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December 21, 2016
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October 6, 2006
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January 26, 1966
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Approved For Release 2006/10/10: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600160022-1 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE Jai -uar- .26, 1966 His column which appeared in this morning's Washington Post, entitled "Well, What Can He Do?" is illustrative of the" enlightened character of his com- ments. I ask unanimous consent that this col- umn be printed at the conclusion of my remarks. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: out of a hat. It is a formula or liquidating a mistake, for ending a war that cannot be won at any tolerable price, for cutting our losses before they escalate into bankruptcy, and for listening to commonsense rather than to war whoops and tomtoms. Because we are neither omniscient nor om- nipotent, we. even we Americans, cannot al- ways win. But I cannot help feeling in my bones that a display of commonsense by a proud and imperious nation would be a good moral for the future. [From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Jan. 25, ' _ 19661 SENATOR 'McCARTHY'S RESOLU- TODAY AND TOMORROW: WELL, WHAT CAN HE ;TON ON THE CIA Do? (By Walter Lippmann ) The reason why the peace offensive failed is most cogently revealed in the Mansfield report on the state of the war. Mr. Johnson has been trying to obtain by propaganda the victory which he has not been able to obtain on the battlefield-that is to say, the acceptance in the whole of South Vietnam of a government which has lost control of a very large part of South Vietnam. The peace offensive was bound to fail, and the grave decisions which the President hoped to cir- cumvent and avoid are now before him. If he is to make these decisions wisely, he must recognize that in international politics peace settlements are possible only as and when they reflect the real balance of power. In the World War, for example, Churchill and Roosevelt had to settle with Stalin for a Soviet political frontier in the midst of Ger- many and of Europe. That is where the Red army had arrived when the peace nego- tiations began. The same principle will hold in Vietnam. There will be no settlement until the terms of peace reflect the military reality. The President will be disappointed again and again as long as he and Secretary Rusk ask for a settlement which in effect demands that the defeat of the Saigon forces be transmuted at the conference table into a victory for the Saigon forces. Nor should he indulge in any illusion that the informed opinion of mankind really thinks as Secretary Rusk talks merely because American envoys have been politely and sympathetically re- ceived in so many capitals. What then should the President do? It is often said by the President's supporters that his critics propose no alternative to what he is doing. If that was ever true, it is no longer true today. It is not true since the Mans- Yield report and since the Gavin statement. The President should reduce his war aims, which today are impossibly high in the light of the conditions described In the Mansfield report. He should alter his strategy along the lines proposed by General Gavin, making it a holding operation pending the eventual negotiation of a political settlement. The Mansfield report shows that Mr. Rusk's objective-the rule of General Ky or his suc- cessor over the whole of South Vietnam-is unattainable no matter how much the war is escalated. The burden of disproving the conclusions of the Mansfield report is on those who have been. proved wrong about the escalation of last summer, on those who are now asking for another escalation in order toredeem their failure, on those who want to redouble the stakes in order to recoup their losses. If the Mansfield report contains the truth of the matter, it follows Inevitably that our war aims should be reduced and our strategy revised. We should put aside the hopeless task of searching out and destroying the Vietcong, and we should take our stand, as General Gavin advises, on a holding opera- tion in the coastal cities. This is not a policy for a glorious victory or for some kind of dazzling political .triumph. It is no trick for pulling rabbits Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, on Monday Senator MCCARTIY offered a Senate resolution (S. Res. 210) providing for "a full and complete study with re- spect to the effects of the operations and activities of the Central Intelligence Agency upon the foreign relations of the United States." Under the resolution, this task would be undertaken by the Foreign Relations Committee or an au- thorized subcommittee, and report would be made by January 31, 1966. On Sunday the Washington Post pre- sented an editorial commenting on the McCarthy proposal and his intention to offer the resolution. The editorial lifts up and comments on the point that the CIA has attained very great importance "as a factor in the formulation and execution of foreign policy." As the editorial notes, the question whose study is called for does not deal with the more controversial question of whether or not the CIA should be in- volved in formulating or carrying out foreign policy, but with "the effects of its operations" on our foreign relations. This is a proper sphere for concern of the Foreign Relations Committee. The area marked out by the resolution is not in conflict with that which is pres- ently under jurisdiction of Armed Serv- ices and Appropriations Subcommittees. This, too, the Washington Post editorial points out. I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Presi- dent, that the item to which I have re- ferred may appear in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: [From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Jan. 23, r'OC,61 C AGILe:xa AND CIA Senator EUGENE MCCARTHY has announced that he intends to seek Senate authoriza- tion for an investigation of the impact of the CIA on U.S. foreign policy. The mecha- nism for this would be a new subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the CIA or-should the Senate prefer-a broader select committee. This is not the first attempt to bring the CIA under con- gressional surveillance. At the time of his death, the late Brien McMahon had Indi- cated his intention to work for a Joint Con- gressional Committee on Central Intelligence as a followup to his successful fight to estab- lish the Joint committee on Atomic Energy. Majority Leader MANSFIELD .:nd his 34 co- sponsors envisa2:cci just such a joint com- mittee in their ill-fated 1956 resolution; and Senator MCCARTHY himself has kept the is- sue alive since. But the present move is unprecedented in its sharp focus on the im- portance of the CIA as a factor in the formu- lation and execution of foreign policy. There can be little Coubt a c the institu- tionalized growth of the int il.gence arm of our Government during the a, dd war years has impinged to a very great ,a. tent on what has traditionally been the eclusive sphere of the State Department. Te CIA's experts in Saigon or Santo Domingo a sess many of the some matters th;.t pre ai upy embassy political officers, and Its ope' t-ves necessar- ily stir up dark waters that a Ii--,Iomat might prefer to leave undisturbed. It hale on paper the CIA answers to the Amb. s.idor in a for- eign capital, in case rfter c.:a the tall has wagged the dog. Presilent Ii.:n aedy's Execu- tive order of May 1961, rea: r,aing the au- thority of the Arnbassrdor, h a iad relatively little practical meaning. Senator MCCARTHY d1oes si inter directly into the controversy over wn' or not the new power of the CIA is a d _sirable and in- deed unavoidable response t. new kind of global political contest. His -oucern appears to be primarily that this poa ?r be made sub- ject to congressional restr; :res-and that the committees of Congress with for- eign policy have a central pl: e in overseeing the CIA. The establishment of thi t roposed sub- committee would be a des a )le first step indicating a recognition by C n;ress that the Foreign Relations Conmuttec has a proper interest In the affairs of the C.A. Both the Armed Services and Appropr --.tons Commit- tees have long had :.ubcon a ttees on the CIA, and these bodies nov I old informal joint meetings with CIA ofli,'as at irregular Intervals in which the Fi c en Relations Committee should be riven : voice. Beyond this, the work of the new :..beommittee in examining the record of the C -A could be a valuable guide for future c a Iressional ac- tion, though It shout I be s ,1 -evident that this examination would have :C be conducted under ground rules nor: to ly acceptable to Congress. REPORT ON SOUTH iMERICA- TRIBUTE TO JACK HO _)1) VAUGHN Mr. HARRIS. M.t Pre: d ant, last No- vember, during the inter n the distin- guished Senator from :I diana [Mr. BAYfH] and I made an ex .a'rsive tour of South America. We visi ?c. four coun- tries-Peru, Argel.tina. -3razil, arid Chile-and in each one ;A sought in- formation on the econor v the people, and the government. A ;e, we sought to check on the effectiver. 's:; of our pro- grams involving Latin Ai le,aica, seeking guidance on matters whi('1 will be com- ing before the Senate. Among the highlights f our 3-week trip, as far as I am cone(: red, were our visits with the Pee cc Ct its volunteers and the opportun.ty tc vatch them working among the pc: pie of Latin America in the fields and vi lages and in the crowded slum acetic :s of some of the cities. I was -leepl} i repressed by the dedication, the intelli 'eace, and the ability of these Anti rican s ho are serv- ing the cause of human y in faraway places. The Peace Corn. .'olunteers, I discovered, are in c.ose cc a: act with the people, are trusted and :e ;pected, and have a real feeling of th ' conditions in the countries where they ai ve. - Before making the S! u h American trip, I was briefed by Jacl. h ood Vaughn, who then served at Assi:..aat Secretary of State for Inter-t_meric ar. Affairs and U.S. Coordinator of th Alliance for Progress. Mr. Vau;thn is cc Talented and dedicated administrator, n3 the insight I gained from our visit w most helpful Approved For Release 2006/10/10: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600160022-1