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October 3, 1968
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Approved For Release 2006/07/06: CIA-RDP71 B00364R0006001.10011-8 1961 ' ; CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE Only about 25 percent of them are liter- ate. Less than a fourth of the children of school age are in school, and less than 2 percent ever complete secondary education. Pupil-teacher ratios of 100 to 1 are common, compared to about 25 to 1 in the developed countries. To help meet this challenge, the United States, through the Agency for International Development has estab- lished cooperative educational programs in 58 nations. In each the goal is the same: To train people who in turn can train teachers, prepare suitable texts and teaching aids, and themselves devel- op a strong educational program in their respective countries. Assistance Is pro- vided for all levels of eduction-primary, secondary, and higher education; fQr all age groups and types of schools-voca- tional and technical as well as general education; and for construction and equipment as well as for technical assist- ance. In 1962, AID obligated $93 million In U.S. funds plus an additional $98 million in U.S,-owned local currencies to assist the developing nations In meeting acute educational problems. In Bolivia, AID projects are being car- ried out to improve commercial educa- tion. Libya, a program in vocational training for farmers, tradesmen, and handicraft artisans is in progress. In Iran, U.S. aid helped to establish an en- tire vocational education system for the Iranian armed forces. In Pakistan, an AID team taught Pakistani railwaymen-few of whom spoke the same language or dialect- how to operate diesel locomotives. With independence approaching in Kenya, an AID-assisted special project has begun to train 47 local government officials for positions of high responsi- bility in the government when independ- ence is granted. A fascinating example of an AID proj- ect covering several levels of education is the program in Nepal. Nepal's first teacher-training center was established in 1954 under the direc- tion of the University of Oregon. In 1956 mobile teaching teams were orga- nized to carry teacher training to the remqte provinces. A college of education was established and a staff trained to educate up to 2,000 teachers a year. A bureau of textbook publication was established and several of Its Nepalese staff members were sent to the United States for special training. The bureau printed 55 different titles and 225,000 pieces of educational litera- ture in its first-5 years of operation. More than 2,400 part-time teachers were trained for literacy education, and they in turn taught more than 1,000 adults to read and write in their first year in the field, Nepal's first national university was established with colleges of liberal arts and sciences, agriculture and forestry, education, law, nursing, and medicine. Before the AID program began, Nepal had no national university, no teacher- training institutions. Only 1 child in 200 was in school, and only 2 percent of the Nepalese people could read and write. At the end of the first 5 years of the education project, more than 1,500 new primary classrooms had trained teach- ers, 200 new schools were receiving fi- nancial aid, and 20 new primary texts had been published. Nearly 200 second- ary teachers had received bachelor of education degrees and 45 high school teachers had undergone a 1-year course for the improvement of English instruc- tion. In addition, Nepal's entire second- ary school curriculum had been re- vamped to include vocational instruction urgently required in agriculture, home economics, commercial education, and industrial arts. A program similar to the one in Nepal Is now being carried out in India with the assistance of U.S.-AID education teams from Ohio State University and the Teachers College of Columbia Uni- versity. In Cambodia a teacher-training pro- gram has been under way for 5 years. Prior to 1958 Cambodian students with a sixth-grade education were given a summer of training and then pressed into service as elementary school teach- ers. Under the AID contract Cambodia's first teacher preparation center was established and has already become the largest educational institution in the country. Each year the center trains 200 elementary school teachers. An- other similar Institution is now being established with AID assistance to train secondary school teachers. Television represents a potentially valuable educational medium for the de- veloping nations. In Nigeria, for ex- ample, AID has provided an experienced American educational television execu- tive as an adviser to the Nigerian staff of a new educational television station. From 1960 to 1962 the station has tele- cast more than 700 different programs for a total of 350 hours of instruction to 100 village schools equipped with tele- vision sets supplied by the Nigerian Ministry of Education. Not only teachers, but also classrooms are in short supply in most underdevel- oped nations. AID has encouraged the building of new schools and classrooms in many countries by providing techni- cal help and materials while local resi- dents provide the construction labor on a volunteer basis. The Guatemalan Government launched a self-help school construction program in partnership with AID in 1960. AID and the Guatemalan Government agreed to share equally any costs not absorbed by the local communities. At the beginning of the project, it was ex- pected that volunteer labor would cover about one-third of the cost of construc- tion. In fact, it has accounted for nearly 44 percent of construction costs. During the 3 years since the pilot project began, self-help schools have been built and are now operating in every province of Guatemala. More than 1,100 class- rooms in 300 schools have been com- pleted. The enthusiastic turnout of vil- lagers for each school dedication symbol- izes the impact of such AID assisted proj- ects on the lives of the people. Self-help school construction programs like the one in Guatemala are now un- derway in Chile. Liberia, El Salvador, Haiti, and Honduras. MORI/CDF Pages _1 thru 7 14265 Another serious educations problem facing many developing natic. ;?. is that of adult literacy. In Turkey t, unique approach to the problem has .,+n insti- tuted with U.S. aid. Literac- training has been given to more th n 150,000 Turkish soldiers and an additional 120,000 are expected to corm- ~! e train- ing each year. In addition, more than 3,&o primary school teachers have gain: literacy teaching experience at the m:tit;ary cen- ters. This group will farm t- Leaching nucleus of a planned civili 1 literacy program. The goal is 1o reciure illiter- acy in Turkey from 70 to 30 u.+rcent by 1975, In the Turkish project, as !: most lit- eracy projects, U.S. experts i;elp local educators prepare training materials, texts, and followup rear=ing n ;terials for use by the newly literate.. As of 1962, the Agency fF,r Interna- tional Development had o?rdertaken projects to increase th=- supr' and Im- prove the quality of prima. -Y and sec- ondary school teachers I 33 Latin American, African, and Asoarr nations. In Afghanistan, U.S. aid is h., only bi- lateral assistance permitted } the Gov- ernment in the sensitive an of educa- tion. Because English has becoi,?e the near- est thing to an internationa? _i-nguage in many underdeveloped natic AIL) has been providing technical s -I tance for the teaching of English in 4 Asian and African countries. Finally, 75 America c uni u 'sities and colleges are working under A..I o contracts in the establishment and roorovement of facilities for higher edue- rim n in more than 26 Asian, African, and ruth Amer- ican countries. Of the many needs of ti developing countries none is more crit'ti.1 than the need for education, in the t, --, d.est sense of the word. And of the r .v vv parts of our foreign aid program nr-ir is more in keeping with American id a s, and the aspirations of Americans fir =-heir fellow men around the world; tha,i educational assistance. INTRODUCTION OF PE3OLUTION FOR THE ESTABLISII 4 -,'NT OF A JOINT COMMITTEE IN FOR- EIGN INFORMATION 'ND INTEL- LIGENCE The SPEAKER pro temi r (Mr. Roy- sAL). Under previous orde:.o c the House, the gentleman frond Ne,: York [Mr. LxiwsAy] is recognized fr,r, 60 minutes, 10 minutes of which havc already been consumed by the previou presentation of the gentleman from li a o nesota [Mr. FRASER]. (Mr. LINDSAY asked 2,i was given permission to revise and x i end his re- marks.) Mr. LINDSAY. Mr. ; c iker, I rise today to introduce a resi3iutlon for the establishment of a Joint - 3,mmittee on Foreign Informatio7i an intelligence. I propose that the comr_e%;aee be con- stituted roughly along tlw* lines of the Joint Committee on Atop -c Energy and that it have its own funs mnd staff re- sources. I propose also `'rat it make continuing studies in the ;hole area of Approved For Release 2006/07/06: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600110011-8 Approved For Release 2006/07/06: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600110011-8 14266 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE g our foreign information and intelligence thority in these areas? Of course it does mittee on National Security Staffing and programs. not. Congress has always asserted its Operations. In my remarks this afternoon, how- right to concern itself with even the most If we are going to refrain from looking ever, Mr. Speaker, I do not Intend to sensitive areas of Government. And, into the affairs of executive agencies, dwell at great length on the precise terms where matters of the highest secrecy even agencies which report directly to of this particular resolution. I think it have been involved, Members of both the President, than I fear we are going to is a good resolution but I am perfectly Houses have shown themselves perfectly have to disband a large number of our ready to be persuaded that a better one capable of exercising the utmost re- committees, or at least to curtail severely might be devised. The question of the straint. This was never more clearly their activities. Of course we in the exact structure and composition of this demonstrated than by the experience of legislature cannot and should not inter- committee seems to me significantly less the Manhattan project during World vene in areas beyond our competence. important than the more general ques- War II, when members of the two appro- But in my view we have not only a right tions of principle involved. I rise today, priations committees were kept fully ap- but a duty to maintain a general surveil- not to make propaganda on behalf of a prised of the progress of the project lance over agencies like the Central In- particular proposal of mine, but rather without on any occasion breaking secu- telligence Agency, which are established. to raise a matter which I think is in need rity. And I am sure all Members of the by statute and sustained by funds voted of the widest possible and most intelli- House will agree that the record of the by the Members of these two Houses. gent public discussion. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in As most Members are aware, the pro- this connection has been impeccable. These excumenly executiveng secrecy posal of a Joint Committee on Foreign As in the case of the Atomic Energy and, the exclusively executive nature of Intelligence is not a new one. In one Committee, i take it for granted of the intelligence community-are at least form or another it habs b i een ntroduced course that much of the work of the new into this House in each of the last 10 committee-perhaps almost all of it- sessions; in 1955 it was the subject of a would be conducted in private and that 2-day hearing by the Rules Committee. the results would be made public. only In the Senate the Committee on Rules of ter a close screening by the appropriate and Administration reported on it favor- Government agencies. Nevertheless, i ably in 1956, and for 2 days it was de- admit that particular concern might still bated on the floor of that body. Nor is be felt about CIA, since breaches of It partisan in nature. Back In 1959 res- security involving CIA might endanger olutions similar to mine were sponsored the lives of American operatives in other' in the House by eight Democrats and countries, and also the lives of agents of four Republicans. Earlier this year the other nations working in cooperation matter was brought to our attention by with us. I think this is a legitimate Ion- a member of the other party, the dis- cern, but I hope to show later in my tinguished gentleman from Florida [Mr. speech that there are many important RocEasl. Moreover, when Mr. MANS- aspects of intelligence work which could FIELD'S resolution came to a vote In the usefully be studied without any need to Senate in 1956, the minority in favor inquire in detail into the activities of included many Members on both sides particular persons and units in the field. of the aisle. On that or-ion one _ junior Senator from Massachusetts, now the President of the United States. If the Proposal for a Joint Committee on Foreign Intelligence has come up so often and been supported by so many Members, why has it never been adopted? Frankly I do not find that u q estion easy to answer, Particularly since some of the arguments against it consistent. But strangely enough those who oppose resolutions similar to thi s that for these reasons Congress should abstain entirely from overseeing the in- telligence community, but that on the contrary congressional oversight is al- ready more than adequate. Senator RUSSELL made this claim in the debate already quoted, and it was reiterated by Mr. Allen Dulles, the former Director of Central Intelligence, in his recent article in Harper's magazine. What is in fact the extent of congressional surveillance at the moment? In both the House and Senate the bodies responsible for overseeing the in- telligence community are small subcom- mittees of the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees. Neither the House another argument that has also beenYad-, ate Foreign Relations Committee has ~urfsdfctin in this area despite m their vanced frequently in discussions of this rest in intelligence matters. question-namely, that the intelligence obvious interest community exists solely to serve the This might not matter were it not for the President and the National Security fact that the surveillance exercised by Council, and that therefore we in the the four existing subcommittees is almost Congress have no right to seek a juris- example, my Both cursory and sporadic. For dictional position. This doctrine was example, last year during a debate in the S enate the c chuset shed senior SenatoMr. extreme seem to me so feeble. Take, to begin stated HAYDEN in the Senaform te in 195 6 by from r Massa ts, with, the argument about secrecy. It is that time: T STALL, as asked fri end, ime an argument that has been advanced the ArmdLServicesSubcommitteet ee ttell every time the proposal has been dis- of the Presiden. U derethegCo c stitution i voted to the CIA affairs. Mr. SALTON- cussed. During the Senate debate in feel we have no right to attempt to regulate STALL was perfectly frank. He said: 1956 the chairman of the Senate an agency which Is designed solely to pro- I say on the floor of the Senate that we Armed Services Committee, Mr. Rus- vide the President, who, under the Consti- spend several hours and go into many details SELL, went so far as to say that, rather tution, is responsible for our foreign rela- of operations, of expenses, of administration, than have a committee set up and in- tions, with information to enable him to and so on. for ti ma on made available to Members of make decisions. Congress, "it would be better to abolish I, for one, cannot accept that doctrine. the Central Intelligence Agency and, by As every Member knows, these two doing so, to save the money appropriated branches of our Government, the execu- and the lives of American citizens." A tive and the legislative- are not water- former Vice President, Mr. Barkley, took tight compartments separated by steel the same view in the same debate. bulkheads; the material between them is Now no one denies that CIA and.other flexible and porous. There are any nuin- intelligence agencies must conduct a very ber of congressional committees which high proportion of their operations in keep a watch over the executive agencies. secret. Secrecy is of the essence of their In this House we have, to name only two, work; without it they could not function, the Foreign Affairs Committee which in- and the security of our country would quires constantly into the policies and be jeopardized. No one denies that. But actions of the Presidentand his agents, what is true of the intelligence commu- and the Government Operations Com- nity is also true in many other areas of mittee which closely scrutinizes the en- government: in the fields of atomic en- tire organization of the executive ergy, weapons development, and foreign branch. The Senate has a subcommittee policy, for example. But does this mean whose area of operations borders on the that Congress is to have no effective au- very area I am discussing: the Subcom- I ask Members to note the phrase "several hours"-not weeks or even days, but hours. The members of one of the most important committees in the other House devote only hours to, the affairs of one of the most important agencies of our Government. The reasons for this are surely clear. The members of the four subcommittees lack any staff spe- cialized in these matters; they them- selves can have little time or thought to devote them. But even if these subcom- mittees do have more time for intelli- gence, nevertheless the disadvantages of having responsibility for the intelli- gence community divided up among four different subcommittees would, I think, be obvious to everyone. I maintain'that congressional surveillance of the intelli- gence community is not now adequate, =Au u,'t 15 Approved For Release 2006/07/06: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600110011-8 Approved For Release 2006/07/06: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600110011-8 1963'__ and cannot be adequate as long as it continues to be organized as it is at present. A moment ago I referred to the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency as one of the most important agencies of our Govern- ment. What is true of CIA is, of course, even truer of the intelligence commu- nity as a whole. Yet from time to time those who maintain that Intelligence op- erations fall exclusively within the execu- tive sphere-those, in other words, who are opposed to the establishment of a - joint congressional committee-try to persuade us, despite all we have heard and seen during the past few years, that nevertheless CIA is a purely advisory body, that that it is not directly con- cerned with the making of national pol- icy. Mr. Allen Dulles himself remarked several years ago: CIA is not a policymaking Agency: we furnish intelligence to assist in the formula- tion of policy. Senator RUSSELL during a debate in the other body was even more blunt: Some Senators who addressed themselves to the resolution on Monday last, seemed to hold the opinion that the CIA was a policy- making agency. That theme ran all through the remarks which were made in advocacy of the adoption of the resolution. Mr. President, the Central Intelligence Agency is far from being a policymaking agency. It makes no policy. The distinguished Senator went on to say that CIA was merely a coordinating and Information-gathering body whose function was simply to present its find- ings to the actual policymaking body, the National Security Council. Senator RUSSELL said all this in 1956. In my view it was scarcely plausible even then. Now in 1963, after our experi- ences In Cuba, Laos and elsewhere, to say that CIA is in no sense a policymak- ing body is to say something that is pal- pably untrue. The National Security `Act, under which CIA operates, does not, of course, formally assign it policymak- ing functions. But CIA is a policymak- ing body, and we all know It. The rea- sons have been well put by Prof. Harry Howe Ransom, our leading lay student of intelligence affairs. In his study "Central Intelligence and National Se- curity," published as early as 1958, he has this to say: Certainly the CIA has no policymaking responsibility. Yet policy making Is not a simple static action. Rather it is a dynamic process. A key element in this process is the information available to policymakers. The man, or group, controlling the information available to policymakers does in fact play a major if indirect role in policymaking. A few pages later Professor Ransom adds: It would be unrealistic to suggest that the bright young men of CIA, by training, talent, and personality, do not hold strong views on controversial issues of national security policy. If it is granted that knowledge is indeed power, it. will be recognized that in reality the CIA, through an increasing ef- ficiency-and consequently rising credit with responsible decision makers-has come to play a major role in creating national secu- rity policy. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE t4267 Surely those statements can no longer be regarded as anything but the simple truth. In fact even Senator RUSSELL appears to have come round. Last year, during the hearings on the confirmation of Mr. John McCone to be Director of Central Intelligence, Senator RUSSELL remarked: In this period through watch we are pass- ing, this office is perhaps seccad only to the Presidency in Its importance. A few moments later he repeated the point. I am inclined to agree with Sen- ator RUSSELL. And I submit to you that one does not describe a man as holding an office "second only to the Presidency in its importance" if the agency of which he is the head is not itself a policymak- ing agency of the very first order of importance. Up to this point, Mr. Speaker, I have been mainly concerned to clear the ground, as it were-to state as clearly as I could my objections to the argu- ments most commonly used by opponents of the proposal I am supporting. Only by implication have I suggested positive reasons why I think a Joint Committee on Foreign Information and Intelligence should be established. I want now to ad- dress myself to the central questions: why do I think such a joint committee is necessary? and, equally important, what work do I think it might usefully undertake? But first I have to make one further point. The Central Intelligence Agency, and indeed the entire intelligence com- munity, is highly---and necessarily--se- cretive in its mode of operations. For this reason outsiders like myself have no alternative but to rely for their informa- tion on newspaper reports, on the oc- casional published hearings on House and Senate committees, on the work of scholars like Professor Ransom, and on a miscellaneous variety of other sources. in the very nature of things our com- ments and criticisms cannot be authori- tative. We are working in the dark, or at least in the semitwilight. Neverthe- less, I think we do know enough to have reasonable grounds for supposing that all is not well within the intelligence community. Even more important, I think we know enough to be certain that we need to know snore-and by "we," of course, I mean not necessarily the general public nor even every Member of Congress, but those Members who would serve on the kind of committee I have in mind. Why, then, do I think such a com- mittee should be established? I have two general reasons. The first concerns the extraordinary number of specific criticisms that have been leveled over the years against the Central In- telligence Agency and, by implication, against the intelligence community as a whole. Admittedly, as Mr. Allen Dulles recently pointed out: You cannot tell of operations that go along well. Those that go badly generally speak for themselves. And I would not want for a moment to deny that the Central Intelligence Agency has scored a number cr quite spectacular successes-the ti - over- flights, for example, and the , rthrow of the Mossadegh regim< in ?a=n. On balance it is almost certainly t, a:, to say that the intelligence c,.-)mm t,ty has served the Nation well. But, tie fact does remain that on occ-tsion ?;I,e com- munity has blundered seriousi- _-tad that for its blunder the citizens of o United States have paid a heavy pric< Let me refer to just aa, few rstances. Back in 1950, as Mr. Dulles h,rself has tacitly admitted, the intellig, ,i -e com- munity failed to anticipate t Chinese Communist intervention in F. ea. We are still living with the eons i ences of that particular failure, A -aw years later an Incident involving he CIA caused us serious embaa rassr ? it in the Middle East and may have ,,eitributed indirectly to the Suez aftai- in July 1956 President Nasser cf Eg', claimed in a speech at Alexandria thai he had been strongly advised by a t 3 Govern- ment official to ignore an Imp -.ant mes- sage that he was aboui; to r c -ive from the State Department. It svts subse- quently confirmed that the , 'fiicial in question had been the reg, mat repre- sentative of CIA. More recently, of course, w had the fiasco of the Bay of Piiis. C:4=-f respon- sibility for that lamentable a, fair must rest with the President of ate United States. However, ther s can he no ques- tion but that the Central _- ttelligence Agency was deeply involved :a the whole affair, and that its actions and advice had a decisive effect on ! nv eventual outcome. Surely most Mei ters of the House will agree that it wo ip: b8 in the national interest to know - cz ether such Incidents were merely pal,.(ular aber- rations or whether, In fact, trey form a pattern that is likely to b< repeated in the future. My second general =reaso, !,,)r pressing for the establishment of ti committee I can state quite bri 'fly. _t is this. I abhor government by secre e I regard it as inimical to the effecti.i function- ing of our institutiats. I regard it as alien to our American way ,i life. Above all, I regard it as a threat -.c: our funda- mental liberties. I ful= - realize, of course, it should be clear f -?om what I have said already that a l i tt-h degree of secrecy is essential to th s workings of the intelligence communis % But I fear that with -.pest to the intelligence community w, are often the victims of secrecy for i ee recy's sake. Things are done to us an i in our name which we know nothing -. I do not wish to see the legitimate- ?2erets of the intelligence community r'oorted in the press and on the air Of 4) arse I do not. But it does seem to me oj e,iormous im= portance that a few selec representa- tives of the people, cho, r by the two Houses of Congress, rho, e be continu- ously aware of what t ?f intelligence community is doing anc_ i ~ the way in which it is going about ,i sing it. The American people have a r stake, not merely their libertic s but } qtr lives. Approved For Release 2006/07/06: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600110011-8 Approved For Release 2006/07/06: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600110011-8 14268 Despite all I have said so far, there would, of course, be little point in estab- lishing this joint committee unless we had some fairly clear idea of what we thought it should do, of what subjects we thought it should study. I propose, therefore, to continue by discussing four questions, all of high importance, which I think might usefully be investigated: first, the relations between the Central Intelligence Agency and the State De- partment, especially overseas; second, the relations between intelligence-gath- ering on the one hand and so-called special operations on the other; third, the selection and training of intelligence personnel; and fourth, the whole ques- tion of Intelligence evaluation. I pro- pose to deal briefly with the first three of these questions and to say rather more abouhe fourth. First, the relations between CIA and the State Department. The problem here has been posed suc- cinctly by Henry Howe Ransom in the book I have already cited. On page 216 he writes: The operation by the U.S. Government of a farflung secret apparatus for Intelligence gathering and political action could have widespread diplomatic ramifications. There may be a basic incompatibility between the maintenance of accredited diplomatic mis- sions In some 78 foreign posts (as of 1958)- The number would be considerably greater now- and the existence of American secret agents in most of these same foreign areas. Great- est care must be exercised in keeping U.S. diplomacy separated from spying and back- stage political maneuvering, at least on the surface, yet the diplomats probablyto should not be lompletely In the dark as the activities of American secret agents. The possibly disruptive effect of hav- ing, on the premises of American em- bassies abroad or in the field, agents who owe allegiance to someone other than the ambassador and to an organi- zation other than the State Department and who may be engaging in activities running counter to expressed State De- partment policy, scarcely needs spelling out In detail. Nor are these dangers merely specu- lative. It seems, for example, that to- ward the end of the Chinese civil war remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's Na- tionalist Army moved into parts of northern Burma. These troops claimed to be eager to harass the Communists across the border, and CIA accordingly supplied them with large quantities of money and arms. But according to available reports the Chinese had long since tired of fighting. Instead of at- tacking the Communists, they proceeded to settle down, to occupy much of the best agricultural land in northern Burma, and to cultivate opium-all with the assistance of U.S. funds. This would have been a melancholy episode in any case. But what made it worse was the fact that our Ambassador in Rangoon apparently had not the faintest idea of what CIA was doing. When the Burmese Government formally complained to the United States, the Ambassador issued a categorical denial; he said the United States had nothing CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- HOUSE ?Augit?t 15 to do with the activities of the Nation- alist Chinese. Our Ambassador of course believed he was telling the truth. But what he was saying was in fact not true, and naturally the Burmese were shocked by this apparent evidence of American duplicity. What was the upshot of this episode? The American Ambassador re- signed, the U.S. Government was deeply embarrassed and the Government of Burma threatened for a time to break off diplomatic relations. Admittedly, this incident was particu- larly ludicrous. But it is not without parallel. Our policy in the early stages of the Laotian crisis appears to have been constantly bedeviled by a lack of effective coordination between the CIA and the State Department. Similarly with Cuba prior to the Bay of Pigs in- vasion. Mr. Tad Szulc and W. Karl Meyer, in their able account of that affair, describe how, on its own initiative, CIA established close working relations with exiled supporters of the former dic- tator Batista. They add: This decision marked the inauguration of what, In effect, became its Independent for- eign policy toward Cuba, in cavalier disre- gard of the thinking in the White House and the State Department. Note that all this occurred despite the efforts of an earlier Secretary of State, Mr. Christian Herter, to regularize rela- tions between the State Department and CIA. Since then the Herter-Allen Dulles agreement on the relations between Am- bassadors and CIA personnel in the field has been reaffirmed by Mr. Rusk and Mr. McCone. And by now we have reason to hope that the responsible foreign policymakers-the President and the National Security Council-have reas- serted their authority over the Central Intelligence Agency. I agree that to a considerable extent this Is a problem of particular persons and particular situa- tions. But it is also the case that, as long as both State Department and CIA personnel are working in the field, as long as both agencies are responsible for the collection of information, and-per- haps most important-as long as CIA continues to be responsible for special operations, the problem of integrating the Central Intelligence Agency into our general-foreign policy apparatus will re- main difficult and will remain worthy of close and continuous examination. The exercise of surveillance in this field I conceive to be one possible function of a Joint Congressional Committee on For- eign Information and Intelligence. A moment ago I alluded to the con- duct by the CIA of so-called special op- erations; that is, the fomenting of oppo- sition against hostile governments, the arming of insurgents, the- provocation of enemy action, and so on. The question of housing these special operations-or additional services or other functions or whatever you want to call them-under the same roof as the CIA's purely Intel- ligence-gathering operations has, of course, long been a matter of controversy, and it is this question that I suggest might usefully be the second of the new joint committee's areas of study. I do not suppose we need to be re- minded of the importance of this ques- tion. The Bay of Pigs invasion was only the most spectacular and. best publicized of CIA's special operations. There was the Iranian affair In 1953, and the fol- lowing year the overthrow of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala. CIA also appears to have had a hand in the main risings in Eastern Europe, in East Berlin and Hungary. Operations of this sort, unless carefully supervised and controlled by responsible political officers, could un- wittingly involve the United States in a -major international crisis, possibly in war. If this was not clear before the Bay of Pigs, it. ought to be clear now. The institutional danger here is read- ily apparent and has often been stated. As Professor Ransom puts it: To mix the two functions-- That Is, of information gathering and special operations- Involves the danger that foreign agents col- lecting facts and trying at the same time to bolster or cause the overthrow of a foreign government In America's apparent interest may develop a less than objective sense for distinguishing between fact and aspiration. Messrs. Szulc and Meyer make the same point apropos of Cuba: The CIA men were not only shaping, in effect, foreign policy, but were exempt from any meaningful outside checks on their ac- tivities. Indeed, they were in the enviable position of both organizing a clandestine op- eration and preparing the intelligence data through which the validity of the venture could be judged. The obvious solution to this problem would, of course, be to deprive CIA en- tirely of its special operations function. Unfortunately the people In the most fa- vorable position to collect clandestine Information are often also the people best placed to engage in subversive polit- ical activities. In addition, a total di- vorce between the two functions might lead, in Ransom's words, to "competi- tion, duplication, and even outright con- flict." For a time the Maxwell Taylor Com- mittee, appointed by the President to in- quire into the Bay of Pigs affair, ap- pears to have toyed, at least, with an alternative idea-the idea of transfer- ring the bulk of CIA's special operations to the Defense Department. But this solution would have had the equally ob- vious disadvantage of ensuring that the uniformed military-and hence the credit and prestige of the U.S. Govern- ment-would become involved as soon as any paramilitary operation became a matter of public knowledge. In the event, It seems that routine covert operations have been left in the hands of CIA, with control to be trans- ferred to the Pentagon only if a particu- lar project becomes so big as to warrant open military participation. Mr. Hanson Baldwin in the New York Times summed up the matter thus: The general rule of thumb for the future is that the CIA will not handle any pri- marily military operations, or ones of such size that they cannot be kept secret. How- ever, each case will apparently be judged on its merits; there Is no hard-and-fast formula that will put one operation under the CIA and another under the Pentagon." Approved For Release 2006/07/06: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600110011-8 Approved For Release 2006/07/06: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600110011-8 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE All of us, I think, will agree that this is an area in which hard-and-fast for- mulas are not appropriate and in which, in the nature of things, organizational gimmicks cannot solve the major diffi- culties. As in the case of relations be- tween CIA and the State Department, much depends on particular people and particular situations. But largely be- cause the problem is of this sort, because it is a problem which can never finally be solved, I feel very strongly that con- tinuing congressional surveillance is urgently required. If a joint committee had been in existence in the early stages of the first Cuban crisis, and if it had had cognizance of this matter, would the Bay of Pigs fiasco have occurred? I think it is at least possible that it would not. Discussion of the Bay of Pigs leads me naturally to the third of the questions I think a joint committee might investi- gate: the whole question of recruitment and personnel within the intelligence community. For it seems to me perfect- ly clear that one of the things that went wrong with the abortive Cuban inva- sion-not the only thing, but one of the things-was that much of the CIA per- sonnel responsible for the operation con- sisted of the sort of people who could not distinguish between the reactionary and the democratic elements in the anti- Castro camp, between the opponents of Castro who were acceptable to the Cuban people and those who, as former sup- porters of Batista, were anathema to them. Let me quote again from Szulc and Meyer. In their book, "The Cuban In- vasion," they write: Thus the CIA established contacts in Mi- ami with pro-Batista organizations and with exile groups whose entire political philosophy was dedicated to the return to the pre-Castro status quo in Cuba. ? * * These factions were placing themselves not only against Cas- tro but against history; whether or not the CIA operatives were aware that total regres- sion is Impossible, the contacts with the rightist factions ran. counter to official U.S. policy, aimed at encouraging social reform in Latin America." A few pages later they remark that the activities of the CIA agents reflected a desire to promote anti-Castro groups which they could manipulate. They con- tinue: It also reflected an attitude of hostility to left-of-center exile groups by second-rate field operatives. This in turn affected the top level of the agency and resulted in a lack of understanding at the top. It is not clear to what extent the CIA attitude was ideolog- ically motivated or was simply a response based on the agent's view of what was prac- tical or realistic. This tendency on the part of the CIA to seek out and support the most anti- Communist groups in the field, regard- less of whether or not such groups are politically viable, has of course been manifested on a number of other occa- sions-in Laos as well as in Cuba, and apparently in Algeria and the Congo as well. It is a persistent tendency, and one that on occasion has had a damag- ing effect on our policy. I suspect it has something to do with the kinds of people the Central Intelligence Agency gets to work for it. Is it wise, for example, to rely to the extent CIA seems to do on the services of retired service officers? One would suppose that retired service officers, though almost always men of great abil- ity, would have an instinctive tendency to take a rather narrow, strictly "opera- tional" view of the problems confronting them. Similarly, is it wise to rely too heavily on the services of political exiles and refugees? It seems reasonable, for example, to suppose that an exile from Ruritania, especially someone who has passionate convictions about what course events in his homeland ought to take, may not be the best person to assess what course events in his homeland actu- ally are taking, especially if what Is actu- ally happening is not to his taste. Please do not misunderstand me. I do not mean to impugn the enormous amount of valuable work being done by retired service officers and by exiles and refugees in the CIA. Without their help, the organization simply could not func- tion. Altogether the Central Intelli- gence Agency undoubtedly commands some of the ablest minds in the U.S. Gov- ernment. And of course I do not mean for a moment to suggest that CIA should be staffed with "soft-liners" or people who have had no personal experience of the countries in question. That would be absurd. But what I do think is that we have to be sure that what we are getting are actually the facts, and not what we would like to be the facts. This is not a matter of personal preference one way or the other. It Is a matter of finding out what is actually taking place-and personal preferences enter only as they may color one's judgment. I suspect that the judgment of the CIA is some- times colored by the preference of its employees. I suspect that CIA ought to take special care to recruit and employ men and women of widely differing back- grounds, temperaments, and opinions. I suspect that in these kinds of situations one gets at the truth only when a wide variety of Inclinations is brought to bear. But remember that these are my feelings only. I have little data at my command. All I am saying is that I have a hunch that CIA recruitment policy has had an effect on CIA's Performance. I may be wrong, but I submit that the only way we in Congress can find out is by our- selves conducting an inquiry into the subject. The whole question of personnel and recruitment is, then, the third of the areas I would like to see a joint com- mittee study. I would only add that of course no investigation need inquire into the names and histories of particular individuals involved; there need be no breaches of security or secrecy. The matter we are concerned with is one of general policy. Finally, I want to turn to what is perhaps the most difficult of the four questions I referred to earlier: the ques- tion of how best to organize the evalu- ation of the enormous amount of ma- terial collected every day by the various agencies of the intelligence community. Obviously evaluation of some sort takes place at every echelon within the com- munity, but I am particularly concerned 14269 with the top-level U.S. Ini ,.gene Board and its auxiliary bock ies. Probably a few words are in vier on how these agencies are orga -i :ed. I think the following description-i r 3ughly accurate, though the Central In, ""ligence Agency refused to provide me Ch au- thoritative information so I ha ; had to rely on data from publish ^d so es. By the phrase "intelliger e com- munity" I mean the nutrerow. a rencies within the executive bra?.ich -)i icerned with Intelligence collection am evalua- tion: the CIA, the new Jlefen Cntelli- gence Agency, the State De ?s etment, RAND, and so on. The Comm*rr4ity as a whole is responsible for pros c1.1ig the national estimates--described '~? Profes- sor Ransom as "these vita: milding blocks of national security polio .' With the exception of the ultrasecr, >. _iet esti- mates which are produced by s= eoial ma- chinery within the Na tiona Security Council, most estimates ire pr, -) Bred un- der the aegis of the so-caller Board of National Estimates. . This Board consists of a sm: < ii number of intelligence experts- -sold r;, diplo- mats, and scholars-whn, to ' v its Ran- som again, "preside as a kind Manning general staff for the intelli--rce com- munity." The Board an 1--Hate the preparation of an estimate. I ough it usually does so only on reque-:c from the President, the Director ~f Ce. ~t~ul Intel- ligence, or some other membe of the Na- tional Security Council. In iz t cases, the Board of National Es':imat, sets the terms of reference, breaks r problem up into feasible comporents, ird assigns appropriate tasks to the varir:c.. agencies. The resulting staff studies arllated by the small Office of Nations -:stimates. The Board then drafts eitht i straight estimate-that is, one which i tempts to assess a foreign nation', inte~,t=ons or fu- ture policies with Implicit as noptions as to future U.S. policy or a e'ieral esti- mate--that is, one involvir. stated as- sumptions concerning liossib changes In U.S. policy. After the draft _,I-mate has been returned to the partic} a ting agen- cies for their comments and iticisms, it Is submitted, possibly with =IFsents, to a committee which used to be _rown as the Intelligence Advisory Com +tee but Is now named the U.S. Yntell:c ace Board. It the Board of Estimate Is the plan- ning board for the Intel p igence com- munity, the Intelligence 34tard Is its board of directors. As Rar ri puts it, it is the "final forum for th ;professional Intelligence community." t resolves jurisdictional dispute; wit' i i the com- munity and is finally respc s.ble for for- warding the nationr.I esttrnates to the National Security Counc?;. Invariably the attempt is made to p s lace agreed estimates, and usually the - ,.z empt is suc- cessful; but on occasion di s xrting opin- ions will be submitted. T: Intelligence Board meets usually one a week. It consists of the leadi rig It iigence offi- cials of the community ar ? ,s chaired by the Director of Central I: iligence, Two aspects of thi, proi:_ in particu- lar are worth noting. 'I first is the central role of the Centr i Intelligence Agency. A high proporti, Ti of the intel- ligence community's far Fathering is done by CIA. The Bee t of National Approved For Release 2006/07/06: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600110011-8 Approved For Release 2006/07/06: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600110011-8 14270 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Estimates functions as a part of CIA. The chairman of the U.S. Intelligence Board is Director of CIA. And, of course, the intelligence community's spokesman on the National Security Council itself is' also the CIA Director. The second thing worth noting, however, is the duality. of CIA's role. Under the Na- tional Security Act the agency is not only one of the participants in the in- telligence community, it is also the chief agency responsible for coordinating it. In other words, at many points in the process of evaluation, CIA is both player and umpire, both witness and judge. This ambiguity is implicit in the title of'the Director who is formally not the "Director of the Central Intelligence Agency" but simply "Director of Central Intelligence." - Now the danger here is clear. It is that the Central Intelligence Agency will become-perhaps it has already be- come-not merely the chief intelligence agency but the dominant intelligence agency, and that it will develop persistent institutional tendencies, biases, and even policies. This type of problem is, of course, not peculiar to the American in- telligence community but is character- istic of any complex administrative ap- paratus. That is the reason it has con- stantly to be guarded against. Sherman Kent, a Yale professor and a World War II intelligence officer, put the point this way: Almost any man or group of men con- fronted with the duty of getting something planned or getting something done will sooner or later hit upon what they consider a single most desirable course of action. Usually it is sooner; sometimes, under du- ress, it is a snap judgment of the top of the head. I cannot escape the belief that under the circumstances outlined, intelligence will find itself right In the middle of policy, and that upon occasions It will be the unabashed apologist for a given policy rather than its impartial and objective analyst. Szulc and Meyer, writing of the Bay of Pigs, conclude: Yet CIA was not behaving idiotically; it was in many senses responding to the insu- lated rationalism that Infects a sheltered bureaucracy. Indeed, if there is an institu- tional villain, it is bureaucracy itself-that hulking, stubborn giant that seemingly can only look where it has been and not whither it is tending. Professor Ransom calls It simply the problem of "feedback." Naturally inthe early months of 1961 the administration addressed itself to this problem. After the Bay of Pigs it could scarcely do otherwise. In particu- lar it reactivated a watchdog group set up by President Eisenhower in 1956, originally called the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Ac- tivities and now named the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. This Board, under the chairmanship of Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., of the Massa- cuhetts Institute of Technology, studied the question of evaluation and appar- ently forwarded one or more reports to the President in the course of the year. These reports have not been made pub- lic, but I think it is possible to piece to- gether from newspaper reportsroughly what happened. It seems that the Kil- lian committee, or at least some of its members, were unhappy about the dual role being played by CIA. They proposed that in future the Director of CIA should be more of a technician, and that a new post should be created, probably at- tached to the White Houses, with some such title as "Coordinator of Intel- ligence," the new coordinator would be in a position to analyse and assess the results achieved by the intelligence com- munity without having any bias in favor of CIA. Reports to this effect appeared frequently in the press in June and July 1961. In August Mr. Cabell Phillips of the New York Times stated that the new post had actually been offered to Mr. Fowler Hamilton. Either these reports were inaccurate, of the administration changed its mind, or they could not find anyone to occupy the new post, because in September 1961 the President announced that Mr. John A. McCone had been named Director of Central Intelligence without any major change being made In the structure of the intelligence community. Subse- quently, however, in January 1962 one such change was announced. Hence- forth the Director of Central Intelligence was not to function both as Chairman of the U.S. Intelligence Board and also as CIA member of the Board. Instead, al- though the Director was to remain Chair- man of the Board, his deputy was to act as representative of the CIA. In a letter to Mr. McCone, the President noted this change with approval. He added: As head of the Central Intelligence Agency, while you will continue to have overall re- sponsibility for the Agency,. I shall expect you to delegate to your principal deputy, as you may deem necessary, so- much of the direction of the detailed operation of the Agency as you may be required to permit you to carry out your primary task as Director of Central Intelligence. Clearly there was a dilemma here. On the one hand, It was evident that CIA's intelligence gathering and operational functions could conflict with its coordi- nating function-and, of course, what was true of the Agency was also true of its Director. On the other hand, the President and his advisers were almost certainly aware that an Independent co- ordinator, who was not himself the head of a major agency, might find himself weak, `even powerless, in the face of the vast intelligence bureaucracies. Inde- pendence In theory might mean im- potence in practice. So a compromise was struck, and the duties of the Di- rector of Central Intelligence merely redefined. How successful this compromise has been it is probably too early to say. But from all that I have said, it ought to be obvious that the problem of evaluation, like the other problems I have already mentioned, is a continuing one, and not one that can be spirited out of existence by merely institutional gimmickry. It is also obvious that the problem of evalu- ation is an enormously important prob- lem, probably the most important con- fronting - the intelligence community. For these reasons, I think that it, too, should be a continuing subject of scru- tiny by a well-qualified and well-staffed committee of Congress. r ugzisl 15 Mr. Speaker, I do not wish to detain the House further. I have spoken at considerable length, yet I am , only too well aware that I have only skimmed the surface of this extraordinarily compli- cated and difficult subject. There are any number of further questions that I might have posed-for example, concern- ing the apparently increasing concentra- tion of authority within the intelligence community, or about the role -of- the U.S. Information Agency. And, of course, I must repeat that this has been essentially an outsider's analysis. I have been trying merely to suggest what kinds of inquiry a joint committee might undertake, not to anticipate what the results of those inquiries would be. Nor as I remarked at the outset, do I wish to insist that the resolution I am introducing today provides the only pos- sible way- of proceeding. Perhaps the joint committee should be given rather different terms of reference. Or perhaps a body should be established comprising private citizens as well as Members - of Congress. I do not want to be dogmatic about this. My purpose in speaking-to- day has been to reopen public discussion of an issue that has too long been dor- mant, and moreover to reopen it at a time of relative tranquillity, when the Intelligence community is not in the public spotlight, at a time therefore when - these matters can be considered soberly and dispassionately. But we in Congress should not be too timid about putting ourselves forward. I wonder how many Members of this House are aware of the enormous body of opinion in favor of the creation of a congressional joint committee. Both the Hoover Commission and its special intelligence task force favored congres- sional - intervention. The New York Times has consistently supported the idea in Its editorial columns. Two years ago the distinguished military analyst, Mr. Hanson Baldwin, stated that one of the lessons to be drawn from the Bay of Pigs was "the necessity of keeping all secret intelligence activities and opera- tions under constant top-echelon sur- veillance and review." He noted that the machinery for achieving this would be greatly strengthened by the creation of a joint congressional watchdog com- mittee. Finally, Mr. Speaker, I should like to quote just once more from the writings of Professor Harry Howe Ransom who, as I have already said, is our country's leading lay student of intelligence affairs. I think his comment deserves all the greater consideration because it comes from a member of the political science profession-a profession which, as we all know, has always had a strong bias in favor of the executive branch of gov- ernment. On page 206 of "Central In- telligence and National Security" Pro- fessor Ransom remarks: It is common experience for security policymakers, military and civilian, to find their fear of congressional interference changed into gratitude for congressional support, frequently more effective support than has been -accorded on the executive side of Government. No executive agency today reveals everything to congressional com- mittees with jurisdiction over its operations. Officials of central intelligence may be ex- Approved For Release 2006/07/06: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600110011-8 Approved For Release 2006/07/06: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600110011-8 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE 14271 196' ' ' petted to reveal even less. But more ad- congressional supervision in this area is longer ignore this problem. 'n United vantages are to be gained than lost from itself a serious omission in view of the States and the entire world fai e`i to pro- establishing a more institutionalized Sys- work required of the foreign policy com- perly plan ahead in the deve >t ment of tem for congressional surveillance. mittees of both Houses. A variety of our present subsonic jet trap. parts and, I agree with that, Mr. Speaker, and I congressional committees now handles as a result, millions of people tai oughout hope that what I have said today will be the Nation's everwidening range of in- the world have had their lives -1rastically - by the by given air- of the tiongof congressional supervision is im- t day sdjet transports fl-)rode _e eat which my colleagues on thoughtful attention aisle. possible. fields near large urban areas Mr. NORBLAD. Mr. Speaker, will the The proposed committee would have a Field o he district wlies ju:;t ~ir-;wr. O'Hare It gentleman yield? comprehensive view of the intelligence would be world's impossible re i? t. t Mr. LINDSAY. I yield to the gentle- and information aspects of foreign af- man from Oregon. fairs. A single committee of this nature fully describe the deaf cuing -) se which Mr. NORBLAD. Mr. Speaker, I want would provide the existing foreign policy thousands of my corstitu, 'i`s suffer to associate'myself with the gentleman's committees with more direct and effi- everyday from conventional s osonic jets remarks. I think we should have had cient service. The agencies under its either . It arriving t be sal ipartingaeO pare a joint committee to monitor the CIA supervision would benefit as well. A Field. it was first established.. I have had prime target of the joint committee's ple shouldn't have built aear + airport ; a little experience in the matter as a efforts would be the improvement of these people were ther=' beff .-e the air- member of the Committee on Armed their operations and policies. Studies port was built. Services. As you may know, we have. a of the agencies' problems and programs i believe it is tragic th:.t airplane subcommittee on the CIA. I was a mem- would, of course, be considerably more manufacturers of the world c. not take ber of that committee for either 2 or 4 extensive and complete when conducted wthese they consequences into ernidertion years. We met annually--one time a by a committee with single responsibility tranpptdeveloped the transport hen the past d,, so a jet year, for a period of 2 hours in which of intelligence oversight. I was not Member of ingress in we accomplished virtually nothing. I Ultimately, I believe, both Houses of days, but I feel r is ,e only rmy think a proposal such as you have made Congress would benefit from the estab- those but the duty feel it isy vtelof is the answer to it because a part-time lishment of the proposed joint commit- duty subcommittee of the Armed Services tee. The Senate and House would be this Congress both in -'he It )t se and in Committe, as I say, which meets for just afforded a broader opportunity for care- the Senate to recognize the ,:u-,t that we 2 hours, 1 day a year, accomplishes ful consideration of foreign information cannot repeat this erroT7 on tae threshold nothing whatsoever. I want to compli- and intelligence matters. The agencies of the supersonic air transpart era. ment the gentleman on his proposal. involved would similarly benefit from must do everyFAA thing pe ible to in- from LINDSAY. I thank the gentleman the committee's studies and recom- We from Oregon and appreciate the con- mendations. sure that this new type o~ .,uper'sonic tribution he has made. He knows where- Therefore, Mr. Speaker, I hope the aircraft-which is being deg eloped from in he talks. He is an expert on the House may act promptly on our proposal. scratch-does not repeat the tragic mis- subject and is a member of the Commit- It would fill a vital gap in our foreign take of its subsonic jet pred:-crssor, FAA. tee on Armed Services and was a member policymaking process. It would stream- The legislation which I h,we intro- of the subcommittee supervising the line existing efforts in the areas of for- duced today would prohibi~ i-he opera- CIA-in theory-and what he says dove- eign information and intelligence. This tion of any civil supcrsoni aircraft in tails entirely and agrees with the experi- is an area in which congressional re- air transportation through u, navigable ence, and the statements made in the sponsibility is long overdue. airspace of the Uni ted states which other body as well. would generate sonic boom u'rpressures . (Mr. LINDSAY asked and was given STAND- exceeding 1.5 pounds per st s re foot on permission to revise and extend his re- ESTABLISHING MINIMUM the ground directly benea li the flight marks.). ARDS FOR OPERATION OF CIVIL path. (Mr. MORSE (at the request of Mr. SUPERSONIC AIRCRAFT This legislation would fu Cher make it LINDSAY) was given permission to extend The SPEAKER pro tempore. (Mr. unlawful to operate any civil supersonic his remarks at this point in the RECORD.) aircraft into or out of U.S s rports un- Mr. MORSE. Mr. Speaker, I rise to House, Under previous order of the less it can be demonstrated that ground H, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. noise level generated by sue -`civil super- uitia v lower than York rk[M Mr. PvcINSKI] is recognized for 30 minutes. the Bend my entleman distinguished from New colleague, Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, I have sonic aircraft is generated the g LINDSAY], on the step he has taken in today- introduced legislation designed to that generated by long r?-tie subsonic k (M .- The gentle- deal with a most serious problem which jet aircraft. man from his resolution. taken from New York remedying Lin a h eraa- will confront our Nation in the very near I am not at all persuaded by the argu- the initiative in policy future. Specifically, Mr. Speaker, my ment that you cannot r ;oil progress. sus us inadequacy acy in our foreign a foreign t our legislation would establish certain limits Certainly we all are for progress. But making process. His efforts merit our of tolerance associated with the advent we cannot blindly state th --t we are for attention thoughtful joined the and solid from support. of the supersonic civil transport plane progress when we kn.w tY, -.t such grog- I ka[Mr. . LINDSAY] in fiemanling fr a om New now being developed by aircraft manu- ress can seriously impair t.e health and Yank [M resolution which, com- facturers in France and England and emotional stability o' greo numbers of panion reommtt , Foreign lestablishing being purchased by several American Americans. Nor can we v :y blindly we a Joint Committee on wuldf fill what lwhat is airlines. Similar efforts to develop a are for progress when we -'c faced with tion now and Iing holece, would ns supersonic transport are now underway the prospect of seeing '-.ire belts of now a gaping htle in the congressional in the United States. destruction criss-cr>ssini- the United mechan At policy. the formulation for- This is a problem which we no longer States from sonic booms - nerated by mien policy. n present, by can ignore. I have introduced this leg- supersonic aircraft. matters are haves dled On both OfCap- islation at this particular time, in order It is my belief, that ut,ie ss Congress Hi committees confusion d but omis- to give airplane manufacturers both in deals with this subsect ratter at this sev'p itol i Hill. Not result from t s duet decentral- our own country and abroad ample op- time, we may conceivably c such havoc sion well peer from Oproposals, propags, portunity to make sufficient changes in wrought upon this i;ount -v from sonic wintelligence or the design of their powerplants to avoid booms that millions of d Al%trs in dam- which ch of would supervision. apply lyto to any Our information agency, not only the CIA, future distress to millions of Americans. age to property and a serious threat to The supersonic jet powerplant of the the health of many of o,r people may would remedy this situation. future must be developed and designed ensue. First, the proposed feint committee with appropriate consideration for noise My bill limits so'iic b,,o n overpres- would must have give Congress the machinery it abatement. sures not to exceed 15 poi hats per square Its must of the te Nation's intelli- or the oversight t of intThis is far-reaching legislation, But foot on the ground lirect , beneath the genre activities. The present lack of I submit, Mr. Speaker, that we can no flight path. Approved For Release 2006/07/06: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600110011-8 Approved For Release 2006/07/06: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600110011-8 14272 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE Augicsr 15 The best available information on be developed with no consideration being sting requirements which will control the sonic booms indicates that anything un- given to noise abatement. noise levels of aircraft operating in and out der 1 pound per square foot in overpres- There is no logical reason why the de- of Ban Francisco International Airport. sure- by a supersonic aircraft flying at velopment of supersonic air transports Mr. Speaker, I should like to call par- an altitude of 70,000 feet creates no dam- for civilian use must be based on some ticular attention to the statement which age to ground structures and no signifi- foolish notion that -a race exists between Indicates that supersonic aircraft are ex- cant public reaction. Anything under developer nations. I am more interested pected to create a noise level approxi- 1.5 pounds per square foot in overpres- in which nation will be first to develop a mately 16 decibels higher than now sure creates no damage to ground struc- supersonic civilian transport which meets being experienced by American subsonic tures but does produce some probability the standards of noise abatement rather jet aircraft. This is incredible. This of public reaction to moderate sonic than which nation develops a supersonic 16 decibel increase is like firing a cannon booms. Overpressures between 1.5. transport which will actually knock the next to a 22-caliber rifle. I submit that pounds per square foot and 2 pounds per world's brains out with deafening noise. if Congress fails to adopt this legisla- square foot produce significant public I am convinced the nation which develops tion or some similar restrictions on the reaction day and night but no damage to a relatively quiet supersonic transport degree of noise level which we will toler- ground structures. - will ultimately get most of the world's ate &t our major airfields from super- I hope my colleagues from the rural business. sonic aircraft, wewill be creating an ab- areas will take into account the fact that The city of San Francisco recently rec- solutely inhuman situation for thou- sonic booms which create significant ognized the tremendous noise problems sands upon thousands of families living public reaction day and night - in this that supersonic air transports will pro- in the vicinity of America's major air- category will also have significant re- duce. Belford Brown, manager of the fields. I submit, Mr. Speaker, that a action on farm livestock. San Francisco International Airport, in 16-decibel increase over the present level Overpressures exceeding 2 pounds per a letter dated July 18, 1963, to Mr. Robert of noise generated by a landing jet, will square foot but under 3 pounds per Murray, Jr., vice president of Pan Amer- create conditions which will be com- square foot at an altitude of 70,000 feet ican World Airways, stated San Francis- plenty unbearable to the human ear create damage to glass and plaster and co's concern regarding the supersonic and brain. I submit this situation, if produce widespread public reaction day aircraft noise problem. This letter true, could have serious psychological and night. Overpressures exceeding 3 should be of particular interest since San effects on vast numbers of Americans. pounds per square foot produce wide- Francisco has in the past adhered to a Subsonic jets now operating In this spread window and plaster damage, mi- policy of no operational restrictions on country produce noise levels both on de- nor structural damage to frame and air carriers. walls, and profound public reaction. Mr. Brown wrote as follows: thetme and arrival human artolerance close r- The U.S. Air Force can produce signif- Recent per- publications within the air trans- ceived noise decibels. To To permit the icant figures showing damage claims portation industry and nationwide news- operation of supersonic transports which paid by our Government for losses due to Wpaper orld reporting indicate that Pan American will produce noise 16 decibels higher sonic booms created by our military air- Airways Is contemplating the pur- craft. You will note that my bill does chase of Concorde supersonic commercial than now being experienced by Ameri- not apply to military aircraft. because transports which have been developed by can subsonic jet aircraft is, in my judg- ot can apply certainly recognize the fact that the Anglo-French combine. The airport ment, Mr. Speaker, to Invite disaster for department at San Francisco understands large segments of our American popula- in the area of national defense, we must from the planners of one European super- tion. be prepared to suffer some discomfort. sonic airport that the landing configura- I submit, Mr. Speaker, this is a prob- Furthermore, the Air Force has car- tion of this particular aircraft Is such that lem which must be dealt with by the ried on an intensive program of rigid con- it is expected to create a noise level ap- trol in the production of sonic booms so proximately 16 decibels higher than now Federal Government. It is not fair to that every effort has been made to keep being experienced by American subsonic jet lea leave the a the individual airports of Amer- the damage to a minimum. I am sure aircraft. responsibility of developing their this will not be the case when aair- As president of the San Francisco Sound own respective standards. private Abatement Center you are aware of the noise Such a policy could bring about a wide lines begin competing against each other problems and community resistance to the with supersonic air transports. airport's operation at San Francisco Inter- divergence of rules and regulations and The other part of my proposal today national Airport and of the legal actions standards which could affect the entire would prohibit flights of civil supersonic now pending and in the hands of our legal configuration of air travel in America. I aircraft into or out of U.S. airports un- counsel. You are also aware that San Fran- believe in fairness to all themajor air- less it can be demonstrated that ground cisoo International Airport has never insti- fields of this Nation. The Congress noise generated by such d that gr and tuted an operational restriction on the air should establish one uniform standard. raft i suastntiall lowerpersonic than that carriers of aircraft operating into and out This would insure against unnecessary of San Francisco International Airport. We economic pressures upon the individual generated by present long-range sub- have relied wholly upon - our preferential sonic jet aircraft. runway systems, airport runway extensions, airport operators. At first blush this may seem like a and community enlightenment on noise Mr. Speaker, this is a matter which harsh and unreasonable proposal, but through the sound abatement center. we can no longer ignore. Continental I hope those who would criticize this on July 9, 1963, the Public Utilities Com- Airlines recently signed a $30 million- proposal will take into consideration the mission of the City and County of San plus contract to purchase three British- fact that we are now only on the tFrancisco passed Resolution No. 23074 (copy French mach 2.2 jet airliners which, hold that development of supersonic thres- es attached hereto) setting forth the city's of- when delivered, will provide the first airframes and velop lants. Unlike the filial position concerning supersonic trans- supersonic service within the United ortss , it should states be (1) that development of the subsonic jet trans- surtPersonic jet transports, able to o States. These supersonic transports port, which was developed in the first in- operate from the existing and currently would be capable of flying from Los stance as part of the military defense planned major civil air terminals; (2) that Angeles to Chicago in less than 2 hours. system when no consideration was given the design of these transports should re- This is the second supersonic air to noise levels in the development of quire no greater landing or takeoff distances transport order placed by an American powerplants, in the development of than present-day subsonic jet aircraft; and (3) that the ground level noise firm. Pan American World. Airways'or- supersonic powerplants we have time and created by supersonic jet transports should be no great- dered six similar planes for use on its we know from experience the necessity er in the airport environs than the levels oversee routes. for taking noise into consideration in the now being experienced. It is estimated that the first Concord development of such powerplants. ' ' The purpose of this communication is to ordered by Continental should make its This legislation is designed to put the advise Pan American World Airways of the maiden flight in 1966, with delivery date whole airplane industry, both in the city's official position in this matter, and in 1969. The Concord is a joint venture ,.to If United States and in other nations of the in h this comm u u ica nication you that h fnois schar- between France's Sud Aviation and Eng- world, on notice that the people of the acter co acistics of the Concorde e axe e noise correct, w correct, w e land's British Aircraft Corp. It will United States do not intend to perpetuate will have to forgo our previous policy and carry 104 passengers at speeds up to the folly of permitting air transports to give serious consideration to imposing oper- 1,450 miles per hour. Approved For Release 2006/07/06: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600110011-8 Approved For Release 2006/07/06: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600110011-8 Approved For Release 2006/07/06: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600110011-8