UNESCO NATIONAL POLICY PAPER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00529R000100050006-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 11, 2000
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 26, 1968
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2001/08/2
2 6 MAR 1968
I DD/ST
Richard Re1th
CSI :
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Approv fo a 2001/08/28: CIA-RAP TI 00@1080 6 ,I,e (UNESCO
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SUGGESTED CHANGES TO THE NATIONAL POLICY PAPER ON UNESCO
1. We suggest revision of the first section of page
19 as follows:
"Within the more recent past, open antagonism
among these factions has partially subsided.
Blatant Soviet a22aratch3ks and professional
polemicists have boon replaced in some cases by
more serious scholars and scientists. Communist
representatives continue to champion resolutions
on behalf of 'peace' and 'disarmament,' but they
have also been more forthcoming by joining other
member states, including the U.S., in sponsoring
and participating in specific projects, notably
in the exact sciences. Presently, an atmosphere
close to a de facto detente prevails.
"While UNESCO most certainly benefits from
this uncertain lull in Communist cold war propa-
ganda, there is no reason to believe that the
objectives of Soviet intelligence regarding
UNESCO have changed. There remains a significant
percentage of identified intelligence officers
in UNESCO Secretariat and Delegation positions
and we can assume there are others as yet uniden-
tified. We note, for example, that the linguistic
and professional competence level of many Soviet
employees of the Secretariat is rather low.
Inattention and indifference toward their UNESCO
jobs are traits commonly manifested by certain
of them, suggesting that their UNESCO job may
serve as cover for other interests. Moreover,
in the prevailing and inherently desirable atmos-
phere of detente, these officers have greater ease
of association with American and Western scientists
and other intellectuals for intelligence purposes.
Increased participation in specific projects,
particularly when such projects take place in
Western and less developed countries, offers
excellent cover for travel to these areas.
Approved For Release 2001/0"f-RDP71B00529R000100050006-3
 Approved For ele sa 2Q01/08/28 :.CIA-RDP7.B~ OO.529ROO0100050006-3
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tJn short, it must be recognized that Soviet
intelligence exploitation of UNESCO remains a
reality despite the present Soviet tactical
attitude with regard to the functioning of the
organization. This circumstance need not, however,
prevent our taking advantage of that tactical
attitude in the more effective pursuit of UNESCO
objectives."
2. We would suggest adding after the second sen-
tence of the second paragraph on page 18 the following:
"The various Communist front organizations
which have consultative status (WFTU, I \DL, WiDF)
have over the years been successful in increasing
their participation and have used UNESCO as an
excellent anti-U.S. political action vehicle to:
a. Raise political issues embarrassing to
the U.S. or on which it is vulnerable.,
b. Delay the normal workings of UNH.SCO,
and accord on programs between a
majority of participating countries,
by injection of extraneous, politically-
loaded issues.
C., Increase their international prestige,
particularly in prime Third World
target countries, by being selected
(and financed) by UNESCO to undertake
programs in those countries.
Operate under the cloak of respectability
by engaging in joint programs with non-
Communist organizations.
e. Use the UNESCO Secretariat as a propa-
ganda disseraination center."
Approved For Release 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP71B00529R000100050006-3
SECRET