(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00590R000100100001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 220
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 27, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1966
• Content Type: CABLE

Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : 91-R9P71B0059G i0010p001-
ihilti
elease Instructions On Fire*
Approi/ecl,,For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP71
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REF PARA 9. PLEASE FORWARD YOUR DRAWINGS 4AQ455, 6
20 REF PARA 12. HEADQUARTERS INTERESTED IN YOUR STOW
ON THE X-15 FACE PIATE HEAT SYSTEM. WOULD APPRECIATE BEING
CIWORMED ON YOUR CONCLUSIONS.
3, KEY PARA 15, PLEASE ADD INSTRUCTIONS FOR IAA BELT
LNSPECTION TO APPROPRIATE A-12 MANUAL
25X1A
AD/
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25X1A
5524
""7'(?;01'1F-WW0'41,4C; OFFIcEtts MAJOR USA
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Aproved For Reteate 12001/08/29 -: CIARDP-71-B00590R00010q1 wool -4 -
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Approved For eleaCti46611110121AESSMIDP71
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REF:
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1. DRAWINGS 4AQ455, 6 AND 7 IN MAIL TO YOU.
2. WILL COMPLY.
3. INSTRUCTIONS HAVE BEEN ADDED TO A-12 MANUAL 3 MARCH 1966
BY TDC 24, 25 AND 26*
4. SERVICE BULLETIN 1024 RELEASED FOR A.?12 WHICH PROVIDES
SPACERS REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 14 OF /425.
END OF MSG
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
SECRET
Approved For 'elease 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP7 BOO 0001-4
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
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TOR 1951Z 28 FEB 66
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r. 3794. DATED 18 FEB. 1966
Tu FROM: KELLY JOHNSON
FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF ADP ACTIONS AND COWNTS AS REWIRED
? REFERENCE. 11 15 UNDERSTOOD THAT TPESE ITEMS WILL RE
DISCUSSED IN GREATER DETAIL IN THE MEETINGS WITH 25X1A
5 MARCH.
, 1 DC NUMBER 5 REFLECTS REVISED FLIGHT OPERATING LIMITS
73i? THE SR-71 A IRCRAF7 TDC NIIMnFR 11 REFLECTS THE REVISED
InTS FOR THE SR-71B AIRCRAFT. CONTU UE CATEGORY I FLYING IS
,73ING CONDUCTED TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL fATA AS THE PASTS FOR FUTURE
:cPANSTON OF THE FL IG IT OPERATING ENVELOPE.
ADP RECOMMEND :3 FOR IMVEDIATE AND INTERIM USE EXPANDED
LSE OF THE PITCH TRIM INDICATOR LOCATED ON THE LOWER LEFT CENTER
AWARD INSTRUMENT PA VEL . THIS IS THE BEST AND MOST RELIABLE
'4,RECT INDICATION AVAILABLE TO THE PILOT AS TO ACTUAL AIRCRAFT
ONGITUDINAL STABILITY. INSTRUCTIONS OR THE MOST EFFECTIVE USE
r:0101.PA
SCRE , 1;1:4411Dil9 Faa
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wow OCiAlteRIUMO
Approved For Release 20Q1108/29 : CIA-RDP71B00590R000 eft=
,I,PRoDucTioN By uniaTi THAN Th ssuom FF10ES PRoliBITED. COPY PO.
: Tt,0
25XAOproved Fonaplease 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP716005940)00100100001-4
5.1x5 f!: ); IN 9I6 65 9
THE 7/3DICATGR ARE BEING EXPANDED IN i REVISION TO THE -1
i%Nr3.1:300K. FOR LONGER RANGE SOLUTION, WORK IS BEING ACCELERATED
-J.NDER EC,P- ON THE DIRECT READING CG INDIC;ATOR. WHICH IS A PART OF
TILE IMPROVED FUEL GAGING SYSTEM? THE IN.:.7ERCHANGEABLE TANK
TOE UNITS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED AND ARE 3EING QUALIFICATION TESTED
,DP. A COMPLETE SYSTEM FOR INSTALLATION ON CATEGORY I AIRCRAFT
'ITU BE AVAILABLE IN APRIL. PRODUCT ION AND RETROFIT EQUIPMENT
j....7VERIES CAN BE AVAILABLE IN SEPTEMBER.
3. IN-FLIGHT CAPABILITY FOR FORWARD MOVEMENT OF FUEL
!7,XISTS IN PRESENT CONFIGURATION? TEST INSTALLATION IN CATEGORY I
...IRCRAFT PERMIT'S AFT FUEL, TRANSFER. OPERATIONAL USE OF AFT
'TRANSFER WOULD REQUIRE GREAT CARE TO AVOID INADVERTENT AFT CG
i,XCURSIONS. IN FACT, IT IS MY DEFINITE OPINION THAT USE OF AFT
RANSFER OF FUEL IS QUITE DANGEROUS AND WE HAVE AVOIDED IT
9EFINITELY FOR THIS REASON.
4. FOLDERS HAVE BEEN PREPARED FOR EACH ADP FLIGHT CREW
MEMBER AND THESE WILL BE MAINTAINED AND UTILIZED IN TH.E FUTURE
FOR STANDARDIZATION AND EVALUATION PURPOSES.
5,, THE FUEL SCHEDULING FOR VARIOUS PAYLOADS IS OBTAINED BY
PROPER TANK FLOAT VALVE SELECTIONS TO THE "CHRISTMPS TREE"
511 ITCHES. CURRENT CATEGORY I FLIGHT TEST ACTIVITIES ARE BEING
ONDUCTED WITH MODIFICATIONS TO THE FUEI. SEQUENCINCi AND CONTROL
MTEM IN AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP MORE PRECISE CG CONTROL. THE
?ROGRESS OF THESE FLIGHT TESTS WILL 3E THE BASIS FOR
RECOMMENDATION OF FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS TO THE FUEL SCHEDULING
SYSTEM.
SERVICE BULLETINS R-212 AND R=298 ARE BEINU ACCOMPLISHED
Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP71600590R000100100001-4
7.E.CRET
2psoved Focupelease 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP71B005W000100100001-4
?)4'25 i P 7 T tki 9045
Aa AIRCRAFT TO IMPROVE THE RAFJC' W1,1ING RELIABILITY. A PROGRAM
INCORPORATING RELIABILITY IMPROVEMEATS IN THE INLET CONTROL
OMPUTER AND PRESSURE RATIO TRANSDUCERS WAS INITIATED PRIOR TO THE
AC:CYDENT, FLIGHT TESTS ARE EVALUATING TIE ADDITION OF ALPHA OR .G
r;OMPENSATING CIRCUITS TO INCREASE THE UAITART MARGIN IN MANEUVERS.
TAE CATEGORY I PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT WORK ON SPIKE AND BYPASS
7f;NEDULES WILL RESULT IN FUTURE RECOMMEUDATIONS FOR IMPROVED
AERODYNAMIC PERFORMANCE AND IMPROVED 1RCTART MARGIN.
THE R-12 FLIGHT LOADING SHEET W7LL BE REVISED TO PROVIDE
CROSS CHECK PROCEDURES AND ENTRY OF CALCULATIONS. THIS FLIGHT
LOADING SHEET IS A DEVELOPMENT FROM DD FORM 375F FOR THE SR-71
VEHICLE.
8. ADP HAS REVIEWED DD FORMS 829 AID 829-1 FOR ALL TEST AND
PRODUCTION AIRCRAFT TO INSURE THAT ENTRIES RELATED TO THE INLET
CONTROL SYSTEM ARE COMPLETE AND CURRENT,
,r- 9. APPROXIMATELY FIFTEEN BELTS WERF GIVEN STATIC AND
DYNAMIC STRENGTH TESTS. AN INCREASE TO STRENGTH OF APPROXIMATELY
FIFTEEN PERCENT CAN BE OBTAINED BY MINOF MODIFICATION:
A. REMOVE SHARP CORNERS FROM THE ROLLER BAR.
B. ADD RADIUS TO THE FLAT METAL FART OF THE 13UCKLE
WHERE THE ROLLER PUTS PRESSURE ON THE BELT.
INSURE THAT THE FLAT METAL POFTION OF THE BUCKLE IS
STRAIGHT AND PARALLEL TO THE ROLLER BAR.
D. ADD A THIN NYLON CLOTH LINER TO THE TOP SIDE OF THE
BELT TO REDUCE CUTTING.
IHESE CHANGES ARE SHOWN ON ADP DRAWINGS 4AQ455, 6, AND 7. THEY WILL
C'L: TRANSMITTED TO YOU FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND ACTION 1 AS THIS IS A
Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP71600590R000100100001-4
:_ ?_CR1.7 I
r.
=:E Pn;f21
ft
'UO; ON INCORPORATION SCHEDULED AT SERIAL 2017 RETROFIT KITS
ApOro4ea Forllapiease 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP71B0059W00100100001-4
r f
.TN
L. TIE STABILIZED .SEAT DEVELOPMENT TS CONTINUING. WITH
ATE UT HO R MED 0
TH-a: OXYGEN HOSES WILL BE PEWNED FROM THE FR0N7 OF THE
SljIT AS A PART OF THE SUTT IMPROVEMENr cHANGES COORDKNATED UTTH THE
STABILIZED SEAT CHANGE,
12. ADP IS CURRENTLY INVESTIGATIO0 THE )(1.5 FACE PLATE HEAT
SYIZEM. THE RESULTS OF THESE TESTS WILL BE REPORTED AS BASF; FOR
FUTURE CHANGE,
13. ADP DOES NOT FAVOR AUTOMATIC SEAT EJECTION FOR REASONS
TOO INVOLVED TO DISCUSS HEREIN. HOWEVER, OUR STUDY DOES INDTCATE
THAT IT IS PROBABLY DESIRABLE TO TIE FRONT AND REAR FJECTIOM
SYSTEMS TOGETHER SO THAT REAR MAN IS tUTOMATICALLY EJECTED ABOUT
ONE SECOND AFTER PILOT EJECTS. THIS IF.EXTEMFLY IMPORTANT FOR
1,0W ALTITUDE EJECTIONS. IT COULD BE SET UP WITH A MANUAL SHUTOFF
AVAILABLE TO THE FCO IF DESIRED.
14, ADP IS DESIGNING SPACERS WHICH WILL PROVXDE SELECTIVE
CREW ADJUSTMENT IN SEAT POSITION, BAD POSIT ION AND HEAD REST
POSIT ION. IT IS PROPOSED TO AUTHORIZE THE SELECTIVE USE OF THESE
!I,IPACERS TO BE FITTED AND CONTROLLED Y THE PHYSIOLOGICAL EQUIPMENT
()FE. ICER. THE PROPOSAL WILL BE SUBMITTED TO SPO SHORTLY.
1.5., LAP BELT INSPECTIONS INSTRUCT IONS ARE PE7NIG ADDED TO THE
71. .='6 MANUAL FOR PERFORMANCE OF PREFLIGHT LAP TIELT INSPECTION.
END OF MESSAGE
F T
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25X1A Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP71600590R000100100001-4
Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP71600590R000100100001-4
L
or
R ase 1708r29 tlA -RDP71 BO 0590 WO 100100001-4 -
AppriiVeirF ?200 -
SECRET
. SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
REPORT OF
MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
- ;
TYPE: SR-71
SN: 61-7952
DATE: 25 JAN 1966
TIME: 1432 MST
PLACE; 3500/107
CANNON AFB, N.M.
SECRET
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
App
Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP71600590R00010
COPY NR. 5
001-4
', DF,A11.11121T OP UE AIR FORCE- ?
eadquarters United States Air IN'ireo
, .
Washington. D.C. ?
,
,
lie 17 to ' Directorate of Aerospace Safety 1
Attn Oft.- USAF
Norton Mr Force Base.' California 92/109,
? . ? , ,? r,..,, ,,, ,,,,,,, ::,?., .,.- ? ,.: ,, ,., ,
Sub jcats Letter of Transmittal, ttajor Aircraft 'Accident ''.? ,
Involving Desert Queen Aircraft. 2, January 1966,', ? ,
Hartbeest of Tucumeari, Hew gotta?
I, AFTAS, Norton APB
AFFTC (FTTA), Edwards APS
SAC through 15A7 Offutt Ala
'.ASD (ASZB), WAYS. Ohio
AYDR
142OC) SW, LkesLie? 011'
,
1.. This report is transmitted in accordance with special instructions
regarding Desert Queen aircraft, Depar4tment of Defense letter, Deputy
e Inspector Generel, Norton AFB. California (AFIAS-7)1 dated 24 January
2. 'OD (ASZB, Col Templeton all navies) will initiate entice in
accordance with paragraph 19. APT 127-h and forward the Indorsement
? Direatorato of Aerospace Safety. (AFTAS-F. Lt Col Bothwell all ,copies
15AP for Col. Simpson *1]. copies will review the report and forward
o SAC .for DOSD Col Basalts all copies. for review and filo.
I 11
"b..Tbis"report 1.s viassifict. szerca 'ati it containe classified infor*'
mation,portaining to Desert 4tt0411 aircraft. When the attached report
is removed, this norreeponftnee ,may ho, downgraded to Unelassitic4.'
Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP71600590R000100100001-4
pproved F?C,141rEtAYM
41F,P71 B00598R0001 0 0001-4
USAF ACCIDENT/INCIDENT REPORT
?
, UtriCUTIRLII PAPAL/ IIIIIJCA
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AF FORM 711 ,
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41
AF FORM 711b
AF FORM 711c
(VIVA 711d
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4 A 61
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AF FORM 711g
UNSATISFACTORY REPORT
11
-
.........
TEARDOWN DEFICIENCY REPORT
1
LIST Of TECHNICAL ORDERS NOT COMPUED WITH
AFTO FORMS 781 SERIES ,
IP
M
AF FORM 5 ?
1.07111112
--.....---
410
STATEMENTS
"
1

ORDERS APPOINTING INVESTIGATING BOARD
rip r.---...?----?
kill ?:_._;_-
BOARD PROCEEDINGS
DD FORM 175 OR DD FORM 1080
ellr '
DD FORM 365 (Weight and Balance Clearance Form F)
..?..-
T
STATEMENT OF DAMAGE TO PRIVATE PROPERTY
II
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1 - -- --- - ----A
CERTIFICATE OF DAMAGE (list of Parts Damaged), fAANHOURS REQUIRED TO REPAIR, AND COST
TRANSCRIPTS OF RECORDED COMMUNICATIONS
W
ANY ADDITIONAL SUBSTANTIATING DATA REPORTS
r 1 --:---?,---A
91 Ai FOPPE faits,- e-d.00-11.--p"-,.9-pe ifr
W.
s
DIAGRAMS (Fall Out?Impact Area, Etc.) '
.?

PHOTOGRAPHS .
?.%--
Whenever "Appikable but not attached" column is marked for any el the above items. Information must be entered under Mande to indicate what action has been taken or will be
taken to obtain the required attachment. Lettered lobs shown above will be inserted for corresponding attached items, I.04 Tab N will always be used for Statemeats, Tab P for
Orders Appointing investigating board, etc. Tabs will be omitted on those items not applicable.
?
REMARKS,
SECRET
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIr
.1
A F 'Die62
t 7 1 1 h
* U.S. ISOVIPINSIINT **INTIM* *shot 115,1 Or-4415M
Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP71600590R000100100001-4 ,
pproved NpRelease 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP711300Wf?000, 00100001-4
Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP71600590R000100100001-4
Approved Fottikelease 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP71130059011k00010)0001-4
AF Form 711 (Continued)
SECRET
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
A. HISTORY OF FLIGHT
25X1A On Tuesday, January 25 1966, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Pilot
took off at 11:20 PST in SR-71 S/N 2003
for the purpose of a Category I Test. The aircraft was fueled to 136,
000 pounds gross weight and a center-of-gravity of 21.4%c. Take-off,
climb and acceleration were normal. The Noah and Eli route was followed.
During the first leg, prior to the IFR, everything was satisfactory with
the following exceptions: the aircraft seemed to require excessive nose
up trim in cruise, the Auto-Nay overshot its 35? bank limit to 40? in a
left turn, and during the last two turns in this leg the pilot was re-
quired to hold back stick due to insufficient manual trim and while holding
back stick noticed the stick pulsing in roll. In an attempt to reduce the
nose-up trim requirements, the pilot used crossfeed for approximately five
minutes. The pilot reported no effect upon C.G., but,based on fuel tank
readings from the dictet, the C.G. actually moved forward approximately
two percent, thus aggravating the up-trim condition during the rest of
the cruise. The overshoot in bank angle and the stick nibble in roll,
although undesirable, have been experienced frequently in other SR-71s.
The overshoot in bank angle is due to slight mistrims in roll and the
stick nibble is due to control system friction being nearly equal in
magnitude to the low breakout forces in roll.
The descent to the tanker and the subsequent refueling was normal.
The aircraft was refueled until 80,000 pounds of fuel was aboard._ The
gross weight and C.G. off the tanker was 137,000 pounds and,21.4%c,
respectively. The acceleration toward Dalhart was uneventful until at
approximately Mach 2.9 the aircraft, while in Auto-Nay, rolled into a
10 - 15? right bank. The pilot initially thought this to be an Auto-Nay
malfunction. However, upon checking other instruments, he determined
that the right forward bypass door had opened. He went to manual on
the door and closed it. The Auto-Nay then rolled him back on course.
The acceleration was continued to Mach 3.2. At 3.2, the pilot noticed
the CIT limit of 400? was being exceeded and Mach number was reduced slightly.
Just short of the Dalhart turn, fuel remaining was reported as 42,200
pounds, yielding a gross weight of approximately 100,000 pounds and a C.G.
of 26.7%c based on the automatic fuel sequencing. In preparation for
the turn at Dalhart, the engine fuel flow was boosted from 18000 - 19000
PPH to 21600 PPH to minimize the altitude loss in the turn. As the turn
was initiated by the Auto-Nay, the pilot started to open the right hand
door to provide an unstart margin. At this time, the conditions were
approximately Mach 3.17 and IIMOOOMMIIIIIIIO feet. In the 35? banked 25X1A
turn, an unstart on the right hand side was experienced which immediately
rolled the aircraft up to 60? right bank. Pilot corrective action stopped
the roll at 60? but seemed insufficient to roll the aircraft level. The
pilot continued to apply additional roll correction without effect as
well as a pitch down correction to reduce angle-of-attack. However, at
this time, the nose started coming up rapidly with the pilot realizing he
was in pitch up. The pilot indicated he recalled planning on staying
with the ship as long as possible and made no conscious effort to eject.
The pilot blacked out. He regained total consciousness while falling
but was unable to see because his visor was iced up. When his main chute
opened, he raised his visor and saw about 'one-fourth of a mile 25X1A
away, descending in his chute and the aircraft burning about five miles
away. The pilot suffered minor bruises and a minor cut on the bridge of
his nose. The RSO was dead of a broken neck.
SECRET
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRE'
Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP71B00590R000100100001-4
Qproved FilignRelease 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP7113005919k0001000001-4
AT Form 711 (Continued)
SECRET
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
B. INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS
The wreck was strewn over an area approximately 16 miles long and
five miles wide near Mosquero, New Mexico. The main portion of the
vehicle, the complete wing and fuselage aft of Fuselage Station 550,
landed upright furtherest east. The forebody forward of Fuselage Station
550 landed inverted approximately eight miles west of the main body.
Examination of the wreck revealed the following pertinent items:
1. The front seat was still in the forebody. Seat
shoulder harness broken.
2. The rear seat had been ejected.
3. Both canopies had ejected.
4. CITs were 365? and 3720.
5. EGTs were: LH - 808?, RH - 838?.
6. Hydro system pressures were 3150, 3200 3150 and 3500 psi.
7. Spikes auto.
8. Fuel 38,100 lbs.
9. TDI altitudes 77,450, 77,600 feet.
10. TDI Mach 0.37, 2.51.
11. TDI KEAS 36
12. TDI TAB 1716
13. Angle-of-attack 15.5?
14. Pitch trim actuator 2.8? T.E. up.
15. The forebody broke in the upward direction.
16. The Dictet was intact.
17. The EMR recorder was intact.
18. The right engine threw blades through the nacelle.
belt and
The dictet tape verified many of the items discussed previously which had
been taken primarily from the pilot's debriefing. However, one discrepancy
was that the dictet indicated the last pitch trim reading immediately prior to
the accident was 4.50 T.E. up. This must be discounted as being in error
on the following basis: In pilot debriefing, he recalled 2.5? T.E. up.
The trim actuator indicated 2.8? T.E. up upon loss of power. Pitch trim
prior to reaching Mach 3.0 from the dictet indicated 3.0? T.E. up. Increasing
Mach number would reduce the required trim angle unless the C.G. had moved
forward by an appreciable amount. 2.5? T.E. up trim matches the predicted
trim requirements for the flight conditions.
SECRET
SPECIAL HANDUNG REQUIRED
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ApPved For Skoidase 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP711300590A101001
AF Form 711 (Continued)
01-4
SECRET
SPECIAL 1-1,104INAH; REQUIP""
Structural analysis of the wreck indicated the lower longeron of the
forebody failed in tension whereas the upper longeron failed in compression.
The forebody, once it broke loose, was aft end into the wind, the
internal chine area became pressurized to +5 psi in a fraction of a second.
This pressure is sufficient to blow off the chine panels in the area of
the external canopy jettison handle and thus rip the handle loose. Inspection
indicated the chine panels to have failed in this direction as well as
having ripped the handle loose. Evidence showed that both canopies, as
a result, jettisoned. The high negative load factors, in conjunction with
the onset rate with the added possibility of deployment of the drogue
chute, literally ripped the pilot out of the forebody. Wind blast on the
seat belt which accompanied the pilot after being torn from the seat actuated
the automatic sequencing of the chute system. The same loads were applied
to the RSO; however, the rear seat had been fired. Evidence showed the "T"
handle to have been pulled, but by what force cannot be positively stated.
If the ejection occurred at the time of peak positive g's, a load in excess
of 30 g's would have been applied while the RSO was in a head down position.
After the forebody broke away, the aft section of the vehicle would
have been stable and would have fallen away from the forebody. However,
the rapid tumbling of the forebody would have precluded any large vertical
separation and sufficient contact could have been made to knock the aft
tailcone off the fuselage. The final motion of the aft body once it had
slowed to subsonic speeds would be a flat spin as evidenced by witness
reports and inspection of the impact area.
The condition of the right engine, melted blades, holes in the nacelle,
etc., are attributed to over-temperature of the engine after breakup of
the vehicle, since the EGTs were normal upon loss of power.
The above information is derived from evidence available from the
wreck, pilot comments in debriefing, dictet notes and witness reports,
and, in large part, except for the initial summary of the flight, deal
with the results of the accident rather than the cause. Analysis of the
pertinent data available from the EMR recorder,in conjunction with a
knowledge of the flight conditions,yields an insight into the sequence
of events leading up to loss of control of the aircraft.
The pitch stability of the aircraft at the reported flight conditions
and at the C.G. verified by the reported trim elevon angle requirement, '
would be as follows: The basic vehicle without stability augmentation
would be neutrally stable in 1 "g" level flight and would become unstable
at load factors above 1 "g". The instability becomes progressively worse
with increasing load factor. However,Hthe pitch stability autmentation
system provides an apparent increase in stability. This increase in
stability would'have precluded a divergency in pitch (pitch-up) even under
the aft C.G. condition that existed providing that the load factor did not
exceed 1.6 g's. In addition, the SAS would have substantially Flowed the
divergence until its authority limit was reached at 2.5 g's; however, the
SAS would not have stopped the divergence once 7.50 angle-of-attack had
been exceeded. The pertinent data obtained from the EMR provides pitch
attitude, roll attitude, time, heading and altitude. Analysis of this
data and, in particular, comparison of the data during the last turn rela-
tive to earlier turns during the flight show the following: During the
SECRET
SPECIAL HANDUNG REQUIRED
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?
A proved FoINIFtelease 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP71B0059011000100Q001-4
AF Form 711 (Continued),
SECRET
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
early turns, pitch attitude varied by, at most, 10; whereas, during the
last turn, pitch attitude showed a continual buildup during the roll into
the turn as far as the data was available. It seems apparent from the data
that the pilot flying the aircraft in the pitch axis instinctively pulled
the nose up as he rolled into the turn. The pitch rate at this time is so
insidious, it may easily escape the pilot's attention. With the unstart
occurring at approximately the same time as the SAS runs out of authority,.
loss of pitch control became a certainty.
A series of tests were conducted on 1 and 2 February 1966 using the SR-71
Flight Simulator at Beale AFB. The purpose of these tests was an attempt
to duplicate the aircraft and flight conditions which existed at the time
of the accident and the maneuvers which resulted in loss of control in order
to determine the reason for loss of control and whether or not it could have
been prevented.
Test conditions were as follows: Aircraft gross weight 100,000 pounds;
speed 3.15 Mach; altitude feet; 350 right bank in a shallow climb;
right forward inlet bypass doors set manually to match the left CIP. Each
pilot flew one test at 25% CG, 26% CO and 27% CO. After initial conditions
were established, the right inlet was unstarted and the pilot attempted to
recover the aircraft from the enauing maneuvers. Data from the tests
was recorded and can be seen in a separate report in Tab W. In general,
the results of the tests showed that, at 25% CG, little difficulty was
encountered in recovering the aircraft; at 26% OG, recovery was marginal;
and, at 27% OG, recovery either could not be effected or, if a momentary
recovery was effected, the aircraft was lost immediately when the pilot's
attention was diverted momentarily from the task of maintaining pitch control.
stated that the simulator test at 27% CO appeared to duplicate
very closely the maneuvers which resulted in his loss of control in the
actual aircraft.
Further tests were conducted at the 27% CO condition with the following
results: (1) With zero pitch rate, an angle-of-attack of 10 1/2? could be
maintained with full forward stick. (2) Above 10 1/2? angle-of-attack, a
zero pitch rate could not be maintained with full forward stick and the angle-
of-attack continued to insrease. (3) With a pitch rate of less than 10 per
second, the aircraft would continue to putch up, out of control, if full
forward stick was applied after 7 1/2? angle-of-attack had been exceeded
(NOTE: At these flight conditions, the angle-of-attack was 4 1/2? for
level flight and 6? in a 35? bank). (4) Pitch rates in excess of 10 per
second resulted in immediate loss of control. (5) By giving maximum
attention to the angle-of-attack and pitch attitude, the aircraft could be
controlled; however, a momentary distraction from these instruments resulted
in loss of control. (6) Pitch rates and angles-of-attack,which would cause
loss of control, were so small that they were not readily apparent to the
pilot during a normal instrument cross-check. Additional tests were con-
ducted with the pitch stability augmentation system failed and, although '
the aircraft was more difficult to control, the results at each CO were
essentially the same.
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SECRET
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIREr
The general opinion of the pilots participating in these tests was that
the Simulator accurately depicts the aircraft handling qualities and flight
characteristics in all areas except roll response. The roll response to a roll
command was felt to be too high. However, they were unanimous in their
opinion that this did not affect the validity of the tests. The SR-71 ?
Flight Simulator employs two Mark I digital computers for continuous solving
of flight, propulsion, navigation, communication and accessory equations
to achieve as close a simulator-to-aircraft performance relationship as
possible. The Mark I computer receives analog and Boolean inputs from the
cockpit controls and switches, converts the analog inputs to digital form,
performs the reauired computations, and converts the results into analog
signals. These signals control the Simulator to provide realistic response
in accordance with the aircraft's performance characteristics. The codkpit
controls, switches and displays are exact duplicates of the Aircraft. A
motion system imparts a realistic sensation of flight maneuvers.
One final conclusion based upon the evidence available is that
the pressure suit provides excellent protection for the man ejecting at
high Mach numbers and altitudes.
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C. FINDINGS
SECRET
SPU:!,?LIPlIa REQUIRED
1. Primary Cause: The primary cause of this accident was a miscel-
laneous unsafe conditon in that the aircraft was flown into a statically
unstable regime in which a disturbance in the pitch axis resulted in develop-
ment of a pitch rate which could not be controlled.
2. Additional Findings:
a. There is no accurate and direct means to show the pilot CO
location, nor are there provisions for manually moving fuel
rapidly aft, as well as forward, to set a desired CO for
various flight conditions.
b4 There is no standardization/evaluation program in effect
for Lockheed California Company ADP pilots, nor are adequate
records of flying activity and training being maintained.
c. The pilot and RSO operated the aircraft in accordance with
Flight Manual procedures and the test plan from time of
entering the cogkpit until the aircraft became uncontrol-
lable.
d. The aircraft fuel system was not programming as desired during'
the first phase of the flight. Subsequent to aerial refueling,
it appears that it was programming in accordance with the pre-
set schedule.
e. The aircraft entered a turn using an Auto-Nay programmed 350
bank at 3.15 Mach and 77,842 feet altitude. CG was approxi-
mately 26:7%.,which is aft of 'the authorized aft limit of_26:5%-
for supersonic flight. The right engine unsthrted shortly
after the turn. The right inlet unstarted from an undetermined
cause.
f. The aircraft did not respond to aileron forces to correct the
bank nor did it respond to forward stick forces to lower the
pitch attitude and decrease angle-of-attack. 'A pitph.rate ?
developed, the aircraft pitched-up and began to disintegrate
due to forces beyond the design criteria.
g. The structural breakup at fuselage station 535 is a result
of exceeding structural design limits due to aircraft
longitudinal instability in pitch-up and is a secondary
failure.
h. The engines were operating in mid-afterburner range at the
time of the accident and did not contribute to the accident;
however, pilot distraction, caused by manual operation of
the right forward inlet doors and subsequent unstart, could
have contributed to the loss of control.
is DD Form 365F is not used nor is there an equivalent form in
use for recording weight and balance data. A form titled:
"R-12 Flight Loading Sheet", is used to record loading of all
serviced items with resulting gross weight and CO. The form
does not provide cross-check procedure for fuel loading to
assure deisred loading and distribution in the aircraft.
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SECRET
SPEC141. HANDLING ROWAN
j. The Flight Control System did not malfunction nor did it
contribute to this accident.
k. Maintenance factors and non-compliance with Service Bulletins did
not contribute to this accident.
1. The pilot's lap belt sheared bilaterally in the area of
adjustment.
in. The injuries that the RSO sustained indicate that he had
undergone a high rate of spin.
n. One of the oxygen hoses on the pilot's suit was broken off
at the solder joint. The solder joint on the other hose
was severely weakened and separated while being leak-checked.
o. The pilot's face plate iced over during the free fall thus
obscuring vision.
P. Sublexation of the RSO's skull on the first cervical vertebrae
which is felt to be due to anterior-posterior forces in which
the neck was immobilized and the head was allowed to move.
q. It is felt that the pilot's lap belt sheared at a force
less than specified in the military specifications due to
the sharp edges on the knurled adjustment.
r. Neither the pilot nor the RSO initiated the ejection sequence.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Aircraft CG, speed and altitude limitations should be changed to
provide a greater safety margin until proper flight parameters,
procedures and equipment are studied and necessary changes made
to provide a safe operating envelope.
2. An accurate, direct reading CO indicating system should be
installed in both cockpits to show the crew exact CO location.
3. The fuel system should be modified to allow rapid aft, as well as
forward, movement of fuel in order to establish optimum CO for
the flight conditions.
A standardization/evaluation program should be established for
Lockheed ADP pilots and crew members, and adequate records of
flying and training maintained.
Fuel system scheduling be revised to maintain aircraft CO limits
during Mach 3+ flight.
Automatic inlet control reliability be improved.
The R-l2 Flight Loading Sheet should be revised to provide cross-
check procedures for fuel loading to, assure that the desired
fuel quantity is loaded and distributed properly. The revised
form should also provide for computation and recording of
necessary weight and balance data. DD Ford 365? should be used,
? C;
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AF Form 711 (Continued)
qr r
Li J il j
'?"j:WIRIED
8. LAC review their aircraft records on DD Forms 829 and 829-1,
reference Spike Assembly, to insure that the data recorded is
correct and current. ?
9. The Project Support Office and the Engine Manufacturer conduct a
study to provide more accurate configuration control of all
engines.
- 10. Redesign the knurled roller bar on the lap belt adjustment to
eliminate the sharp edges on each end.
-44
Remove the stabilization chute from the man and utilize a stabilized
seat as soon as possible.
12. Remove the oxygen hoses from the front of the existing suits as
soon as possible. Modify them to a more modern configuration.
Provide bailout face plate heat.
14. A study should be made to determine the feasibility of an auto-
matic ejection system under high altitude breakup conditions.
A means be developed immediately to insure that all crew members
can reach the headrest regardless of torso height.
The lap belt should be inspected prior to each flight for general
condition.
13.
15.
,sp? 16.
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USAF ACCIDENT/INCIDENT REPORT
FM In all spaces applicable. If additional spate in needed, ma additional 1404)
I. DATE OF OCCURRENCE (Year, month and day)
1966, Jan, 25, Tuesday
2. VEHICLE(S)/MATERIEL INVOLVED
(MS & Serial Nr., If applicable)
SR-71, SN 61-7952 (#2003)
3. FOR GROUND ACCIDENTS ONLY
(Base Code and Report Soria/ Nr.)
N/A
4. PLACE OF OCCURRENCE, STATE, COUNTY, DISTANCE AND DIRECTION FROM NEAREST TOWN. IF ON '
BASE, IDENTIFY. IF OFF BASE GIVE DISTANCE FROM NEAREST IV!. 41.
New Mexico, Harding, 107 mi, 350 True, Cannon AFB
S. HOUR AND TIME ZONE LOCAL
1432 MST
6.
A DAY NIGHT
DAWN El DUSK
7. ORGANIZATION POSSESSING
Major Command
AFSC
OWNING VEHICLE
Subcommand or AP
#ASD(ASZB)
OR MATERIEL AT TIME OF MISHAP
. Air Division
an
Wing
-
Group
-
Squadron Of UnIt
..
Name and Base Code
Wright -
at. AFB
B.
I
(List orpanIsallons of second
1
vehicle, If they differ from
I
Item 7 above)
I
I
9. BASE AND COMMAND SUBMITTING REPORT (Do not Abbreviate)
Directorate of Aerospace Safety, Norton Air Force Base, California
10. LIST OF PERSONNEL DIRECTLY INVOLVED
(For aircraft Include operator and all other persons whether In plane or not. If MOTO space Is required to list all personnel, us* additional sheet(s).)
Lail Name First Name M.I.
Grade
Service No.
Assigned Duly
Aare,
Rating
Injury
to individual
Civ
_
Pilot
RSO
-
-.Fatal
Minor
Civ
an
25X1A
,
?
t
11. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT, Give a detailed history of II eh., or clitoral:Disked order of facts and circumstances leading to the mishap as applicable, the results of
Investigation and analysis to Include discussion of all cause factors fisted, findings, and ricommondalions, and any corvective action talon. (Continuo en reverse, If more space needed.)
SEE ATTACHED PAGES FOR:
A. History of Flight
B. Investigation and Analysis
C. Findings
D. Recommendations
Individual Group reports are in Tab "W"
* Main Wreckage - 1740 True, 7.1 am from Bueyeros, New Mexico ,
Nose Section - 228? True. 6.9 am from Bueyeroa, New Mexico
//AIRCRAFT BAILED TO LOCKHEED-CALIFORNIA COMPANY
12. AUTHENTICATION
CERTIFICATION BY (Title)
RECORDER,
TYPED NAME AND GRADE
Donald R. James
$IT: jet 4
/r/dt91714st.0"
DATE ,
2 Feb 66
D 2 PREV1OUS EDMONOF THIS FOIVA IS OBSOLETE.
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The foregoing findings and recommendations were approved
by the following members of the accident board coordinating
group.
JAMES G FUSSELL
Colonel, USAF
Board President
AN D ROTHWELL,
Lt Col, USAF
Investigating Officer
4-044f.405
C GORDON,;
Col, USAF
Material Factors
dA/
0 CE A TE
Colonel, USAF
Special Advisor
efi'd PFf DANIEL'
Lt Col, USAF
Pilot Member
ROBERT E MATEJ
Major, USAF
Flight Surgeon
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SECRET
SPECIAL HANDL(Wt P(
001-4
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT/INCIDENT REPORT
To be fllled out for principal aircraft Involved. (Appropriate blocks only should be filled out on secondary aircraft.)
1. ACCIDENT/INCIDENT CLASSIFICATION (Check one)
XXXXXXXIDOX
Flight Accident Resulting In Aircraft Damage
Aircraft Non?flight Accident
RI El Accident Not Resulting In Aircraft Damage 0
Air Force Aircraft Incident , 0 '
2. Aircraft/Serial Number
61..7952
3. Type, Model, Series, Block No,
SR-71 #2003
4. Assignment/Status Code (MM 63-110)
EB
3. If aircraft was being ferried or delivered indicate gaining and losing organizations, data of transfer, ultimate destination.
Not applicable.
6. CLEARANCE'
From Edwards AIM 1,0 Edwards AFB !To Round-robin fliRht
7. Filed,
VTR WR?ON TOP IFR ___,X.._ Local Other Direct Airways (Controlled)
8. Flight reference at time of accident
Instrument
Cold X Actual Sins Other Unk
9. Duration of Flight
10. Mission of flight
Category I sensor test.
Hrs.
2
Mins.
12
I 1. ALTITUDE
DATA
MSL
Cleared AltTim
Above is6op
b t
Altitude. above terrain ac 14.
dt i
quence begar,79
.. f f 482 y,
Altit d
Altitude R Impact point
M
468o R.
Highest altitude MU flown
829685 Ft
above
flootbleff+.
Hrs. j Min 27155"
12. fire and exp
a. fires
None? Inflight?Oround.L.
Result of grd.
b. Explosions
Non....Might
Result of grd.
osion data
Impact? Yes.Z.No?.
? Oround?,
Impact? Tes_No
13. Airfield data, Applicable to takeoff and landing ,accidents occurring within 2 miles of airfield
Field elevation in use Pt. Composition of mvry. Asphalt_ Cowen
Length of runway In use R. Other (Specify)
Length of overrun Ft. Composition of overrun (specify)
Distance of touchdown from runway rw Surface condition. Dry.? Wet.?... Icy
Heading of runway o Other (Specify)
Conditions affecting occurrence, e.g., type of instrument or lighting approach aid used, obstructions, barrier, airspeed, gron
weight, forced landing
14. (If answer is
Violations
"Yes," to either quartos, discuss under item 11, AP Form 711)
Yes 125 No Breaches of air discipline Yes
,i1
No
IS. PHASE OF OPERATIONS
landing approach,
Supersonic
e.g. take off roll, Initial climb, normal flight, acrobatics,
flareaut
cruise at design speed.
16. TYPE OF ACCIDENT' e.g. geor.up landing, mici.air collision, abandoned aircraft,
fire or explosion in flight, undershoot, overshoot
Airframe failure inflight. _
17. WEATHER AT
TIME AND PLACE OF ACCIDENT, (If a factor in the accident, attach statement of tveath r officer)135 msTI Tucumcari? N.M.
Sky conditions
Clear
Visibility
20
Wind direction and velocity
070/11
Temperature
29?F
Dew pobt Alt. setting
18 F 30.06
Other weather conditions
None
PILOT'S) INVOLVED (FLIGHT
CREW)
16. OPERATOR (Person
.
Front I= Seat
at controls at time of accident)
X Rear or Right Seat
c A5tc3NW UUET UN PUUIII 25X1A
AC If. p X cp Other (Specifjr)
d. ASSIGNED ORGANIZATION
Major Command
LOCK ME
1 Subcommand or AP Afr Division
CALIFORNIA COMPANY.)
1 Wing
Group
Squadron or Unit
'
Base
Burbank, Calif.
e. ATTACHED ORGANIZATION
Molar Command
ADVANCEID
FOR FLYING
Subcommand or AP
1
DEVELOPMEN
Air Division
PROJECT (4&C
I Whig
-ADP)
Group Squadron or Unit
Base
Burbank, Calif.
f. ORIGINAL AERONAUTICAL RATING
AND DATE RECEIVED
p. PRESENT AERONAUTICAL
AND DATE RECEIVED
RATING
h. INSTRUMENT CARD
AIR
Type
I. AMC
Primary
Pilot July 1952
FAA-AIR March
1961
Date of expiration Indefinite
Duty
19. OTHER PILOT
a. LAST NAME (Jr., II, MO FIRST
NAME MIDDLE NAME
GRADE
COMPONENT SERVICE NUMBER
NATIONALITY
YR. OF BIM
Is. POSITION IN AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF
Front or Left Seat Rear or Right
ACCIDENT
Seat Other
c. ASSIGNED
AC
DUTY ON PLIGHT ORDER
IP-- P CP Other
(4,10)
cl, ASSIGNED ORGANIZATION
Major Command
Subcommand or AP
1
Air Division
1
Wing
Group
Squadron or Unit
Base
e. ATTACHED ORGANIZATION FOR PLYING
Major CommandI subcommand or AP
Air Division
I Wing
Group
, Squadron or Unit
Base
I. ORIGINAL AERONAUTICAL RATING
p. PRESENT AERONAUTICAL RATING
Is. INSTRUMENT CARD
Type
I. ANC
Primary
Date of expiration
Duty
NOTE. IF MORE THAN TWO PILOTS ARE INVOLVED (FLIGHT CREW) REPORT SAME INFORMATION REQUIRED ON AbbiTIONAL SHEET FOR EACH. ,
AF cTc":2 711b PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE.
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20, FLYING EXPERIENCE (Attach copy of AP Porm 5 for Pilot(t) Juror= outlined In APR 1.21-4.)
PLIGHT ORDERS.
Pilot
Co.Pliot
Inst. Pilot
Ack. Cmdr.
Student Pilot
ASSIGNED DUTY ON
(Gime lons names only. Ile all flight times to nearest boar.)
25X1A
a. Total flying hours (including AP time, student and other
accredited time):
3,577g25
b. Total Jet Time,
2 1112:10
c. Total 1a Pliot/IP hours, all Aircraft'
29868?20
II, Total Weather Instrument Haunt
No record
e. Total lit Pilot/IP hours this Models
70330
?
I. Total 111 Pilot/IP hours last 90 Days.
24:10
g. Total lit Pilot/IF hours lost 90 Days this Models
23 3 05
h. Total lit Pilot/IP hours weather and hood lost 90 Days,
?.
No record
I. Total Pilot hours night last 90 Days'
None
I. Total Pilot hours last 30 Days.
k. Total lit Pilot/IP hours last 30 Days,
4:25
I. Total 1st Pilot/IP hours last 30 Days.thls Models
4:25
at. Dale and Duration last previous flight this Models 19 Jan
66 1815
n, Date of last proficiency flight checks
No record
21 CAUSATIVE AGENCY
Cause factors (Chech one primary and all applicable contributing and probable factors.)
Primary Contributing Probable
Primary Contributing Probable
Other Personnel
(Specify)
Operators
Pilot
Co-Pllot
Materiel Failure or Malfunction
Controller
Engines
(Drones)
Crewmembers (Other than Operator)
Airframe
(Specify)
Landing Gear
Oilier (3Y'ae)
Supervisory Personnel
(Specify)
Airbag, or Airways
Weather
Maintenance Personnel
Misc. Unsafe Conditions
Type of level
apecffy) Loss of cont- --X--
pers. and orgn.
roI in statically unstini regime
,
Undetermined
22, DAMAGE
Damage
ti
to Aircraft
Destroyed Minor
El Substantial None
Damage Seyond Economical Repair
El Yee No
Manhours to Repair
NA
Cost (Bud
$
Description of Damage (Describe briefly extmt of damage to aircraft and any property damage incurred)
'
Aircraft totally destroyed (See Tab U) \
25X1A
Damage to private property (See Tab T)
?
?
23, i AUTHENTICATION (Signature arid grade) )
President James G, Fussell , f ,
Colonel, USAF x ' 1 21 '4,,' -.6e0aA'46,-
Accident Inv418tricuil0pc.Rothwo.
Lt Col, USAF
Maintenanitter-e. 0
I., Gordon, i .or
Lt Colt_ USAF :." elir
Medical 0mftbbort E. Matejka9/
Major, USAF -/-01% ',.
AACS Representative 71
NA
AWS Reprosfallve
Member Walter F, Daniel II' ',' . '7'
Lt Col, USAF /P 1,
"'Jude' Donald R. James.,
Major, USAF irleiti.
AF PeClcReitE 71 1 b
* U.S. OOVINIIMINT MIMING Orricli IOU or? l
clrlr#117rel
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AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE/MATERIEL REPORT
Use This form when AP aircraft accident/Incident Involves inadequacy, malfunction or failure of AP materiel.
1. AIRCRAFT TM & SERIAL NUMBER
2, SPECIAL REPORTS DATA
SN,"71
a, Were Previous UR's Submitted
Involved?
Dyes
OKI
on Pectoris)
No
b. No. and Date of IJIt's Submitted as Result of This Accident (Attach copy)
See Life Sciences Report
61-7952
C. Is TDR Requested?
Dyes
IF:4 No
d. Na. of T.O.'s Not Complied With at Time of Accident (LW T.O. Nos. and Mies on
separate sheet(s).?.Tab X) Aircraft (91)
Engine #1 (24) Engine #2 (25) Total (14'
3. AIRCRAFT HISTORICAL DATA
Item
Aircraft
Part, Component or Accessory
Identification of Aircraft/Part, etc.
3E-71 952
17 Feb 1965
Aircraft General
Air Force Acceptance Date
Total Flight Hours
791 g
New
_
Last Overhaul Date
Overhauling Activity (Name and location)
14,?A
Hours Since Overhaul
N/A
Hours Since Last Periodic Inspection
9:39
Dote of Last Periodic inspection
30 Dec 1965
lat_ Periodic
Type of Last Periodic Inspection
4. ENGINE HISTORICAL DATA
(Complete a separate column for each engine Involved. Also, complete a separate column for each power plant component Involved.)
Installed Position
Number 1
Number 2
Engine Model and Series
JT11D -20
JT11D-20
.
Engine Serial Number
P648336
P646333
Total Engine Hours
43:49
62:19
_Flight + Ground
time
Number of Major Overhauls
Nelr,
NEW
Hours Since Last major Overhaul
New
New
Date of Last Overhaul
23 Oct 3.245
16 Sep 1965 ?
Acceptance
Overhaul Activity
P & W
P & W
Date Last Installed
17 Nov 1965
17 Nov 1965
Hours Since Lost Installed
42:21
Lk:26
Flight + Ground.
time
Date of Last Periodic Inspection
New
New
Type of Last Periodic Inspection
New
Nem
_
Fuel (Type and octane rating)
P&W 523
P&W 523
5. FIRE DATA ?
(To be completed when firs or chemical explosion occurs, not resulting from ground Impact. Indicate, P?Probable or K?Known, In squares below.)
a. MATERIEL FAILURE CAUSING THE FIRE
b. IGNITION SOURCE
c. . COMSUSTIBLE MATERIAL
Electrical System
IA
Propulsion System
NA
Electrical System
A
Static Electricity/
Lightning
NA
Cargo
NA
Hydraulic Fluid
NA
Fuel System
NA
Other (Specify)
NA
Pneumatic System
NA
Other (Specify)
NA
Electrical Insulation
NA
Lubricating 011
NA
Hydraulic System
NA
NA
Propulsion System
DA
NA
Explosives
NA
Other (Specify)
NA
Pneumatic System
NA
Unknown
NA
NA
Unknown
NA
Fuel
NA
Unknown
NA
cl. AIRCRAFT FIRE EXTINGUISHING SYSTEM
e. PIPE/OVERHEAT WARNING
Fixed
Portable
Fixed
Portable
Fire Detector
Overheat Indicator
Extinguished Fire
NA
Not Activated and Not
Near Fire
NA
Operated Properly
NA
Reduced Fire
NA
If Discharged, Chemical
Used
NA
Not Operated, but Near ?Ire
NA
No Effect When
Discharged
NA
It Discharged, Amount
of Chemical Used
NA
Net Operated and Not Near Fire
NA
Activated but Did Not
Discharge
NA
Other Pertinent Info.
NA
Not Installed
NA
Not Activated but
Near Fire
NA
NA
Other (Specify)
NA
.1.
f.
SHUT OFF PROCEDURE
RESULTS OF ALLOWING FIRE TO &URN OUT
g. EFFECT OP FIRE
MARK ONE
Extinguished Fire
NA
NA
Catastrophic
Reduced Fire
NA
NA
Increased Severity of Mishap

NA
No Effect
NA
NA
No Change In Severity ef Mishap
NA
Not Accomplished
NA
NA
Unknown
NA
Unknown
,
NA
NA
,
---.
D2 I I IC
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6. LOCATION OF INITIA.I. FIRE
Known
Probable
Known
Probable
Known
Probable
Baggage Comportment
NA
Aft of Pirewall
forward of Pirewall
NA
NA
Wheel Well
C.0.4,.....wa..w....m
NA
NA
tomb lay
NA,
Cockpit/Clew Quarters
NA
Rocket Pod
NA
0141.(spww
NA
Engine Section
_NA
Tire/Wheel/Brake
NA_
Unknown
7. MISCELLANEOUS CHEMICAL
EXPLOSION DATA
Known
Probable
Known
Probable
?
Initial Ignition Occurred In on Explosive Manner Prior to Ground
Impact.
NA
intensity of Explosion Was, Sufficient To Cause OP Appreciably
Contribute to In.ffight Airframe Ireak.Up.
NA
?
Exploston Occurred Atter Fire and Before Ground Impact.
NA
Other Significant Data (Sp?clly)
NA
,
Explosion Occurred Subsequent to Ground .1tripoct.
NA
.
Unknown or Not Available.
11_,.....
a. AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE
OFFICER'S ANALYSIS AND SPECIFIC ACTION TAKEN
Describe difficulties involved and relationship of the IMPIOUS components to the accident. Describe specific action taken. for Fire Data describe the fire andier chemical explosion.
Cover In detail any noted deficiencies, malfunctions of fire detecting and extinguishing equipment, or questionable procedures. When discussing specific equipment, ;Iv* the name of
manufacturer, port numbers, etc., and state whether or nota UK has been submitted. Include any additional information or opinion of possible value to future technical analysis of this report.
On 25 January 1966, SR-71, 61-7952, was airborne from Edwards Air Force Base,
California at 1120 hours, Pacific Standard Time, on a Category I research and
development test flight. The aircraft was airborne approximately two (2) hous
twelve (12) minutes and the pilot had completed the first half of the scheduled
mission and had accomplished one (1) aerial refueling. No mechanical difficulties
had been encountered. At approximately 1330 hours, Pacific Standard Time, a right
turn was started for turn around to Edwards AFB, California when an unstart occurred
on the right engine. This condition started the aircraft rolling to the right. The
pilot moved controls to counteract this rolling, but a noes up movement developed
and the aircraft became uncontrollable.
The aircraft nose section broke off at approximately station 535 and landed
about ten (10) miles from the rest of the aircraft. The large section; wings,
fuselage, etc; came down in a flat spin. Fire damage was caused by ground impact.
Parts were scattered over an area approximately fifteen (15) miles in length and
ten (10) miles in width. All major components were transported to Edwards AFB for
analysis except the aircraft drag chute and the tape from the Mission Recorder.
These could not be found.
The aircraft records were impounded and reviewed.. .
There were no overdue time change items. All documented maintenance actions
were signed off properly. In all cases a mechanic and an inspector signed off each
discrepancy and the removal and replacement of all items. In reviewing documentation
on aircraft maintenance records from October 1965 to current forms for flight number
41, 25 January 1966, one discrepancy was noted:. One open write up' in AFTO Form 781b
that ballast is installed in EMR 'and SLR compartments was in error. Load sheet and
wreckage shows that sensors were aboard and not ballAsi.
In reviewing DD Forms 829-1 the following discrepancies were found:
1. Engine DD Form 829s indicate that proper documentation did not arrive
with the engine from the factory. Examples: Engine P648336 indicates fifteen (15)
service bulletins complied with, however, service bulletin application says they are
not applicable to this serial numbered engine. The engine DD Form 829s do not show
previously complied with service bulletins. They only show the service bulletins
complied with at Edwarde AFB Engine Shop.
- 2. Spike assembly DD Form 8290 did not haye.a-part number on it and the
DD Form 829-1 was not attached, therefore, it is impossible to tell from the records
what service bulletins apply to this aircraft._ ,
There were 140 outstanding service bulletins on the aircraft and engines:
Aircraft and Associate Equipment 91
Engine Serial Number P648336 24
. Engine Serial Number P648333 25 ?
Service Bulletin R-212, Inlet Control Wiring Revision, was partially complied
with on the left engine, but not on the right. Accomplishment of service bulletins
R-104, R-212, Rp.221 and R-269 will decrease the amount of unstarte, but will not
eliminate them. ,
Service Bulletin 17300, Substitution of Shear Bolts at FS 535 would not have
prevented break-up. The subject bolts are at the top of the fuselage but the air-
craft started breaking up at the bottom of the fuselage.
These open service bulletins did not contribute to the primary caunu of the
accident.
_......
7116
* VAL 1101/1111MMINT PAINTING 0111Cli 110 Op...1111/11
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RECOMMENDATION:
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1. Project Support Office and engine manufacture conduct a study to provide
more accurate configuration control of all engines.
2. LAC re-evaluate Service Bulletin 306; Substitution of Shear Bolts at
FS 535 with reference to the bottom longeron.
3. LAC review their aircraft records for proper information on DD Forms
829 and 829-1 on Spike Assembly.
Orff Gie
CORDON L. SCHARNHOR3T, Capt., USAF
Maintenance and Records Team Chief.:
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AF Form 711g, LIFE SCIENCES REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IN AN AF ACC/DENT/
INCIDENT SECTION A. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT/INCIDENT
Paragraph 3n.
The aircraft was engaged in a flight performance check with an aft center-
of-gravity greater than 26%. As the aircraft was rolled into a bank, an
unstart occurred on the lower engine. Because of the flight characteristics,
the aircraft entered a slow, imperceptible pitch and the pilot had insufficient
stick control. The pitch attitude of the aircraft continued until the forebody
separated. The forebody continued to rotate in the longtudinal axis and it is
speculated that, at about 135? of rotation to the original flight path, the
chines separated and, as a result, both canopies fired.
What occurred after this point is pure speculation as both occupants in one
way or another were extracted from the forebody. The suitp end parachutes
functioned normally and the occupants were returned to terra firma.
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AF Form 711g, LIFE SCIENCES REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED /N AN AF ACCIDENT/
INCIDENT. SECTION A. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT/INCIDENT
Paragraph 10, MEDICAL OFFICER'S RATIONALE, COMMENTS--
The manner in which the pilot escaped from the forebody is purely speculative.
The bruises .sustained are probably due to being thrown about the cockpit.
The pilot blacked out in the initial positive g loading as the forebody
pitched up and decelerated. Apparently, as negative forces were applied to
the pilot, the lap belt sheared. (See Photo Nr. 12.)
The unrestrained movement of the pilot then caused the automatic sequence of
the parachute to be initiated. When the canopy fired, the pilot slid out of
the aircraft as nylon burns occurred both on the shoulder straps and the
stabilization chute cover. The most distal burns on the shoulder straps would
indicate that the lap belt was pulled up around the neck ring of the suit.
During this interval of time, the stabilization chute was deployed, and it,
along with the weight of the pilot, caused the shoulder harness to part at the
proximal point of attachment (See Photo Nr. 12).
The pilot regained consciousness during the free fall under the stabilization
chute. He experienced very mild spinning which he could control by extending
an atm.
His hands became numb from the cold and he experssed concern over not being
able to locate the manual chute release. However, his fear was quickly
dispelled when the main chute opened and he continued his descent to terra
firma. He activated the global survival kit as soon as he could identify objects
on the ground.
He landed facing the wind in an erect position and rolled over onto his back.
The wind was estimated at approximately 5 knots and a surface temperature of plus
10?F. He did experience difficulty in releasing the capwell: Fortunately,
his descent was witnessed by a rancher who arrived shortly after the pilot made
contact with the ground. The rancher assisted in collapsing the chute. He
was then transported in a helicopter to the nearest hospital.
Personal Equipment Finding STATOTHR
It is felt thatwas rendered unconscious by high positive "g" forces during
the pitch-up and subsequent aircraft breakup. Investigation reveals that this
lap belt, like most aircraft lap belts examined, has a knurled roller bar which
is part of the lap belt adjustment system. This roller bar has a sharp edge on
each end and it is very simple to catch one edge of the lap belt over one of
these edges. (See Photo Nr. 12.) It is apparent from the lap belt in this case
that it was sheared from the bottom edge up. During the uncontrolled maneuvers
of the forebody, the belt was broken and the pilot was thrown up into the canopy.
(See Photo Nr. 13) An imprint of the back of the helmet plus paint samples
from the helmet were found in the uppermost part of canopy. It is possible that
shortly thereafter both canopies were blown off the aircraft. The pilot would have
then been bent over facing forward with the top of the helmet facing the wind-
screen. This would have exposed the'stabilization chute directly in the windstream.
It would have also placed the torn lap belt under the pilot's neck ring and the '
shoulder harnesses stretched out behind him. (See Photo Ni'. 12.) At this time,
either the stabilization chute was deployed by wind force or had been deployed
by the lanyard attached to the torn lap belt. There is evidence to support
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AF Form 711g, LIFE SCIENCES REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IN AN Al' ACCIDENT/
INCIDENT. SECTION A. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT/INCIDENT
Personal Equipment Finding (cont'd)
either theory. The combination of the explosive decompression, plus
a 2700 pound force being exerted by the stabilization chute, snapped Mr
from the cockpit. There is paint on the back of the main para-
chute pack which indicates that he was dragged quite rapidly over the
head-rest. At this point, the shoulder harness was torn from the inertia
reel strap. The lap belt and shoulder harness were found still attached
to the stabilization chute riser which failed to jettison (See Photo Nr.
12). This then is a provable fact that the stabilization chute did
deploy through the shoulder harness.
The rest of the escape system then tooklover and functionedwellexcept
, for the damaged right stabilization ?chute release pin whichAlailed to
Ljettison the right riser. The main chute deployed on schedule at 15,000
feet and raised the pressure-suit face plate about one minute
after main chute opening. He later deployed the survival kit which dropped
on its lanyard below him with the life raft inflated. Parachute landing
shock was stated to be mild to moderate with no injury. He rolled over on
his back and head and at that:tiMO'damaged le visor latch methahism
because he later stated when heAstood up he ould not keep theface plate
up. His hands were still very cold and he could not operate.thelparachute
canopy quidk _releases. The follOwing4t a descriptidh of the,lamage to
persona1 equipment:?
A, Stabilization Chute
? 1. Covering torn.
.2. Actuating cable housing' almost completely severed.-
_
3. 'Pin guide plate ripped from housing.
4. Both risers show signs of high speed dragging, evidenced by
melted nylon on risers.
5. One suspension line cover is broken (no cords broken).
6. The skirt of the stabilization cahOpy shows evidence of very
high "Q" forces in the lower four ribbons.
7. The stabilization pilot chute also shows high "Q" forces
(See Photo Nr. 14).
B. Main Parachute and Pack
1. No canopy or suspension lines or risers damage.
2. The harness shows evidence of high friction dragging of the
shoulder harness across it (melted nylon).
STATOTHR
3. The main parachute pack shows evidence of being dragged across
the headrest. 'Melted nylon and_rerLstains from the headrest on the
pack occurred prior to main chute deplOyment."ThiedaMage did
tot affectAta spbsequentoperationLor redueelitSyr0.1.a144.ity.
7,
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AF Form 711g, LIFE SCIENCES REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IN AN AF ACCIDENT/
INC/DENT. SECTION A. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT/INCIDENT
Personal Equipment Finding (conttd)
C. Survival Kit
No damage - functioned perfectly,
D. Pressure Suit and Components
1. Helmet (See Photo Ni'. 13).
a. Two gouges in the back of the helmet which were matched
to two screws in to p of the aircraft canopy. (Paint
samples analysis was done to confirm).
b. An impression in the top of the canopy between the two
previously mentioned screws matched a mark on the back of
the helmet.
STATOTHR
c. The left hand visor latch was broken off.
statement indicates this happened on landing.
d. Gouge on the sunshade latch.
e. Sunshade ripped off.
2. Outer Cover, Boots and Gloves
a. Gloves and boots essentially undamaged.
1
b. Outer coverall contained three very small rips, none of
which are considered significant either by size or function.
c. The flotation garment built into the outer coverall was
undamaged.
3. Pressure Suit
a. The pressure suit itself was undamaged.
b. One of the oxygen hoses was broken off at the silver solder
joint. The other oxygen system hose was weakened at the
' same silver solder joint and failed after several minutes
of operation under leak testing (See Photo Ni'. 15)._
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AP Form 711g, LIFE SCIENCES REPORT OF IN INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IN AN IF ACCIDENT/
INCIDENT. SECTION A. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT/INCIDENT
Item 10 (conttd)
'FINDINGS:
1. The pilot's lap belt sheared bilaterally in the area of adjustment.
2. The injuries that the RSO sustained indicate that he had undergone
a high rate of spin.
3. One of the oxygen hoses on the pilot's snit was broken off at the
solder joint. The solder joint on the other hose was severely
weakened and separated while being leak checked.
STATCZTHR
The pilot's face plate iced over during the free fall thus
obscuring vision.
It is felt that the pilot's lap belt sheared at a force less than
specified in the military. specifications due to the sharp edges
an the knurled adjustment.
Neither the pilot nor the RSO initiated the ejection sequence.
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i4.1.;.113
JAHDLTS,
AF Form 711g, LIFE SCIENCES REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IN AN ArACCIDENT/
INCIDENT. SECTION A. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT/INCIDENT
Item 10 (contld)
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Redesign the knurled roller bar on the lap belt adjustment to
eliminate the sharp edges on each end.
2. Remove the stabilization chute from the man and utilize a stabilized
seat as soon as possible.
Remove the oxygen hoses from the front of the existing suits as
soon as possible. Modify them to the more modern configuration.
4. Provide bailout face plate heat.
5. A means be developed immediately to insure that all crew members
can reach the headrest regardless of torso height.
6. The lap belt should be inspected prior to each flight for
general condition.
, A study should be made to determine the feasibility of an automatic
ejection system under high altitude breakup conditions.,?
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STATEMENT
Aircraft 2003
Flight #41
25 January 1966
25X1A
1 February 66
The crew briefing for flight #41 of aircraft 2003 was held at 0830
an 25 January 1966 with the following personnel in attendances
25X1A
The briefing began by discussing the flight roots, weather, crew
duties and support, ie: (Chase, frequency's and tanker call sign and
refueling altitude).
The pilot briefing consisted of the followings
1. Aircraft configuration plus payload configuration and
flight #40 squawks and corrective action.
2. Conduct takeof; test utilizing Sport 44 with engines
trimmed IGT 50"C below max.
ronald R.
3. Dictet - Pilot to give, time and events periodically
during flight.
4. Select crosafeed when tank #6 goes empty for 4 minutes
approximately, during cruise going Noah route to min-
imize excessive up elevvn trim later in cruise. From
results noted on Noah leg vary time of crossfeed "ON"
during cruise on Eli route. Maintain positive elevon
trim and stable pitch response.
5. Conduct special ATOS configuration' during decal - spikes
and forward bypass doors "Auto"; select aft doors to
position 'IP before going to mil power; "Close" doors
just before retarding throttles to 6800 RPM; leave for.
ward bypass doors and spikes 'Unto" all the way open.
6. Conduct drag chute test - (Emergency pull) at 190 KIAS on
landing. Notes Chute will not jettison after emergency
deploy.
7. The SR-3 compass is not working correctly since prior to
the last flight when we installed a turn rate servo for
test. Therefore do not fly the needle on TACAN, but fly
the course bar.
Pull L/H throttle back to equalize fuel flows at cruise.
Fly the ball and not the yaw trim indicator.
5, Ma
25X1A
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;:'
fl,,:.Albert:J. Mitchell, make. the following voluntary statement
in Connection with an 'aviation accident involving an Air Police aircraft
whiChAoccurred.on 25 Vanua*: 1966 naarjucturpai.i,'Nplallexico.,
.1 understand, and have been advised, that the solo.purpose of
'the investigation ip to determine all factors relating to the accident
endi in the interest of accident prevention, to preclude recurrence, .
I was branding colta'in our Headquarters corral When we heard .a sonic bOoni.
,."With me were Bernard', Moon, Simon Martinez,. and T.D. Laster. all of Albert,
7New Majcipo. :1 had my head down and didn't look up for about 30 seCOnds -
when Laster said he is on fire. I lookedAip and saw a white contrail going:
''from West.to.East. I Was about lb miles South Of the path of flight. I.
'looked West about 15 to 20 miles and paw tho beginning of the contrail.
filhere was a'little'puff where the contrail started then three (maybe only 2)
more puffs almost due north of us about a mile apart. Then I eOuld see
the piano going.down to the East still trailing the white contrail. This
took about 45 seconds. I turned to Moon and told him to come help get out
the helicopter. .I got into Laaters pickup and started toward our airport
?looking Eastward. Just as we' got to ranch cattleguard t saw two chutes
with the Pilots. One was about, mile n
:the other further east. At this 'time t.called the house to Milk .
. i north and mile East and 25X1
-A:
.in Las Vegas about crash. ,After crossing cattleguard look at chutes again
.:and saw a third chute almost in line between the two other chutes or even'
further East. It was smaller and I loft it after this and :never have aeon
it since. The plane was still falling trailing White trail.. After openinv
hanger door'i looked Eastward and:saw planeabdut 10,000.ft in the air . ?
fluttering like .a loaf. At about this tins ',could see flamed but still
white smoke. It took the plane.a'long time to. fall this let 'distance.
; wondered if it would over hit. Upon impact a big black bellow of smoke
rose. I'continued to gat helicopter and start. Iarrived at about
30 seconds to 1 minute after he landed and helped am spill hia 'chute. I
-25?(M.
...told him that ,I was sure glad to see him alive. He paid same.
face was streaked with blood but. he Could Acme and acted very onsibio to
14.e. I helped him remove face Plate so that.; was cure hp could .breathe
:and the? told himi had to get to the other boy. _Laldo:aeked
hol4lnedy were, in the plane and be said .just thd onlvdtbep'1665r...
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STATEMENT
1011
1-4
PAGE 1 of 1 PAGE
I, Norman N. Libby, make the following voluntary statement in
connection with an aviation accident involving an Air Force aircraft
which occurred on 25 January 1966 near Tucumcari, New Mexico.
I understand, and have been advised, that the sole purpose of the
investigation is to determine all factors relating to the accident, and,
in the interest of accident prevention, to preclude recurrence.
Norman Libby and Henry Olds talking at point on sighting plane
hearing exp or sonic boom. Libby stated to Olds that one had broken sound
barrier. Olds said "barrier, hell. It is on fire and falling". We both
watched it from point of exp to point of impact. I checked Div watch at
time of sighting and found it was 24 minutes of three. It hit the ground
at 20 minutes of three. Upon sighting it seemed to fly in a big arch. I
left Olds at point of impact. I went to Mosquero called Cannon Air Base
reported crash and returned to point of impact. Commanding Officer asked
to keep all public away and to secure area. We could see nothing separate
from plane or parachute from time of sound until plane hit ground.
Smoke for 30440 minutes.
A TRUE COPY
onald R.amee. Maj., USAF
12/4"vii-r7
Recorder .
y
Norman N. Libby
//t NORMAN N. LIBBY
Bueyeros, New Mex.
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STATEMENT
1-4
PAGE 1 of 1 PAGE
Is Henry Alla, make the following voluntary statement in connection
with an aviation accident involving an Air Force aircraft which occurred
an 25 January 1966 near Tucumcari, New Mexico.
I understand, and have been advised, that the Bole purpose of the
investigation ifs to determine all factors relating to the accident, and,
in the interest of accident prevention, to preclude recurrence.
Mr. Norman Libby and I were talking on Hwy 65 and I heard a boom.
I looked up and saw this plane explode again. It kindly weaved around and
then atarted to fall in flambe. It looked like it came straight down
after that. We firat thought it broke the Bound barrier. We rushed to the
scene of the craBh and it maa all in flames. It looked like it hit straight
down as it didn't bounce.
/a/ Henry Alla
Hula ALLS
0/0 Libby Cattle Co.
Bueyeroa, Nate
A TRUE COPY
ora?Veivi.42--
Donald R. ems, Maj., USAF
Recorder
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PAGE 1 of 1 PAGE
STATEMENT
SI, August J. Hayoz, make the following volux4ary atatement in
connection with an aviation accident-involving an.4ir Force aircraft
which occurred on 25 January 1966 near Tucumcaris New Mexico.
I understand, and have been advised, that the aole purpose of the
inveatigation is to determine all factore relating to the accident, and,
in the interest of accident prevention, to preclude recurrence.
Ed. McMahon
Ale t Navarro
Looking out of barn
Mr. Libbya Ranch
Alex Navarro called to the attention of a plane after a boom was heard.
Ran to West barn door, seen what to me appeared a explosion. After seeing
the explosion heard another boom which I believe -watrthe aftermath of
the explosion. Plane nosed up into a complete circle then gliding from
aide to aide which appeared to be heading Southerly dirOtion staying
horizontal poaition. Juat before drop mimed to 'nose down a little then
tail section seemed to level off. Hitting ground aflame rose 500 to
800 feet. At arrival at the ecene all sections were flattened down,
Wee 2i miles from crash
site East
A TRUE COPY
Donal R.
Recorder
USAF'
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/s/ August J. Ham
/t/ AUGUST J. HAYOZ
Plant Supt.
Schwartz Plant
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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS, AIR FORCE FLIGHT TEST CENTER (*roc)
EDWARDS AIR FORCE BASE, CALIF. 93523
SPECIAL ORDER 1 Feb 1966
M-26
The following named personnel, organizations and stations indicated, are
appointed members of an Aircraft Accident Investigation Board under the
provisions of AFR 127-4. *Indicates orders published with the approval of
the individuals'
GRADE
organization Commander.
VOTING MEMBERS .
ORGN AND STATION
NAME AN) AFSN ,
DUTY
*COL
JAMES 0 FUSSELL, FR6705
President
1002 IG Gp, Norton
AFB, Calif.
*COL
HORACE A TEMPLETON, FR9349
Special
Advisor
ASD (ASZB), W-PAFB,
Ohio
*LTCOL
RAY C GORDON JR, FR16097
Material
1002 IG Op, Norton
AFB, Calif.
*LTCOL
IAN D ROTHWELL, FR36728
Investigating'
1002 IG Gp, Norton
Officer
AFB, Calif.
LTCOL
WALTER F DANIEL, FR28225
Operations
AFFTC (FTIA) Edwards
AFB, Calif.
MAJ
ROBERT E MATEJKA, FR59702
Medical
AFFTC (FTDTB)
Edwards AFB, Calif.
25X1A
LTCOL
*MAJ
CAPT
NON-VOTING MEMBERS
RALPH N RICHARDSON, FV782011
DONALD R JAMES, FR41908
GORDON L SCHARNHORST, FR47150
FOR THE COMMANDER
L. H. CWO, W4, USAF
Director of Administrative Services
M-25
Material
Material
Material
Material
Medical
Recorder
Material'
DISTRIBUTION
1002 IG Gp, Norton
AFB, Calif.
1002 IG GO, Norton
AFB, Calif.
1002 IG Gp, Norton
AFB, Calif.
AFFTC, Edwards AFB,
Calif.
AFFTC (FTDTB)
Edwards AFB, Calif.
4200 SRW, Beale
AFB, Calif.
AFFTC (FTTA)
Edwards AFB, Calif.
8
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The accident board arrived at Tucumcari? New Mexico on 26 Januar,'
1966. The pilot was interviewed at 0700 hours at the Tucumcari hospital. At
this time they recorded his original statement. (attached) The board then
proceeded to the wreckage site, some forty miles to. the north of the town.
the remainder of the day was utilized in assuring the security of the
wreckage and in establishing a center for the activities of the board. The
Army National Guard Armory building at Tucumcari became the center of all
activities for the board.
Amarillo APB, Texas, was notified that that station would be the
logistical center for the operation. Manpower and equipment for removing the
wreckage was obtained and put in place at the accident site.
The accident board convened at 0730 hours an 27 January. At this
time the board president assigned specific duties to board members and advisors
to the group. The meeting was then adjourned and the group proceeded to the
accident scene to complete a detailed study of the wreckage. At the same time
an intense air and ground search, was being conducted.for parts of the
aircraft. In this connection twd R-43 helicopters and crews from Reese AFB
were assigned and performed shuttle and search operations during the board
activity at Tucumcari, New Mexico. On this date no parts of the wreckage were
moved or dismantled, since technical assistance personnel were still arriving
at the accident scene from all parts of the country.
The accident board convened at 0730 hours on 28 January for the pur-
pose of establishing that all possible data had been gathered prior to
commencing reclaimation activities. It was agreed by all present that salvage
operations should begin. During the period 28 to 29 January, all efforts were
directed toward readout and salvage of the aircraft. The wreckage was placed
on mobile equipment supplied from Cannon APBs Kirtland AFB, Amarillo AFB,
and Walker AFB. The accident board was then adjourned and directed to proceed
to Edwards AFB for future activity. The aircraft was transported overland by
convoy, accompanied by a security guard to Edwards APB, arriving on 31 January.
On 31 January 1966 at 0800 hours the board was convened at Edwards
APB. Members of the group were directed to proceed to the wreckage area and
accomplish a detailed examination of various components. The board spent the
remainder of the day in laying out the wreckage and in detailed inspection and
analysis of components.
The board was formally convened at 0800 on 1 February for the purpose
of interviewinghi pilots with h experience in the SR-7]. type aircraft. The
board called
transcripts attached).
Subsequent to these interviews a team of board members were selected to conduct
a aeries of tests at Beale AFB on the SR-71 flight simulator. This group
departed Edwards AFB at 1300 hours. The tests were conducted on 2 February
and the team returned to Edwards AFB on that evening.
At 0800 on the morning of 3 February the board received a briefing
concerning the results of the test e o e
the board caned 25X1A
(transcripts at e OW e Mee was a =rued.
The board reconvened on 7 February at 0730 hours to deliberate 'on
the Findings and Recommendations of the board.
?
25X1k
DONALD R.
Recorder
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PILOTS STATEMENT
25X1A
1-4
statement Of the morning of January 26, 1966.
Present to hear his stRtement are Colonel Templeton, Lt.
Colonel Daniel, Lt. Colonel Bothwell and Mr. Miller
I'd like to explain APR 127-4, paragraph 16.
?Tha e eo.e purpose of the investigation is to determine all
factors relating to the accident and in the interest of accident
prevention, to preclude recurrence. The investigation will not
be used as evidence, or to obtain evidence for use disciplinary
action, to determine pecuniary liability or line of duty status,
or to revoke commission, or to support a demotion or to remove
from the active list under the provisions of APR 36-20 or for
use before a flying evaluation board.
This is pilot of Ship 2003, Tail Nr. 952,
flight on 25 January 1966.
I'll go through a debriefing of the whole flight.
The engine start on both sides was normal. Except on the
right side the right hydro did not come up to 3300 until the
engine was up to Idle. However, I was informed by the Engineer
that this is fairly normal in this airplane.
Prior to start, while I was punching the manual tanks, the
Nay system dumped so we had to wait another 17 or 18 minutes to
realign the Nay system. Al]. of the pre-taxi checks were normal.
We taxied out to the end of the runway and trimmed the engines
up to 794 on each side for a takeoff check with Askania, Sport
44. We tookoff on runway 4. After a countdown with Sport,
added power, release brakes.
Takeoff rotation was at 192 and lift-off was about 212.
Gear retraction fter takeoff was normal.
I came back to Minburner and turned left toward our outbound
track of 336 true to our modified NOAH route. I noticed the left
A/li went out in the Min AM position. I came back to the Min A/B
stop after takeoff and the left burner went out. I relit that
and continued climb at about 400 ERAS up to .88 Mn. At .88 Mn
and on up to 320000, / nosed over at .88 Mn and 32,000 and to
full A/t, accelled on up to 450 AS, established the 450 IAS
climb schedule. This accel took me down to about 28,000
and around .19 Mach. When I hit 450, / noticed that pitch
trim was a little higher than normal in this area. It was
about three to four degrees nose up.
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Our takeoff fuel load had been max. It was indicating
82,200 at engine start and 78 something at takeoff. The climb
and accel was fairly slow from that point on. The CIT's
appeared higher than normal.
Inlet schedule for takeoff was: Spikes - Auto, Forward
Doors - Manually Closed, and Aft Doors - Closed.
At 1.7 Mn Poe ":111," was selected on the aft doors and prior
to this time, there had been about a half psi lag between left
and right OM The left CI? was half psi below the right.
This disparity continued after selepting Poe W on the Aft
Doors.
At Mach 2.3 the forward doors were put in the Auto position
and CIP's responded normally.
At 2.6 Mn, the Fos "A." was selected in the Aft Doors and just
prior to this, inlet roughness occurred, some mild roughness,
and, after going to Poe "A", the roughness increased in intensity.
The roughness persisted out beyond 2.8 Mn.
At 2.8 Mn I placed the aft door switches to the closed
position. In Poe "A" I noticed the aft door lights flickered
for considerable period of time. The right light flickered
for m ybe 15 or 20 seconds and then went out. The left light
flickered for, or stayed on continuously for maybe a minute
and then started flickering and finally went out but I didn't
notice any unusual CIP indications at this time. When I went
to closed on the aft doors at 2.8 Mn, both lights responded
norm lly. They indicated transient operation and then went
out.
Above Mach 3.0 the inlet roughness diminished and the
inlets were fairly smooth beyond Mach 3.0 on this accel.
Further fter takeoff Auto-Nav was selected and it steered
us to our desired outbound track and it maintained track to what
appeared to be perfect throughout the entire leg of the NOAH
route. Northwest of Fallon, the Auto-Nay programmed us into a
35 degree right bank. At this time we were at about 2.8 Mach,
and it turned-us into a heading of 050 true. This was held for
about one minute through program and then the Auto-Nay turned
us left in approximately a 35 degree bank, sometime as high
as a 40 degree bank to the left. I rolled it out whenever it
got above 35 degrees back to between 30 and 35 degrees. This
steered us around the far turn of the north end of the route
and brought us back on track southbound. The southbound track
again appeared to be the desired track. We hit 3.2 Mn in the
turn, and maintained between 3.1 and 3.2 Mn s6Uthbound. The
Auto-Nay programmed again about 65 miles north of Santa Barbara
and took us over Edwards.
2
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A decel was started west of Daggett and the Auto-Nay
programmed the turn at Daggett toward Beatty. The decel was made
with the aft doors positioned to A, l5 open, and there were no
unusual inlet disturbances on the decel.
At 2.5 Mach, the aft doors were closed. Throughout the decel
the Spikes were Auto and the forward doors were Auto. At 2.5 Mn
the aft doors were closed and the throttles retarded to 6800 RPM.
We decelled back in the SPA, and made contact with the
tankers FATE 53, at 27,000 feet refueling altitude. We hooked
up when he was at the south end of the refueling track just
starting his turn. We stayed hooked up to the tanker until we
had about 58,000 lbs. We were indicating 315 knots IAS at
27,000 feet. At this time I was power limited in Mil with
580000, so we dropped off and I lit the right A/H and ttempted
to re-engage. I didn't trim out the rudders - I just left it
in the yaw. The boomer operator said that he couldn't make
engagement in this yawed condition so I had to trim out the
rudders and get fairly well aligned with the tanker. After
trimming out the yaw with the rudders, contact was made and we
stayed on the tanker through the north turn and dropped off
just after completing the turn, at the north end of the track.
At that time, we had 80,000 lbs indicated. We then cleaned up the
bird, and closed the refueling doors.
Prior to refueling, I'd transferred forward about 6,000 lbs
in tank 1. I had turned off forward transfer before refueling
engagement.
We commenced the second accel heading south 160 true, again
engaged Auto-Nay on this s uth leg and Auto-Nay programmed us
perfectly onto our track toward Boulder. The second accel was
made with the same inlet configuration as the first. The forward
doors had been placed in manual closed, the aft doors closed, the
Spikes Auto.
Then again at 1.7 Mach the aft doors were to position "B".
At Mach 2.0 I placed the forward doors to Auto. At 2.6 Mn the
aft doors to "A", with the same light indications as previously
in Poe "A". The lights stayed on an excessive length of time,
the aft door lights.
At 2.8 Mn the aft doors were closed and at 2.9 Mn I noticed
yawing in the aircraft which put the aircraft in a 20 degree
right b nk. I first attributed this to the Auto-Nav because
the yaw wasn't really noticable. It was more noticeable as arch.
However, checking CIP's I noticed that right CIP was about 4
psi below the left. I assumed this to be the forward door
opening so I rotated the right forward door switch clockwise
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and the CI? increased on the right side. I rotated the door
switch until it matched the left. From that point on in the excel
I used the manual right door schedule to maintain the right CIF
fairly close to the left. This occurred at 2.9 Mn on the second
accel.
I had had some inlet roughness at about the same point on
this accel as on the first. However, during this period the
inlets were fairly smooth, during this period of manual door
operation.
? The Auto-Nay was taking us along our eastbound leg right
on track. We continued the accel on up to 3.18 to 3.2 Mn. I
noticed at about 2.18 Mn our CIT limit had been reached. Also
on the first leg southbound I noticed that we had to back off
a couple of times from our 400 degree CIT limit at 3.2 Mn. Our
max Mach on the first leg had been 3.22 and max altitude 83,000
feet. In a couple of areas I had to decrease Mach to lower the
CIT below 400. The max CIT on the flight had been 405 before I
backed off. So this occurred on the e stbound leg and I backed
off to pproximately 3.15 Mn and about 78,000 feet, just short
of the turn at Dalhart, on the east end of the leg.
25X1A
I remember checking with =FiRand asking hi when he
expected the turn point to be reac a an he said in approximately
20 seconds. At this time I added a little bit of power, '
approximately 3000 lbs fuel flow on each side. Because I wanted
to maintain approximately the same altitude throughout the turn.
So I was 3.15 Mn and between 77,000 and 78,000 at the start of
the turn.
The Auto-Nay programmed the turn at exactly the right moment'
and put the aircraft into a 35 degree right bank, between 30 and
35. After about 20 degrees of turn the conditions were: I'd
like to back up a minute.
Just prior to the turn I called out a ue1 reading of
42,200 lbs and a pitch trim indication of 2 degrees nose up.
The pitch trim on this second leg was considerably lower than on
the first. On the first leg we almost ran out of nose up pitch
trim in level flight. In the turns excessive back pressure was
required on the stick to maintain level flight. As I was
saying on the first leg the pitch trim was excessive throughout
the accel. It got as high as 7 degrees nose up in level flight
southbound.
We took a lot of individual tank readings. In the turn on
the south end of the NOAH route it was 8 degrees and required a
lot of back pressure. I had attempted using crossover on the
southbound leg of NOAH to alleviate this e.g. condition. But
it had no noticeable effect on pitch trim. I left crossfeed
on for 7 minutes.
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We had discussed this before flight and decided on using
crossfeed in lieu of tank 2 manually. But after the lack of
effect of crossfeed I decided on the second accel I would
select tank 2 manually for a short period to see if that
improved the e.g. situation. This was not necessary because
on the second leg the c.g. was noticeably further aft. The
max elevon pitch trim was 2i degrees up and I noticed this
condition just prior to the turn at Dalhart, the east end
of the ELI route.
The aircraft felt very stable in pitch at this time. I
had no indication of sloppiness which we have had on
occassion. The only unusual control indications I noticed
in the flight were, of course, the extreme forward e.g.
requiring the excessive back stick pressures on the first
leg and also during this stick input in the turns, excessive
back stick input I noticed some roll feedback, slight pulsing.
roll feedback, in the stick, in Auto-Nay.
After about, I would say, 15 degrees of turn, 30 to 35
degrees right bank angle, at the east end of ELI, the conditions?
were: approximately 3.17 Mn, and approximately 77,000 to
78,000 feet. Just after starting rolling into the turn I
cranked down the right CIP by opening the right forward '
bypass slightly, so the right CIP would lag the left by about
i psi. Hopefully giving me unstart margin in the turn.
However, about 20 degrees of turn I experienced an unstart
on the right side. The aircraft went to approximately 60
degrees right bank from 30 to 35. I attempted to correct the
excessive roll angle with opposite roll input and glanced over
at the restart switches and CIP's and I could see the split
in CIP's. The right CIP in this glance I got, looked like
about 4 and the left looked to me as it was approximately 14.
Prior to that both CIP's had been about 15. The right one
had been lagging the left because of the forward door. After
looking at the CIP's and, of course, realizing the increase
bank angle?I knew it was the right inlet. However, I remember
thinking I'll hit both restart switches anyway because I felt
th t might help alleviate the excessive roll. .1 then glanced
again from the restart, CIP area and I noticed that there was
no responce to my roll correction. It was maintaining about
the same bank angle, which I would estimate at 60 degrees,
although I had just about full opposite control.
At this time I
incident, which was
in a split secor
90 degrees like
25X1A
recall thinking of
similar to mine, this went through my mind
remember thinking, well at least it isn't
had.
25X1A
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About the same time as that I recall thinking I had better
get the nose down a little bit and reduce this roll coupling
input by lowering the angle of attack. I just discussed this
subject a couple of days prior to the flight with one of our
Aero Dynamleipts. I pushed forward on the stick, maintaining
the left ailerwl input, with no effect on the bank angle.
Shortly after putting in some forward stick the nose started
coming up. The nose came up at an extre ely rapid rate.
The last thing I remember was I had the stick in the left
forward corner of the cockpit with the nose coming up at a
very rapid rate above the horizon. I remember seeing blue
sky and thinking - My God this is Pitch Up. Which is what
it appeared to me to be. It looked as if when the nose came
up th t the bank angle had diminished somewhat, but I couldn't
say for sure. I can't estimate the pitch rate except that it
was very fast and I couldn't really say how far up it went
because from that point on everything was total confusion.
The only thing I can remember after that were a couple of
thoughts that went through my mind. I didn't notice any.
"g" effects on me personally, although I'm sure thry were
present. I do recall thinking that I had better stay with
it as long as possible. However, I don't have any conscious
recollection of what was happening outside.
I've gone over this many times trying to estimate the
time span involved. I would estimate that from the time of
the unstart until the nose was well above the horizon, in
this pitch up situation, was approximately 5 seconds. The
entire episode happened so fast I didn't have a change to
get scared or think about ejection or anything else.
After this I remember thinking that I should stay with
it as long as possible and then I heard a loud noise and what
souhded like a bang and rushing. I don't believe that I was
fully conscious at this time but I could hear these things
h ppening and I felt as if I was tumbling or being thrown
about. , Then I don't remember anything for awhile.
After that I remember thinking I was tumbling or anyway
I don't have any conscious recollection of what was happening
except everything was kind of jumbled and mixed up and
confused. I couldn't see, everything was black. I thought
to myself that I was dreaming. After this I regained "
consciousness or simi-consciousness and thought I had to be
dead if what had really happened, really happened.
After this the next thing I remember was the rushing of
air, the quiet rushing of air and I thought maybe I was
falling. Pretty soon I realized I was falling and / woke up.
I could open my eyes and see the f ceplate Which was completely
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liprp
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iced over. I could feel some of the straps flying up and I
could actually hear them slapping against the suit and
faceplate.
I was falling vertically and rotating slightly. Then I
realized I could control my rotation somewhat by extending
an arm or a leg or by bring my arms in close to the body. So
I attempted to do this to keep from spinning. I was worried
about rotating too rapidly. I knew, of course: that the
stabigzing chute had deployed and I was descending with the
stabillizing chute because my feet were down and I was, what
appeared to me to be, vertical.
I noticed that the suit was inflated and I felt kind of
numb and cold. My fingers were very numb. I thought about
trying to find the manual parachute release, in the event that
I had to use it. With the gloves and the stiff fingers I
could not identify it by feel. I would like to recommend that
we go back to the old "D" ring which you can put your hand in.
The fact that I could not feel that manual release concerned
me a little bit.
I don't have any idea how long I fell with the stabilizing
chute. It didn't seem like an excessively long time to me
until the main chute opened. The main chute opening shock was
not bad at all.
After that I opened my faceplate, because I knew I was
low enough. I lokd around and one of the first things I
25X1A was was chute. It looked like he was i of a mile
away from me and he was slightly lower than I was. I was very
happy to see that chute, of course, I thought that he was
alright too. Then I saw the wreckage. The wreckage appeared
to be about 5 miles east of us. It was burning. I continued
on down looking for roads and buildings trying to find out which
way I was going to go when I got on the ground. Also trying to
feel if there was any damage to me. I could feel blood in my
nose so / knew I had a bloody nose. Other than that I felt
alright except for the cold.
I tried turning the chute to keep Jim's chute in sight
but my hands were so numb and cold that I couldn't effectly
pull on the visors to turn the chute. There was no
oscillating of the chute. It was perfectly steady just a
slight drift. When I felt I was getting fairly close to the
ground I released the survival kit and it extended properly.
There was an antelope right underneath me on the way down.
I thought it was a deer but the rancher told me it was an
antelope later on. So he ran away and / landed. / rolled
over on my back. The landing impact was very moderate.
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After landing my first concern was dumping the chute canopy,
It dumped by itself and then the breeze caught it and it inflated
again but it wasn't dragging me. It was just a slight pull.
However, because of the numbness in my fingers and the inaccess-
ability of the rocket jet release mechanism I could not actuate
the rocket jet release to spill the chute canopy. I would
like to see a modification on that.
While I was fooling around with the rocket jet release I
heard a noise that sounded like a helicopter but I couldn't
believe that there would be a helicopter there because this
country, on the way down, looked very desolate. However, sure
enough it was a helicopter and this man came over to me and
asked me if / was alright and helped spill the canopy and
weighted it down so it wouldn't inflate again. He tole me at
that time he had seen both of us come down and he was going
over to help Jim, whose canopy he said was also inflated. He
said, he looks alright but he's having the same trouble you
are with the canopy. So he got in the helicopter and went
over there.
In the meantime I was able to release the parachute harness.
Not without a little difficulty. Also my visor would not
stay up so I held my visor with one hand and released the chute
mechanism with the other.
When I finally got free of the chute,NM. the
an
rcher, came back and said that Jim hadn't made it. He said
his face was black. He had removed his, helmet and taken his
pulse and said there was nothing.
STATOTHR
helped me get my helmet off and then his
manaPEIRlin the pickup truck and said he would take care
of the parachute and the gear. took me in the sTAToTHR
helicopter and flew me to Tucumcari Hosipital.
I went over with him, to Jim and realized STATOTHIR
that there was nothing we could do for Jim so .we covered him
up with the chute. His manager said he would take oars Of him.
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Question:
25X1A
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
SUESTIONS
Bill, do you recall at any time during the flight of
any SAS problems, any SAS warning lights or mal-
functions of the SAS System?
I don't recall any SAS warning lights or problems at all.
Question: Particularly during the pitch Up maneuver itself did
25X1A you notice any?
I couldn't see any warning lights at all. I thought
about that a lot and if there were any lights on I
didn't see them. There might have been but I couldn't
say if there were or not. Mainly because it was
happening so fast, if they would have come on they
would have had to attract my attention because I
wasn't looking for them.
Question: Do you recall, other than the right inlet proplem,
25X1A any other inlet problems during the flight?
None at all except for the aft bypass door lights
staying on.
Question: How about the engines itself, any problems with the
25X1A engines throughout the flight?
No, the engines operated real well. The right oil
pressure fluctuated plus or minus 1 psi. At about
a certain period on each accel we got stabilized.
The Tight got down As low as 36 psi, up to about
39.
Question: How about the Autopilot. Was there any difficulty
25X1A with the Autopilot?
The Autopilot operation was very nice. The only
function I used was Auto-Nay, however, I didn't
use Mach or Pitch Hold.
,Question: During the unstart and subsequent roll and pitch
maneuver do you recall the Autopilot disengaging
25X1A or you disengaging it?
This is one thing I'm not sure of, whether'I
disengaged it or it disengaged. I really can't say.
I don't remember consciously disengaging it.
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Question: How about the Hydro Systems?
was watching the hydros closely all the way through
because they had had hydro problems in the flight
25X1A before. They had loss of "L" and "A" on the
previous flight, but the pressure stayed up and
there were no lights.
Question:
25X1A
Question:
25X1A
Questions
25X1A
Question:
25X1A
Question:
Question:
25X1A
Just prior to the unstart or during the unstart did
you happen to notice any hydro pressures?
Not that I recall. Periodically I'd call out all
the engine parameters and pressures into the
recorder, I recall that each time / called out
hydro that they were right where they had been
on the ground.
In the unstart subsequent maneuver do you recall any
warning lights coming on, Master Caution or other
Annunciator Panel lights?
No / don't. AgaiI I was trying to think of that
afterwards, I didn't see any.
How about the fuel derich was there any indication
that it had activated? '
No there wasn't. Not that / noticed.
Bill, do you recall taking any individual tank
readings, just prior to the unstart?
Yes I took tank readings, / would say, maybe
5 minutes prior to that. / can't recall any of
the readings.
Do you reeall them being unusual?
NO.
Was there a dictet onboard the airplane?
There was a dictet onboard.
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Question:
25X1A
Question:
25X1A
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
On the unstart itself, do you recall how high the
nose was initially after you had established this
60 degree bank prior to you reaching forward with
the stick?
It was, if anything, slightly low on the horizon.
I would say we had almost a 1000 feet in rate of
descent in this part of the turn. I remember
seeing the Vertical Speed Indicator, which is
not particularly accurate, and it was indicating
approximately 1000 feet rate of descent just prior
to this.
Do you recall seeing a KEAS reading, max KEAS or
max Mach at this time?
? I do not recall seeing max KEAS, I do recall Mach
just prior to this was 3.176. This was probably
the last reading I remember looking at.
Question: Do you recall what, approximately what, the CIT
25X1A reading was around this time?
Question:
25X1A
Question:
25X1A
They were running about 390 or 395.
In your action during the unstart you reached for
the restart switches. Had you at that time prior
or afterwards made any movement .on the throttles
reducing it to Minburner or Mil power?
No, the first action was the stick trying to - It
went up to the 60 degree bank and I merely reacted
with the control and then reached over for the
restarts and saw the CIP's and thought I'll hit
both restarts instead of one. Then my attention was
attracted to the excessive bank angle and the lack
of responce to bank correction. And after that this
is what preoccuppied ma.
Did you activate the restart switches?
I can't say. I think I did but I can't say. I
remember thinking I'll hit them both and looking at
the bank angle and think well at least its not 90
degrees like had and I've got to get rid
of that bankWM?THEY: the forward and full left
aileron input and the nose started up. I think I hit..
the restart switches but I wouldn't swear to it. I
know I thought to myself I had better hit both restarts.
/ was reaching over there but the Whole thing happened
so fast / can't say for sure.
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Questions
25X1A
Question:
25X1A
Question:
25X1A
Question:
Question:
25X1A
Question.:
Question:
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During the unstart did you have any chance,
opportunity to talk to Jim at all?
None at all.
You don't recall any attempt to actuate the bail
out switch or anything like that?
No I don't. There was no conscicpus attempt to
actuate the ejection system.
Coming down you said the faceplate was iced over
did you have sufficient vision that you could tell
that the stabilize chute was out?
No I couldn't see that. I looked up for the
stabilize chute and I couldn't see it. I could
see some of the straps.
Could you see the horizon?
No I couldn't. I could tell that there was blue
sky outside. It was very light but I couldn't see
the horizon. The only thing I could see definitely
were the straps coming up in front of the faceplate.
Bills will you clarify the Auto-Nay portion of the
Autopilot that you were using. Were you flying the
aircraft in pitch manually?
Yes, I flew the aircraft in pitch manually throughout
the entire flight. All I was using was making it roll,
Auto-Nav.
You did not use Mach Hold?
I did not engage pitch Autopilot in the flight at
all.
The only Autopilots you had were Autopilot and roll.
Roll and Auto-Nay, Yes Sir.
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Question:
25X1A
Question:
25X1A
When you made the control movement to recover from
this angle do you recall either knocking your
kirswitches off or (Interrupted by
25X1A
No, I know I didn't knock the switch off. My hand was
on the stiek all the time. I can't tell you truth- .
fully whether I disengaged it with the trigger.
I don't recall consciously doing it.
Did you use any rudder to compensate for the yaw
and roll coupling?
25X1A
I think so. I think I had rudder and full aileron
and full left stick but this is all instintive
reaction.
This is Colonel Daniels on the 27th of January. We're at
the National Guard Armory with a preliminary partial meeting
25X1A of the hearing board. Present are Colonel Fussell Colonel
Tempeiton,
Major James,
25X1ALockheed.
This is a continuation of the questioning of
This is Colonel Daniels:
Question: Bill, would you describe this unstart and compare it
? to other unstarts you have had and its reference to
25X1A its violence?
25)(1A
25X1A
It was not any more violent than the normal unstart
as far as noise and vibration. The primary difference
was the fact that it put the aircraft almost immediately*
from a 35 degree, into a 60 degree right bank. Then
following that there was the lack of control response
to the bank correction input. But the unstart itself
was essentially a normal unstart.
Question: Bill, would you compare this pitch up to pitch ups
25X1A you have seen in other aircraft?
I have not personally experienced pitch ups in other
aircraft, but I have studied the pitch up spin history
and tests of the 104, considerably, at great length
and seen all of the films many, many times. The pitch
rate involved here coNlwares almost the same as the pitch
rate I've seen from cockpit pictures of the 1040 '
Pitch Up Spin Tests.
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Questions Bill, what was the last angle of attack reading
25X1A that you recall?
It seems to me that it was approximately 3* degrees.
I recorded a lot of angle of attack readings
throughout the flight but I believe the angle of
attack reading I saw in conjunction with 2* degree
nose up pitch trim was 3i degrees.
Question: Bill, what was the last number position do you
25X1A recall on the forward door, right side?
/ was not consciously looking at the door position
indication. I was attempting more to match CIP's
manually with the forward door handle or knob.
However, I believe in cruise prior to that time the
door position was at approximately 10 on the
indicator and then when I opened the door slightly
at the initial part of the turn I believe the
position was about 9 on the door at the time of the
unstart, 9 to 9.
Questions Bill, just prior to the unstart what was the
25X1A approximate throttle position that you had?,
I would say a third burner.
Questions Bill, do you recall using the pitch trim in trying
25X1A to correct for this pitch maneuver?
.No I do not recall consciously putting in pitch trim.
Questions Bill, were your shoulder harnesses locked?
Yes, I'm positive my shoulder harnesses were locked.
I locked them before takeoff and for the entire
flight with the harnesses locked.
This is Colonel Tempelton:
Questions Bill, I wanted to get clarification on a couple of
points you made earlier in the tape. You mentioned
in the first leg where you had a forward e.g. that
you were getting a little feedback in the stick
during the turn. Would you clarify this a little
bit?
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Yes Sir. When I was making these turns at the end of
the NOAH route where I had maximum nose up pitch trim,
a very heavy back stick force was required, When
this aft stick input was made I experienced a
pulsing feedback in the stick. The stick was pulsing
lateraly, very slightly. At the time the aircraft
appeared to be stable as far as roll attitude is
concerned. The only unusual occurrence was the
stick pulsing itself.
Questions The other point was -Earlier in the mission you
had corrected the course alth ugh you were Auto-
Nay. Did you disengage or did you override the
25X1A Autopilot?
No, I overrode the Autopilot to minimize the bank
angle. Auto-Nay put the aircraft into approximately
40 degrees of bank in some of the turns we made on
the first leg. I just took the roll out manually
with the stick. Without disengaging the Autopilot.
It brought the bank angle back to 35 degrees.
This is Colonel Daniels:
Question:
25X1A
Question:
25X1A
Bill, do you recall making any rudder corrections
during the unstart maneuver?
No not consciously, I may have instinctively but
I do not consciously recall any rudder input.
Bill, how long had you been at speed prior to the
unstart?
I would say approximately 10 minutes.
This is Colonel Richardson:
Question:
25X1A
Bill, do you recall or can you state how you opened
the faceplate after the main parachute deployed?
Yes, I reached up with my left hand to actuate the
unlatching knob and it felt like a perfectly normal
unlatching and the rotation of the visor upward was
surprisingly easy. I thought that I might have
difficulty opening it. Z expected to have difficulty,
since it was all iced ?Vet but the opening appeared
to be. very easy to me.
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Questions Bill, how soon after the main chute deployed did you
open the faceplate and when I ask this question
I'm speaking in terms of time, of course, and
25X1A approximation?
NEM I would say within a minute after the main chute
deployed. Probably 30 seconds.
Question: Bill, after you raised the visor on descent, did
the visor remain up by itself. You didn't have
25X1A to hold it?
Yes, the visor remained up on the parachute descent.
I didn't have to hold it up.
Question: And then after parachute landing on the ground did
25X1A you notice any difficulty with the visor then?
Yes, after landing I noticed that I had to hold the
visor up with my left hand while I was trying to
unfasten the shoulder harness. The visor would not
stay in the up position. And it was still iced
over.
A. TRUE TRANSCRIPT
j or, USAF
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COLONEL russEm
COLONEL FUSSELL
25X1A
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BOARD METING - 1000 HOURS - 1 FEBRUARY 1966
25X1A
the sole purpose of the
investigation is to determine all factors
relating to the accident, incident and in the
interest of accident prevention to preclude
recurrence. The investigation will not be
used as evidence or to obtain evidence or
use in disciplinary action to determine
pecuniary liability, or line of duty status,
or to revoke commission or to support a
demotion or to remove from the active duty
list under the provisions of AFR 36-2, or
for use before a flying evaluation board.
During the course of the investigation the .
pilot, made the statement that
_25x1A you had witnessed a pitch-up some time ago.
Will you tell the board, in your own words,
the circumstances surrounding that incident
and the action taken by you, to recover. If
possible, we would like for you to include
elapsed times of the incident and the re-
covery, including speed, altitude, angle
of bank and pitch, center-of-gravity, fuel
aboard, etc..
of the SR-71/F-12 Test Force, In response
to the statement that I had experienced
pitch-up in this aircraft, this is not a true
statement. At no time in the YF-12 or the
SR-71 have I experienced what I would consider
pitch-up. I have experienced unstart conditions,
which is the inlet unstart on both the YF-12
and SR-71, and, on these occasions, the aircraft
does go into different conditions at that
time, and I will go into some detail in
describing exactly the conditons encountered
in this particular aircraft - the same aircraft
in which the accident occurred. First, however,
I would like to state that the unstart conditions
encountered in the YF-12A are not considered
to be in the same ballpark, so to speak, or in
the category as unstart conditions in the SR-71.
There appears to be some basic difference in
the stability of the aircraft or in the capability
of the aircraft to stay in a right-side-up
condition under inlet unstart that' the similar
condition encountered on the SR-71. With
regard to the specific conditions encountered
on the SR-71: On Flight 19 bf this aircraft, .
.on the 23rd of September, I took off and headed
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north on course. Approximately 24 minutes
after take-off I was on speed and climbing
in altitude, maintaining full power on the
aircraft. The automatic navigation system
was operating properly in the aircraft and,
shortly after take-off, the autopilot was
engaged and the automatic navigation system
was also engaged and, in this condition,
the navigation system flies the aircraft
through the autopilot. The plan was to maintain
full power and to maintain a limit of 400?
compressor inlet temperature. This had been
a recently established limit that we would
try to maintain and would vary with the ambient
temperature at altitude. As far as our speed
and altitude capability, these variables
would depend on what you're able to attain
while maintaining a limit of 400? compressor
inlet temperature. While maintaining 400?.
I reached a Mach number of 3.18 to 3.2 and
was holding this condition at approximately
75,000 feet when the aircraft went into its
first programmed turn. This turn was to the
left. The aircraft went into a 40? bank,
initially, to the left, and then slowly
rolled back out to a 350 bank in about 2 or
3 seconds, possibly 4 seconds, and then, in
another 4 or 5 seconds, rolled out to a
stabilized 300 bank. Approximately 3 1/2
to 4 minutes into this turn, the nose of the
aircraft started down slightly and, since
both pitch and roll attitude to hold were
being used, as far as maintaining the attitude
of the aircraft, the pitch trim knob was moved
in the "NOSE UP" direction in order to keep
the compressor inlet temperature at 400?
and, at the same time, reduce the Mach number
to effect maintaining this limit. The Mach
number reached 3.22 by the time this NOSE UP
correction was made. The first correction
was put in at 3.21 Mach number and didn't
have quite the desired effect and another
small beep trim - NOSE UP trim - was put in
to hold the speed and temperature as desired.
Just as the Mach number reached 3.23 and the
nose was coming up slightly, the left engine
unstarted. At this time, my right hand
was on the autopilot control and my left hand
was near the control stick. Simultaneously,
with the uns tart, the aircraft started a roll
to the left. Already being in a stabilized
30? bank, the aircraft went into a continued
roll in that direction - to the left. The
control stick was moved to the right with my
left hand while taking my right hand off of
the autopilot control and grabbing the control
stick and moving, forcing the control stick,
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to the full right position. At this time,
the nose of the aircraft was approximately
on the horizon. Even though the stick had
been moved all the way to the right, and the
bank angle had reached 45 or 50 degrees, which
should disengage the autopilot automatically,
the autopilot disconnect switch trigger was
actuated on the control column and the aircraft
continued to roll to the left. My left hand
was moved from the control column to the throttle
and power reduced to minimum afterburner since /
felt that the right engine, the right inlet, being
still in a starting condition, the power on that
side was actually rolling the aircraft, tending
to roll the aircraft over on its back. The
power was reduced to minimum afterburner on
both throttles even though the left engine,
the left inlet, was unstarted. This was
verified by rapid check of the compressor
inlet pressure gauge. The reading on that
gauge was in the vicinity of 5 psi, which was
quite different from the right engine, which
was reading in the order of 15 or 16. The
aircraft was continuing to roll to the left
and full aileron appeared not to have much
effect in the rate of roll. The rate possibly
slowed down slightly but it was still going
up. As soon as I noticed that this combination
of reducing power and full right aileron was
not having the desired effect, I started feeding
in right rudder. Having quite a bit of previous
experience in delta wing aircraft, it comes
as almost second nature to effect use of the
rudder for roll if the aileron is not having
the desired effect. By feeding in full right
rudder, the rate of roll slowed down and the
aircraft stopped rolling to the left when the
bank angle reached approximately 90?. At
that time, I believe, was the first time that
I felt that I had the aircraft back under
control. Until that time, this was the first
time in one of these aircraft that I felt
that, possibly, it was getting away from me.
I definitely had the feeling, when I went
through about 60 or 70 degrees of banks, that
there was a very strong possibility that I
might roll over on my back, and I didn't"
particularly want to be on my back at 3.22
Mach number at 76,000 feet. Once the bank
angle peaked out at about 90?, the aircraft
started righting itself normally; the nose
had no tendency to go up or down and the
bank angle was reduced to about 10 or 15
degrees and the right correction - the left
restart switch had already been actuated.
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COLONEL FUSSELL
25X1A
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The roughness encountere4 connected with the
inlet was reduced and the restart switch
was placed in the normal position. The
compressor inlet pressure built up normally and
there was no over-temp of the engines, the
EGT stayed within the normal range and it was
not even necessary to get an afterburner
relight. The inlet restarted, the compressor
inlet pressure came back up, the aircraft
was placed in approximately 20 or 30?
bank to the left, the autopilot was re-engaged
and the automatic navigation mode was re-engaged
and a small direct turn correction was necessary
to get back on course. This entire operation
required less than one minute.
25X1A
do you feel that you had
sufficient control to maintain straight-
and-level flight or to regain straight-and-
level flight with the power you had initially
when you encountered this roll tendency? In
other words, had you not reduced power, do
you feel you would have had sufficient control
to hold the aircraft?
I feel that had I not reduced power that with
full rudder the aircraft possibly would have
rolled back in the same direction that I had
started out from. In other words, I feel that,
even though I had not reduced power, the rudder
was the primary factor that got the aircraft right-
side-up again. This is just a feeling - I
have no way of knowing this - it is possible
that had I not reduced the power and that the
right inlet had stayed in a normal condition -
in other words - had not unstarted, that the
aircraft might possibly have gone to a higher
angle of bank. I do feel, though, that, even
with this differential in power, the rudder
was effective enough to bring the aircraft
back to a level flight condition. I have no
way of knowing this without trying it. On
this same flight, near the end of the flight,
I encountered this seine condition at 84,500
feet and went through almost the same maneuvers
I had to use full right rudder to right the
aircraft, but, in this instance, the right
inlet also unstarted as I was recovering and
the right EGT went overboard and I had to
shut the right engine down in order to keep
the engine from cooking in just a few seconds -
and I,Oan go through that maneuver also if
you're interested; however, it was almost a
repeat of the lower altitude maneuver - it
was just at a higher altitude with about the
same speed Mach number conditions, much lower
equivalent airspeed conditions.
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COLONEL FUSSELL
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Can you tell the board what your approximate
center-of-gravity was during this maneuver?
I don't recall exactly what the center-of-
gravity was at this condition. I don't
25X1A recall, without looking at some more data
from that flight, exactly what my pitch trim
condition was going into the turn or what my
total fuel remaining was, but this information
is available from the records of that flight.
I just don't recall it off-hand. I didn't,
make a note of it before I came in.
COLONEL FUSSELL
25X1A
Discussion with other pilots in the SR-71
indicates that it takes rapid reaction on
the part of the pilot to prevent loss of
control. Could you give us an estimate of
that time? I understand that you probably
are high time man in this airplane, but,
for a less-qualified individual, what would
his reactions be to this same condition?
This entire experience took approximately
one minute; let's say you had much less
experience, what would your reactions be?
It's a little bit hard to estimate. I feel
that there's a good possibility the reaction
time would have been slightly less and, as you
stated, any comment that other qualified
people made with regard to reaction time
can't be over-emphasized as far as I'm
concerned. This reaction time is very
important once you see the aircraft assuming
some altitude that you are either not expecting
or would rather not see - the importance of
a quick reaction time cannot be over-emphasized
for this reason. At these altitudes and
speeds, the response of the aircraft to the
deflection of the controls is relatively slow -
by this I mean it is quite a bit slower under
the same conditions, equivalent airspeed-wise,
at a lower altitude or subsonic condition.
So, since there is a noticeable delay In the
response of the aircraft to the control
deflection, it's very important to make a
correction as quickly as possible and hold
the required deflection until the aircraft
assumes the attitude that you desire. As
far as a less-qualified pilot - this probably
would depend whether he was on his first,
second or third ride, or if he had maybe had
10 or 15 rides and whether or not he had
encountered some unstart condition or acme
emergency condition that would require
relatively rapid reaction; but it's conceivable
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that an inexperienced pilot, relatively
inexperienced pilot, particularly someone
who didn't have a large amount or reasonable
amount of delta wing experience, would not
feel it was a normal reaction to use the
rudder to either recover from a roll condition
in the aircraft or to actually effect a roll
in the event that the ailerons were ineffective.
I think that it's a combination of the reaction
time and knowing what controls actually are
helpful under these conditions in order to
keep the aircraft in the desired attitude.
25X1A
, do you consider unstart in
25X1A this aircraft as a"fairly common occurrence?
In the early development stages we experienced
quite a few - a large - much larger number of
unstarts, I should say, than we have experienced
with the improved inlet and bypass door controls -
spike and bypass door controls. The unstarts
were relatively common in the early stages
of the interceptor and are still encountered,
I think, to a higher degree because of these
earlier controls than we are experiencing
with the SR-71. So I feel - I actually have
had very few unstarts in the SR-719 but by the
same token the unstarts that I have encountered
with the SR-71 have given me a different
feeling about the aircraft than with the YF-12.
I would like to make this statement with regard
.to the situation that was encountered on 25X1A
25X1A flight. I don't recall any time in
the YF-12 or the SR-71 that I had the feeling
that the aircraft was, no matter what the
emergnecy was, particularly in an unstart
emergency, I don't feel I ever came across a
situation where I had the feeling the aircraft
was getting away from me longitudinally. The
closest I came to this was an unstart in the
interceptor at one time when the nose of the
aircraft when I was diverted in the aircraft
for as long as 5 or 10 seconds and the nose
of the aircraft got down lower than I would
have desired to see it go down, and I was
still in a 45 or 55 degree bank. At this time,
I immediately rolled the aircraft to a level
condition and pulled all the way back on the
control column, however, the response of
the aircraft under these conditions was slow
enough that the equivalent airspeed limit was
exceeded by some 30 or 35 knots while the're-
covery was being effected. This proved to met
very quickly, that the longitudinal or pitch
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condition of the aircraft is going to have to
be monitored relatively closely by the pilot
at all times and I.have stressed this with
all of the pilots not to let their nose get
down or up to any great extent at these high
altitudes and high speeds because of the rela-
tively slow response of the aircraft to a con-
trolled deflection for recovery.
25X1A
as an experienced pilot,
what control reaction do you normally apply
during an unstart?
Well, I think, whether consciously or un-
consciously, of primary importance is main-
taining the proper pitch attitude of the air-
craft - the movement of the controls in a very
rapid fashion to keep the nose relatively on
the horizon or in a situation where you want
to make sure that it's not going either down
or up to any great extent that it might get
you into trouble. This is probably something
positive that could come out of this that
what has happened is that we may probably
have to increase our emphasis on maintaining
the longitudinal, proper longitudinal attitude
of the aircraft first and then taking care of
any other things that are going wrong after that.,
I guess - I probably was fortunate In my first
bad unstarta on the down side engine in the
aircraft in that my nose was either slightly
down or at least on the horizon when these
were encountered and I felt that my problem
was entirely in roll and didn't even have the
feeling that anything was going wrong
longitudinally. I had no tendency of the
aircraft to pitch up and the feeling was never
there that the airplane was getting away from
me longitudinally, but it sure did feel like
it was getting away from me in roll.
Could I summarize by saying that high altitude,
high Mach, possibly CO a little aft, that when
a pilot witnesses an unstart that he has
definitely an unstable aircraft on his hands?
Well, he's got a situation that he has to take
immediate corrective action on - there's no
time to check a checklist or to think a little
while about what's going on and take the action
later. The corrective action has to be taken
immediately, particularly in pitch, and also
in roll, to correct this situation. The
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stability augmentation system normally takes
care of any excessive Yawing condition you
get with this, but I think there are a lot?
of things we don't know about the coupling
condition of the slight Yaw plus the roll
condition in the aircraft and that even though
the stability augmentation system is helping
the pilot, the pilot also has to help it
by using what rudder is required and, particularly,
longitudinal control to maintain the aircraft
in a level or slightly nose down condition.
25X1A 25X1A
in the early part of your
discussion, answering your question from COLONEL
FUSSELL, you stated that inexperienced pilots
would have less reaction time - I think you
meant "more" reaction time. Is that right?
Correct. The reaction time would be slower
on the part of the inexperienced pilot.
Okay. Now, to your knowledge, did other
pilots experience at a seemingly roll
instability or pitch instability?
Other pilots of the SR-71?
Yes, in this aircraft.
I've discussed whis with a couple of con-
tractor pilots and I believe one or two of
them have experienced some roll difficulty
in an unstart condition, but possibly not
quite as severe as the roll that I experienced
on my unstart. These pilots, as well as I
recall, were
And were all of these experiences associated
with the unstart condition or is that entirely
necessary?
The only conditions that I have described are
connected with the unstart conditions. The
other pilots will have to speak for themselves
and the only one I recall that was not an un-
start was one that LT COLONEL DANIEL had that
was where he was also using the autopilot and
was in a bank and a malfunction in either the
autopilot or the stability augmentation system
caused the aircraft to go into increased
bank - increasing bank in a direction that he
was already turning and I think those specific
conditions can probably better be recalled by
LT COLONEL DANIEL than myself.
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Now, to your knowledge, were there any rumors
during the previous time period that the air-
craft, in certain phases of flight, had unstable
characteristics?
No, not unstable characteristics, per se. We
have had many discussions between the military
and contractor pilots flying this aircraft
with regard to the feel of the aircraft and
its stability augmentation system under a
variety of CG conditions and the pilot that
has had more experience with this and actually
more experience in the SR-7l than any other
pilot is the primary contractor pilot for the
aircraft, He flew the aircraft
with the CG furtherest aft and made turns
initially. I believe since that time other
contractor pilots have flown the aircraft
CG - I believe one of these pilots
. The only comment made by MR
er the initial condition was that
the aircraft felt like it had a slightly aft
CG and that he felt that he should transfer
a little bit of fuel forward so that it would
fly - feel a little bit better. However,
at that time, that particular aircraft had the
preliminary or the non-standard stability
augmentation system and there were some changes
made in the gains and improvements made in the
production stability augmentation system of
the aircraft and the comments of the nature
that the airplane felt like it had an aft
CG sort of went away once we got the production
stability augmentation system. I don't recall
any comments by any of the pilots that they
felt like the aircraft gave them a feeling
that it was real unstable.
Now, during the unstart, you made the comment
that a pilot has to be pretty quick on his
reactions with his controls and to select the
proper control to use to get up out of the
difficulty; but aren't you very busy in the
cockpit during this unstart and doing everything
else so that a less-experienced pilot could have
difficulty and let, perhaps, the aircraft get
away?
Well, I have great hopes that our training
program will be such that a pilot won't be
able to get the aircraft to these speeds and
altitudes under these conditions until he has
a degree of proficiency that it would allow
him to take these corrective actions immediately
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SPEt".1A1, 14AtJni Otkft", ie...
once he had some difficulty. We have a Simulator
that can simulate these emergencies and we have
the trainer that is available and I feel that
the pilots that get out to these speeds and
altitudes are going to have to have these pro-
cedures down cold, namely, get the aircraft
under control, attitude-wise first, and take
' care of your unstart or whatever your emergency
is after that. Next, without referring to a
checklist or to the systems operator to read
something to him or consulting with him and
all this. These things have to be practiced
and memorized so that they come as an immediate
reaction to any emergency. You don't have
time - you don't have B-52 and B-47 times to
take care of these things. They have to be
done in a little bit quicker fashion than that.
25X1A
In your estimation of would you
say that he was an above-normal pilot with
regard to quick reactions?
My estimation ofd his capability
is that he's a vli!!!!!!!alified pilot.
He had much experience in the F-l04 and he's
young enough and he's in good physical condition
;and he's alert and I have a relatively high
estimation of and his capability. I
certainly feel that his reactions are fast enough
and he knows the aircraft well enough
care of emergencies that come up.
has had some relatively serious emergencies in
this aircraft and he has taken care of them, '
in what I would consider, a pretty good fashion. -
Could you give any explanation, at this time,
of how the aircraft presumably got away in
a pitch attitude?
Well, this would be mostly speculation on my
part, but in studying what could have happened
in this particular condition,
flight conditions differed from mine in that
he was flying the aircraft longitudinally
without the aid of the autopilot, I should
say. In other words, he had roll hold and
automatic navigation engaged to keep him on
the automatic navigation track, but he was
controlling the longitudinal attitude of the
aircraft with the control stick. If, by chance,
as he went into the turn, he got diverted
checking into the cockpit and this sort of thing
and not paying extremely close attention to the
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longitudinal attitude of the aircraft, in other
words, if his nose started up or down without
.him noticing it particularly, there is a
possibility that he could have been a little
late,. shall we say, in correcting this longitudinal
attitude, until it was a little bit too late.
Now, by this, I mean - just by being diverted
one way or the other looks like there is a
possibility that the longitudinal axis, particu-
larly if you are in a 30 to 60 degree bank
you don't really have a good reference to the
horizon and you have to depend on your instru-
ments in the cockpit to some degree but I like
to use a combination of the attitude instruments
in the aircraft and also the horizon, if it's
available, but it's conceivable depending on
what he was using as a reference that he could
have let the longitudinal attitude of the
aircraft get away from him just long enough
to create a situation where full deflection
of the controls would not have corrected
this attitude to the full deflection of the
controls is a little bit slow at these
altitudes and speeds.
In your estimation, do you
think in order to avoid a situation like
this from recurring that some corrective
design - some action - should be taken on
the aircraft?
Well, I don't have any specific recO6mendationa /
at this time. I think we may find out that
we will be better off with some very definite,
specific instructions to the pilot in maintaining
the proper pitch attitude. I would like to see
investigated after the difficulty I had and the
fact that I had to use rudder to keep the air-
craft up right, I would like to see investi-
gated the affect or the possibility of re-
moving the control surface limiter once we're
above a certain altitude and speed condition.
Now, I think a study of this should be made if
it hasn't already to see what this will do
for us as far as giving the pilot a little
'bit more control surface deflection to tffect
any sudden attitude change in the aircraft.
I think we should possibly study the longitudinal.'
situation of the aircraft a little more carefully
with regard to the proper CG that should be
maintained, but outside of that I don't have
any at this time.
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25X1A
LT COLONEL DANIEL
25X1A
LT COLONEL DANIEL
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Thank you very much Colonel.
I'd first like to have into the record that
we will make an effort to obtain the instru-
? mented and data from flights .25X1A
? which should include the pitch rates ppd
attitude which will be made part Of the record.
would you say that the
primary concern of the pilots up to this point
in high speed flight has been one of a directional
stability rather than pitch up to this point;
primarily we have been concerned with, loosing
the airplane directionally.
I'd say that is correct - a combination of
directional and lateral stability in that and
the lateral control system. I believe the
worst condition encountered laterally was
possibly my condition at least as far as bank
25X1A
angle with a possibility that
may have experienced a fairly close to the
same bank angle with an unstart, but I have
to agree that I believe of all of the test
pilots that have been flying this aircraft
have sort of had the feeling with the engines
displaced from the fuselage, the distance that
they are and knowing the situation when you
suddenly lose one of these engines or the
effective one, which is the same thing if
you lose an inlet, an unstarted inlet, that
our primary concern has been directional
rather than longitudinally, and this. is in-
cluding a flight on the interceptor where
the test pilot, flew the aircraft 25X1A
with a CO about on the aft limit or slightly
after the aft limit for that matter. He
felt that he had a relatively unstable air-
craft longitudinally on that flight and maybe
we're fortunate that he didn't have an unstart,
but his only comment was he felt that his CO
was a little bit aft of normal because he could
feel the difference longitudinally, but he
didn't feel it - at that time even then he didn't oar
he felt it was unsafe.
25X1A
would you confirm that,
when the operating, the
stability in all axes, as far as what the pilot
feels, is normally quite gopd.
Yes, I'd verify that 100%. The general feeling
among all pilots that have flown this aircraft
is that the SAS system is one of the best and
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LT COLONEL DANIEL
25X1A
COLONEL TEMPLETON
25X1A
100001-4
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most reliable systems in the aircraft and that
it is a great aid to the pilot in flyIng the
aircraft, in maintaining the proper attitude .
and flight conditions. The stability augmenta-
tion systems acts as a damping device for
rapid movement of the controls and it acts as
a - the biggest help is that in an unstart
condition the rudder is fed in in the proper
directions so fast that there have been many
occasions that the pilot initially made the
statement that a certain engine had been
unstarted, an inlet had unstarted and it
turned out to be the wrong one. We've had
this on many occasions.
Sir, then would you confirm that the SAS
does mask any instability of the plane
under the normal flight regimes and it's
only when you get an unusual condition
where the slow control response enters into
it that the pilot, himself, would then
report on a bad handling airplane?
Absolutely. The SAS is so effective that
it does mask any unstable characteristics
of the aircraft that would normally be noted
by the pilot. This is one of the things
that I feel we get into at this state of .
our development is that we become more and
more dependent on artificial stability
devices rather than the inherent stability
of the airframe of the vehicle itself.
25X1A
would you clarify a point
on the uns tarts you were describing With
particular regard to the second unstart?
Did you find it necessary to reduce power
on the good engine and add rudder in the
higher altitude unstart?
Yes, and I'd also like to add a few more
comments about that second unstart. To
describe the conditions again, I was at
84,500,Mach number was 3.17, the aircraft
automatic navigation system rolled it into
a 35 - 40 degree bank and then back to a
stabilized 300 bank. I was about half-way
through that turn, or approximately 2 minutes
and the left engine unstarted again, I went
through the same maneuver only I feel
that my reaction time was a little bit
quicker because I was more or less expecting
it after the first occasion and even though
I again had to move my hand over to the
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LT COLONEL BOTHWELL
25X1A
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stick and so forth, I did reduce power and
feed rudder in at the same time and also
pushed the nose down under these conditions
because I noticed that the right EGT was
going overboard and so I had to shut that
engine off completely and the left EGT was
up high enough, over 820 - 830?, that I
reduced that engine to less than military
power. With this power reduction and the fact
that I started slowing up very quickly, the
immediate reaction was as the aircraft was
righted laterally, in other words, as I got
the right wing back down, I also pushed
forward on the stick to get the nose down
to keep my speed up and at the some time
hit the restart switches which gave me more
drag and caused me to push my nose down
even further. This was a buffeting situation
and the aircraft went through a lot of
buffeting until I got to a speed of.about..
'2.2 or 2.1.Mach number at which time the,
inlets were restarted and things, smoothed
out a little bit; but primary concern again
was reducing the power on the good side and
getting the right rudder in but this was
not quite as important as the other time
even though I was at higher altitude
because I had to shut the right engine off
because it unstarted also whereas on my
first addition the right inlet never did
unstart.
25X1A
could you comment' on the
use of the autopilot pitch trim knob in
this aircraft which forces you to transfer
your normal right hand stick position to
flying the aircraft with your left hand so
that you will have to switch hands to get
back to the throttle. How often do you
fly in this condition and its effect on
recovery from an unstart under these con-
ditions?
In the design concept in the way this auto-
pilot was supposed to be used, it was hoped
that the requirement for the pilot to keep
his right hand on the autopilot control would
be minimized through the use of a Mach hold
mode. However, at this stage of development
the mach hold mode is not functioning well
enough to be used normally or to be kept
engaged for any length of time without the
aircraft going into a long period longitudinal
oscillation that is disturbing to the pilot
and gives him the feeling that he could fly
much better manually or using the pitch
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LT COLONEL ROTHWELL
25X1A
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SPODIAI.HANDLNo [moor
attitude hold and using tng pitch control
knob on the autopilot. Now, in your comment
with regard to the requirement to keep the
hand off the control column is very important -
because, I know myself and I believe the other
pilots agree, that one thing they don't
want to do flying at Mach 3 at these alti-
tudes is to take their right hand off of
the control stick because you like to have
it there to be ready to put any input in to
either overpower the autopilot or to dis-
engage it and_put,your own control in manually.
-
So, I feel it's very important that if we're
going to be continuing to be required to
use the longitudinal trim on the autopilot
as a primary means of maintaining the desired
longitudinal attitude that the autopilot should
be modified to allow this trim function to
be performed while keeping the right hand on
the control column. This can be done - it's
been done with autopilots similar to this one
and it can be done through control stick
steering of the autopilot or putting the f,
longitudinal trim in some location on the
control head similar td the way it is done
in other aircraft. I might mention-that
we had complained about this deficiency to the
prime contractor and to the associate sub-
contractor who builds the stability augmen-
tation system and the autopilot and a study
has been underway for some time to, not only
improve the Mach hold mode,but to see what
would be required to make a change in the
autopilot system that would allow the pilot
to keep his right hand on the control stick.
Going to another system, Sir, the knowledge
by a pilot of his actual CG position as I
understand it now, is generally taken from
the pitch trim position. Could you comment
on the adequacy of this and how accurate the
knowledge is to you and whether you have
additional thoughts on this subject give you
better information to, considering we do have
apparently a longitudinal stability problem the
effect this lack of accurate knowledge might
have.
This is correct. The normal indication to
the pilot of his relative CG position is, by
.observation, of the pitch trim control.
Considering the fact that this trim indication
might have some inaccuracies and also considering
the fact that any longitudinal instability
could be apparently well masked by the stability
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25X1A
LT COLONEL ROTHWELL
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augmentation system, it would be desirable for
, the pilot to have some more positive indica-
tion of what his longitudinal CG is. However,
I feel that the CG could be in range of possibly
3 or 4% near the aft limit and the aircraft
could still - there is a possibility from
looking at the stability curve - that the
aircraft could get into trouble by the laxity
on the part of the pilot in not maintaining
the proper pitch attitude in level flight as
well as in accelerated flight.
Do you feel that your capability in this
aircraft to move fuel to get or to establish
a desired CG give you adequate control over
the system?
I feel that it is satisfactory at the present
time to keep the CG at a desired forward
location. By that, if the CG, under some
flight condition, is more aft than desired,
fuel can be transferred forward and a rough
indication of the change can be determined
by the change in the pitch trim required to
hold the aircraft in level flight. Where I
feel a more sophisticated system would
help would be the capability of possibly
getting a more aft CG than is being maintained
for the high speed cruise part of the flight
so that minimum trim drag could be maintained.
This should be a part of the study that is made
on the overall CG position and possible change
in the attitude on the part of the nose section
of the aircraft.
25X1A
going back to your unstart
condition where you got into your severe
bank, had this been at night, is the instru-
mentation in the aircraft adequate for an
average pilot to be able to recover with or -
could you recover as well - as easily at
night as you could in the daytime?
Well, I think it goes without saying that any
night or weather condition would amplify the
seriousness of the attitude control situation.
I will say this, that the pilot spends an
awful lot of time looking at the instruments
in the cockpit on these flights as opposed to
looking out at what's left of the horizon,
so to speak, and that the instrumentation in the
aircraft is as good as comparable aircraft, I
feel that fly at least up to Mach 2 and what
few aircraft fly up into this regime. At night,
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I/r COLONEL ROTHWELL
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LT COLONEL ROTHWELL
COLONEL FUSSELL
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SPECIAL PA' ''Nflincr)
I feel that I probably still would have taken
somewhat the same corrective action, hope-
fully with the same reaction time involved, .
but I think all pilots would be the first to
admit that at night in weather it's not going
to be quite the same as it would be under VFR
conditions as far as recovering the aircraft
to an upright condition.
You do feel that you are relying considerably
on your instrumentation in daylight recovery
and things were adequate?
I feel that in this aircraft we're relying
more on the instrumentation in the aircraft
than you would for other aircraft with less
performance because we can't see our wings -
we're sitting out in almost our own little
environment, we're at a pretty high altitude
and many times there's an undercast and we
don't really have a good true picture of the
horizon anyway, so I believe the other pilots
will agree that we spend more time looking
at the attitude instruments in the aircraft
during VFR conditions than you would at
lower altitudes and lower speeds.
Sir, switching subject again, what is your
requirement as Test Force Director in regards
to control and monitor of the Lockhepd - the
company pilots - as regards to their checking
of proficiency checks, instrument checks -
where do you stand in this area monitoring
their quality?
We stand in this area as advisors to the System
Program Director, COLONEL TEMPLETON, since he
is performing the function of the AF Plant
Representative or the normal AFLC function
and we feel that he relies on our background
and knowledge of these pilots to keep him
advised with regard to what our feelings are
about their qualifications, etc.. Any time
that we may notice that maybe One pilot hasn't
been flying very often or might appear to be
what would normally be considered uncurrent
or non-proficient, our course of action is to
report this to COLONEL TEMPLETON and he discusses
it with the contractor.
1Do you have any further comments concerning
your previous incidents that you might add
at this time?
20004.-ttlAk!:).:11,N, JR UlRen
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A TRUE COPY
1/44fe
DONALD R J
Major, US
Recorder
01-4
Just one short comment. As a result of what
I encountered on my flight, we made the
recommendation to all pilots that bank angles
. be restricted to no more than 30? when flying
the aircraft at 80,000 feet or above. This
had been somewhat of a common practice among
the pilots but we handlt done an extreme
amount of flying above 80,000 feet so we
made this recommendation firm as a result
of my flight. Also because of the engine
difficulty that I had, we restricted flights
to 75,000 feet unless the derichment modifi-
cation was made to the aircraft and to the
engines and this is a system to proteat the
engines from over-temperature in the event
of an unstart at these extreme altitude conditions.
SPECIAL
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Nw% Nue %ow
COLONEL FUSSELL
COLONELTUSSELL,
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BOARD MEETING, 1100 HOURS, 1 FEBRUARY 1966
25X1A
ae President of the board I will explain
APR 127-4, paragraph 16. "That the sole purpose
of the investigation is to determine all factors
relating to the accident and, in the interest of
accident prevention, to preclude recurrence. The
investigation will not be used as evidence, or to
obtain evidence for use in disciplinary action, to
determine pecuniary liability or line of duty
status, or to revoke commission, or to support
a demotion or to remove from the active list under
the provisions of APR 36-2, or for use before a
flying evaluation board."
There are indications from various pilots in the
SR-71 that unstarts are relatively common in the
aircraft. The ensuing moments following an unstart
require considerable skill and rapid reaction to
prevent loss of lateral control. Will you tell
the board of your experience in the aircraft, whether
or not you have ever had experience of loss of
lateral or pitch control and what actions you took
to prevent or recover from the loss of control.
I am
I am a Lockheed engineering 25X1A
25X1A
any of my remarks here by the experience I have had
in this area on the SR-71. To date, On the two
sensor test aircraft, #2002 and #2003, I have
flown ten flights in each aircraft. I have flown
one flight in aircraft #2009. One flight in #2001.
I rode as the back seat pilot in #2008. Of all the
flights I've'had in #2002, whi01 is ten flights,
eight of these flights were high and hot, and on
every flight where I was high and hot I experienced
unstarts. The only flights in this machine where
I did not experience unstarts were two shirtsleeve
flights, or low altitude, and slow. On #2003,
I flew a total of ten flights. On this, on six
of the ten flights, I experienced unstarts. Again,
these were all in a condition of high and hot. I
believe, with the exception of only one flight,
all unstarts occurred above 2.6 Mach number. The
bulk of them were at 3.2 Mach number. Sir, would
you now direct your specific questions?
Would you indicate what actions you took upon
experiencing an unstart? And also, relate whether .
or not you were in straight and level flight, in a
bank, what degree of bank, etc.?
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25X1A
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? COLONEL FUSSELL
25X1A
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0001-4
Well, Sir, I've experienced unstarts in the aircraft
from entirely straight and level flight in a lg
situation, up to and probably including a 45? bank
in both directions. I would have to give you a
qualified answer in that generally, when we were
reaching our cruise point, which was anywhere from
3.1 to 3.2 Mach number - in a case like this, when
we got an unstart it was generally, the action taken
as I look back on it now is directly related to the
position of the center-of-gravity of the aircraft.
In most cases it required aileron in the direction
to stop any ensuing roll that occurred, and generally
there was a roll, especially in a bank situation.
I've never had any excessive rolls, that I've heard
reported - maybe 10 to 150 over and above what
I had. But in practically all cases I had to apply
forward stick almost simultaneously with the ailerdh
control. The extreme case that I can bring to mind,
I believe, occurred on Flight 41 in #2002 when the
right engine unstarted. This was somewhere in the
area of Bakersfield, and I required almost full
forward stick and left aileron. I also had
numerous unstarts in the same place where this
accident occurred, rolling into the turn in aircraft
#2003, and this was Flight 21 in #2003. At that
time, ras with me. And again, I would
say that e recovery technique was the some - it
required roll correction immediately and forward
stick.25X1A
Okay, could you tell the board in any
way or generally when you had an unstaft, what your
center-of-gravity was?
Sir, Center-of-gravity cannot be related directly
to any given unstart. I don't feel that center-of-
gravity was ever a contributing factor. However,
in the straight and level position, I would, to
make a general statement, I would say it ran
anywhere from 2 to 50 up elevon trim position.
This is the only indication we have that is indicative
of center-of-gravity position. If we were in a turn,
and generally all turns in these two vehicles are
made in automatic nay, the elevator pitch trim
position was generally running from 5 to, in some
cases, as much as 80 up, but again, this would
depend on how long you had been in the turn, and
the effect of the trim follow-up from the auto-
pilot.
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COLONEL FUSSELL
25X1A
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Could you tell the board what degree of rudder you
used? Is this a coordinated maneuver, or do you
depend on the SAS, or, in your own description, how
do you control the aircraft during an unstart?
The first reaction, I think of almost everyone is
to use almost full opposite rudder. It's one of
those things, you don't have to think, you do it
instinctively. If the right inlet unstarts, the
aircraft yaws to the right and you end up with full
left rudder - generally speaking almost full left
rudder, which in the limited case is 100.
25X1A
did you ever feel that the aircraft
was going to get away from you in your experiences?
Well, Sir, I wouldn't say that I ever felt that
there was a situation where I didn't have control
of it. I have been to the point where I was very
happy that it didn't go any farther than it did.
Then you were a bit concerned in some of these
instances?
The one particular one, Yes, Sir, on aircraft
#2002. I wouldn't say I was unduly concerned, but
I was concerned that it did require as much control
as it did to recover from it.
And was this concern of control in roll and pitch, or
Roll, pitch, and yaw.
All three axis?
That's correct, because my own personal recovery
technique is to get the aircraft in straight and
level, lg configuration, as quickly as possible.
Do you think a less experienced pilot than you
would have been in difficulty and maybe let the
airplane get away?
Sir, I think that's a real intangible.
Just a guess. This airplane is going to be flown
by pilots of lesser experience.
I think in some cases, possibly this could be
stated, Yes - that a lesser experienced person
might have gotten himself in trouble.
Do you think that if the aircraft ie not modified
in one or more respects, that it could be released
for general flying, say for SAC personnel?
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Would you explain your term, modification, Sir?
Modifications to improve stability characteristics?
Well, again, are you talking about movement of C.O.,
or limiting controls, SAS authority? Would you be
a little more specific?
All items. Any kind of an item to improve what is
perhaps difficulty with the aircraft now in stability.
My own personal feeling is that if the C.G. is
moved forward I think the aircraft is very satisfactory'
the way it is.
Then you think there should be some kind of automatic
limitation, or C.G. position, or what?
Would you elaborate on the term "automatic"?
That you could not arrange fuel, or disposable items
in such a position that you could get a rearward
C.G. that would be detrimental to the, upset the stability
characteristics.
Well, Sir, to begin with, I'm not particularly
in favor of automatic C.G. systems. I had a good
deal of experience in flying the B-58 with this.
Even though I personally didn't have this problem
with the B-58, it was of a great deal of concern
at all times, and as you know, that particular
machine had C.G. problems which resulted in the,
loss of some of them. This has beer one of the
nice things about our machine, the SR-71, the
YF-12 and other machines - is the fact that it has
been able to go along without all of this monitoring.
I feel that the tanks can be scheduled in such a
manner that it can solve this problem. Now, I
don't think that we're going to be able to come
up with any kind of a situation to where if someone
works at it, they can't get this machine in trouble.
I believe that if one starts punching on tanks and
this sort.OfthinglthitAt's very:definitely,posiine
to get in trouble, and I think the onlylway'out
of this is the training Of the personnel involved.
Now, were there any kind of rumors or talk among
the pilots about unstable characteristics at a
certain realm of flight? At a high Mach, or high
altitude?
No Sir, to my knowledge, there was not. We knew
at the time that we were flying near our Aft limit.
There has been no secret about this. But to my
knowledge there has been no talk - at least not in :
my presence of anything like this..
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Do you have knowledge of other pilots experiencing
uncontrollable, or near uncontrollable, situations?
No Sir, I do not.
You're only talking about your own definite experiences?
Any comments I have are relative only to my own
experience. 25X1A
Then you didn't hear about difficulty?
Well, I did hear about it - that he had one where he
had rolled up to a fairly excessive angle of bank.
That's about all I knew of that particular situation.
Then his particular experience was not advertised
throughout the ---
25X1A
Yes it was. I don't know by what means it was
advertised, but I do know for a fact that
at the time this accident, his was occurring, when
he applied aileron control he thought."I must be
in the same situation that was in". 25X1A
Then you did know of the difficulty of 11111111
25X1A 25X1A
Yes, I guess you could say if it was a difficulty.
I didn't know the full circumstances that surrounded
this, though.
25X1A
would you describe your feel for the flight
control as the aircraft responds to an input which
you make to overcome a pitch or yaw or roll rate
which has been generated?
I feel that all cases that I have personally come
into contact with in the matter of unstarts, that
the quicker the control is applied, the better.
And at no time have I run into a situation where I
.didn't get immediate response. I feel that had
I let it go longer, without applying the control,
there is a question of doubt in my mind, and its
one that I have no way of knowing ,what the response
would be when the control was applied.
Would you say, then, that possibly the control
response is in the marginal area, where if a pilot
let, say for instance, pitch rate generate, and
wait a small time lag, that it might not be
sufficient to control the aircraft?
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COLONEL DANIEL
25X1A
COLONEL DANIEL
25X1A
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Well, this again falls into a category of an intangible.
I can't give you a black and white answer on this.
I know that the stability augmentation system, for
example, in pitch, is 6 1/20, and I've been told
before, and this was in the case of the YF-12 where
we had a flight where we got a very, very rear C.G.
and this was where we were practicing for the world's
speed records here, that had we got into an aero-
dynamics situation, the aero people didn't feel
that I would have been able to respond fast enough.
However, this was a condition of a very, very extreme
C.G. condition.
As you have said, most of the unstarts you have
had in the SR-71 occurred in the auto-nay mode.
Is it your habit to have both 'pitch and roll on
attitude hold, or do you fly, for instance, pitch,
manually?
In order to make it a true test, I use as much of
it as possible. Whenever requested, I have even
tried the Mach Hold, and I have not had a successful
flight with that; however, to be specific on your
question, I do use the Pitch Hold, and I do use the
RoYll Hold.
JIM, what is your opinion in this mode when you
have an unstart, of having your hand off the
control stick. Has this presented a problem?
No, because I generally fly with my hands on my
knees nearby, and it's an automatic reaction to go
for the stick and the trigger at the same time to
disengage it. It has never presented a problem.
COLONEL DANIEL When recovering frcm an unstart, do you normally
25X1A
COLONEL DANIEL
reduce power immediately?
No, I do not, because the main thing is to get the
aircraft in straight-and-level flight and into a
lg configuration. One of the reasons that I don't
pull the power of the remaining good engine out of
Afterburner, since I've been flying this machine,
which is 3 1/2 years, is that I've never had an
occasion that I didn't know which engine unstarted.
If you take both engines out of Afterburner, or
your remaining good engine out of Afterburner and
you're at design speed and altitude, no matter how
quick you are, it's going to cost you 10,000 feet of
altitude.
I would like to have on the record here your opinion
of any difference of control response, or the
severity of an unstart, between a YP612 and an SR-71.
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COLONEL TEMPLETON
25X1A
COLONEL TEMPLETON
25X1A
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? I would say that there is no difference. They are
. both severe, and the severity of them seems to be
almost a direct function of your speed and knots-
equivalent-airspeed - the higher the equivalent airspeed,
the more severe the unstart.
Would you comment on the practice by the Cat I
test aircraft in terms of their fuel scheduling,
and attempt to get a fairly low trim drag for
these cruise missions. Was your fuel system set
up to give you the best fuel conditions?
At no time have I ever punched on a tank in order
to get an Aft C.G. This could only be done initially
by punching on tank #1 or tank #2.
As I remember, #2001 encountered some Aft C.G.s in
your flights. Would you describe the control
response, or feel of the aircraft in this condition?
First, I'd like to make a brief comment on how this
occurred. This was totally unpredictable. We didn't
know about it until after it had happened. After the
engines were started, this was on #2001, the flight
was delayed a considerable amount of time due to
andelectrical problem on the aircraft and then the
nay system had to be fast-aligned, which took an
additional 20 minutes. At the exact same time, the
bus tie split on the aircraft. So, rather than
lose the flight, I pressed on the crossfeed and we
continued on. Now the reason the crpssfeed was
turned on was that in the event we lost the generator
on a particular side of the aircraft, we would have
lost that engine also. From a safety-of-flight
standpoint, it seemed like the thing to do, and the
thing we have always done in other machines,
is to punch on the cross feed. What we found out
was that, once tank #1 had reached the Christmas
Tree level, this cuts off the two pumps feeding the
right manifold. You then have two pumps in tank
#1 two pumps in tank #2 feeding the left manifold,
and two pumps in tank #6 feeding the right manifold.
The net result is that the four pumps, the two in
tank #1 and the two in tank #2 feeding the left
manifold, and two pumps in tank #6 feeding.the right
manifold. ,The,net,xesult is that the four,pumps?
the two in tank #1 and the two in tank-#2.with
corssfeed on,,will,overpower the two feeding from
tank #6. In; addition, once you're in flight, the
two pumps in tank #6 are pumping against a head,
due to the angle-of-attack of the aircraft. So
we literally drained tanks one and -- I said tank
two meant tank!. #3. We drained tanks #1 and #3.
Now, to get to your specific question, / believe my
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COLONEL FUSSELL
25X1A
25X1A
COLONEL DANIEL
25X1A
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:comments were that the aircraft was, I think I
said, pretty "squirrely", it was extremely "sloppy"
and I can relate this directly to the flights back
on #1001 during the speed attempts, and during the
first attempt at extending the envelope. Even
with the full authority of the SAS, and I do have
the world's most respect for that piece of
equipment, you could tell that this airplane was
extremely sloppy, and I so stated.
We're concerned here about the training and the
qualifications of the pilots in the program.
Realizing that the Air Force does not control this;
or at least at th12_10221A_muld you tell the board
your estimate of qualifications?
Also, what type of a program does Lockheed have
to maintain proficiency on all of its pilots?
Sir, I'm afraid I can't give you much of an answer
to any of your questions because as you may or may
not know, I came to Lockheed on this program from
Hughes Aircraft Company. Consequently, I only
had personal knowledge of one pilot at Lockheed
prior to going to work for Lockheed. From the
standpoint of he is probably one of the
most educated pilots that we have. He's had a
very fine background from what little I know of it. _
I personally have never flown with him. We are
generally working in different locations at all
times, and it is not my prerogative to analyze
any of his data. In my awn personal.opinion, I
have always felt that he was a good boy, though.
On tfte question of proficiency - again, this is
totally out of my hands. It all falls under the
jurisdiction of the chief pilot for
Lockheed. Any answer in this case would have to
be given to you by him.
Even in flights that you had an unstart where you
had a healthy C.G. margin, and you knew it was a
good C.G. margin, would you still say it is very
important to get on the controls right away to get
your attitude back to level flight conditions?
Yes, I feel very strong about this, that it is.
And the amount of control that is required again is
directly related to the center-of-gravity and the
knots-equivalent-airspeed. I feel the first thing
that. should be done is to get this airplane flying
straight-and-level, or as near straight-and-level
as possible before anything is done. You certainly
don't have to tell anyone which rudder to push. I.
feel that these items are instinctive.
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\ COLONEL FUSSELL
25X1A
COLONEL FUSSELL
A TRUE TRANSCRIPT
Arda44,640
DONALD R JAS
Major, USAF
Recorder
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In the event you fail to react promptly enough,
and in the event in this split second of timing
the aircraft exceeds those limitations, do you feel
that you have enough control, let's say in 130
Pitch Attitude and Mach 3, to recover the aircraft?
Sir, the question was asked a little while ago in
a different form and I can only give you the same
answer. I don't know. It is completely intangible.
I can't say what it would take in a situation I've
never been in.
Were you given, in a Simulator, any kind of attitude
that was experienced by you in unstart at high Mach
at high altitude, and how was the reaction?
Sir, I've never been in
the airplane some three
was built, and the only
the Simulator was to go
a Simulator. I was flying
years before the Simulator
connection I've had with
back on the Mock-Up Board.
Do you know of other pilots being put in the Simulator
for the SR-71 and given these conditions in flight
and whether or not it got away from them?
No Sir, I'm not knowledgeable of any program that is
being run on the SR-71 Simulator. It is up at Beale
AFB. I've had no occasion to go up there and I've
had nothing whatsoever to do with it.
/ would appreciate it if you would not discuss this
with any other witnesses. You are entitled.
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TAKEN AT 0930 HOURS, 3 FEBRUARY 1966!111111
CONTINUATION OF BOARD TESTIMONY BY
25X1A
25X1A
COLONEL FUSSELL in the original interrogation
you were asked by Col Daniels, what .
? was the last Angle of Attack reading you
recall. Your answer at that time - Quote
"It seems to me that it was approximately.
3i?. I recorded a lot of Angle of Attack -
readings throughout the flight, but T. -
believe the Angle of Attack reading I
saw in conjunction with 2i0 nose up pitch
trim was 3*0." Unquote. Now on your
dictet we get a readout along .the latter
part eJf the flight - Pitch trim 40 nose
up. Also .1 'd like to add that in the
investigation of the metal itself, the
Jack screws are set at 2.8. After some
additional thought could you tell us what:
the last nose up pitch trim was, whether '
25X1A it was 4i or 2i1
Yes Sir. The it nose up pitch trill
indication, which i'recall seeing was
? 2io. I don't recall seeing 40 nose up
pitch trim, on this particular leg.'
COLONEL FUSSELL The board felt that the factthat you
stated 4i? nose up tri, in the dictet,
was probably more authentig then yout ?
subsequent statement of 2e. However, I've
been told by the people that have listened
to this intently that the dictet is garbled
and it's hard to determine 'whether its 43-0.
? or just What. Your statement then is that
25X1A it's 210 nose up trim?
Yes Sir. I don't?ever recall seeing the
pltch trim over r on this leg. believe
was the maximum nose up pitch trim that I
saw on this accel and this cruise.
COLONEL RICHARDSON, Bill, have you ever had a parachute accidently
activated while you were still sitting in.
25X1A the aircraft?
No, I haven't.
COLONEL RICHARDSON Bill, while you were still in the aircraft, in
this brief moment, did you feel any pull
pressure on the shoulders in the aircraft Or
25X1A did you notice it?
No, I didn't notice any pressure a4 all of,
that nature.
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COLONEL RICHARDSON Do you recall, definitely that the suit was
inflated while you were falling on the
drogue chute and if so do you have any feel
for time?
25X1A
Yes, the suit - my first recollection, as
Boon as I realized I was falling, was,
one of my first recollections was, that the
suit was inflated. But / don't really
have a good idea of the time of fall, with
the suit inflated. I have thought about it,
and have estimated approximately a minute'
and a half.
COLONEL RICHARDSON Also, do you have any conception of time in
25X1A this fall prior to the main chute deployment?
Actually, that minute and a half period is
in reference to time of fall prior to main
chute deployment. Not necessarily suit
inflation time.
COLONEL'RICHARDSON Dill, one question I have that you mentioned
in your other statement that you noticed Jim
was below you. Have you thought any about
that, Now do yOU feel Jim was above you
or below you?
I'm sure he was below me, and I would
estimate about 500 feet. Just slightly
below me.
25X1A
COLONEL RICHARDSON Since you left the hospital in Tucumcari, have
you noticed any other soreness stiffness or
bruises, that you would care to talk about now?
Yes, / noticed that my left ankle was swollen
and bruised, altho it wasn't sore. It was
swollen and there was a very large discolor-
ation on the inside of the left ankle. But
no tenderness or soreness at all. And one
bruise on my left thigh, which /,believe they
noticed in the orginal examination. That was
the only mark that I found that might have been
made from the lap belt.
aczoier, Ems= Is that a bruise on your right wrist?
2 X1A That was noticed originally in the orginal
examinatton. I don't know Where, that came from.
COLONEL RICHARDSON Have you noticed any soreness across the abdomen?
5X1A None whatsoever. My stomach muselep Were pretty
sore, but I think that was more from teneeing
up then from anything else.
,25X1A
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COLONEL DANIEL
25X1A
COLONEL DANIEL
25X1A
COLONEL DANIEL
25X1A
COLONEL DAN/EL
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B4110 on the first leg of the flight, you
stated and in the dictet we found that you
had been using crossfeed. Do you recall
positively turning the crossfeed off?
Yes I do. I used crossfeed for seven
minutes. I recall definitely turning it
off. , I did not turn it on again inflight.
Bill, yesterday you were at the SR-71
simulator at Beale and you ran a series
of profiles which approximate the profile
that you were in prior to the accident.
Would you give us your impression of this
simulation and as how it compared with
the actual flight conditions?
Yes, the simulation at 27% e.g., in a 35
degree right bank., in a slightly climbing
attitude, was, I would say very realistic as
far as the pith rate response was concerned.
On two particular occasions in the simulator,
the simulation appeared to me to be, almost
what I saw in the aircraft. On other
occasions I was able to control it, but only
by making a conscious effort and devbting almost
my entire attention to pitch control.
Bill, would you describe this pitch rate, on
the simulator, Where you lost the aircraft,
as to how noticeable is this. Is it some-
thing a pilot would in his normal flying
catch immediately or is it a little bit
slower than that where it might not be so
noticeable?
It's noticeable only if the pilot is looking
at the angle of attack indicator. It was'
not apparent on the attitude indicator or
vertical speed Indic tor. But I did notice
after seeing this pitch rate and pitch up
response, correlating it with the angle of
attack indicator, X was able by concentrating
almost completely on angle of attack i
indicator, plus attitude I was able to control
the pitch rate. Although, angle of attack in
some cases would build up pretty high, I was
able to control it by anticipating pitch rate
on angle of attack indicator. But it isn't
evident unless you are concentrating on angle
of attack indicator. In the aircraft it wasn't
detectable visually.
, ' 1
Bill, do you feel
system that is in
able to detect an
the control forces
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that with the type of control
the SR-71, that a pilot maybe
aft e.g. condition through
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25X1A
.COLONEL DANIEL
25X1A
COLONEL DANIEL
25X1A
PgdfAt HANDLING MUM
Yes, this is poesTuilear I've noticed it op'.
on several occasions in the past. It's
particularly true in the subsonic region,
where the aircraft gets very sloppy in
pitch, and it's ordinarily noticeable,in
a.turns at high Mach. On this particular
occasion I did not notice any unusual
sloppiness or aft e*g..feel entering this
turn or in the turn. I have, as I said
before, noticed that several times in the
past and the airplane is very slopptin
pitch with an aft e.g. and ite
detectable but on this occasion / didn't
notice this sloppiness entering the turn.
Bill, would you describe this sloppiness as a
response or as a control force that you can feel
. change in, control stick forces?
/ would describe this more as a response
than as.a change in control force feel.
Bill, after your simulation and after this
flight do you feel a e.g. readout would
be desireable in this aircraft?
Yes / do.
Bills prior to this experience with 17952
have you ever had any previous experience
in your flying with this type of aircraft
where the plane was marginal or you,felt
,you were in a critical position.
Yes I have on one other flight. I had an
experience not similar to this but approaching
this where the e.g. was too far aft on takeoff.
I've related the two experiences in ,my mind.
The aircraft response in the other case was
similar to What I have just discussed. It was
extremely sloppy in pitch and right after.
takeoff had a definite nose up tendency Which
required practicaly full forward stick.
Transferring fuel forward alleviated this.
condition and attitude normal control was
regained by transferring fuel forward.
.Do you recall *4at the aft o.g. was?'
On that flight?
yes:
believe it was, no I don't,recillithe exact
figure.
How many hours have you flown in this type
aircraft?
think about 70.
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And that was your only other experience where
the aircraft may have been critical. Is
that right?
Yes sir.
Do you know of
troubles where
I can't recall
that nature.
other pilots
the airplane
any specific
experiencing
was marginal?
incidents of
Thank you.
COLONEL RICHARDSON Pill, on descent on the main chute, you
stated that you waited until the main
chute opened to raise the faceplate, and
when you raised the faceplate did you have
any difficulty keeping it up, on your way
25X1A to the ground or did it stay up normally?
COLONEL RICHARDSON
25X1A
A True Transcript
Atafe
DONALD R AMES
Major USAF
Recoraer
No / didn't have any difficulty during the
parachute descent with the visor.
Again Bill, after the main chute had deployed
did you look up at the main chute to check its
condition and so forth and if you did, did lop
notice the drogue chute or Stabilization
chute anywhere?
Yen, I looked up at the maim chute, but I
did not notice the drogue chute.
Then further on in your descent / assume you
were looking down trying t figure Out the'?
spor where you were going to land did you:
ever
ever notice the drogue chute or stabilization
chute hanging below you?
No I didn't notice it. The only thing /
noticed was the chute bag fallinglree.
Getting back on the pitch trim subject again,
as I said before / don't recall ever seeing
the pitch trim above .2i degrees on this leg and
the 4i degree figure in the dictet is quite
probably in reference to the angle of attack
indication rather than pitch trim.
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SCT
REQUIRE!)
25X1A BOARD MEETING, 1.000 HOURS, 3 FEBRUARY 1966
I am Colonel Fussell, President of the Accident
Investigation Board.
The sole purpose of the investigation is to determine all
factors relating to the accident incident and in the interest
of accident prevention to preclude recurrence. The investigation
will not be used as evidence or to obtain evidence for the use in
diciplinary action to determine pecuniary reliability or line of
duty status or to revoke commission or to support a demotion or
to remove from the active list under the provisions of APR 36-2 -
or for the use before a flying evaluation board.
The board has several questions we would like to ask you today.
COLONEL'FUSSELL Indications from various pilots of the SR-71
is that unstarts are relatively common in the
aircraft and the ensUeing moments require
considerable skill and rapid 'reaction to
prevent the loss of lateral or pitch control.
Will you tell the board your own experience
In the aircraft, whether or not you have ever
experienced the loss of lateral or pitch .
control and in the process what your center
of gravity, speed, altitude etc., was at the
25X1A time of the experience and recovery?
Well, of course, I've never lost complete
control of an aircraft as a result of an
unstart. However, I feel that your reaction
time is important as a function of aft e.g..
We have been, in Flight Test, experimenting
with further aft c.g.'s primarily with a
view toware increasing range. But if you
assume that we have a cog. that's 25% or
further forward than the control ability, 'I
think, is quite satisfactory. It's
important for your reaction time, in my
opinion, to prevent inertial moments from
developing, which when you put in your ,
_control you have to first of all oppose and
stop, and then correct it to the position'in
which you would like to have it. I could'
talk about these unstarts all day. I don't
know in particular just what aspect of them
you'd, like. We have our particular procedures
that we follow and some of them vary to a certain
extent, depending on how high you ate and just
what your conditions is. .
COLONEL FUSSELL . At this stage of the investigation unstarts
become secondary. We would like to confine
the discussion to lateral and pitch control
25X1A with reference to aft,c.g., Mach, weight, etc.
Your now, asking me to discuss the handling
characteristics apart from unstarts. Is that
correct?
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COLONEL FUSSELL That's correct.
,I feel that if you don't have the unstart
and you don't put any loaded maneuvers on
the aircraft, then the handling character-
25X1A istics are quite. satisfactory. They degrade
rapidly .with further aft c.g.'s. Now where
this point is is under investigation by
Flight Test. In other words its a nonlinear
relationship, I think. You can go for
example from 24% cog. to 25% without
suffering any degradation, particUlarily in
handling characteristics or flight qualtities,
but.when you go from 25 to 26 its more marked,
and 26 to 27 even more marked. The way I
have written these things up on my pilot
comments, for any of You who. have ever
happened to read them befOre. I usually .
call this sloppy on the pitch axis incl.- by
that I mean When youjput,a Stick force in and
you get a certain "g" loading right away
you go nonlinear on stick force per"g".
This means that it makes it, moredifficult ? .
to fly the aircraft 'It's. a little sloppier'
is the best way I can define it.
COLONEL FUSSELL Would you tell the board approximately how many
25X1A hours you have in this aircraft?
I'm sorry I don't have the slightest' idea.
I don't keep track of that but'I'm titre: the
company keeps track of that.
COLONEL FUSSELL Can you give ,4e an approximation?.
5X1A
COLONEL DANIEL
25X1A
I probably have as much as anybody else in the
airplane0 my time in the
aircraft at perhaps 300 hours. STATOTHR
Bob, your experience in the aircraft, have you
ever been in a condition where it took full
forward control stick movement in order to
control the pitch?
Right. I've had one incident where that was the
case and it was while performing a structural
test at 2.6 Mn, 450 knots and with a c.g. of
26.3%. I looked this up on the record recently
thRts +he reason I'm familiar with all these
particulars, We overshot the particular test
point that. We irtended because of the fact that
even tho I had the stick full forward, well below
the maximum "g" point the airplanefoontinued
on up as a result of inertial forces.'X think
that this test is somewhat pertinent to the
atter at hand, here today,
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COLONEL DANIEL
25X1A
COLONEL DAN/EL
25X1A
COLONEL DANIEL
25X1A
SECRET
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
Bob, the pitch rates, which you've seen
generated at aft c.g0 conditions, both
inflight and in the simulator, would you
describe these rates as being very high-,
which would be readily apparent to a pilot,
or would you describe them as being fairly
nominal or small rates which would not be
apparent to the pilot?
would say with these aft e.g. 's, and its
a function of how far aft you are.
Bob, do you feel that the fuel system and
its management that we have in the aircraft
today. That it would be an assist to have
a cog. type indicator in the aircraft?.
There is no question that it would be an
assist to have a cog indicator in the "
aircraft but I don't believe that it is
presently co atible with our type of fuel
indicating system. However, we've gotit
new one under way sometime ago, I think G.E.
makes it, and it would be compatible with a
c.g. indication. Talk about getting a system
that would be compatible with computation'
inflight of a e.g. for pilot presentation.
Since we don't h ve that today, in lieu of
that, we've had to develope capability of
determining and interpreting the readouts on
the pitch trim indicator.
Bobo along that line using the pitch tr.ini
indicator, fro iA your past experience would
you say that at fuel weight of roughlY
400000 lbs, flying in the 78,000 foot region,
at cruise speed, that a'pitch trim indication
.of 3 degrees nose up Would lead you to believe
that you were towards an aft e.g. limit?
Right. This would be a function of your gross
weight and of course, your angle of attack and
this would be also a function, whether you
were straight and level or in a turn. And so
from particular aircraft I've been able to
review the records on our instruAented aircraft
later and actually make a pilot correlation for
my awn benefit, so that I am able to better use
the pitch trim indicator for 'e.g. determination.
On this particular aircraft 3 degrees or so
would be so ewhere around 26%0 I believe, at
that gross weight, from my previous experience.
For example, #2 airplane is slightly different fro
#3 and I guess for a given condition 'for example,
the pitch trim indication is slightly different,
.It's slightly further down for given conditions
in 2002 for example, then in 2003. The only
explanation I could offer for this is the
fact our calibration on the instrUments are
slightly different..
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COLONEL DANIELS
25X1A
COLONEL DANIEL
25X1A
COLONEL DAN/EL
25X1A
SECRET
SPECIAL HANDLINGRD
Bob, this airplane nas a long term fugoid
motion at cruise speed at high altitude.
Would you discuss this as related to the
pilot's ability to keep the airplane in
trim at all times.
Right, I'll discuss the straight away long
term fugoid and the handling character-
istics. A fugoid is a result of the inter-
change of energy between kinetic and
potential and I think the Aero Dynamacists
have told me that it's 1 1/100th of a Machs
equivelent to about a 1000 feet. This is
what gives y u sort of a basic, it's not '
Instability, but a basic up and down motion
of the aircraft over a long term period,
think thats 3 to 4 minute period, but this
really would be no trouble at all to control
as far as handling characteristics are
concerned. It's the short term stuff that
would get the pilot in trouble, / think on
the pitch axis. I don't think the fugoid
itself is pertinent to this.
Well, does it make it more difficult, to say,
to keep the airplane in trims using pitch
trim?
I would say, yes. Ordinarily the pilot has to
use the stick force to get the airplane stable
on a given selected Mach rather than being &pie
to do this as in so many other aircraft by
merely trimming it. For examples I'm flying
very precise instruments inkther aircraft I
like to not use any stick force at all but
keep it close enough to where / can merely
trim it and hold my Mach. I've found that
I've tried to do it this way in this airplane
but I think that the SAS masks the trim effect
to a certain: extent so that I've found it' better
to go ahead and use stick force and your able ?
to control it more precisely.
Bob, you stated th t you felt in this airplane
3 degrees pitch trim would run you around 26
percent fairly aft e.g.. However, are you
familiar with the ADP Instructions which state
that below 30,000 lbs of fuel that forward
transfer should be used in order to assure that
you have at least 3 degrees nose up pitch trim?
Well we've changed the rules on this so many times,
in Flight Test, that I'm not certain that we
have a hard and fast rule on such a thing as
that. I try to use my experience in the aircraft ,
and use this primarily as a guide, because we
do have the aft cog. under investigation at this
time and with the views I've mentioned before
toward maximizing range. Thats thOihole purpose
of this.
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Bob, on this simulator were you able to
duplicate the conditons as you knew them
on the flight, where the accident occurred,
and What were the results of your simulation?
Well, the simulations that we ran consisted
of putting the e.g. at different positions,
all of them quite far aft, and then establish-
ing bank angles and then assuming unstarts
on the down engine, that is the engine that
is lower in the turn. Which we feel is the
situation in the ccident. Then take
immediate corrective actions. We were
writing records on principle parameters during
thest tests. To a certain extent, while this
simulates the aero dynamics I feel sure it
doesn't simulate the condition in the
aircr ft bec use I was sitting there
expecting all this to happen and was gearing
my reaction times to be immediate. We tried
to get around this to a certain extents .In
some of the later tests, by permitting the
aircraft continuing rolling, from say 35 .
degree bank to a 60 degree bank angle,
before I would initiate corrective action
on the roll axis. We tried to initiate .
unstarts in the middle of all this, some-
times without the motion system on, again,
to try to prevent the reaction from being
so immediate such as an unsuspecting pilot
might have who was actually flying the
aircraft. Also, I would like to comment that
in these tests there's a certain amount of
learning curve on the part of the pilot. He
gets more proficient at doing,them so as he
starts watching ALPHA for example, an the
simulator, which ordinarily I don't watch
inflight. You can sense this through your
seat of the pants "g", "gls" that you feel.
But we ran all of these tests and I think
that it is likely that we've investigated
the very area that caused the airplane 2003 to
have its accident. Specifically, we found
that a 260, when we duplicated this maneuver
it was very very touch and go and I was able
to control the thing nearly evertime, but I
was really working hard and really in a sweat
when I came cut of there. I also established
that if you permit any type of positive pitch,
rate to develope in the middle of all this
then you, can go to the full forward stick
condition and depending on the rate of the
pitch on the positive side, it depends on
whether, or not you are able to recover the
full forward stick. That's very important.
You don't want to let these inertial couplings
develope about any of your axles, and that
includes the roll axis, but pitch is most
important. At 27%0 that was as far aft / believe
as we went in the simulator,, then I did some
investigation on getting the airplane up to 11
and 12 and 13 and even 14 degrees ALPHA, but you
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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
have to do it by arriving at that ALPHA
with a zero pitch rate. If you can do that,
then you have just sufficient control, to
control the aircraft. But if you have any
type of positive pitch rate, even at 8 or 9
degrees, then itis a hazardous maneuver and
touch and go.
A True Transcript
cxCid.d,
DONALD R AMES
Major, U AF
Recorder
7
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Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP71600590R000100100001-4
proved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDF'71B0059
Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP71600590R000100100001-4
oVed FORJapleaSe 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP7113005919K000100)001-4
REPLY TO
TI OF JA-C
?6..?
SECRET
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AMARILLO TECHNICAL TRAINING CENTER (ATC)
? AMARILLO AIR FORCE BASE, TEXAS 79111
OFFICE OF THE STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE
3 FED 1966
summ Report of Property Damage, Other Than USAF, Resulting from
SR-71 Aircraft Accident on 25 Jan 66 near Tucumcari, New Mexico
1. An investigation was made and completed 2 February 1966
of property damage, other than USAF, resulting from the above
mentioned accident.
2. Properties involved:
STATOTHR
a. Albert, New Mexico. Parts of
the aircraft scattered over this property. No damage sustained
? by property owner.
STATOTHR
? b. 111111111.11.111.11.111.111.....1 Mosquero, New Mexico. Parts
? of the aireraPt scattered over this property. Only damages
. incurred were deep truck tracks caused by removal of parts.
TATOTHR
?c. eros, New Mexico. Main part
of aircraf eras es on property resulting in the STATOTHR
burning of grassland measur ng approximately 801x201. A
temporary roadway was constructed by USAF personnel from
Highway 102 to the crash area. This roadway wae .9 of one
mile in length.
3. CLAIMS - - All three of the above listed property owners
were contacted and each stated emphatically that no claim
would be filed against the United States for property damage
or services re
HEN K. LESTER, Captain, USAF 1 Atch
ims Officer Diagram ,
SECRET
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Nue
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SECRET
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
CERTIFICATE OF DAMAGE 7.9. AIRCRAFT
01-4
2 February 1966
This is to certify that SR-71 aircraft, serial number 61-7952
was totally destroyed upon ground impact during -an aircraft accident
which occurred an 25 January 1966 coo The
estimated cost of the aircraft is
25X1A
awilAgtopuitert.
Donald R. s, Maj. USAF
Recorder
SECRET
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP71B00590R000100160001-4
4/08/29 TC A-RDP71600590R000100100001-4
'N./ ? `1/4.1 ,?
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SECRET
tiAtiDujocy moullut
TRANSCRIPTION
? Transcription of notes taken on a portable "Dictet" recorder
carried in aircraft. Thts device is utilized to record data in flight.
The recording tape was found in excellent condition. All material
transcribed from this tape were made by___________ during the flight
which terminated in the accident.
25X1A
,4v1. Left side looks good. '
Generators are on the line. Generator lights are out.
Pitch trim - Nose up. "Pitch Trim-Nose down
Roll trim- Right roll, Left roll.
Neutral in the roll.
Auto-Pilot - ON
All SAS - ON
Calling Edwards Ground
Request Taxi
Engine Readings on the left in Idle -
RPM - 3660; EGT - 380; Nozzle 12; Fuel Flow -
3700; Oil Pressure 42; "fa" Hydro 3300; "R"
Hydro 3400; "A" Hydro 3300; "B" Hydro 3300.
On the right.side
RPM - 3580; EGT - 380; Nozzle 12; Fuel Flow ie
6400; Oil Pressure 42.
Cleared as filed. '
Maintain above flight level 60,000 '
The left EGT and left Fuel Flow are cycling.
The left Fuel Flow is cycling from about 3600
up to 4000: ?'
.#
The left EGT goes from 372 up to 390 in'
conjunction with Fuel Flow cycling.
I have a right EGT stable at 380 and a right
Fuel Flow of 6400
Engine readings on the left in Military -
RPM - 6680; EGT - 792; Nozzle Division is
minus 1; Fuel Flow - 18,500; Oil Pressure -
50.
Bleed light went out at 5150 RPM.
Also at_Military I'm getting EGT and Fuel.
Flow cycling. 18,200 to 180600 on Fuel
Flow.' 788 to 794 on EGT.
On the right side in Military.
RPM - 6650; EGT - 794; Nozzle is minus 1;
Fuel Flow - 180400; Oil Pressure is 49.
Fuel tank readings - #1 - 150000; #2 -13,600;
#3 - 160200; #4 - 100300; #5 - 120000;
#6 - 13,600.
Dutch 54 ready for takeoff
Going tower frequency.
Calling Edwards Tower
Ready for takeoff
SECRET
?spichm. HANDUNG WIND
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specIAL HANDLING RBNIRID
Total fuel - 790200#
Calling Edwards Tower
Dutch 54 ready for takeoff
Rogers I'll take the left side
Calling Edwards Tower
Calling Sport 44.
Ready to go in about 1 minute.
Rogers I'll expedite
Oxygen ON
Sport 44 - 54 in 10 seconds
54 on the roll
54 mission frequency
Going to Auto-Nay
I noticed on takeoff roll the left,EGT
got up to 810. Right EGT (Blocked)
Calling Edwards Approach
.88 Mn, 31r800, 305 KEAS
I let up full A/B
.9 Mn now - 70,200# fuel
Max A451,
1.2 Mn, 670700#, 445 KEAS, 29,300 ft:
450 KEAS now.
Pitch trim 3i degrees nose up
450 KEAS, 1.3 Mn, 31,800 feet
Angle of Attack 3 degrees
Fuel remaining 660000#
Climbing through flight level 330000 feet.
Bleeding my KEAS off
It's 610400# (Fuel) - and its 1.6 Mn
Elapse time is 13..
42,8000 430 KEAS
CIP's are 7i and 8. About' i psi difference.
Calling Oakland Center
1.7 Mn and going Pcs "B" on aft.
Roger Oakland Center climbing through flight
level 44,000 and squawking.
1.9 Mn, 4%000, 447 KEAS
Elapse tile 15.
CIP's are 818 and 9.3
Fuel remaining 570904
Actually about 570800. It cycled a little.
It cycles occasionally. 57,300 to 57,800#
Its stable now at 57p4o0
Mach 2.0 to Auto on the Fwd Doors and 58,200
Now its dOwn to 570600#
Elapse time is 16.
Locks like its stabilizing Out at 570200.
Its cycling quite a bit.
2.2 Mach, 442 KEAS, 54,600
CIP's are 10 and 10.3
C/T's are matched at 150.
Elapse time 17.
RICK HANDUNO
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.11141r ? " '44401
oved Fork/Meese 2001/08/29: CIA-RDP71B0059011050010641001-4
SECRET
SPEOULHANDUMAMMAIII
RPMs are 7200 and 7100
EGT's are 782 and 782
Nozzle's 6 and 5.5.
Fuel Flows are 37,200 and 37,600
Oil Pressure is 45 and 43.
Fuel Remaining 540700 '
Pitch Trim is 3 degrees nose up
Right Oil Pressure is fluctuating quite ,a bit.
Plus or minus 1 psi
Accelling very good today.
It's pretty warm
2.4 Mn, 440 KEAS, 57,900
CIP's.are 114 and 12
CIT's are matched at 200
Fuel remaining 52,300
Pitch Trim is 31 degrees nose up
2.5 Mn, 438 KEAS, 60,550
CIP's are 12 and 12i
CIT's matched at 220
Fuel remaining 500600
RPM's - 7150 and 7050
EGT's - 774 and 772
Nozzle's 7i and 7
Fuel Flows - 33,200 and 340000
Oil Pressure 43 and 42
Coming up on 2.6 Mn. Going to Poe "An on
Aft Doors.
Elapse time is an
Both the Aft Door lights are still ON.
Now the right one is out Left one is still
flickering.
CIP's are 12.8 and 13.3
Mild inlet roughness.
Roger, right on 30 - 35.
Calling Oakland Center
In this turn 35 degrees right bank at 2.7 Mn,
640700, Lq6 KEAS
Getting 6 degrees nose up Pitch Trim
Fuel remaining - 46,500#
Calling Seattle Center
Looks like.. it's rolling us out right On course.
Rolling out on 050 True
At about 2.8 Mn
Elapse time is 27
Going to dlosed on the Aft Doors
At 44,200
MP's are now matched at 14.
Ready for left turn.
(Blocked)
This left turn is giving us a bank angle ,of about
40 degrees.
I'm going to hold it down a little bit
OK it's rolling us out now.
SECRET
ET
SPECIAL HAWING RIM.
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so"
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SECRET
SPECIAL HANDUNG REQUIRED
2.94 Mn, (Blocked)
Elapse time is 29.
Rolling us out (Blocked)
I'm going to pull out a little bit.
I have 37,900 at 3.1 Mach, 405 KEAS,
72,500.
Elapse time is 34
CIP's are matched at 18.8
CIT's are at 385.
3.15 Mn - Throttling back
Rolling out on heading 235 True
5 degree Pitch Trim (Blocked)
I have 32,600
How's the temperature back there Jim.
Calling Oakland Center
Dutch 54 above 60,000 and squawking
Now at 3.19 Mn, 82,300, 330 KEAS
CIP's are 12.5 and 13.
CIT's are matched at abut 395 - 398.
I have 300200#. I'll get some tank readings
here.
RPM's are 7100 and 7100
EOT's are 784 and 784.
Nozzles are 7 and 7
Fuel Flows are 17,600 and 17,800
Oil Pressures are 41 and 35.
I'll go thru the tanks - 30,000 total.
#1 - Empty; #2. 13,500; #3 - 1600;
#4 - 9400; #5 - 5803; #6 - 100.
Angle of Attack is 5,
Trim is indicating 6fr degrees ,nose up.
Total is 29,200#
I'll,turn crossfeed OFF
I'M going to add a little more power.
Theres a lot of fuel in Tank #2.
I had the crossfeed on for a little over
5 minutes.
"R" Bay is 64; 'IL" is 65;' "E" Bay is 65.
Now its 7 degrees nose up Pitch Trim'
27,300 # left
3.16 Mn, 80,800 M, 338 KEAS
Angle of Attack is 4.8
I'll have to back .off a little we re
a little over 4000
3.2 Mn, 81,000 ft., 404 - CIT.
CIP's are 13 and (Blocked)
Nozzles 7.2
Fuel Flows 17,500 and 17,900
Oil Pressure 42 and 37
Hydro System is OK
LN2 - 98 and 95
Fuel Remaining 25,700
Pitch Trim is 7 degrees nose Up
Calling Oakland Center
-4-
SECRET
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SPACIAL HANDUNG AEQUIREI3
Going to start turn in 72 miles
Calling Los Angeles Center
? Dutch 54 squawking
Sun Visor just fell off
Getting a little roll feedback in the stick
and its putting me completely out on Pitch
. Trim.
I've got 21:600
Calling Edwards Approach ?
Dutch Charlie this is Dutch 54.
Going "A" on the Aft Doors for decel.
Both Doors programmed.
Going decel now.
Elapse time 57.
It's pretty hot up here today. We were
pushing that 400 degrees quite a bit.
? Above 60,000
In decel: 2.8 Mn, 343 KEAS
76 thousand (Blocked)
Still have 8 degrees nose up trim
Tanks 2 and 4 feeding
19,500# remaining.
How's your temperature.
A little warm up here, but I've got it all
the way down.
2.5 Mach I'm going closed on the Aft Doors.
Pitch Trim is 2 degrees up
? Fuel remaining 18,700#
Tank #2 - 80000; #4 - 9300.
Al]. the others are indicating empty.
We're just a little bit east.
Fate 53 - Dutch 54 '
We're 17 miles south of Beatty now on the
135 Radial, Heading 295.
Roger Dutch 54 - 1, 2, 30 4, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1,
Turning left to 140
I have a visual on the tanker
Understand 160
You can go ahe d and start a descent and accel now
X'm reading 16,000 even
I'm reading 6100 in Tank #1 now.
Have about 5900 in Tank #2.'
#3 - 0; #4 - 3500; #5 - 500; #6 0,
Total is cycling - 15,200
Fate 53 this is Dutch 54
Receiver is ready
Remind me to check the IFR intercom
? 54 ready.
Get as much tamp out as we can get out.
I'll need another 20,000
Thats all / need - 80,000
Fate 531- Dutch 54
-5-
SECRET
SPECIAL HANDUNG REQUIIIM
Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP71600590R000100100001-4 ?
ic)rotA For Realpase.8161/08/29 : CIA*P71B00590R,Q010 0001-4 oni
SECRET
SFECIALHANDLING REQUIRED
Thank you very much
We were 80,000 off the tanker.
We were off the tanker at elapse time 137.
80,000#
Ready for our next leg.
Tank #1 - 140900; #2 - 130300; #3 - 150600;
#4 - 9,900; #5 - 11,400; #6 -.14,900.
Total npw - 78,300
Calling Edwards Approach Control
Departing the Beatty Refueling Area.
Preceding on our flight plan route
At .88 Mn, 31,300 ft., and I'll go on up
to max AAB.
.9 Mn now - 770000#
Its 450 KEAS, 280000, 1.2 Mn and 740300#
Climbing through flight level 30,000
1.2 Mn my Pitch Trim is 3i degrees nose up
RPM 's at 1.2 Mn are 6800 and 6800
EGT's are 808 and 800
Nozzle's are 3 and 31
Fuel Flows are 53,800 and 51,400
Oil Pressures are 49 and 45.
Hydro 's are 33 and 34 and "A" and "B"
are 33 and 33
CIP's are 8.8 and 9.3
CIT's are matched at SO.
1.4 Mn, 450 KIEAS, 35,100 ft.
Programming into a 30 degree left bank.
About 32 degrees.
Good Deal -It sure went nice on the first leg
Flight level 38,000
Calling Edwards Approach
Passing through 39,000
Calling Los Angeles Center
.Squawking and at 42,000
Turn the temperature up a little.
1.7 Mn and going ft" pos on the AFT.
CIP's are matched (Blocked)
"Rh Bay temperature (Blocked) 40
"E" Bay 111 55.
Now she's programning about a 40 degree
right bank.
At 1.97 Mach and going AUTO on the Fwd Doors
CIP's are matched
At Mach 2.0 - 610800#
2.2 Mach, 448 MAN% 54,100 ft.
area are 10 and 10.3
CIT's matched at 150.
Fuel remaining is 600000#
Pitch Trim is 3 degrees nose up
3.1i degrees nose up
dm/
-6-
SECRET
RECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP71B00590R000100100001-4.
?-4%;0". "%IT*"
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SECRET
$PEC1AL 1 IANDUNG REQUIRED
Angle of Attack is 3i degrees
Calling Los Angeles Center
Were you calling ma
2.4 Mn, 447 KEASD 57,700 ft.
CIP's are 11.6 and 12.
CIT's matched at 200
Fuel remaining 57,300
RPM 's are 7150 and 7100
Etc's re 780 and 780
Nozzles are 7 and 6.9
Fuel Flows are 32,000 and 33,100
Oil Pressures are 43 and 42
Calling Denver Center
Thats affirmative and Ident
2.6 Mn and going Pos "A" on the Aft Doors
Getting a little inlet roughness
446 !AS, 61,100
CIP's are 13.5 and 14
CIT's are matched at 20
Left Aft Byp as Door light is still flickering
Pitch Trim is 3 degrees nose up
2.7 Mn, 338 KEAS0 640000
Just swung Tuba City
About 300 to go - 294
2.8 Mn and going Closed od Aft Doors
Lights cycled and there off now
Fuel remaining 52,000
CIP's are 15i matched
CIT's are matched at 300
RPM's ?re 7120 and 7060
ET's are 784 and 790
Nozzles are 8 and 7.5
Fuel Flows are 35,200 and 32,500
Oil Pressure 42 and 40
LN2's are 90 and 85 ?
Pitda Trim is 3 degrees nose up
Programming into a turn.
15 degrees right bank and it doesn't call
for a turn here. It's picking up. Now
were doing lIttle left turn. Only
about 5 degrees of turn.
Right CIP is way down so it looks like
the right forwarl door went open,
Closing it manually. Thats what caused
the turn.
Calling Albuquerque Center
Above Flight level 60,000 -
3.0 Mach, 395 1EAS0, 73,600
CIP's are matched at 17i
CIT's are matched at 375
SEd-LET
SWIM. 'HANDING Wow
Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP71B00590R000100100001-4..
Alkoved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIAIRDP711300590%)00100 0001-4
SECRET
SPECIAL HANDLING RE9U110/
Getting some pretty good cycling in Mach here
Call us 3.2 Mn, 4402Oo on the fuel
396 KEAS0 74,900 ft.
CIP's re matched at 18.8
CIT's are matched at 400
I'll back off a little
'Pitch trim 4- degrees nose up
Start our turn now
Dalhart's 118 miles
When will we turn.
Rog -
Fuel is 420200
A True Transcript
NALD R
Major, US
Recorder
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ApQed For Rase 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP711300590RQ,a01001
'
AT?
1-4
? SECRET
SPECIAL FIANDLING REQUIRED'
.FEDERAL AVIATION AGENCY
Air Route Tve.tfic Control Ceker-
BO; 32350,Station b
buquOciiie New Me*lc? 87110*.
c; " .
January 27, 1966
IN REPLY
REFER TOt
;e
Dear Mr.' .13teVens t
.Atan RatOmsky of our 'liashington office, we areT'
forwarding you 'a ,copy of the recorded conversatione regarding the flight
of Dutch 54 in the Albuquerque, Center's area on January 25, 1966.
We believe that he transcription contains the only infOlhation we .have.'
40 may be Ortinent to; the aecident investigation,.
Sin.,roly yc>t
S. Dalton .
Chiefo'Albuquer e b,sntei-
g
I .
Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP71600590R000100100001-4
AGved For Rease 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP711300590R4001000001-4
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Sr:CIALE1ANDLING REQUIRED
?
?
ITDERAL 'AVIATION AGENCY
-1 ?Mx Nous Traffic Oemlesit Center
,
? .?.O.**323S,$$*ttD.
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0001.001,101. IMO 1.siI lin"
ailislastwoo Af?x louse TWO* Csatrot Canter
;Subjects Trabseviption .1 easoinroattimie reserdies Dutch 34
This tresstript 4001re She peeled trail 21.121123 41M2 to 2040.13S 411121ms . ?
,AReasery 2$, 2906.
?
Th. aseecies listed below uede the trneselesiess duties the period
imwolved. AbbreviatiOme used Is the hod, of the transcript AMO
? *Meted after seek awry.
Atkopmerquet, View *nice Air Route brans
Central. Comer
? ??
'41444,1'004
Demmer. Colorado Ale Route Traffic Control, .
. Center oloo04,01.000.64. *** * ...604100 ********* oil,'
Air Force Butch 54 o? *************
Amoripme Airline* ?tight $S ***** ***or.** ** ? **
Trams World Airtime /Mkt 12 ??????4*,14,4 *****
Delta Airtime fliekt $19 40410 ******** +lb
410161401W Squadree, Aaimrtllc, beim
Albuquerque Cueterlector. 14/13 Coordinator
alfroptilet 'cositor Ssetos Voitirdinotoit
DEN AV*:
DUTtli
? AA85 ?
21/12
DLS19 .
SLRSPIM OC1
C14/13 .
Ama
RIRUST CMITUrt that the foltdrins ie
? , a true treueeriptios of the resorded,
eaavoireatits pertelsatl:t0 tht.14200S?
. ?
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acetliset.
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,
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Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP71600590R000100100001-4
Awed For Rea!pass 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP7113005901:441001000001-4
Dutch five tour free the J fifteen tetereeettoe of the tenter
'Weedery three five elle* west live eetth of the aettter bowedery,
, VP,* ea tor shoo eh" aere
Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP71600590R000100100001-4
Aped For Rase 2001/08/29 : CIA-IRDP711300590R8001001g01-4
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SECRET ?
SPECIAL HANDLING RE9UlliED
'
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? .1111.....?11
ABQ /XiCet Dutch five four AlbuquetqUe i.Iertter
(fint4s)
,
Ms ? Albuquerque Ceeter Dutch tts four
'411314 dltfets . liuteh five four Albuqueetee Center roger Verify night
?
s!evrtlisAll
Q
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(2123110)
v
idiest
r
?voter abaci tlisbt lerel elet eat* wire
MEZMUMLUZIMMISOW
Malt ...-Alhuquerque_Centep tide is leeriest:4 eighty five do you have
12184,13). , anything es radar off to our right uh look* like some kind
a atoll or steeptblosubelipleue (ublOtoltlitiblo)
, ? '
4114 Antis , Aserf.era eighty floe tiffeeetfre de Wire e'redu identified'
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SECRET
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SECRET
SPECIAL HAND! !NG REQUIRED
FLIGHT OPERATIONS AND WITNESS GROUP
Investigation of aircraft accident involving SR-71 serial
number 61-7952, production number 2003, which occurred near
Bueyeros, New Mexico on 25 January 1966.
A. HISTORY OF FLIGHT 25X1A
arMIIIIIMMIRIRILIFFiceespecvey,eid
25X1AOn 25 January 1966,
pilot and RSO re
California Company, were scheduled to fly 8R-71 61-7952 on a
-- Category I sensor flight test mission. Call sign was Dutch 54.
Two of several pre-established routes (Noah and Eli) war,
planned for the mission and an air refueling with KC-135 Pate
53 was scheduled in the Beatty Air Refueling Area between the
two route segments. Weather conditions were satisfactory for
the mission.
Flight planning was,completed by the Lockheed Flight Test
Engineering Dep rtment at Edwards AFB. Crew briefing was in
accordance with existing policies and was conducted by the
pilot, RSO and mission flight test engineer. The aircraft was
preflighted by maintenance crews using established procedures
and no discrepancies were noted. The flight crew was dressed
on scheduled and taken to the aircraft. Engine start, taxi and
all pre-takeoff checks were routine except that a 17 to 18'
minutes delay was inturred before engine start to allow for
re-alignment of the navigation system.
Takeoff, climb and cruise through the Noah route segment
was uneventful. The pilot noted a relatively high pitch trim
position during this cruise, indicating a CG position farther
forward than desired. He used the cross-feed system to move
CG aft. There was no indication of a fuel system sequencing
problem. Deceleration and rendezvous with the tanker was
according to the flight plan.
The air refueling was completed and the SR-71 departed the
tanker with full fuel tanks, an indicated total of approximately
80,000 pounds. The aircraft departed the refueling area and
started acceleration for the Eli route segment. The roll axis
and Auto-Nay modes of the autopilot were engaged after refueling
was completed but the pitch axis was controlled manually.
During acceleration and climb, the aircraft performed normally
and pitch trim indication was noticeably lower than on the
preceeding leg. At approximately 2.9 Mach, the ircraft yawed
and rolled into a 20 degree right bank. The pilot noted the
right CIP to be 4 psi below the left so he changed to a manual
control schedule of the right forward by-pass door for the
remainder of acceleration and cruise. Because of CIT limitations,
cruise was stabilized at 3.15 Mach between 77,000 and 78,000
feet. Approaching the turn at the east end of Eli (west of
Bueyeros) the pilot added a little power so as to maintain altitude
through the turn. The turn was started at 77,482 feet and approximately
3.16 Mach. Fuel load at the start of turn was 42,200 pounds and
pitch trim at 2.8 nose up. This computes to a CO of 26.7%, see
attachment to this report
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The aircr ft entered a right turn as programmed through
the Auto-Nay system. Bank was established at approximately
35 degrees and after 15 to 20 degrees of turn, the fight
engine inlet unstarted. Bank immediately increased to about
60 degrees and the pilot countered with left aileron to stop
the roll. Use of rudder by the pilot to aid roll control
cannot be determined. The pilot stated that he thought of
having to use both inlet restart switches but he has no
conscious recollection of actuating them. He attempted to
lower the nose and reduce the angle of attack by forward stick
force but the nose started up at an increasing rate. The
last stick position that the pilot remembers is in the forward
left corner. No decrease in the bank angle was noted until the
nose started up, and then the nose went into a very rapid
pitch up. Pitch angle increased to a point where all the pilot
could see was blue sky and at this point he apparently loWt
consciousness.
The pilot regained oonsciousness while he was descending
to the main parachute deployment altitude with the stabilization
chute operating normally. After the main chute opened, he
actuated the survival kit and opened his face plate. The .
landing was relatively mild and after landing he was assisted
in getting out of his equipment by a richer who flew his
helicopter to the landing point. The rancher checked the RSO
and determined that he was dead. He then flew the pilot tds
the hospital in Tucumcari, New Mexico for treatment.
B. ANALYSIS OF WITNESS STATEMENTS
There were a considerable number of persons who observed
the final stages of the fall of aircraft wreckage and the descent
by parachute of the two crew members. The witnesses were
generally inexpert in the field of aviation and' none could see
the aircraft during the pitch-up and disentegration phases of
the flight. Four statements are included under Tab N; however,
no significant information re1at1v to these of the accident
can be found in the statements. gave STATOTHR
information concerning his assistance to the pilot after landing
and is discussed in the medical report of this accident.
C. SIMULATOR STUDIES
1. A series of tests were conducted on 1 and 2 February 1966
using the SR-71 flight simulator at Beale AFB. The purpose of
these tests was an attempt to duplicate the aircraft and flight
conditions which existed at the time of the accident and the:
maneuvers which resulted in loss of control in order to determine
the reason for loss of control and whether or not it could have
been prevented.
25X1A
25X1A
tin in the tests were: (LAC pilot);
; Col Templeton R-71 PS0);
and Lt Col Daniel SR- Tea perations). With the exception of
Col Templeton, each of these pilots has flown the SR-71. Col
Templeton has flown the YF-12. Observing and recording the
tests were Lt Col Rothwell (Directorate of Aerospace Safety)
and Mr Hoey (AFFTC Performance and Stability Engineer).
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3. Test conditions were as fkalows: Aircraft gross weight
100,000 pounds; speed 3.15 Mach; altitude 770000 feet; 35
degree right bank in a shallow climb right forward inlet bypass
doors set manually to match the left CLF. Each pilot flew
one test at 25% CO, 26% CO and 27%0O. After initial conditions
were established, the right inlet was unst rted and the pilot
attempted to recover the aircraft from the ensueing maneuvers.
Data from the tests Was recorled and can be seen in the attachment to
vtirti"ileport in Tab W. In general, the results of the tests .showed
that at-25* CO little dirricuity was endountered in recovering
the aircraft; at 26% CO recovery was marginal; and at 27%
CO recovery either could not be effected or, if a momentary
recovery was effected, the aircraft was lost immediately
when the pilot's attention was diverted momentarily from
the task of maintaining pitch control, stated that STATOTHR
the simulator test at 27% CO appeared to duplicate very closely
the maneuvers which resulted in his loss of control in the actual
aircraft.
4. Further tests were conducted at the 27% CO condition
with the following results. (1) With zero pitch rate an
angle of attack of 10i degrees could be maintained with full
forward stick. (2) Above 10i degrees angle of attack a zero pitch
rate could not be maintained with full forward stick and the
angle of attack continued to increase. (3) With a pitch rate of
less than one degree per second the aircraft would continue to
pitch up, out of control, if full forward stick was applied after
7i degrees angle of attack had been exceeded (Note: At these
flight conditions the angle of attack was 4i degrees for level
flight and 6 degrees in a 35 degree bank). (4) Pitch rates in
excess of one degree per second resulted in immediate loss of
control. (5) By giving maximum attention to the angle of attack
and pitch attitude the aircraft could be controlled, however,
a momentary distraction from these instruments resulted in loss
of control. (6) Pitch rates and angles of attack which would
cause loss of control were so small that they were not readily
apparent to the pilot during a normal instrument cross check.
Additional tests were conducted with the pitch stability
augmentation system failed and although the aircraft was more
difficult to control, the results at each CO were essentially
the same.
5. The general opinion of the pilots participating in these
tests was that the simulator accurately depicts the aircraft
handling qualities and flight characteristics in all areas except
roll response. The roll response to a roll command was felt
to be too high. However, they were unanimous in their Opinion
that this did not affect the validity of the tests. The SE-71
flight simulator employs two Mark I digital computers for
continuous solving of flight, propulsion, navigation, communication
and accessory equations to achieve as close a simulator-to-
aircraft performance relationship as possible. The Mark I
computer receives analog and Boolean inputs from the cockpit controls
and switches, converts the analog inputs to digital form, performs
the required computations, and converts the results into analog
signals. These signals control the simulator to provide
realistic response in accordance with the aircraft's performance
characteristics. The cockpit controls, switches and displays
are exact duplicates of the aircraft. A motion system imparts a
realistic, sensation of flight maneuvers.
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6. Additional simulator studies conducted at AFFTC are
included as an attachment to this report.
D. INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS
1. Lockheed California Company pilots assigned to ADP are
not subject to standardization/evaluation flight checks by AFSC
Contract Management Division. Further, there are no requirements
for flight evaluation of these pilots by existing contracts as
far as could be determined.
2. Investigation of the wreckage by the maintenance investi-
gation team and evaluation of known facts and circumstances
revealed that structures, flight controls, engines and afterburners,
all aircraft systems, ruptures, or fire and exglosion were not
factors in this accident. All damage occurred after the aircraft
entered a statically unstable flight regime.
3. A group of four qualified pilots including the pilot
involved in the accident conducted a series of tests in the SR-71
flight simulator. It was determined that the simulator control
response approximated the aircraft sufficiently to validate the
tests. Specific results are discussed in paragraph C of this
report. Overall results showed that the probability of
recovering the aircraft from the conditions to which it was
exposed was virtually nil.
E. FINDINGS
1. The crew was qualified, current and proficient in SR-71
aircraft and was on an authorized flight.
2. There is no standardization/evaluation program in
effect for Lockheed California Company ADP pilots, nor are
adequate records of flying activity and training being maintained.
3. AFCS facilities and weather were not factors.
4. Flight planning and briefing were adequate for the
mission and in accordance with existing polcies.
5. Aircraft preflight by the ground crew was in accordance
with existing maintenance directives.
6. DD Form 365F is not used nor is there an equivalent
ftamin use for recording weight and balance data. A form titled
Flight Loading Sheet is used to record loading of all
serviced items with resulting gross weight and CG. The form
does not provide cross-check procedure for fuel loading to
assure desired loading and distribution in the aircraft.
7. The pilot and RSO operated the aircraft in accordance
with Flight Manual procedures and the test plan from time of
entering the cockpit until the aircraft became uncontrollable.
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SPECIAL HAND' ING PrnoinFoi
8. There is no accurate and direct means to show the pilot
CG location, nor are there provisions for manually moving fuel
rapidly aft, as well as forward, to set a desired CG for
various flight conditions.
9. The aircraft entered a turn using
grammed 35 degree bank at 3.15 Mach and 77,
CG was approximately 26.7% which is aft of
limit of 26.5% for supersonic flight. The
shortly after the turn was established and
rolled to approximately 60 degrees of bank.
an Auto-Nay pro-
842 feet altitude.
the authorized aft
right engine unstarted
the aircraft immediately.
10. The aircraft did not respond to aileron forces to correct
the bank nor did it respond to forward stick forces to lower the
pitch attitude and decrease angle of attack. A pitch rate
developed, the aircraft pitched-up and began to disintegrate due
to forces beyond the design criteria.
11. The pilot experienced complete loss of control when
the aircraft entered a statically unstable regime in which a
disturbance in the pitch axis resulted in development of a pitch
rate which cculd not be controlled.
F. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. A standardization/evaluation program should be established
for Lockheed ADP pilots and crew members, and adequate records Of
flying and training maintained.
2. The R-12 Flight Loading Sheet should be revised to pro-
vide cross-check procedures for fuel loading to assure that the
desired fUel quantity is loaded and distributed properly. The
revised form should also provide for computation and recording
of necessary weight and balance data. DD Form 365F should be used.
3. Aircraft Ws speed and altitude limitations should be
changed to provide a greater safety margin until proper flight
parameters, procedures and equipment are studied and necessary
changes made to provide a safe operating envelope.
, 4. An accurate, direct reading CG indicating system shoul0 be
installed in the cockpit to show the pilot exact CG location.
5. The fuel system should be modified to allow rapid aft, as
well as forward, movement of fuel in order to establish optimum
CO for the flight conditions.
AN D ROTRWELL
Lt Col, USAF
Directorate of Aerospace
Safety.
WALTER F DANIEL
Lt Col: USAF
SR-71 Test Force
, SECRET
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ROBERT G HORT
AFFTC Engineering
Branch
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STABILITY STUDY - ATTACHMENT
TO FLT OPS & WITNESS GP REPORT
Static Stability in Pitch
A longitudinal trim curve for the SR-71 at 370 KEAS and
Mach 3.15 is shown in Fig 1. The two curves for 25% and 27%
C.G. positions are based on contractor wind tunnel and estimated
flexibility data (Ref LAC-SP-508). Notice that these curves
indicate positive stability below approximately 5? angle of
attack (CL m .13), that is, increasing trailing-edge-up elevator
(back stick) is required to change from a low angle of attack
to a higher one. Above approximately 50 angle of attack the
airplane exhibits increasingly negative static stability which
will result in pitchup if no corrective control action is applied.
Since the elevator effectiveness is relatively high in spite ,
of the low level of static stability the pitch damper (estecially
the 'lagged pitch rate' system) is quite effective And will
maintain a nearly constant pitch attitude even under conditions
of mild static instability. At higher levels of instability or
if the unstable region is approached with a nose up pitch rate
the SAS ystem will oppose the pitch up tendency but will be
unable to reduce the pitch rate to zero and thus pilot action
will be required to prevent pitchup. At aft C.G. conditions
the level of static stability is reduced at all flight ,conditions
and thus the critical angle of attack for pitch-up is also --
reduced.
The lift coefficient as computed for the flight conditiona
reported by the pilot just prior to the start of the turn is
shown by the arrow in fig 1. Notice that any increase in angle
of attad'or nose up pitch rate as might be expected at the
initia0on of a turn would place the airplane well into the ,
unstable pitch-up region especially for an aft C.G. conditioq.
LJateral Control Power
. At the flight conditions under consideration (3.15 Mach
number, 370 KEAS) the SR-71 exhibits a relatively low level of
lateral control power even under normal flight situations. A
condition of thrust asymmetry as experienced during an unstart
will produce a steady state sideslip which is roughly proportional
to the difference in thrust between the two engines. This side-
slip will result in a steady state roll as produced by the airplane
dihedral effect unless controlled by aileron or rudder. The
solid line in fig 1 describes the flight condition where the rolling
moment produced by sideslip is exactly balanced by full aileron .
deflection. Also shown are estimated sideslip values for 100%
and 50% thrust variation between engines (yaw damper on). For
conditions above and to the right of the cross hatched line the
airplane will continue to roll into the dead engine even with
full opposing aileron.
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ntailz.1 Description
The pilots description of the maneuver causing the accident
can now be fully explained based on the predicted longitudinal
stability and lateral control power for the SR-71. A slight
amount of back pressure on the stick was apparently applied
by the pilot at the start of the turn. The resulting nose
up pitch rate and increase in angle of attack placed the air-
plane into the unstable angle of attack range where the SAS
was unable to completely stop the pitch rate. Angle of attack
therefore continued to increase slowly throughout the
ensuing maneuver. At approximately 80 angle of attack an
unstart occurred on the right engine distracting the pilot from
the gradually increasing angle of attack. The airplane rolled
into the unstarted inlet and the pilot applied full corrective
iler2n. The angle of attack at this point was apparently 8
to 10v and the fully applied aileron was ineffective in righting
the airplane (fig 1). This further distracted the pilot from
the increasing angle of attack. When the pilot realized that
the airplane had attained a significiant nose up pitch rate
and applie&full forward stick the airplane had exceeded a con-
trollable angle of attack and an uncontrollable pitchup
occurred.
Results of AFFTC Simulator
Al]. of the pilots who flew the Beale simulator also flew
the AFFTC SR-71 simulation which had been mechanized to assist
in the Cat II test program. All of the participating pilots
felt that the roll response of the AFFTC simulation was much
closer to the actual airplane than was the Beale simulator. Al-
though the pitchup symptoms were similar in both simulators the
pilots found that they could control the pitchup better in the
AFFTC simulator. They attributed this to the low pitch stick force
gradients (approximately 1/3 of actual), lack of breakout forces
and the unrealistic cockpit presentation. The lower lateral
response also appeared to reduce the tendency for the airplane
to couple from inadvertent roll inputs as was noticed in the Beale
simulator. The pilots felt th t in general the AFFTC simulator
verified the conclusions reached after flying the Beale simulator
with regard to conditions causing the accident.
The AFFTC simulator was also used to attempt to match the
pitch, roll and yaw angle data obtained from the ANS. A ti e
history of the best match is shown in fig 2. If it is assumed
that the rate of climb and sideslip remained approximately
constant during the first few seconds of the turn (prior to
the unstart) then angle of attack alone can be varied to match
the three measured attitude angles. This simulated data
'verifies the contention that the angle of attack began to in-
crease at the initiation of the turn and continued to increase
gradually until an uncontrollable pitchup occurred.
ROBERT 0 HOEY
AFFTC Engineering
Branch
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42 143
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Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP71600590R000100100001-4
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Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP71600590R000100100001-4
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Approved For RDlease 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP716005902000100100001-4
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SECRET
SPECIALHcANDVANIArb
58,449
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887.8"
104.6
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E.? Assuming no forward transfer or crossfeed operation, the c:g.
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15 Dec 1965.
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Tank 1 - (-) 10,000
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Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP71B00590R000100100001-4
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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
Tank 6 - (-)
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Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP71600590R000100100001-4
eroved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP71B00590R0001000001-4
SECRET
STRUCTURAL, FIRE, AND EANY80114EhRtAWRWIEPERTAINING TO SR-71-A, S. N. 17952,
ON THE 3500 RADIAL/107 NM, CANNON AFB, NEW MEXICO, 25 JANUARY 1966
Except for small parts of chine honeycomb and miscellaneous small parts the
aircraft broke into two sections. The forward part of the fuselage, from the
pitot static boom to approximately station 535 was in. one piece upon contact
with the ground. This part of the aircraft came almost straight down in an
inverted position. The impact broke the pitot static boom and the forward
part section at approximately station 240, which is the manufactured joint.
There was observed no in-flight fire nor ground burning. The impact with the
ground smashed the upper surface inward. Examination of the fractures of the
skin and the load carrying longitudinal members at the separation point, station
535, revealed quite definitely that the forces acting on this forward part of
the fuselage were in a direction mostly upward and slightly to the right.
This was evident since the two lower longerons on the bottom of the fuselage ,
--failed in tension with a slight burr on the right edges of the right longeron,
the skin failure in 450 shear at the line of rivet holes, the compression
buckling of each side longeron and heavy brinelling of the fracture surfaces,
the compression buckling of the top center longeron and the heavy brinelling
of the fracture surface, and the clear "saw-tooth" tear of the upper left
skin which again indicated final upward separation and movement to the right.
Examination of the corresponding fractures and deformations on the front
part of the rearward fuselage at station 535 corroborates the evaluation on
the forward part. Even more pronounced is the skin corrugation of the upper
surface on the forward part of the fuselage which is due to the compressive
force as the forward part of the fuselage deflected upwards. This also caused
buckling of the upper longerons.
Evaluation of these observations results in the conclusion that this structural
failure has to be the consequence of an unorthodox maneuver of the aircraft.
In order to create the loads acting mostly upward, the aircraft either has to
be in a pitch up attitude where the dynamic pressure causes the fracture at
535, or else the aircraft would have to be accelerated in ayitch down maneuver.
The rotational acceleration in pitch down would have to beof such a high
unrealistic figure that it is out of the question. Hence, this fuselage
fracture is secondary and is not a primary cause factor. For academic reasons,
parts of the longerons and skin will be removed and subjected to hardness,
pull, and metallurgical examination to determine whether or not they meet
specifications. The report of these tests will be an appendix to this group
report.
Since the survivor, from the front cockpit stated he did not release the canopy
and it is doubtful whether the deceased pilot from the rear cockpit executed
the canopy release, a study was made as to how they were released. The four
hooks for the forward canopy on the upper fuselage rails were found unfastened
and had rotated to the forward and unlocked position. The two hooks on the
right side of rear cockpit were in partially locked position, those on the left
side were unlocked. Since this part of the aircraft landed inverted, the Impatt
and pressure with the ground could have moved the right-hand hooks to the
partially closed position. The mating rollers on the canopy are unmarked.
The writer observed a sharp mark made by the canopy release wire on the end of
a tube through which the wire runs for the external jettison of the canopies.
The direction of the markings is approximately in the 4:30 o'clock position.
A reasonable explanation as to how the canopies were released is as follows.
The outer chine section from the station 240 to the station 535 is an air-tight
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compartment. However, when the forward part of the fuselage broke off due to
upward forces it rotated so that the open end at 535 is now exposed to ram
pressure. Lockheed engineering calculated that in approximately 0.13 seconds
that 3 psi can be built up which is sufficient to blow out the silicone asbestos
honeycomb which serves as the structural cover for the chine. The handle for
external jettisoning of the canopies is located on the left upper chine cover
at approximately station 320. When the chine blew out, it pulled the handle
with it and the flexible cable, which mechanically released the canopies.
When this occurredthe forward part of the fuselage is approximately upside
down, so that the explosive decompression and downward "g's", due to rotation,
could break the pilot's seat belt which had broken. Estimating the weight of
the pilot and equipment as 300 lbs and the strength of the seat belt as 3000
lbs, it would take 10 "g's" to break the seat belt. The "g's" due to rotation,
plus the pilot's initial 1"g" upside down, aided by the outward push from ex-
plosive decompression could very likely be more than 10. Assuming a seat
belt width of 5 inches and a length across his body and hips of 20 inches, the
bearing of the belt on his body is 100 sq. in. The pounds pressure per sq. in.
is then 30. This is diminished by the 4 lbs per sq. in. of his pressure suit.
Considering the padding of his clothes, it appears that the above is an ex-
planation of why there were no bruises on his stomach and hips.
The rest of the fuselage, wings and engines came down as a unit right side
up. Upon impact with the ground the right nacelle separated and moved and
rotated outward from the rear. No evidence or in-flight fire was apparent
although there was ground fire. The ground fire severely burned the right fin.
Since, from the pilot's testimony, there was no response to his corrective
control action first in roll and then in pitch up, and also from the direction
of forces on the forward part of the fuselage which caused structural breakup,
it is apparent that the cause of the accident is in the area of longitudinal
instability. This adverse characteristic can be the result of one or more
of the following, besides others:
1. Aero -Elasticity of the structure.
2. Inadequate control surface area.
3. Inadequate rate of control response.
4. Operating at too far rearward center-of-gravity.
The above items are now being investigated and will be presented in a separate
report.
FINDINGS:
1. The structural breakup at fuselage station 535 is a result of exceeding
structrual design limits due to aircraft longitudinal instability in
pitch-up and is a secondary failure.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. It is recommended that various studies to delineate the cause for instability
be made and adequate action be taken to prevent future accidents from thii
cause.
25X1A
CO.cal ?d sor
Directorate of Aerospace Safety
Office of the Inspector General
Norton AFB, California
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Maki A "r`. 4' '?,?-???."...rn
k
MATERIAL GROUP REPORT
SR-71 S/N 61-7952 (2003)
Accident - 25 January 1966
1. The Material Factors Group Report consists of the Propulsion and
Fuel, Electric and Electronics, Flight Controls, and Maintenance and
Records Group Reports. Findings and Recommendations are summarized as
follows:
FINDINGS:
1. The Flight Control System did not malfunction nor did it
contribute to this accident.
2. The engines were operating in mid-afterburner range at the
time of the accident and did not contribute to the accident;
however, pilot distraction, caused by manual operation of
the right forward inlet doors and subsequent unstart, could
have contributed to the loss of control.
3. The right inlet unstarted from an undetermined cause.
4. The aircraft fuel system was not programming as desired during
the first phase of the flight, subsequent to aerial refueling,
it appears that it was programming in accordance with the pre-
set schedule.
5. The C.G. was aft of the limiting C.G. at the time of the
accident.
6. Maintenance factors and non-compliance with Service Bulletins
did not contribute to this accident.
T. AC and DC power was available up to the time the aircraft
disintegrated.
8. There was no evidence to indicate the loss of either AC
generator or T-R unit.
9. The electronic, instrument and navigation systems operated
satisfactorily during the flight.
10. The electric/electronic/instrument systems did not contribute
to the cause of this accident.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Fuel system scheduling be revised to maintain aircraft C.G.
limits during Mach 3 plus flight.
2. C.C. indicator be provided in both cockpits.
3. The Project Support Office and the Engine Manufacturer conduct
a study to provide more accurate configuration control of all
engines.
4. Automatic inlet control reliability be improved.
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swim. 1-1,ANT.!t.fr:, REOUIRED
5. LAC review their aircraft records on DD Form2 829 and 829-1,
reference Spike Assembly, to insure that the data recorded is
correct and current.
PrGORDON,. J
Lt Col, USAF
Directorate of Aerospace Safety
Norton AFB, California
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sper4A!1. 7:7JIRED
Propulsion Group Report
Propulsion Grpup Report on SR-71 Aircraft
S/N 61-7952 (2003) Major Accident Which Occurred
On January 25, 1966
JT11D20A engines S/N 648336 and S/N 648333 were installed in the
left and right positions, respectively, on 17 November 1965. Neither
engine had been removed from the aircraft for any reason since the
original installation.
Engine historical
data is as follows:
Left Engine
Right Engine
Serial Number
P648336
P648333
Total Time
43:49 Hrs
62:19 Hrs
Military Time
22:54
30:07
Mach 3.+ Time
11:08
13:06
Mach 3.2+ Time
10:22
11:23
The above engine data does not include the January 25, 1966 flight
time.
Pilot write-ups of engine discrepancies since the November 17, 1965
installation (flights 31 through 40) were reviewed. No discrepancies
were noted which could have contributed to the accident.
The engines remained in their nacelles and with the Main fuselage
to the point of impact. Impact damage on the engines showed the impact
was vertical with the aircraft in a relatively level attitude with no
forward velocity. This resulted in crushing of engine cases and
compressor and turbine blade damage which showed the engines were not
rotating at the time of impact.
Examination of the engines revealed both engines received extensive
foreign object damage (MD). The damage was more severe on the right engine
and caused compresor and turbine blade fractures. This resulted in turbine
and compressor case rupture and penetration of nacelle surfaces by blade
fragments.
Engine combustion cases and burner cans were removed. Debris
recovered in this section revealed numerous pieces which were foreign
to the engine but positive identification of the pieces could not be
made. The battering of burner can domes and penetration of the inner
cones by foreign objects is evidence that the engines were operating
at high power at the time of object ingestion.
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Engine instrument readings obtained from the cockpit instruments
which were captured at the time of loss of electrical power (separation
of the fuselage) were as follows:
Left Engine Right Engine
CIT 372?C 365?C
CIP Broken 9 Psi
EGT 808?C 838?C
Fuel Flow 10,900 lbs/hr 11,300 lbs/hr
ENP 4.8 10.5
With the exception of the exhaust nozzle position (ENP) on the left
engine, these readings correlate with engine operating conditions expected
for the flight conditions at the time of the accident. The low exhaust
nozzle area on the left engine (ENP 4.8) indicates the left afterburner
had blown out prior to loss of electrical power.
The main fuel control and afterburner throttle settings were observed
to be as follows:
Left Engine Right Engine
Main Fuel Control Cut off Minimum A/B range
A/B Fuel Control Cut off Minimum A/B range
These settings compare favorably with the reported cockpit throttle
positions.
Engine internal bleeds, external bleeds and exhaust nozzle positions
were observed to be as follows:
Left Engine Right Engine
Internal Bleeds Open Open
External Bleeds Intermediate Intermediate
Exhaust Nozzle Closed Closed
The exhaust nozzle and external bleed positions are not -consistent
with an engine experiencing a normal run down. Since the hydraulic
fluid used in these systems is fuel, it is probable that the loss of
fuel to the engines prevented the engines from functioning during engine
run down.
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Fuel System
let I
1-4
The fuselage separation occurred at station 535, resulting in
separation of the number 1 fuel tank. Other than this damage, the fuel
sells remained substantially intact. Damage occurring at impact resulted
in crushing of the bottoms of the tanks. The vertical trajectory of the
aircraft in a level attitude is attested to by the vertical penetration
of the top of number 2 and number 5 fuel tanks by their fuel probes.
The top surfaces of the number 6 fuel tanks (both left and right
wing roots) were bulged upward as a result of internal pressures.
These pressures were generated by explosions within the tanks subsequent
to impact and as a result of the ground fire.
Post-impact fire resulted in melting of furl system components to
the extent that fuel feed configuration and functional integrity of the
system at the time of the accident could not be established.
Fuel readings during the first phase of the flight (prior to aerial
refueling) as reported by the pilot and recorded on the "dictet" were
compared to readings expected from a normally functioning fuel system.
Results of this comparison indicate the fuel system was functioning
normally up to and including aerial refueling.
Using the fuel tank quantities reported by the pilot (dictet),
and assuming a normally functioning fuel system without the use of
crossfeed, it was determined that a C.G. of 27% MAC existed at the
time of the right engine unstart.
Aft C.G. limits for Mach 3.+ flight is reported to be 26.5% MAC.
Fuel system scheduling, as presently configured, is capable of producing
a C.G. which is marginal on aft limits. Corrective action is available
to the pilot in that fuel can be transferred forward to tpe number one ,
tank. The only means available to the pilot for determination of an out-
of-C.G, condition is by computation.
Inlet System
The pilot reported that, while in a right turn with 30? of bank
an unstart occurred on the right inlet. This was confirmed by the pilot's
observation of compressor inlet pressures which showed the left inlet
at 14 psi and the right inlet at 4 psi. The pilot was not sure that he
had initiated the restart switches prior to leaving the aircraft; however,
the restart switch for the right inlet was found in the restart psoition
and the compressor inlet pressure for the right engine was found at 9 psi.
These two findings, along with engine readings showing an exhaust gas
temperature of 838?C, a fuel flow of 11,300, and an exhaust nozzle position
of 10.5, indicate that the right inlet was restarting at the time of
aircraft breakup.
During the establishment of cruise speed, prior to the turn, the
pilot reported (dictet recording) that the right inlet forward bypass
door had opened requiring selection of the manual control to close the
door. Just prior to entering the turn, he manually opened the door
slightly to provide some margin for prevention of an unstart. When the
forward door is ON, automatic normally opens to a scheduled position, de-
pending on the angle-of-attack and degree of yaw. Whether the pilot
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opened the door sufficiently could not be determined. Further, it cannot
be determined,if the automatic door system had been functioning normally,
whether the unstart would have occurred.
The right nacelle was subjected to intense post-crash fire resulting
in damage to the inlet control wiring. Wiring deficiencies have been a
large contributor to inlet control deficiencies and necessitated changes
which are provided by Service Bulletin 212. This bulletin was not
complied with on the right nacelle.
FINDINGS:
1. The engines were operating in mid-afterburner range at the
time of the accident and did not contribute to the accident.
2. The right inlet unstarted from an undetermined cause.
3. The aircraft fuel system was operating satisfactorily during
the first phase of the flight and through aerial refueling.
4. Assuming the fuel system operated normally after aerial
refueling, the C.G. was approximately 27% at the time of
the accident.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Fuel system scheduling be revised to maintain aircraft C.G.
limits during Mach 3.+ flight.
2. C.G. indicator be provided in the front cockpit.
IL 4-Okc,44---
R G SMITH
DI1ECTORATE OF AEROSPACE SAFETY
NORTON AFB, CALIFORNIA
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SWIM
ELECTRICAL, ELECTRONIC AND INSTRUMENT SYSTEMS
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
1. Separation of the forebody from the main structure at high altitude
precluded the finding of rotational scrolling on electrically driven
motors such as those of fuel booster pumps and cooling motors. The
separation parted all AC generator feeders to the power center in the LH
chine area just forward of the nose gear. The post-impact fire destroyed
all except one of the fuel booster pump assemblies, thus precluding any
evidence of pump rotation. The fuel booster pump that was in an unburned
state was in the wreckage of the forebody and was most likely one of the
pumps from the number I tank. It consisted of the motor, motor housing
and the impeller. One blade of the impeller was bent against the flat
portion of the drive end of the motor with no evidence of scrolling.
In all probability, the blade bent as a result of ground impact since it
is unlikely that this damage occurred as a result of forces Imposed
during the initial break-up of the airplane. The impeller housing of this
pump most probably remained attached to the pump mounting in the main
portion of the structure that burned.
2. The only rotational scrolling evidence found was thaton the end
bell of the SR-3 system gyro. This resulted from the long-coast down
time peculiar to gyros.
3. Nothing could be learned from the electrical power center components,
such as generator breakers, generator control units, etc.. Although
unburned, major impact damage destroyed all evidence.
4. There was typical evidence of arcing and welding of some strands
of the generator feeder cables which would be expected at the time of
airframe separation when the generators were feeding a load.
5. The pilot did not see any warning lights that would have indicated
difficulty with the electrical, electronic, or instrument system, nor
did he note any other phenomena that would indicate any difficulty with
these systems.
6. The evidence of oeprational aspects contained elsewhere in this
report and the statements of the pilot indicate that AC and DC power was
available up to the time the airplane was committed to crash.
ELECTRONIC SYSTEM
1. All of the principle components of the electrical, electronic and
instrument systems were recovered with crash damage only since they were
contained in the forebody which was not involved in any possible in-flight
fire and no post-crash fire. The forebody struct the terrain in a relatively
flat attitude, inverted. Upon impact, the forebody broke into three major
components: the forebody proper, the radome and the pitot/static boom.
A considerable number of electronic components were released from the
forebody during or closely following the initial separation of the forebodr.
These components were associated with the Inertial Navigation System (INS),
the Electromagnetic Reconnaissance System (EMR) and the Mission Recording
System (MRS).
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2. The tape from the MRS was separated from the main component and was
still missing at the time this report was written. The EMR tape was
recovered from the EMR package which was found some distance from the
forebody. Reduction of data from this tape shows chronological evidence
that the system operated up to the time of the airframe separation.
Details of the EMR tape data appear in the Flight Controls Group Report.
3. The Dictet Recorder was recovered from its normal position in the
forward cockpit. The recorded conversation showed the availability of
electrical power up to the time the last known dictation was performed by
the pilot. The transcription of this recording is in Tab V of the Report.
4. The INS package was sent to Nortronics for data reduction on 3
February since the means for extracting memory data therefrom do not
exist locally.
5. The Stability Augmentation System (SAS) pitch and yaw rate gyros
were severely burned, having remained in their normal position and sub-
jected to the post-impact fire at the main scene. An acetylene torch
was used to remove the structure to which the gyros were attached with
the connectors intact and engaged. A subsequent examination shoved that
the connectors were properly mated. Internal impact and fire damage pre-
cluded a funCtional test since there were open and shorted circuits in
evidence when a pin-to-pin continuity test was made.
6. The fall-out pattern of components was generally in a semi-circle
to the south of the forebody. Winds aloft for Tucumcari during the
period in which the accident occurred averaged 3100 with velocities
ranging from 14 knots at 7,000 feet up to 49 knots at 25,000 feet. Data
was not available for winds above 25,000 feet at Tucumcari.
7. Considerable effort was expended to determine proper connections and
safetying devices to all electrical, electronic and instrument components.
The only discrepancy found was a demated connector (J104) to the pilot's
interphone control box. It is highly probable that an unknown person
disconnected this plug or that it became loose and fell away during salvage
operations or during the transport of the forebody by truck from the
scene to Edwards AFB. The other connector to the interphone control box
was secure. These connectors are not normally safetied. There was no
evidence to indicate any difficulty in communication between the pilot
and the RSO or air-ground communication.
8. There was no evidence to indicate that the electronic/navigation
systems failed in any way.
INSTRUMENT SYSTEM
1. The elevation at the main impact scene was 4680 feet, as measured
by a serviceable altimeter, with a setting obtained from the FAA Flight
Service at Tucumcari. The elevation at the impact point of the forebody
was approximately 150 feet lower (not measured).
2. Instrument readings and pertinent control settings in the front
cockpit were as follows:
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a. Accelerometer - minus 2.6g, plus 8g (not reliable, pointers
free to move).
b.
Triple Display Indicator (TDI) - KEAS:
036
- Alt:
76,450
- Mn:
037
c. Airspeed Indicator - 65K
d. Attitude Direction Indicator (ADI) - Inverted Dive, Heading 130?.
e. Elapsed Time Indicator (ETI) - 1:36 hours. The indicator was
started at 11:20 hours PST by the pilot at take-off roll. This
elapsed time does not coincide with known facts.
f. Altimeter - 5,160 feet, setting 30.24
g.
Angle-of-Attack Indicator - 15.5? nose up
h. EGT - LH: 808?
RH: 838?
i. Nozzle Position Indicators - LH: 4.8 units
RH: 10.5 units (0.5 off scale)
j. Fuel Flow Indicators - LH: 10,900 (lbs/hr)
RH: 11,300 (lbs/hr)
k. TEB Counters - LH: 4
RH: 4
1. Throttle positions - LH: Undetermined
RH: Mid -A/B range
m. Engine Trim Switches - Both neutral (LH broken)
n. FBPD Switches - Missing
o. ABPD Switches - Broken
. P. Spike Switches - Both in Auto (LH Emergency Switch in EMERG)
q. Compressor Inlet Temperature Indicators (CIT) - LH: 373?
RH: 365?
r. Compressor Inlet Pressure Indicators (CIP) - LH: Broken
RH: 9 (psi)
s. Restart Switches - LH: Missing
RH: RESTART
t. Fuel Shutoff Switches - Both in VALVE OPEN position.
u. Fuel Quantity Indicator - 38,100 lbs. (Fuel qualtity selector
switch position : TOTAL.)
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01-4
v. Hydraulic Pressure Gages LH: 3150
RH: 3500
A: 3100 (psi)
B: 3250 (psi)
w. Canopy Handle - Unlocked position (aft) but not connected
mechanically.
x. Standby Oxygen Selectors - Nr. 1: ON
Nr. 2: OFF
3. Instrument readings and pertinent control settings in the aft
cockpit were as follows:
a. Triple Display Indicator (TDI) - KEAS: 1710K
Alt: 77,600 Feet
Mn: 2.15
b. Radio Magnetic Indicator (PM') - Card: 1310
Nr. 1 pointer: 140?
Nr. 2 pointer: 3170
c. Standby Attitude Indicator (2-inch) - 15? nose up, 88? R bank
d. Liquid Oxygen Quantity Indicator - Nr. 1: 8.5 (liters)
Nr. 2: 8.0 (liters)
e. V/H Indicator, milliradians/second (MR/SEC) - A Pointer: 41.1
M Pointer: 38.7
4. Readings of instruments and control positions not mentioned herein
is because of excessive damage, missing components or factors that have
no significance.
FINDINGS
1. AC and DC power was available up to the time the airplane disintegrated.
2. There was no evidence to indicate the loss of either AC generator or
T-R Unit.
3. The electronic, instrument and navigation systems operated satisfactorily
during the flight.
4. The systems discussed herein did not contribute to the cause of
the accident.
RECOMMENDATIONS
None
D NAGLE
Dir ctorate of Aerospace Safety
Norton AFB, California
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FLIGHT CONTROLS GROUP REPORT
SR-71 S/N 61-7952 (2003)
Major Accident - 25 January 1966
1. Inspection of the aircraft controls was conducted at the accident
site and at Edwards AFB. On-site inspection included removal of servo
panels, SAS pitch and yaw rate gyro packages and inspection of visible
control hardware connections. The on-site inspection revealed no hard-
ware malfunctions.
2. Inspection and investigation at Edwards AFB revealed the following:
a. Primary Mechanical Controls (Cables)
The center control console in the forward cockpit was extensively
damaged at impact and no detailed examination was made of the internal
components. The control stick was doubled back and part of the control
grip missing. The emergency landing gear system cable was broken in
tension at the handle socket. The emergency drag chute cable was still
attached to the "T" handle and pulled from the handle socket approximately
two feet. The largest amount of control cables were found in a bundle
near the nose section but not attached. Many of these cables had been
cut with a torch to help in transport and could not be identified as to
function. All of the calbes in this bundle were either failed in tension
due to overload or cut with a torch. The aft ends of all 12 primary
control cables were still properly connected to their terminal quadrants
and failures due to overload were found in each cable forward of this
point. The evidence indicates that the primary cables were complete and
in-place at the time of the accident.
b. Mixer
The torque tubes from the quadrants to the mixer were connected.
The mixer had all of its attaching and pivot bolts in-place and safetiedft
The pitch trim actuator was in-place but damaged. The length of the actuator
Indicated that the aircraft was in a 2.8? nose up trim position prior to
loss of electrical power. The roll trim actuator was badly damaged
although both of its attachments were in-place and safetied. The roll
trim was approximately at neutral prior to loos of electrical power.
Both pitch and roll feel springs were damaged but in-place and connected.
The mechanical linkage from the mixer to the inboard elevon servos was
damaged. All connections at rod ends and bellcranks were in-place and
accounted for.
c. Inboard Servo
Both inboard elevon servos were damaged but the damage appeared
to be from impact and fire. The servo feedback rods and summing levers
were attached and safetied. All electrical connections to the inboard
servos were accounted for, although they were badly damaged. Al]. of the
inboard elevon actuators were connected properly.
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d. Primary Mechanical Controls (Elevon Inboard to Outboard Transmission)
The 4AC32g-1 spring-loaded push rod assembly (shotgun) in both
the right-hand and left-hand inner wing was in the centered (detent) position.
Every joint in the elevon push rod systems in the inner and outer wing and
the torque tubes in the nacelles were found. All of the bolted connections
were still in-place and safetied. All of the push rod breaks were matched
and were either torch cuts or breaks produced by impact.
e. Outboard Servo
The left-hand outboard elevon servo and all of its components
(servo, summing lever, feedback rod, actuators, and attachments) were in
good condition and in-place. The right-hand outboard elevon servo and
its components were badly damaged. The right-hand outboard wing rear
beam (cylinder support) was fractured and some of the cylinders were
damaged. The right-hand outboard elevon servo was damaged. The damage
to the right-hand outboard elevon servo and its components was due to
impact and fire.
f. Rudder Push Rod System
All of the connections for the rudder push rod systems from
the terminal pulley through the nacelle to the rudder servos were found
to be in-place and properly connected to their cranks. The fore and
aft push rod in the left-hand fin was broken at impact. Both push rods
in the right-hand nacelle and the torque tube in the left-hand nacelle
had been torch cut for transport.
g. Rudder Servo
The left-hand rudder servo was torn loose from its mounts in
a downward direction. The shear pin, attaching the trim actuator hanger
to its support structure, had been sheared. The summing lever and feedback
rod were in-place and safetied. All actuators were in-place and properly
pinned. All electrical connections were connected and safetied. The
damage noted was caused by impact. The right-hand rudder servo and all
of its components (servo, summing lever, feedback rod, electrical
connections, and actuators) were in-place and safetied.
3. The following data were recorded on the Electromagnetic Reconnaissance
System as output from the Astroinertial Navigation System.
a. Inclosure number 1 is the EMR data in graph form. Page 5 is
approximately the last 30 seconds recorded. Altitude change was from
77.5K to 79.2K, navigation system pitch change was from 6.9? to 13.2?,
roll change indicated slight left wing down 9.6? just prior to start of
turn, this progressed to right wing down 41.5?, true heading change was
from 93.6? to 107.9?, and change in flight path data presented represents
the deviation from the straight line path at the beginning of the turn.
b. Inclosure number 2 represents the rate change over the same period
of time for pitch, roll and heading. Maximum recorded rates for heading
was 3.7?/sec, for pitch 1.3?/sec and for roll 5.4?/sec.
SECRET
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4. Analysis of the above data and data obtained in the SR-71 flight
simulator located at Beale AFB, and the engineering flight test simulator
at Edwards AFB is contained in the Flight Simulator Study of the Operations
Witness Group Report.
FINDINGS:
1. That the Flight Control System did not contribute to this
accident.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. None.
A ! . .
RA GORDON, JR
LT OL, USAF
DIRECTORATE OF AEROSPACE SAFETY
NORTON AFB, CALIFORNIA
SECRET
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*ARILLO DAILY NEWS, Amarilld,' Texas, 26 Jan 1966
?
* * * * * * 1k- * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
* * * * Security Lid
t in Crash
'Spins Out in Flight
By DON REYNOLDS and WES PENTLEY
Of Our stem
and BOBBIE LUTZ
Our Eastern New Mexico Corresoordent
MOSQUERO, N.M.?One civilian test pilot was killed
and another injured about 4:15 p.m. Tuesday when a top
secret SR71 super spy plane apparently caught fire in
midair and pancaked onto a high plateau in Harding
County, New Mexico.
The twin-engine, 2,000 mile-per-hour aircraft was
found virtually intact a quarter-mile east of New Mexico
102 and a mile north of New Mexico 63, about 20 miles
east of her.e.
Witnesses reported they heard
arAdirs FAorirce oFfofricciealsBata d e-, a loud "popping" noise when
w
the plane, flying at high speed
Calif., identified the?deadiand great - altitude, apparently
man as James T. Zawyer of exploded.
...; ,.....,J,, .,.....?........?... Lancaster, Calif. After the first exploding noises
?U.S. Air Force Official Photo
'
The injured man, who was not were heard by witnesses on the
believed to be in serious condi-
ground, the aircrafts speed di-
? minished greatly, and it began a
on at Trigg Memorial Hospi- _
clow spiraling fall to the ground
tal in Tucumcari, N.M., late trailing a stream of heavy white
Tuesday, was identified as Bill smoke as it descended.
Weaver, 37. reident of North-
ridge, Calif.
Albert Mitchell Jr., we n hdiss eve-
Air Force and civilian security! witness to the crash, reported
and investigative personnel from h an
3 I cisi g colts7dvienral ranch
anch
Amarillo Air Force Base, Wright ere bra
Patterson in Ohio and two Cal- rar.eli headquarters east ofi
ifornia bases were summoned toi Mosquero.
. the accident scene and were still! Mitchell s'aid. "At first, we
pouring into the area after mid- i heard a- loud bang, then we saw
_ night Tuesday. . _! smoke, and about four minutes
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The two-man crew is enclosed
later we saw two parachutes."
- This is an aerial view of _the SR71 which crashed in northeastern New Mexico Tuesday :Afternoon. Performance of the. plane, which car-
crew of two, is termed the most effective of any operational aircraft io the wild. 07:e or the crew members ',las killed, but the
r as not seriously i:iitred in a hailout from 80,0e,0 feet.
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Crash--
(Continued From Page 1)
in a pressurized capsule which
protects the men should it be-
come necessary to abandon the
aircraft. nt high speeds and high
altitudes.
Reportedly, the capsule mita-
matically ejected when the plane
was flying in excess of 80,000
feet. The plane is capable of
speeds up to 2,000 miles per hour
at that altitude.
"One of the fellows was dead
when I got to him. I got to this
Weaver boy about a minute after
he landed. I helped him collapse
his chute and get free of the har-
ness," Mitchell said.
, Mitchell, also a pilot, Jumped
In the ranch helicopter and flew
to the landing place of the
pilots. He picked Weaver up
and took him to the Tucumcarl
hospital. hut left the body of
the dead man in place.
Air Force security officers
Isolated Weaver at the hospital
and allowed only two doctors to
treat him. Dr. 'Chows B. hoover
; and Dr. George Evetts were con-
? ducting various medical tests on
the injured aviator late Tuesday.
An attendant at the hospital
said Mitchell landed his helicopter
on tile hospital parking lot, but
said she was under strict orders
"not to give out any information"
concerning Weaver.
She did say, however. that
Weaver "walked in" to the hos-,
pit al.
Mil ellen said he -talked to1
Weaver during the trip to the;
hospital. According to Mitche11,1
Weaver said, "Everything was,
going Eine, and stuldenly?whoof."r
, Mitchell said the aircraft was
flying at an extremely high ala
Wade when it exploded.
Weaver later told Air Force
officials at the has that he ;
was "pretty sore." Doctors, ,
however, said there were very '
few visible injuries, notably a;?
light cut on his nose.
The plane crashed on the Nor-1
man Libbey Ranch, about foul
miles from the landing place ot
the two flyers.
Quay County Deputy Sheriff
Dub Smith said that a bulletin
came over his police radio about
4:20 p.m, from the State Police
headquarters.
, State police ordered that t h c
area be guarded with offieen
and that the body of the dead
man was not to be moved unti!
Air Force officials arrived at
the scene.
Trrv; ii,,
I
Gil Ilenshaw, editor of t h c
Tucumeari, N.M. Daily News',
reported that he went to tilt
scene and found the fuselage
generally Intact. I
He said the entire plane was
blackened by fire, and that
some flames were still flicker-
ing in the area when he arriv.
,cd. The only portion of t h e
plane which appeared extensive-
ly damaged was the nose sec-
tion.
rr-7,77,
Debris from the nose of the
r plane was strewn over a small
area, and a deep grunge
through the ea it Ii for only
about ao feet. The evidence
prompted Air Force officials
to assume that the plane had
"pancaked" to the earth, fall.
Ing flat on its belly rather
than sliding along the ground.
It was assumed that radio
contact of some kind had been
made by the pilot before the
two-man crew ejected.
Lihbey said within moments
after the plane disappeared
front view, two Air Force J e t
fighters were circling the area.
Three employes at an 1 e e
'plant near Mosquero also wit-
bassed the descent of t h e
'plane. They told Harding County
deputy sheriff Steve Vigil that
-they looked up after a sharp
'explosion and saw the p 1 an e
'circling and smoking directly
;above them.
' They said the plane was fly-
ing hi a northeasterly direction
'before the sound of the explos-
ion. None of the three noticed,.
parachutes.
Shortly nfter the plane hit the
ground, stale police had formed
a cordon around it. Less than an.
hour after the crash, a rope bar-
'Her had hem thrown up around
the wreckage,
Hinshaw said a photographer
who accompanied him to the
crash site was allowed to take
pictures, but that his film was
confiscated by slate police be-
fore they left the area.
Maj. Dennis O'Brien, public
Information officer at Amarillo
Air Force Base, said the In-
vestigation of the crash was
the responsibility of Cannon Air
Force Base at Clovis, the clos-
est military installation.
Cannon officials, however, re-
quested personnel from Amarill&
Air Force Base to assist In se-4
curdy precautions and investiga-
'tit'llniaj. O'Brien said that Brig.
Gen. C. D. Stewart, director of
-aerospace safety at Norton Air
Force Base in San Bernardino,
'Calif., would be in charge of the
investigation.
Under
Under his command will be
'personnel from Amarillo, Cannon,
;Norton and Wright-Patterson Air
?Force Base in Ohio.
I An 11-man squad headed by
Flying Safety officer Maj. .lames
Hahn from the Amarillo base was
sent to the crash scene Tuesday
afternoon. Included were air
policemen and safety personnel.
, Washington military officials
Tuesday afternoon issued direc-
tives to two Tucumcarl funeral
homes and to Roy Rumbaugh,
administrator of Trigg Memorial
Hospital, ordering them not to
release any type of information
about the dead aviator.
Disposition of Zwayer's body
was not certain late Tuesday,
but reports indicated that It
would be taken to Cannon Air
Force base In an Air Force
ambulance.
The SR71 is a later develop-
ment of the N'F12A, which was
formerly designated the A-11.
All three aircraft were develop-
ed by the Lockheed Aircraft
Corp., employers of the two
civilian test pilots.
The New Mexico accident was
the first reported in the entire
testing sequence of all three
,planes.
The YFt2A recertly was put in-
to military service as an opera-
tional weapon system at Beale
,Air Force Base, Calif.
Testing on the newer ST171, how-
ever, is continuing at Edwards
Air Force Base.
, The YF12A was designed to
carry missiles to shoot down high-
flying bombers. The SR71 carries
some armament, primarily a
sophisticated air-to-air missile,
but is designed primarily as a
successor to the much slower U2
reconnaissance aircraft.
Observers at the crash scene
late Tuesday were warned to stay
clear of the aircraft until any
armament aboard could be lout.
&I and deactivated. .
,
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14
THE DALLAS TIMES HERALD Dallas
?AP WIrwhoto
These are aerial and ground views of super-secret U.S. spy plane.
Joags Jet
Test Pilot KilkrJ i P.,AysteriMishap
? ROY; N.M. (AP) -- 'Ey mili-
tary clamped a tight security
covt-r around a northeast New
Mexico ranching area after the
? flaming crash of .a 2,000-mile
per hour American reconnais-
sance plane.
1., One test pilot was killed and
,
another injured sligldly , a
the black SR71 spiraled to ,nrth
near the Texas border Ti-' ' v.
Both men parachuted out
burning jet. One was found dead
by ranch *pricers. '
The Air Force stopped every-
on9,,but .p.incher,s,:epd their em-
Alves from entering the area,
id, refused la elaborate on do-
of the crash.
A spo:iestnan at Edwards Air
Foyer, 1a to', Ca hi., sold the
SR71. was on a routine long-
ra ii!;e test flight. The spokes-
man said that It was the first
reported accident for the new
series of twin-engine surveil-.
la nee era ft capable of scanning.
00,000 square miles of earth
from an altitude of 80,000 feet.
The Lockheed Aircraft Corp.,
which builds the secret craft,
identified the dead pilot as
James T. Zwayer of Lancaster,
Calif. The injured mai, Bill
Weaver, 37, of Northridge,
was admitted to a Tu-,
cumcari hospital but he was not
believed seriously hurt.
A rancher who carried Weav-
er by helicopter to the hospital
quoted him as saying he didn't
know what happened to the
plane,
"Everything was going fine'
and suddenly ? whoof," Albert
Mitchell Jr. quoted Weaver aa'
Saying.
rash
Mitchell and several others
said they heard explosions be-
fore the plane began a long fall
to earth, trailing arnoke.
The SR71, a 'slightly heav,ter
and longer model of the YFI2A"
built by Lockheed, went into
service Jam 7. ;
? "I
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HERALD, Dayton, Ohio, 3an 26 1966
Super Spy Phine Shown in Hight
. . . SR-71 flies at 2,000 miles-an-hour
Associated Press Wirephoto
.`811-711. Crashes luring
:fest, -Killing One Pilot
ALBERT, N.M. ? (UPI)
?A new Air Force jet re-
connaissance plane capable
of flying more than 2,000
miles-an-hour exploded in
flight and plunged to the
ground in desolate north-
eastern New Mexico yester-
day, killing one of the two
civilian test pilots aboard.
. The other pilot aboard para-
chuted to safety. Air Force of-
ficials quickly clamped a tight
'security lid on the crash scene.
Both test pilots were employed
by Lockheed of California.
Lockheed officials said Wil-
liam A. Weaver, of Northridge,
Calif., parachuted to safety but
that James T. Zwayer, of
Lancaster, Calif., was killed
despite the fact he ejected from
the airplane.
'four-engine craft known as the
. The officials said the plane, a
SR-71, was on a routine flight
and had left Edwards AFB
early yesterday. The plane,
built by Lockheed, ha ct been
undergoing tests since Decem-
, ber, 1964. It was declared op-
erational and some of its type
have been turned over to the
:Air Force, which designates !
-them A-111.
Gil Hinshaw, editor of the
Tticumcari, N.M., Daily News,
said the plane crashed on a
high tableland near a small
, peak,
Hinshaw said a New Mexico
stale police sergeant confiscated
pictures his photographer had
ttiken of the new plane.
New Mexico state pollee said
they had been telephoned from
. Richards-Gobatter AFB, near '
,.ansas ? City, and told to slap !
; total security around the plane
until the Air Force could get
to the scene.
The plane crashed about one
ta two miles east of the intersec-
tion of New Mexico highways
102 and 65, Some 20 miles east
of the tiny town of Mosquero.
Mrs. Albert Mitchell, wife of a
former New Mexico national Re-
publican committeeman, said
her son A. J. Mitchell Jr., a pilot
flew a ranch helicopter to pick
UI) the survivor.
"He picked up the boy where
his parachute landed and took
him to Tucumcari," Mrs. Mitch-
ell said.
Hospital authorities said
Weaver was in "satisfactory
condition:"
He was quoted as saying he
felt "kind of sore" but otherwise
"all right."
"The plane exploded right
over our ranch,' Mrs. Mitchell
said. "It crashed in a mad. My
hushand and some of the cow-
boys were out and saW the ex-
plosion.
"I heard it but nothing else.
'It just blew up and then the
chutes were seen shortly there-
after. They took off immediately
to go to the boy.' ? ,
"I cannot divulge where the
plane came from at the p r e-
sent," Mrs. Mitchell said. "When
they (the Air Force) tell us we
can tell you we will but not until
that time.
"They have asked us not tlo
say anything."
Hinshaw said the plane came
down On the Norman Libby
ranch.
"It had windows," Hinshaw
said, "We walked right up there
, and started taking pictures.
; Then some rancher told t h e
stale police sergeant we had
taken some pictures and he took
.our camera.
"I asked him for the camera
back and he took Out the fan."
411111111.11.....??????????
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wie,. 40,
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.....?101,,r11111Ircrt
-
AMARILLO DAILY NEWS, 4rnari110 Texas,
27 Jan 1966
?Stoll Photo by MEINHARO EICHEL
This is the SR71 piloted by two civilians which crashed Tuesday afternoon on
the Albert Mitchell ranch in Hardin County, N.M. One of the pilots was killed
and the other survived. This view of the wreckage WAS taken with a telephoto lens
from the highway, about a mile away.
Tucitinearit Hub of
Official Activiiy
TUCUMCARI, N. M. ? The
crash of a super-secret spy
plane about 75 miles northeast
of here Monday had resulted
Wednesday In a military bi-
vouac In the heart of this New
Mexico city.
Jet-powered helicopters landed :
and took off in the middle of a
block long section of a city street
near the National Guard Armory
while inside high-ranking military
brass set up a command post re-
sembling a total-war operation.
News media were denied any
information about. the command
post activities while photographs
were confiscated and citizens
were warned not to "tell any-
thing."
An estimate could not he made
of the number of high-ranking
military and "not military" per-
sonnel manning the post, but ho-
tels, including the GO-unit Pow-
Wow Motel reported capacity
military registrations.
"We're completely full," said
a spokesman of the Pow-Wow
al mid-afternoon. By nightfall,
the employe reported. "We've
been doubling-up all evening."
While many of the personnel
scurried back and forth to the
wreck scene in the two transport.
type jet, cargo copiers, others con-
(-totaled on tightening security
lids.
"They got me up in the middle
of the night. and demanded some
photos we- had taken before the
Air Force arrived," said the pub-
lisher of the Tucumeari Daily
News, Hill King, .
"I called the State Police office
the nest flay and asked them why
a patrolinan had taken them,"
he reported. "The sergcaht said
.he was unaware it had happened.
1
"Ile told me he would order
the photos returned. I saw a
bulletin on police wires (about
mid-morning) saying they were
to be returned, but I don't ex;
peel to see them again."
The cloak-and-dagger security
operations included orders to
civilians having any information
about the crash to keep mum to
reporters.
"I'm really sorry," said ranch-
er Albert Mitchell Jr., who flew
the pilot of the craft to a hospital
hero in his personal helicopter.
"I've been told I can't tell you
anything about it."
At the Pentagon in Washington,
Maj. Gen. E. II. L Boilly, director
of information for the Secretary
of tho Air Force said, complaints
of such tactics had "already re-
sulted" in reprimands.
"I really don't understand
what is happening there," said
Mai. Tom Martin, a member of
LeIlailly's staff. "We are try-
ing to get this straightened out
and cooperate. But, we must
also protect the (secret) equip-
ment on that plane."
"It would seem that by now
all of it should have been cover-
ed up. I'm surprised they won't
let you take photos under their
supervision."
Advised of the Pentagon report,
Mitchell said:
"That's the whole problem; this
Is not the military doing this."
He declined further comment ?
"under orders."
? ? r
411..1111.,
?Staff Photo by MCINHARD EICHEL
Rancher Albert Mitchell
Jr. points to the sky where
-he first heard a popping
noise and later saw para.
chutes coming down. He
used the ranch helicopter
to get to the area where
the two SR71 flyers land-
ed and took one 75 miles
; pita! in Tucumeari. ."
to ; Trigg Memorial Hos.
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?
t
,
,
' ? 1.`",;.
I
;.1.,,??^A
ia.
?Staff Photo by ,MEINHARO. EICHEL
Helicopter Airborne
A jet-powered helicopter 'takes off from a barricaded section of a city street hi. Tuctimcari, N.M., where a)
command post has been set up to supervise the investigation of the crash of a SR 71 about 75 miles away 1111
rugged ranch country. Military and civilian officials set up the command post at the National Guard Armory.,
,* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *? *, * * *?**
By VES PENDLEY
Of Our Stoll
BUEYEROS, N.M. ? A
?two - engine j e t, military
!reconnaissance plane cruis-
ed slowly over a plateau sev-
eral miles south of here
Wednesday afternoon in-
specting the site where its
'probable twin crashed Tuesday
;afternoon.
On the ground below, an in-
spection team composed of Mr
Force specialists and Lockheed
Aircraft Corp. personnel comb.
Other Pictures,
Story, Page 27
ed the debris searching for
clues as to what caused the
crash of an S1t71 experimental
aircraft.
Intermittent waves of B52
bombers also made frequent
passes over the area, presum-
obly. taking photographs,
.?0\
'AL./
ed
to help Weaver collapse his
- The spy plane, de?siiMed lochute and get out of the harness.
replace the 112 of previous tame, At the direction of security
crashed Tuesday. A Defense De-agents, he later refused to com-
partment spokesman at Wash-
ington pinpointed the I hoe as
2:32 p.m., New ? Mexico time.
James T. Zwayer of Lancas-
ter, Calif., one of two civilians.
manning the aircraft, lost his
life in the crash.
lie and William A. Weaver,
37, of Northridge, Calif., had
parachuted from the 2,000-
mile-an-hour, high - altitude
craft. Zwayer was dead when
he hit the ground.
A witness to the crash, who
arrived at the scene ahead of
police, security agents and mili-
tary guards, said Zwayer's pres-
sure suit was torn and his
Oxygen mask appeared to have
been ripped from his face "by
some force."
First on the scene, however,
was Albert Mitchell Jr., a ranch-
er who witnessed the crash. Ile
flew to where the two men were ,
descending and landed in time
777777777-777,777"--7,-
t
f , ,
JAMES ZWAYER
WILLIMI WEAVER
I ment on the condition of Zway-
ler's flight suit. He did a a y
Zwayer was dead in his para.!
chute harness when he rs:achedl
him,
6- ?
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As reporters talked to Mit-I
elicit at his ranch home Wednes-
day afternoon. he was asked
what the airplane looked like
that had crashed.
"Well," said Mitchell, look?
log skyward, "if you want to
see one, there goes one." ,
Overhead, a dip-nosed, swept-
wing, craft passed by at low
? altitude approaching the crash
,-scene. Its long black fuselage
resemble,d an oversized cigar.
and its pointed nose the beak
, of some prehistoric flying rep.;
The SR71 is considered the.
: most advanced plane of its kind;
in the world.
Mitchell said he and some'
ranch hands had been branding'
colts when they heard a crash
in the sky, Looking up, ho said,;
?? they saw the SI171 fluttering,
; earthward "like a falling leaf";
trailing a plume of white smoke'
and belching flames.
Other witnesses said the craft
-circled lazily as it fell, emitted!
a series of popping explosions'
and "winked" fire.
Mitchell said about four ;
in inutes after they first ;
heard the loud crash, he was
able to make out four para-
culites. Two of them, appar-
ently, were lowering the plane'
cabin capsule to earth.
Tight security has prevented!
the interview of Weaver ? the;
only person who could tell about
the harrowing descent from au
estimated 80,000 feet.
Before security agents put ai
''hush" on Mitchell, he quoted
Weaver as saying:
"Everything was going fine,
and suddenly ? whoof!"
Mitchell said Weaver told himri
he did not know what had gone
wrong.
Mitchell flew Weaver to the
Trigg Memorial Hospital at
Tucumeari in his helicopter '
and landed in the parking lot
outside the door. Weaver was
admitted for observation but .
was not believed to be serious-
ly injured.
Itelorts Wednesday indicated,:
the I1S71. was flying at an ni-;
titude of 80,000 feet, or higher,i
at an estimated speed of 1,800I
miles per hour, when it sonic-
how was disabled. , ?
' Also, an Air Force officer who,
refused to give his name, said
fastest speed prior to Tuesday,
at which a pilot had ejected
from an airplane was 800 miles
per hour.
Tight security was clamped'
on the crash site on the Nor.'
man Libbey ranch, with only
1.ibbey and his ranch hands be-
ing 'allowed in and out of a
:pasture gate leading .to the pia-
Jean where the 1tS71 came to
'rest.
? An Air Force sentry armed
with an M-2 carbine would not
:permit photographers or report-
ers to pass. An Office of Secur.
,ity Information lieutenant said
:to a Daily News reporter:
"There is still a hell of a
lot of cl.o.,itied Information
in tliaLf_i_ch_.!."
A photographer was allowed
to take pictures from New Mex-
ico 102, where the gate leads
;to the crash scene about a quar-
ter of a mile away.
The SR71, from that distance,
'seemed to be generally intact
with the exception of the nose
;section, fragments of which were
'scattered about the terrain.
Zwayer's body was transferr-
ed to the Doughty Funeral Home
i at Tueurneari Wednesday after-
inoon after it had been X-rayed
at the hospital.
i.titopsy was performed by
i
D. Col. J. Gordon Webster of
Washington, D, C., consultant in
pathology to the surgeon general
and a member of the Air Force
Air Crash Medical Investigating,
Team,
The body was not visibly mu-
tilated, There were strong in-'
dicalions that Zwayer died from
oxygen starvation.
The body had lain where it
fell, in an ice-crusted, muddy
pasture, until early Wednesday
morning. It was guarded by,
state police.
An ambulance from Cannon
Air Force Base near Clovis took
it to the Tucumeari hospital at
that time.
Marvin Doughty, funeral
home operator, said security
agents had forbidden him to
talk about the condition of the
body or the apparent cause
of death.
Lihhey reported that minutes
alter the plane struck the
ground, Iwo Air Force jet fight-
ers m ere circling the area.
Newspaper photographers who
arrived at the scene before the
area was cordoned off had film
exposed by them confiscated by
state police and given to Air
Force personnel.
The Air Force has set up a
command post at the National
Guard Armory in Tucumcari to
oversee a thorough Investiga-
tion.
The SR71. is capable of fly-
ing high enough to scan 60,000
square miles of earth. It is a
;slightly longer and heavier
model of the YF I2A, also built
by Lockheed,
It was first called the A 1-11
when its development was an-
nounced by President Johnson.
Air Force security guards
will remain at the crash site
until the on?the-scene investi-
gation is completed.
Air Force personnel from the
Amarillo Air Force Base and
Cannon Air Force Base, includ-
ing medical, legal, and flying
safety specialists, have been
rushed to the scene.
Amarillo Air Force Base sent
50 military personnel and the
following equipment to the crash.
scene: 10 trucks, a ,bulldozer,
a forklift, two flat-bed trailers,
three troop carrier trucks bor-
rowed from the National Guard
and a fuel truck.
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TUCUMCARI DAILY NEWS
Tucumcari N.M. 28 Jan 1966
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THIS IS IT?the only close up, civilian news photograph of the downed SR-7I spy plane in a pasture about
20 miles east of Mosquero. The photo, first confiscated by State Police, was held until late yesterday by
Air Force officials probing the cause of the crash. The aircraft's tail section is to the left of the photo-
-graph. Note openings, that could be windows, along the fuselage. The main body of the craft appears to
be intact.
---Photo By Daily News Staffer Jimmy Crocker
? ,
AIR
Approved For Release 2001/08/29
FORCE CALLS PRESS CONFAB
Pil t
To be
: CIA-RDP71600590R0001001000Q140nd civilian pilot, Wil-
liani A. Weaver, 37, North ridge,
Calif., parachuted to safety
f Spy Pi iwne
Buried Monda
The test pilot who died in
Tuesday's crash near Mosque ro
of the super spy-reconnaissance
SR-'71, the world's fastest air-
craft, will be buried Monday in
Arlington National Cemetery
With military rites.
Doughty Funeral Home,
where the body has rested s ince
the crash, announced today that
funeral services for James Per-
shing Zwayer, 48, a test pilot
forLockheed A ircraft at the time
of his death, will be held tom-
orrow at 1 p.m. in the Shannon
Funeral Home in Ft. Worth,
Tex.
Zwayer's body was shipped
by rail from Tucumcari last
night after weather conditions
prevented a Lockheed airplane
from flying the casket out of
the city's Air Hub.
The dead man is survived
by his widow, Lucille, and three
daughters, Nancy, Linda and
Carol, all of Lancaster, Calif.;
two brothers. B.E. Zwaver of
Westchester, Ohio, and Roger
of Maderia, Ohio; his parents,
Mr. and Mrs. Clyde H. Zwayer
of Bradenton, Fla.
A Doughty Funeral home spo-
kesman said that the funeral
was being held in Ft. Worth
because the widow is a former
resident of that city.
Zwayer was an Air Force col-
onel until Sept. 30, 1964when he
resigned to join Lockheed.
It is believed that Zwayer
may have died while ejecting
from his super secret aircraft
before it plummeted to earth
on the Norman Libby Ranch
'about 20 miles east of Mos-
quero at 2:36 p.m. Tuesday.
An autopsy, performed at
Doughty's Wednesday by a team
of physicians and pathologists,
revealed that cause of death
was a broken neck and a cer-
ebral hemorrage.
rre?
7r.
from the doomed SR-71 and was li
brought by helicopter, flown '
by Rancher Albert MitchellJr.,
to the Dr. Dan C. Trigg Mem-
orial Hospital where he was
found to be In satisfactory con-
dition and later released.
Col. Horace D. Templeton,
commander of the Tucumcari-
based team probing the cause
of the crash, was to meet to-
day at 3 p.m.with newsmen from
a wide area to answer their
questions. The press confer-
ence was to be held in the Pow
Wow Restaurant.
Templeton, from Edwards
Air Force Base, Calif., where
the ill-fated SR-71 flight ori-
ginated, yesterday released
Daily News films of the crash
that were confiscated by the
State Police and later the Air
Force. Reportedly, the film con-
tains the only civilian news med-
ia photos taken of the downed
aircraft.
, State Police said later they
, planned to release the film
following a protest from the
? Daily News, but Air Force
officials intercepted the un-
developed roll.
Today in Santa Fe, State Po-
lice Chief John R. Bradford
released the following policy
statement regarding the law ,
enforcement agency's roll at ;
military plane crashes:
"Generally speaking, our ob-
jective is to maintain safety
at the scene of an aircraft
crash to prevent pilfering and
safeguard military facilities un-
til the military can take over.
As far as pictures, we gener-
ally have no concern here other
than the fact that if pictures
are being taken, the military
should know about it.
"In some of these accidents
classified status applies to the
equipment and there should
be precautions to safeguard the
nation's clasified position to
keep material from falling into
the hands of unauthorized per- ,
sons. We don't intend to inter-
fer with the news people's tak-
ing of pictures. The only angle ,
as far as the news people are .
concerned is the safety factor. '
Such things as pop-out eject-
ion seats or weapons could pre-
sent dangers. And the state
police have no way of knowing
whether there is a nuclear wea-
pon aboard or not?the military
doesn't keep us posted on what 1
the score might be but when
we get a report of highly class-
ified situation it's question-
able just exactly what steps
you do take until the mili-
tary comes and takes over."
The SR-71, capable of speeds
at over 2,000 mph and heights of
80,000 feet, was on a routine
flight when the accident occur-
red. Development of the highly
secret craft is believed to have
cost $1 billion.
The team investigating the
crash maintains headquarters i
in the 'Ilicumcarl National Gu- 1
ard armory.
TIJMICARI DA.LLY
Tu6uxacari, .I?I
28 Jari 1966;
.....
Irl.t Ir.
T'.
r
1 .....!.. 1 ' ''?,' ?:;,1**
r
WATCH FOR HELICOPTERS could well be the wording on street signs in the Hancock
and (,rove area near the National Guard Armory in Tucumcari where the U.S. Air
Force roped off one block of Hancock Street for a landing strip. The jet-powered 11-43
, Kaman ?liusky" rescue choppers like the one above are transporting men and equip-
ment to the crash scene of the top secret SR-Il spy plane which plummeted to earth
Tuesday about 20 miles east of Mosquero.
Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP711300590R000100100001-4
Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP71600590R00010
E111 111:Mve
Ja77. -rr ?
AMARILLO DAILY NEWS, AmarillcVTexas 28 Jan 196
k
c
0)1/4,rtcrf it
L cc.h,"sz-
....0" 3
Cf.;)
From Our Eastern New Mexico Bureau
TUCUMCARI, N.M. ? Col.
Horace D. Templeton, head of
the Investigative team prob-
ing the crash of a super-secret
S1t71 spy plane, has called
news conference for 3 p.m, to.
day in Tueunicarl.
The conference was called
Thursday shortly after pilot Wil-
iam A. Weaver, 37, who re-
portedly said he bailed out "in
excess" of 80,000 feet, was re-
turned to Edwards Air Force
Base, Calif., by military plane.
The body of his co-pilot,
Tames T. Zwayer, 47, killed in
complications resulting from the
bail-out, was later flown to Fort
Worth for funeral services to be
followed by burial in Arlington
National Cemetery.
Both men were civilian test
pilots employed by Lockheed
Aircraft Corp. They were on
a routine test flight out of Ed-
. wards Ali% Tuesday when the
plane crashed about 75 miles
northeast of here.
An interview with Weaver,
earlier authorized by Air Force
iinformation director Maj. Gen.
1E. B. LeBailly, was refused by
;Col. Templeton.
; "I don't care what the Pen-
tagon says," said Col. Temple.
ion. "This is a classified proj-
ect and no one is going to talk
to that pilot."
j In Los Angeles, Associated
Press reporters were told by
a Lockheed spokesman that
j Weaver did not want an in-
terview and would not be al-
lowed to say anything any-
way.
Col. Templeton, a former Air
- -
Defense Command spokesman
now connected with the SR71
project, said? he would attempt
at the news conference to clear
up questions surrounding the
crash, the first reported for the
2,000-mile-per-hour plane.
Also on hand will be mem-
bers of the Air Force Inspector
General's office and personnel
from Edwards Air Force Base
and Lockheed Aircraft Corp. It
will he held at the Pow-Wow
Motel.
More than 100 persons have
been investigating the crash,
including representatives of
j Cannon AFB, N.M., Norton
APB, Calif., Lockheed and of-
ficials from Washington, D.C.,
and Houston.
The Air Force has remained
mum on details of the crash
and the investigation since the
; incident The crash area has
been closely guarded, and news-
Cinen have been barred.
Time of services for Zwayer,
father of three, have not been
announced. Burial in Arlington
for the retired Air Force col-
onel WaS set for 10:30 a.m.
Monday.
Zwaytr, svhose wife Lucille is
,41 native. of Fort Worth, is a
Iresident of Lancaster, Calif.
rIFTOW'rel?,""ime,nmsosnmsser
AMARILLQ. DAILY
NEWS, Amarillo
Tex. 29 Jan 1966
"They manually ejected them-
selves." Templeton said. "As
has been reported, Zwayer was
dead in his chute when he hit
Crash the ground.
lie refused to comment on
the cause of death, but informed
sources said Zwayer's neck was
broken and his lungs and heart
Remains diet is expected to be death by
broke,' neck.
were collapsed. The official ver-
Criticism of press stories by
Templeton was in the form of
M
ys- the news information had been
tery detrimental to security restric-
"misleading." lie said none of
Met with demands of expla-
nation for his previous refusal
to make available any Infer-
illation concerning the crash,
he cited "confusion and Cha-
Os'' at the outset of the In-
vestigation and offered an
apology for remitting "confu-
sion and discomfort."
Many replies to direct quer-
ies were evasive. When asked
shout reports that a similar
craft to the downed one was
'seen overhead the next day, he
isaid he did not know what the
TIMM Was.
"We can't make any state. "I'm sure it was not another
ments as to the cause until all SR12A," he said. "I asked that
the data is assembled," was clIc r11 aircraft. stay clear of the
of his opening remarks. '''':v?,tirea, so I really don't know
don't expect a final report that it was. I don't know what
several weeks." all those (jet bombers) were
Asked If the findings would ;doing overhead."
then be revealed at the Penta-
Ile added that he felt certain
gon, he said that all further in. ;that test flight of SR12A crafts
formation would come from the over the area would resume
command center "but I doubt 'shortly, stating that "We make
the cause will ever be re- I
vealed." a soft sonic boom, but we like
Ito do it in lesser populated
areas."
Returning to questions about
ithe investigation, Templeton re?
Iported that the wreckage is be.
Jing replaced into a truck con.
lvoy to depart in about two-days
'for Edwards Air Force Base,
"We've got a bit jigsaw puz.
zle to put together out there,"
he said. "We have to find the
pieces and assemble them.
J We cruet deduce what's going
on."
I Templeton was also evasive
Jon questions concerning eye-wit-
ness accounts of the crash.
Asked if the plane had not
seemed to be under some kind
of power as it descended, he
replied, "That's what we're try-
ing to figure out.."
He gave indications that this
was not the first difficulty en-
counter during test flights of
the spy plane. "The purpose of
test flights is to iron out ?any
difficulties and try out new
equipment"
Secret instructions on precau-
tions to be taken in the event
of a crash or forced landing of
one of the planes were given to
several area Air Force bases
more than six months ago, he
said.
By WES PENDLEY
Of Our Staff
TUCUMCARI, N. M. ? The
cause of the crash of an SIITIA
reconnassance plane while on.
test flight near here may
never be revealed, Col. Horace
A, Templeton said Friday.
Col. Templeton, In charge of
a team of investigators probing
the crash 75 miles northeast of
hero Tuesday, made the state-
ment during the first press con-
ference on the crash.
Col. Templeton apologized
for "inconvenience a n d dis-
comfort" caused citizens and
the press because of the con-
fusion at the outset of the in-
vestigation, including denial of
an interview with pilot Wil-
liam A. Weaver, 37, of North-
ridge,
He said that word of Pentagon
authorization of the interview
failed to reach him until several
hours after a Daily News re-
porter was told it was being ar-
ranged.
Col. Templeton would offer
only that the pilot and dead co-
pilot, James P. Zwayer, 47, of
Lancaster, Calif. were not in
capsules in the bail-out.
"They were wearing only
space suit s similar to those
worn by astronauts," he said.
"I cannot tell you anything he