ANALYSIS OF ISRAELI DESTRUCTION OF ARAB AIR FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71T00730R000400220008-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 27, 1999
• Sequence Number: 8
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Analysis .of Israeli Destruction of Arab Air Forces
Summary
Most of the 440 Arab aircraft claimed to have been
destroyed by the Israeli Air Force were caught on the
ground. by low-level strafing attacks. Available evidence
suggests that success was attributable largely to standard
weapons, skillful flying, and excellent intelligence --
de spite
giving. the impression that some secret weapons were
responsible for phenomenal accuracies. Moreover,
Arab protective and defensive measures were. minimal.
The Israelis attained tactical surprise by approaching
targets at very low altitudes and from unexpected
directions.
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Low altitude and low speed,
combined with excellent gunnery, were apparently the
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Research and Reports
and coordinated with the Offices of Current Intelligence
and National Estimates and with the Directorate of
Science and Technology; the estimates and con-
clusions represent the best judgment of the
Directorate of Intelligence as of 2 June 1967.
SC No. 04455/67
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principal contributors to the effectiveness of Israeli
attacks. In general, Arab runways and radars were
put out of action first and then. the aircraft on the
ground were systematically destroyed.
- A major Israeli effort clearly was assigned to
damaging runways to make them Unusable..
Another "new weapon" has been referred to only in
press speculation. It is described as a fragmentation
bomb with a guidance system, is supposed to be about
12 feet long, and is alleged to have been used against
25X1C aircraft on the ground. However,
=Arab wreckage indicates damage most consistent
with strafing.
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1. Israeli jet planes did not leave their home
bases for the attack on major airfields in Egypt until
about 0845 local time (0545Z) on the fifth of June.
This timing -- some four to five hours after dawn --
apparently contributed to the element of surprise.
The Israelis then depended upon poor communications
between the Arab states to give them time to finish
the Egyptian Air Force before turning their attention
to Syria and Jordan. An initial wave of attacks was
carried out simultaneously against a number of
Egyptian fields, and a total of 25 Arab fields were
attacked during the first day.
2. Israeli tactics were simple and effective. The
attacks were planned to take the Arab air forces by
surprise. The approach to the targets was made
through gaps in radar coverage and from unexpected
directions. Some Israeli planes, upon take-off, flew
out over the Mediterranean before heading for enemy
targets. Approach from the northwest added to the
element of surprise. The entire mission, including
attacks, was apparently flown at a very low level,
something like 150 feet and probably no higher than
500 feet. This minimized the risk of detection, made
interception by aircraft extremely difficult, and
enabled the Israeli pilots to make very sure of their
fire.
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There is a lack of information on how the attack was
carried out at each airfield, with the exception of
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Damascus. The US Army attache reported that 16 Israeli
aircraft attacked the Damascus airfield four times, each
attack consisting of four planes. Only on the second
attack were rockets used. All. four planes attacked with
bombs on the first pass, The planes with rockets fired
them on the second pass. All other passes involved
strafing of targets on the ground.
4. Syrian air defense artillery fired some
1, 000 to 1, 500 feet above the attacking forces. Either
their guns could not fire at lower altitudes or the attack
so unnerved Syrian gunners that they failed to reset the
fuzes of their shells. Low altitude and low speed,
combined with excellent gunnery, were the principal
contributors to the accuracy of Israeli attacks. Israeli
planes made three and.four passes at target airfields.
Some planes reportedly made as many as eight sorties
on the first day of the battle.
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By nightfall of the first day of the war, Israel
had destroyed the bulk of the Arab air forces and was in
control of the air in the war zone.
6. The destruction of the Arab aircraft was
characterized by accuracy against individual targets
and by extensive destruction of aircraft at the fields
under attack. Dummy aircraft did not appear to have
been damaged, but this discrimination may have been
more apparent than real, however, since the cannon
rounds, which had devastating effects on fueled air
craft, would have little effect on the dummies.
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7. The observed damage to Arab aircraft could have
been caused by the use of armor-piercing incendiary
ammunition in the 30-mm cannon with which most Israeli
aircraft are armed. There is no independent evidence
that this type of ammunition was used, but Israel.is
capable of producing all types of ammunition. The light
armor and self-sealing fuel tanks of Soviet aircraft
could not provide protection against such ammunition. 25X1 C
9. A major contribution to Israeli success
undoubtedly was the miscalculation by the Arabs as to
Israeli intentions and Arab strength in relation to that
of Israel. Failure to anticipate the Israeli attack was
another maior factor.
Once
over their targets, the Israeli aircraft encountered
weak and ineffective air defense artillery. Moreover,
there is some evidence that in the first few hours of
the attack the Egyptian air defense apparatus fell into
confusion and that communications virtually broke
down. Finally, no protective or defensive measures
appear to have been taken despite the existence of a
crisis which, it was widely assumed, would culminate
in war.
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10. A striking feature is
the apparent lack of Arab preparation against attack. 25X1 C
For example, three or more aircraft
parked wingtip to wingtip in the open. Apparently very
little effort was made to disperse or camouflage air-
craft, and apparently no attempt was made to build
additional revetments. 25X1 C
Israeli Aircraft
11. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the Israeli
Air Force consisted of some 260 jet aircraft and a number
of transports, helicopters, trainers, and utility aircraft.
(See the table for data on the principal Israeli jet aircraft.
The fighter/bomber aircraft are of French manufacture
with the exception of the Fouga-Magister jet trainer,
which is of French design but was manufactured by Israel
under licence. All aircraft are capable of carrying high
explosive or napalm bombs. Most carried air-to-air or
air-to-surface rockets. With the exception of the Fouga-
Magister, which carried rnachineguns, and the Ouragan,
which carried 20-mm cannon, all aircraft are equipped
with 30-mm cannons.
12. The fighter/bombers have radius of action
varying from 100 to 375 nautical miles. This is adequate,
even with the additional mileage required by diversionary
tactics, to accomplish the destruction of the Arab air
forces. (The map, Figure 3, shows the location of
Israeli and Arab airfields, )
New Weapons
13. It is obvious from photography that Israeli
attacks on Arab aircraft were extremely accurate. Two
new weapons were reportedly used during the war. This
has given rise to tales of secret weapons to account for
both the accuracy of Israeli attacks and the large
numbers of enemy aircraft destroyed.
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 Principal Israeli and Arab Airfields
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Figure 3
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Although it is
reasonably certain that a major Israeli effort was
successfully directed against runways, there is no
independent verification that a new type of bomb was
used.
15. Another new weapon" has been referred to only
in press speculation. It is alleged to have been used
against aircraft on the ground. It is described as a
12-foot fragmentation bomb with a guidance system.
Each Israeli aircraft was alleged to carry two of them.
On balance, there are at least two factors which militate
against the foregoing being an accurate description. The
impact of a 12-foot fragmentation bomb on an aircraft
would scatter wreckage over a considerable distance and
would create a noticeable crater. None of the
Arab wreckage show these effects. The
damage observed is more nearly consistent with that
which could have been caused by 30-mm cannon.
Training, Maintenance, and Morale
16. High standards of training, maintenance,
and morale, although not quantifiable, made a sub-
stantial contribution to Israel's success. The US
Air Force is apparently the Israeli model, and the
training for both aircrews and ground crews, which
follows conventional lines, is intensive and thorough.
The Israeli Air Force reputedly flies more hours
per pilot than any other air force in the world. A gunnery
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and bombing range provides live firing practice against
all kinds of targets.
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17. The Israeli Air Force is maintained on a con-
stant alert basis and actual combat is not only an
ever-present possibility, but also relatively common.
From November 1966 to the June 1967 outbreak of
hostilities, there were three air-to-air clashes in
which a total of eight to ten Arab aircraft were downed.
18. A high degree of self-sufficiency in aircraft
maintenance has contributed greatly to the superiority
of the Israeli Air Force over the Arab air forces. The
Israeli Air Force is capable of performing most of its
own major maintenance. It depends on the Israeli
aircraft industries for maintenance which it cannot perform.
19. The Israeli Air Force is widely acclaimed for its
high morale. Israeli pilots are known as daredevils,
although in reality this reflects their aggressiveness and
excellent training. They will push their aircraft beyond
recommended safety limits when circumstances require.
They display absolute confidence in themselves and their
equipment, This confidence undoubtedly contributed to
the Israeli success in the war. The extent of the damage
done not only to Arab aircraft but also to Arab ground
forces demonstrates the thoroughness and determination
with which Israeli pilots pressed their attacks.
Israeli gunnery was highly accurate and that the Arab air-
craft were destroyed by burning or explosion of the fuel
tanks.
Observable damage is therefore
attributed to weapons known to have been in the Israeli
inventory prior to the Mid-East crisis.
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Characteristics of Principal Israeli Aircraft as of 1 June 1967
Aircraft Type
Radius of Action a,
(Nautical Miles
Mirage III C All-weather inter- 285 with heavy load
ceptor and day and no external
ground attack fighter fuel
Two high explosive or
napalm bombs (up to
1,000 pounds each)
62
315 with reduced
load and small
external fuel load
Two rocket pods
Two AAM - Sidewinder or
one Matra R 530
Mirage III B
Probably reconnaissance
3
Super Mystere IV
Interceptor and ground
300 to 325 with
Two high explosive or
29
B2
support
auxiliary fuel
tanks
napalm bombs (up to
1,000 pounds each) if no
auxiliary fuel tanks
Mystere IV A Interceptor 225 to 275 with
auxiliary wing
tanks
Two high explosive or
napalm bombs (up to
1,000 pounds each)
Two 30-mm cannon (air-to-
surface rockets can be
carried in lieu of bombs)
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Characteristics of Principal Israeli Aircraft as of 1 June 1967
(Continued)
Radius of Action
Aircraft Type (Nautical Miles) Armament Number
Ouragan MD 450 Fighter/ground 225 to 275 with External stores vary, 52
support
Vautour II A Ground support
fighter
Six modified to
fighter/bomber
One modified to
trainer
One modified to
reconnaissance
Vautour II B Light bomber
Fouga-Magister Trainer and
ground support
auxiliary fuel can carry up to 3,400
tanks pounds
Four 20-mm cannon
375 with Variety of bomb
auxiliary fuel loads in bomb bay
tanks and attached to wing
pylons
Four 30-mm cannon
(may carry rocket
launchers)
100 to 125 with Two small bombs
non-jettisonable (one under each wing)
tanks
Under wing racks can carry
air-to-ground rockets
Two 7.5-mm or 7.62-mm
machine guns
a. All values for radius of action are estimates of to-l0-1o ground-support mission, based on
conversion of performance from hi-lo-hi missions. Accuracy may vary within 15 to 20 percent.
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