SOME PROBLEMS IN PRODUCING CURRENT INTELLIGENCE AND CURRENT ESTIMATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72-00121A000100010004-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2004169 ?/CIA-RDP72-00121 A000100010004-9
O P$ O W IN ? DBUCI NG T R.R `S` INTELLIGENCE ND CURRE FSTI S
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SOME P. hx MS IN PRO z. }LING CURRENT It ' ,LI INK A Q i CURRENT ESTfl4 "
The Central Intelligence "Wily Summary," as published from 19146 to
1950, was adequate for its purpose and at tim
a brilliant performance within its limitations. (See lo, ) The
principal problems affecting this publication had to do with (a) the
advisability of producing it before any real groundwork had been laid
for a Central Intelligence organization; (b) the question of how
as serving its purpose, (c) the propriety of introducing sucn a publics-
hoot reference to the parallel efforts of the established Intel-
nce agencies; and (d) the allocation and retention of this function
If theoretically designed to produce a different kind of
intelligence.
Paragraph 4 of the second directive of the motional Intelligence
Authority (Febru.ry 8, 19146) states that;
"The Director of ^entral Intelligence will give first priority
the following tasks:
a, Production of daily summaries containing factual state-
ments of the significant developments in the field of intelli ,ence and
operations related to the national security and to f orei: n events for the
use of the President, the embers of this Authority, and additional
The reason for this provision seems to have been a desire to give
President easy access to all foreign information being received by
the government, The President seems to have wanted such a service at
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once, but no facilities yet existed for the "production of daily
eumse vies." In fact there was no such thing as a Central Intelligence
Ckwoup in February-, 1946 except in a plan, and a few individuals designated
as the nucleus of a future organization. Most of these indiviad
had been assi: ned to the Central Reports Staff which was to have the
duty of produei? } the Strategic and National ?olicy intelligence specified
resident's letter. These persons were the most logical if not
the only ones who could be used to produce sunTiaries if they o mat be
produced.
Hence at a time when the new Staff might well have been occupied
vely with making the intricate plans that would be necessary
before machinery for production of strategic intellizence could be put
in motion, it found its time al=!t entirely taken up with the problem
zing daily dispatch traffic. Probably this was looked u-.-on
he time as a temporary situation which would be corrected. Actually,
it was never fully corrected. Even after the Central deports Staff had
become a large research oranization it was still, in many respects,
subordinating all other work to that of producing daily and weekly current
11i once.
on why the Office developed in this way may be found in
the President rs attitude toward his intelligence summary. President
Truman was personally pleased with it. He so expressed himself un-
officially on more than one occasion. When the Secretary of State
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objected that these digests were not '*intelligence," Truman replied
in effect that they might not be intelli