PROJECTED SOVIET BLOC AND OTHER DEFENSIVE ENVIRONMENTS THROUGH THE 1975-1980 PERIOD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00822R000200130019-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: July 11, 1968
• Content Type: MFR

Approved For FJease 2004/?.W@A f, pIA-RDP71 B008220000200130019-3
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11 July 19 68
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Projected Soviet Bloc and Other Defensive
Environments through the 1975-1980 Period
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1. Reference (a) is the OSI response to reference (b;{
that OSI project the defensive weapons environment of the
"Soviet Bloc" and selected other countries into the 1975-
1980 time period and endeavor to establish a performance ert-
velope in which a survivable, quick reaction, aerodynamic,
reconnaissance vehicle might viably operate. The memorandum
goes into considerable detail regarding the uncertainties of
the estimates due primarily to the lack of good intelligence
plus the fact that projections so far into the future are
difficult to make even with good intelligence as a data baEe.
2. Nevertheless the document does address all of the
defensive possibilities and notes that in many regards the
projections made are pessimistic from the point of view of
OSA's problems. With reference to the USSR, this observation
could be designated the "understatement of the year."
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4. Considering first the reconnaissance role outside
of the USSR, it is difficult to comprehend a legitimate
justification for an advanced concept study other than improve-
ment of the OXCART. There have been, at various times,
proposals for increasing speed and altitude of the A-12 which
when coupled with the established reliability and capability
would appear to make this a survivable reconnaissance platform
for the 1975-1980 period. The cost of re-establishing a
fabrication facility for the A-12 would unquestionably be
considerably less than the cost of a completely new develcpment
program in addition to providing a known and demonstrated
capability and reliability.
5. The capability of the projected USSR defenses has been
so positively stated in paragraph 25k of reference (a) that
one can take solace only in the fact that this does represent
an estimate based on little intelligence and much speculation.
However, before initiating any advanced concept study which
could potentially result in a billion dollar program, it could
appear to be mandatory to concentrate all effort on acquiring
firmer intelligence regarding at least the present USSR de-
fensive capability from which a more realistic projection could
be made. It- is suggested therefore that rather than atter pting
to justify an advanced concept study effort, a request be pre-
pared for authorization to focus heavily on acquiring USSP
defensive data,
6. In'summary, it is recommended that the EXCOM be
solicited to approve a performance improvement investigation
for the OXCART to be used outside of the "Soviet Bloc" durin
the 1975-1980 period
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ASD/R&D/OSA
ASD/R&D/OSA 11 July 68
Distribution:
Copy 1 - ASD/R&D/OSA Copy 7 - RB/OSA
2 - D/R&D/OSA
3 - DD/SA
4 - A(T)D/R&D/OSA
-%ppr&Va%4ftIW a 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP71 B00O
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6 - ASD/R&D/OSA(Chrono)
SECRET