heavy concentrations will cause arseni- cal poisoning in humans. Widely used in Vietnam. It is composed of 54.29 per cent arsenic. BIOLOGICAL AGENTS Anthrax.' An acute bacterial disease that is usually fatal if untreated when it attacks the lungs (pulmonary anthrax). Death can result in twenty-four hours. Found naturally in animals, which must be buried or burned to prevent contamination. Symptoms include high fever, hard breathing, and collapse. Also known as woolsorters' disease. Brucellosis: Bacterial disease usually found in cattle, goats, and pigs. Marked by high fever and chills in humans. Also known as undulant fever. Fatal in up to 5 per cent of untreated oases. Symptoms can linger for months. Encephalomyelitis: Highly infectious viral disease that appears in many forms and gradations: it can be simply debilitating or fatal. Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis were killed. ON: A non-lethal gas with a deceptive, fra- of those afflicted. Complete convalescence testing of biologicals at Dug-way, has pro- agent, now in use in Vietnam, Is a fast-acting Q-/ever: Acute, rarely fatal rickettsial dfls- Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDF'711300364R000300100001-3 A'ugust 11, 1969 S 9523 Approved Feaftitifseq8R4AtlIntglierpaRA199,013i?4R000300100001-3 Tularemia: A bacterial disease marked by high fever, chills, pains, and weakness. Acute period can last two to three weeks. Sometimes causes ulcers in mouth or eyes, which mul- tiply. Untreated, its mortality rate is between 5 and 8 per cent. Highly infectious, and usually found in animals, fowls, and ticks. Also known as rabbit fever. Source: Chemical and Biological Warfare, America's Hidden Arsenal, by Seymour H. Hersh (Doubleday Co. 1969). ease usually found in ticks, but also found in cattle, sheep, gents, and some wild animals. The Q-fever organism can remain alive and Infectious in dry areas Tor years. Rarely fatal but the resulting fever may last up to three months. Rift Valley Fever: Viral infection of sheep, cattle, and other animals that can be trans- mitted to humans, usually to the male. Symptoms include nausea, chills, headaches, and pains, but the disease is mild: despite the severity of symptoms deaths are rare and acute discomfort lasts only a few days. Also believed to be more virulent among Asians. Rocky Moutnain Spotted Fever: An acute rickettsial disease transmitted to man by the tick. One of the most severe of all infectious diseases. Can kill within three days. Fevers range up to 105 degrees F. Often found in northwestern United States, but susceptibil- ity to the disease in general. Highly respon- sive to treatment. PLANNED OPEN AIR TESTING?MARCH 1968-MAY 1969, DUGWAY PROVING GROUND, UTAH Item Agent Agent amount Quantity M139 bomblet GB 1 round per trial (5 trials). E139 bomblet GB 1 item per trial (8 trials). 105 milimeter projectile_ GB 1.5 pounds per round_ 1 round per trial (3 trials). BLU 19/623 GB 1 round per trial (I trial). Item Agent Agent amount Quantity M55 rocket GB Spray boom (truck) GB 8-inch howitzer shell VX Spray boom (truck) VX 1 round per trial (4 trials). 2 gallons per trial 3 trials. 143.h pounds per round__ _ 1 round per trail (5 trials). 2 gallons per trail 2 trials. PLANNED TESTING, FOURTH QUARTER, FISCAL YEAR 1969: APRIL-JUNE 1969 Item Agent Agent quantity per item Deseret Test Center, Utah (Dugway Proving Ground, Utah): United States Army: 8 inch shell, 50 foot release VX 15.4 pounds E139 bomblet GB Do GB M55 rocket warhead GB M23 land mine VX Test fixture, ground release 1 VX 10 pounds Test fixture, ground release 1 HD do 155-millimeter shell, ground release 1 GD 12.5 pound Test fixture, ground release 1 GA 1.2 pounds United States Navy: Bomblet G-type Defense system challenge, ground releasel_ GB or VX United States Air Force: BLU-19 bomblet GB 3 pounds do Number of items to be teste Item Agent Agent quantity per item Number of items to be tested Edgewood Arsenal, Md.?all Army: 155 mm shell, ground release 1 Test fixture Do E139 bomblet (EOD test) M23 land mine E139 bomblet i. Test munition Fort McClellan, Ala:8 Bulk agent, poured on a suitable surface for detection and decontamination exercises. VX EA 1356 GB GB VX GA GB GD VX HD HD HD HD HD HD GB VX VX 6.5 pounds 100 grams 50 grams 10 pounds 2 gallons 1 gallon 160 centimeters_ 120 centimeters 80 centimeters 40 centimeters 42 centimeters_ 42 centimeters 42 centimeters . 08 ?24 ?20 1 3 114 8 039 2 1 5 1 1 6 5 5 5 8 4 4 4 4 6 3 3 10 16 6 3 4 LETHAL AGENT, OPEN-AIR TESTS SCHEDULED, FIRST QUARTER, FISCAL YEAR 1970?JULY-SEPTEMBER 1969 Height of Item release Agent Quantity of item Agent quantity to be per item tested Deseret Test Center, Utah (Dugway Proving Ground): United States Navy: V Bomblet____ Ground United States Army: 55-gallon drum?portable water._ do VX 1 pound 3 GB Less than 2 5 pounds. HD VX M2XR XR 75 155 MI21 projectile GB 28 155 M121 projectile VX 28 155 M121 projectile GB 6 155 M121 projectile VX 6 4.5-inch mortar Ground HD 6 pounds 148 HT 155 do G 12 to 14 pounds___ 30 M23 Land mine VX 12 M56 Warhead (M55 racket). GB 10 United States Air Force: Test fixture Ground HD 8 pounds 7 Item Quantity of item Height of Agent quantity to be release Agent per item tested Edgewood Arsenal, Md. (All Army tests): 155 Howitzer shell Ground VX 6.5 pounds 7 Test fixture do EA1356 100 grams 24- Do do EA1356 11 pounds 3 On do GB 50 grams 20 E139 bomblet (EN) test) GB 1 Test bomblet do VX 1 pound 8 M23 land mine VX 3 155 Howitzer canister do VX 3 pounds 9 Test spray 1 meter. GA 1.3 pounds 16 Fixture GB 1.3 pounds 8 GD 1.3 pounds 16 VX 10 pounds 2 GB 4 E139 bomblet GD 8 I Ground releases are statically detonated or functioned. 2 Te be conducted this quarter or next quarter, depending on availability of facilities. a Chemical agent decontamination and detection exercises are conducted to train chemical specialists in techniques for these operations. The specialists are subsequently assigned to Army divisions and decontamination teams. Source: Subcommittee on Conservation and Natural Resources, Committee on Government Operations, U.S. House of Representatives. Mr. GOODELL. Mr. President, let us suppose that VX again escaped from a testing site. Suppose instead of drift- ing to a field of sheep, the nerve gas drifted to a city or town of people. The deadly nerve gas VX is colorless and odorless. The protection required against Its very rapid fatal effect is a gas mask and protective clothing. First aid sug- gested is atropine. What chances under Note: Recent exchanges between Representative Henry Reuss, chairman of the House Conserva- tion and Natural Resources Subcommittee and Army Secretary Stanley Resor give some idea of the scheduling of open air tests of chemical agents, including nerve gas. The unclassified data above lists item-by-item outdoor testing for the periods March 1968 to May 1969 at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah; April to June 1969 at Deseret Test Center, Utah (Dugway Proving Ground, Utah); at Edgewood Arsenal, Md.; and at Fort McCelllan, Ala.; July to September 1969 at Deseret Test Center, Utah (Dugway Proving Ground, Utah) and at Edgewood Arsenal, Md. these circumstances would our people have of surviving? A ban on outdoor testing of lethal chemical agents, including VX, would prevent such circumstances from arising. I simply cannot accept accidental death, contaminated land, and the spread of disease as a price for adding still more to the already vast offensive capa- bility of our CBW arsenal. Mr. President, on Saturday, Secretary of Defense Laird said that a chemical warfare deterrent and a biological re- search program are essential to national security. He said that research and test- ing of CBW agents should continue. If I rightly understand, we can expect Pentagon requests to break the proposed "moratorium" on CBW open air tests. If such Pentagon requests be made and Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9524 Approved For ReltuRAM11/3.0 ? ClAttD5/8300364R000300100001-3 311./INAL K SENATE Augwzt .11, 1949 agreed to, I fear we will be back again where we started. That is, we will be back with peril to the public health and peril from a spiraling t7.13W program. Mr. President, why, in view of the nu- clear, and other deterrents, are chemical warfare deterrence andan offensive bio- logical research program essential to na- tional security? To date, research in biological war- fare has already produced biological war- heads for the Sergeafii; research has brought germ warfare U3 the missile age. Chemical deterrence1 has also found shelter in the Sergeant. Still, we are told by the Pentagon that research and test- ing should continue. What are we really_ contributing to when we stockpile munitions filled with lethal gas and disease-producing bac- teria? Do we not contribute to that eerie sense of doomsday? 'What do we mean to accomplish with gas and germ weap- ons? To prevent use? But what if the net result is to proliferate use? Mr. President, anything so infamous as germ warfare should be deterred ulti- mately by eliminating germ weapons. Some will say that this is a dream. Some will say that it cannot be achieved. I cannot accept this reasoning to justify germ weapons. Today, I call for the day when we will dismantle can germ arsenal. I look forward to the day, when the United States will eliminate the means by which civilizations of the world could plunge into the abyss of epidemic and mass death. I urge today, that we fight germs with medicine; not with germ weapons. Medical protection against germs is reasonable, it is sane. To pro- tect against germs with germ weapons is folly; it is madness. Deterrence with defensive equipment, such as gas masks and vaccines, is more reasonable than the deterrence offered by military science and by hardware which places gas and germs in grenades and in nuclear warheads. Deterrence with defensive equipment has the added advantage of beneficial "spin-offs" for peacetime medical applications gained by gas and germ research It is still un- clear to me why medical research of this kind is done by the Defense Department when such research can be done by the Public Health Service. Deterrence with weapons has the neg- ative side effect of arms race competition with other nations or indeed, with our own self. Unilateral armament may be the net effect, or perhaps is the goal of our CBW program. Still, we cannot ignore our contributions to proliferation of CBW throughout the world. Mr. President, how does our national security benefit from CBW proliferation? We have spent years to check nuclear proliferation to nonnuclear nations. If we succeed in nuclear nonproliferation, then few nations will pose a nuclear threat to the cities of this country. Chemical and biological weapons are a way that many nations can threaten our cities. Do we and should we encourage for- eign nations to build up gas and germ weapons as a deterrent to a potential enemy? Should we train foreign officers in gas and germ warfare? Should we have CBW courses at Fort McClellan and in- vite foreign officers to attend? Mr. President, many people are un- aware that in the past 20 years, con- cerning CBW, and prior to 1951, we even had a foreign officer training program which trained military officers from Egypt and Yugoslavia in the use of chem- ical and biological agents. It has been charged that, subsequent to that time, Egypt used deadly gases in Yemen. We have a share of the responsibility for this tragic development in the history of mankind, Some 35 nations have received foreign officer training in how to use CBW weap- ons. This is truly a significant rung up the balance-of-terror ladder for the world, because chemical and biological agents can be produced cheaply by countries with very small resources. Unlike nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons which can wipe out mankind can be produced by small countries. We must move forward?cer- tainly our country must?and should not be a party to escalating an arms race in this area of CBW. Certainly it is difficult to look back at different countries' activities in the past 20 years with any confidence that we have done anything but contribute to greater escalation. It is particularly distressing to me that our CBW program includes a foreign officer training program in CBW. The Army offers two courses in CBW open to foreign officers at Fort McClellan. One course is for a period of 9 weeks. The other is for a period of 9 months. Since 1951, the Pentagon has provided CBW training to officers from over 35 foreign countries. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent to have printed in the RECORD two charts showing the countries which have participated in the Army's CBW train- ing program. There being no objection, the charts were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: ARMY'S CBW FOREIGN OFFICER TRAINING PROGRAM PARTICIPATING COUNTRY LIST, FROM 1951 TO PRESENT FOREIGN OFFICERS TRAINING PROGRAM-I.. 9 WEEK COURSE Fiscal year- 1969 1970 Japan Korea Philippines Taiwan Thailand South Vietnam Iran 1 Lebanon Pakistan Saudi Arabia 5 4 France Germany 2 2 Greece 5 4 Italy Netherlands Norway Spain Sweden United Kingdom 3 3 Yugoslavia Canada 1 2 Argentina Mexico Australia 2 Source: Department of Defense FOREIGN OFFICERS TRAINING PROGRAM-36 WEEK COURSE Fiscal year 1969 Australia Japan Korea Phillipines Taiwan Thailand South Vietnam Iran 2 Iraq Jordan Lebanon Pakistan Egypt! Austria Denmark Germany Greece Italy Norway Switzerland Turkey Yugoslavia I Canada Argentina Brazil Venezuela Israel I Terminated since early 1950's. - Source: Department of Defense. Mr. GOODELL, Mr. President, officers have come here to learn about CBW. They have come from Europe, from Latin America, from the middle East and from Southeast Asia. This year, emphasis has been given to training officers from Viet- nam, Thailand, Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. I am concerned that such training of foreign officers could inspire an wipe- tite for acquisition of these insidious weapons of war. I am disturbed that knowledge and acquisition of CBW could propel nations of the world to use CBW in war. Have we learned nothing from Yemen? Indeed, sharp review of this foreign officers training program in Cl3W is long overdue. I urge that the Senate Armed Services Committee make a complete review of this aspect of the OEM' program. The question to be faced is whether these study courses should be continued or abandoned in the name of reason. If we fail to halt chemical and bio- logical weapons spread and build-up now, what will be in store for future gen- erations? While we now pause on the present rung of the CBW balance-of-ter- ror ladder, we see that we are in a near perfect model of weapons escalation. If we have "overkill" in nuclear weapons; we have "superkill" in chemical and Mo- logical weapons. If the Pentagon has asked us to deploy an ABM for defense against nuclear attack, it is just a matter of time that the Pentagon will ask us for funds to deploy an ACBM, an anti-chem- ical and biological monitoring system? We simply must guard against the dangers inherent in the very existence of chemical and germ weapons. There is danger in any outdoor testing of lethal gas and any disease-producing bacteria and toxin. There is danger in CBW esca- lation and proliferation. There is danger in the use of gas and germs in warfare. Today, we can start to check the dangers posed by CBW by acting favor- ably on the omnibus anti-CBW amend- ment. We can begin today with what promises to be a very long and difficult Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 ? 0AzIRDPUB00364R000300100001-3 August 11, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECuKll ? &CNA S9525 road to additional review and further control of chemical and biological weap- ons both in this country and throughout the world. Yet to be done is a review by the whole Congress of many general areas of inquiry: Why do we have a gas and germ ar- senal? Is the Pentagon's retaliation in kind a valid justification given the nu- clear deterrent? How does our CBW program contrib- ute to the proliferation of CBW through- out the world? What is the U.S. policy on use of these weapons in combat? What steps are the United States will- ing to take in CBW arms control? Let us give deep consideration to the grave moral issues which arise when we stockpile munitions filled with lethal gas and disease-producing bacteria. Let us think deeply on this as we move further in our review ot CBW from the stand- points of deterrence, proliferation, use in combat, and targets for further dis- armament. More steps can be taken to control chemical and biological weapons. These include: Presentation of the Geneva Protocol by the President to the Senate for rati- fication. The United States signed, but never ratified, the 1925 Protocol outlaw- ing use of gas and germs in war. A report by a nongovernmental Scien- tific and Medical Advisory Committee on CBW. This report could focus on scien- tific, medical, and arms-control aspects of chemical and biological weapons. The report should be presented to both the President and to Congress. Paralleled with congressional examination and that of the National Security Council, such a report could be an important contribu- tion M options for charting a long-range Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I deterrent and our biological research pro- should like to respond to the Senator gram, both of which are essential to na- tional security," the statement said. from New York and commend him for Senate Armed Services Committee Chair- the fine work he has done in this area man John Stennis (D-Miss.) said Friday he of CBW, and to commend also the Sena- would probably support the amendment and tor from Wisconsin (Mr. NELSON) and predicted its approval. others, and their staffs, for their close The compromise language, which the or- cooperation and the fine work they have iginal supporters?said would not harm the done in trying to bring together and con- amendment, would allow open air testing of solidate the thinking on control matters CBW agents only when the Secretary of De- fense certified that it was necessary for na- concerning the CBW program. tional security, the U.S. Surgeon General To this point I would say that all of certified that it would not be hazardous to these Senators have cooperated. The health or the environment and congressional compromise may not please everyone; committees had been notified in advance. but, as the Senator from New York There are no restrictions on such testing stated, it represents a beginning of con- now. The original amendment would have flatly banned it. trol that Congress should have over this The compromise version was worked out program. Friday in a meeting between Dr. John S. Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I thank Foster, Pentagon research director, and Sen. the Senator from New Hampshire. As Thomas J. McIntyre (D-N.H.) , chairman of chairman of the subcommittee, along an Armed Services subcommittee that had with other Senators and their staffs, they already recommended deletion of all funds did a superb job in working out the com- for development of offensive CBW weapons. bined amendment. CONCERN CITED I should like to mention that a num- Laird said that when he took office in Jan- ber of us have offered amendments of uary he "became concerned with the manage- various kinds to the budget. It is ap- ment and control of our chemical warfare propriate to mention that the original and that i biological resesarch programs" i n e " and "felt eorfe needede se programs." budget on January 14 was $23,151,660,000. man- agementin aonvd con ement control That was reduced by Secretary Laird's On result of this concern, he said, was recommendations to $21,963,060,000. And President Nixon's directive in April ordering then through the efforts of the chairman, the National Security Council to make a the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STEN- thorough study of CBW activities. NIS), the budget was cut another almost "Pending the completion of the NSC $2 billion, down to $20,059,500,000. study," Laird said, "I believe it is prudent It should not go unnoted that the that we act jointly with Congress and take actions, wherever possible, to improve the chairman and his committee did an ex- management and control of chemical war- cellent job in reducing the budget. The fare and biological research programs." fact that a number of us have other Laird emphasized that research and test- amendments should not cause us to ig- ing of CBW agents should continue even nore the fact that the chairman did a though the United States has stated it would fine and conscientious job. use them only in self-defense, because "fail- ure to maintain an effective chemical war- Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- fare deterrent would endanger national se- sent to have printed in the RECORD a curity." news story from the Washington Post of The amendment would also require semi- yesterday, Sunday, August 10, 1969, on a annual reports to Congress on CBW spend- course of action on gas and germ weap- statement by the Secretary of Defense, ing and would bar procurement of further ons. Mr. Laird, as well as the statement by CBW delivery systems, CBW activities found These are some more steps we can take Mr. Laird made on August 9, 1969, re- hythteSeci law, of Statetviolatewithinw- to control CBW in addition to the omni- garding the CBW amendment pending. le r agents iowna within tiiernU?st nited shiptnieatens ts an ndf CBW to anti-CBW amendment we are con- There being no objection, the news - trans- port to foreign countries without approval sidering today. article and statement were ordered to be of the foreign nation and notification to Mr. President, I am not completely printed in the RECORD, as follows: Congress. ? $2.5 BILLION SPENT 1969] satisfied with the compromise, but I [From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Aug. 10, think it is a significant breakthrough. . Since 1960, the Pentagon has spent about I want to commend particularly the CBW CURB ENDORSED By LAIRD $2.5 billion on CBW activities with little Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. NELSON) The Defense Department announced un- congressional scrutiny or public knowledge. The amendment ththtatywo would procurement be at attached bill, to which for his cooperation in working with me expectedrir yesterday that it would support $20-b and others in developing these amend- has been on the Senatefloor for five weeks. germ warfare weapons. efforts for strict congressional controls on the testing and production of chemical and ments, particularly the three originally Nearly a dozen other amendments are await- cosponsored by us. I would also like to The announcement by Defense Secretary ing action and Senate leaders said Friday commend the Senator from New Hamp- Melvin R. Laird virtually insures Senate ap- the bill would probably not come to a final shire for his continuing concern and in- proval Monday of a revised but still broad vote until September. terest in this area, and for his coopera- amendment drawn up by critics of the Sen. Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis.), a sponsor of Pen- ton in working out the amendment tagon's past activities in the CBW field. It the CBW amendment, released this list of colleges and universities engaged in Pentagon would, among other restrictions, ban most which we expect will be carried through CBW contracts: open air testing of the lethal agents. in conference and not diluted further. ri approved, the CBW amendment would "Boston Univ., Brooklyn College, Buffalo Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, will be the second major victory for critics of the Univ., Univ. of California at Berkeley, Univ. the Senator from Wisconsin yield me Pentagon since they failed by two votes last of California at Los Angeles, Univ. of Chicago, 1 minute? week to block initial deployment of the Univ. of Connecticut, Cornell Univ., Delaware, Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, how much Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system. George Peabody College, George Washington time remains to me? The Senate's liberal bloc won approval Univ., Georgia Institute of Technology, Hah- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Pour mm- Thursday of a potentially far-reaching nemann Medical College, Harvard, Univ. of Illinois at Urbana, Illinois Institute of Tech- amendment that would give the General Ac- utes remain to the Senator from Wis- counting Office greater powers to audit de- nology. consin. tense contracts. Also, Indiana Univ. Foundation, Iowa State Mr. NELSON. I yield 1 minute to the .1 am in agreement with the goals of the Also, Johns Hopkins, Kansas State Univ., Senator from New Hampshire. (CBW) amendment," Laird said yterday Univ. of Maryland and its medical and dental es schools, Univ. of Massachusetts, Massachu- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- in a statement released by the Pentagon. setts Institute of Technology, Univ. of Michi- ator from New Hampshire is recognized "I believe this revised amendment will gan, Univ of Minnesota, Univ. of North Caro- for 1 minute. allow us to maintain our chemical warfare Una, Ohio State Univ., Univ. of Oklahoma, Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9526 CO NGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 11, 1969 Univ. of Oregon, Univ. of Pennsylvania, Univ. of Pittsburgh, Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn. "Also, Rutgers, St. Louis Univ., Stanford Research Institute, Univ. of Tennessee, Univ. of Texas at Austin, Texas AeirM, Univ of Utah, Utah State Univ., Medical College of Vir- ginia, Univ. of Washington, Washington State Univ., Western Reserve Univ., College of William and Mary, Univ. of Wisconsin and Yale." MEMORANDUM FOR CORRESPON?wNTS, AUGUST 9, 1969 Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird today issued the following statement in response to queries about the DoD position on the pend- ing McIntyre amendment. On assuming the office of Secretary of De- fense in January, I became concerned with the management and control of our chemical warfare and biological research programs. I felt that improvements were needed in the management and control of these programs. That is why in April I requested and the President ordered a National Security Council study of these matters. This study Is in progress. Pending the completion Of the NSC study, I believe it is prudent that we act jointly with Congress and take actions, wherever possible, to improve the 'management and control of chemical warfare and biological research programs. Members of my staff, principally Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Research and Engi- neering, have been working in recent days with Senator Thomas J. iliferntyre of New Hampshire, and with other members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, on a re- vised amendment to the pending Defense Authorization Bill. I am in agreement with the goals of the new amendment, which the Senate is sched- uled to consider on Monday. I believe this revised amendment will allow us to maintain our chemical warfare deter- rent and our biological research program both of which are essential to national security. The history of the use of lethal chemical warfare agents has demonstrated on three notable occasions in this country that the only time military forces have used these weapons is when the opposing forces had no immediate capability to deter or to retaliate. This was true early in World War I, later in Ethopia and more recently in Yemen. Clearly, failure to maintain an effective chemcial warfare deterrent would endanger national security. Because it would not always be possible to determine the origin of attack by biological agents, the deterrent aspects of biological research are not as sharply defined. A con- tinued biological research program, however, is vital on two other major ?mints. First, we must strengthen our protective capabilities in such areas as vaccines and therapy. Secondly, we must minimize the dangers of technological surprise. It is important that the American people be informed of why we must continue to maintain our chemical deterrent, conduct biological research, and how we propose to improve the management and control of these programs. Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, how much time do I have left? The PRESIDING OFiviCER. The Sen- ator from Wisconsin has 2 minutes re- maining. Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to hare printed in full in the RECORD the report of the Sec- retary General on chemical and bacterio- logical weapons and the eirects of their possible use. There being no objection, the repor was ordered to be printed in the RECORD as follows: LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL Jusre 30, 1969. DEAR M. SECRETARY-GENERAL: I have the honour to submit herewith a unanimous re- port on chemical and bacteriological (bio- logical) weapons which was prepared in pur- suance of General Assembly resolution 2454 A (XXIII). The Consultant Experts appointed in ac- cordance with the General Assembly resolu- tion were the following: Dr. Tibor Bakacs, Professor of Hygiene, Di- rector-General of the National Institute of Public Health, Budapest. Dr. Hotse C. Bartlema, Head of the Micro- biological Department of the Medical-Bio- logical Laboratory, National Defense Research Organization TNO, Rijswijk, Netherlands. Dr. Ivan L. Bennett, Director of the New York University Medical Center and Vice- President for Medical Affairs, New York Uni- versity, New York. Dr. S. Bhagavantam, Scientific Adviser to the Minister of Defense, New Delhi. Dr. Jiri Franek, Director of the Military In- stitute for Hygiene, Epidemiology and Micro- biology, Prague. Dr. Yosio Kawakita, President of the Uni- versity of Chiba, Professor of Bacteriology, Chiba City, Japan. M. Victor Moulin, Ingenieur en chef de armement, Chef du Bureau Defense chimi- que et biologique, Direction technique des armements terrestres, Saint Cloud, France. Dr. M. K. McPhail, Director of Chemical and Biological Defense, Defense Chemical, Biological and Radiation Laboratories, De- fense Research Board, Ottawa. Academician O. A. Reutov, Professor of Chemistry at the Moscow State University, Moscow. Dr. Guillermo Soberon, Director, Institute de Investigaciones Biomedicas, thaversidad Nacional Autonama de Mexico, Mexico City. 'Dr. Lars-Erik Tarrunelin, Chief of Depart- ment for Medicine and Chemistry, Research Institute for National Defense, Stockholm, Dr. Berhane Teourne-Lessane, Medical Co- Director and Head of Department of Viruses and Rickettsiae, Imperial Central Laboratory and Research Institute, Addis Ababa. Colonel Zbigniew Zoltowskl, Protestor of Medicine, Epidemiologist and Scientific Ad- viser to the Ministry of National Defense, Warsaw, Sir Sony Zuckerman, Chief Scientific Ad- viser to the Government of the United King- dom, Professor Emeritus, University of Bir- mingham. The report was drafted during sessions held in Geneva between 20 and 24 January and between 16 and 29 April, and finalized at meetings held in New York between 2 and 14 June 1969. The Group of Consultant Experts with to acknowledge the assistance they received from the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the In- ternational Committee of the Red Cross, the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs (Pugwash) and the International In- stitute for Peace and Conflict Research (SIPRI) , all of which submitted valuable in- formation and material for the purposes of the study. The Group of Consultant Experts also wish to express their gratitude for the valuable assistance they received tram members of the United Nations Secretariat. I have been requested by the Group of Consultant Experts, as their Chairman, to submit their unanimous report to you on their behalf. Yours sincerely, WILLIAM EPSTEIN, Chairman, Group of Consultant Experts on Chemical and Bacteriological (Bio- logical) Weapons. QUESTION OF' GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT [Illustrations not printed in the Recone] (Report of the Secretary-General on chem- ical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use) Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2454 A (XXIII) of 20 December 1968, the Secretary-General has the honour to trans- mit herewith to the General Assembly the report on chemical and bacteriological (bio- logical) weapons and the effects of their possible use, prepared with the astistance of qualified consultant experts. In accordance with paragraph 4 of the resolution, the report is also being trans- mitted to the Security Council (8/9292) and the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Com- mittee on Disarmamenti as well as to the Governments of Member States. FOREWORD DT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL During the past few years, I have become increasingly concerned by developments in the field of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and have given expres- sion to this concern on several occasions. A year ago, I stated publicly that "the inter- national community was not sufficiently conscious of the dangers inherent in this new type of weapon of mass murder", and that "due attention had not been focused on this very serious problem". In the introduction to my annual report on the work of the Organization, in September 1968, I stated: "While progress is being made in the field of nuclear disarmament, there is another aspect of the disarmament problem to which I feel too little attention has been devoted in recent years. The question of chemical and biological weapons has been overshadowed by the question of nuclear weapons, which have a destructive power several orders of magni- tude greater than that of chemical and bio- logical weapons. Nevertheless, these too are weapons of mass destruction regarded with universal horror. In some respects, they may be even more dangerous than nuclear weap- ons because they do not require the enormous expenditure of financial and scientific re- sources that are required for nuclear weap- ons. Almost all countries, including small ones and developing ones, may have access to these weapons, which can be manufac- tured quite cheaply, quickly and secretly in small laboratories or factories. This fact in itself makes the problem of control and in- spection much more difficult. Moreover, since the adoption, on 17 Jane, 1925, of the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of War- fare, there have been many scientific and technical developments and numerous im- provements, if that is the right word, in chemical and biological weapons, which have created new situations and new prob- lems. On the one hand, there has been a great increase in the capability of these weapons to inflict unimaginable suffering, disease and death to ever larger numbers of human beings; on the other hand, there has been a growing tendency to use some chemi- cal agents for civilian riot control and a dangerous trend to aceept their use in some form in conventional warfare, "Two years ago, by resolution 2162 B (XXI), the General Assembly called for the strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, condemned all actions contrary to those ob- jectives and invited all States to accede to the Protocol. Once again, I would like to add my voice to those of others in urging the early and complete implementation of this resolution.- However, in my opinion, much more is needed. . . ." "By a letter dated 1 July 1969 from the Secretary-General to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference. Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Relea5 2004/11L3.0 ..aCIA :RDP7Mi64R000300100001-3 August 11, 1969 CONGREssioiN AL 'chmp ? bh S 9527 At its twenty-third session, by resolutionmeans of warfare; the possible ?long-term logical (biological) agents intended for pur- 2454 A (XXIII), the General Assembly re- effects on human health and ecology; and poses of war were to end if they were elimin- quested me to prepare, with the assistance the economic and security implications of ated from all military arsenals. of qualified consultant experts, a report on the development, acquisition mid possible "If this were to happen, there would be a chemical and bacteriological (biological) use of chemical and bacteriological (biologi- general lessening of international fear and weapons in accordance with the proposal cal) weapons and of systems for their de- tension. It is the hope of the authors that contained in the introduction to my an- livery, this report will contribute to public aware- nual report on the work of the organization The consultant experts to whom I conveyed ness of the profoundly dangerous results if (A/7201/Add. 1), and in accordance with the these terms of reference accepted them as these weapons were ever used, and that an recommendation contained in the report of the basis for their study. aroused public will demand and receive as- the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Corn- It was my intention that the Group of surances that Governments are working for mittee on Disarmament of 4 September 1968 Consultant Experts should survey the en- the earliest effective elimination of chemical (A/7189). tire subject from the technical and sof- and bacteriological (biological) weapons." In pursuance of this resolution, I ap- entiflc points of view, so that the report I have given the study prepared by the pointed the following group of fourteen con- could place these weapons in proper per- consultant experts my earnest consideration sultant experts to assist me in the prepara- spective. It was also my hope that an au- and I have decided to accept their unani- tion of the report: Dr. Tibor Bakacs, Profes- thoritative report could become the basis mous report in its entirety, and to transmit sor of Hygiene, Director-General of the Na- for political and legal action by the Mem- it to the General Assembly, the Security tional Institute of Public Health, Budapest; bars of the United Nations. Council, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Dr. Hotse C. Bartlema, Head of the Micro- As the report was to be made available Disarmament and to the Governments of biological Department of the Medical-Bio- by 1 July 1969, very concentrated efforts by Member States, as the report called for by logical Laboratory, National Defence Re- the consultant experts were required in resolution 2451 A (XXIII). search Organization TNO, Rijswijk, Nether- order to cover this extensive field. The mem- I also feel it incumbent upon me, in the lands; Dr. Ivan L. Bennett, Director of the bars of the Group, acting in their personal hope that further action will be taken to New York University Medical Center and capacities, carried out this demanding task deal with the threat posed by the existence Vice-President of Medical Affairs, New York at three sessions between January and June of these weapons, to urge that the Members University, New York; Dr. S. Bhagavantam, 1969. of the United Nations undertake the fol- Scientific Adviser to the Minister of Defence, The Group had the benefit of valuable lowing measures in the interests of enhanc- New Delhi; Dr. Jirl Franek, Director of the submissions from the World Health Organi- ing the security of the peoples of the world: Military Institute for Hygiene, EpidemiologV zation, the Food and Agriculture Organize- 1. To renew the appeal to all States to and Microbiology, Prague; Dr. Yogic. Kama- tion, the International Committee of the accede to the Geneva Protocol of 1925; kite, President of University of Chiba, Pro- Red Cross, the Pugwash Conference on Sci- 2. To make a clear affirmation that the lessor of Bacteriology, Chiba City, Japan; M. ence and World Affairs (Pugwash) and the prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol Victor Moulin, Ingenieur en chef de l'arm- International Institute for Peace and Con- applies to the use in war of all chemical, ement, Chef du Bureau Defense chimique at filet Research (SIPRI). I wish to express my bacteriological and biological agents (includ- biologique, Direction technique des arme- grateful appreciation to all the consultant ing tear gas and other harassing agents) , ments terrestres, Saint Cloud, France; Dr. experts for their dedicated work and to the which now exist or which may be developed M. K. McPhail, Director of Chemical and Bio- organizations and bodies who co-operated in the future: logical Defence, Defence Chemical, Biologi- in the preparation of the study. cal and Radiation Laboratories, Defence Re- The Group has submitted me to a unani- search Board, Ottawa; Academician 0. A. mous report embodying its findings and con- Reutov, Professor of Chemistry at the Mos- elusions. I wish to avail myself of this cow State University, Moscow; Dr. Guillermo opportunity to express my gratification for Soberon, Director, Instituto de Investiga- the very high level of competence with which ciones Biomedicas, Universidad Nactional the consultant experts have discharged their Autonoma de Mexico, Mexico City; Dr. Lars- mandate. In a very short period of time, they Erik Tainmelin, Chief of Department for have produced a study, which, in spite of Medicine and Chemistry, Research Institute the many complex aspects of the subject , for National Defence, Stockholm; Dr. Ber- matter, is both concise and authoritative. It bane Teoume-Lessane, Medical Co-Director is a document which, I believe, provides and Head of Department of Viruses and valuable insights into the grave dangers that Rickettsiae, Imperial Central Laboratory tuid are posed by the production and possible Research Institute, Addis Ababa; Colonel use of these dreaded weapons. Zbigniew Zoltowski, Professor of Medicine, I am particularly impressed by the con- Epidemiologist and Scientific Adviser to the . elusion of the consultant experts wherein Ministry of National Defence, Warsaw; Sir they state; , 801131 Zuckerman, Chief Scientific Adviser to "The general conclusion of the report can the Government of the United Kingdom, thus be summed up in a few lines. Were Professor Emeritus, University of Birming- these weapons ever to be used on a large scale ham. in war, no one could predict how enduring Mr. William Epstein, Director of the Die- the effects would be, and how they would armament Affairs Division, Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, served as Chairman of the Group of Consultant Experts. Mr. Alessandro Corradini, Chief of the Committee and Conference Services Sec- tion, acted as Secretary of the Group. He was assisted by members of the Disarmament Affairs Division. After giving due consideration to the terms of the resolution and to the views expressed and the suggestions made during the dis- cussion of the question at the twenty-third session of the General Assembly, I reached the conclusion that the aim of the report should be to provide a scientifically sound appraisal of the effects of chemical and bac- teriological (biological) weapons and should serve to inform Governments of the con- sequences of their possible use. Within this over-all framework, the report would fur- nish accurate information in a concise and readily understandable form on the follow- ing matters: the basic characteristics of chemical and basteriological (biological) 3. To call upon all countries to reach agree- ment to halt the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical ond bacterio- logical (biological) agents for purposes of war and to achieve their effective elimination from the arsenal of weapons. INTRODUCTION 1. In accordance with the resolution of the General Assembly 2454 A (X.XIII) the Secre- tary-General was asked to prepare, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts, a report on chemical and bacteriological (bio- logical) weapons and on the effects of their possible use. Specifically the experts were asked to provide a scientific appraisal of the characteristics of the chemical and bacterio- logical (biological) weapons which could be used in warfare; of the effects they could have on military personnel and civilians; as well as of their long-term effects on health and our physical environment. They were also asked to provide a statement about the eco- nomic and security implications of the de- affect the structure of society and the en- velopment, acquisition and possible use of vironment in which we live. This overriding such weapons and associated weapon sys- danger would apply as much to the country tems. The report which follows is confined to which initiated the use of these weapons as these objectives. to the one which had been attacked, regard- 2. No form of warfare has been more con- less of what protective measures it might demned than has the use of this category of have taken in parallel with its development weapons. The poisoning of wells has been re- of an offensive capability. A particular danger garded from time immemorial as a crime in- also derives from the fact that any country compatible with the rules of war. "War is could develop or acquire, in one way or waged with weapons, not with poison" another, a capability in this type of warfare, ("Armis belle non venenis geri"), declared despite the fact that this could prove costly. the Roman jurists. As the destructive power The danger of the proliferation of this class of arms increased over the years, and with it of weapons applies as much to the develop- the potential for the widespread use of ing as it does to developed countries. chemicals, efforts were made to prohibit "The momentum of the arms race would through international understandings and by clearly decrease if the production of these legal means the use of chemical weapons. The weapons were effectively and unconditionally Brussels Declaration of 1874 and the Hague banned. Their use, which could cause an Conventions of 1899 and 1907 prohibited the enormous loss of human life, has already use of poisons and poisoned bullets and a been condemned and prohibited by inter- national agreements, in. particular the separate declaration of the Hague Conven- tion of 1899 condemned "the use of projec- Geneva Protocol of 1925, and, more recently, tiles the sole object of which is the diffusion in resolutions or the General Assembly of of asphyxiating or deleterious gases". means of warfare; the probable effects of the United Nations. The prospects for gener chemical and bacteriological (biological) and complete disarmament under effective 3. The fear today is that the scientific and weapons on military and civil personnel, both international control, and hence for peace technological advances of the past few protected and unprotected; the environ- throughout the world, would brighten. sig- decades have increased the potential of mental factors affecting the employment of nificantly if the development, production chemical and bacteriological (biological) chemical and bacteriological (biological) and stockpiling of chemcial and bacterio- weapons to such an extent that one can con- Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9528 Approved For Reletael?caMyc3RTAIN?n18? S003%1N00300100001-3 TE August ii, i99 ce ve of their use catviing casualties on a scale greater than one Would associate with conventional warfare. At the moment most of our knowledge confierning the use of chemical weapons Is band upon the wiper- ience of World Wax I. Gas was first used in 1914 and the first big attack in 1915 claimed 5,000 human lives. It is eatimated that from then until the end of the War in 1918, at least 125,000 tons of toxic chemicals were used, and according to official reports gas casual- ties numbered about 000,000, of which about 100,000 were fate/. The agents which were used in this war ante much less toxic than those, in particular nerve agents, which could be used today, and they were dispersed by means of relatively primitive equipment as compared with what is now available, and In accordance with battletield concepts of a relatively unsophisticated kind. 4. It is true that a conelderable effort has also been made to develop chemical agents which have as their pure not to kill but to reduce a mares capadity to fight. Such agents are used by civir authorities of a number of countries in eater to suppress dis- orders and to control riots, but when used in warfare they would inevitably be employed as an adjunct to other forms of attack, and their over-all effect might be lethal. 5. Since World War II. bacteriological (biological) weapons hales also become an increasing possibility. But because there is no clear evidence that these agents have ever been used as modern military weapons, discussions of their characteristics and po- tential threat have to draw heavily upon experimental field and laboratory data, and: on studies of naturally occurring outbreaks and epidemics of infectious disease, rather than on direct battlefield experience. Their potential importance in warfare can be sensed when one remembers that infectiouti disease even as late as World War II caused numerous casualties. 6. The greater threat posed by chemical weapons today derives from the discovery and manufacture of new, more toxic compounds. On the other hand, bacteriological (bio- logical) agents already exist in nature and can be selected for use in warfare. Some of these agents, notably bacteria, have been known for several decades, but there Is a vast number of other possible agents, es- pecially viruses, which have been discovered only recently, and some of these also possess characteristics which make their use pos- sible in war. Increases in potency of these various types of agent have been made pos- sible by scientific and technological advances in microbial genetics, experimental pathology and aerobiology. 7. As is well known, the use of toxic gases in World War I generated so powerful a sense of outrage that countries were en- couraged to adopt measures prohibiting both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. The result was the fieneva Protocol of 17 June 1925, which prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonoW or other gases and of all analogous liquids, materials or de- vices, as well as bacteriological methods of warfare. This established a custom and hence a standard of international law, and in practice most States have adhered to the principle that no one should resort to the use of such weapons. But despite the adhor- rence in which they have always been held by civilized peoples, chemical weapons have none the less on occasion been used. For ex- ample, mustard gas was used in Ethiopia in 1935-36, causing numerous casualties amongst troops and a civilian population which was not only completely unprotected, but which lacked even the itest elementary medical services. It should also be noted that the existence of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 may have helped as a deterrent to the use of chemical or bacteriological (biological) weapons in World War II, even though the belligerents in that conflict had developed, produced and stockpiled chemical agents for possible use. The International Tribunal at Nuremberg brought into the open the fact that amongst the new agents which had been produced and stockpiled during the course of the war were such highly lethal agents as Tabun and Sarin. Since then the validity and effectiveness of the Geneva Protocol have been reinforced by the approval, by the General Assembly of the United Nations, Without a single dissenting voice, of resolu- tions 2162 B (XXI) of 5 December 1966 and 2454 A (xxin) of 20 December 1968, calling for "strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives" of the Geneva Protocol, and inviting all States to accede to it. 8. It is simple to appreciate the resurgence of interest in the problems of chemical and bacteriological (biological) warfare. Ad- vances in chemical and biological science, while contributing to the good of mankind, have also opened up the possibility of ex- ploiting th cal and bacterio- logical (biological) warfare weapons, some of which could endanger man's future, and the situation will remain threatening so long as a number of States proceed with their development, perfection, production and stockpiling. 9. The report, as is noted in the General Assembly resolution, is designed to submit to peoples and governments, Ma form easily understood by them, information on the ef- pfeerotigileornsf connected possible bacteriologicse ec(bteiod eflogiuscale) of ai eeapthonsmai,ncasald re as to promote a further consideration of bac- teriological (biological) weapons. Informa- tion about the nature of chemical and bac- teriological (biological) weapons, about their increase and diversification as technology has advanced, about their long-term effects on human beings, animals and vegetation, and about environmental factors which con- dition these effects, is provided in Chapters I to IV of the Report, In Chapter V. which deals with the economic and security im- plications of chemical and bacteriological (biological) warfare, the experts have in- terpreted the worst "security" to mean both security in the narrow military sense, and security in terms of the adverse and long- term effects which these weapons, given they were ever used, could have on the framework of civilized existence. 10. As the present report shows, the out- standing characteristics of this class of weapons, and particularly of bacteriological (biological) weapons, is the variability, amounting under some circumstances to un- predictability, of their effects. Depending on environmental and meteorological condi- tions, and depending on the particular agent used, the effects might be devastating or negligible. They could be localized or svide- ipread. They might bear not only on those attacked but also on the side Which initi- ated their use, whether or not the attacked military forces retaliated in kind. Civilians would be even more vulnerable than the military. The development, acquisition and deployment of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons--quite apart from ques- tions of protection--constitutes a real eco- nomic burden which varies in extent for dif- ferent countries. Above all their acquisition could not possibly obviate the need for other weapons, 11. As chapters I and V of the report in- dicate, it would be enormously costly in re- sources, and administratively all but iinpos- Bible, to organize adequate protection for a civilian population against the range of pos- sible chemical agents. Even military person- nel, if locally engaged in a particular oper- ation in which chemical and/or bacteriologi- dal (biological) weapons were used and where they had the advantage of protective measures, would be unlikely to escape the wider-spread and longer-term effects on their country at large. These might arise, for ex ample, from the ampractleability of protect lug soil, plants, animals and essential focal crops against short and long-term effects 12, To appreciate the risks which bacterio- logical (biological) warfare could entail, one has only to remember how a natural epi- demic may persist unpredictably, and spread far beyond the initial area of incidence, even when the Most up-to-date medical resources are used to suppress the outbreak. The difficulties would be considerably increased were deliberate efforts made, foe military reasons, to propagate pathogenic organisms. Mass disease, following an attack, especially of civilian populations, could be expected not only because of the lack of timely warn- ing of the danger, but also because effective measures of protection or treatment simply do not exist or cannot be provided on an adequate scale. 13. Once the doer was opened to this kind of warfare, escalation would in all likelihood occur and no one could say where the process would end. Thus the report concludes that the existence of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons not only cantdbutes to international tension, but that their further development spurs the Rams race without contributing to the security of any nation. 14. The present report will, in accordance with resolution 2454 A (XXIII), be sub- mitted to the Eighteen-Nstion Committee on Disarmament to the Security Connell and to the General Assembly at its twenty- fourth session. We hope that it will con- tribute to the implementation of measures Which, in the final analysis, will eliminate chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons from all military arsenals. CHAPTER /. THE BASIC CHARAOIERLSTICS OP CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) MEANS OF WARFARE 15. Since World War I, When chemical war- fare was first resorted to on a lerge scale, the variety and potency of chemical and bac- teriological (biological) weapons has grown steadily, and there has been a corresponding increase in the capacity to deliver them to a target area. The particular threat posed by chemical weapons today- derives from the existence of new, and far more toxic, chem- ical compounds than were known fifty years ago. Since bacteriological /biological) agents exist naturally, their increased potency as weapons has resulted from a process of se- lection rattier than from the production of entirely new agents. As Is explained in later sections of this report, selection has been made possible by advances in our knowledge of the genetics of microbes, and through ad- vances in experimental aerobiology. 16. The most significant result of these technical developments is the great variety of %injurious effect which these agents can induce, and the consequent increase in the number and types of situation in which ere might be a temptatoia to use them for military purposes. A. Characteristics of chemical and bacterio- logical (biological) weapons 17. For the purposes of this reports chem- ical agents of warfare are taken to be chem- ical substances, whether gaseous, liquid, or solid, which might be employed because of their direct toxic effects on man, animals and plants. Bacteriological (biological) agents of warfare are living organisms, whatever their nature, or infective material derived from them, which are intended to cause disease or death in man, animals or plants, and which depend for their effects on their ability to multiply in the person, animal or plant attacked. 18. Various living organisms (e.g. rick- ettsia,e, viruses and fungi), as well as bac- teria, can be used asi weapons. In the con- tent of warfare all these are generally recog- nized as "bacteriological weapone". But in order to eliminate any poasible ambiguity, Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 F oalemB:91,W3RiaiBDID7s1EIRRW R000300100001-3 August 11; 1969APproved S 9529 the phrase "bacteriological (biological) weapons" has been used throughout to com- prehend all forms of biological warfare. 19. All biological processes depend upon chemical or physico-chemical reactions, and what may be regarded today as a biological agent could, tomorrow, as knowledge ad- vances, be treated as chemical. Because they themselves do not multiply, toxins, which are produced by living organisms, are treated in this report as chemical substances. We also recognize there is a dividing line between chemical agents of warfare in the sense we use the terms, and incendiary substances such as napalm and smoke, which exercise their effects through fire, temporary depriva- tion of air or reduced visibility. We regard the latter as weapons which are better classi- fied with high explosives than with the sub- stances with which we are concerned. They are therefore not dealt with further in this report. 20. Finally, we recognize that both chemi- cal and bacteriological (biological) agents are designated either as lethal agents, that is to say, agents which are intended to kill, or as incapacitating agents, that is to say, agents which are intended to cause dis- ability. These terms are not absolute, but im- ply statistical probabilities of response which are more uncertain with bacteriological (biological) than with chemical agents. Not all individuals will die from an attack with a given lethal agent, whereas some, for example infants and people weakened by malnutrition, disease or old age, as well as a high proportion of individuals in special circumstances, for example following irradi- ation, might succumb to an attack with incapacitating chemical or bacteriological (biological) agents. With a few chemical agents, notably some tear gases (lachry- mators) , there is a negligible probability of any fatal outcome, and these have been used by many Governments to quell riots and civil disorders. When used in this way they are called riot control agents. Lachrymators have also been widely used in warfare as harassing agents, in order to enhance the effectiveness of conventioxial weapons, or to facilitate the capture of enemy personnel. 1. Differences Between Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Warfare 21. Although there are some similarities between chemical and bacteriological (bio- logical) agents regarded as weapons of war, they differ in certain important respects. These differences are related to (1) potential toxicity; (2) speed of action; (3) duration of effect; (4) specificity; (5) controllability; and (6) residual effects. Potential toxicity 22. Although more toxic than most well- known industrial chemicals, chemical war- fare agents are far less potent on a weight- for-weight basis than are bacteriological (biological) agents. The dose of a chemical agent required to produce untoward effects in man is measured in milligrams (1/1,000 of a gram), except ,for toxins which may be in the microgram (1/1,000 of a milligram) range. The corresponding dose for bacteri- ological (biological) agents is in the picogram (1/1,000,000 of a microgram) range. 23. This difference reflects the fact that bacteriological (biological) agents, being alive, can multiply, and its significance is that, weight-for-weight, bacteriological (bio- logical) weapons could be expected to inflict casualties over very much more extensive areas than could chemical weapons. 24. Being living organisms, bacteriological (biological) agents are also very much more susceptible to sunlight, temperature, and other environmental factors than are chem- ical agents. A bacteriological (biological) agent disseminated into a given environment may retain its viability (ability to live and multiply) while losing its virulence (ability to produce disease and injury). Speed of action 25. As a class, chemical agents produce their injurious effects in man, animals or plants more rapidly than do bacteriological (biological) agents. The time between ex- posure and significant effect may be minutes, or even seconds, for highly toxic gases or ir- ritating vapours. Blister agents take a few hours to produce injury. Most chemicals used against crops elicit no noticeable effect until a few days have elapsed. On the other hand, a, bacteriological (biological) agent must multiply in the body of the victim before disease (or injury) supervenes; this is the familiar "incubation period" of a disease, the time which elapses between exposure to in- fection and the appearance of symptoms of illness. This period is rarely as short as one or two days, and may be as long as a few weeks or even longer. For both chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents the speed of , action is affected by the dose (i.e., the quantity absorbed) but this secondary fac- tor does not obscure the basic difference be- tween the two classes of agents in the time they take to manifest their effects. Duration of effect 26. The effects of most chemical agents which do not kill quickly do not last long, except in the case of some agents such as phosgene and mustard, where they might continue for some weeks, months or longer. On the other hand, bacteriological (biologi- cal) agents which are not quickly lethal cause illness lasting days or even weeks and on occasion involve periods of prolonged con- valescence. The effects of agents which act against plants and trees would last for weeks or months and, depending on the agent and the species of vegetation attacked, could re- sult in death. Specificity 27. While both classes of agents can be used to attack men, animals or plants, indi- vidual biological agents have in general a much greater degree of host specificity. In- fluenza, for example, is essentially a disease of man; foot-and-mouth disease mainly af- fects cloven-hoofed animals; and rice blast is a disease confined to rice only. On the other hand, some diseases (for example, bru- cellosis and anthrax) occur both in man and animals. However, chemical agents are much less specific: nerve agents can affect mam- mals, birds and invertebrates (e.g., insects). Controllability 28. By controllability is meant the ability to predict the extent and nature of the dam- age which chemical and bacteriological (bi- ological) agents can cause. This is a most important consideration in their use as weapons. The most likely means of deliver- ing chemical and bacteriological (biologi- cal) agents is by discharge into the atmos- phere, relying on turbulent diffusion and wind currents to dilute and spread the agent over the area being attacked. Control is thus possible only to the extent that the meteor- ological situation can be predicted. 29. Because they infect living organisms, some bacteriological (biological) agents can be carried by- travellers, migratory birds, or animals, to localities far from the area orig- inally attacked. 30. The possibility of this kind of spread does not apply to chemical agents. But con- trol of contamination by persistent chemical agents could be very difficult. Should large quantities of chemical agents penetrate the soil and reach underground waters, or should they contaminate reservoirs, they might spread hundreds of kilometres from the area of attack, affecting people remote from the zone of military operations. Although we know of no comparable substance likely to be used as a chemical warfare agent, the spread of DDT over the globe illustrates, in an extreme form, how man-made chemicals can spread. This chemical insecticide is now found in the tissues of creatures in all parts of the world, even in places in which it has never been used. For example, as a result of its transfer through food chains, it is even found in the tissues of the penguins which live in Antarctica. Residual effects 31. In circumstances which favour their persistence, herbicides, defoliants and per- haps some other chemical agents, might linger for months, stunting the growth of surviving or subsequent plant life, and even changing the floral pattern through selec- tion. Following repeated use, certain chemi- cal agents could even influence soil struc- ture. The risk of residual effects with some bacteriological (biological) agents is poten- tially greater, mainly because they could lead to disease, which might become epi- demic if man-to-man transmission occurred readily. Bacteriological (biological) agents might also find unintended hosts in the ani- mals and plants of an area, or be trans- ported by infected individuals over great distances to new environments. 2. Technology of Chemical and Bacteriologi- cal (Biological) Warfare 32. The technological problems associated with chemical and bacteriological (biological) warfare are of two kinds; (1) those associ- ated with the production of the agents and the weapons needed for their dissemination and (2) those which concern the provision of the protective equipment and defenses nec- essary to protect military forces and civilian populations. Any nation whose chemical, pharmaceutical and fermentation indvstries are well advanced could produce chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents on a scale commensurate with its other military capabilities. The assurance of safety in the production of bacteriological (biological) agents, problems associated with the syn- thesis of complex chemical agents, and decid- ing on the best weapons to disseminate them, are examples of some of the relevant tech- nological difficulties. A special problem asso- ciated with the development and main- tenance of an offensive capability in bac- teriological (biological) warfare relates to the fact that some agents are viable for only a short time (a few days) after manufacture. This period can be extended by refrigeration of the agent or by freeze-drying it before storage. The drying processes, however, are very complex and difficult where large quanti- ties of highly pathogenic agents are involved. The problems which relate to defence are far more difficult, for as with most weapons, ef- fective defence calls for much more stringent training, and demands far more manpower and monetary resources than does the of- fence. For example, alarm systems against chemical attack are very complex electro- mechanical devices whose production de- mands a highly technologically based indus- try. They cannot be maintained except by ex- pert and highly trained personnel. 3. Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons Systems 33. The use in warfare, and the possible military effectiveness, of chemical and bac- teriological (biological) agents cannot be ap- preciated if they are thought of simply as poisons and plagues. They need to be con- sidered in the context of the weapon systems of which they would be part. 34. A weapon system comprises all the equipment and personnel, as well as the or- ganizational structure? required to maintain and operate a military device. By itself, for example, a cannon is not a weapon system. Only when it is integrated into an artillery battery, together with trained crew, ammuni- tion, vehicles, supplies, spare parts, firing table, forward observer, communications and command organization does it constitute a weapon system. Correspondingly, artillery shells filled with mustard gas or nerve agents and guns to fire them, or an aircraft with a spray tank filled with a bacteriological (bio- Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9530 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE August 11, 1969 logical) agent, are not by themselves weapon systems. 35. Many complex technological problems have to be overcome in transforming a chem- ical or bacteriological (biological) "agent" into a "weapon system". A "weapon" is of little military value if it is not dependable and if it cannot be delivered to a target with certainty. This means that In the develop- ment of a chemical and bacteriological (bio- logical) weapon system it is not only neces- sary to consider matters such as mass pro- duction, storage, transportation, and means of delivery, but also the limitations on use set by terrain and weather prediction. 36. In addition, considerations affecting defense need to be taken into account. Masks, protective clothing, detection alarms, spe- cial medical supplies, augmented logistic facilities and, above all, thoroughly trained military and civilian personnel. are necessary parts of chemical and bacteriological (bio- logical) weapon systems. The concept of a fully developed chemical or bacteriological (biological) weapon system is thus exceed- ingly complex, and implies as much technical capability and as high a degree of training as does the operation of any other advanced weapon systems. While chemical and bac- teriological (biological) weapon systems are cheaper and more readily attained than nu- clear weapons, and while they may in some circumstances be more effective militarily than conventional weapons, they are highly complex systems which for their development and operation call for sizeable resources and considerable expertise. But the possibility al- ways exists that by choosing a single agent and a simple means of delivery, a nation could equip itself relatively cheaply to attack a limited area with a reasonable chance of success. B. Concepts of the use of chemical and bac- teriological (biological) weapons in war 1. Chemical Weapons 37. Chemical weapons could be used either within the zone of contact of opposing forces; or against military targets such as airfields, barracks, supply depots, and rail centres well behind the battle-area itself; or against targets which have no immediate connexion with military opera tions; for ex- ample, centres of population, farmland, and water supplies. The circumstances in which they could be used within a zone of contact are many anti varied?for example, to achieve a rapid and surprise advantage against a poorly trained, ill-equipped military force which lacked chemical protective equip- ment; to overcome troops tri dug-outs, fox- holes, or fortifications where they would be otherwise protected against fragmenting weapons and high-explosive; to remove foli- age, by means of chemical herbicides so as to improve visibility and to open up lines of fire, and to prevent ambush; to create bar- riers of contaminated land on or in the rear of the battlefield to impede or channel move- ment; or to slow an enemy advance by forc- ing them to use protective clothing and equipment. Such equipment undoubtedly re- stricts mobility and impedes normal activi- ties. It is thus highly probable that once one of two well-equipped sides had been at- tacked with chemical weapons. it would re- taliate in kind, in order to farce its opponent to suffer the same penalties of restriction. In all such operations civilians who had not fled from the battle-area might become casu- alties, as they also would if, while not in the battle-zone, vapours or aerosols drifted to- wards them with the wind, or if they strayed at a latter date into areas contaminated with a persistent agent. The risk of civilian casualties would obviously be greater if chemical attacks were made on military tar- gets well in the rear of the zone of contact, and would be very serious in- the case of at- tacks on centres of population. 2. Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons 38. There is no military experience of the use of bacteriological (biological) agents as weapons or War and the feasibility of using them as such has often been questioned. One issue which has frequently been raised con- cerns the validity of extrapolations made from laboratory experience to military situa- tions in the field. Some recent investigations under field Conditions throw light on this point. 39. In one field trial, zinc cadmium sul- fide (a harmless powder) was disseminated in particles two microns (one micron is 1/1,000,000 of a metre in. diameter, from a ship traveling 16 kilometres offshore. About 200 kilograms were disseminated while the ship travelled a distance of 260 kilometres parallel to the coastline, The resulting aero- sol traveled at least 750 kilometres, and cov- ered an area of over 75,000 square kilometres. 40. This observation provides an indica- tion of the size of area which might be cov- ered by a windborne aerosol, but It does not tell whether the bacteriological (biological) agents which might be spread in an aerosol would still retain the ability to produce dis- ease. All bacteriological (biological) agents lose their virulence or die progressively while travelling in an aerosol and the distance of effective travel of the cloud would depend on the rate of decay of the particular agent in the particular atmospheric conditions prevailing. 41. Some idea of the relative size of areas which can be covered by bacteriological (bio- logical) and chemical aerosols can be gained from this same experiment. Had the parti- cles that were carried been a bacterial or viral agent, they would not have caused cas- ualties over as large an area as the one covered, because of decay of the agent while in the aerosol state. However, depending on the organism and its degree of hardiness, areas of 5,000 to 20,000 km2 could have been effectively attacked, infecting a high propor- tion of unprotected people in the area. If the same means are applied to a hYpothetical chemical attack using the most toxic chem- ical nerve agent, then about 0.8 kg of agent would have been released per km. The down- wind hazard from this, in which some cas- ualties might be expected, would not have extended more than one kilometre, and prob- ably less, unless meteorological conditions were extremely favourable (see chapter III). The area covered by such a chemical attack might thus have been 50 to 150 km., as com- pared with the 5,000 to 20,000 km2 for the bacteriological (biological) attack. 42. For purposes of sabotage or covert (secret, as in sabotage actions behind enemy lines) operations, small aerosol generators for bacteriological (biological) agents could be built, for example, into fountain pens or cigarette lighters. It is also possible to con- ceive of the distribution of bacteriological (biological) agents by hand to poison either water supplies or ventilation systems, espe- cially in a situation of breakdown of sani- tary facilities due, say, to military mobiliza- tion, or to a nuclear attack. In addition to producing casualties, such an attack could produce severe panic. If half a kilo of a culture of Salmonella (a group of bacteria, many species of which produce severe intes- tinal infections, including gastro-enteritis, food ("ptomaine") poisoning, paratyphoid fever and typhoid fever) had been added to a reservoir containing 5 million litres of water, and complete mixing had occurred, severe illness or disability would be suffered by anyone drinking 1 decilitre (about 3 ounces) of untreated water. 43. The same degree of poisoning as would be produced by half a kilo of Salmonella culture could be achieved with 6 kilos of botulinum toxin (see chapter II), 7 kilos of staphylococcal enterotoxin (see chapter II), or 50 kilos of V-nerve agent, or in the case of common industrial chemicals, with five tons of sodium fluoroacetate (used as a roden- ticide) or ten tons of potassium cyanide. C. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents Chemical Agents 44. Chemical agents are usually described in terms of their physiological effects and are characterized as foliates: Agents affecting man and animals Nerve agents are colourless, odourless, tasteless chemicals, Of the -same family as organophosphorus insecticides. They poison the nervous system and disrupt vital body functions. They constitute the most modern war chemicals known; they kill quickly and are more potent than are any other chemical agents (except toxins). Blister agents (vesivants) are oily liquids which, in the main, burn and blister the skin within hours after exposure. But they also have general toxic effects. Mustard gas is a good example. Blister agents caused more casualties than any other chemical agent used in World War I. Choking agents are highly volatile liquids which, when breathed as gases, irritate and severely injure the lungs, causing death from choking. They were introduced in World War I and are of much lower potency than the nerve agents. Blood agents are also intended to enter the body through the respiratory tract. They produce death by interfering with the utili- zation of oxygen by the tissues. They, too, are much less toxic than nerve agents. Toxins are biologically produced chemical substances which are very highly toxic and may act by ingestion or inhalation. Tear and harassing gases are sensory irri- tants which cause a temporary flow of tears, irritation of the skin and respiratory tract, and occasionally nausea and vomiting. They have been widely used as riot control agents, and also in war. Psycho-chemicals are drug-like chemicals intended to cause temporary mental disturb- ances. Agents affecting plants Herbicides (defoliants) are agricultural chemicals which poison or dessicate the leaves of plants, causing them to lose their leaves or die. The effectiveness of different chemical warfare agents against man, ani- mals and plants is shown in table I. The vari- ous specific chemical agents are listed and described in chapter 2. Methods of delivery 45. Chemical munitions are designed to ful- fill three objectives: (1) to provide a con- tainer for the agent so that the agent/muni- tion combination can be delivered to its target; (2) to attain an effective distribution of agent over the target area; and (3) to re- lease the agent in active form. In the case of Incapacitating and riot control agents, it is necessary that the munition itself should not cause injury or death, and that it should not start fires. This is particularly important for devices used in the control of riots. 46. The munitions to be used would depend on the method of delivery, the shape and size of the target area, and other variables. Ground-to-ground munitions include gre- nades, shells, rockets; and missile warheads; air-to-ground munitions include large bombs, dispensers, spray tanks, and rockets: emplaced munitions Include generators and mines. 47. Ground-to-ground munitions. Small ground-to-ground munitions (grenades, shells and small rockets) function much like their conventional counterparts. Upon im- pact in the target area, they would either ex- plode or burn, and so expel the agent to form a cloud which Would diffuse and drift down- wind, resulting in an elongated elliptical area within which casualties would occur, This represents a paint source Of dissemination (chapter II). Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71800A4R000300100001-3 August 11, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENA TABLE 1.?CATEGORIES OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS S 9531 Physical state at 2V C. Persistency Main state of aggregation in target Effective route of entry Effective against Nerve agents Blister agents Choking agents Blood agents Toxins Tear and harassing gases Inca pacitants Herbicides (defoliants) do Liquid Low to high Vapour, aerosol, liquid Lungs, eyes, skin Man, animals. Liquid, solid High do do Do. Liquid Low Vapour do Do. Liquid, vapors do do Lungs Do. Solid do Aerosol, liquid Lungs, intestinal tract Do. Liquid, solid do Vapor, aerosol Lungs, eyes On. do do Aerosol, liquid Lung , skin Do. Low to high do Foliage and roots Plants!. I Some herbicides, particularly those containing organic arsenic are also toxic for man and animals. - 48. Small rockets would frequently be fired (c) be effective regardless of medical coun- to have any potential in bacteriological (bio- in "ripples", and artillery shells in salvos, ter-measure; logical) warfare. resulting in a group of impacts over the (d) be able to cause a large number of 65. Protozoa are one-celled microscopic target area. This would constitute an area casualties (this would imply that any agent organisms which cause several important hu- source of dissemination (chapter II). chosen would be highly infectious, but man diseases, including malaria. Because of 49. Large ground-to-ground (as well as whether the agent chosen would also be their complex life cycles, they too appear aerial munitions and missile warheads) easily transmissible from man-to-man, would to have little significance in the present might carry a number of small submunitions depend upon an intent to initiate an epi- context. as well as agent in bulk. The parent muni,- demic spread). 66. Parastic worms such as hook-worm, and tion, upon functioning, would disperse the Agents affecting man . the filarial worms have very complicated submunitions over the target area. These life cycles. They cause illness and disability 59. All the diseases under consideration would then disseminate the agent over a only after long exposure and repeated in- occur naturally, and the causative organisms wide area rather than a single point of im- with few exceptions, are known to scientists , fection and would be extremely difficult to pact, as in the case of bulk munitions. throughout the world. Incapacitating agents ? produce in quantity, to store, to transport, 50. Another military concept is to use or disseminate in a weapon. Insects are also are those which, in natural outbreaks, cause large warheads filled with several hundred illness lout rarely death. If the natural dis- difficult to conceive of as weapons. Some, Such a warhead, burst at a suitable altitude ease has an applicable mortality, the agent kilos of an agent of low vapour pressure. would produce a shower of droplets, effec- is regarded as a lethal one. However, these tively contaminating everything on which it agents when used as aerosol weapons might fell. A number of such weapons could bb cause more severe disease than occurs nat- used to assure that the target was covered. urally. 51. Air-to-ground munitions. Bombs 60. Different populations have varying de- dropped from aircraft are larger than most grees of resistance to the diseases produced shells, and consequently would result in a by bacteriological (biological) agents. An in- higher concentration of the chemical near the fectious disease which might be only mildly point of ground impact. Bombs bursting incapacitating in one population might prove close to the ground could be used to achieve disastrous to another. For example, when a wider dissemination of the agent, especially measles was first introduced into the Hawai- with chemical agents. ian Islands, it caused far more deaths than 52. A dispenser is a container for submu- in the relatively resistant populations of nitions, which, after opening, could remain Europe. A bacteriological (biological) weapon attached to the aircraft. The submunitions which might be intended only to incapacitate could be released simultaneously or in suc- could be highly lethal against a population cession. where resistance had been lowered as a re- 53. Small rockets or missiles could also be sult of malnutrition. Conversely, a weapon used to deliver chemical agents from aircraft. which was intended to spread a lethal disease The pattern of dispersal would be much might only cause occasional mild illness in the same as that produced by ground-to- people who had been given a protective vac- ground rockets or missiles. eine or who had become immune as a result 54. Ground-smplaced munitions. Ground- of natural infection. The history of epi- emplaced munitions comprise generators and demiology is rich with surprises. mines. The generator is a tank containing 61. Viruses are the smallest forms of life. a chemical agent, a source of pressure, and Most of them can be seen only with the a nozzle through which the agent is forced. electron microscope, and must be grown Generators would be placed upwind of the on living tissue (tissue cultures, fertile eggs, target, and then activated by a suitable de- etc.) Genetic manipulation of the whole vice, virus or chemical manipulation of its nu- 55. Chemical mines would be placed in dela acid, might be used to acquire strains areas of anticipated enemy activity, and of higher virulence or greater stability to en- such as the mosquito and the tick are trans- mitters of disease, and as "vectors", have to be looked upon as having potential military significance. Higher forms of life, such as rodents and reptiles can be dismissed in the context of the present discussion. Agents affecting animals 67. Bacteriological (biological) anti-animal agents, such as foot-and-mouth disease and anthrax would be used primarily to destroy domestic animals, thereby indirectly affect- ing man by reducing his food supply. 68. Outbreaks of contagious disease in animal populations, knows as epizootics, may spread much more readily than do epidemics among human beings. Viral infections are probably more serious for animals than those caused by other classes of micro-organisms. 69. Most of the bacterial diseases of ani- mals which could probably be used in war- fare are also transmissible to man. Human beings would be expected to get the disease if they were affected by the attacking aerosol cloud, and occasional individuals might con- tract the disease from infected animals. Agents affecting plants 70. The natural occurrence of devastating plant diseases such as the blight of potatoes in Ireland in 1845, the coffee rust of the 18708 in Ceylon, the chestnut blight of 1901 in the United States of America, and the widespread outbreaks today of cereal (cape- would be activated by pressure or trip wires, vironmental cially wheat) rusts has suggested that plant 62. Rickettsiae are intermediate between pathogens might be used for military pur- 2. Bacteriological (Biological) Agents the viruses and bacteria. Like the viruses, POSes. There are four major requirements for 56. Like chemical agents, bacteriological they grow only in living tissue. Judging by the deliberate development of a plant disease (biological) agents may also be classified in the scientific literature, research into the into epidemic (epiphytotiC), proportions: terms of their intended use, whether de- genetics of rickettsiae has been less intense large amounts of the host plant must be signed to incapacitate or to kill human be- than into that of viruses and bacteria, present in the region; the agent should be ings, to incapacitate or kill food and draft 63. Bacteria are larger than viruses, ran.? ?,._ capable of attacking the particular varieties animals, or to destroy food plants and in- of host plant that are grown; adequate quan- ing in size from 0.3 micron to several ml- crops. crons. They can be easily grown on a large tities of the agent must be present; and the 57. Bacteria, viruses, fungi, and a group scale employing equipment and processes environmental conditions within the region of microbes known as rickettsiae are by far similar to those used in the fermentation should be favorable for the spread of the the most potent agents which could be in- industry, but special skills and experience disease. An epiphytotic cannot develop if corporated into weapon systems. There is would be needed to grow them in quantity in any one of the above requirements is not no assurance, however, that other living or-satisfied. the particular state in which they readily ganisms may not in the future become more cause disease. Although many pathogenic Methods of delivery important as potential agents for warfare. (disease-producing) bacteria are susceptible 71. Bacteriological (biological) agents can, The selection of agents for use in warfare to antibiotic drugs, antibiotic-resistant in principle, be loaded into the same type of 58. The number of bacteriological (biolog- strains occur naturally, and can be selected munitions as can chemical agents. Other ical) agents which could potentially be used or obtained through the use of suitable than for covert or "special-purpose missions", in warfare is far fewer than those Which methods of genetic manipulation. Similarly, bacteriological (biological) weapons, if de- cause naturally-occurring disease. To be ef- it is possible to select strains with increased veloped for military purposes, would in all fective for this purpose they should: resistance to inactivation by sunlight and probability be delivered by aircraft or by large (a) be able to be produced in quantity; drying. ballistic missiles. Aircraft (including cruise (b) be capable of ready dissemination in 64. Fungi also produce a number of die- missiles and drones) could drop a large the face of adverse environmental factors; eases in man, but very few species appear number of bomblets from high altitude, or Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9532 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August ii, 1969 spray from a low altitude. Because a small amount of agent will cover relatively large areas, bombs would probably be small (1 kilo or less) and dispersed over as wide an area as possible. They could be released from clusters or from dispensers in the manner of chemical weapons, but probably from a high- er altitude. 72. An aircraft could establish a line of agent which, as it traveled downwind, would reach the ground as a vast elongated infec- tive cloud (see chapter II). The effectiveness of such a procedure would be highly depend- ent on weather conditions, but the larger the area, the larger the weather front involved, the greater the chances that the predicted results would be achieved. A small relative error might, however, involve a country net in the conflict. 73. It is conceivable that bacteriological (biological) weapons, probably bomblets, could be packaged in a laalltstic missile. The bomblets could be released at a predeter- mined altitude to burst atetound level. The effect would be the same as rablet delivery by aircraft except that it would be more costly, 74. Unless transmitted by insects, bac- teriological (biological) agents have little power to penetrate the intact skin. Infections through the respiratory tract by means of aerosols is by far the most likely route which could be used in warfare. 75. Many naturally-occurring diseases (e.g. influenza, tuberculosis) are spread by the aerosol route, and some of them, notably influenza, can generate into large epidemics. When an infected person sneezes, congas, or even speaks, an aerosol is formed which contains particles ranging widely in size. The larger particles are usually of little impor- tance because they fall to the ground. But small particles (3 microns or less in diame- ter) dry out rapidly in the air, and are the most infectious. They may rarain suspended in the atmosphere for a lot* time. Animal experiments have shown that a great many infectious agents (including ins ny which are transmitted otherwise in nature) can be transmitted to animals by aerosols of small particle size. Laboratory accidents and ex- periments on volunteers have confirmed the effectiveness of the aerosol route of infec- tion for man, 76. If bacteriological (biological) warfare ever occurred, the aerosol technique would thus be the one most likely to be used, sim- ply because the respiratory tract is normal- ly susceptible to infection by many micro- organisms; because of the Wide target area which could be covered in a single attack; and because ordinary hygienic measures are ineffective in preventing the airborne route of attack. Since the particle size of an aerosol is crucial to its ability to penetrate into the lung (see chapter III for detailed dis- cussion) , the method for aerosolizing a bac- teriological (biological) agent would have to be controllable so as to assure the dissemi- nation of a large proportion of particles less than 5 microns in diameter. 77. Aerosols of bacteriological (biological) agents could be formed by three general methods. Agents could be disseminated by explosive means in much the same way as chemical agents. However, the size of the resulting particle is hard to control by this method, and much of the agent may be de- stroyed by the heat and shock of the ex- ploding munition. Particles could also be formed by using pressure to force a suspen- sion of the organisms threugh a nozzle, Particle size is determined by tae amount of pressure, the size of the diselairge orifices, the physical characteristics of the agent, and atmospheric conditions. Size eon trol of solid particles (dry form of agent) can be achieved by "pre-sizing" before dissemination. Aerosol particles could also be produced by a spray by releasing the agent in liqUid suspension into a high velocity air strewn. This principle can be applied to spray devices for use on high performance aircraft. D. Defence of man against chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents 78. A comprehensive defensive system against attacks by chemical or bacteriological (biological) agents would have to provide for deteotion and warning, rapid identification of agents, protectioti of the respiratory tract and skin, decontamination, and medical prophylaxis and treatment. Some aspects of such a system could be dealt with by fairly simple equipment. Others would necessitate highly sophisticated apparatus. But the Whole complex would necessitate a very effec- tive organization manned by well-trained personnel. While military units and small groups of people could be equipped and trained to protect themselves to a significant extent, it would be impracticable for most (if not all) countries to provide comprehensive protection for their entire civil population. 1. Medical Protection Chemical attacks 79. No general prophylactic treatment ex- ists which could protect against chemical attacks. Antidotes (atropine and oximes) to nerve agents of value if administered within half an hour before or within a very short time after exposure. Atropine is itself toxic, however, and might incapacitate unexposed individuals given large doses. Skin can be protected from the vapours of blister agents by various ointments, but they are not ef- fective against liquid contamination. Bacteriological (biological) attacks 80. Vaccination is one of the most useful means of protecting people from natural infective disease, and the only useful means available for prophylaxis against bacterio- logical (biological) attacks. The protective value of vaccines against small-pox, yellow fever, diphtheria, and other diseases is fully established, although the protection they afford can be overcome if an immunized in- dividual is exposed to a large dose of the infectious agent concerned. It is probable, however, that even those existing vaccines which are effective in preventing natural in- fectious diseases might afford only limited protection against respiratory infection by an agent disseminated into the air in large amounts by a bacteriological (biological) weapon. Moreover, whole populations could not be vaccinated against all poSsible dis- eases. The development, production, and administration of so many vaccines would be enormously expensive, and some vaccines might produce undesirable or dangerous re- actions in the recipients. 81. This picture is not significantly al- tered by certain new developments in the field of vaccination: e.g. the use of living bacterial vaccines against tularemia, brucel- losis and plague; or aerosol vaccination, which is particularly relevant to vaccination of large numbers of people. There have been recent advances in the control of virus diseases, but at present none of these is practicable for the protection of large popu- lations against bacteriological (biological) warfare. 82. Prophylaxis against some diseases can also be provided by the adrinnistration of specific anti-sera from the blood of people or animals previously innoculated with micro-organisms, or -products derived from them, to increase the anti-body levels (im- munity) in their blood. Tetanus anti-toxin is used in this manner, and until more ef- fective methods replaced them, such anti- sera were used for many diseases. It would, however, be impossible to prepare specific anti-sera against all possible bacteriological (biological) agents and to make them avail- able for large populations. 83. Other possibilities, for example the use of therapeutic materials before symptoms appear, are equally remote from practical realization. They include immune serum, gammaglobulin, or drugs such as antibiotics or sulfonamide drugs. The use of gamma- globulin to prevent, or mitigate the severity of, disease may be useful for individuals known to have been exposed. But since gam- maglobulin is made by separation frem human blood, stocks could never be avail- able except for isolated eases. In theory, chemoprophylaxis (the use of drugs and antibiotics to prevent infection) might also be useful in the short term for small groups operating at especially high risk. But it would only be prudent to assume that the bacteri- ological (biological) agents which an enemy might use would be those which were re- sistant to such drugs. 2. Detection and Warning 84. The requirement is to detect a cloud of a chemical or a bacteriological (biological) agent in the air sufficiently quickly for masks and protective clothing to be donned before the attack can be effective. Usually the objective would be to try and detect the cloud upward of the target so that all those downwind could be warned. There are also requirements for the detection of ground contairnanation with chemical agents and for detection equipment to enable those under attack to decide when it would be safe to remove their protective equipment. Chemical attacks 85. In World War I it was possible to rely upon odour and colour as the primary means of alerting personnel that a chemical a"6- tack had been launched. The newer more toxic chemical agents cannot be detected in this way. On the other hand, presumptive evidence that such weapons had been used would none the less still be Of value as warn- ing. Once an enemy had used chemical wea- pons, each subsequent attack would neces- sarily have to be presumed to be a possible chemical attack, and protective measures would have to be instituted immediately. In- dividuals would have to mask not only in the air attack in which spray was used, or when there was smoke or mist from an unknown source, or a suspicious smell, or when they suffered unexpected symptoms such as a runny nose, choking and tightness in the chest, or disturbed vision, but whenever any bombardment occurred. But because of the uncertainty, it would be clearly desirable to devise and provide a system of instruments which can detect the presence of toxic chem icals at concentrations below those having psysiological effects, and which would give timely and accurate warning of a chemical attack. It would also be advantageous to have test devices, collectors and analytical labora- tory facilities in order to determine whether the environment was safe, as well as to identify accurately the specific chemical agent used in an attack. 86. The first and essential component of a defensive system would be an instrument Which could detect low concentrations of a chemical agent. However low the concentra- tion, a person could inhale a toxic amount in a short time because he breathes 10-20 litres of air per minute. Since the human body can eliminate or detoxify Very small amounts of many toxic materials, there is no need to consider very long periods of exposure?the concern is with the exposures of only a fetv hours. This is often referred to technically as the Ot (concentration time) factor. Essen- tial requirements of a method of detection suitable for use by military or civil defence personnel are that it be simple, specifie, sensitive and reliable. Typical detector kits contain sampling tubes and/or reagent but, tons, papers, etc. After being exposed to par- ticular chemical agents, these detectors change colour or exhibit some other changes easily observable without special insturraents. Chemical detection kits could also be used to decide when it Is safe to remove proteca tire masks or other items of protective cloth- Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : ClAirP0p4t4R000300100001-3 August 11, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECOR ? A bag. Obviously, laboratories, whether mobile or fixed, can perform more elaborate chem- ical analyses than can detection kits. 87. Warning devices which have been de- vised incorporate sensitive detectors that ac- tuate an automatic alarm which alerts indi- viduals to take protective action before a harmful dose of agent is received. They are of two trends: point sampling devices, which sample the air at one location by means of an air pump, and area scanning devices, which probe a specific area for chemical agents. The disadvantage of point source alarms is that they must be placed upwind of the area that has to be protected, and a rather large number may be needed. If the wind shifts, they have to be repositioned. Successful area scanning alarms have not yet been developed. 88. It must be recognized that in spite of instrumental warning systems, personnel near the point of dissemination of a chemical agent might still not have sufficient time to take protective action. Bacteriological (biological) attacks 89. Unlike chemical weapons, bacteriologi- cal (biological) weapons cannot readily be distinguished from the biological "back- ground" of the environment by specific chem- ical or physical reactions, and much lower aerosol concentrations of bacteriological (bi- ological) agents are dangerous than of chem- ical agents. The problem cal early detection and warning is thus even more difficult than for chemical weapons. A partial solution to the problem has been achieved with certain non-specific but very sensitive physical de- vices such as particle-counters and protein detectors (protein is a typical constituent of micro-organisms). Presumptive evidence of a bacteriological (biological) attack might be obtained if there is an unusual deviation from the normal pattern of material in the air recorded by the instruments. The eleva- tion of such a deviation, however, would necessitate intensive and prolonged study of the normal pattern in a given location. This subject is discussed further in annex A. 3. Physical Protection 90. The primary objective is to establish a physical barrier between the body and the chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents, and especially to protect the skin and the respiratory tract. Without this no warning system, however effective, has the slightest value. Protection could be achieved by using various types of individual protec- tive equipment or by means of communal shelters. Individual protection S 9533 casualties because of lack of training, fail- ferred to nutrient media, where sufficient ure to keep the mask in good condition, growth may take place to permit identifica- growth of beard, or ' because facial in- tion of some kinds of bacteria within fifteen juries prevent a good fit, etc. The amount hours. Another method, the fluorescent anti- of leakage that can be tolerated with bac- body technique, can be highly specific, and terriological (biological) agents is much less is applicable to bacteria and some viruses. In because of their greater potency. some cases, it allows of specific identification 9$. Since mustard gases and the nerve within a few hours. But despite all, these agents of low or intermediate volatility can recent developments, laboratory identifica- penerate the unbroken skin, even through tion of biological agents is still a complicated normal clothing, the whole body surface must and unsatisfactory process. be protected by some form of special cloth- 4.. Decontamination ing, of which there are two kinds, one which Chemical agents is impermeable to liquid agents, and the 98. Prolonged exposure to weather and other which, though permeable to air and moisture, has been treated so as to prevent sunlight reduces or eliminates the danger of most chemical agents, which are slowly de- chemical agents from getting through. Rub- ber coated fabrics, made into protective suits, composed by humidity and rain. But one could net rely on natural degradation to constitute the first, while normal clothing, eliminate the risk and, in general, it would treated with chlorimides or absorbents, is an be essential to resort to decontamination. example of the second. In addition, some This would reduce the hazard but it is a form of impermeable cover, ground sheet or cape, can be used to protect against gross time-consuming process and would greatly liquid contamination. Feet and hands are haxnper military operations. 99. A wide range of chemicals could be usually protected by special gloves, and used as decontaminants, the choice depend- either by boot covers or treated boots. ing on the particular agent which has to be 94. Together with a mask, protective cloth- neutralized, the type of surface that needs ing, properly worn and in good condition, to be treated, the extent of contamination, will afford excellent protection against known and the amount of time available. Decon- chemical and bacteriological (biological) taminants range from soap and detergent in agents. The greatest degree of protection is water, to caustic soda, hypochlorite and var- provided by the impermeable type but ,when lows organic solvents, and their successful worn continuously it becomes very burden- use calls for large numbers of people, a cop- some because of heat stress, particularly in ions supply of water, and appropriate equip- warm environments. Permeable clothing al- ions lows somewhat greater activity, but even so, 100. Decontaminating solutions, powders, physical activity is impaired. applicators and techniques have been de- Collective or communal protection veloped for decontaminating skin, clothing, 95. Collective protection takes the form of personal equipment and water. These would fixed or mobile shelters capable of accom- need to be used immediately after an at- modating groups of people, and has been de- tack. vised not only for civilians but also for ape- 101. Unless food has been stored in metal cial groups of military personnel (e.g. corn- cans or other containers which were imper- mend posts, field hospitals). Collective pro- meable to chemical agents, it would have to tection is the most effective physical means be destroyed. Decontamination of complex of protection against all forms of attack. equipment and vehicles is a difficult and Sealing or insulating the shelter will provide ttme-oonsurning procedure. Special pres- protection only for a limited time, because of suxized sprayers to disseminate powdered lack of ventilation. Sealing plus a supply of and liquid decontaminants have been de- oxygen and a means of eliminating carbon veloped for this purpose, as have paints or dioxide is better, but once again the time of coatings to provide a smooth impermeable occupancy is limited. The shelter could be surface to preclude the penetration of chem- none the less safe even though surrounded ical agents. by fire or high concentrations of carbon 102. Decontamination might even need to monoxide. The best kind of shelter provides be extended to roads and selected areas. This ventilation with filtered air to maintain a would involve the removal of contaminated positive pressure relative to that outside. soil by bulldozing, or covering it with earth, This positive internal pressure prevents the using explosives to spread a powdered de- penetration of airborne agents, and permits contaminant over a wide area. entry or exit of personnel and equipment Bacteriological (biological) agents without contamination of the interior of the shelter. Extended periods of occupancy are 103. Decontamination procedures for bio- logical agents are similcr to those used for possible. toxic chemical agents. Aeration and exposure 96. These principles of collective protection -to strong sunlight will destroy most micro- as applicable to all enclosures arranged for organisms, as will also exposure to high tem- human or animal occupancy. They have been peratures. Thoroughly cooking exposed food, used to provide protection by: hastily con- and boiling water for at least fifteen minutes structed or improvised field shelters, mobile will kill almost all relevant micro-organisms. vans and armoured vehicles, and permanent Calcium hyprochlorite and chlorine can also or fixed shelters designated for housing be used to purify water. Certain chemical civilian or military personnel. compounds, such as formaldehyde, ethylene 97. Once a bacteriological (biological) at- oxide, calcium and sodium hypochlorites, tack had been suspected or detected, it would sodium hydroxide and betapropiolactone, can be necessary to identify the specific agents be used to decontaminate materials and involved so that proper protective measures work areas. A hot, soapy shower is the best could be taken and chemo-prophylaxis and way to decomtaminate human beings. 91. Protective masks are the first line of defense against all chemical and bacteriolog- ical (biological) agents. Although protective masks differ in appearance and design, they have certain features in common: a fitted facepiece, made of an impermeable material soft enough to achieve' an effective seal against the face, and some means of holding it in place, such as a head strap, and a filter and absorption system, in canister or other form, which will remove particulate (aero- sol) agents by mechanical filtration. The canister also contains activated charcoal, sometimes impregnated to react with agents in the vapour state, but which in any case will absorb toxic vapours. Some masksare made so as to permit the drinking of water treatment planned. Identification would also while the individual is masked, or attempts help to predict the incubation period and at resuscitation measures on casualties hence the time available for remedial meas- without unmasking them. Civil defense urea to be taken. At present the only means masks are often less elaborate versions of of identifying specific micro-organisms is by the military mask. Gas proof protectors can normal laboratory procedures. Many routine be provided for infants, laboratory methods of identification require 92. A protective mask, properly fitted and as long as two to five days, but some recent in good working condition, will provide corn- developments have reduced this time appre- plete respiratory protection against all known ciably. It is possible to collect the particles chemical and bacteriological (biological) from large volumes of air and concentrate agents. However, a Certalo percentage of them in a small amount of fluid. Bacteria can masked personnel can be expected to become then be trapped on special filters and trans- E. Protection of domestic animals and plants against chemical and bacteriologi- cal (biological) attacks 1. Chemical Attacks 104. The widespread protection of domes- tic animals and plants from chemical at- tack would be impracticable. Once a crop had been attacked with herbicides there Is no effective remedial action. The damage could be made good only by a second plant- ing of either the same or another crop, depending on the season. Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9534 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 11 1969 2. Bacteriological Biological) Attacks Animals 105. Animals or flocks could be protec by collective shelters, although the cost would be great and, in the absence of an matic warning devices, it would be impose ble to assure that the creatures would b sheltered at the time of attack. 106. The ideal means of protection f animals would be vaccination. Vaccines hay been developed, and many are routinely pro duced, for foot-and-mouth disease rinde pest, anthrax, Rift Valley fever, hog cholera, Newcastle disease and others. Vaccination of animal herds by aerosols Is a promising area of investigation. Plants 107. The only hopeful approach would be to breed disease resistant plants. This Is a regular part of most national agricultural programmes, and has as its object the in- crease of crop yields. But unless the exact identity of the bacteriological (biological) agent which might be used were known well in advance (possibly years), it would not be feasible to apply this principle to provide protection to crops against this kind of attack. 108. Efforts devoted to spraying fungicides and similar preparations to reduce loss after attack do not appear to be economically effective. In most cases the best procedure Is to utilize available manpower and machines In planting second crops. ANNEX A : EARLY WARNING SY,A EMS FOR AIR- BORNE BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) -AGENTS An ideal automatic system for early warn- ing against an attack with bacteriological (biological) agents would comprise the fol- lowing components: (1) a device to collect large volumes of air and concentrate the particulate matter ob- tained, in a small volume of fluid or on a small surface; (2) a device to quantify and identify the collected material; (3) a mechanism to assess the results and to initiate an alarm if necessary. To collect and identify bacteriological (biological) agents and to initiate an alarm so that protective measures can be taken in sufficient time to be,useful is extremely diffi- cult This is so because, firstly, identification of agents is generally time-consuming and, secondly, large and fluctuating quantities of bacterial and other organic materials exist in the atmosphere at all times. Thus if pathogens from a cloud released by an ag- gressor were collected, the device would need, not only to determine whether the quantity collected was significantly above the normal amounts that might occur, but also what the agent was, or at least that- in the amount collected, it vras highly dangerous to man. At present, warning devices are available which are sensitive but non-specific and these, unfortunately, would give an unac- ceptably high proportion of false alanne. Others are being developed which attempt to incorporate both rapid respOnse with high specificity, but none to date thin the produc- tion stage. Research on this bisportant prob- lem is being continued and some of the ap- proaches and techniques that are being used in this study are listed below. Classification of automated biodetection approaches ? General category: Physical.particle detec- tion. Suggested approach: magnification, light scattering, volume displacement, General category; key biochemical compo- nents. ted Suggested approach: antigen detection by fluorescent labelling, dyes and staining, bio- to- lumineecence and iluorescences, optical activ- ity, pyrolysis products detection, ATP detec- tion, proteins, nucleic acids, or others. General category: Biological activity. Suggested approach: Growth (increase in or cell mass or numbers), CO. evolution, phos- e phatase activity, substrate change (pH, Eh, r 0. interchange), Pathogenic effects,, - ? Adapted from Greene, WI'S. "Biodetect- ing and Monitoring Instruments Open New Doors for Environmental Understanding", Environmental Science Technology, F'ebru- ary 1968, pp. 104-112. CHAPTER I/. THE PROBABLE EFFECTS OF CHEM- ICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS ON MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PER- SONNEL, BOTH PROTECTED AND 'UNPROTECTED A. The effects of chemical agents on individ- uals and populations 109. The effects of chemical warfare agents on humans, animals and plants depend on the toxic properties of the agent, the dose absorbed, the rate of absorption and the route by which the agent enters the orga- nism. Toxic agents may enter the body through the skin, the eyes, the lungs, or through the gastro-Intestinal tract (as a re- sult of eating contaminated food or drinking contaminated liquids) . 110. For a given agent absorbed under the same conditions, the effect will be propor- tional to the dose absorbed. This is why It is possible to define for each agent certain characteristic doses, such as the dose which, under given conditions, will on average cause death In 50 per cent of the individuals exposed (the 50 per cent lethal dose, or "LD 50"), or the dose which will cause 50 per cent non-fatal casualties, or the dose which will have no appreciable military effect. These are expressed in milligrams of agent, with reference to a healthy adult of average weight. They may also be given In terms of milligrams per kilogram of body weight. 111. For purposes of evaluation it is con- venient to express the same idea somewhat differently in the case of gases, vapours and aerosols absorbed through the respiratory passages. Here the absorbed dose depends on the concentration of the agent in the r, on the respiration rate of the subject, and on the duration of the exposure, If, for the sake of Illustration, it is assumed that the average respiration rate for groups of in- dividuals engaged in various activities re- mains relatively constant, it follows that the dose, and therefore the effect produced, will be directly proportional to the product of the concentration of the agent in the air (C in milligrams/cubic metre) and the exposure time (t in minutes). This is called the dosage (or Ct factor), certain charac- teristic values of which (for example the LD TABLE I.?GENERAL CHARACTERISTI Type 50) are used in particular situations for quantitative estimates of the effects pro- duced. 112. For toxic agents acting on or through the skin, the dose absorbed by contact will often be related to the "contamination rate," expressed in grams/square metre, which indi- cates to what extent surfaces are contami- natde by the liquid. 113. The consequences of an attack on a population are a combination of the effects on the individuals in it, with both the con- centration of agent and the susceptibility of individuals varying over the whole area ex- posed to risk. Different individuals would respond differently to an attack, and might have different degrees of protection. Possible long-term contamination of personnel from chemical warfare agents persisting on the ground and vegetation may add to the im- mediate, direct effects. 314. Protective masks, protective clothing and shelters and, to a certain extent, de- contamination when applicable, give sub- stantial protection against all chemical War- fare agents. But, as already emphasized, the mere possession of a means of protection by no means constitutes an absolute safeguard against contamination by poisons. Alarm and detection equipment is important, soil-se- times vital, because without It timely warn- ing, which is essential to the proper use of protective equipment, would be lacking. Since protective measures are most effective when performed by trained personnel works ing effectively in units, military personnel are more likely to be provided with adequate protection than a civilian population. In any event, the civilian population in most coun- tries is simply- not provided with protection against chemical warfare. 115. Several chemical warfare agents which were known during World War I, and others developed since, have been reported on in the scientific literature. However, the effects of the more lethal modern chemical weapons have not been studied under conditions of actual warfare. Furthermore, no complete and systematic field Studies of the use of de- foliants, herbicides and riot control agents are available. The following descriptions of the probable effects of chemical weapons, based both upon evidence and on technical judgment, must therefore be regarded as somewhat conjectural. 1. Effects of Lethal Chemical Agents on Individuals 116. Table 1 provides a classification of the most important lethal chemical agents, and notes some of their characteristics in terms of the effects they produce. More de- tails are given in annex A. CS OF LETHAL CHEMICAL AGENTS Mechanism Time for onset of effects Examples Nerve agent G Interferes with transmission of nerve impulses. Nerve agent V Interferes with transmission of nerve impulses. Blister agent Cell poison Choking agent Damages lungs _ Blood agent Interferes with all respiration_ Toxin Neuromuscular paralysis Very rapid by inhalation (a few Tabun, Sarin, Soman. seco nds). Very rapid by inhalation (a few VX. seconds); Relatively rapid through skin (a few minutes to a few hours). Blistering delayed hours to days; Sulfur mustard. eye effects more rapid. Nitrogen mustard. Immediate to more than three hours___ Phosgene. Rapid (a few seconds or minutes)_.. _ __ Hydrogen cyanide. Variable (hours or days)__ Botulinum toxin. 117. Lethal chemical agents kill in rela- tively small doses, and ate a rule the amount that causes death Is only slightly greater than that which causes incapacitation. Death may occasionally be caused by high doses of presumed incapacitating agents and, conversely, minor effects could be caused by low doses of lethal agents. Blister agents are considered with the lethal agents, since a small but significant fraction of the person- nel attacked with such agents may die or suffer serious injury. Nerve agents 118. These lethal compounds are readily absorbed through the lungs, eyes, skin and inteatinal tract without producing local ir- ritation, and they interfere with the action of an enzyme (cholinesterase) essential te the functioning of the nervous system. The nerve-agerut casualty Who has been exposed to a lethal dose will die of asphyxiation Within a few minutes if he is not treated swiftly by means of artificial respiration and drugs each as atropine or =iamb. Otherwise Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP711300364R000300100001-3 -August .11, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 9535 recovery is generally rapid and complete. Oc- casionally, it raay take several weeks, but will be complete unless anoxia or convul- sions at the time of exposure were so pro- longed as to cause irreversible brain damage. 119. The route of entry of the agent into the body has some influence on the appear- ance of symptoms. Mute develop more slowly when the agent is absorbed through the skin than when it is inhaled. Low dosages cause a running nose, contraction of the pupil of the eye and difficulty in visual accommodation. Constriction of the bronchi causes a feeling of pressure in the chest. At higher dosages, the Skeletal muscles are af- fected-weakness, fibrillation, and eventually paralysis of the respiratory muscles oc- curring. Death is usually caused by respira- tory failure, but heart failure may occur. It is estimated that the most toxic nerve gases may cause death at a dosage of about ten mg min/m3.* Less toxic ones are lethal at dosages of up to 400 mg min/m3. Blister agents or vesicants A 120. Mustard is a typical blister agent which, like other members of this class, also has general toxic effects. Exposure to concen- trations of a few mg/m 8 in the air for sev- eral hours results at least in irritation and reddening of the skin, and especially irri- tation of the eyes, but may even lead to temporary blindness. Exposure to higher con- centrations in the air causes blisters and swollen eyes. Severe effects of this kind also occur when liquid falls on the skin or into the eyes. Blistering with mustard is compar- able to second degree burns. More severe lesions, comparable to third degree burns, may last for a couple of months. Blindness may be caused, especially if liquid agent has entered the eyes. Inhalation of vapour or aerosol causes irritation and pain in the up- per respiratory tract, and pneumonia may supervene. High doses of blister agents cause a general intoxication, similar to radiation sickness, which may prove lethal. 121. The first step in treating a person who has been exposed to a vesicant or blister agent, is to wash it out of the eyes and de- contaminate the skin. Mild lesions of the eyes require little treatment. The blisters are treated in the same way as any kind of second-degree burn. Other lethal agents 122. Phosgene and compounds with sim- ilar physiological effects were used in World War I. Death results from damage to the lungs. The only treatment is inhalation of oxygen and rest. Sedation is used sparingly. 123. Hydrogen cyanide in lethal doses causes almost immediate death by inhibiting cell respiration. Lower doses have little or no effect. 124. Most of the so-called blood agents contain cyanide, and all act rapidly. The casualty would either die before therapy could begin, or recover soon after breathing fresh air. 125. Botulinum toxin is one of the most powerful natural poisons known, and could be used as a chemical warfare agent. There are at least six distinct types, of which four are known to be toxic to man. Formed by the bacterium Clostridium botulinum, the toxin is on occasion accidentlly transmitted by contaminated food. The bacteria do not grow or reproduce in the body, and poisoning is due entirely to the toxin ingested, It is possible that it could be introduced into the body by inhalation. 126. Botulism is a highly fatal poisoning characterized by general weakness, head- ache, dizziness, double vision, dilation of the pupils, paralysis of the muscles concerned in swallowing, and difficulty of speech. Res- piratory paralysis is the usual cause of death. *A dosage of one mg min/m3 consists of an exposure of one minute to gas at a concen- tration of one milligram per cubic metre. After consumption of contaminated food, symptoms usually appear within twelve to seventy-two hours. All persons are suscep- tible to botulinum poisoning. The few who recover from the disease develop an active immunity of uncertain duration and degree. Active immunization with botulinum toxoid has been shown to have some protective value, but antitoxin therapy is of limited value, particularly where large doses of the toxin have been consumed. Treatment is mainly supportive. 2. Effects of Lethal Agents on Populations 127. As already indicated, the possible ef- fects of an attack on populations with lethal chemical warfare agents would depend upon the agent used, upon the intensity of the attack, whether the population was mainly under cover or in the open, on the avail- ability of protective facilities, on the physi- ological state of the individuals affected, and upon the meteorological conditions, which might differ from what had been predicted, and alter during the course of an attack. 128. The importance of meteorological con- ditions on the spread of agent from its point or area of release is illustrated by Figures 1(a), 1(b) and 1(c) which show in an ideal- ized diagramatic form the type of dosage contours to be expected from a point source, from multiple sources and from a linear aerial source respectively when exposed to the effects of wind. 129. Figure 1 (a) shows the shape of the zone travelled by the chemical cloud pro- duced by a point source (for example, one isolated munition), at the far left of the innermost cigar-shaped figure under condi- tions of a strong wind (say, 5-20 km/h) in the direction indicated. 130. The number on each line indicates the dosage (Ct = concentration times time) on the line. The dosage at any point inside the area delimited by the curve is greater than the number indicated. On the basis of these data, it is possible to estimate the casualties when the characteristic dosages of the agent used are known. For example, if the LD 50 value of the agent were 30 milli- gram-minutes/cubic metre, there would be more than 50 per cent fatalities in the area inside the contour marked 30. 131. This figure applies to a volatile agent such as Sarin, which is usually released in the form of a vapour or an aerosol cloud. In the case of a non-volatile liquid released in the form of droplets which fall onto the ground and contaminate it, a corresponding map could be drawn for the level of contam- ination of the soil (expressed in milligrams/ square metre). 132. Figure 1 (b) shows the same phenome- non in relation to an area source such as would result, for example, from attack by a missile warhead filled with small bombs or by an artillery salvo. 133. In the case of a volatile agent released in the form of a vapour or aerosol, the re- sulting cloud, carried downwind, covers a zone whose general shape is the same as in the case of a point source (Figure 1 (a) ), but its dimensions are obviously much larger and the dosage values are also larger. 134. If a non-volatile agent were released In the form of droplets, the hazard would be very great in the impact area because all sur- faces (skin, clothing, vehicles, equipment, vegetation, etc.) would be contaminated. The downwind hazard caused by the drift of the most minute particles would extend over a much smaller area than in the previous case because only a relatively small number of minute particles would be carried by the wind. 135. Figure 1(c) shows the zone covered by a linear aerial source, as in the case of dissemination of a non-volatile agent from an aircraft. 136. The emitted cloud is carried by the wind and does not touch the ground until it has travelled some distance away from the line of flight of the disseminating aircraft; this depends on the altitude of the aircraft and on the wind velocity. Since the cloud has already been subjected to the influence of turbulent diffusion before reaching the ground, the dosage values or contamination rates will be highest some distance away from the zone boundary nearer the source. 137. Because of meteorological and other variables, it is impossbile to make general statements about the quantitative effects of chemical weapons on populations. The fol- lowing hypothetical examples, therefore, are intended merely to Illustrate what might happen and the degree to which protective measures could reduce casualties. To provide representative illustrations, the examples chosen include the different hazards created by nerve agents used in a battle zone, on military targets in the rear and on civilians - in a town. Effects of nerve gas on protected troops in combat 138. A heavy attack with air-burst muni- tions dispersing non-volatile liquid nerve agent would create concentrations on the the ground that could rage from one-tenth of a gram to ten grams of liquid per square metre, giving a mean value of about five grams. This would be extremely hazardous. At the same time, aerosol concentrations would be created over almost the entire impact area (dosages about twenty mg. min/m3). This would produce casualties even if there were no liquid hazard. 139. To counter this type of attack, pro- tective measures of a very high order of efficiency, including protective masks, light protective clothing, means for decontamina- tion, detection systems, antidotes and medi- cal care, would have to be available. Pro- tective clothing and rapid utilization of gas masks would give a certain measure of protection. But in this case, subsequent de- contamination and medical care would be necessary to avoid heavy lethal losses. Effects of nerve gas on a military target in the rear 140. An attack from the air with a volatile nerve agent against a military installation in a rear area would cause an intense liquid and vapor hazard in the installation itself, and a vapour hazard downwind in the sur- rounding area. As suggested in figure 1(b), the impact area would be very heavily con- taminated; gas dosages inside and close to the impact area would be very high. Further downwind the gas concentration would de- crease gradually, and finally become in- nocuous. A general picture of the way cas- ualties would occur in a downwind area is indicated in figure I (a) . 141. After an attack in which tons of Sarin were used against an area of one square kilometre, the impact area and the area immediately downwind from it would be highly lethal to all unprotected personnel. Lethal casualties would occur at dosages above eighty mg. min/m3 and severe casual- ties down to thirty mg. min/m3. Some very light casualties would result at dosages around five mg. min/m3. The distance be- tween the impact area and the area of lowest effective dosage would depend on the local topography and on weather conditions, but would rarely exceed a few tens of kilometres. 112. Personnel provided only with gas masks, but not wearing them at the moment of the attack, would suffer substantial losses in and close to the impact area, both because of the effects of the liquid and because of the high gas concentration inhaled before they could don their masks. Further downwind, masks would give essentially complete pro- tection if warning were provided reasonably quickly. Effects of a nerve gas attack on a town 143. The population density in a modern City may be 5,000 people per square kilometre. Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9536 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE August 11, 1969 A heavy surprise attack with non-volatile nerve gas by bombs exploding on impact in a wholely unprepared town wcadd, especially at rush hours, cause heavy losses. Half of the population might become cainzalties, hall of them fatal, if about one ton of agent were disseminated per square kileraetre. 144. If such a city were epared for at- tack, and if the preparations Included a civil defence organization with adequately equip- ped shelters and protective Isn.sks for the population, the losses might be reduced to one half of those which would be anticipated in conditions of total surprise. 145. Although it would be very difficult to achieve, if there were a high level of pre- paredness, comprising adequate warning and effective civil defence procedures, it is con- ceivable that most of the population would be sheltered at the time of the attack, and that very few would be in the streets. 146. Given a town with a total population of 80,000, a surprise attack with nerve gas could thus cause 40,000 casualties, half of them fatal, whereas under ideal circum- stances for the defence, fatalities might num- ber no more than 2,000. It is inconceivable, however, that the ideal woUld ever be at- tained. 3. Effects of Incapacitating Chemical Agents 147. Incapacitating chemicels, like tear gases and certain psychochemicals, produce in normal health people a temporary, rever- sible disability with few if any permanent ef- fects. In your children, old people and those with impaired health, the effects may some- times be aggravated. They 'are called in- capacitating because the ratio between the lethal and incapacitating doses is very high. The types which could have a possible mili- tary use are limited by requirements of safe- ty, controlled military effectiveness and eco- nomic availability. Tear and harassing gases 148. Many chemical compounds fall into this category, of which a-chloaaeetophenene (CN), ortho-chlorobenzylid :enemalononitrile (CS), and adamsite (DM) are probably the most important. They are sands when pure, and are disseminated as aerosols. _ 149. Either as vapour or in areosol, tear and harassing gases rapidly produce irrita- tion, smarting and tears. These symptoms disappear quickly after exposure ceases. The entire respiratory tract may also be irritated, resulting in a running nose aria pain in the nose and throat. More severe exposures can produce a burning sensation in the trachea. As a result, exposed persons experience dif- ficulty in breathing, attacks of coughing and occasionally, nausea and headaches. 150. Extremely high dosages of tear and harassing gases can give rise to pulmonary edema (fluid in the lungs). Deaths have been reported in three cases afters extraordinary exposure to sachloracetophenone (CN) in a confined space. 151. The effects of adamsite (nM) - are more persistent. Nausea is more severe and vomit- ing may occur. 152. Results of experiments on various species of animals (see annex B) and some observations of human responses lead to the following tentative conclusions First, CS IS the most irritating of these gases followed by adamsite (DM) and sachloracetophenone (CN). Second, the tolerance limits (highest concentration which a test subject can toler- ate for one minute) of DM and CS are about the same. Third, the least tax- lc of the tear gases is CS, followed by Datt- and then Cia. Fourth, human beings vary In their sensi- tivity to, and tolerance of, tear and harass- ing gases. And finally, the toxicity of these gases varies in different animal species and in different environmental conditions. 153. The symptoms caused by tear gases disappear, as tears wash the agent from the eyes, and if the victim gets Out of the tear gas atmosphere. Some, however, cause red- dening or rarely even blistering of the skin when the weather is hot and wet. Toxins 154. Staphylococcus toxin occurs naturally in outbreaks of food poisoning?which is the only medical experience with this toxin. The symptoms have a sudden, sometimes violent, onset, with severe nausea, vomiting and diar- rhea. The time from ingestion of the toxin to the onset of symptoms is usually two to four hours, although it may be as short as a half hour. Most people recover in 24-48 hours and death is rare. Treatment is sup- portive and immunity, following an attack, is short-lived. The toxin is resistant to freez- ing, to boiling for thirty minutes, and to concentrations of chlorine used in the treat- ment of water. Staphylococcus toxin could be. considered as an incapacitating chemical warfare agent. Symptoms can be produced in animals by intravenous injection, and the toxin may also be active by the re- spiratory route. Psychochemicals 155. These substances have been suggested for use in war as agents which could cause temporary disability by disrupting normal patterns of behavior. The idea cannot be accepted in its simple form, since these sub- stances may lead to more permanent changes, particularly in individuals who are mentally unbalanced or who are in the early stages of a nervous and mental disease. Moreover, very high doses, which would be difficult to exclude during use in war, can cause ir- reversible damage to the central nervous sys- tem or even death. Psychochemicals could also have particularly severe effects on children. 156. Compounds such as LSD, mescaline, psilocybin, and a series of benzilates which cause mental disturbance?either stimula- tion, depression or hallucination?could be used as incapacitating agents. Mental dis- turbance is, of course, a very complex phe- nomenon, and the phychological state of the person exposed to a psychochemical, as well as the properties of the agent, would pro- foundly influence its manifestations. But, despite the variation in responses between individuals, all those affected could neither be expected to act rationally, nor to take the initiative, nor make logical decisions. 157. Psychochemicals do more than cause mental disturbance. For example, the general symptoms from the benzilates are interfer- ence with ordinary activity; dry, flushed skin; irregular heartbeat; urinary retention; constipation; slowing of mental and psy- chical activity; headache, giddiness; disor- ientation; hallucinations; drowsiness; occa- sional maniacal behaviour; and increase in body temperature. While these effects have not been fully studied, there would be a significant risk of affected individuals, par- ticularly military personnel, becoming sec- ondary casualties due to unco-ordinated be- haviour. A single dose of 0.1 to 0.2 mg L6D25 will produce profound mental dis- turbance within half- an hour, the condi- tion persisting for about ten hours. This dose is about a thousandth of the lethal dose. 158. Treatment of the symptoms of pay- chochemicals is mainly supportive. Perma- nent psychotic effects may occur in a very small proportion of individuals exposed to LSD. 159. It is extremely difficult to predict the effects which an attack with psychochemical agents would produce in a large population. Apart from the complication of the varying reaction of exposed individuals, there could be strange interactions within groups. A few affected individuals might stimulate their fellows to behave irrationally, in the same way as unaffected persons might to some ex- tent offset the reactions of those affected. Since the probability of fatal casualties re- sulting directly from exposure is low, some normal group activity might be sustained. Protective masks would probably provide complete protection since practice/1y all po- tential psychochemical agents, if used as of- fensive weapons, would be dessiminated as aerosis. 4. Other Effects of Chemical Agents Effects on aniznals 160. The effects of lethal chemical agents on higher animals are, in general, similar to those on man. The nerve agents also kill insects. Effects on plants 161. A variety of chemicals kill plants, but as already indicated, little is known about their long-term effects. The effective dose ranges of defoliants vary according to the particular species of plant attacked, its age, the meteorological conditions and the de- sired effect: e.g., plant death or defoliation. The duration of effect usually lasts weeks or months. Some chemicals kill all plants indis- criminately, while others are selective. Most defoliants produce their effects within a feW weeks, although a few species of plant are so sensitive that defoliation would occur in a period of days. 162. An application of defoliating herbi- cide* of approximately 3 gallons (32 pounds) per acre (roughly 36 kg per hectare) can produce 65 per cent defoliation for six to nine months in very densely forested areas, but in some circumstances some species of trees will die. Significantly lower doses suffice for most agricultural and industrial uses throughout the world. Defoliation is, of course, a natural process?more common in trees in temperate zones than in the tropics. Essentially what defoliants do is trigger defoliation prematurely. 163. Desiccation (the drying out) of leaves results in some defoliation, although usually the leaf-drop is delayed, and the plant would not be killed without repeated application of the chemical. Chemical desiccants cause a rapid change in colour, usually within a few hours. B. The effects of bacteriological (biological) agents on individuals and populations 164. Mankind has been spared any experi- ence of modern bacteriological (biological) warfare, so that any discussion of its pOssible nature has to be based on extrapolation frosts epidemiological knowledge and laboratory experiment. The number of agents which potentially could be used in warfare is limited by the constraints detailed in chapter I. On the other hand, the variability which char- acterizes all living matter makes it conceiv- able that the application of modern knowl- edge of genetic processes and of selection could remove some of these limitations. Some species of micro-organisms consist of a num- ber of strains characterized by different degrees of virulence, antigenic constitution, susceptibility to chemotherapeutic agents, and so on. For example, strains of tularaemia bacilli isolated in the TJnited States are gen- erally much more virulent in human beings than those found in Europe or Japan. Foot- and-mouth disease virus is another well- known example of an organism with various degrees of virulence. The situation with bacteriological (biological) weapons is thus quite different from that of chemical weap- ons, where the characteristics of a given com- pound are more specific. 1. Effects on Individuals 165. Bacteriological (biological) agents could be used with the intention of !tilling people or of incapacitating them either for a short or a long period. The agents, how- ever, cannot be rigidly defined as either lethal or incapacitating, sins* their effects are de- *For example, the commonly used "2,4-Ds and "2,4,5-T" which are the butyl esters of (2,4-dichlorophenoxy) acetic acid and (2,4,5- triohlorophenoxy) acetic act& Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 ? CIA-RDP7I RO9R4R000300100001-3 s 9537 August 11, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RE.CORD ? A pendent upon many factors relating not only to themselves but also to the individuals they attack. Any disease-producing agent intended to incapacitate may, under certain condi- tions, bring about a fatal disease. Similarly, attacks which might be intended to pro- voke lethal effects might fail to do so. Exam- ples of naturally occurring lethal disease are shown in table 2 and representative incapac- itating diseases in table 3. A detailed list of possible agents, NVith a brief description of their salient characteristics is given in an- nex C. 166. A number of natural diseases of man and domestic animals are caused by mixed Infections (e.g., swine influenza, hog chol- era). The possible use of two or more differ- ent organisms in combination in bacterio- logical (biological) warfare needs to be treated seriously because the resulting dis- eases might be aggravated or prolonged. In some instances, however, two agents might interfere with one another and reduce the severity of the illness they might cause sepa- rately. 167. The effects of some forms of bacterio- logical (biological) warfare can be mitigated by chemotherapeutic, chemoprophylactic and immunization measures (for protec- tion see chapter I and annex C of this chap- ter). Specific chemotherapeutic measures are effective against certain diseases, but not against those caused by viruses. But it may not always be possible to apply such meas- ures, and they might not always be success- ful. For example, with some diseases early therapy with antibiotics is usually success- ful, but relapses may occur. Moreover, re- sistance against antibiotics may develop in almost all groups of micro-organisms, and re- sistant strains may retain full virulence for man as well as for animals. TABLE 2.?EXAMPLES OF AGENTS THAT MIGHT BE USED TO CAUSE DEATH Agents Diseases Incubation period (days) Effect of specific therapy Likelihood of spread from man to man Viruses Rickettsiae Bacteria Eastern equine encephalitis__ 5 to 15 Nil Tick-borne encephalitis 7 to 14 do Yellow fever 3 to 6 do Rocky Mountain spotted fever_ 3 to 10 Good Epidemic typhus 6 to 15 do Anthrax 1 to 5 Moderate Cholera do Good Plague, pneumonic 2 to 5 Moderate Tularaemia 1 to 10 Good Typhoid 7 to 21 do NiI.I Do. Do. Do. Do. Low. High. Do. Low. High. I Unless vector present. TABLE 3.?EXAMPLES OF AGENTS THAT MIGHT BE USED TO CAUSE INCAPACITATION Agents Diseases Incubation period (days) Effect of specific therapy Likelihood of spread from man to man Viruses Rickettsiae Bacteria Fungi Coccidioidomycosis Chikungunya fever 2 to 6 Nil Nil.' Dengue fever 5 to 8 do Do. Venezuelan equine 2 to 5 do Do. encephalitis. Q-fever 10 to 21 Good Low. Brucellosis 7 to 21 Moderate Nil. 7 to 21 Poor Do. I Unless mosquito vector present. Possible bacteriological (biological) agents 168. Victims of an attack by bacteriological (biological) weapons would, in effect, have contracted an infectious disease. The diseases would probably be known, but their symp- toms might be clinically modified. For ex- ample, apart from the deliberate genetic modification of the organism, the portals of Infection might be different from the natural routes, and the disease might be foreign to the geographical area in which it was de- liber6tely spread. Possible bacteriological (biological) agents representing diseases caused by the main groups of relevant micro- organisms are: 169. Anthrax: Under natural conditions, anthrax is a disease of animals, the main source of infection for man being cattle and sheep. Its vernacular synonym "wool sorter's disease" indicates one way men used to con- tract the disease. Depending on the mecha- nism of transmission, a cutaneous (skin) form (contact infection), an intestinal form (alimentary infection), or pulmonary form (airborne infection) may develop. The lung or respiratory form is most severe, and un- less early treatment with antibiotics is re- sorted to, death ensues within two-three days in nearly every case. 170. Antibiotic prophylaxis is possible, but would have to be prolonged for weeks, since it has been shown that monkeys exposed to anthrax aerosol die if antibiotic treatment is discontinued after ten days. In certain coun- tries, several types of vaccines are employed, but their value has not been fully evaluated. of the illness, and can be significant for proper diagnosis. Treatment presents great difficulties. 174. Plague: Under natural conditions, small rodents, from which the disease is transmitted by fleas, are the main source of human infection with plague. This is hoW "bubonic" plague develops. If the plague microbes are inhaled, pneumonic plague de- velops after a three-to-five-day incubation period. The patient suffers from severe gen- eral symptoms and if untreated, normally dies within two to three days. A patient with pneumonic plague is extremely contagious to contacts. 175. Preventive vaccination is moderately effective against bubonic, but not pneu- monic, plague. If administered early, strep- tomycin treatment may be successful. 176. In a study of experimental pulmonary plague in monkeys, it was found that an average dose of only 100 bacteria caused fatal disease in half the animals tested. Animal experiments have also show that particles of 1 micrometre diameter (1.25,000 of an inch) , containing single microbial cells, can cause primary pneumonia, with a rapid and fatal outcome. If the aerosol is formed by larger particles (5-10 micrometres diameter) micro- bial cells are deposited in the nose and other regions of the upper respiratory tract, and primary foci of the disease develop in the corresponding lymphatic nodes. A fatal gen- eralized infection may then follow. 177. A large mass of plague bacteria could be grown, and probably lyophilized (freeze- dried) and kept in storage. The agent is highly infectious by the aerosol route and most populations are completely susceptible. An effective vaccine against this type of dis- ease is not known. Infection might also be transmitted to urban and/or field rodents and natural foci of plague may be treated. 178. Q-/ever: Under natural conditions, Q- fever is a disease a animals, the main sources of infection to man being sheep, goats and cattle. The infection is transmitted most fre- quently by the air route. 179. An incubation period of two to three weeks follows the inhalation of the infectious material. A severe attack of influenza-like ill- ness follows, with high fever, malaise, joint and muscle pains, which may be followed in five to six days by pneumonia. In untreated cases, the illness lasts two to three weeks; the patient feels exhausted and is unable to do normal work for everal weeks. But the disease can be successfully treated with broad spectrum antibiotics (tetracyclines). Prophy- lactic vaccines have been prepared in some countries, but have not yet been proved suit- able for large-scale use. 180. The agent causing the disease is a rickettsia, and is extremely infectious for man. An epidemic of Q-fever once occurred due to contaminated dust which was carried by the wind from a rendering plant some ten kilometers away. Q-fever is also a coinmon and significant laboratory hazard, even though it is only rarely transmitted from man to man. The high susceptibility of hu- mans to this agent has been demonstrated in volunteers. 181. Q-fever rickettsiae are extraordinarily resistant to environmental factors such as temperature and humidity. Very large amounts can be produced in embryonated chicken eggs (20,000 million mirco-organisms par millilitre) and can be stored for a lung period of time. A Q-fever aerosol could pro- duce an incapacitating effect in a large pro- portion of the population of an attacked area. The infective agent could persist in the en- vironment for months and infect animals, possibly creating atural foci of infection. 182. Tularaemia: Under natural conditions, tularaemia is a disease of wild animals, the source of human infection being rodents, especially rabbits and hares. When it occurs naturally in human beings, who are very susceptible to the disease, skin lesions with swelling of the lymph nodes are its usual 171. The anthrax bacillus forms very re- sistant spores, which live for many years in contaminated areas, and which constitute the most dangerous risk the disease presents. From epidemiological observations, the in- halation, infectious dose for man is estimated at 20,000 spores. Experiments on animals show that anthrax can be combined with in- fluenza infection or with some noxious chemical agent, and that the susceptibility of the animal to airborne anthrax infection is then markedly enhanced. 172. With suitable expertise and equip- ment large masses of anthrax bacilli can be easily grown, and heavy concentrations of resistant anthrax spore aerosols can be made. Such aerosols could result in a high propor- tion of deaths in a heavily exposed popula- tion. Immunization could not be expected to protect against a heavy aerosol attack. The soil would remain contaminated for a very long time, and so threaten live-stock farm- ing. 173. Coccidioidomycosis: This disease, which is also called desert fever, is caused by a fungus found in the soil of deserts in the United States, South America and the USSR. The spores of the fungus are very stable, and can easily be disseminated as an aerosol. If they are inhaled, pneumonia with fever, cough, ague and night-sweatinig, and muscle pains follow after an incubation period of one-three weeks. In most cases, recovery from the disease occurs after some weeks of illness. An allergic rash sometimes breaks out during the first or second week Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP711300364R000300100001-3 S 9538 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 11, 1969 manifestation (infection by contact with sick and dead animals, or by way of ticks and other vectors). Infection can also occur through the eye and the gastro-intestinal tract. The pulmonary form (airborne infec- tion) is the more serious. Pulmonary tula- raemia is associated with general pain, irri- tant cough, general malaise, etc., but in Europe and Japan mortality due to this form of the disease was never higher than 1 per- cent even before antibiotics became avail- able. American tularaemia strains in the other epidemics have been associated with a mortality rate as high as 20 )ercent despite antibiotic treatment. Usually treatment with streptomycin or tetracycline is highly effec- tive. A tularaemia vaccine developed in the Soviet Union is also highly effactive. 183. The agent causing the disease is a microbe which is very sensitive to common disinfectants, but which is able to survive for as long as a few weeks in contaminated dust, water, etc. 184. Aerosols of tularaemia have been tested on volunteers. The inhalation infec- tious dose for man is about ten to twenty- five microbes, and the incubation period five days. By increasing the inhaled dose a hun- dred times, the incubation period shortens to two to three days. Owing to its easy aerosol transmission, tularaemia has often infected laboratory workers. 185. The microbiological characteristics are similar to those of the plague bacillie (al- though antibiotic treatment and vaccination prophylaxis are effective). Both lethal and incapacitating effects are to be expected. The disease is not transferred front man to man, but long-lasting natural foci might be created. 186. Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus (VEE): In nature, VEE ia an infection of animals (equines, rodents, birds) transmitted to man through mosquitos Which have fed on infected animals. 187. The disease has sudden onset, with headache, chills and fever, nausea and vomit- ing, muscle and bone pains, with encephalitis occurring ha a very small proportion of cases. The mortality rate is very low and recovery Is usually rapid after a week, with reSidual weakness often persisting for three weeks. No specific therapy is available. The vaccine Is still in the experimental stage. 188. NUMerOUS laboratory Infections in hu- mans have been reported, most of them air- borne. In laboratory experiments, monkeys were infected with aerosolized virus at rela- tively low concentrations (about 1,000 guinea pig infectious doses). 189. Since the virus can be produced in large amounts in tissue culture or embryo- nated eggs, and since airborne infection read- ily occurs in laboratory workers, concentrated aerosols could be expected to incapacitate a very high percentage of the population ex- posed. In some areas, persistent endemic in- fection in wild animals would be established. 190. Yellow fever: In nature, yellow fever is primarily a virus diseaat of monkeys, transmitted to man by variety of mosquitos (Aedes rtegypti, Aedes simpsoni, Hamagogus species, etc.). After an incubation period of three-six days, influenza-like aymptoras ap- pear with high fever, restlessness and nausea. Later the liver and the kidneys may be seri- ously affected, with jaundice and diminished urinary excretion supervening. The very se- vere forms end in black vomitus and death. In a non-immune population. mortality rates for yelloW fever may be as high as 30-40 per cent. There is no specific treatment, but pro- phylactic vaccination, being highly effective is widely used in yellow fever endemic areas. 2. Effects on Populations 191. Other than for sabotage, the use of aerosol clouds of an agent is the most likely form of attack in bacteriological (biological) warfare. For example, material can be pro- duced containing infective Micro-organisms at a concentration of 10,000 million per gram. Let us suppose that an aircraft were to spray such material so as to produce an aeronsol line source 100 kilometres in length across a 10 kilometre per hour wind. Then, assum- ing that 10 per cent of organisms survived aerosolization, and that subsequent environ- mental stresses caused them to die at a rate of 5 per cent per minute, about 5,000 square kilometres would be covered at a concentra- tion such that 50 per cent of the unprotected people in the area would have inhaled a dose sufficient to infect them, assuming that the infective dose is about 100 micro-organisms per person, This particular calculation is valid for agents such as those which cause tularaemia, plague, as well as for some vir- uses. The decay rate of the causative agents of Q-fever, anthrax and some other infections is much lower and the expected effect would be still greater. 192. The effects of bacteriological (biologi- cal) attacks would obviously vary according to circumstances. Military personnel equip- ped with adequate protective measures, well trained In their use and provided with good medical services could, if warned of an at- tack, be able to protect themselves to a considerable degree. But effective early warn- ing and detection systems do not yet exist. On the other hand, attacks on civil popula- tions are likely to be covert and by surprise and, at present no civilian populations are protected. Unprotected military or civilian personnel would be at complete risk, and panic and irrational behaviour would com- plicate the effects of the attack. The heavy burden which would be imposed on the med- ical services of the attacked region would compound disorganization, and there would be a major risk of the total disruption of all administrative services. 193. In view of the extensive anti-person- nel effects associated with agents of the kind with which this report is concerned, it is useful to view them against the area of effect of a one-megaton nuclear explosion, which as is well redognized, would be suffi- cient to destroy utterly a town with a popu- lation of a million. It should of course be emphasized that direct comparisons of the effects of different classes of weapons are, at best, hypothetical exercises. From the military point of view, effectiveness of a weapon cannot be measured just in terms of areas of devastation or numbers of casualties. The final criterion will always be whether a specific military objective can be achieVed better with one than another set of weapons. The basic hypotheses chosen for the com- parison are rather artificial; and in particu- lar, environmental factors are ignored. But despite this limitation, table 4 gives data that help to place chemical, bacteriological (biological) and nuclear weapons in sorne perspective as to size of target area, numbers of casualties inflicted, and cost estimates for development and production of each type of weapon. The figures speak for themselves. TABLE 4.?COMPARATIVE ESTIMATES OF DISABLING EFFECTS OF HYPOTHETICAL ATTACKS ON TOTALLY UNPROTECTED POPULATIONS USING A NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, OR BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPON THAT COULD BE CARRIED BY A SINGLE STRATEGIC BOMBER Criterion for estimate Type of weapon Nuclear (1 megaton) Chemical (15 tons of nerve agent) Bacteriological (biological) (10 tons a) Area affected Up to 300 km 2 Time delay before onset of Seconds - effect. Damage to structures Destruction over an area of 100 km.2 Other effects Radioactive contamination in an area of 2,500 km.2 for 3-6 months. Possibility of later normal 3-6 months after attack use of affected area after attack. Maximum effect on man____ 90 percent deaths Multiyear investment in $5,000-10,000 million substantial research and development production capability.2 UP to 60 km2 Minutes None Contamination by persistence of agent from a few days to weeks. Limited during period of con- tamination. 50 percent deaths $1,000-5,000 million UP to 100,000 km I. Days. None. Possible epidemic or estab- lishment of new endemic foci of disease. After end of incubation period or subsidence of epidemic. 50 percent morbidity; 25 percent deaths If no medical intervention. $1,000-5,000 million. It is assumed that mortality from the disease caused by the agent would be 50 percent if no medical treatment were available. 2 it is assumed that indicated cumulative investments in research and development and production plants have been made to achieve a substantial independent capability. Individual weapons could be fabricated without making this total investment. 3. Effects on Animals 194. The way bacteriological (biological) weapons might be used against stocks of domestic animals would probably be the same as that used in attacks against man. Rep- resentative diseases and their characteris- tics are shown in table 5. 195. Viral infections probably cause the most important diseases of domestic animals and could have more devastating effects than diseases produced by other types of patho- gens. Since many of the organisms which cause infectious diseases in domestic animals are also pathogenic for man, and since some of them may also be readily transmitted from animals to man, either directly or by vectors, such attacks might also affect the human population directly. Attacks upon livestock would not only result in the immediate death of animals, but also might call for compul- sory slaughter as a means of preventing the spread of infection. 196. Covert bacteriological (biological) at- tack during peacetime directed against do- mestic animals could give rise to serious political and economic repercussions if large numbers of stock were affected. For example, African swine fever occurs endemically on the African continent as a subclinical disease of warthogs. In 1957 it was accidentally brought from Angola to Portugal, and then in 1960 to Spain. Despite strict and extensive veteri- nary measures that were enforced, losses in pig breeds were estimated to amount within a single year to more than 89,000,000. 197. Isolated attacks against stocks of do- mestic animals during wartime would have only a nuisance value. However, if a highly infectious agent (e.g,, foot-and-mouth dis- ease) were used, even a local attack could have very widespread effects because of spread by the normal commercial movement of animals, particularly in highly developed countries. Extensive attacks with travelling clouds could, however, lead to a disastrous state of affairs. The history of myxamatosis (a rabbit disease) in Europe provides a par- allel. Not only did it drastically reduce the rabbit population in France, into which it was first introduced; it immediately spread to other countries of Europe, including the United Kingdom. The risk of the uncon- trolled spread of infection to a number of countries is an important consideration in Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 August 11, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE the use of some bacteriological (biological) weapons. 198. The possibilities of protecting domes- tic animal stocks against bacteriological (bio- logical) attacks are so remote that they are not worth discussing. of protection. Advanced countries might, as a precautionary measure exchange suscep- tible plants by more resistant strains. This would be difficult for countries whose agri- cultural standards were not high, and which would be the most vulnerable to bacterio- logical (biological) attacks on their crops. TABLE S.?EXAMPLES OF DISEASES THAT MIGHT BE USED TO ATTACK DOMESTIC ANIMALS 7ABLE6.?EXAMPLES OF DISEASES THAT MIGHT BE USED TO ATTACK PLANTS DISEASE ANIMALS ATTACKED Viruses: African swine fever Equine encephalitis Foot-and-mouth disease_ _ _ Fowl plague Hog cholera Newcastle disease Rift Valley fever Rinderpest Vesicular stomatitis Ricksettsiae: Veldt disease Q-fever Bacteria: Anthrax Brucellosis Glanders Fungi: Lumpy jaw Aspergillosis Hogs. Horses. Cattle sheep, hogs. Chickens, turkeys, Hogs. Chickens, turkeys. Cattle, goats, sheep. Cattle, sheep, oxen, goats, water buffaloes. Cattle, horses, mules, hogs. Cattle, sheep, goats. Do. Cattle, sheep, horses, mules. Cattle sheep, goats, hogs, horses. Horses, mules. Cattle, horses, hogs. Poultry, cattle. 4. Effects on Plants 199. Living micro-organisms could also be used to generate diseases in crops which are economically important either as food or as raw material (e.g., cotton and rubber). Sig- nificant food crops in this respect include potatoes, sugar-beet, garden vegetables, soya beans, sorghum, rice, corn, wheat and other cereals and fruits. Obviously the selection of the target for a biological attack would be determined by the relative importance of the crop in the national diet and economy. Deliberately induced epiphytoties (plants dis- ease epidemics) could in theory have serious national and International consequences. 200. The fungal, bacterial, or viral agents which could be used against plants are shown in table 6. 201. With a few minor exceptions, the plant viruses could be cultured only in living plant systems, the causal agent being found only in the plant tissues and juices. Virus diseases are transmitted principally by insect vectors and to some extent by mechanical means. 202. Bacterial agents which attack plants can persist for months on or in the plants. All of them can be cultured on artificial media. Normally, plant bacteria are not dis- seminated to any great extent by winds; the principal methods for spread in nature are insects, animals (including man) and water. Rain can spread bacteria locally, while in- sects and animals are responsible for their more extensive spread. It is conceivable that bacterial plant pathogens could be adapted for deliberate aerial dissemination. 203. Plant fungi, which cause some of the most devastating diseases of important agri- cultural crops, are disseminated mainly by winds, but also by insects, animals, waterand man. Many fungal pathogens produce and liberate into the air countless numbers of small, hardy spores which are able to with- stand adverse climatic conditions. The epi- demic potential of a number of fungal patho- gens is considerable. 204. In theory there are measures which could protect crops against bacteriological (biological) attacks; but at present their po- tential cost rules them out in practice. There is no essential difference between the coun- ter-measures which would have to be intro- duced to counter bacteriological (biological) weapons and those employed normally to con- trol plant diseases in peacetime. But the use of bacteriological (biological) weapons to de- stroy crops on a large scale would imply that the attacker would choose agents capable of overcoming any known, economical method Diseases Liklihood of spread Viruses Corn stunt High. Ho)a blanca (rice) Do. Fiji disease (sugar cane) Do. Sugar beet curly top Do. Potato yellow dwarf Do. Bacteria Leaf blight (rice) Do. Blight of corn Do. Gummosis of sugarcane Low. Fungi Late blight (potato) Very high. Cereal rusts Do. Rice blast Do. Corn rust High. Coffee rust Very high. 5. Factors Influencing the Effects of Bacteri- ological (Biological) Attacks Exotic diseases 205. Any country which resorted to bac- teriological (biological) warfare would pre- sumably try to infect, with a single blow, a large proportion of an enemy population with an exotic agent to which they had not be- come immune through previous exposure. Such exotic agents would lead to the appear- ance of diseases which normally had not oc- curred before in a given geographical area, either becauSe of the absence of the organism involved (e.g., foot-and mouth disease in North America or Japan), and/or of natural vectors (e.g., Japanese or Venezuelan ence- phalitis in Europe, Rocky Mountain spotted fever in many countries). In addition, a dis- ease which had been controlled or eradicated from an area (e.g., urban or classical yellow fever from many tropical and sub-tropical countries, epidemic typhus from developed countries) might be reintroduced as a result of bacteriological (biological) warfare. Altered or new diseases 206. Deliberate genetic steps might also be taken to change the properties of infectious agents, especially in antigenic composition and drug resistance. Apart from genetic changes that could be induced in known organisms, it is to be expected that new in- fectious diseases will appear naturally from time to time and that their causative agents might be used in war. However, it could not therefore be assumed that every outbreak of an exotic or new disease could necessarily be a consequence of a bacteriological (bio- logical) attack. The Marburg disease, which broke out suddenly In 1967 in Marburg, Frankfurt and Belgrade, was a good example. It was acquired by laboratory workers who had handled blood or other tissues of vervet monkeys which had been recently caught in the wild, and by others who came into con- tact with them. Because the outbreak oc- curred in medical laboratories it was very skillfully handled. In other circumstances, it might have spread widely before it was con- trolled. Epidemic spread 207. As already emphasized, a wide variety of agents can infect by the inhalation route, so that in a bacteriological (biological) at- tack a large number of persons could be in- fected within a short time. From the epi- demiological point of view, the consequences would differ depending on whether the re- sultant disease was or was not transmissible from man to man. In the latter case the result would be a once-for-all disaster, vary- ing in scale and lethality according to the nature of the organism used and the num- bers of people affected. The attack would S 9539 undoubtedly have a strong demoralizing ef- fect on the unaffected as well as the affected population, and it would be in the nature of things that were would be a breakdown of medical services. 208. If the induced disease were easily transmissible from man to man, and if it was one against which the population had not been effectively immunized, it is possible to imagine what could happen by recalling say, the Periodical appearance of new varieties of influenza virus, e.g. the 1957 influenza pandemic. In Czechoslovakia (population about 14 million), 1,500,000 influenza pa- tients were actually reported; the probable total number was 2,500,000. About 50 per cent of the sick were people in employment and their average period away from work was six days. Complications necessitating further treatment developed in 5-6 per thousand of the cases, and about 0.2 per thousand died. Those who axe old enough to remember the 1918 influenza pandemic, which swept over most of the world, will judge the 1957 out- break as a mild affair. Susceptibility of population 209. A very important factor in the effec- tiveness of an aerosol attack is the state of immunity of the target population. Where the population is completely lacking in spe- cific immunity to the agent which is dis- seminated, the incidence and severity of dis- ease are likely to be exceptionally high. Nat- urally occurring examples of very severe epi- demics in virgin populations are well known (e.g. measles in Fiji, poliomyelitis and in- fluenza in the Arctic). A similar result fol- lows the introduction of a suspectible popu- lation (often a military force) into an al- ready infected area. Thus there was a high prevalence of dengue fever in military forces operating in the Pacific in World War II? sometimes affecting as many as 25 per cent of the operational strength of a unit. The local population suffered relatively little from the disease because they had usually been infected early in life, and were subsequently immune. Populations of increased vulnerability 210. Malnutrition: Recent statistical studies reveal a clear association between malnutrition and the incidence of infectious diseases. FAO, WHO and UNICEF have pointed out that in developing countries, a shortage of nutritious food is a major factor in the high mortality rate due to infectious diseases, particularly in children. 211. Housing and clothing: Primitive hous- ing and inadequate clothing would lead to an increased vulnerability to bacteriological (biological) and more particularly chemical weapons. Millions of people live in houses which are permeable to any sort of airborne infection or poison, and millions are inade- quately clothed and walk farefooted. 212. Other conditions which characterize poor populations have a definite influence on the spread of infections. Large families increase the opportunities for contagious contact. Inadequate housing, lack of potable water and, in general, bad sanitation, a low educational level, numerous vectors of in- fectious disease (e.g. insects), and, of course, lack of medical services are factors which also favour the spread of disease. The agents used might also persist in the soil, on crops, grasses, etc., so that delayed action might need to be taken into account. Social effects and public health measures 213. A basic factor which influences the risk of epidemic situation during every war is a rapid impairment of standards of hy- giene. Widespread destruction of housing and of sanitary facilities (water works, water piping, waste disposal, etc.), the Inevitable decline in personal hygiene, and other diffi- culties, create exceptionally favourable con- ditions for the spread of intestinal infec- tions, or louse-transmitted disease, etc. Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9540 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 11, 1969 214. The importance a adequate public health services is well illustrated by an ex- plosive water-borne epidemic of infectious hepatitis in Delhi in 1955-1956, which af- fected some 30,000 persons, and which oc- curred because routine water treatment was ineffective. This epidemic was caused by the penetration into the water supply of waste waters heavily contaminated with hepatitis virus. However, there was no concurrent in- crease in the incidence of bacillary dysentery and typhoid fever, showing that the routine treatment of the water had been adequate to prevent bacterial but not viral infections. 215. Air streams, migrating animals and running water may transport agents from one country to the other. Refugees with con- tagious diseases pose legal and epidemiologi- cal problems. In areas with multinational economies, losses in livestock and crops may occur in neighbouring countries by the spread of the disease through regional commerce. 216. The experiences from fairly recent smallpox epidemics can also be used to illu- strate the social effects of an accidentally in- troduced, highly dangerous airborne infec- tion. In New York (1947) one patient started ANNEX A.-CHEMICAL PROPERTIES, FORMULATIONS AND TOXICITIES OF LETHAL CHEMICAL AGENTS (EXCERPT FROM MATERIAL SUPPLIED BY WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION) -10? C., (b) at 20? C.; (6) approximate duration sunny, light breeze, (c) -10? C., sunny, no wind, : breathing rate ca. 15 liters /min.); (9) estimated an epidemic, in which twelve persons became ill and two died. Within a month more than 5 million persons were revaccinated. Similarly in Moscow, in January 1960, a smallpox epi- demic of forty-six cases (of whom three died) developed, caused by a single patient. At that time 5,500 vaccination teams were set up and vaccinated 6,372,376 persons within a week. Several hundreds of other health workers searched a large area of the country for con- tacts (9,000 persons were kept under medical supervision, of these 662 had to be hospital-. ized as smallpox suspects). Key to table:(1) Trivial name; (2) messy classification; (3) approximate solubility in water at 20? C.; (4) volatility at 20? C; (5) physical state (a) at of hazard (contact, or airborne foflowing evaporation) to be expected from ground contamination (a) 10? C., rainy, moderate wind, (b) 15? C., settled snow; (7) casualty producing dosages (lethal or significant incapacitating effects); (8) estimated human respiratory LC40 (n.C1c1 activity human percutaneous toxicity.' (1) Sarin (2) Lethal agent (nerve gas). Lethal agent (nerve gas). Lethal agent (blood gas). Lethal agent (blood gas). Lethal agent (lung (f53)) 100 percent 1 to 5 percent (a) Liquid 3 to 18 mg/m3 Liquid 873, 000 mg/ms 3, 300, 000 mg/m3 6, 370, 000 mg/m3 _ irritant). 4) 12,100 mg/m8 100 percent 6 to 7 percent Hydrolysed (b) do do Liquid Solid Liquid_ do (0 (aVapour (b) )1. to 1 boor._ _ 1 to 12 hours Few minutes Few minutes 34 to 4 hours ?_ 3 to 21 days do (c) Ito 2 days 1 to 16 weeks 1 to 4 hours >5 mg.-min./m.1 >0.5 ma-minim 0 >2,000 ma-minim 100 mg.-min./m.8 _ 10 mg.-min./m.1 5,000 mg.-min./m , 11,000 mg -min /rn 1 3 200 (9) 1,500 mg./man _ 6 mg./man vx Hydrogen cyanide Cyanogen chloride Phosgene Mustard gas Lethal agent (vesicant)._ Lethal agent. Botulinal toxin -A 0.05 percent Soluble. 630 mg/ma _ Negligible. Solid Solid. Vapour Liquid Do. Few minutes 12 to 48 hours__ do do 2 to 7 days 3,4' to 4 hours to 1 hour 2 to 8 weeks .3 >7,000 mg.-min./m.3 >1,600 mg.-min./m.3 >100 mg.-min./me 0.001 mg. (oral). . _ , mg.-min./m.3 1,500 mg.-min./m.3 0.02 mg.-min./ m.s (7) (8) 4,500 mg./man 'A drop of mustard weighing a few milligrams can produce a sedans blister which will be incapacitating if it interferes with the normal activities of an individual. _ ANNEX B?TEAR AND 110.ASSING GASES Three parameters will be used to qualify the effects of tear gases. These are defined as follows: Threshold of irritation is the atmospheric concentration of the substance (in mg per ma), which, in one minute of exposure, causes Tear ass Lethal index irritation. (mg.min/m9 Tolerance limit is the highest atmospheric - Adamside (DM) concentration (in mg per 01?) which a test Ethyl bromacetate_ 0. I 2-5 15, 000-30, 000 subject can tolerate during one minute of Bromacetone 5 5-50 25, 000 exposure. Omega-chloracetophenone (ON) 1.5 10 30, COO Lethal index Is a dosage, and thus the .05-. I 1-5 40, 000- 75, 000 0-chlorbenzylidene malononitrile (CS) O. 3 -1. 5 5-15 8, 500-25, 000 product of the concentration in the air (in ANNEX C.-SOME BIOLOGICAL AGENTS THAT MAY BE USED TO ATTACK MAN mg per ni,) and the time of exposure (in The data given under "Lethal index" are minutes), which causes mortality. Data for from animal experiments with various various tear gases are given in the following species. table. T reshold of Tolerance irritation limit (mg/m8) (maims) Disease Viral: Chikungrinyna fever Probably high_ None R to 6 days_ 2 weeks tea few Very low (less than 1 percent)._ None None. months. Dengue fever .iiiah do 5 to 8 days... A few days to weeks do Eastern equine encephalitis do do do Do. 5 to 15 days__ 1 to 3 weeks . High (greater than 60 do Under development. Tick-borne encephalitis do dopercent). Venezuelan equine encephalitis do do Ito 2 weeks_ 1 week to a few months.. Variable up to 30 percent do_. Do. Influenza do do 2 to 5 days... 3 to 10 days Low less than 1 percent) do Do. 1 to 3 days... 3 to 10 days Usually low, except for de Available. Yellow fever complicated cases. Smallpox ..... do do High do 3 to 6 days... Ito weeks High (up to 40 percent) do Do. 7 to 16 days 12 to 24 days Variable but usually high (up do Do. to 30 percent). Transmis- Incubation - Infectivity I sibilitys period, Duration of illness 5 Mortality3 Antibiotic therapy Vaccination Ricksettsial: Q-fever do None or 10 to 21 days Ito 3 weeks Low (usually less than 1 Effective Under development negligible. (sometimes percent.) shorter). Psittacosis to Moderately 4 to 15 days_ 1 to several weeks high Moderately high do None. Rocky Mountain spotted fever do None 3 to 10 days 2 weeks to several months. Usually high (up to 80 percent.) do Under development. Epidemic typhus do chi_ 6 to 15 days_ A few weeks to months Variable but usually high (up do Available. to 70 percent). Bacterial: Anthrax (pulmonary) Moderately Negligible_ _ __ 1 to 5 days... 3 to 5 days Almost invariably fatal Effective if given very Do. high. - Brucellosis We None early. Cholera High 1 to 3 weeks . Several weeks to months_ Low (less than 5 percent) Moderately effective Under development Glanders h None 1 to 5 days_ _ Ito several weeks Usually high (up to 80 percent) do Available. Melioidosis do dO 2 to 14 days_ 4 to 6 weeks Almost invariably fatal Little effective. None. Plague (pneumonic) do High 1 to 5 days._ 4 to 20 days Almost 100 percent fatal Moderately effective Do. 2 to 5 days__ 1 to 2 days do Moderately effective if Available. Tularemia .... do given early. Negligible_ 1 to NI days 2 to several weeks Uusually low sometimes high Effective Do. Typhoid fever f up to 60 percent). Moderately Moderately 1103 weeks A few to several weeks_ Moderately high up to (10 high. high. Moderately effective Do. percent). Dysentery Nigh High 1 to 3 days A few days to weeks Low to moderately high de- Effective None. Fungal: Coccidioido mycosis pending on strain. -. do None__ 1 to 3 weeks.. A few weeks to months_ Low. None Do. . Infectivity: indicates the potency of the parasite to penetrate and multiply in the host's orge- agent, resistance of the host and many other factors. It also should be noted that if the agents _ nism, regardless of the clinical manifestation of illness. In fact, there are several agents by which concerned would be deliberately spread in massiVe concentrations as agents of warfare, the in. great majorityof the exposed population will be infected without developing clinica symptoms. cubation,periods might be shorter and the resulting symptoms more serious. As to mortality, this of any arthropod vector. 8 Transmissibility: This refers to direct transmission from man to man without the intervention refers to the ratio between the number of fatalities to the number of diseased (not to that of in- 5 The figures listed under incubation period, duration of disease, and mortality are based on 4 The availability of vaccines is no indication of their degree of effectiveness. fected) individuals, if no treatment is given. epidemiological data. They vary, according to variations in virulence and dose of the infecting Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 August 11, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 9541 CHAPTER III. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS AFFECT- ING THE USE OF CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGI- CAL (BIOLOGICAL) CONSIDERATIONS A. General considerations 217. Extraneous factors influence the be- haviour of chemical and bacteriological (bio- logical) weapons to a far greater extent than they do any other kind of armament. Some, such as wind and rain, relate to the state of the physical environment, and to a certain eitent can be evaluated quantitatively. Others, which reflect the general ecological situation, and the living conditions and physiological state of the populations ex- posed to the effects of the weapons, are more difficult to define; their influence?though they could be considerable?cannot be quan- tified. 218. This limitation applies particularly to bacteriological (biological) weapons. The natural course of infectious diseases?for example in influenza epidemics?shows that they are governed by so many uncontrollable factors that the way they develop cannot as a rule be foreseen. This would also be prob- ably true of pathogenic agents which were deliberately dispersed. On the other hand, the knowledge gained through the study of epidemiology, and in the study of artificial dispersions of bacteriological (biological) agents, both in the laboratory and the field, has shed some light on some of the factors concerned. 219. The ecological problem is the main theme of chapter IV. The factors which con- cern the variability of the human target, e.g. physiological and living conditions, and levels of protection, have already been described in chapters I and II. This chapter is con- cerned with physical environment (climate, terrain). 1. Phenomena Associated With the Dispersal of Chemical and Bacteriological (Biologi- cal) Agents 220. It has already been pointed out that chemical substances and living organisms capable of being used as weapons are ex- tremely varied in their nature and in their effects. On the other hand, regarded solely from the standpoint of their physical state after dispersion in the atmosphere, they can clearly be placed in one or the other of the following categories: Liquid drops and droplets of varying size; (diameters greater than about 10 Microns). More or less finely divided liquid and solid aerosols; (diameters less than about 10 Mi- cron.$). Vapours. 221. Almost always, moreover, especially in the case of liquid chemical agents, the result of dispersion is a mixture of these different phases; thus, a liquid dispersed by an ex- plosive charge gives rise to a mixture of aerosol and vapour, while aerial spraying may produce a mixture of droplets and aero- sols. Solid chemical substances will be in aerosol form, and this will also be true, as has already been pointed out, of bacterio- logical (biological) agents. 222. Thus, chemical attacks would usually take effect simultaneously in two forms: Contamination of the ground at, and in the immediate vicinity of, the target by di- rect deposition of the agent at the time of dispersion, and by subsequent settling of large particles; Formation of a toxic cloud consisting of fine particles or droplets, of aerosol, and possibly of vapour. 223. Most bacteriological (biological) at- tacks would be designed primarily to create an infectious aerosol as an inhalation haz- ard. Some ground contamination might, however, also result when infectious par- ticles settled on the ground. 224. Both ground contamination and toxic or infectious clouds would be immediately subject to the physical action of the atmos- phere. 225. If the soil contaminants are liquid chemical agents, they would either evapo- rate, producing a sustained secondary cloud, or be absorbed by the ground, or diluted or destroyed by atmospherical precipitation. If they were solid agents, whether chemical or biological, they might be returned to a state of suspension by air currents, and perhaps carried out of the initially contaminated zone. 226. As it becomes formed, the toxic or infectious cloud is immediately exposed to atmospheric factors, and is straightaway carried along by air currents. At the same time, the particles within it are deposited at different rates according to their mass, and reach the ground at varying distances from the point of emission, depending on wind velocity (up to several kilometres in -the case of particles less than a few tens of microns in diameter) . The mechanically stable frac- tion of the aerosol (particles under 5 mi- crons in diameter) remains in suspension, and may be carried along for considerable distances. B. The influence of atmospheric factors on clouds of aerosols or vapours 227. The movement of a toxic or infectious cloud after its formation depends chiefly on the combined effects of wind and 8,t1n0S- pheric conditions. The cloud is carried a longer or shorter distance by the wind; at the same time it is dispersed and diluted at a faster or slower rate by turbulence of the atmosphere and by local disturbances of mechanical origin resulting from the rough- ness of the ground. 228. The cloud may rise rapidly in the at- mosphere or remain in the immediate vicin- ity of the ground, thus retaining its de- structive power for a greater or lesser time depending on whether the air layer in which it is released is in a stable or unstable state. 1. State of the Atmosphere 229. The state of the atmosphere plays such an important role in the behaviour of aerosol clouds that one might almost say that it is the predominant factor in de- termining the outcome of an attack, the ef- fect of which could be considerably reduced, or almost nullified, were the atmosphere very unstable, or very serious if it was in a state of pronounced and prolonged stability. For this reason the mechanisms governing the turbulent movements of air, caused by differences in temperatures between super- imposed air layers require some explanation (see fig. 2) . 230. Disregarding the frictional layer of air close to the ground, where mechanical turbulence resulting from friction between the air and the rough ground over which it moves creates special conditions, air tem- perature in the troposphere decreases on average at the rate of 0.64? C for every 100 metres of altitude. Very frequently, how- ever, as a result of thermal exchange between the air and the ground, a cooler air layer may be formed beneath a mass of hot light air; in such conditions, the lower air layer, with its greater density, does not tend to rise and the atmosphere is said to be in "stable equilibrium". 231. The situation, in which the vertical temperature gradient becomes inverted, is known as "temperature inversion", while the air layer affected by the phenomenon is termed as "inversion layer". When present it is eminently favourable to the persistence of toxic clouds. 232. After a day of sunshine, the surface of the ground cools rapidly, with the result that the layer of air close to the ground cools more rapidly than those above it. Both the intensity of the inversion and the thick- ness of the air layer involved increase to a maximum towards 4 a.m., and then decrease again, finally disappearing shortly after sunrise. This variation is very marked when the sky is clear, and in favourable conditions the inversion may last from fourteen to eighteen hours a day, depending on the season. 233. Very often, however, especially in winter or in overcast weather, when the rays of the sun are not sufficiently intense to heat the surface of the ground, the temper- ature inversion may last' for several days. This condition has characterized all the dis- asters caused by industrial pollution; for example, the smog which claimed 4,000 vic- tims in London in 1952 took its toll during a period of atmospheric stability which lasted for seven days. 234. Figure 2 shows the evolution of a toxic cloud depending on the state of the atmos- phere. (Fig. 2 not printed.) 235. Apart from this kind of low-altitude inversion, which is most important in the context of this report since it governs the behaviour of toxic clouds released close to the ground, similar process may take place on a large scale at higher altitudes (hundreds of thousands of metres) whenever a cool air layer is formed beneath a hot air mass. This may take place over large, cold expanses (i.e. large expanses of land or sea, cloud or fog masses, etc.). Because of the high alti- tude at which they form, these inversion layers have little effect on toxic clouds released at ground level; but in the case of the long-distance transfer of spores they may act as a screen or reflector. 236. The configuration of the surface of the earth in a particular area, which alters the thermal exchange pattern, may also be conducive to the formation of an inversion. For example, inversions are a customary phenomenon in winter in deep valleys sur- rounded by high peaks, and occur more fre- quently in the neighbourhood of slopes fac- ing the north than on southern slopes. This ? also occurs whenever hills of any size en- close a plain or basin, interrupting the gen- eral flow of air and preventing mixing from taking place. It is interesting to note that apart from the periodic appearance of smog in London, all the other major accidents re- sulting from air pollution have occurred in regions where the land configuration fits this description. For example, the small town of Donora, in the United States, lies in a rela- tively narrow plain bordered by high hills. In 1948 air pollution in the course of an inversion lasting five days led to twenty deaths and 6,000 cases of illness among the town's 14,000 inhabitants. 2. Urban Areas 237. The case of urban built-up areas is more complex, and it may even be said that each one possesses its own micro-climate, depending on its geographical situation, its topography and the layout and nature of its buildings. 238. Because the materials from which they are constructed are better conductors, and because their surfaces face in very varied directions, buildings Usually capture and reflect solar radiation better than does the natural ground. Urban complexes therefore heat up more quickly than does the sur- rounding countryside, and the higher tem- perature is still further augmented by do- mestic and industrial heating plants. The re- sults in a. flow of cool air from the neigh- bouring countryside towards the hot centre of the town, beginning shortly after sunrise, decreasing at the beginning of the afternoon and then rising again to a maximum shortly before sunset. This general flow, which is of low velocity, is disturbed and fragmented at ground level by the buildings, forming local currents flowing in all directions. 239. This constant mechanical turbulence, to which is added the thermal turbulence caused by numerous heat-generating sources, should prevent the establishment in towns of a temperature inversion at low al- titude. In fact, however, inversions do occur, when conditions are otherwise favourable, but the inversion layer is situated at a higher Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9542 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE August 11, 1969 altitude than over the surrounding country- side (30 to 150 metres). 240. At night, local inversions may be gen- erated at low altitude as a result of rapid radiation from the roofs of houses; thus in a narrow street lined with buildings of equal height, an inversion layer may be created at roof-top level which will persist until dawn. 241. Fog is more frequent over towns than over open country (+30 per cent in summer and +100 per cent in winter). The process of fog formation is accelerated by the parti- cles, dust and smoke which form a dome over the town. At night these particles act as nuclei around which the fog oondenses, the fog contributing in its turn to the re- tention of the particles in the dome. Fog will obviously have the same concentrating effect on particles originating in toxic clouds. 242. One final point which should be noted is that toxic aerosols and Vapours may take some time to penetrate enolbised spaces. Once they have done so, they niWy continue as a hazard for very long unless adequate ventila- tion is provided. 3. Effect of Wind and Topography 243. The wind carries and apreads the toxic or infectious cloud, which is simultaneously diluted by turbulence. The distance which the cloud travels before its concentration has fallen to a level below which it is no longer harmful depends on the velocity of the wind and the state of the atmciaphere. Since to- pography also produces changes in the nor- mal wind pattern, it too plays an important part in determining the direction of travel of toxic clouds, sometimes focusing their ef- fects in individual areas. Local winds may also be established as a result of differences In the heat absorbed by, and radiated from, different ground surfaces. 244. These local, surface winds, which af- fect the air layer nearest the ground up to 300 metres, are frequent and widespreati in mountain ranges and near sea coasts. There are slope breezes, valley breezes, sea breezes and land breezes; and they could shift a toxic cloud in directions which cann.ot be pre- dicted from a study of the general meteo- rology of the area. The breezes develop ac- cording to a regular cycles Luring the day, under the influence of solar-radiation, the air moves up the valleys and slopes, and moves from the see, towards the land; at night these currents are reversed. In temperate climates land and sea breezes are predominant during the summer; but they are masked by the general wind pattern during the other sea- sons of the year. They are predominant in subtropical and tropical regions through- out the year. 4. Example of Combined Effects of Wind and the State of the Atmosphere on a Cloud 245. There is some similarity between the evolution of toxic blonds Which could be produced by chemical and bacteriological (biological) attacks and that of clouds con- taining industrial pollutants, so much so that the mathematical models developed for forecasting atmospheric pollution can be ap- plied, with a few modifications, to toxic clouds. But the initial characteristics of the two are as a rule different. Characteristic features of chemical or bacteriological (bio- logical) attacks are the multiplicity and high yield of the sources of emission and their very short emission time, all of which are factors making for a greater initial concentration in the cloud than the concEntration of pol- lutants in industrial clouds. 246. Figure 4 indicates the order of magni- tude of these phenomena, and demonstrates the schematic form, and for different at- mospheric conditions, the size of area which would be covered by toxic clouds originat- ing from a chemical attack using Sarin, with an intensity arbitrarily chosen at 500 kg/km. It shows that the theoretical distance of travel by the cloud, determined for bare and unobstructed ground, may exceed 100 km. In practice the atmosphere must remain stable for more than ten hours in order to enable the cloud to travel such distances, a condition which, although certainly not ex- ceptional, is fairly uncommon. (Figure 4 not printed.) 247. This figure illustrates the effect of atmospheric conditions on the distance a toxic cloud can be carried by the wind. 248. The example chosen is that of a medium-intensity (500 kg) attack with Sarin on a circular objective 1 km in diam- eter. The wind velocity is 7 km/h. 249. Each of the lines represents a con- tour of the hazard zone, i.e. the zone in which any unprotected person would be ex- posed to the effects of the agent. 250. Under highly unstable conditions (for example, on a very sunny day), this hazard zone is no greater than the area of objective aimed at (the circle at the left end of the figure). On the other hand, in any other situation?(1) slightly unstable, (2) neutral, (3) slightly stable, (4) moderately stable or (5) highly stable?the distance traveled will be greater, and it may extend almost 100 km if conditions remain highly stable for a suf- ficiently long time. It must be noted, how- ever, that the distance of 100 km could be reached only if a very marked inversion persisted for about fourteen hours (100+7) ; such a situation is quite rare. 251. Corresponding evaluations cannot be made for an urban area, since the parameters Involved are too numerous and too little understood. But it may be presumed that most of the characteristics of the urban micro-climate would tend to increase the persistence of chemical clouds. This is seri- ous cause for concern, when it is remembered that in highly industrialized countries 50 to 90 per cent of the population live in urban areas 252. To sum up, a stable or neutral atmos- phere in equilibrium might cause a toxic cloud produced by a chemical or bacterio- logical (biological) attack to persist for hours after it had exercised its military effect, which could generally be expected to mate- rialize in the first few minutes following the attack. These conditions could obtain not only at night, but also during long winter periods over vast continental expanses. If a neutral atmosphere in equilibrium were as- sociated with a light wind irregular in direc- tion, then the area affected could be rela- tively large, and, assuming an adequately heavy initial attack, the concentrations Would be high. 5. Special Features of Bacteriological (Biological) Aerosols 253. So far as physical phenomena are concerned (horizontal and vertical move- ments, sedimentation, dilution, etc.), bacter- iological (biological) aerosols would be generally affected in the same way as chem- ical clouds of aerosol and vapour, but not necessarily to the same extent. But since the effective minimum does for bacteriologi- cal (biological) agents are considerably smaller than for chemical agents, bacterio- logical (biological) aerosols would be ex- pected to remain effective even in a very dilute state and, consequently, that they could contaminate much larger areas than could chemical clouds. An example is given In chapter II. 254. There would be no limit to the hori- zontal transport of micro-organisms, if there were none to the capacity of the organisms to survive in the atmosphere. Thus if the microbial aerosol particles were so small that their speed of fall remained close to the speed of the vertical air movements in the frictional layer (under average conditions this is on the order of 10 cm/s), the agents, whether alive or dead, would remain sus- pended and travel very considerable dis- tances. Even if bacteriological (biological) clouds were to move only in the air layer nearest the ground, they could cover very large areas. For example, in one experiment 600 litres of Bacillus globigii (a harmless spore-forming bacterium which is highly re- sistant to aerosolization and environmental stresses) were released off shore; bacteria were found more than 30 km inland. Organ- isms were found over 250 kin, which was the entire area within which there were monitoring stations during the trial. The ac- tual area covered was much more extensive. 255. On the other hand, most pathogenic agents are highly vulnerable when outside the organism in which they normally repro- duce, and are liable to biological inactiva- tion, which is sometimes rapid, in the aerosol state. This inactivation process is governed by several factors (such as temperature, humidity, solar radiation, etc.) which are now the subject of aerobiological research. 256. The size of the infective particles in a bacteriological (biological) aerosol is highly significant to their ability to initiate disease as a result of inhalation. It has been established that the terminal parts of the respiratory tract are the most susceptible sites for infection by inhalation. As with chemical agents, the penetration and reten- tion of inhaled bacteriological (biological) particles in the lungs is very dependent on particle size, which is primarily determined by the composition of the basic material and the procedure of aerosolization, as pointed out in chapter I. 257. The influence of particle size of aero- sol infectivity is illustrated in table 1, which shows that there is a direct relationship be- tween the LD5, and particle diameter of an aerosol of Franciscella tularensis. TABLE 1.?NUMBERS OF BACTERIA OF FRAN- CISCELLA TilLARENSIS REQUIRED TO KILL 50 PERCENT OF EXPOSED ANIMALS ? ? Numbers of bacterial cells LDg, Diameter of particles Guinea Rhesus (microns) pigs monkeys 3 17 7 6,500 240 12 20,000 540 22 170, 000 3,000 C. Influence of atmospheric factors on chemical agents 1. Influence of Temperature 258. An attack with a liquid chemical agent, as already pointed out, would be as a rule result. in the formation of a cloud of small droplets, aerosol and vapour in vary- ing proportions, as well as in ground con- tamination, all of which would be affected by air temperature. 259. Influence on. droplet and aerosol clouds: Only particles having dimensions within certain limits penetrate and are re- tained by the lungs. The larger ones are trapped in the upper part of the respiratory tract (e.g. nose and trachea), whereas the smaller ones are exhaled. Penetration and retention have maximum values in the sive range of 0.5 to 3 microns. 260. Liquid chemical agents exercise their effects both by penetrating the skin and by inhalation. The material absorbed by the lungs acts immediately, whereas there is a delay before the effects become manifest from an agent absorbed through the skin or the mucous membrane of the upper air pas- sages. 261. A high temperature favours the evap- oration of particles which will decrease in size and thus reach the lungs, contributing to the immediate effect; an additional quan- tity of vapour is produced which contributes to the same effect. 262. Effect on ground contamination: The temperature of the air, and even more that Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 August 11, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE of the ground, have a marked effect on the way ground contamination develops and persists. The temperature of the ground, which depends on the thermal characteris- tics of its constituent materials and on the degree of its exposure to the sun, either in- creases or reduces evaporation, and conse- quently decreases or increases the duration of contamination. The surface temperature Is extremely variable from point to point, depending on the type and colour of the soil; a temperature difference of 20? has been noted between the asphalt surface of a road and the surrounding fields. The tem- perature gradient also varies during the course of the day; in clear weather the dif- ferences may range from 15 to 30? C. in a temperate climate, and up to 50? C. in a desert climate. High temperatures of both air and ground favour the rate of evapora- tion, thus reducing the persistence of sur- face contamination; wind, because of the mechanical and thermal turbulence it creates, has a similar effect. 263. To illustrate the effect of these vari- able factors, it is worth noting that the con- tamination of bare ground by unpurifled mustard, at a mean rate of 30 g/m2, will persist for several days or even weeks at temperatures below 10? C at medium wind velocities, whereas it lasts for only a day and a half at 25? C. Furthermore, because of ac- celerated evaporation at high temperatures, the cloud produced is more concentrated, and the danger of vapour inhalation in, and downwind of, the contaminated area becomes greater. 2. Influence of Humidity 264. In contrast to high temperature, high relative humidity may lead to the enlarge- ment of aerosol particles owing to the con- densation of water vapour around the nuclei which they constitute. The quantity of in- halable aerosol would thus diminish, with a consequent reduction in the immediate ef- fects of the attack. 265. On the other hand, a combination of high temperature and high relative humidity causes the human body to perspire pro- fusely. This intensifies the action of mustard- type vesicants, and also accelerates the trans- fer through the skin of percutaneous nerve agents. 3. Influence of Atmospheric Precipitation 266, Light rain disperses and spreads the chemical agent which thus presents a larger surface for evaporation, and its rate of evap- oration rises. Conversely a heavy rain dilutes and displaces the contaminating product, facilitates its penetration into the ground, and may also accelerate the destruction of certain water-sensitive compounds (e.g. lewisite, a powerful blistering agent). 267. Snow increases the persistence of con- tamination by slowing down the evaporation of liquid contaminants. In the particular case of mustard gas, the compound is con- verted into a pasty mass which may persist until the snow melts. 268. Soil humidity, atmospheric precipita- tion and temperature also exercise a powerful influence on the activity of herbicides, which are much more effective at higher humidities and temperatures, than in dry weather and at low temperatures. This applies equally to preparations applied to plants and to those introduced into the soil. 4. Influence of Wind 269. As vapors emanating from ground contaminated by liquid chemical agents be- gin to rise, the wind comes into play. The distance the vaport will be carried depends on the wind velocity and the evaporation rate of the chemical, which will itself change with variations in ground and air tempera- tures. The distance is maximal (several kilometres) when there is a combination of the conditions promoting evaporation (high soil temperature) persistence of the cloud (stable atmosphere) and dispersal of the cloud (gentle winds). These conditions exist in combination at the end of a sunny day, at the time when a temperature inversion exists. 5. Influence of Soil?Dependent Factors 270. Nature of the soil. The soil itself, through its texture and the porosity of its constituent materials, plays an important role in. the persistence of liquid chemical contaminants, which may penetrate to a greater or lesser extent, or remain on the surface. In the former case the risk of con- tamination by contact is reduced in the short term, but persistence will be increased to the extent that factors favourable to evaporation (temperature, wind) are pre- vented from acting. In the latter case, when the contaminant remains on the surface, the danger of contact contamination remains considerable, but persistence is reduced. Thus persistence in sandy soils may be three times as long as in clay. 271. Vegetation. Vegetation prevents a liquid contaminant from reaching the soil and also breaks it up, thus encouraging evaporation. But at the same time the short- term danger is enhanced because of the widespread dispersibn of the contaminant on foliage, and the consequently increased risk of contact contamination. 272. The canopy of foliage in dense forests (e.g., conifers, tropical jungle), traps and holds a considerable portion of a dispersed chemical agent, but the fraction which none the less reaches the soil remains there for a long time, since the atmospheric factors in- volved in the process of evaporation (tem- perature, wind, over the soil, turbulence) are hardly significant in such an environ- ment as compared with open spaces. 273. Too little is known about the absorp- tion and retention of toxic substances by plants to make it possible to assess the re- sulting danger to the living creatures whose food supply they may constitute. Like cer- tain organic pesticides, it is probable that other toxic chemicals may penetrate into plant systems via the leaves and roots. Cases could then arise where all trace of contami- nant had disappeared from the soil but with the toxic substance presisting in vegetation, 274. Urban areas. It can also be assumed that, in spite of a surface temperature which is on the average higher, contaminants might persist longer in built-up areas than over open ground. There are two reasons for this. Structural, finishing and other building ma- terials are frequently porous, and by absorb- ing and retaining liquid chemical agents more readily, they increase the duration of contamination. Equally the factors which, in open country, tend to reduce persistence (sunshine, wind over ground) play a less important part in a built-up city. 275. Climate, in general, may exercise an Indirect influence on the effect of percutane- ous chemical agents, simply because of the fact that in hot climates the lightly clad inhabitants are very vulnerable to attacks through the skin. 276. The predominating influence of cli- matic factors and terrain on the persistence of contamination Indicates that the a priori classification of chemical agents as persistent or non-persistent, solely on the basis of dif- ferent degrees of volatility, is somewhat ar- bitrary since, depending on circumstances, the same material might persist for periods ranging from a few hours to several weeks, or even months. D. Influence of atmospheric factors on bac- teriological (biological) agents 277. Infectious agents, when used to infect by way of food and water, or by means of animal vectors are, of course, hardly subject to the influence of climatic factors. But any large-scale attack by bacteriological (bio- logical) agents would probably be carried S 9543 out by aerosols, in which the agents would be more susceptible to environmental influ- ences than chemical agents. 278. Physioo-chemical atanospheric factors have a destructive effect on aerosol-borne micro-organisms. Their viability decreases gradually over a period of hours or days at a progressively diminishing rate. Some decay very rapidly: for example, certain bio-aerosols used for pest control in temperate climates, and dispersed under average conditions in the cold and transitional seasons, show a rate of decay of 5 per cent per minute. 279. This apparent vulnerability of micro- organism in aerosols might cast some doubt on the possible effectiveness of bacteriological (biological) attacks. However there are var- ious means by which the rate of decay in the aerosol can be considerably reduced. For ex- ample: the use of very high concentrations of agent; the use of suitably "modeled" path- ogenic strains; or the protection of aerosol particles by encapsulating them in certain organic compounds. 280. These procedures, which prolong the survival of micro-organisms in air, could pre- sumably also be applied to potential agents of bacteriological (biological) warfare. Means are also available for prolonging the survival of micro-organisms in water, soil, etc. 1. Influence of Temperature 281. The effect of temperature on the sur- vival of micro-organisms in bacteriological (biological) aerosols is not highly significant in the temperature ranges generally encoun- tered. As a general rule, aerosol-borne bio- logical agents will be destroyed more rapidly the more the temperature rises. On the other hand, in some circumstances high tempera- tures may act on bacteriological (biological) aerosols in the same way as on chemical aero- sols, that is to say, particle size will be di- minished by evaporation, and thus their rate of entry into the lungs will be enhanced. 2. Influence of Humidity 282. Relative humidity is the most impor- tant of the atmospheric conditions which af- fect the rate of decrease of viability of micro- organisms in the air. The extent of its effect varies with different micro-organisms, with the nature of the suspending fluid from which the aerosol is disseminated, with the manner of its dissemination (as a spray or as a dry powder). As a general rule, the rate of inactivation is greater at lower relative hu- midity although with some organisms maxi- mum inactivation occurs in the middle range of relative humidity (30-70 per cent). The rate of inactivation will, however, tend to decrease with time, and may become ex- tremely low when a state of equilibrium (sta- bilization) between the particles and their environment has been established. This im- plies that irrespective of relative humidity values, the final infective concentration of a stabilized aerosol may still be above the threshold minimum dose for infection by in- halation. Even SO, microbial survival in a stabilized aerosol may be further reduced by sudden variations in atmospheric humidity. 283. The effectiveness of aerosol-borne bacteriological (biological) agents depends not only on their capacity to survive in the air. Also important is their low rate of sedi- mentation, combined with the capacity of the micro-organisms to spread and penetrate into buildings, so contaminating surfaces and materials indoors as well as outdoors. The possibility that some infective agents can survive for a long time in such condi- tions, and the fact that environmental duet particles may exercise a protective influence on organisms have been demonstrated on many occasions. Studies made in hospitals have shown that surviving micro-organisms can be dispersed from sites which have come to be called "secondary reservoirs", and that they may become sources of new infections, carried either through the air or by contact. Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9544 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 11, 1969 3. Influence of Solar Radiation 284. The ultra-violet part of the solar spectrum has a powerful germicidal effect. Bacterial spores are much less sensitive to this radiation than are -either viruses or vegetative bacteria, and fungal spores are even less sensitive than baoterial spores. The destructive effect of solar radiation on micro- organisms is reduced whensrelative humidity is high (over 70 per cent). Air pollution including a high proportign of atmospheric dust, also provides some erotection. 285. Ultra-violet light exercises its destruc- tive effects on micro-orgastisms through the structural degradation of Vie nucleic acids which carry the genetic Informations Most research on this subject hale been carried out on microbes in liquid suspeissions, but the results of studies of aerosOl-borne microbes seem to lead to similar conclusions. 286. The germicidal effeeit of ultra-violet radiation has been known foe a long time and used in combating airborAe infections in schools, military builclinge and hospitals. The problem of proper radiation dosage, and proper techniques, owever, still remain to be salved. 287. The lethal effect of sainlight on micro- organisms is less marked, although still ap- parent, in diffuse light. This is why a bac- teriological (biological) attack, if one ever materialized, would be more probably under- taken in darkness: 4. Influence of Atmospheric Precipitatidn 288. Rain and snow have relatively little effect on bacteriological (biological) aerosols. 5. Influence of the Chemical Composition of the Atmosphere 289. Little is known about the influence on the viability of mirco-organienis of the chem- ical compounds present in the atmosphere. Oxygen promotes the inactivation of aerosol- borne agents, particularly in conditions of low humidity, and recent studies have also demonstrated that an unstable bactericidal factor (formed by combination between ozone and gaseous combustion products of petroleum) is present in the air, particularly downwind of heavily populated areas. 6. General Effects of climate 290. Climate may also have a general and considerable influence on the development of epidemics and epizootics, in so far as the pro- liferation of vectors which spread disease may be encouraged, given the right condi- tions. This is indicated by the way myxoma- tosis developed in Australia. Although several attempts in 1927, and then from 1936 to 1943, to impart the disease to Australian rabbits failed, the epizootic spread rapidly from 1950 onwards, apparently for the sole reason that the summer, which was particularly rainy that year, was associated with an exceptional proliferation in the flooded Murray River valley of the mosquitoes which carry the disease. 291. Atmospheric humidity and tempera- ture also have a strong influence on micro- organisms acting upon vegetation. CHAPTER IV. POSSIBLE Loisc-resier EFFECTS OF CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGIdAI, (BIOLOGICAL) WARFARE ON HUMAN HEALTH AND ECOLOGY A. Introduction. 292. So far this report has dealt essentially with the potential short-torm effects of chemical and bacteriological (biological) war- fare. The possible long-term effects of the agents concerned need to be considered against the background of thetrends whereby man's environment is being constantly modi- fied, as it becomes transformed to meet his ever-increasing needs. Some Of the changes that have occurred have been unwittingly adverse. The destruction of forests has created deserts, while grasslands have been destroyed by over-grazing. The air we breathe and our rivers become polluted, and chemical pesticides, despite the good they do, also threaten with undesirable secondary effects The long-term impact of possible chemical and bacteriological (biological) warier clearly needs to be considered within an adequate ecological framework. 293. Ecology may be defined as the study of the interrelationships of organisms on the one hand and of their interactions with the physical environment in which they are *found an the other. The whole complex of plants and animals within a specific type of environment?a forest, a marsh, a savan- nah?forms a community comprising all the plant life and all the living creatures?from the microorganisms and worms in the soil, to the insects, birds and mammals above the ground?within that environment, and the understanding of their interrelationships also necessitates a knowledge of the physical characteristics of the environment which bear on the living complex. Ecological com- munities are normally in dynamic equilib- rium, which is regulated by the interaction of population density, available food, natural epidemics, seasonal changes and the compe- tition of species for food and space. 294. Man has his special ecological prob- lems. His numbers are multiplying fast, and increasing population requires commensurate increases in food production. The production and distribution of adequate food for the population which is predicted for the latter part of this century, and which will go on increasing through the next, will allow no relaxation in the effort which has already proved so successful. Food production has increased phenomenally in the past fifty years, primarily because of (1) improved agri- cultural practices, and particularly because of a marked increase in the use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides; (2) the develop- ment of genetically improved plants, herbs and flocks; and (3) increased industrializa- tion of food-producing processes. There is hope that steps such as these will continue to bear fruit. 295. But while the use of fertilizers, herbi- cides and pesticides has brought about a massive increase in food production, it has a.sio added to the pollution of soil and water, and as a result has altered our ecological environment in an enduring way. So too have other features of our industrial civili- zation. The motor car has been a very potent factor in increasing air pollution in towns and cities. The increasing population of the world creates unprecedented wastes, and the methods used to dispose of it?burying it, burning it, or discharging it into streams or lakes?have further polluted the environ- ment. The remarkable development of syn- thetic and plastic materials in recent years has also added a new factor to the short- and long-term biological effects on man. Every new advance on our technological civ- ization helps to transform the ecological framework within Which we evolved. From this point of view the existence and possible use of chemicals and bactriological (biologi- cal) agent in warfare have to be regarded as an additional threat, and as a threat which might have enduring consequences, to our already changing environment. B. Consequences to man of upsetting the ecological equilibrium . tilizers and more productive hybrid seeds came widespread, the increase was eleven e quintals. This is characteristic of What has happened everywhere where fertilizers have been used on a large scale. 297. The beneficial effect of the use of modern chemical pesticides also does not need spelling out. It is estimated that the present annual world loss in production due to weeds and parasites is still approximately 460 million quintals of wheat and 360 mil- lion quintals of maize, and that to eliminate this waste will mean the use of even more pesticides than are now being consumed, 298. What has to be realized about modern agricultural practices is that without them the increases in the output of food which the world needs could never be achieved. Unless production mounts everywhere, those who have not yet cast off the burdens of living in a primitive agricultural world will never reach the level of civilization to which all aspire. 299. But, as already indicated, the grew' increase in the use of fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides does have deleterious side effects. For example, in Switzerland, sur- face waters and springs have been contam- inated in times of high rainfall by excessive amounts of fertilizers corresponding to 0,3- 0.5 kg of phosphorous and 45 kg of nitro- gen per hectare per year. This kind of thing occurs elsewhere as well, and it cannot but help transform -for all we know adversely.. theenvironment in which living matter in- cluding fish otherwise thrive. 300. The dangers of the side effects of modern pesticides are also beginning to be appreciated, and are already beginning to be guarded against in advanced countries. Except in high dosage, these substances act only on lower organisms, although some organophosphorous compounds are toxic to man and other vertebrates. Less selective agents may be toxic to soil bacteria, plank- ton, snails and fish. Chlorinated hydrocar- bons, such as DDT, are toxic only in un- usually high dosages, but accumulate in fat, and deposit in the liver and the central nervous system. Following surface applica- tion, pesticides enter the soil and seep into underground waters; or become washed by rain into rivers, lakes and reservoirs. It is theoretically possible that in some situa- tions, in which non-selective chemical pesti- cides are used, disruption of the ecological equilibrium could lead to the long-term sup- pression of useful animals and plants. These are dangers which only constant vigilance will avert. 301. Detergents are another modern chem- ical development whose use has had to be regulated, since they have a direct short- term effect on certain types of natural food such as daphniae and the algae which are eaten by fish. The first detergents which came on the market led to enormous quanti- ties of foam on river, and this in turn re- duced the supply of oxygen for organisms living in the water. They also damage the earth by affecting soil bacteria. Such de- tergents, which resist destruction even by the most modern water treatment Methods, have all but disappeared from use and have been replaced by others, which can be al- most completely destroyed by waste water treatment. 302. In the context of the possible long- term effects of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, we have finally to note that towns and cities are growing all over the world, and that in the developed coun- tries, conurbations (fusion a cities with loss of suburbs) have reached population levels approaching 50 million. Such great concentrations of people require very com- plicated arrangements for supply of food, water and other materials, transport and general administration. The use of chemical or bacteriological (biological) weapons against cities would undoubtedly have an ex- 296. The chemical industry doubled its output between 1953 and 1960 and it is still growing fast but the useful results of its continued development are none the less of the utmost importance to man's future. The good effects on food production of the use of artificial fertilizers alone far outweigh any secondary deleterious consequences of their use. The facts are too well known to need spelling out. It is enough to point out, as one example, that maize production in the United States increased between 1923 and 1953, a thirty-year period, by barely four quintals per hectare, but that in the ten years be- tween 1953 and 1964, when the use of fer- Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 August 11, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE ceptionally severe disorganizing effect, and the full re-establishment of the services necessary for health, efficient government, and the smooth operation of industry might take a very long time, C. Possible long-term effects of chemical and bacteriological (biological) means of war- fare on man and his environment 303. Chemical weapons, in addition to their highly toxic short-term effects, may also have a long-term effect on the environment in which they are disseminated. If used in very high- concentration they might cause damage by polluting the air, by pointing the water supplies and by poisoning the soil. 304. Bacteriological (biological) weapons could be directed against man's sources of food through the spread of peraistent plant diseases or of infectious animal diseases. There is also the possibility that new epi- demic diseases could be introduced, or old ones reintroduced, which could result in deaths on the scale which characterized the medieval plagues. 1. Chemical Weapons 305. There is no evidence that the chemical agents used in World War I?chlorine, mus- tard, phosgene, and tear-gas?had any un- toward ecological consequences. As already observed, over 120,000 tons of these agents were used during that war, and in some areas which were attacked, concentrations must have added up to hundreds of kilograms per hectare. Theae regions have long since re- turned to normal and fully productive use. 306. The organophosphorous, or nerve, agents have never been used in war, and no corresponding experience is available to help form a judgment about their possible long- term effects. But since these agents are toxic to all forms of animal life, it is to be expected that if high concentrations were dissemi- nated over large areas, and if certain species were virtually exterminated, the dynamic ecological equilibrium of the region might be changed. 307. On the other hand there is no evi- dence to suggest that nerve agents affect food chains in the way DDT and other pesti- cides of the chlorinated hydrocarbon type do. They hydrolyze in water, some of them slowly, so there could be no long-term con- tamination of natural or artificial bodies of water. 308. The use of herbicides during the course of the Viet-Nam conflict has been re- ported extensively in news media, and to a lesaer extent in technical publications. The materials which have been used are 2,4- dichlorophenoxyacetic acid, 2,4,5-trichloro- phenoxyacetic acid, eacodylic acid and picloram. 309. Between 1963 and 1968 these herbicides were used to clear forested areas for mili- tary purposes over some 9,100 km2. This may be divided by forest type as shown in the following table. TABLE 1.?TYPE OF FOREST AND EXTENT AND AREA TREATED WITH HERBICIDES IN SOUTH VIETNAM, 1963-68 Type of forest Extent Area treated kilometers 2 kilometers 2 Open forest (sem ideciduous)___ Mangrove and other aquatic__ Coniferous 50, 150 4, 800 1,250 8, 140 960 0 Total 56, 200 9,100 310. South Viet-Nani is about 172,000 km2 in area, of which about one-third is forested. The area treated with herbicides up to the end of 1968 thus amounts to abput 16 per cent of the forested area, or a little over 6 per cent of the total. 311. There is as yet no scientific evalua- tion of the extent of the long-term ecological changes resulting .fram these attacks. One estimate is that some mangrove forests may need twenty years to regenerate, and fears have been expressed about the future of the animal population they contain. Certain species of bird are known to have migrated from areas that have been attacked. On the other hand, there has been no decline in fish catches, and as fish are well up in the food chain, no serious damage would seem to have been done to the aquatic environ- ment. 312. When a forest in a state of ecological equilibrium is destroyed by cutting, secon- dary forest regenerates, which contains fewer species of plants and animals than were there originally, but larger numbers of those species which survive. If secondary forest is replaced by grassland, these changes are even more mraked. If one or more of the animal species which increases in number is the host of an infection dangerous to man (a zoon- oats) , then the risk of human infection is greatly increased. This is exemplified by the history of scrub typhus in South-East Asia, where the species of rat which maintains the Infection and the vector mite are much more numerous in secondary forest, and even more no in grassland, 50 increasing the risk of the disease being transmitted to people as forest is cleared. 313. In high rainfall areas, deforestation may also lead to serious erosion, and so to considerable agricultural losses. Deserts have been created in this way. 2. Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons Against man 314. New natural foci, in which infection may persist for many years, may be estab- lished after an arosol or other type of bac- teriological (biological) attack. This possible danger can be appreciated when one recalls the epidemiological consequences of the acci- dent introduction of rabies and other veter- inary infections (blue-tongue, African swine fever) into a number of countries. The spred of rabies in Europe following World IT, as a consequence of the disorganization caused by the war, shows how an epidemiologically complicated and medically dangerous situa- tion can emerge even with an infection which had long been successfully controlled, In 1945 there were only three major foci of infection in Czchoslovakia. In the following years, foxes multiplied excessively because farms were left unworked, because of the increased number of many kinds of wild creatures, and also because of the dis- continuation of systematic control. Foxes also came in from across frontiers, and the epizootic gradually worsened. In the period 1952/1966 a total of 888 foci were re- ported, 197 new ones in 1965 alone. Bringing the situation under control demand extra- ordinary and prolonged efforts by the health service: in 1966 alone, 775,000 domestic ani- mals were vaccinated in affected areas of the country. Non the less, the disease has not yet been stamped out. Natural foci cannot be eliminated without organized and long-term International co-operation. 315. Arthropods (insects, ticks) also play an important part, along with other crea- tures, in the maintenance of pathogenic agents in natural foci. A man exposed to a natural focus risks infection, particularly from arthropods, which feed on more than one species of host. A bacteriological (bio- logical) attack might lead to the creation of multiple and densely distributed foci of in- fection from which, if ecological conditions were favourable, natural foci might develop in regions where they had previously never existed, or in areas from which they had been eliminated by effective public health meas- ures. ? 316. On the other hand, the large-scale use of bacterological (biological) weapons might reduce populations of suscepitibIe wild spec- ies below the level at which they could continue to exist. The elimination of a species or group of species from an area would create in the ecological community an empty niche S 9545 which might seriously disturb its equili- brium, or which might be filled by another species more dangerous to man because it carried a zoonosls infection acquired either 'naturally or as a result of the attack. This would result in the establishment of a new natural focus of disease. 317. The gravity of these risks would de- pend on the extent to which the community of species in the country attacked contained animals which were not only susceptible to the infection, but were living in so close a relationship to each other that the infection could become established. For example, not all mosquito species can be infected with yellow fever virus, and if the disease is to become established, those which can become vectors must feed frequently on mammals, such as monkeys, which are also sufficiently susceptible to the infection. A natural focus of yellow fever is therefore very unlikely to become established in any area lacking an adequate population of suitable mosquitos and monkeys. 318. Endemics or enzootics of diseases (i.e. infections spreading at a low rate, but in- definitely, in a human or animal population) could conceivably follow a large-scale at- tack, or might be started by a small-scale sabotage attack, for which purpose the range of possible agents would be much wider, and might even Include such chronic infections as malaria. 319. Malaria is a serious epidemic disease In a susceptible population, but it is difficult to envisage its possible employment as a bacteriological (biological) weapon, because of the complex life cycle of the parasite. Drug-resistant strains of malaria exist in, for example, areas of Asia and South Amer- ica, and their possible extension to areas where mosquitos capable of transmitting the disease already exist, would greatly com- plicate public health measures, and cause a more serious disease problem because of the difficulties of treatment. 320, Yellow fever is still enzootic in the tropical regions of Africa and America. Monkeys and other forest-dwelling primates, together with mosquitos which transmit the virus, constitute natural foci and ensure survival of the virus between epidemics. 321, Importation of this disease is possible wherever a suitable environment and sus- ceptible animal and mosquito hosts exist. This occurred naturally in 1960 when a pre- viously uninfested area of Ethiopia was in- vaded by yellow fever and an epidemic re- sulted in about 15,000 deaths. Because of the inaccessibility of the area, some 8,000-9,000 people had died before the epidemic was recognized. The epidemic was extinguished but it is likely that a permanent focus of yellow fever infection has been established in this area, previosuly free of the disease. It might be extremely serious if the virus were introduced into Asia or the Pacific Is- lands where the disease appears never to have occurred, but where local species of mosquito are crown to be able to transmit it. Serious problems could, also arise if the virus were Introduced into the area of the United States where vector mosquitos still exist, and where millions of people live in an area of a few square kilometers. 322. Another consideration is the possible Introduction of a new species of animal to an area to cause either *long-term disease or economic problems. For example, mon- gooses were introduced many years -ago to some Caribbean islands, and in one at least they have become a serious economic pest of the sugar crop, and an important cause of rabies. The very large economic effect on the introduction of rabbits to Australia is well known. Certain mosquito species (a yellow fever mosquto, Aedes aegypti, and a malaria mosquito, Anopheles gambiae) have natu- rally spread to many areas of the world from their original home in Africa, and have been responsible for serious disease problems in the areas that have been invaded. It is con- Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300100001-3 S 9546 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE August 11, 1969 ceivable that in the war the introduction of such insects on a small (ital.? might be tried for offensive purposes. 323. In addition to the development of new natural foci, another long-term hazard, but one which is very much more speculative than some of the possibilities mentioned above, is that of the establishment of new strains of organisms of altered immunolo- gical characteristics or increased virulence. This might occur if large numbers of people or other susceptible animal species became infected in an area through a bacteriological (biological) attack, thus providing oppor- tunities for new organisms to arise naturally. The appearance from time 1.0 time of immu- nologically different forms of influenza shows the type of thing which might happen. Such altered forms of agents might cause More severe and perhaps more widespread epi- demics than the original attack. Against domestic animals 324. Foot-and-mouth disease is a highly Infectious but largely nen-fatal disease of cattle, swine and other cloven-footed animals It is rarely transmitted front a diseased ani- mal to man, and when it is, the order is a trivial one. 325. The milk yield of diseased cows de- creases sharply and does not reach its normal yield even after complete recovery. Losses range from 9 to 30 per cent of milk yield. In swine, loss from foot-and-mouth are esti- mated at 60-80 per cent among suckling pigs. Foot-and-mouth is endemic in many coun- tries and breaks out frouCtime to time even In countries which are normally free of the disease. Some countries let it run its course without taking any steps to control it; others try to control it by the use of vaccines; and some pursue a slaughter policy in which all affected animals and contacts are killed. 326. It is obvious that a large epizootic could constitute a very serious economic bur- den, for example, by bringing about a serious reduction in the supply of milk. It is in this context that foot-and-mouth disease could conceivably serve as a bacteriological (bio- logical) weapon, especially since war condi- tions would greatly promote its spread. Effi- cient prevention is possible through active immunization, but the immunity is rather short-lived and annual vaccination is re- quired. 327. Bruce/Zosis is an example of chronic disease which could possibly result from bacteriological (biological) weapon attacks. There are three forms known, which attaffic cattle, swine and goats respectively. Any of these may be transmitted to man, in whom it causes a debilitating but rarely fatal disease lasting for four to six mon he or even longer. It is enzootic in most countries of the world, and an increased incidence of the disease re- sulting from its use as a Weapon could be dealt with, after the initial blow, In the same way as is the natural disease. But the cost of eliminating disease suela as brucellosis from domestic animals is very high. 328. Anthrax was described in chapter II and what concerns us here as that if large quantities of anthrax spores were dis- seminated in bacteriological (biological) weapons, thus contaminating the soil of large regions, danger to domestic animals and man might persist for a very long time. There is no known way by which areas could be rendered safe. The use of large quantities of anthrax as a weapon might therefore cause long-term environmental hazards, Against crops 329. The rust fungus, as already noted, is one of the most damaging of natural path- ogens which affects wheat crops. Each rust pustule produces 20,000 uredospores a day for two weeks, and there may be more than 100 pustules on a single infected leaf. The ripe uredospores are easily detached from the plant even by very weak air currents. The spores are then carried by the wind over die- tances of many hundreds of kilometres. It is estimated that the annual total world loss of wheat from rust is equivalent to about 43500 million. 330. Weather plays a decisive role in the epiphytotic spreading of rust. Temperature influences the incubation period and the rate of uredospore germination. Germination and infection occur only when there is a water-saturated atmosphere for three to four hours. Thus, epiphytotic spread occurs when there are heavy dews and when the tem- perature is between 10? and 30* C. The prin- cipal means of prevention is to destroy the pathogen and to breed resistant species. Recently, ionizing radiation has been em- ployed to develop resistant strains. 331. The cereal rusts die out during winter unless some other susceptible plant host, such as barberry, is present, and therefore their effect on crops would be limited to a single season. As they are capable of reducing man's food reserves considerably, rust spores could be extremely dangerous and efficient bacteriological (biological) weapons, especi- ally if deployed selectively with due regard to climatic conditions. Artificial spreading of an epiphytotic would be difficult to recog- nize and delivery of the pathogen to the target would be relatively simple. 332. Rust epiphytotics might have a very serious effect in densely populated develop- ing countries, where the food supply might be reduced to such an extent that a human population already suffering from malnu- trition might be driven to starvation, which, depending on the particular circumstances, might last a long time. 333. Another conceivable biological wea- pon, although neither a practical nor a bacteriological one, is the potato beetle. To use it for this purpose, the beetle would have to be produced in large numbers, and Introduced, presumably clandestinely, into potato growing regions at the correct time during maturation of the crop. In the course of spread the beetle first lives in small foci, which grow and increase until it becomes established over large territories. The beetle is capable of astonishing propagation: the progeny of a single beetle may amount to about 8,000 million in one-and-a-half years. 334. Since beetles prefer to feed and lay their eggs in plants suffering from some viral disease, they and their larvae may help transmit the virus thereby increasing the damage they cause. The economic damage caused by the beetle varies with the season and the country affected, but it can destroy up to 80 per cent of the crop. Protection is difficult because it has not been possible to breed resistant potato species and the only means available at present is chemical pro- tection. 335. Were the beetle ever to be used suc- cessfully for offensive purposes, it could clearly help bring about long-term damage because of the difficulty of control. 3. Genetic and Carcinogenic Changes 336. The possibility also exists that chem- ical and bacteriological (biological) weapons might cause genetic changes. Some chemicals are known to do this. LSD, for example, is known to cause genetic changes an human cells. Such genetic changes, whether induced by chemicals or viruses, might conceivably have a bearing on the development of cancer. A significantly increased incidence of cancer In the respiratory tract (mainly lung) has been reported recently among workers em- ployed in the manufacture of mustard gas during World War IL No increased preva- lence of cancer has been reported among mustard gas casualties of World War I al- though it is doubtful if available records would reveal it. However, most of these cas- ualties were exposed for only short periods to the gas whereas the workers were con- tinuously exposed to small doges for months or years. CHAPTER V. ECONOMIC AND SECURITY IMPLICA- TIONS OF THE DEVELOPMENT, ACQUISITION AND POSSIBLE USE OF CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGr- CAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS AND SYSTEMS OF THEIR DELIVERY A. Introduction 337. Previous chapters have revealed the extent to which developments in chemical and biological science have magnified the potential risks associated with the concept of chemical or bacteriological (biological) war- fare. These risks derive not only from the variety of possible agents which might be used, but also from the variety of their effects. The doubt that a chemical or bacteriological (biological) attack could be restricted to a given area means that casualties could occur well outside the target zone. Were these weapons used to blanket large areas and cities, they would cause massive loss of hu- man life, affecting non-combatants in the same way as combatants, and in this respect, they must clearly be classified as weapons of mass destruction. The report has also empha- sized the great problems and cost which would be entailed in the provision of pro- tection against chenaical and bacteriological (biological) warfare. It is the purpose of this final chapter to explore in greater depth the economic and security implications of mat- ters such as these. B. Production 1. Chemical Weapons 338. It has been estimated that during the course of the First World War, at a time when the chemical Industry Was in a relatively early stage of development, about 180,000 tons of chemical agents were produced, of which more than 120,000 tons were used in battle. With the rapid development of the industry since then, there has been an enormous growth in the potential capacity to produce chemical agents. 339. The scale, nature, and cost of any progamme for producing chemical weapons, and the time needed to implement it, would clearly be largely dependent on the scientific, technical and industrial potential of the country concerned. It would depend not only on the nature of the chemical industry itself, and on the availability of suitably trained egnineers and: chemists, but also on the level of development of the chemical engineering Industry and of the means of automating chemical processes, especially where the pro- duction of highly toxic chemical compoun