LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS AND CAPABILITIES OF COMMUNIST CHINA TO CONDUCT MILITARY CAMPAIGNS AGAINST INDIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71T00730R000400020002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 18, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

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LCGISTIG REQUIREMENTS AND CAPABILITIES
OF COMMUNIST CHINA TO CONDUCT MILITARY CAMPAIGNS
AGAINST INDIA
18 November 1962
Office of Research and Reporta
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This paper presents tentative estimates of the supply requirement
for the forces of Corr munist China in combat units currently engaged
in the Sino-Indian conflict along the Tibet border. The paper also con-
siders the part of the capability of the road transportation ro?tes in the
area currently in use, the size of forces that can be supported by the
current capability of roads, and the speed with which additional forces
can be deployed for combat against India. In addition. it provides a
tentative estimate of the ability of Communist China to supply forces
in Tibet by an airlift.
These estimates are based on the best information available to this
Office from all sources on 18 November 1962. Work also is currently
underway on this problem by the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence.
Department of the Army; by the Defense Intelligence Agency; and by the
Rand Corporation under contract with the Department of Defense. The
definitive conclusions of the studies of these other organizations will
not be available for some time.
GROLP
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CONTENTS
Page
1. Supply of Troops in Tibet . .. a . . . . . . . . 1
2. Redeployment of Combat Troops to Tibet . . a . . . . 2
3. Potential Airlift Capabilities . . . .
Appendix
The Road System of Tibet . .
Maps
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Figure 1. Himalayan Frontier
Figure 2. Tibet: Number of Troops Currently Supported
and Roads Used for Supply Movements
Figure 3. Number of Troops in Front Line Combat Units
Supportable by Maximum Use of Present
Tibetan Road Capability I
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LOGISTIC REQUIi2EMENTS LND CAPAI3ILITiES
OF COMMUNIST CHINA TO CONDUCT MILITARY CAMPAIGNS
AGAh\ s T INDIA
I. Supply of Troops in Tibet
At present, about 100, 000 troops are currently estimated to be in the
Tibet Military Region, and 24, 000 of these are believed to be In the combat
areas. The troops in the Region would require about 445 tons* of supplies
daily, including 270 tons delivered to the corrLbat areas and the area north
of Sikkim. e*
If maximum use were made of present Tibetan road capability, 1,440
tons of supplies could be delivered daily to troops in front-line combat
units out of a potential total of 2, 000 tons deliverable daily by road to
Tibet. The 1, 440 tons of supplies could sustain about 170, 000 troops in
the front-line combat units, leaving 560 tons of supplies daily for use of
troops and civilians not In the front-line areas.
The present roads could support the daily resupply requirements of
seven times the number of troops now in the front-line combat units, and
five times as many supplies could be brou ht in compared with those now
required !,,y the troops located in the whole of Tibet. On the average, all
roads In Tibet are being used to only slightly more than 20 percent of their
maximum capability, an shown in the tabulation on the following page.
2. Redeployment of Combat Troops to Tibet
The Chinese Communists could provide the resupply requirements
for 300 000 troops in the Tibet Military Region. We estimate that the
Tibet internal road net and feeder lines would permit the deployment of
Tonnages are given in short tons throughout this paper.
For a description of the road. system of Tibet, see the Appendix and
the map, Figure I.
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a. E,--e the raap..
b. Including supplies delivered to the area north of Cikkirn,
about 170, 000 troops to they border areas of Ladakh, the Northeastern
Frontier Agency (NEFA), and Yatung, north of Sikkim. * The remaining
130, 000 Chinese forces would be used to resupply forward units, to pro-
vide for internal security, and to maintain internal lines of communica-
tions.
Theoretically, 170, 000 combat troops could be positioned in the bor-
der areas in as little as 6 weeks, but the buildup of rear area strength
would come much later. The buildup of combat troops could be accom-
plished by repositioning troops already in Tibet but not actually fighting
and by moving seven additional divisions into Tibet. Five of these seven
divisions probably would be brought in via the railheads north of the
Tibet Military Region from as far as the Peiping and Wu-han Military
Regions.
In order to move seven, new infantry divisions to the border area in
6 weeks, the Chinese Communists would have to operate their motor
transport units and organic motor transport at a greatly accelerated pace# #*
See the map, Figure 3.
** If troops were to be moved at the normal rate used for resupply move-
ments, it would take, for example, as long as 18 days to move one division
from the railhead at Heiatung to Lhasa and 30 days to Burn La, a total dis-
tance of some 1, 600 miles.
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Torr>a_ p r D.-
R-ru
Present Reoup y Pre
_'= ments 2/ C2
nt` Uce of Percent of
sent Road Cepebility
pability in Use
5
Combat arer's
270
1
t 18.8
Noncombat e.reas
175
,
560 31.3
Total Tibet Mi1ittcry
Region
445 2
,700 22.3
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Operating on a "crash basis, 41 they could, for limited periods of 2 to
5 days, provide a capacity three to five times the normal sustained
capacity of the main roads into and within the Tibet Military Region.
It is unlikely. however, that the buildup could be accomplished so
rapidly, owing to the deterioration of roads, the difficult terrain, the
high altitudes, adverse weather, and the problem of gasoline supply
for the substantial number of trucks involved in the crash operation.
It would be reasonable to expect a more moderate buildup extending
over a period of several months. A more moderate tempo in the
buildup would provide ample time for necessary road maintenance
and stockpiling of gasoline along the supply routes. would lessen the
urgency of eliminating adverse conditions caused by weather, and
wx-ould`compensate for possible errors in the. organization of so vast
a movement in this area over such a relatively short period of time.
Computing on the basis of accepted logistic factors, the time re-
quired for the redeployment of the seven additional divisions in specific
geographic areas, however, would be as follows:
a. Two weeks probably is about the shortest time that a division
now located outside of the Tibet Military Region could move into Tibet
and to a fighting front. The shortest route is from Ch'eng-tu to Li-ma
via Chang-tu.
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c. In the Ladakh area the roads to the front would support four
division in addition to the nearly two divisions already there. Because
of the relative route capacities, it to likely that one division only would
move from the east via Urumchi and three divisions via Lhasa. All
four divisions could be in the Ladakh area within about 6 weeks, the
longest period of time required for the deployment of combat forces to
Tibet.
3. Potential Airlift Capabilities
It is estimated that the Chinese Communists are currently moving
only a few military supplies to Tibet by air transport. The potential
airlift capability of the Chinese civil-military transport fleet to carry
supplies from the airfields at the railroad-served distribution centers
of Lan-chow, Ch'eng-tu, and fisi-sing to Lhasa, however, is estimated
to be about 240 tons per day. This daily rate can be maintained for a
period of approximately 1 month, after which the daily rate would be
cut at least in half over a sustained period.
The airlift capability, therefore, is not sufficient to augment
rapidly the troop at in Tibet, but the tonnage moved by air would
augment supplies transported by truck to Lhasa for the resupply of com-
bat and garrison troops under present conditions. Such augmentation
would be equivalent in magnitude to the support required for 28, 000
troops in combat for I mouth and about half that number thereafter.
Because the road capacity south of Lhasa is less than that of the roads
northward to the railheads, airlifted supplies would have to substitute
for, rather than augment, supplies moving to the border areas where
troops are in combat and also to troops located elsewhere in Tibet.
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APPENDIX
THE ROAD SYSTEM OF TIBET
A. Main Access Roads to and Within Tibet
1. Tsinghai-Tibet Highway -
This highway starts at the railroad in northern China at Hung-
liu-yuan, or Hsia-tung, and is the major supply route for troops in
Tibet. It goes south through An-hsi, Ta-ch'ai-tan, Golmo, An-to,
Nagchhu Dzong, and Yang-pa-ching, to Lhasa. The length of this high-
way is estimated to be about 1, 300 miles. An alternate route is avail-
able from the railhead at Hsi-ning in north-central China, then west to
Golmo and thereafter south to Lhasa as stated above. The alternate
route from Hsi-ning to Lhasa is about 70 miles longer, or an estimated
total of 1, 370 miles.
2. Szechwan-Tibet Highway
The Szechwan-Tibet Highway starts at the railhead at Ch'eng-tu
in Szechwan Province and runs generally west through K'ang-tang, Kan-tzu,
To-ko, Ch'ang-tu (Chamdo), Pang-ta, and west to Sung-tsung and Lhasa,
approximately 1, 210 miles.
3. Urumchi-Kashgar-Rudog Highway
This highway originates in northwestern China at the railhead in
the Urumchi area. From Urumchi it goes south to Karashahr and then
west to Kucha, A'ko-su, and Kashgar. It then turns southeast to Yarkand.
Karghalik, and Rudog. The estimated length of the road from Urumchi
to Rudog is about 1, 335 miles. The southern section of this route from
Karghalik to Rudog is often referred to'as the Sinkiang-Tibet Highway.
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4. Trans-Tibet HI#.ghrvay
This highway connects the Sinkiang-Tibet Highway with the
TsinC hai-Tibet Highway and has terminal roads at two places on each
of these highways. On the Sinkiang Highway the terminal is at Tashigong
and at a point about 30 miles north of Rudog. From these two locations
the roads intersect about 130 miles to the east, forming one road which
travels east approximately 475 miles. Near Seling Tsbo it divides, with
one road going 110 miles north to An-to and one going south 180 miles
to Nagchhu Dzong, both on the Tsinghat-Tibet Highway. The estimated
total distance over the Trans-Tibet Highway, therefore, is between
715 and 785 miles.
5. Lhasa-Gartok Highway
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This highway roughly parallels the southern border of Tibet,
starting at Lhasa and thence to Zhikatae, Lhatse Dzong, Sangsang,
Saka, Tradoun, Nakchak, Barizha, and Garton. This distance is esti-
mated to be approximately 765 miles. However, the road continues
150 more miles through Gar D ,ong, to meet the Trans-Tibet Highway
at Tashigoug and the Sinkiaag Highway at Rudog, a total distance from
Lhasa to Rudog of about 915 miles.
B. Roads from Access Highways to the Borders of Tibet
1. Ladakh Area
The roads in the Ladakh area all originate from the main
Sinkiang-Tibet Highway.
a. Chip Chap Valley Road
This road starts about 10 miles north of Haji L.angar and
follows the Cara Dash River to Cizil Jilga and then goes west to the Chip
Chap River valley. The total distance is approximately 110 miles.
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This road is the same as the Chip Chap Valley road (as above)
to Qizil Jilga but then goes south through Debra La and west and south to
v"ischu, a total distance of about 155 miles.
c. Road to Ningri
This road leaves the Sinkiang-Tibet Highway and goes west
through Lauak La to Ningri, a distance of almost 60 miles.
d. Rudog to Chusul
This road runs west from Rudog to Chusul, about 55 miles.
2. NE PA Area
a. Lhasa-Bum La Road
Starting at Lhasa, this road travels south to Chhushu, east
to Tsethang. and south again to Lhuntse Dzong, Tsona Dzong, and Bum La.
The estimated distance is 280 miles.
b. Ch'ang-Tu - Li-ma (Ri-ma) Road
This road goes south from Ch'ang-t a to Pang-ta and then
west and south to Sang-ang-ch'u, and Li-ma, a total distance of approxi-
mately 280 miles.
3. Central Tibet
a. Lhasa-Sikkim Road
From Lhasa this road goes southwest to Nangkartse Dzong,
west to Gyangtse? and south to Khangmar. Phari Dzong, and Yatung. The
distance is estimated at 230 miles.
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b. Barkha-Taklakhar
This road runs from Bairkha on the Lhasa-Gartok Highway
to Tai3lakhar near the northwestern corner of Nepal, about 50 miles.
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