SENATOR MCCARTHY'S RESOLU-TION ON THE CIA

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CIA-RDP71B00364R000600170089-7
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RIFPUB
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K
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1
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 27, 2006
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89
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Publication Date: 
January 26, 1966
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OPEN
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Approved For Release 2006/11/27: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600170089-7 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE Javtuarti 6, 1966 His column which appeared in this Out of a hat. It is a formula for liquidating morning's Washington Post, entitled a mistake, for ending a war that cannot be "Well, What Can He Do?" is illustrative won at any tolerable price, for cutting our of the enlightened character of his com- losses before they escalate into bankruptcy, and for listening to commonsense rather ments. than to war whoops and tomtoms. I ask unanimous consent that this col- Because we are neither omniscient nor om- umn be printed at the conclusion of my nipotent, we, even we Americans, cannot al- remarks. ways win. But I cannot help feeling in my There being no objection, the article bones that a display of commonsense by a proud and imperious nation would be a good d in the RECORD int d d t b , e pr e ere o was or as follows' moral investment for the future. [From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Jan. 25, ---1'~ 1966] SENATOR McCARTHY'S RESOLU- TODAY AND TOMORROW: WELL, WHAT. CAN HE TION ON THE CIA Do? Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, on (By Walter Lippmann) Monday 210) offered a The reason, why the peace offensive failed Senator (S. Res. MCCARTHY is most cogently revealed in the Mansfield Senate resolution (SS. Res. providing report on the state of the war. Mr. Johnson for "a full and complete study with re- has been trying to obtain by propaganda spect to the effects of the operations the victory which he has not been able to and activities of the Central Intelligence obtain on the battlefield-that Is to say, the Agency upon the foreign relations of the acceptance in the whole of South Vietnam United States." Under the resolution, of a government which has lost control of a this task would be undertaken by the very large part of South Vietnam. The peace Foreign Relations Committee or an au- offensive was bound to fail, and the grave thorized subcommittee, and report would decisions which the President hoped to cir- curnvent and avoid are now before him. be made by January 31, 1966. If he is to make these decisions wisely, he On Sunday the Washington Post pre- must recognize that in international politics sented an editorial commenting on the peace settlements are possible only as and McCarthy proposal and his intention to when they reflect the real balance of power. offer the resolution. The editorial lifts In the World War, for example, Churchill and up and comments on the point that the Roosevelt had to settle with Stalin for a CIA has attained very great importance Soviet political frontier in the midst of Ger- many and of Europe. That is where the "as a factor in the formulation and Red army had arrived when the peace nego- execution of foreign policy." tiations began. The same principle will hold As the editorial notes, the question in Vietnam. There will be no settlement whose study is called for does not deal until the terms of peace reflect the military with the more controversial question of reality. whether or not the CIA should be in- The President will be disappointed again volved in formulating or carrying out and again as long as he and Secretary Rusk foreign policy, but with "the effects of ask for a settlement which in effect demands that the defeat of the Saigon forces be its operations" on our foreign relations. transmuted at the conference table Into a This is a proper sphere for concern victory for the Saigon forces. Nor should of the Foreign Relations Committee. he indulge in any illusion that the informed The area marked out by the resolution opinion of mankind really thinks as Secretary is not in conflict with that which is pres- Rusk talks merely because American envoys ently under jurisdiction of Armed Serv- have been politely and sympathetically re- ices and Appropriations Subcommittees, ceived in so many capitals. This, too, the Washington Post editorial What then should the President do? It is often said by the President's supporters that points out. his critics propose no alternative to what he I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Presi- Is doing. If that was ever true, it is no longer dent, that the item to which I have re- true today. It IS not true since the Mans- ferred may appear in the CONGRESSIONAL field report and since the Gavin statement. RECORD. The President should reduce his war aims, which today are impossibly high in the light There being no objection, the editorial of the conditions described in the Mansfield was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, report. He should alter his strategy along as follows: the lines proposed by General Gavin, making [From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Jan. 23, it a holding operation pending the eventual 1966] negotiation of a political settlement. Coxesrss AND CIA The Mansfield report shows that Mr. Rusk's Senator EUGeNE MCCARTHY has announced objective-the rule of General Ky or his suc- that he intends to seek Senate authoriza- cessor over the whole of South Vietnam-is tion for an investigation of the impact of unattainable no matter how much the war is the CIA on U.S. foreign policy. The mecha- escalated. The burden of disproving the nism for this would be a new subcommittee conclusions of the Mansfield report is on of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee those who have been proved wrong about the on the CIA or-should the Senate prefer-a escalation of last summer, on those who are broader select committee. This is not the now asking for another escalation in order first attempt to bring the CIA under con- to redeem their failure, on those who want gressional surveillance. At the time of his to redouble the stakes in order to recoup their death, the late Brien McMahon had indi- losses. cated his intention to work for Joint Con- If the Mansfield report contains the truth gressional Committee on CentralaIntelligence of the matter, it follows inevitably that our as a followup to his successful fight to estab- war aims should be reduced and our strategy Ilsh the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. revised. We should put aside the hopeless Majority Leader MANSFIELD and his 34 co- task of searching out and destroying the sponsors envisaged just such a joint com- Vietcong, and we should take our stand, as mlttee in their ill-fated 1956 resolution; and Claneral Gavin advises, on a holding opera- Senator McCAnTIY himself has kept the is- tion in the coastal cities, sue alive since. But the present move is This is not a policy for & glorious victory unprecedented in its sharp focus on the im- or for some kind of dazzling political portance of the CIA as a factor in the formu- triumph. It is no trick for pulling rabbits lation and execution of foreign policy. There can be little doubt that the institu- tionalized growth of the int :lligence arm of our Government during the cold war years has impinged to a very great extent on what has traditionally been the , xciusive sphere of the State Department. Tie CIA's experts in Saigon or Santo Domingr assess many of the same matters that pre.' -upy embassy political officers, and its operatives necessar- ily stir up dark waters that a diplomat might prefer to leave undisturbed. While on paper the CIA answers to the Ambssador in a for- eign capital, in case after c se the tail has wagged the dog. President Kennedy's Execu- tive order of May 1961, reailirming the au- thority of the Ambassador, hLs had relatively little practical meaning. Senator MCCARTHY does not enter directly into the controversy over whether or not the new power of the CIA is a desirable and in- deed unavoidable response to a new kind of global political contest. His concern appears to be primarily that this power be made sub- ject to congressional restr ints-and that the committees of Congress resting with for- eign policy have a central pl:,ce in overseeing the CIA. The establishment of the proposed sub- committee would be a desirable first step indicating a recognition by Congress that the Foreign Relations Committ, o has a proper Interest in the affairs of the CIA. Both the Armed Services and Appropr ations Commit- tees have long had subcommittees on the CIA, and these bodies nov hold informal joint meetings with CIA offie-ials at irregular intervals In which the F:,reign Relations Committee should be given . voice. Beyond this, the work of the new aibcommittee in examining the record of the CIA could be a valuable guide for future congressional ac- tion, though it should be self-evident that this examination would have to be conducted under ground rules not normally acceptable to Congress. REPORT ON SOUTH AMERICA- TRIBUTE TO JACK HOOD VAUGHN Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Presddent, last No- vember, during the interim, the distin- guished Senator from Indiana [Mr. BAYI3] and I made an extensive tour of South America. We visied four coun- tries-Peru, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile-and in each one we sought in- formation on the economy, the people, and the government. Also, we sought to check on the effectivei ess of our pro- grams involving Latin America, seeking guidance on matters which will be com- ing before the Senate. - Among the highlights of our 3-week trip, as far as I am cons eited, were our visits with the Peace Corps volunteers and the opportunity to watch them working among the people of Latin America in the fields and villages and in the crowded slum sections of some of the cities. I was deeply impressed by the dedication, the intelligence, and the ability of these American 3 who are serv- ing the cause of humanity in faraway places. The Peace Cori-s volunteers, I discovered, are in close contact with the people, are trusted and respected, and have a real feeling of the conditions in the countries where they serve. Before making the South American trip, I was briefed by Jack Rood Vaughn, who then served as Asst: tent Secretary of State for Inter-snleri?-,3'1 Affairs and U.S. Coordinator of th ~ Alliance for Progress. Mr. Vaughn is a talented and Approved For Release 2006/11/27: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600170089-7