SENATOR MCCARTHY'S RESOLUTION ON THE CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00364R000600160022-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2006
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: January 26, 1966
• Content Type: OPEN

Approved For Release 2006/10/10: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600160022-1
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE Jai -uar- .26, 1966
His column which appeared in this
morning's Washington Post, entitled
"Well, What Can He Do?" is illustrative
of the" enlightened character of his com-
ments.
I ask unanimous consent that this col-
umn be printed at the conclusion of my
remarks.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
out of a hat. It is a formula or liquidating
a mistake, for ending a war that cannot be
won at any tolerable price, for cutting our
losses before they escalate into bankruptcy,
and for listening to commonsense rather
than to war whoops and tomtoms.
Because we are neither omniscient nor om-
nipotent, we. even we Americans, cannot al-
ways win. But I cannot help feeling in my
bones that a display of commonsense by a
proud and imperious nation would be a good
moral inve..tn.ent for the future.
[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Jan. 25, ' _
19661 SENATOR 'McCARTHY'S RESOLU-
TODAY AND TOMORROW: WELL, WHAT CAN HE ;TON ON THE CIA
Do?
(By Walter Lippmann )
The reason why the peace offensive failed
is most cogently revealed in the Mansfield
report on the state of the war. Mr. Johnson
has been trying to obtain by propaganda
the victory which he has not been able to
obtain on the battlefield-that is to say, the
acceptance in the whole of South Vietnam
of a government which has lost control of a
very large part of South Vietnam. The peace
offensive was bound to fail, and the grave
decisions which the President hoped to cir-
cumvent and avoid are now before him.
If he is to make these decisions wisely, he
must recognize that in international politics
peace settlements are possible only as and
when they reflect the real balance of power.
In the World War, for example, Churchill and
Roosevelt had to settle with Stalin for a
Soviet political frontier in the midst of Ger-
many and of Europe. That is where the
Red army had arrived when the peace nego-
tiations began. The same principle will hold
in Vietnam. There will be no settlement
until the terms of peace reflect the military
reality.
The President will be disappointed again
and again as long as he and Secretary Rusk
ask for a settlement which in effect demands
that the defeat of the Saigon forces be
transmuted at the conference table into a
victory for the Saigon forces. Nor should
he indulge in any illusion that the informed
opinion of mankind really thinks as Secretary
Rusk talks merely because American envoys
have been politely and sympathetically re-
ceived in so many capitals.
What then should the President do? It is
often said by the President's supporters that
his critics propose no alternative to what he
is doing. If that was ever true, it is no longer
true today. It is not true since the Mans-
Yield report and since the Gavin statement.
The President should reduce his war aims,
which today are impossibly high in the light
of the conditions described In the Mansfield
report. He should alter his strategy along
the lines proposed by General Gavin, making
it a holding operation pending the eventual
negotiation of a political settlement.
The Mansfield report shows that Mr. Rusk's
objective-the rule of General Ky or his suc-
cessor over the whole of South Vietnam-is
unattainable no matter how much the war is
escalated. The burden of disproving the
conclusions of the Mansfield report is on
those who have been. proved wrong about the
escalation of last summer, on those who are
now asking for another escalation in order
toredeem their failure, on those who want
to redouble the stakes in order to recoup their
losses.
If the Mansfield report contains the truth
of the matter, it follows Inevitably that our
war aims should be reduced and our strategy
revised. We should put aside the hopeless
task of searching out and destroying the
Vietcong, and we should take our stand, as
General Gavin advises, on a holding opera-
tion in the coastal cities.
This is not a policy for a glorious victory
or for some kind of dazzling political
.triumph. It is no trick for pulling rabbits
Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, on
Monday Senator MCCARTIY offered a
Senate resolution (S. Res. 210) providing
for "a full and complete study with re-
spect to the effects of the operations
and activities of the Central Intelligence
Agency upon the foreign relations of the
United States." Under the resolution,
this task would be undertaken by the
Foreign Relations Committee or an au-
thorized subcommittee, and report would
be made by January 31, 1966.
On Sunday the Washington Post pre-
sented an editorial commenting on the
McCarthy proposal and his intention to
offer the resolution. The editorial lifts
up and comments on the point that the
CIA has attained very great importance
"as a factor in the formulation and
execution of foreign policy."
As the editorial notes, the question
whose study is called for does not deal
with the more controversial question of
whether or not the CIA should be in-
volved in formulating or carrying out
foreign policy, but with "the effects of
its operations" on our foreign relations.
This is a proper sphere for concern
of the Foreign Relations Committee.
The area marked out by the resolution
is not in conflict with that which is pres-
ently under jurisdiction of Armed Serv-
ices and Appropriations Subcommittees.
This, too, the Washington Post editorial
points out.
I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Presi-
dent, that the item to which I have re-
ferred may appear in the CONGRESSIONAL
RECORD.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Jan. 23,
r'OC,61
C AGILe:xa AND CIA
Senator EUGENE MCCARTHY has announced
that he intends to seek Senate authoriza-
tion for an investigation of the impact of
the CIA on U.S. foreign policy. The mecha-
nism for this would be a new subcommittee
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on the CIA or-should the Senate prefer-a
broader select committee. This is not the
first attempt to bring the CIA under con-
gressional surveillance. At the time of his
death, the late Brien McMahon had Indi-
cated his intention to work for a Joint Con-
gressional Committee on Central Intelligence
as a followup to his successful fight to estab-
lish the Joint committee on Atomic Energy.
Majority Leader MANSFIELD .:nd his 34 co-
sponsors envisa2:cci just such a joint com-
mittee in their ill-fated 1956 resolution; and
Senator MCCARTHY himself has kept the is-
sue alive since. But the present move is
unprecedented in its sharp focus on the im-
portance of the CIA as a factor in the formu-
lation and execution of foreign policy.
There can be little Coubt a c the institu-
tionalized growth of the int il.gence arm of
our Government during the a, dd war years
has impinged to a very great ,a. tent on what
has traditionally been the eclusive sphere
of the State Department. Te CIA's experts
in Saigon or Santo Domingo a sess many of
the some matters th;.t pre ai upy embassy
political officers, and Its ope' t-ves necessar-
ily stir up dark waters that a Ii--,Iomat might
prefer to leave undisturbed. It hale on paper
the CIA answers to the Amb. s.idor in a for-
eign capital, in case rfter c.:a the tall has
wagged the dog. Presilent Ii.:n aedy's Execu-
tive order of May 1961, rea: r,aing the au-
thority of the Arnbassrdor, h a iad relatively
little practical meaning.
Senator MCCARTHY d1oes si inter directly
into the controversy over wn'cr.er or not the
new power of the CIA is a d _sirable and in-
deed unavoidable response t. new kind of
global political contest. His -oucern appears
to be primarily that this poa ?r be made sub-
ject to congressional restr; :res-and that
the committees of Congress cea.ing with for-
eign policy have a central pl: e in overseeing
the CIA.
The establishment of thi t roposed sub-
committee would be a des a )le first step
indicating a recognition by C n;ress that the
Foreign Relations Conmuttec has a proper
interest In the affairs of the C.A. Both the
Armed Services and Appropr --.tons Commit-
tees have long had :.ubcon a ttees on the
CIA, and these bodies nov I old informal
joint meetings with CIA ofli,'as at irregular
Intervals in which the Fi c en Relations
Committee should be riven : voice. Beyond
this, the work of the new :..beommittee in
examining the record of the C -A could be a
valuable guide for future c a Iressional ac-
tion, though It shout I be s ,1 -evident that
this examination would have :C be conducted
under ground rules n.it nor: to ly acceptable
to Congress.
REPORT ON SOUTH iMERICA-
TRIBUTE TO JACK HO _)1) VAUGHN
Mr. HARRIS. M.t Pre: d ant, last No-
vember, during the inter n the distin-
guished Senator from :I diana [Mr.
BAYfH] and I made an ex .a'rsive tour of
South America. We visi ?c. four coun-
tries-Peru, Argel.tina. -3razil, arid
Chile-and in each one ;A sought in-
formation on the econor v the people,
and the government. A ;e, we sought
to check on the effectiver. 's:; of our pro-
grams involving Latin Ai le,aica, seeking
guidance on matters whi('1 will be com-
ing before the Senate.
Among the highlights f our 3-week
trip, as far as I am cone(: red, were our
visits with the Pee cc Ct its volunteers
and the opportun.ty tc vatch them
working among the pc: pie of Latin
America in the fields and vi lages and in
the crowded slum acetic :s of some of
the cities. I was -leepl} i repressed by
the dedication, the intelli 'eace, and the
ability of these Anti rican s ho are serv-
ing the cause of human y in faraway
places. The Peace Corn. .'olunteers, I
discovered, are in c.ose cc a: act with the
people, are trusted and :e ;pected, and
have a real feeling of th ' conditions in
the countries where they ai ve. -
Before making the S! u h American
trip, I was briefed by Jacl. h ood Vaughn,
who then served at Assi:..aat Secretary
of State for Inter-t_meric ar. Affairs and
U.S. Coordinator of th Alliance for
Progress. Mr. Vau;thn is cc Talented and
dedicated administrator, n3 the insight
I gained from our visit w most helpful
Approved For Release 2006/10/10: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600160022-1