SOME ASPECTS OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES OPERATONAL GROUPS IN WORLD WAR II

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
221
Document Creation Date: 
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
February 26, 2002
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Content Type: 
PAPER
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3.pdf15.13 MB
Body: 
Approved For Rase 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121100190001-3 SECRET ~ PAPER.. NM$R 1i Approved For Release 2002/07/ CRET : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121AQQ0100190001-3 ASnCTS OF THE A TMTIES OF THE O MC VTCZ3 P O,?AL GROUPS II. OPE ,TIONTAL MOMS IN THE ? fA T ATEt, 105. Approved For Release 2002/07/3?M 2-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 , 4 A-RDP72-00121 AQA0100190001-3 II. 0 ATI0 tAL GROUPS IN THE CHINA THEA`i t, 19Ia5 Your factors led to the decision to employ the OSS Operational Groups in Central and South China in 1945 and helped to determine the way In which they were ultimately used in the field. First was the general strategic problem faced by the Allies after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor? Second was the political and diplomatic relationship between the Western powers and the Chinese govsrnrent. Third was the military position of the Japanese forces in China, Fourth was the concept of the role of psychological warfare which was decided upon lean entry into the war there arose the question of how o practice in the European campaigns. utilize available forces to defeat the Axle powers. Allied leers decided, after considerable discussion. to concentrate the ards Europe and then following the conquest of 0 turn to the problem of defeating Japan. In the meantime, forces in the Far East would attempt to stem Japanese advances and prepare the ground for the later campaigns* The military reasons for this decision wer that the regular Allied military forces were unable to mount major operations simultaneously against both Oermany and Japan, were militarily stronger in China than the Chinese and ab them in the field* but were not powerful enough to achieve Japanese success and remove them from the war. A stalemate ensued, brought about Approved For Release 2002/07/ P72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 by Japanese weaknesses as by any particular Allied military . The Allies therefore selected psychological warfare as the interim means of attacking the Japanese. The political and diplomatic problem differed vast encountered in Europe. In Europe the major Allied powers had to deal. with refugees to did not control any part of their home territories and consequently were dependent on British and Li -..r. ican policy decisions and on British and American supplies for what small rmed forces they were able to maintain in exile. Therefore, political and diplorisatic problems did have influence, they were of secondary importance.I In China, however, th The Chinese government remained in control of a substantial portion of ory. It was maintaining in the field a large zero in,. active operations against the Japanese. Since the Chinese gove.z nt and military forces did represent a potential, if i t actual., =ream pressure against the Japanese, must be given to Chinese sensibilities. In other words., therefore, were able to exercise a greater influence on American and British military policy than did the views of the refugee TeNropean goveralrnents. The Chinese were also particularly sensitive regarding their treatment by the Western poweers.2 All these facts problem of organizing Allied intelligence services and guerrilla. warfare operations in China far ro re complex than had been 4t he case in trope. Approved For Release 2002/07/ : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SET Approved For Fase 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A100190001-3 been a that a major Allied mistake was to sub. ito poli~ and diplomatic factors in Europe to the aim of defeating Geraaasaa r. The me ricer of this argu- reaee status their mdepenace on the United the United tingdoaa these stover cents-in-Mle sable to exercise any aaa ar' inf .uence on policy daai- ovsttnt in control of the honer territory under regarded as a puppet of the Germane and, of d no influence. a have been written about the Chinese problem since these `heso have been notable as s ch for etr beat an for It is not the purpose of this study to discuss cniaaae-for treating the Chinese gent as aqua;I or al rdinate. Suffice it to say that the Western powers did troot it no an equal and that that decision inf.uencrd greatly *9 use made of unorthodox warfare in general and the Operational in paarti+cnlar during l91145. An exaaale of the extremes writers have gone in their treatment of the Chinese to be found in Naar Rouortp " `olt a IT, 'F9. Writing . ulties of mounting 053 operations in E: na, of the Chinese gover at as follower t activity in China suffered from the Laa atmosphere pervading Chinese officialdom. a'1f4nterea t and corruption .san rather than nationaaa, policy evidenced s of the Chinese Nationalist Uove.ent,, negated any efficient conduct of active Warfare against Japan. The American prograaa received Chinese coopera- tion ierever it entailed supping or expanding agendles. Thus the activities of Naval Imoup, in building up China' as internal sled ample cooperation from the Chinese. r WOO the OSS plan for an Independent Amaerican l ,igence sowriae in ns, even though this d at Japan and Japanese, activities, was at at every turn.* ssible to raise the question of whe a: , in China, the treatment of the Chinese gave rdinate d the establishment of a t y iudep intelligence service would have produced better results. f Course assuming that the picture drawn by t t, Approved For Release 2002/07 ek P72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121AWD0100190001-3 The military position of the Japanese in China in the spring of 195 was In general term as follows. The invaders held Manchuria and the bulk of China proper north of the Y ver. South o Yangtze they hold the major ports, such as Canton and major rail lines and ran j tions, the bigger cities, and the r* jor river valleys. They had, as a result of their 19I offensive, succeeded in establishing themselves in force and to controlling the rajor rail and road system from the Indo-Chinese border north chow, Kweilin, Hong-yarn ,sand Chang-shat to the Yangtze valley. Pro Nanning and Liuc they held the so-called River" valley as far as their coastal holdings in and around Canton and Hong-Kong- The region was otherwise. in Chinese hands. mpossible for the or but poorly-equipped Chinese forces to expel the invaders unaided. On the other hasnd,, the Japanese were -unable to their ? ontrol beyond the areas mentioned and to gain a decisive victo .l' It evident that the: situation was ripe for the development Of psychological, warfare operations, in particular those In warfare. Lion and discussed above, the Allies had reached a major decision in 1943. This was to keep Ch forces in action 'with as small an expenditure of American personnel and equipment as possible."' In February and )larch, 193, OSS Planning Group, the Joint Staff Planers, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff turned their attention to the problem of Asia and warfare against Japan. The Approved For Release 2002/07/30 1 ; 2QP72-00121A000100190001-3 . SEGRL I Approved For ease 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121.0100190001-3 for asap shown g Japanese and Chinese held areas oath of eTan,tse River. Situation as of March, e Chinese Ccando project was in its early 1 A& A for nap showing estimated dispositions of Japanese Owzd Teresa in Chins* Situation as of 11 February 19k5. It stU be noted that estimated Japanese strength in central M uth China was 13 divisions and U Brigades, with a total of 1,C00, men. these units ware distributed from ;gland and the 1 ido?nese frontier in the south to 160 mass north of the !aagtse River in the north and "Ooosbr4ad in the zdors already mentioned in the t xt. 2 *5, the SOM0 is we the military situation as of early 19 teristics were present in 1943, when J.C.S. 2b$ was Ooluae I , ' 9? ad in this discussion Gill be to Washington. Haar 2. JCS 145. eo adns studies,,, recommendationsf a the directive. The Cn 31 March j 1943 capta Forrest Be a eMrandia too The Assistant Chief of .` der in Chiefs 3. 8. Flooti flirectm' of str kr teee.,x The subject of t ra t a mass * pectaa Military nax for ? 1,o Psychological Warfare Operations Against tree within the Asiatic Theater.* paragraph 1 states: be Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff have approved the, 1 ~ .t Ong of the Joint'. Staffs Planners as contained J.C,S, 9415: paragraphs 23 to 31, 1w :ve s Approved For Release 2002/07/ 0 : DP72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Fase 2002/07/30 CIA-RDP72-00121A''10100190001-3 -n of this arrangement, see War ltep4rt, ?olm e passino The present di ssion Is intended a iwa of the basic problems to indicate ,aut ri*ation under which the Operational Groups was the abbreviation for ino4 ir& Special _Tech cal ate. This organisation preceded proper discussion of it# see War Report, ' F III ~~111711~I~~I~f _ Approved For Release 2002/07/30 :,CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECREt Approved For W ease 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121AQ00100190001-3 .C.8. Directive 2k5, March 31, 1943.- The staff study led to this Directive departed from the basic promise that since ted States military effort was to be in the European Theater warfare offers a most effective mans for leading na." Japan, declared the study, had penetrated so far into China, had "so widely and thinly spread her forces, that on all Ades the Japanese are vastly outnumbered by hostile Chinese. The Japanese inva- has been cruel. Chinese hatred is bitter. All the i nple- polo ?...cal warfare,, especially sabotage, subversion, and guerrilla activities, will find the world's richest field in the Chia, Theater." It it here was a situation which offered the return on minima investme ,weer Americ d 2 A cooperative working arrangement be n in the peyd' ological warfare field. This to be continued on the same principles as before, which were to rican equipment and training to enable Chinese "agents, forces and bas warfare, and black propaganda against the Japanese." effort was to win furtherance of actual or planned mi.litery opera tionsc" and was wonder." go coordinated "by close cooperation with the theater ;ontrol was to rest in the hands o Chinese government,, since the chief of OSS activities in the China Theater was to prosecute psychological warfare "in cooperation with under the direction of" the Director of SACQ, d of the Generalissimo,, Chiang Kai-Shek."- All C ersonne; conduct every foxn of sabotage, secret Approved For Release 2002/07/30 :: CIIAI-RD 2-00121 A000100190001-3 Approved For ReIse 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A0QD=100190001-3 activities win or concerned with China, Bore na, and Thailand to be placed under the command of the Chief of O.S.S. .Activities, eater." it has already been shown abo ad States psychological operations had been subordinated to regular military operations, operational control vested in the theater cow under. This individual had the right to employ it or not, as he saw fit. Pl nin; had been vested in the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the O35 Planning group, with the OS! having the responsibility for conducting psychological operations, To this rather complex picture was added in the factor of subordination to control by SACC and ultimately by the Chinese government, with the 0SS still charged with the responsibility of actually aprosecuting's psychological warfare operations. Once again, ore, the OSS was given responsibility without authori Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Rase 2002/07/30: CIA-RDP72-00121A100190001-3. Approved For Release 2002/07/30: CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Rase 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121AQU0100190001-3 -E. B. OSS ORGANIZATION IN CHINA FOR OPERATIONAL COUP ACTIVITIES A revised OSS General Order, effective December 26, 19W4, set forth the principal parts of the organization, following the proscriptions of earlier OSS orders and J.C.S. Directives.I This order reveals that for the first time there was set up within the OSS an "Operational Group Command," with functions separate and distinct from those of the Special Operations Branch. These functions were described In the following terms: "The 0 up Command shall be responsible fort 1) The selection and training of operational nuclei for otivaticn of resistance groups in carrying out guerrilla operations. Furnishing fighting officer patrols to invasion commanders. 3) Coup de main. .) Attacking selected targets." be admitted that interest in this particu nical, since these activities had been going on for some time under the Special. Operations Branch. It does, however, mark a further development of the organization conceived by Donovan back in 191L1. and the grant of pendent existence to the Operational Groups. On March 16, l94li, an OS8 General Order set forth the "Organization and Duties of Principal Officers of OSS Theater Establi shm, illustrates again the basic concept of psychological warfare operations and provides the actual theater organization for is conduct of such operations. Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Base 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A`ddb100190001-3 OSS Washington, t feral Order Number 9. !e ed. Utfective on December 26 1914.. of of this order will be found in war ms, volume no 142944O. 03$ Was in rn, General Order Winer 37. Issued 16 Bch,, 1944, effective 14 Harsh, 1944, A copy of this order will be found in 0 Archives - Reg. OP s1. 055 : GE L (to 1 Oct 1945) Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 order snakes the point that the authority and responsibility of the Strategic Services Officers who is described as the officer in command of each OSS Theater Ustablish rent, "is subject to the limita- tions i osed by the fact that the 0SS theater establishment is not an independent and isolated unit but is part of an organization conducting coordinated operations in all theaters." Conseouentl j the organization as a whole must function so as to discharge simultaneously its it nediate responsibility to the individual Theater Commander and to the broader requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to who gency is responsible." This is of course a restatement of the principles laid down: by the Joint Chiefs as far back as 190. It should be remembered, too, he situation in China was further complicated by the delicate question of Sino-American relations and its effect on military operations. The Strategic Services Officer was to make recommendations for plans and policies to the Director of CSS and carry out recommended p ct to the control of the Theater Commander, He was to "carry on all essentisi liaison with the U.S. Commanding Cenral of his Theater end the Allied High Command thereof (if any and procure from them what- ever approvals are necessary for 085 activities within the 'heater." WWithin 0SS he was to exercise comrd and in particular was directed to '#make final decision as to the activities of each branch in his theater," with the proviso that in case of a disagreement r ith "a prin. cipal, officer on matters of policy" the Director in Washington was to have the final power of decision. The complexity and delicacy of this Approved For Release 2002 / 33 tt RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 task is self-evident and illustrates the difficulty of waging warfare by coalition and of trying to combine under one military z ender bath regular and unorthodox operations. ,hose who were to assist him in the discharge of these and arts %mve an operations Officer and a Training Officer. -'These of particular interest in connection with the Operational Group activities. The Operations officer had the duty to "'supervise and coor- dinate strategic services operations including specifically the operations of SO, MOO 00 and 4U and any special operations not assigned to one of the foregoing branches or offices."' This officer was to prepare recommenda- tions g'concernin current and proposed operations." He was to have charge of establishing requirements and raking recommendations regarding the personnel, s plies,,, and of ui.pment needed for operations. He was also to maintain liaison with similar Allied agencies, arrange for interchan e of information with Washington headquarters and "other theater establish- "tents concerning subversive operations," determine training questions, and consult with the Training Officer concerning training programs. The Training Officer was responsible for liaison with the Operations Officer concerning courses and qualifications of recruits. He was to "obtain from field agents advice and suggestions concerning t liaison, for the purpose of exchanging information, with other ti.S. and the appropriate Allied agencies, and keep in touch for the same purpose with the Schools and Training Branch of OS5 in Washington. On Dece her 2 6., 194, an 055 Special Order designated Colonel Richard P. fleppner, FA,, as Chief of 0, China Theater. 2 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Rase 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A N100190001-3 The above abbreviations stay for the following activities and for the sake of convenience id.U henceforth be used. 60 - Special Operations. NO - Morale Opera ions. of, - operational Groups.. 1 Maritime Unit. 2. O Washington Revised Special Order r 26., issued 26 giber., 19414 effective 9 Decesber, Heppner succeeded Col.. John M. Ooughlia., lni`,., as 055/china Commander. A copy of this order id U be -found in 055 Archives ? lunsd. Reg. OP.1.. 058 CTs mmn (to 1 Oct 1945) 6A, a, Office of Strategic Services, China Theatre,: Order N er 5, 2 March 1945, copy of this order and an O85 argeitteation 03S Archives - Kunming. 08$ Fs GE. R L (To 1 Oct 1945) #, Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 :CIA-RDP72-00121 A000100190001-3 March, 1945, while planning for 00 activities earlier stages, OS Headquarters in the China Theater tasued, over the 1 signature of the Strategic Services Officer, General Order dumber 5, This order elaborated the organization envisaged in the earlier documents. set up as a separate component of the organization an Operational Grou Command. It was to organize and train such Operational Groups (not further defined or described) "as may be specified by the Chief, OSS, China Theatre." Decision concerning the employment of the 00s woul of course, lie with the Strategic Services Officers depending on the needs and desires of the Theater Corn ander and, more remotely, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Operational Planni Board mould have n- siderable influence over QS9 decisions and planning for 00 activity, for it was given the responsibility for "integrating major operational projects and plans for strategic services with Ar and Navy agencies," initiating" and "developing, in conjunction with all operating branches concerned, all plans, programs, and doctrines pertaining to strategic services activities originating from'' CUSS China Theater Headquarters. Final decision, insofar as OSS was concerned, would of course rest with the 3trate?ic Services officer in his capacity of holding "command of CSS functions and operations in the China Theatre," Such was the rather brief description of 0Q functions and of the machinery for puttin into operation ? 0 activities. It will be noticed that within lines of comr;;:and and responsibility concerning CS matters are c and simple. Tt was to trove otherwise concerning other aspects of the 00 operation in China. Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121AO00100190001-3 -l.0- '0MPTS A! PLANS: .HEATER, ()Ss On January , 194.5, the cormandor of U. S. Forces t n the China Theater, C. 'edemeyer, wrote to Colonel Heppner that 055/China would be under the direct control of himself and follow the C .aff channel for information, recomrendation, coordination, and cooperation This decision followed considerable discussion concerning the proper place for 0 in the Theater organizational structure. There had been a recom iendation that the Office be placed under the Assistant chief of Staff, O-5. Others had felt that 0 5 should be under G4, and re that it be made a separate staff section. 2 The difficulty se, caused by the variety and complexity of O SS opera.tions* The final decision was in harmony with the principles laid down in earlier J.C.S. directives, since Wedemeyer could best control O SS operations if he were its immediate commander, On January A. 1945, Wedemeyer presided over an inter-allied con- ference on clandestine and quasi-military activities. five British representatives there were present General Chang kai-Ming, Chinese Director of Military Intelligence, and four of his colleaues, Donovan, Heppner, and various others represented the United States. The purpose of the conference was to lay down principles for the conduct of clan estine and quasi-military activities against the Japanese in China.3 ? edemeyer spoke as Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek' a Chief of Staff rather than in his capacity as Commander of the United States Vices In the China Theater, His -position with regard to clandestine activities had been Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121AW0100190001-3 A coy of this letter will be found in 0 Archives - iunmirg. QS8 C2t .-SAL (to 1 Oct 1945) l., on March 1, 19 5, however, Theater Headquarters directed that , '.. Theater 0-5 assume the responsibility of coordna clandestine operations in the China Theater. In he was specifically ordered tat Receive and disseminate the weekly reports qqxsi?e f ltar and clandestine or an sati ns o nationals operating in the China Theater, (2) Deal directly with all agencies under the operational control of the Le nding General, C. S. ?carceaa,, China Theater, and in a liaison capacity with such other argenisations -Adch are nr t. directly under the operational.. control of the Camandi General, U. S. Forces. China Theater, ectly 11 General Cheat kei-$ing, the 0-2 the National Military Council, on all matters relating to quasi-military or clandestine activities of other nationals. ~( ) Continue the present procedure which requires the submission of all quasi- litaerg and clandestine, projects. () Maintain closest possible coordination with Assistant Chief of Staff, C-, because the greater proportion of the activities concerned will be directly related to Assistant Chief of Staff, tip.." 0 -5 vas also directed to coordinate "actions pertaining more psrticul:azty to Assistant Chief of Staff, Q -3s and other staff sectionv* In the normal military fashion. Headquarters, United States Forces, China mater, An 879, 1 march, 1945. Memorandum Nor Ott 0Q l-rdlitary and Clandestine Organizations, A copy of this naeaaoranda will be found in /ARSES Chungking - Rego OP.i. Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For R&ease 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121AGO0100190001-3 138 1945 Theater Headquarters charged the 0-3 sectio: staff functions relating to 085 *training, operation plane, a corbat operations' and provided for. datly liaison Visits between and Q-3. ds rters, United States Force., China Theater APO 8?9, 13 dune, 1945 rioranihni Sher it, Change lumber 1 "Qa i-mtii atins Organisatione* A copy of this chare will be :found in 088 Archives - Xuni tng. Reg. QP.1,. 085 CT, GENERAL (to 1 Oct 1945) 16*. 3. A transcript of this conference for which the mate this part of this paper is taken, will be found' in Archives - naming. Reg, ?#P.1. 083 CT i 4 SAL (to 1.. Oct 1945) f6A Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CI -RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 deters fined the previous afternoon in a meeting with Chi? complained that on hia arrival in the Theater he had found a complete lack of coordination in clandestine not Chiang. and he were ctete mined to remedy'. a the Chinese were willing to allow continuation of activities already under way and to honor agreements already a xa.de, the Generalissimo waa Pill& to in; ties we designated rener. as his depn a situation wKeh both or stated, that in the future knowing s ecifical:ly what a giving authorization for them. Cliiang had Chem kai. -Minn ,is Director of l Military. Intelligence, such matters. Anyone desiring to begin an activity, or to bring into China ac:diti sonnel or supplies# was to apply either to Wedeneyer or to (.,hen;,. They in turn uld :oorelinete the re- quests with each other. Any unauthorized activities uld be expelled the China Theater. The factors upon which clandestine activities would be dependent reflected the complexity of the th .nese situation in its various aspects. Foremost was the necessity of being able to support zuch operati the logistical point of view. The Japanese controlled all major Chinese ports, as wail as Fr, ench In:o- air. . Owing to the cow secuent distances An d trans,aortat.ion difficulties j_nvuly :d in China opcrations,such a sideration therefore iooned large in the thinking of both Chian ' eders y*er. Clandestine activities were., after all, in their vir i, but a part of the total 1il.itary effort against the Japanese invaders. Of equal. it nortance in the view of the high command way the *ay- in which Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA RDP72-00121A090100190001-3 unorthodox warfare operations were to be mounted. !-ere the prima was that such operations must be used against the Japanese. 'cede emphasized this severaal times. He asked that the organizations represented at the meeting not "perxdit your agencies to become involved in discussing Central Government policies or Communist policies" and that they not "make available to indivi duaals,, for example separate provincial governors or Chinese war lords or special political parties, any assistance or materiel," He warned that "such action would be dangerous to you and . your organization. You must not become involved in politics and local matters. I emphasized at the beginning of our conference that the Generalissimo wants your activities to be employed against the common enemy, the Jap," final point was that he insisted that regular reparts of activities be tiled at Headquarters by all organizations. This was insisted on apparently for two reasons. First,,, was the requirement that all operations be con- ducted only against the Japanese. Allied to this was Wedemeeyera s insistence on strictly controlling operations, such control extending to authorization activities. For instance, the General dtated that "before clandestine activities like guerrilla raids are undertaken against a certain bridge,, for example, or operations against lines of communications and important enemy installations,, all these mist be cleared through us, through Generaal. Cheng kai.-Ming and myself." His insistence on control was made clear at another point in the conference and re 'lected the basic concept of unorthodox warfare as strictly subordinated to regular military operations. Wedemeyer declared that until such time as definite military Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA--RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 plans had been formulated, clandestine activities were to continue, subject to the fbregoing limitations, r::nh as they had been doing in the past. In other cords, more positive action would have to await military decd signs on the highest levels in the China Theater. This was indeed a far cry from the original concepts of guerrilla warfare. Wedemeyer expressed these thoughts in these words; "There are no definite plans of operations for the next three months. There may not be. We are preparing fbr certain military action, consequently we cannot give you directives indicating at this time the contribution that you could make in coordination with military operations. We are trying to formulate overall plans that we will put into effect at times and places of our choosing not the enemy's. That has not been accomplished yet and it is going to require a little time. When we have a firm plan we will caalll you in and In- dicate what we propose to do. We would request your recommendations on the contribution that you could make. Until that happy situation arrives, (I don't know whether it wi'al be a month or two months, before we can formulate elan and call you in for such integration), until that time sores I will ask each head of clandestine organiza- tions operating in the China Theater to submit to not later than Tuesday of each week a report of activities. 4 aat has been accomp- lished, where, what personnel. and equipment were involved. That will enable me to point your effort toward more remunerative targets. You may get off the beam and if we know what you are doing we can better effect coordination at least until that time arrives when we can integrate the effort with a well qualified overall plan for the China Theater." therefore, unorthodox warfare operations,1 concepts, were restricted from the beginning in China by two basic forces, the necessity of deferring, as a matter of policy, to the wishes of the Chinese government; and the concept of unorthodox warfare as subordinate to regular military operations and under the control of the Theater Commaander.2 The duties of the OSS in the China Theater were zzsade more precise by Wedemeyer in a directive dated February 6, 1945. This may be regarded Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121AO00100190001-3 --L),. as the OSS charter for operations in China. The graph reaffirmed ar principle of control by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and. the Theater Coi ander by reference to J.C .S. l55/l1/d. and any and all amendments thereto.I Wedemeyer directed that from the organizational point of view OSS was to be a separate coz and. or coordination purposes,, S3 would work with both r=-2 (Intelligence) and 0-3 (Operations) and would "have the same status as a special staff section." The directive defined the 035 mission in the China Theater precise d thus limited it),, but left two familiar "escape clauses a which might permit the mounting of operations not specified elsewhere In the directive. The 0S8 was to coordinate with Wedemayer's appropriate staff section conduct of all of its activities,, the more important of which ores..."2 The second "escape clause" is contained in the final paragraph of the directive, which lists as a mission of the OSS "The performance of such , activities or operations as may be required for the accomp- lishment of the missions above described." Thus,, while in the other para- graphs the OSS mission was spelled out in details tiers was authority for other operations as yet undefined. The "more important" OSS activities were precisely defined in the other paragraphs and psaent at least one item of interest to the concept of unorthodox warfare. These activities were: to develop and expand the 035 communications network; to accumulates evaluate,, analyze inftsrmatton concerning the enemy and enemy-occupied territories and to prepare studies on those subjects; to lower enemy morale and raise the morale of friendly Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Rn ase 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121AW6100190001-3 "unorthodox warfare operations" as neidered as applying only to the Operation" ties, since this paper is not concerned with other aspects of 055 operations in the general field of secret intelligence and. psychological ussion above (Section "Ae of this paper) come at difference between the problem of dealing with Allied forces representing occupied areas in Europe and that of dealing with the Chinese Government.. Headquarters, United States Forces, China Theat Operational Directive No. 4 "038 Operations," 6 February, 1945. A copy of this directive will be found in Archives ? Kunming. Op.1. 085 C?s GEI RAL (to 1 Oct 1945 . See Paper No. 1 of this series for discussion of earlier J.O.S. directives regarding the.fti Emphasis supplied. The listing which follows cannot view of these words, be a definitive one. Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 elements in occupied territory; to collect secret intelligence by means including both espionage and counterespionage. In addition, the followini paragraphs are of interest: The organization, supervision and direction of guerrilla activities or #special operations' designed to effect the physical subversion of the enemy including sabotage, the organization, direction and conduct of guerrilla warfare, direct contact with and support of resistance groups both underground and open, and the equipping and training of such personnel as may be required to carry out such activities, b. The delay and harass nt of the enemy, and the denial to him of the use of lines of supply and, connunications and strategic facilities wherever located. 11 f particular importance, because of the use, in of the following clauses "including ... the organization,, .on and conduct of guerrilla warfare,.." It will be recalled that ctives In 19b2 and 191..3 had specified that the role of American rrilia forces would be limited to support and training, and the fuurnish- ing of "opera. American ." ere, howeve, open for ally to conduct guerrilla warfare as units. of the direct role ieh the ie 003 ,played in the European ale n seeming contravention of the "operational nuclei" authorization for a departure from that former liad.ted authority for the conduct of guerrilla warfare. Furthermore, the second of the phe quoted above includes no limitation at all on the lean personnel. In abort, thereforev, the way is left open of Amer- conduct of guerrilla warfare, insofar as this particular document is concerned, Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 rCLA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 either by purely American units or by Chinese and American personnel in some sort of cooperation. With the issuance of operational, Dire No, , 083 had a firm basis of authority for the planning of oper While the events discussed above were taking place the 036 was draw- ing up plans for the ' ss or Chinese Cora andos, Donovan addressed on February 2, 19h5, a memoranda to the OSS commander in the China The in which he discussed what in his view were the nature ark. possibilit of i orthodox warfare. l' This document is a re-statement of Donovan's doctrtne of guerrilla. warfare.' He did not mention the question of control of such forces, but confined his state e a to ratters of substance. stated that in his opinion the chief wegkners of the Japanese in was their dependence on long railroad lines and described this dependence as their "weakest resistance link." Proper use of the cor andos would enable them to combine w df. sper. sal along the line ck and c one sitrati on at selected points." Tfi , the Allies would be able to ""impose upon the enemy a passive defense confined to that railway. This vi l give hix flanks but no front." One advantage, anong others, of operation of that type, wo ld,, van's opinion, be "to condition paAholo .caally for the operations to coact." Above all, stated the OSS Director, "unnecessary battles with resultant casualties" must be avoi of irregular warfare" was summed up under three headingas . To avoid attacking places because of their inabil force a decd. lion. h. To aid the defense of a tine or point for the : sm- reason, Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Reie'ase 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121AB 100190001-3 11 Nemrandum, Director, O S4 to Chief of 03$, China .eater,, 2 February? 191. A copy of this a orondua mill be found in OSS Archives - Kuz ink .. R""* AP. 3. Projects BOSON, Ad ietration,, etc. lLi9*. Outline Plan for the I or tion, Training and Use of Chinese Ar + zando Untta, (R.e sed) 3 ?ebra .ry 1945.. A c o p y o f this document will be fbuzid in OSS Archives ? tmi ng. .aP*2* Approved For Release 2002/07/3(0'x: CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET 4 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 Their value lies in their depth, in their ability to "lit and get away, to sting and run." h were ponovants ideas on irregul 19h5, to rated in February, the O G co hander in China subscribed. Those a of interest ew of other contemporary concepts of such oper iitions and In iie*A of the use actually made of the Chinese con nan.ios. On February 3, 1914, the OSS addreaased to Wedemeyer an outline plan for the use of "Chinese Army Commando Untts."I In its memorandum OSZ; proposed the creation. of commando units from within the regUar Chinese . These would number twenty in oil, with two hundred nciuding American personnel, Only volunteers of "the highest possible type of officers and men, both physically and mentally that are avallaLle" would be accepted. The document stated that 11this personnel should be of a calibre that the Generalissimo would be proud to ha t!enerali.sstmt s Chm Comma:n - ." Each 11nit would be divided Into four sections, of fifty man each, Chinese sources would provide uniform erfbly w=ith a spent al insignia, while OSS would provide uniforms for the training period. The Chinese would provide rations, while OSS would supply the following equi.pT&ent (pending submission of a definitive Table of Ecuip. "Per man 1 rifle, Springfield - with sling 14 11 - I belt, web " 11 section - 1 first aid packet - 2 la unc her a, rocket a n - 2 mortars, 60 xsn. n n 2 i'ARts ? 4 BAR a nition clips" In addition,, 053 undertook to provide ammunition for the above weaapons, demolition, engineering, and Signal Corps supplies plus any required Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121AO00100190001-3 vehicles. These would be drawn 'either from 855 stocks in Calcutta or theater stocks in Calcutta or China." A headquarters staff would handle plannin , administration,, and supply. All operations would be directed by the Theater Coriander. Detailed plans of field operations "pursuant to these directives" would be submitted to Ora/U FCT for approval. OSS would undertake to provide experienced American personnel to administer training to the Chinese, to "assist Commando Units in conducting their operations in the field.," and to assist with combat intelligence and medical aid in the field, This American personnel would be under the command of Lt, Colonel Alfred T. Cox, who will be rerbered as the commander of one of the "French" G Gs already discussed,I sld be to conduct the training program provide personnel to assist the Commandos in conducting their operations." 035 declare self ready to make every effort to begin trrainIng within *,irty days of Theater's approval of the above plan, This plan was approved by Wedemeyer on 16 February 19I.5, in a letter to Heppner, thus reu ving the 'Last obstacles to the establishment of the 0a program in China.2 Each of the four sections of each of the twenty commandos (or eighty sections in all) would have assigned to it one American officer and two enlisted men,, or a total of eighty officers and one hundred sixty enlisted men, In addition, each of the twenty commandos would have assigned to it one American officers, who would act as the commander of all Am rican personnel In the commando, a minimum of one intelligence officer, one medical technicians and one radio operator, These would total forty Approved For Release 2002/07f P72-00121 A000100190001-3 Approved For Raiease 2002/07/30: CIA-RDP72-00121A`9K100190001-3 Letter, Wod yar to H*'Ppnar,, 16 Febr ry 1945# ubiocta Corraando Units, A copy of this letter will fond in QSS Archives .. Turing. OSS,OP.2. outline Plan for the Fors tton, Training and Use of Chinese Ar C o m r and Unite, (Revised) 3 F e b r u a r y 1 1 . A copy of this : ocu,en't will be foui in 0,55 Archives - Iurwdng. OSS.OP.2. o, 421, Wsdereyar to Chiang, Chungking, 20 February, 1915. f Archives - Kwrdng. 0090P# 449 O G,, SF, CT ? Letters. Folder Approved For Release 2002/0 ]I.:c ' rP72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121AO00100190001-3 officers and forty enlisted men. The total of Ar rican personnel assigned to commando .operations would. amount to one hundred twenty officers and two hundred enlisted men. The total strength of the twenty corrxsando unite would therefore be four thousand Chinese officers and enlisted men and three hundred twenty American officers and enlisted ?en. this memorandum cud not touch on the problems of corrui and, other than to function of the American personnel d be to train the Chinese and assist them in their operations. The inference Is, of course, that command I -would be exclusively in Chinese hands. On February 10' 1945, Wedemeyer addressed a andum. to tie ne ral_ issimo Chiang Kai- hek, in which he outlined. briefly the commend :Lan described in the 0SS memorandum and approved, by him. Fie then asked Ghig four questions bearing on commando affairs, answers to which were necessary "prior to any action leading to actual organization and train- o queries concerned Chiang' s wishes regarding possibility of giving the commandos a special name and special uniform. These rather secondary ouestton_a were followed by two of ers of considerable importance. First was the question of Chinese personnel. Wedem yer asked whether Chian would "authorize the very highest t;:?:* of soldiers be selected from the regular Chinese now belonging to any special corps - such as parac utists?" These shr)uld. be volunteers aands, since "in this ty ie of operation the individual must be capable of acting independently at tins," of the highest type of soldier. Second was the question of command. Wedemeyer asked whether Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 40- uld aithorize the co*_~rsandos to troperate under The c:o the Comnandor-in-Chief Chinese Ground Forces, Oenerr . ":=lo Tang-chin." 1L-,: of rc rr rtd -thin r i t e co ;rts.ndo 'had not fret been 3pecificali:Y ans,.aered, the forerotng ion eliminated all doubt as to who, Ch.T_neie r A ri.cans, -~=:auld hold overall ccnr:~and of the camando operations. A little ;more thsn one rrnth later, 1i tater. Chen Chen; ese I4inistry of Or, trpnsmitt:sd to the ;fineriCa l 3 I Gea eralissirt 's answers to Vede scyer's principle to the n proposals regarding chi-an agreed in t&ncdo OD fi?WO"'l ar3d duties. In answer to t" four specific questions, the (hi.nese provided a special Ch& ne ce name for each of the twenty units, but the commandos should seer the ordinary Chinese,, uniform with special r bti dges.2 In answer to Wederneyer' a other acceded to the American request for partlcul ons, Chi a ty e personnel and ,gge'ted th t when organtLed the comnandos should he plac sole co #riafd of loneral 910 fln "chin.tt Chinese personnel, who would be selected from the Chinese Alpha and , ro 1 a rat.rc op a3iment in gfu April 10 and April 20 respectively. By the errs of February, 1945,P therefore,, the basic questions of whether or not there would be any oon Eando operations had been s by the Americans and the Chinese. e in forthcoming operations had been *enerelly determined and their basic organization and equipment tentatively decided. Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 %%011 NNIK 1.. (Translation) Ministry of War, Executive !'uan,, M riorand Chen a eng, Minister, to Weedemeeyer, Chungking,, March 1S,, 1945. A copy of this document will be found in OSS Archives E ng. 3. Pro jectsa BOSTON, Administration, etc. 149a., 9 collar badge was described (in an annex to the r Red sun stands for Japan,. Blue back growwd stands for China,. bite arrow stands for Commando Units, Arrow shot through the am may be interpreted as mean- in 'Piercing into the heart of Japan by Commando Units' and indicates that the Japanese Empire is sure to be crushed, r badges of officers will bear a yeiow colored rim. The collar badges as suggested is as bright in color as it is clear in meaning.* RANUt( OF THE ACR ~4M, AND ALFRRD T. cox C CU 1(E EQUIPMENT, THE AND THE EARME OF THE CHINESE PAR.ATPS,'" signed "M&j. Gen. H. P, Lee Comer-ander of the let Pars. Ree 1mat.' NO data. and Heacrtere,, Office of Strategic Services China operations Office, A.P.O. 62?, 12 March 1945, Approval of Agreement,, as Reviewed. Addressed to Goner Copies of these doe uments will be found In OSS Archives - Reg, CP.3 Frojectes HSTON, Administration, etc. lb9a. Approved For Release 200 ?t. J~ -RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A 0100190001-3 2. The American comment on tide passage Wass correct, bat feral No has indicated that questions of *o and." It .U be recalled (see above) that a few da ski dad that Ho would everalse command Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 -21- A series of planning cretin *s between Cox and the Chinese culminated onto in March between C3S and the Chinese tli.tar r authr,ritie . This document waa ira (also "Lill Canardl lie Via. Lee taammspndi.nq Cenerp-1. of the First Chtnase `'araehute and on March 12 was approved with revisions by Colonel Williai P. ;laves, ions (ffioer.l Just as Operational Y)trectivo No. may be regarded as the "charter" for OS operations in China generally, so can this . re?r nt be considered as the Chinese mew : andurP ? these sic principles regarding aai-istration, supply, trainin r sr^et t was reached that a parachute schoo Col. Lucius 0 ? Rucker, Jr., would be established, probably nnin;. 1 er ?lition trairsirz , driving practice, tactic l oiler ti0 n al, training, and so on r- ere to be handled by the A ricpxns, The Chinese schute ~,r.. opera- be good i op s chosen !`r ox stry rsp, the soldiers who he Ith and the vol=.unteers. Aim: n them, bhe medical technicians orierators x'1.11 to chosen also." Dbiem of corm a9.nd, which u was discuaRed In the fbilowing terns: y la "As the U.S, officers and personn.el come to join the unit for traini and operation, they will hays a 3i.Q. for cornding their iro like an aeNisory .awn r,en. But their organization is so vh~ group to the Chinese co an o, and attached to it also. They can 2 intervene neither the Chinese exe hive nor the Chinese 'o r?Tlnnnel," Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 cted as the recrui.ti, n7?-grornr' SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 Thus,. in accordance with Theater policy, basic question of who should command the called that 088 had ori.ginaslly proposed to Theater to A. Another thorny question was that of supplies and eoutpment, supply weapons, as nttion, demolition equipment, and vehicles. The Chinese memorandum had this to say on the question of aupplys "As to the Droblen of subsistence, Lt. Cal, A, T. Car says that to will like to solve it for us, At least U. S. Oov. ?itarmina, carts, etc.. to us." ply to this statement b e continued to feel that their The Davis letter stated. he official decision, although ion was the correct one, "fine U.S. will furnish arms, a nuaition, demolition, certain it of fiend equipment, and vita mina, It cannot undertake to turn rations., unifor , *to., which must be supplied by the Chinese government." Davis reiterated. that th ad States would "undertake to arm and equip th which 4U be charged with the administration of t Os." document in this series concerned with basic plans gyrational Directive No, 10, addressed to N ner by edemeyer.1 directive is dated April 27 and i_rAicates,, headquarters hree months after the January, 19b5, "clandestine conference," that Theater planning for s against th advancing. Wedemeyer directed that all twenty Commando operations by August 1,, 1945, and ordered 038 to by May Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 1945, SECRET Approved For ReWase 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121AN 100190001-3 adquertsrs, United States Forcess Chins, Tiasatsr, A.P.O. 6790 27 April 16. Operational Dirseti,O Not to C e a ndiM Office, 085, Mesdqu rtere, U.S. re", China heater, APO 879. A *e of this dac:nt sill f*A8$ Arabives X g Beg* Opj Pra,3 ctsa BOSMW, Administration, itc 1499 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 Cl RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SUCRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121AQfl0100190001-3 -23- a schedule showing in what way it was going to conduct the program so as to meet the required deadline. +OSS, furthermore, was adhere to the stipulations contained in Chiang's letter of larch 15 relative to the 00# (see above for discussion of this letter). The key paragraphs of this directive deal with the problems of supply command and are as followsa # You will be in direct control of the training of these units and will supervise and *exist in their organization and in the supply of equipment to them. Upon their readiness for combat they will be assigned to the Alpha Force and cams under the operational control of that Fce, General Ho Yfing?chin. After these units have been assigned to the Alpha Force all of your dealings with these units will be forwarded through the Commanding General, Chinese Combat Command. You will establish liaison with that officer in order to facilitate administrative and supply procedures. 6. When each Com nd Unit has oorpleted its organisation training and to ready for operations you will so noti in writing, the Commander, Alpha Force through the Commanding tleneral, Chinese Combat Comaand, with inforration copies to this Headquarters." It will be noted, in concluding this discussion of general plans 00 operations, that +OSS was removed from any control over them, beyond supply matters, once they had been trained, for they were to come under the operattional control of General Ho Ting-chin aid his Alpha Force. By the end of April both Theater and 0SS plans for 00 operations were well under waay, with the commandos being looked upon as adjuncts to Approved For Release 2002/SECWDP72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 - FIA-RDP72-00121 A000100190001-3 C T .AnRrnAW . TION 4IPS R THE C IN S COMBAT C - N' It is neceasavy, before dip-olassi actual.. 00 organ t3 on, s.o.d operations, to touch a an the matter of r latione between ne ae o for they 'l.tsi ately, pr red to be a s onree off' of .eid operations. Tt will be recalled A, r vier to the control of large p 1' the country, the et ,17 constituted ^hinese government and oaring to that Ability to maintain a force In being against the invaders,, the Allied vflitary problem had. _fer r ore sif;raificent diplomatic sepecte than the cese in deal. n s with exftled rogimes in the Eu pean `heater. The eaa? aa?fi aticn created to handle the military- relationship Chinese was the Chinese Combat Co and.l Although the 038 was not directly responsible to it# the principles aster which It operated &td the ME obligation to It concerning the 00 operations rake it necessary to diecuss it at least briefly. r ni.zed to serve as the medium through which #rican technical advice re ardtng operations, training, and other a to be transmitted to the Chine e., The organization end it d it r e length by Wedencyer in a letter to Al' offic?a concerned, 2 This letter r by defi.nin the Ctr"C an "The Chinese Combat Command (translated by Chinese as f Chinesc- ..can Liaison Conaaandr) InnIudes all U. 3. personnel aeei. d to Chinese Combat forces in the field." There were a headquarters at Chinese Supreme Command Headquarters and complements of American officers and men assigned Chinese army groups, aiiee9 ions. The individual cadres Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For RWaase 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A9G6100190001-3 the make of come .ence, the sbbmiation *C henceforth be used. :dqssxterae United States Fo 18 ?bbruary !W, AG 353.02. Sub3e+ to Alt I.S. officers S fig with the Chimee ?o: Al U.. Officers Conc d. A copy of this cdce>eeent will be 9but In OSS Archives - ~ Kugrieing. of the fe reeiping de nt will be sion,, Other versions of the sere Theater Directi . Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121AU00100190001-3 -25- ware knom an HU. S. Combat Sections (translated by Chinese as ' A m Liaison Section or Group')." Air-Ground Liaison Sections rounded out the CCC organiz Lion. The COC Mission was defined in, these terms: "to assist and advise Chinese Commanders of each echelon to which assigned,, and to guide Chinese training." en officers, copse specifically forbidden to "exercise commend over Chinese forces. The degree of influence that they may attain over the Chinese to whom they are associated is entirely dependent upon each individual's tact, patience and professional knowled American officers were consequently adjured to make suggestions which "will be con t sctive in nature and will be made in a spirit of helpfulness and cooperation." Since the Asa rioans could under no conditions exercise command over Chinese forces and since, on the other hand, they had a definite responsibil advise and guide in training and operations and to ensure that iced "against the enemy in the most effective manner," there were bound to be problems of disagreement over policy. These were foreseen in this letter end .the following solu- tion provided. "U.S. Officers will make specific recommendations to their respective Chinese Commanders in important matters such as those requiring definite decision on the part of the Chinese Commander which will effect the ultimate combat efficiency of the Chinese forest. If these aecommendatione are disre- garded the U.S. officer concerned will submit within 24 hours a complete and detailed report to his next senior U.S, officer. in the same manner the Chinese Commander to required by Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A0f.0100190001-3 1 -0 directive from the Generalissimo to submit a detailed report to his next senior Chinese Commander. The two individuals, that is,* the next senior U.S. officer and the next senior. Chinese Commander, will attempt to resolve the matter. If no agreement is reached, it will be referred to the next U.S. and Chinese command level and so on, if necessary, until it reaches the Commanding feneral, China Theater and the General- isei . It is of the utmost importance that this procedure be strictly adhered to by all personnel both U.S. and Chinese." A Chinese document accompanying the ' edeme r letter spelled out the mission and position of the CCC in more detail, The Chinese version of the CCC mission save to the Arnericsns a considerable number of duties to perform. They were to advise the various Chinese commanders to whose units they were to be assigned. More specifically, the CCC members we charged with the following mission, "(b) Guide, and make recommendations regarding, the wok of equipment, training,, counicaation,, correspondenc transportation, supplies, medical service o ordnance, engineering, and all matters pertaining thereto. Approval of the coma anding officer of the headquarters concerned mast be obtained beforehand relative to the allocation a and distribution of supplies." They might "suggest" plans for operations, but in each case the final decision was reserved for the Chinese. In case of isaagreement, the Chinese document provided for the same system for resolving differences as quoted above from the Wedemeyer letter. Although the American elemen in the commandos were not apeci ficaally parader the direct command of i CCC+ they nevertheless, as shown &bore, had a responsibility to it. They were therefore governed by the general principles according to which the CCC was bound to operate,,, since they,, too, were American personnel operating in the China Theater and with the Chinese. Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30: CIA-RDP72-00121A 0100190001-3 26 ;tern C. of this pepper. Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 -27- The conduct of warfare by coalition is, as has been remarked be-Ebro difficult art at best, for the military and diplomatic interests he parts are often as strong asp, or at ties stronger thanp the interests coalition as a whole. The situation in China was a re rely compiexe owing to four factors. First was the military situation in China, which the Japanese invaders and Chinese defenders were about evenly balanced as far as the question of a definitive military decision was concerned. This made it necessary for the Chinese to call for outside assistance. Second was the military situation in the world, led to the Allied decision to concentrate the major effort ii pending the defeat of the European and of the Axis. This i late or the quasi-ind en tt war lords. The led to the Allied decision to confine Allied (particularly American) nee to the Chinese to a minimum of personnel,, a maximum ndern weapons of war, and the teaching of modern tactical principles. Third was the internal political situation in China. While the central governr*nt of Chiang Kai- aek maintained nominal control over the f Chinn, there were large parts of the country under the control factiona were either covertly or openly resisting control by the central government. Fourth was the force of Chinese nationalism, which had been increased by the long years of war against the irrradere. While it may be argued that the mass of the Chinese remained lukewarm owing to central government weaknessses, there in little do strong in governmental circles, with whom the western Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 -28- allies were daeaaaling. Consequently, insofar as the Westerners and Western policy were concerned, this force of national, feeling was of considerable importance. These factors, taken together with the single-mined Allied deter.na- tion to subordinate everything to the purely military aim of defeating the both in China and elsewhere in the Orient, led to what some people called undue deference to the wishes of Chiang Kai.-hek. Since this is asv, the liaison agreement discussed above was a natural result. While such e nt might have proven workable in political or diplomatic matters it olutely operations were concerned. Problems of command require clearcut lines of authority. The principles of the Chinese-:ricaan liaison agreement and the ent provides the manpower,, the other supplies weapons, train- nation of the CCC are logical on the surfaace. One party to the tag, advice, and assistance in operations. There were? however, serious defects in the arrangement from the point of view of the human factor. ct the Chinese admitted Implicitly, their own weakness and the superiority of American methods. This was however,, by the explicit statement that under no circumstances could the Americans exercise command functions, either in training or in operations. This negation was clearly illustrated in the history of the 00 operations, as was almost bound to happen. In practice, either the Chinese abdicated their command function or else there was mending friction, stemming from the Chinese willingness to accept in principle advice from a better-in, rmed party but their unwillingness in Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SEtika Approved For Release 2002/07/30~y: ~CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 -2J.0 to fr it the advice. Thus., operations tended to result in at best a qualified success or also ooawiand passed and by default into Ar rican hands, with resulting dissatisfaction on both sides. 00 operations therefore had indeed a rocky road to travel, as n the discussion of their actual deeds. OPERATION "C OHWe AND 'M Pte' CTD During the late winter a . early spring of 1945 the Allied high command elaborated its military plan for South China. This camp a considered a necessary operations against them. The operational plan,, known, by the code proposed to drive the Japanese eastward from on and capture the strongly-defended Canton - Hong Kong area. In he high sand proposed to use the s to assist and supple. ment the efforts of the regular Chinese armies and their Anx '.o advisers. Before shin could be done, however, and began a slow withdrawal eastward towards Canton and H and northward from Consequently modifications, without, however, losing its essence. cuated various 1915, Headquarters, United States Forces, China Theater, over Wes meyerts eigi tore, an operational directive 2 modified operation CAR8ONADO. This stated that di f .catio e , because the Japanese withdrawal from ft= Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For 11,4zase~2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121 A9fi0100190001-3 29 1e Since this paper is concerned not so much with the regular military campaign as with 00 activities in support of it, it will suffice here to indicate the general features of the CARBONADO plan and tat the high command felt it ree? quired of the +Gs. This discussion will not, therefore, undertake to analyse the various modifications in some features of CARBWA which the march of events forced upon the Allied high oo11and. 2. Headquarters, United States Forces,, China Theater, APO 879, 10 June 19451 MODIFIED OPERATION CARSOAC(?. ' This was ad- dressed to s Commanding General,. Tactics% Headquarters3 VommodLng General, Services of Supply; Coxnnanding General, Chinese Combat Ce nandi Commanding Gom*ral0 lburteenth Air Force. A copy of this documnt will be found in 038 Archives - Running. Folder #84 - CAREONADO. TOP SECRET. A. Reg,. Op,. 6. 30 1. See Tab *A* for four maps The first of these maps is a situation map as indL sated, with the Japanese-held areas shown in yellow, This .asp will also be helpful for locating place-neea mentioned in the tesct, for follow- ing the general lines of action envisaged in Operation CARSONADO, and for obtaining a broad picture of the areas in which the 00 teams were to operate. other three maps will be helpful in obtaining an appreciation of the strength and disposition of the Japanese forces in 'China in early 19!45,, Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 - .0 cabin with tbs indication of my-hold corridor North from WAN as directed that a build-yap RIVER to CANTON has virtually eliminated Phase I of Operation ntlys the :assault on CAN N/fl GKO ,"" the capture and consoli * Nanning base ares be pursued quickly "to facilitate the earliest Possible tion of which, "as a base for id the final objective. seguent operations against the Japanese," nery capabilities were estimated as ed defense in the NNN?,#IN -LIMHO force equ3.; d forces in He could put up area by a a ximum Combat Divisions." He could launch a lii.ted objective attack against the south flank of an eastward Allied drive. Flee could tandertaiee o ffent i ve action "with the equivalent Divisions" against an Allied effort to setae Fort Bayard (on the Lu chow Peninsula). He could, "at great effort and a ena concentrate forces "for the purpose of reopening Corridor south of and/or an offensive ag ad plan developed " And,, finallys h judged capable of a "deterained and effective" defens, aw abandot of the entire rG to HENOTA Directive for the modified C ,R dA O opera, nary atepe" to be taken "at on to be the securing and consolidation of the Liuchow, Ki areas eras bases for operations" against Canton and to render airfields Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 DO." mg these was SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 in thkt general area "operationaal for air defense and for max supply." Next in importance was the necessity for maintaining pressure against the Japanese 1thdrawine towards Canton and the effective con- tinuation of the aa.arericaan training and ecuipnrent program for the Chinese. The first chase of the main effort had assignee to it the t date of September I and was to comprise sn Advance on Canton aalor the West River and an, effort to "aaoften-up principal ene strong] oint s' Canton area by Air,, air, and pa ssibly sea, bombardment. Phase had a the 0 its target date November 1 and was to capture and consolidate - Hong Kong at At the same time, a "defensive and was to be to *remain on the active defense in PAO i r-CHA GT' -WIL rea by blocking apprcaaches from CH t SHA- ' O Coupled with these was to be a "contributory ef'f:'ort,,I" to consist fled guerrilla and aggressive commando operation Cher desci'ibed at this tire* logistical operations mere tied to the rabvve of the forthcoming ewnpaigno `ormer were to give tactical support d troops, intain air superiority over the soma of opera- tions, and to interdict the enemyte commrnications lations. Te' latter were to include the "rapid develop a able airfields he t iNINC, L JCHJW, they become a avaat1*ba*, to receive shipment of traopaa, equipment and supplies." T nchu' 1 in psrticu *r was regarded as important, since it Approved For Release 2002/07/3 72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Reuse 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121AOW100190001-3 Lois" sps i of t* 'late varies covet referesee is Invariably e There imm several of these plans poly with 00 operations a evLV ssaond 4 detailed discussion of acgea in operrti*nal PUMS >ttedl~. Approved For Release 2002/07 stw~ P72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 -32- was spedi, d for d v.lopmefut "ae soon as possible to pport as air supply to this oper Such were the chief elements of the plan fav cleaar"i South Ching apanese. The 00 role was contributory in cberacter and and was to be in direct support of regular military operations. Of the twenty d in Chin*, three were eventually used in the capture of i*anchuk, a fourth to disrupt the enema in the Changsha aareaaa, and and a2 h for the same purposes In the West River v The relationship between their eventual use and the requirements of modif9 ed GARBONADO is d that one of the major themes of this series of the question of how the 00s were to be used. There was a fooling that in Europe they had perhaps not been used to best advantages because their original purpose bad been chaa ed, and not for the bettere it will be of interest to see in what way they were used the 194e5 campaign in China. 058 had received noti fcstion that The?& >loy the Wit. Consequently, concurrently with the development of Theater plans a opain, 088 begs fontulate its own plans for subgission to Theater and particularly the C ac. on April 10 appeared an "Outline Plan" drawn up by the 0 Opera- tions Office to show in what way 055 proposed to use its facilities to contribute to CARS. Part of this plan was devoted to the 008, 1 t point of interest is that there is envisaged on Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 ?33- of the cone e strategic" use of 00 operations in favor of the about .otical" use. While the mission of the s was stated about had been earlier, in the OSS fated the &Met important change foreshadowed in this as contemplated of opeeraation, "emphasis will be switched from present strategic objectives to operations which will be of iaa ediste advantage to the advancing pies." This represented in one sense a fundamental change in the concept of the use of the 006s despite nt that no "radical charge" was contemplated, because of the enormous difference between "strategic objectives" and "i diiate tactical advantage to the advancing armies." Ii but "strategic" in Objectives, 2 since its very essence was bear-red that Donovan other early planners had never envisaged guorrill* warfare as attack with lightning rapidity lightly-defended strategic installations such as rail lines and power stations and then got *way with equal rapidity. It had not been thought ofe. and,, given the basic premises, could not be thought of,, as as tactical wreapon,, which Carrie the necessity for assaults against regular enemy troops and for defense of prepared positions* 3 On the other hands, hoaaevarra, it is clear that the original concept erriUs warfare had rover really been put into practice by the ,ricans. It had long aims been eased in theory by the J.C.S. directives already discussed and in practice the us* actually m de of the 00* in the European mater in 1943 and l9W4,4 In addition, China Approved For Release 2002/07/3C -72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Rehase 2002/07/30: CIA-RDP72-00121AN 8100190001-3 Sperrias on e r $ and delq the no led. On t td (Sea. Paper X xrandw to flerpp r of Pebrn*r7 in Per I of this ser, Headquarters# Office of Strategic Saa vloos# Chin Theater, Al 21 April 1945. $ubjeott Tas :ca r Ton Theater Planaing Staff, Kq.,,, per, (him Theater. For the Strate a Services Of . cert I PA. t rations Officer. A copy of this newraMus will be f tton e-rsee r reserves WA to in rise. lines of co -c diioueaton Don vanRa ideas in Per Nusber I of the dtuation in lump prior i stratedicsl r different tier made no difference insofar as OPSO.. folder ?. Lrchinua - Zutsreds . Approved For Release 2002/07/30,: CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRE1 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 'heater directives had, m de clear that 00 operations would be direr subordinate to and controlled by the tactical situation and the regular a"tlitary forces. From this point of view, therefore, had already been made and the issue settled. `here could be no possibility employing the ?s as Donovan had originally conceived of them. discussed again in a memorandum from the 0SS Operations Officer to the Theater Planning Staff,, in which ted notes, among other subjects, on the cal employment# cialised training to be received by the COs there should be established a set of princip #coverir their tactical, emplWy ent,,- in order that they may not b dissipated, nn -Assi.ons which could be accomplished by o as special. ized,, troops." The 055 then advanced as as its operating principle cooendation that the SGs be in the field "prior to the juste-off of any offensive," with the "initial mission" of %isolating the battlefield by means of demolitions, road blocks, ambushes and general harassing action energy routes of approach." F'oll:owing this they would employ guerrilla tactics "against enes g of C, supply dumps, ccoa sand posts, and exposed flanks." `While it was admitted that such activities would be similar to those carried on by SO teams, it was pointed out that this 00# 'ould be "better organized and equipped and far more highly trained than the -normal group of guerrillas with which SO team operate, and will have a, much larger cadre of experion?ed Americans sole, Approved For Release 2002/07/3?ttP-nP72-00121 A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 and urgent, recoasendaation was that as shock troops to spearhead an advance,,, ar to estee and hold areas any protracted period of tics. Thus far the "doctrine" is not too different in concept Donovan* s original one. However see. While ndum contains a -.*at significant at the OOs not be used as of the line or as se shook troops, the remora d contradicted itself and departed from Donovan in a highly it will be recalled that the N orth odor doctrine of unorthodox Warfare ea hani sod continually that guer attempt defense of a position they ;might have attacked and seized. Purthe ad been found in Europe that the "held what they wa had * against guerrillas. This memorandum,, howeva despite its repo endations against the use of 008 to "seize and hold areas for any protracted period of time, 00 negated one of the bas err l.a principles In the following mordst o + COG*7 a be employed to seize as hold, for a short prigs critical terrain features such as bridges or defiles. The same considerations governing the employment of regular airborne troops would of course apply in this case - the Commandos would have to be relieved in a matter of days r egulaar forces. Their light armaments and lack of aartf lleryr, would preclude a prolonged defense of any position against attack by superior forces." by the and of April the t on the subject of the OGa had evolved from the original concept of a purely guerrilla, #hit-and-run," force to that of a combination of guerrilla and specialized force,, a force which was at tines to rove Approved For Release 200210713Q,,:t # 2-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30: C -RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 behind enepy lines and spread destruction, but which at other tines was to operate in much the same fashion as air-borne or other regular forces, In other words, to the original principles of mobility* speed, and constant attack with no defense,,, had been added some of those overni: the use of regular line troops less mobility and more emphasis on the defense. of seriously codifying arm An examination of , e,, however, there seemed to be no thought to cope with new responsibilities. "Draft 'Plan for OSS Operations" confir a in more detail the fore o.iing general points.. 1 Under the heading *Corr ndo Operations" a set of detailed Ott missions was outlined. were to he assigned to the columns of the Chinese main attack and were to be both infiltrated and ran-supplied by ground. rive were to be held In reserve. Two were to be assigned the task of "die- road and/or river traffic in various areas and were to be both infiltrated and re-supplied by air. Two were not only, to disru a. but were also to be prepared on call from the Supreme Commander to occupy and hold towns and other fixed pointa,. One of these was to hold the town in question for twenty-four hours, the other to hold it indefinitely! Both of these unite were to be infiltrated by ground and re-supplied by air, Three others were to disrupt traffic and occupy and hold various e to be both infiltrated and re-supplied by air.,. One, to be both infiltrated and rye-supplied by ground, was to operate against highways and to hold a road junction for twenty-four hours, One, to be both infiltrated and ren-supplied ground, was to "provide active Approved For Release 2002/07/3 72-00121 A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121AD00100190001-3 w37w main effort $" She south blocking attack and the MA l al detailed plan thus called for loysaent in the field on commandos immediately operations should have been begun, with be held in reserve. Of these fifteen, given the concept of unorthodox warfare and control of the 00s already discussed in considerable detail# only two might be considered as true guerrillas or commandos* 'use two were to be both infiltrated a re-supplied by air# thus giving more nobility. In addition, their mission was confined to that of disrupting road an river traffic. The mobility of the rest was distinctly restricted by the proscribed methods of infiltration and re-supply., one or both of which was to be by ground. It is difficult to believe that they could operate at any great distance from the regular a and therefore that they could avoid being tied closely to regular operations. This impression is strengthened when it is realized on of those thirteen commandos was to include the capture and retention of towns and road junctions either for twenty-four hours, or until relie ved# or with no limiting factor stated at all, i'hus,, it is clear that all now fundamentally considered the OGs be auxiliary troops with primarily an immediately tactical mission to perform support of the regulaar Chinese forces and under the orders of the There exist two, la'. which resulted from a request for sub plans from the CM Approved For Release 2002/07/30 :. CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For RJease 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121AVO0100190001-3 quarters, Office of Strategia S.rvicecc a 627, Operations Office, 30 April 1945. operations.: A copy of this doh will be found is 080 Arohitas ~.5 . OS40?, 2. RASME&$. OP$D At law: relieved,* was mentioned, the (1i they war* cold b* moo rs varied to an indefinite mod, One of ose, dated 26 June 1945, 033 Archive* Rte. 00.4PJ. ? Molder #l. other? dated 4 July 1945, viU 035 AraMv- Kunming. .der + C A O. TO . A. Rsg, +.6, or, such fwd Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : C P72-00121A000100190001-3 e SE Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 -38M While these later plans contain certain modifications in proposed assign- r to from those discussed as Love, there are no changes in concept. The chief points of Interest In connection with theme documents lie in two subsequent efforts by Cox to impress upon both the CCC and the Chinese Army Headquarters whet the CC.e were and what they were intended to accom- plish. The first of these was contained in a letter of July from Cox to the co anadi.ng Genera., Second Command, CCC.1 After discussing the projected assignment of the 00# to the Second Command Cox discussed the question of their employment in the following terms, These are of interest in view of the eventual use made in the Taanchuk operation of the three units here under discussion, "The most advantageous employment of these units lies in long- range penetration, the harassing and cutting of en r communica- tion lines, the furnishing of Intelligence,, and in being prepared on call out le carry out such additional missions as the Commaanding General may direct." On July 12 Cox addressed another corvnunicaation to CCC, this time to the 2 C-3. Speaking of the same three commandos as in his earlier letter, he adopts the ambivalent attitude towards co ando operations found in the various OSS draft plans already discussed, He states that the pro- posed directive should, when speaking of the use to be made of the three that they should operate in advance of the di lane n.3 The primary mission should include the furnishing of tactical intellig one order of battle, dispositions, and a'ovements, rm ltion of roads and bridges,, extent of river traffic, the food situation, and the attitude of the local population, In addition, were included the usual "harassing Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121AOW100190001-3 to .... Gr s$ Office, of Strategic Services, l 621,. Subjects Chinese Cc nndos. Addressed to ng General, 2!! omwand,, CCC, to this letter cox agreed n concerning the *esi in nts ewt ntba. A copy of this doc t will be 6271 Operet# o , Oroups,, Operation a of Three G--, CCC,, F* T. This ant elaborates seat "do by in his letter of d meetly the causation of the to i dopted, the number of the eaelsatLon# and al eo dl scusses ploy; t of the 00. . as proposed directive ar in t h e al Tanchuk. operation the 89tho Approved For Release 2002/07/3 E y2-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 -39- end ambush of enemy lines of c t d the aa! wiping up of enea installaation&," Finally, in accordance With the newer interpretation ,ctiona, the units were to set up "road and river blocks brcement or withdrawal." Obviously, the last item would Involve defense for unstated periods of fixed positions in opposition to regular enemy troops. On the other hand, Cox stated in the same document that "the Commandos are especially trained in the hit-and-run tactics of Are, and their strength should wt be dissipated by use as Shock troops leading an assault,, No ha aavy sup : o tided in their T/0 or tra ini ." it was Patently clear by the late spring of 1945 that while the 06 Cs would be used in the campaign there was little or no possibility that they would employed primarily for the purposes of guerrilla war- originally conceived by Donovan and the early OSS planners. The J.C.S. directives had placed all such operations under the control of the Theater oander, it was, furthermore, proactive only of a o ontraa prevailing concept since the rouge were to act simultaneously as . guerrillas and as regular troops of the line. In view of these facts, therefore, there was left for OS on the possibility of pointing out the inadvisability of utiliziN the 003 as shook troops and attempting to emphasize their true nature and conseanently the way in which they could best be used. This atta pt not with only limited success. Of the five commandos actuary in combat, one attempted to perform guerrilla harassing Operations, a second was saddled Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 tORET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 task of attacking and holding fixed positions in addition to Lion of harassment, and the three others were used exclusively By March, 1945,* the act, ire drawn up and approved.- ,A. ric personnel had begun to arrive in the Thea and included mostly officers and men who had had previous experience in the field in the European Theater. They were to help train the China" volunteers and then to accompany then on their operar'ions in the field. 'omando unit had at the top a headquarters, with six ranches , belo these were Rifle Branches, Mortar anch,, one an L Branch, and the sixth a Demolition Branch. divided into Squads. Each Rifle Bra tai .d two Sods. The Mortar Branch had three two, and the Demolition Branch was a single Squad in itself. organization was not too different in structure from a regular line company. sad of l Chinese officers, 13? Chinese waisted men, 8 Chinese interpreters, 8 A m e r i c a n officers, and American enlisted n, a total of 178. Two American officers and five American Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SICRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30: CIA-RDP72-00121Ao ei00190001-3 See Tab "Bit for copies of Tables of Organisation and Tables of Equipment for the Chinese Cosa ndos, March,, 1945, Exhibits r through V. , See the follow source for the OSS tashingt'on Special Orders, lhbruary B, 1945, appointing Lt. blonel Alfred To. Co* the Commanding. Officer of the 00 estsblishmint in China and dssig- matirig the officers and men assigned to his o de 058 Archives- Sunning. OGOP,4* ? Personnel llder 021. See the sews source for the OSS/iashington General Order, also Psbruary 8? 19145,, activating the Operational Group Ceownd and allotting to it a total of 1140 oftl eers and 535 enlisted men. It was stated that this allotment was *Inclusive of all grades heretofore sub-allotted to Operational Groups within the United States or in Theaters of Operations.#0 Thus, Cox could not dispose of this total in China, Those interested may consult this source for personnel rosters and other such material covering the period up to the cessation of hostilities.; Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 ad men were assigned to commando headquarterso d one American officer and one American enlisted man. The Chinese rsonre were assigned as follows: ti officers and four enlisted commando headquarters; one officer and eleven enlisted man to each Rifle Squad (or six of ficers and si ty-six enlisted men to the six Rifle Squads); one officer and six enlisted men to the headquarters of e; it (a total of three officers and eighteen enlisted men to the three Rifle Branch headquarters); five enlisted men to each Mortar Squad (a total of fifteen to the thre enlisted men to Mortar Branch headquarters; std (a total of twelve to the two Squa( one officer and three men to I G headquarters; and one officer ard sixteez the Demolition Branch. Two of the eight interprets assigned to commando headquarters? and one to each of the six Branch heauarters. il' en screened and even these are not so hot. Sole reason for the many changes in training schedule has been failure on part of Chinese to produce recruits." Even allowing for exaggeration regarding the percentage of rejectio: this radiogram clearly reflects the dtacouragenient which by now had permeated rican 00 headquarters*2 Two more major attests were made before the surrender of Japan to do something about the personnel situation. On July 23 Cox radioed Davis now the Deputy Strategic Services Officer, as follows:3 ar very general g.e., Chinese genera wants at least three commandos for his ova but no one gives me the men pd clenerel Lee advises that minister of war promised him one thousae td of cream of China within ten days fifteen days ago pd an you know replacements needed immediately pd would it be possible for you to contact minister of war and Jack him up pdw On the following day Davis addressed a letter to WWedomeyeer, in which he rtaed the situation. He pointed out that the Chinese First Para- chute Regiment (which had been designated at the beginning as the chief ~cruit+a) had provided enough men only fo commandos and that the remainder had been obtained "only through the Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECR Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121AW6100190001-3 OP to "Little { Ch, 033 Archives - at Reg. a?.3. - Pr jectst Administrations 4c. 1149x. foUe #,ng day Cox personas difficulties. S zpr+ a Mdness Arnie ficte nt recruits to staff his replace esnt already *eked from General Tu on June 18. See Cox to CO, luprems Chinese Andes, 3 J 0S3 Archives - rmeing. .QP.4 - General Tn id Aug. Fol4er am, 0 to Davis, 23 July 1915, 453 Archives - funsing.. 'Reg. OP.3. - P jects$ Adednietrstion,, etc. Us*. 66 NO 1916, CQ/Mf C Attent .on AC of $, 0-5)s, 24 Julg 1915, in sets: D0 iON, AAtinistration. *to. 1149x. to aG OC f 7 August 086 Archives - fem. +.4P.4. Chtnese tact Folder 2, d. Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 - -RDP72-00121 A0G0100190001-3 remitting efforts of Colonel Cox and his staff in screen'thg many thousands of Chinese soldiers to obtain the required number." He asserted that flC standards of selection wore not impossibly high, since he and h1 a colleagues had personally seen m ^ Chinese units chose men were of far Esher caliber than those provided for the commandos. Davis summarized Cox's July 23 radiogram to himself and statedz "these soldiers have still not materialized and if past experience is any criterion, it be weeks or months before they will." Davis closed his letter with an urgent request that "every possible effort be made to induce the Ministry of War to fulfill tte promise and to make availab soldiers i:ssenedietely." , "h:at this a highest headquarters fell at some point upon is shown by the letter from Cox to the Chinese Combat Command, August 7, in which he indicated that the personnel problem con- tinned to be re serious than ever. In addition to the need for filling usual vacancies created by_ rejections before and durirr training it was now necessary to replaces the combat casualties incurred by Commandos 9, 10, which had meanwhile gone into action. The final paragraph of this letter shows the stage which Cox's9 thinking had now reached,2 at the CO, CCC seriously consider a worth of the Commandos to the war effort, and that indications show that they will furnish acceptable re he CCC,, that everything possible be done to provide the nun of personnel required as soon as possible,,* Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30IA-RDP72-00121 A000100190001-3 .An incor rlet?e series of weekly progress and efficiency reports on the comndoe during their training period provides some clues to the problem of how capable were the Chinese officers and soldiers. It should. be recalled that the majority of the cnmpl them concerned those provided for Commandos 31 through 20, #1 through 10 being on the whole sores apt better. The to-m. " sown at better"" is a relative one,, however, and must be so understood. The reports in question deal with the first four weeks of training of Cor r ando #8, the second and third of #9, and the first four of #10. The reports on these three cor ndoe are particularly interesting, because these units later formed the 0C battalion which participated with the regular Chinese army in the opera tion against the Japs se-held, Tan uk airfield, Commando 8 received a unit efficiency rating of "Excellent" for each of the four weeks. The individual ratings given the Chinese offie er 'vary from "Superior" for all four weeks in the case of the Second Branch (Rifle) Leader, who was described as the "beat all around officer in Ct omresndo,e to three officers who in the first weak, s report were deemed not of Commando auslity. The Branch ratings, when given stly "Excelien The Chinese commanding officer received one "Superior" and three "Excee lents." Most Branch and Sued leaders earned ratings from to the one "Suaperl or" already mentioned.2 The two reports on Commando #9 give the unit as a whole a of "Excellent." The first describes the commando's morales as "extreme, high" and the condition of their weapons was "Excellent." Their physical Approved For Release 2002,?RERDP72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Rase 2002/07/30: CIA-RDP72-00121AON100190001-3 T h e " or . American. Officer" of the. Oomahdo filled in the weekly unit If 'ietency , report and issued the ratings for the Cam-a:ndo as a holes, for the Branches, for the ndi da and Chinese officera. Fie did not rate the t t e enlisted; Pon individually,, The 'Senior Aerioan Officer" co -ded the A eric cadre assigned to the t o ands and acted as the chief adviser to the Chinese co=ander and his aubordtn tes, These reports will be found in OSS Archives - Ewtn , t ,OP.5? .- 8th Contru*n4o (Combat). #12, 70 These reports vin be found In OSS Archives .. P utsaine, 00,07.15o - 9th Commando (Co* a These reports will be found in 038 Archives - juasi . OG,!OP... - 10th mmado (Co*, Approved For Release 200//wtI-RDP72-00121 A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 -Yo- condition had "improved considerably since arrival," The Executive Officer of the eo sando was given a "Superior" rating for both weeks and was commented. on in the i".i.:P-st re ort as follows: "This officer is ?ivi.n cooperation toward training a Administrative natters in a superior fashion. T to his efforts the Commando has a well above average attendance and promptness record. It has become daily S.O.P. him to account accurately for all absentees." The Commanding Officer received an "Excellent" in both cases. The Branch Leaders varied from "Satisfactory" to "Superior," with most of them being termed "Excellent."' The Senior Arerican Officer of Commando #10 either was stricter than his colleagues or had lees promising zsterie1 with which to word. In contrast to the other two units,, #10 received for the four weeks a unit efficiency rating of only "Very Satisfactory." The Branches and the Branch and Squad Leaders in Commando #10 received more ratings facto their colleagues in #8 and 9. All snuad leaders "show Food judgment and leadership." The Comm for each of the four weeks, with the ac diit comment on the first report hat he sowed agetrese:iveness and on the fourth that he "demonstrates excellent tactical knowl edge." He was described in the third report "very capable,, efficient, strict disciplinarian" and as open to aug gestion."2 It is per asible to speculate,, therefore= reflect a gre officer. e of strictness on the part of It is difficult to draw definitive conclusions concern effectiveness and capability of the Chinese officers and men once they Approved For Release 2002/07L30 IA-`R~'DP72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 -?(I- had begun their con mando training. on the one hand,, there were the continual pleas by Cox and others for mare ran and their complaints the personnel pr?ovi ded was of inferior quality) On the other hand, the reports just summarized indicate competent levels of perfhrr- ance by most of the Chinese officers and men. Two factors, however, reduce or eliminate entirely this meaning inconsistency. One is the nature of the ratings given. It should be rems tiered that during orld mi lltaTRf efficiency rating of anything below "Excellent" was, to say the clarntit with faint praise. With this in rind the ratings given Conrnan 9' and 10 become more consistent with the pleas and complaints continually voiced by the higher authorities. More important then this, however,, is the ouestion of American as opposed to Chinese standards of performance, it is to be doubted that the reting officers applied to these Chinese trainees the sans standards which they would have applied to American OFD trainees. Evidence of this is to be found in the reports on Commandos #9 and 10 and in Cox's correspondence. In this third report the Senior American officer of Cor dando 0 sayst "The commando as a whole has shown an aptitude for learning daily lesns. However, due to language difficulties it is the opinion of this officer that mare demonstration be attempted and less lecture time be devoted for instructional purposas." This officer is of the opinion that the officers and in have done exceedingly well in view of the many obstacles that must be overcome daily." Approved For Release 2002/f~LfDP72-00121 A000100190001-3 SA Approved For Ruse 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121AN8100190001-3 It may. be anted that these. coma,1attrtt ; and, military circles to exaggerate deficiencies and re quiramnents in order to be Mrs of a ettirg chat the tow gcestora really mant. This in highly improbable A. this case, however, since the requirements had *Ir*a0V'bew meet forth hyr aeuthori ies higher then 08$ and si commandos reap r for action t+' August 1e l9 Ccx to Tu Lei l tng, 1s duns 1945, iz OSS Archives - Kunming. CsxP.4 r - 0.n rol Tu Lei f ? Folder .1, Approved For Release 2002/07/ C DP72-00121A000100190001-3 T Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 -72-0 "The health of the corando is at present being Jeopardized 'by the location of billets in an extremely filth village. This accounts for the greater portion of our sick." In the .fourth r?enort he co ents; "The. r*ener ?1 condition of the com. oan.do at this ttre is quite satisfactory. Baas:: ing minor deficiencies they -e as for combat as they can be expected ever to be with the ins background they" have." The following comment appears in the second report of Commando #9: "Due to his he Chinese Executive Off'icert efforts the Commando has a well above average attendame and proomptne record. It has become daily S.Q.P. for him to account accurately for all absentees, 0 Cox wrote the following to General Tu Lei Hirst 1 generalip the training is progressing satisfactorily. In a a As a result of the G ieraVe .e., Tea Let Mingle. This letter always refers to Tu in the th rd pereo recent visit, attendane at classes has improved cconsiderably. The interest and attention of the Chinese solder is almost always a reflection of the ability of the Chinese officer over him. Every effort is being lade to #.mnrove the quality of the officers, but there still :remain a few who are not doing a good job." standards and every effort is being made to improve our work, These six comz ents are s gnt ficsnt and show that ratings of "Superior" and "1xcellent" must not be taken to mean the same as when applied to American units, They reveal that the Americans, whose role, it must con- stantly be remembered, was confined to that of advice, had to contend with various factors beyond their control. They had to contend with the blem, which inevitably affected the quality of the instruction, despite the use of interpreters. They continually faced "eat obstacles & difficuities.tt There was a health problem. And Cox admits that the Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 -73- training Is progressing only "satisfactorily' and that "in a few instances the instruction has not been up to beat American ing, t both the Senior American Officer of Commando 9 and Cox feel called upon to point out as unusual and worthy of special mention the improvement in promptness and in attendance at classes. one case a Chinese officer is singled out for special commendation because of his bringing his unit's attendance "well above the average attendance and promptness record." And Con's remark. to Tu on the same subject to of e. Perms the most important evidence of the standard of peerfor:ancee is the remark that Commando d is "as ream for combat they can be expected ever to be with the training background they have" In of these Chinese units were applied with the same exactness as they a have been applied to similar A rican. units. The difference in stan background ,nditionas and performance is bared that the Americans were very much hampered in their task by the they could the absence of zealous Chinese of fl cars, therefo virtually tied. This account of personnel problems has been lon . It is perhaps too cue to state that the success of a unit's operations depends on its personnel. It remains -truss however,, that adequate weapons and supplies are sd and competent officers and men. The OOaa were Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 .more than advise. In SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 -7t- given a task o us complexity. Their mission was f as has been shown, a, dual one, in that they were to be prepared to function both as true guerrillas and as regular troops of the line. The time allotted for training was short at best. In view of these facts,, in view of the awkward and. complex relationship between Americans and Chinese, which was dictated by the diplomatic and political situation as much as by the vilitary situation in China, and in view of the restrictions placed upon the Americans, the quality of the personnel was even more important in this Instance than perhaps in any other set of circumstances. In short, everything depended upon it,, since the 00 authorities were given once more sponsibility of producing results without adequate authority to enable them to do so.l 'inhere can be little doubt that the quality of the Chinese personnel was not equal to what were considered to be proper 00 standards. it remains to be seen how these Chinese Os functioned under combat condi- tions. Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Remise 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A04P100190001-3 fls Another serious personnel problem otficere. . These wave ChUmme. who we drafted and ift tere assigned to the is obviouus. During the tradni ,pert proved to be a source of friction, part had the honorary rink of of fl aers a si more not under as strict military teci This friction increased during April and May, 194 5., resulted in an 0 Zntez'preter Sum's s condue ed by ti Counterespionage) Branch of a during which no evidence of subversion or espionage was found. Consult the fob rg r ocunsnts for infbmation concerning the interpr this period. cexa elated. April 5 191, addressed airs ng the raponeibilittes,, This will be O Archive, OQ.OP.L. - Personnel. Folder 1. A Chinese Coabat Coaa?iand inst dated April 21?, 19 ,a dealing This will be found in OSS archives - fu ing. OW.OP. ? V water Directives. .1 Pei use of interpreters. An 05S Operations Coitittse Meeting ry, dated 1915, in %bich ox discusses briefly the probl+ of the interpreters' behavior* This will be found O SS Archives Pura ing. 00. 0P.6. OPWOK4 Felder . Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Reuse 2002/07/30: CIA-RDP72-00121AOQP100190001-3 74 L. (Contd.) 5. The complete text of the "OQ Interpreter S v above,, whit a cons ted bar invasti 'Branch (Counterespionage) of 4 , dated Key 2 191-145* The covering letter Reppner is dated Way As 197t5. This U. be found; in $ Archives K OG.OP.3. ? Folder Since the interpreter problem presented no features essentially different, Iran other aspects of Chinese rican relationships already diet issed,, it is sufficient to sitit the refer those interested in additional study of the s above.z ationed dacntsr Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 OG OPER:ATI "APPLE, JUL! - ANUS', 19 Ghineee Commando #1 went b, of 12 July 19ia5. a,1 OSS ordered APPLE to pay "particular attention* to the "intelligence derived from the conduct of these operations" and gave it six prinryr tanks: d the operational plan for ch was to parachute into south of WEST RIVER. between WUC OW and L O TAO, on the b. one within the area of operation as may be within the capabilities of the Cor banth, as determined by the Com ando Leader. Preparing a plan of attack and seizure of the key town of 4UCH( .., to hold 'IUCfOW until relieved by designated Chinese forces or as directed by higher headquarters. Warning order will be issued through this headquarters,. Preparing a plan of attack and seizure of the key town of gAO4AO ... to be executed on call from higher headquarters. To hold KAO-TAO until relieved by designated Chinese forces or as directed by higher headquarters. Warning order will be issued through this headquarters. Preparing a plan for the establishment of defended road blocks at critical points in the enemy read net throughout the opera- tional area and be prepared to estaabl i sh these road blocks on call." Attacktng and destroying such enemy and places as may be selected by th the code-name PPI . On July ., 19h ,# iraee of comunication and destruction of enemy river traffic along T RVER at such times and places as may be selected by the Co ndo Leader. Disrupting eneW lines of communication and destruction of enemy supply columns using the area road net, at such times Analysis of these mission* reveals a number of significant points, warfare doctrine as enunciated by Donovan annd his associates, the first three are true guerrilla operations. IPPtE was to concentrate its efforts against enemy lines of coimntni cation, supply Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For ReT-ease 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121AOW00190001-3 A copy of this docuasnt idli be found O Archives . Ku sing. OG.OP.S. let Co tando (Combat) ? #. . See gab eM for maps to serve as an a=x to this etg4r of 00 Operation AP's. 76 Th* term "Commando Leader" refers to the Chinese comman Officer. As motioned before, his American collesoe a adviser was called the "Senior American Officer, Approved For Release 200293 tIAT-RDP72-00121AO00100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30+7C A-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 15- and installations,. It was to attacks, disrupt,, and destroy, der was left to his own devices in the matter specific targets for attention and in the matter of determining whether or not his unit was able to carry out a given task. He was thus not governed in his every move and decision by orders from above, Success or failure depended on the urAt itself and on its leader's judgment. 1 the obligation to attack *Installations" might be regarded as a of the injunction in guerrilla doctrine against attack and d installations and positions necessarily so, for in each case the operation was to be within the capability of the commando, as determined by the Commando Leader. The second three missions, on the other hand, show very clearly the dual nature of the On operational concept long since decided upon in on and more recently in China. The most obvious point is that designed to give direct tactical support to regUar military operations, APPLE was directed to prepare plans for the seizure and retention until relieved, or otherwise ordered, of the "key" towns of Wuchow and Kaoyao and for the "establishment of defended road blocks at critical points in the enee road net throughout the operational area." ended road blocks and the attacks on the two towns were to be ared on call. These operations partook of the nature of regular infantry assaults. APPLY? was both to attack and defend fixed positions and was to do so when directed to do so by higher headquarters, regard- he Corrsnando Leader's own Judgment concerning his unite s Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 -??- capabilities. finally, the two towns in question and the "operational area" in which road blocks were to be set up and defended lay directly in the path of the Allied advance envisaged by Operation ARBONA and were iraportsnt to any West River operation, In sum, therefore, the mission given to APPLt confoi ied in every detail with the difted concept of 00 operations,, with the principles enunciated at Wedemeyerts Clandestine Conference No. I (January, 1945), with the mission of Operation CARBOWADO, and with the type of training given to the Ws in consequence, The whole mission, as defined, partook strongly of the combination in the same opera.. tion of both tactical and strategic aspects. It rust be adaatteed, .further- r. rare,, that even the strategic objectives had much of the tactical about then 9 since they lay within the area of tactical effort by regular mili- tary forces. The isolation of the battlefield was the goal, lnteellilence concerning the enev within the area of operations was pleete. the "Intelligence Annex rio, 1 to Operation 'APPLg'," 19h5, it was stated that "information co erntng eneaey forces along the WEST RIVER (HSI CHIA1 ) is very limited, For general I locations and identifications see map overlay .,. Stuty of the map yields no infbrmation concerning Japanese n, ngth, but does give an indication of the location of units. The bulk of Japanese strength was concentrated in and around Canton and to the north and east of that city, The enema had entrusted the defense of the West River area to the Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Rase 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121Adaid100190001-3 1 vaff of this dmua will, be bouad Jirahi t.p,6, - Foil 1. co nection with Li a his *P the following aamm item is 2,954* isaa of the reek' a e ai photograph with the f*11oviing caption under oh*Lrmn Maw `ae-t, 'lad b7 five vie* deg" parade from the gate of Heaavsn1,7 Peaom, , Liu Shoo-chi,, 14w,, Clon, Chu T a for Approved For Release 2002/0 WR Q;rP72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 13th Independent Infantry Brigade. Elements of this were in uchow, in and around Xaoyao, in and around Canton, and near the coast due south of Canton. The situation presents two factors of interest. Total Japanese organized ground forces strength available for the defense of the West River valley was not great, for the enemy had concentrated most of his h In and around Canton. i1owever, it is of interest to note that he had concentrated elements of what organized forces he had allotted to the West River in or close to the towns of chow and Kaoyao, which to be prepared to capture and defend. The situation of friendly forces in the area was as fbUows. ' General Tu 1{ansmou coraranded the Seventh War Area, in which were located troops the Chinese 65th Army. Tu was reported to be hostile to the Chungking government, to be a member of the South Chinese Secessionist "orerant,, and closely allied with Marshal Li-chi-shen's "People's Mobilization Commission," which the report described as "powerful" in the southern Province.2 Yugo regular troops of the 65th Army in the VII War Area were considered to be of "negligible" military value. Amer- -observers considered that Yu would cor sit then "only in the event of an Allied landing on the Coast," since they had refused battle with any Japanese forces for the past year. A General. Fang,, whose second-ins-command was Colonel Wat, was the commander of the "only known reported organized guerrilla band to be operating west along the MST MR." This group belonged to the "National Government Guerrilla Heaad- ted at Shaping, Other irregular forces in the area were Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 L-Ar SEM t I Approved For Release 2002/07/30:CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 compooed of small groups looaely led by the central gove militia groups, and the river pirates. generally anti-Japa se, while the bidder. The West River area co=zld therefor kind. Of no- .an'slann !, siace effective control really resided in the hands of. irregular groups of uncertain temper, hands of either the Japanese or the Chinese central governrW The sa report gives a lengthy description of the terrains and communications of the area. The terrain i~ hilly? with the river valley itself broken -yap by hill width from about 10 miles to *narrow gorges. are probably the worst in all of China. Although aced, the vast of lend ways are 04 oads are paths. In the lower areas they are paved with flag-sic nes and follow the paddy- di.ke lines. in the uplands they normally follow the ridge lima and, kved." An important feature of the area was that *due to the density of the tau 't saw-grass covering tier hills" it w difficult for foot-troops to move Off" the pa Lion on co .cations was scanty. There was no info nsidered an we to the the rying in the existence of a telephone system. Information on telegraph lines was meager and unreliable. One radio station was known to exist in Wudhow d there is an unconfirmed report of a similar station in KAOYAO. It Is evident from the information contained in these intelligence annexes that APPLE would have to be prepared to operate pretty much on its own Approved For Release 2002/0V R DP72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 resources. While the Japanese forces it might have to face were not large, uld expect no reliable assistance from Chinese groups already in the area and would have to rely on its own equipment for coneraaunicetions. ady in the area, was ordered to assist In the arranmeaents for the reception unit Of APPLE s dropped convoys were usually guarded by two Japanese soldiers, traveled at arranernts and to provide last-minute inforeration..I On July U. 19e, GAZELLE radioed back to the base that there were 3,00 Japanese troops in yao and that no Chinese troops were to be found south of the river. Japanese gunboats were on the river. Japanese supplies were stored in caves north of Kaoyao and were carried in barges towed by motor launches* nigh, APPLE would not. have to worry about food, since it was plentiful. Yid made their stops at small villages along the north bank of the Now would it have to concern itself with the attitude of the local popu tion, which was said to look upon the Americans with favor. The r exchange was about 40O Chinese dollars to 1 American. urged that d not to mention the rate prevailing in Kunninqw . Also, a three-man advance on July 10, to help with reception rest, of course, of keepin same day APPLE f as advance unit repor Drop Zone was ready for the drop scheduled for the following day..' July 12, 1945, APPL parachuted safely behind the Japanese lines near aaoyao, eported that all went well, except for the loss of one hinese, who landed in a fish pond and drowns Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For R ease 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A9e'b100190001-3 on mounting of A: 033 Archives ? ng, 4.0P 2 (Box 1) 00 .% APPLE, g' X,, CHMM. R@&ograa,, Car e 14,t 083 Archives - going,. 81 K,r We* opera tea' - gung* Qrperet .on.i RAP is DetailAd Report on A,P Operation, dated 18 July 1916, signed by Lb. Co1. Lucius 0. R cker, Jr., a d messed to the Strategic Services Offi r/0 /C??. Col. Mu* was head of the Parachute Thin ng 8Chool and Chief of d r Operations* A copy of this repwt idII be found 035 Archives so .OP.lt (Bo 00 - P , A copy of this schedule, dated July 120 194,5s will be fond in OSS Archives - Nursing. C .OP.5. - lot Co, nan (Combat) - #19. The complete plane-load nanifests, personnel rosters clcs. (with coder; For Release 2002/07/30- Approved SEdtf DP72-00121AO00100190001 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121AO00100190001-3 Before beginning a discussion of APPL 's actual activities in the field it is of importance and interest to note the transportation and rachutin arrangements for the unit. This information will be found l a detailed report on the actual air transport operation.' The time chedule which was carried out was as follows t 5 t - First aircraft took off. All take-offs were one (1) o836 - Drop co eeted. All men am equip nt out. 08231- First aircraft passed directly aver target '`r; . CLO and I element of 2. . W in formation 50 ft, outs Q ft. back, elements o 033: - Aircraft No. 5 landed to Zee load. 0345t- Aircraft No. 5 took off again. do at MANN Pia. All fourteen ^XPLIN X red-svo+as )1.11:. Aircraf't No. 5 developed engine trouble. trip to CHE 01 t1WG. a2 First aircraft landed at G -.. The load to be airlifted consisted of 'i% Chinese and AvariMM -achutists, 28 containers, and 30 packages o ,, and requiring fourteen airplanes.* The 27th Troop Carrier Squadron of Fourteenth Air Force handled 41 The chief loading principle 's that of keeping gun squad:, rifle squad, mortar squad, or other unit their equipment so that if an emergency arose necessitating ng with some unexpected place, they mould have a combat unit together With its officers, personnel and equipment." The unit rods in trucks the 18 nail. Commando cam to the Cheng1cung airdrome. Cox assigned one 2*-ton truck to each of the fourteen planes and sent along an extra vehicle in case of breeakdow s a routs. Per and equipment were loaded in. the rding to the plane to which the track a they rage assi ned. Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 the actual lift. otion, iaee., machine SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 _R2.. the evening of July 11 all pin* crews and parachute school briefing to cover the dispatchers were For security reasons, they were not given the location of the exact Drop Zone until ust prior to the actual departure time. In addition to the fourteen C- ort planes a a the air fleet consisted of buy P-51 ft them from Planning to the Drop Zone and back, and one B-2 "obtain aerial photographic coverage." along to The truck convoy arrived at Cbengkung Afr ro at 2200 hours on Jul A eaanwhile, the parachute school dispatchers had reported in to the planes to which they had been assigned, and occupied tie selves with taping the doors,, checking the anchor cables,, and seeing that their plus were reedy for loading and taking off. The 00a were given and hot drinks and spent the remaining time before loading in two rev on the opposite side of the field from where them. At X30 hours, July, 12,, the trucks were reloaded and crossed the field to the parking tin the truck assigned to Plans Thither 1h in the lead and the others in reverse order. Each truck reported to the plane b rim the number corresponding to its own. By 0200 the planes were loaded and the men place. During the trip all the men were airsick. Except for the mishap to Aircraft No, 5 reported above, the trip to the Drop tone proceeded without other incident. The planes Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For RRLease 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A 100190001-3 086 Archives -- EuI , 00.AlD 1 - Operational, a,port 1. Capt. Leopold. Jo 1Car skt,, Leader of T July 19 5, in - 5ft, d that APP Is ad dra i 1, sated that tb paid 100 nes a collars Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 traveled at 100 to 105 miles per hour at 500 chief difficulty occurred over the Drop Zone as follows. "They arrived at tZ at 0825 hours and found the panels of the reception committee with no difficulty. The original plan was to rake one pass over the DZ with all equipment and per- sonnel being dispatched. However, several of were hampered in their dispatching by airsickness, resulting weakening of the Jumpers and two passes were neces- sary in order to clean, out the loads. The whole formation made second Hess and the few planes that had been unable t their loads on the first pass threw out the remaining equ The drop was counted as successful, size the one Chinese who landed in a fish pond and drowned and one whose arm became entangled in the static line of another jumper and was broken as he Jumped. All equipment landed safely, It is possible, however, that the broken a could have been the only casualty on the drop, for the head of the GAZED reported the following about APPLVe drop.1 "This kid that aimed was seen by a few Chinese paratroopers but instead of going to gins assistance, they ran back one thousand yards for an American, hot stuff,* return to base the dispatchers the follow i ng suggestions to improve caper Da not make drop approaching water, even thou craft cannot fly the direction of the panel on the .field. All planes parked in line before taping doors and lo, equipment to prevent confusion among the dispatchers In they may load a plane other than that assigned to tb lust have covers for trucks so that chutes dona't gat wet on way to field. A wet chute may cause a malfunction and endanger the jum?per's life. d. Have cigarettes? candy, gam, etc., for the jumpers while flying, and clothing or blankets to keep the men warm during flight. Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 e. sire that all se fill their canteens befcer f. Have a briefing of all dispatchers just prior to loa case there has been a char a in plate after the preliminary briefing of all dispatchers and ne bers of the air crews. 'The reconstruction of a F 's activities during the month between its arrival in the West River area and the Japanese surren August, is relatively easy from the strictly chronological point of view? owing to the eodatence, of regular reports from Cox to his superiors, However* it is permissible to wish to look somewhat beyond these routine reports, for two reasons. First is their brevit to obtain much aors, than the outline of events. econd, is their character, Which# it 1945j, concerning the nature of reports. emphasize accomplishments rather than difficulties., T iney of radio silences trace :s on diffi lties't and the rapid as at the and of the var membered,, was governed the Directives of May ated that reports must difficulty o After lending between Wuchow and !aoyao on July to move to Loytinguyen2 The Demolition otion was E a APL prepared min Taan-chiaarsien. The Wiese in the area #ae very cooperative paartial to ?wericans.e3 Tar four days the Japanese chased APPLE, high t ? -- --. The, establish a base there from which they will begin operations.' At to-ting radio trouble developed,, which meant that "way meagre information Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 EG l Approved For Rase 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A0100190001-3 814 See Footnote f 2p page 57, of this paper, It has been impossible for either the present writer Library Dieion/ORR to locate this town. Cox to OPSO, Weekly Operational Reports, dated 19 July 1945, in OS5 Archives - l uiing. oq.nr X' Operational Report. 14. Cox to OPSO, Weekly Operational Report, dated 26 July 1945, OSS Archives ? 1Cuam' . 0O,Ap I ? Operational Report. 85 1. Cox to Heppner, CO Monthly Report? dated A July 1945, in 089 Archives ? luu tag. OG.OP.3 ? Monthly Report, lbl 2. Coat to OPSO, Weakly Operational Report,, dated 2 August 1945, in 039 Archives -funning. OO.AD I - Operational Report. Cox to CG/ Reserve Command and to OD/O nose Ommondos, 6 August 1945, in 086 Archives - gunming. oo,OP.4, Co nding General, lot Parachute Regiment. Folder #13. Cox to Heppaer, OD Monthly Report, dated 31 August 1945, in OSS Archives - Kunming OO.OP.1 - M IM (Co. "R") ? OPERATIONS. No Nemkong river exists under this name. It is suggested that the Junction of the Wont and Wan-Chiang Rivers may be the scene of this'action. This Junction has been circled on the map. Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For R I ase 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A10100190001-3 ntd.) See also the following reference for Cox''s citations of various American personnel of APPLE for their conddat diking this and other activities of the unit. OSS Archives ? Kunming. O.OP.I, Citations. Folder #25, Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 was obtained during the next few days, but some contact was maintained ugh other OSS units operating in this area."' The same report states that Lo-ting proved to be an excellent base for operations. There was in the area a ieneral Tam, who had a force of about 6,000 guerrillas under his co ard. "He displayed willingness to cooperate but he was initially engage in decisive actions against the enemy,, fearing they 1ght ravagii the area. Vowever he was induced an ca i-red: operations. the same time APPLE set up an intell net to cover both nantora and the West River area and carried out numerous reconnaissance activities, on August 2 it was reported that APPLE and Tam had dra up plans for a simultaneous attack on three villages on the south bank of the West River.2 On August 4 APPLE reported that it was on an operation and would report as soon as it returned.3 On August 9 the report was that APPLE had. *attacked a Jap fortified position at the _Junction of NAM KONG & WEST RIVERS on 5 August. The position had. 3-70 me, ortarsa, and machine guns. Jap casualties were 8 dead an wounded. Commando casualties were 7 wounded and 3 missing believed dead, Americans. 2.00 Jap reinforcements arrived from TAMING 2 hours after attack began. The conduct and discipline of the commando under fire was superior."4 This some report described this attack as APPT. ;s "initial gyration. two complete reports from the Senior Amer~icin Officer of APPLE, Captain Vernon G. Hoppers, Inf.,, to Cox. These cover the period from July 12 to the Unit a s arrival at sting on July 25. The Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 a a "Rc?oort on Area" and provides some information. The second Report of First Commando 12 to 25 supplementing the briefer official reports. In the first of these docunenta Hoppers crrnfirrad t l of earlier intelligence reports. The country was agricultural , with a plentiful. supply of food, The Americans were politic-ally popular, while the British were ecua ly detested. The local officials more cool towards the Chungking government., "because they have had no support from it." military leaders maintained a sort of "gentleman's agree the Japanese, with the result that a large smuggling trade flourished throughoutt, the area. There were about 2,000 Communists southwest of Lt,-tiro;, of whom all local military men were afraid. The only regular Chinese division in the area, the 15th, was described as having "done no fighting and evidently have no intentions of doing any." Hoppers closed this report with a. few suggestions for the benefit of future core andoQ in the field. He theug each comendo a thorough briefing on the money s his own unit, he confirmed Karwaski a s July 16 report of APPLE's behavior in these wordst "The men of the first commando are actually by the change here being paid better than 60 gold per L.I. a conseque are spoiled. They have inflated the exchange in every town pass through." Since the operations were financed byr the Americans ntrusted to the Senior American Officer in the field, tb was of considerable Importance. The lack of control of the Americana over erlg important to give Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30: CIA-RDP72-00121AS0100190001-3 The handwritten report und and will, be found in O chi s - u_ OG.OP.? - 1PPLI Opetration. Folder 3. In both of Hoppers' r po rta the sp*Uing and punt bom correat.d: The wrde, home Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Eli Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 -17- the Chinese personnel is graphically shown by this passage. Hoppe second suggestion concerned the interpreter problem* interpreters were hired at Chungking and that the table of organ- isation aesignod eight of them to each commando. Hoppers makes what should have from the beginning been an obvious point to higher headquarters when he says: "Interpreters should be picked for the provincial langu which they speak." He sa9ya, further: I have only one interpreter who is worth a damn. Ali of then are too young and have had no experience in handling cool es, merchants or anyone else, Interpreters hired in the area In which you operate are a great deal more useful. '*Men hired through the magistrate they are thoroughly trustworthy and. can save you a great deal of mney and time. Mr, o Mon bixang 1 453. has done a very good job. Int. Charlie Chan was an agi- tator so we used him as a courier," The trouble with the interpreters which erupted during the training period evidently because In his report on the period July 12 ? 25 ?4oppersprovid.ed a rather depressing picture of the activities of the First Con"Wndoe This report is of such interest, owing to its frankness and to its authorship by responsible position with APP;, that the significant portions of it are herewith repro theed. The contrasts with the routine arized above should be noted. x' Jumped at Kai-Ping at approx. 9: 00 AN to well organized reception. Sores of the jw p masters were poorly coordinated with pilots. planes were stood up and hooked up one hour before using height was from 250 to 300 feet. This was probably due to diffi.- culty of getting bindles out of door. The planes d- 11-d not fly across the T in the right direction. If they had, all of the men would have landed on dry ground. As it was one nen landed in a lake and was drowned, two more almost landed in it and the greater maa; ority landed in wet rice paddies. .a., the parachutists were stood up and hooked up7. The Jump - Approved For Release 200!8Ea-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 :DP72-00121A000100190001-3 When we hit the grothe Commando personnel were physically exhausted. A great many refused to help gather equipment. 1 d that they should carry their parachutes into town' about imiles distant, they were very unhappy. All other equipment was being moved by coolies. Some of them threw the parachutes in the rice paddies on the way in, we spent two days in lei-ping atheri ; information and waiting for Lt. Frailer to return from the West river area. During these two days the Chinese soldiers bought everything that was loose in the town and prices went up over twice what they were, Colonel Ching /the Chinese Commando LeadeEf promised to restrict them* to the area, they were inflating the market. On the second day in Kai-ping i sent Lt. Hudson with the Demo. Section on a riving and recon, mission down the coast road, I had received rd that a Jap column was halted near Tang.ichianm,-hsf en and there we right be able to booby-.trap some empty hides. Also for a look at the road itself and the terrain around It. The mission w?+s not atuccessfuul where the min eo-"R ?. for the JapL- were on the ou.tskirtc ..#,# but they 7h-ting on the 15th. After the first day of marching not one _ Chinese soldier was carrying his pack. All equip. was being carried by coolies. After the first day rifles and belts gars to appear on the coolies' loads. I went to Col, Ching and told him the mien mint carry at least their are in case of attack. The men started carrying them for about two days when they started to crop out again. We corrected this again. on arrival at San-bin I decided to base there, for the most narrow part of the West River is east of Xao-yao about eight miles. The river narrows at some places to 200 or 300 yards which is ideal for ambush operations. 1 .9 to San-qui, which is located about 5 miles from the West River. , .. When arrived at San-hing /T.e., returned from an-quip we found the entire commando packed and ready to evacuate. We heard the news that two Jap columns were moving from Kai-ping toward Sen hing and were then about 30 kilometers southeast of San-ping. I insisted to Col. Ching and Major Lo 5ne of the Chinese officers] that we should take sampans down to San?quiv to. carry out,--out` ,original plan. ... There is a mountain range east of aan..qui, which we could have ne into in case they cab after us# and there was a possibility of hitting their flank as they came down ie river. Their excuse for not wanting to go was that we could not get past the Jap column, which was at that time still 16 riles away. When I insisted that we still had our mission to accomplish they offered no further excus e } but continued preparations f ar the move, Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : IA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 Ban ring to Loh-ting we were really given a pict re of the First (`o ando. No more then three miles out of San hing packs, am o, and other equipment began to fall by the aside. Ow man tried to throw away his tommy gun along with the rest of his equipment. Sgt. BeCamp broke up a fight between the Col. Li.e., Col. Chin and this man. The imerican personnel ran a scavenger unit be- hind the commando picking up discarded equipment* one Chinese soldier was restrained from throwing away a mortar at the point of a gun. Mai. La & Col. Ching sulked along at the rear of the column. I controlled, as best I could the march,, with a radio in the font and one in the rear. At one point Wire crossed a rivers I tried to leave a rear guard of one rifle branch, the K. Go Branch, and a mortar squad, to ambush the Jape as they tried to cruse the river. They refused to do so. The remainder of the march to L -TIl was just a repetition of the same thing, We are still. trim. There is still a chance of doing something. The American personnel have really dose a good job, And for inset of them it was quite a slap in the face to have their judgment go so completely haywire. Most of the men have the patience of Confucius. ... The report of the Co;ando is as absolutely fair as I can make it. ?ate' small things are not mentioneds bat it at least draws a verbal picture of our straggle against the enemy behind the lines (if we could get then near the one-my). I have checked this over with every man for some things I did not see myself, the other bogs making out?)el The second principal primary source on ntur s of APPLE in the field is the series of radioed reports which APPLE ard i-A,MILE sent back to headquarters and which have been preserved. These add no addition- al material not found in either Cox's or Koppers' reports, but do furnish illuminating details on some of the operations. On July 25 GAZELLE radioed 2 to Wa ler as folic ss OUR GU RItLA , QUITTING US. NOT F CinH MONEY FOR MOD. WE PAT OUR MEN 30 C.N. P BAY. APPLE CHINESE PAY 100 C.K. AND PE PRICES RAISED giRE THEY CO. P,ST SITUATION R!OA3 TO JAS` MOVE ROTM AS APPLE. CRT" SE NOT PU.TTTINO STAND ANY PLACE. RRTTS TN WANTU .f BIG LAR ' . REPORTS RE ,ATI 710 THEIR EXTRE LT EXAGGERATED. M Approved For Release 2002/07/30 CIA- P72-00121A000100190001-3 SE Approved For Rase 2002/07/30: CIA-RDP72-00121AM100190001-3 89 The carrsct identification of. "Bar hingf and *San-qui"" remains in doubt, Maas neither the present writer nor the Map Library Division/G has been able to locate any places by these names. It is suggested that the correct rendering of "San-hlnr is. "Hein-hsing." This city is therefore: underlined on the map. Its location between Kai-paing and Luting NOW it possible that it is the place which Hoppers had in mind, since he is describing. the journey between Kai-p" ing and Lo?tng. It is suggested tentatively, again on the basis 0' that assn-qui"" may actually be "San-ho-hair"" which has underlined on the map. Radiogram, C LLE to 'ampler, 25 July 1945, in CSS Archives ? gauming. 0G.oP. S ? 2nd Commando (Combat) 90 Radiogram, GAZEL to Wampler, 25 July 1945,, in 038 Archives - gumming. 0O.0P.5. - 2nd Commando (Combat) ? #18. Radiogram, APPLE to Cox, 28 July 1915, in ONS Archives - turning,* 00.0P.5. ? 2nd Commando (Combat) - #18. Radiogram, APPIA to 'Coat, 30 July 1915, in 056 Archives - lunaaing. OG.0P.5. - 2nd Comando (rCoaabat) Radiogram, APPLE to Cox? to August M5. in 08$ Archives - running. 0G.OP.5, ? 2nd Commando (Combat) - #18. Approved For Release 2002/07/30 IA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 -90- On the following, day GAS, :L3s radioed another report, which was uncompli- rentary' to the Chinese and based on both APPLE's end GAZ E "'ta'MESF S LEAST DESIROUS OF COMBAT. NOT O LY Tim OF APPLE ... Th LAST JAP PUSH HM NO RESISTANCE ?RFD ANA ? Ai 3ICANS OPSWE WITH CHINS BUT 8 WNED OFF EE TO i IR NONAO S"s ATTITUDE. ... PLENTY SPACE FOR FIGHT T ?TS PROVI # IF CHINESE WO MM ONLY C OO E A' . IDEAL SITUATION 9ooPS DER DIRECT CC 4A'! OF AMERICAN: PP TIVE THEY ARE. EERY ON DOINO ST TO 0W AIM ?t!;StU TS. 1 JOOH SLEDDING AT PR S I T,a The money situation was reflected on July 28 in APPIE's request for 2 e. On July 30 APPLE reported that it had contacted General Tan and had persuaded his to release 300 of his 6,000 troops to assist the eo nendc in the attack on the three villages on the south bank of the 3 ity of any operations in China, and p, behind the enemy lines, was Illustrated by Hio apera' adventures wit he above-mentioned General Tam. be recalled that Theater had decreed that the A ricana should have nothing political affairs, This plains Hoppers' attitude. The incident which nothing eventually came, shows the difficulty of remaining aloof, era radioed as follows: "HAVE :RUN INTO POLITICAL TANGLE, OEN "L. TAM ... LOCATED TAKL BATS GENERAL HO .. TO RE(MONIZE HIS TROOP, AS SIX THOUSAND MEN WHO ARE PART OF T? F NINETEENTH ROUTE Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 T. GE!ER H i ANS' I AM ACTING AS MIDDLE MAN, HAVE PTrMI T NOTRIIWC. RECOGNIZE AND &UF`PL! HIM. CAN YOU CONTACT C E WILL TM ORDERS M IF ME CI 'fIT W ON OPERATION WITH PART OF 0WM . 4;t WLPC~>TP WHO HAS 700, ALL A WWRILLAS. ... ALL the Theater decree concerning involvement in political affairs was undoubtedly inspired by the best of rrrrtive s, it is clear that such a restriction,, given conditions in China genera3l r, a particularly ; very those prevailing behind enemy lines, was too categorical at best and too kginn o and impossible at worst, Since guerrilla doctrine from the h.+ssizeed that operations could not be mounted at all without at the very least the tacit support of the local population, it was demanding, too much to expect that the O'Oa could possibly completely ignore local powers and strong men. Thus far, the accounts of APPLE'a activities have emphasized the difficulties, with particular emphasis, borne out by experience, on the Chinese lack of discipline and aggressive spirit, The Ibllowing account of the penultimate operation of APPLE serves,, on the other hand, to show the American work was not a complete waste of time and at the provides a clue to the rather sorry, performance during the weeks of APPI.'s mission in the field. "COINA JO ATTACH JAP FORTIFIED POST BY ho JAPS AT JTJMCTTON OF NAF N0 AND WEST RI R. JAP CASUALTIF R DEAD.. 4 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Rase 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121ASO0100190001-3 1. Ra ? APJIZ Cox, 7 A as t '19 ?Wps5. r &A c tat on s r K, .0P.7'+ - Citation*, Fbl Approved For Release 2002/07/$EC&EQP72-00121 A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 4ANDO CAS uAT; IES o 113VILUEVW KILLDT. LLT BRIDGES, LT CARPENTER Sines The ope3 V~RTOTt JOB OF TROOP LEADIN . PLCOWE CPT. CAHILL FOR sTLVER STAR, HE C'RMsm 50 ThE OPEN FIEEL1) TO CARRY OUT UN DED C~x R " a. 501;)T FR. NO Allk %NS W,OOUNDiD, DISCIPLlN OF COMMANDO DER FIRE SU?Lv.gjOR E '~. Y RESPECT, "FETE! w EN wl HT J O HOUSES AFTER SAPS THEY PUSHED T':`1 ;WIT IN 20 YDS OF VP FORT., pane se reinforced their garrison, the Commando had to withdraw. Lion in one sense could not be called a success. It is evident, however, from this text that the Chinese soldiers behaved in an exemplary that when the righting actually began the Aeerican officers and enlisted amen took over the co bat leadership of AP :E. In other words, under the conditions of stress it was the Chinese 04' cer who we f'au t,, rather then the Chinese soldier. The latter attack capable of fighting bravely and w himself In this en he received proper leader- ship, This point is conArued in the citations of two Aa rican officers and three A..rican en:Listed or the Silver and Bronze for their roles in the operation of Augus net a Japanese-held village. In each case, the citation speaks of the personal leadership whih the Aricans exercised and the good response of the Chinese soldiers to that leadership.I Ths attack of August 5 just described evidently led to some reproaches from cox, who was known to be opposed In principle to using 01a to attack fortified places. On August 11 VPLF explained The reason was not that they ther?tselves had changed in any way. Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 -93- the reason for the attack and confirmed what has been said above con- cerning the Chinese officers. "ATTACK AGAINST POSITION AT NANXONF PLANNED AS SURPTIM DAWN ATTACK. REASON FOR FiEN KILLED AND WOUND WAS LACK OF AGGRESSIVE SPIRIT IN Vii. LO. REASON FOP. ATTACK ON POSITION: THERE ARE NO COLI.1NWS AND VERY LITTLE TRAFFIC ON W S'T RIVER. WE HAD D TO ?IfHt MME ONE.U The final APPLE operation before the end of the war was an attack its Machine Faun Section on a Japanese headquarters, in which it was re- ported that four Japanese were killed and an unknown number sanded. ' question always arises of the ranner in which to Judge an opera- tion. From one point: of view this project can be regarded as a failure. In terms of concrete results achieved the unit accoaMlished little. During the month it was in the field it attacked four Japanese-held or Japanese- fortified villages and strong points and one Japanese headquarters of unde- termined importance. None of these were apparently of any particular tactical or strategic significance, their significance insofar as APPLE was concerned being their role in accustoming the unit to combat operations. There is no evidence that these attacks particularly hampered the Japanese. That they did annoy them is certain, for the enemy did take the trouble to reinforce one of his threatened garrisons and thereby caused APPLE to withdraw. Concerning the tactical role of the 00a in support of military operations, there is no evidence that APPLE was of any particular assistance to Operation CARBf TA1O, since the above-mentioned Approved For Release 2002/0 r $DP72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Rease 2002/07/30: CIA-RDP72-00121AM100190001-3 93 1.. Rograoc, APPLE to cox, u August 19450, in OS$ Archives - Iu.ng. OO.OP.S. ? 2nd Commando (Combat) ? #1.8. No locality exists under this name. See mote X, F. 85. Radiogram, APP to Cox,, 13 August 19h5, in OSE Archives ? Kuns ng. OG.OP.5. - 2nd Co ando ( bat) 8. Approved For Release 2002/07/ P72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 attacks were made on APLE+s own initiative. The intelligence which the unit sent back according to its secondary responsibility did not either y to, or seriously modify, the information airs from other sources. i'ro a this point of views therefore, it results obtained in this case did not 3usti:f, ical or the guerrilla warfare viewpoints, the time effort which Cox and his associates put into the project. To make the above one's definitive judgment ou the af would be bath a gross oversimplification and an injustice. The judge shnnld bear two things in Lind. One is that significant targets were few and far between at this stage of the war. The Japanese had largely plated their withdrawal from the area in which APPLE was to operate and the field for the most part to local guerrilla groups. 1the only ese forces left were the elements of the 13th Independent infantry 3rigade, which was scattered piecemeal over tk area. river end road traffic was correspondingly insignifican radiograaa of August 11: truly As Toppers had to fight someone." To expect a in such a situation is therefore asking too much. The second thing, the element which really hampered operations, was the a1 )st Impossible arra nt for command and control of the unit. The Aricans, as demonstrated earlier, had been put into the very difficult position of possessing responsibility without authority, They were to advise the Chinese, but were forbidden to oer !and them. Command of an operation would therefore either not exist at all or would fail into the Approved For Release 2002/07SE ~P72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 _5.. hands of those beet capable of exercising it, irr rnertts and directives. The history of APPLE shows, of report of the period July 12 ? 25 is an excellent illustration of the situation in such the A ricans found themselves. In the absence of Chinese will, there was little the Arricans could do. When an action asctuzlly undertaken it was the A. ricsns vho really did the leading and co]' mandinslr, as shorn in the accounts of and citations for the actions against the four villages and the Japanese headquarters. Now, from this two things haceaz; cleatr, tuna is that the Chinese officers the caliber required for OG operations. on their lack of aggressiveness. Hoppers, furthermore,, recounts detail his adventures in trying to operate within the framework of the `mater directive concerning command of field units and relations between Chinese and Americans. CAMLE made the following point in its radio- gram of July 2S, which has already been ouoteds "IDEAL Sr'r"UATION IS T HAVE TROOPS UNDER DIRECT CA D OF . ROUGHER TRE*T tiT CHINESE RECEIVE THE ? A PPr CIA t I3 THL Y ARE." the last sentence may be debatable, little question under the leadership of the A ricans the Chinese soldiers performed well, as shown by the brief account of the action of August 5 and in the cita- tions for the action of August 1. In sum, therefore;, APT L33 operating order two great handicaps: the lack of targets and an impossible command situation. The circ stances were ,Auite beyond its control. Accordingly, it is too much expect a record of startling results in the field. Approved For Release 2002/07/%30~ P72-00121A000100190001-3 T Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 ..96. t of, Operation g gAW in the West Riser valley and ,on, the second 00 unit was preparing go into the field around the area of Qheng-aha. It parachuted now Ching of July 2?s, i9s!,1 and operated in the Chong-ssha - Shaoyang (Pao ) ,. Hong-yam triangle from that date until the end of the war a little more weeks later. 3 RRV ee mission was generally similar to that of APXS and was set forth as ibUo z $a. Disrupting enemy lines of oo cetioa enemy river traffic along N SUNG such pla,cesss as may be selected by the Commando Leader. b. Disrupting enemy lines of coss cation and destruetto enemy supply copes using the area read nets at such and places as s be selected by the Owmnda Lauder. Disrupting the flow of enemy rail traffic and the destruction of railroad equipment and facilitiees in use by the es, at such times and places as may be selected by the Connando, Loader. d. Preparing a plan for the establishment of defended road blocks at critical points in the enemy road not throughout the sera. tional area and be prepared to establish those road blocks all. ?. Attacking and destroying? such enemy installations within the ore" of operation as massy be within the capa3 .littees of the C andos, as determined by the Comma' do Leader.. The undo Leader will establish friendly relations with Military _ f ldak and Guerrilla Organizations in the area of operation and cooperate with these a tivities wherever possible for out: , benefit.* d that URR!sss mission d`feee several impo, In contrast to the latter's mission, - s enssibtli.ti.es included only one instance in which the control Approved For Release 2002/07~~ RrP72-00121 A000100190001-3 Approved For R&Wase 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121AO 100190001-3 Cox to Reppner, 0G. Xon l7 Report! Jul 1915, dated .3. July 1945 OSS Art hf va8 - Kunming 00.6P.),, ? Monthly Report? Toldsr #3. See Tab IT)" for naps to aer a as an annex to this stud ration DLi BERRt. 085 Operational P1.an for BLUEHl6RRT, 22 July 19 5? in 088 Archives E_. OO.0P.5o d C (eo bat) - #iB. So* the 4jsouaston above of Operation CAR?ONADO and 083 pwtio pation therein, pp. 29-40 an especially pp, Approved For Release 2002/07/30: PIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30: A-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 of the commando was out of the hands of the Commando Leader. This ex- ception is to be found in the order to BLiEB: Y to be prepared on call to establish "defended road blocky at critical points in the enemy road rzet throughout the operational area." With the exception of the road block mission the tacks given to BLUEBERRY were all in accord with the traditional ='uerrllla doctrine. They were missions of attack rather than of defense and were to be decided upon by the i der and not by a higher head'q?iar?ters romoved from the scene of operations. This practice t leader is seen again in the ragraph of the mission directive. He was therein directed to es ndlg '!1S" with local military and guerrilla organizations and to "cooperate" with them"fear Mutual benefit," whenever possible. There was thus provision for cooperation with groups in the area on a military basis ("for mutual benefit'') without violating the Theater injunctions against mixing in political affairs. Since BLUEBERRY was to be in the area only for mili- tary purposes for mutual benefit" can have no other meaning. gyration CAR8)MA)O provided for a "defensive and diversionary" .n on the active; defense in the POKING - CHANQ?EN - SILT' area by blocking approaches Zro C Al S- - H WLG area." This explains the di lTerences between APP 's and E,0 RE '' a erissione. Whereas the former envisaged offensive tactical operations in direct and i ae?ii.a ar Chinese armies advancing eastward towards Canton the latter clearly had the defensive ptarpoae of"isolating the battle Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 -98- Considerable Intelligence, on the area was available to BL BRY before its departure. Of especial importance were sections on the enemy strength an- situ tion, the topography, and the condition of comuni cat ions routes.l T e to rraa? of both unan and 'ian si provinces was described as ctiv ',.illy' or mountainou ." There was relatively little level la, rttr~ .? a e. halls rose often to peaks of two to three thousand feet, :pith an occs.si.: nal sumr'it up to five thousand feet. In r the root part the area is a n .mntaira with only limited l 3vel land along the rivers. ... The hi ..l slopes are steep, ar in many places the swift streams have cut picturesque gorges to depths of severrl hundred feet." "The hillsides are a wilderness, covered with natural vegetation. Forest at onetime covered the entire region, but the trees have now been largely tut out near all .te the higher peaks." 'either province was thickly settled, and villages are located along river valleys and the upland regions, approx- imately 75% of the total area, are almost completely unaettleed." It will be obvious that such countryside offered of uerrilla warfare. The enemy controlled the principal cities,, rivers,, roads, and railroads as had not been dismantled or destmyed during the course of the Sino-Japanese struggle, e gradual Japanese withdrawal to the r dependence on the communications routes was of partl.cu- aportance. The city of Heng-yang was an important railroad junction, since tx,th the Hunan-Kwangsi and the Canton-Rankow lines set there and Approved For Release 2002/07A CIA- fP72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Rase 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121ABO6100190001-3 Ilse t, vsrioue Annexea,, Att chments# and ?ppsn ;x.s , Operational Plan ILMIMT1 22 dull 191 In 080 Archives ? il`tsmring OO,OP.6 - Folder 0264. Xise q Approved For Release 2002/07/30.:,CIA-RDP72-00121 A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 -99- continued north through Chang-alas. "'Phis section consists of a standard gauge track." The follow description of the manner in which the Japanese operated the railroad shaws the potentia r guerrilla operations against it. "Traffic over this section of the railroad is small due damaged condition of the li, harassing tactics forces? and 14th Air orce bombings. Present usage of the line is limited to the operation of 'motor trucks'. "use nsi of two trucks with tires replaced by flanged iron wheels an pulling and pushing between then four cars. The Japanese are using this section of the railroad for military tr rts- tion, and operate care over the road only at night in order to avoid. aerial bonbirzg Many of the bridges are make-shift affairs Mace of railroad ties and during the day the Japanese camouflage these bridges by placing straw huts on then. atione are guarded by detachments of varyUg sties depending on the importance of the station and the activity of guerrilla forces. The Japanese operate patrols of 10-20 men along the railroad. Japanese in civilian clothing are responsible for the Reprisals are taken for acts of sabotage. It was reported May of this year that the main snsmW garrisons between CB' O- HA and HE *-TM are located at TMM-SHAW ..., l- U-H0 ... , H I T' a N ... and d G TA `O." Although the Japanese were able to use the roads,, their Control over them was limited. The road between Chang-sha and Hong-yang s reported to be a twenty-five-foot-wide ..veatbsr road in good condition. This ad was important to the enemy,, for he used it for the rajor of his traffic in the Chang-sha - Hang-yang corridor. Owing to attacks by the With Air Force# the Japanese used it mostly at night. Japanese convoy and protection. techniques were shown to be as The Japanese maintain garrisons a road for the protection and maintenance of the road. garrisons include guard detachments, supply warehouses, road maintenance crews. According to a Chinese source guard Approved For Release 2002/07/:LO,.CIJL-gW72-00121 A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 -100" are small and avid interference with parties crossing he road rather than risk a cash with guerrillas. Permanent pillboxes are maintained at strategic points, ..e.,, br fueling points. Japanese convoy habits on the road very depends on tt of guerrilla groups. Convoys usually rove between 2000 and Duriiz the day the 4p ese send single trucks rather then con- voys over the road. They pursue the following policy, (1) Truck* "cod 25' or 50, apart. Guard consists of armed soldier in each truck. (2) Convoy-preceded and followed by tanks. (3) Squads of armed armed soldiers ride In first and last truck." The local political situation presented its usual features of com- plexity, jockeying for power? and indifference to the course of the ware Political Son 1936=37 there has been no or n Communist In :n and liangat provinces.. Pockets of ex- a :at guerrillas exist in the se'areuntainous regions on the borders of i 'iaangai, but their connection with the Tenan regime has long been severed and their activities turned to banditry. Recant hupsia dis- patches, however, publicise a Communist pocket on the borders of Hunan, gweichow, and Seechuanj unconfirmmW reports speak of Nationalist clashes with Communists in the region between Tung- t'ing and Po-yang Lakes, near the Yangtze River; the Tenan regime has called to the attention of Americans the possibility of re- activating the gisngsi border Cole .st pockets left behind a att the time of the tan iiaaa h and has recently indicated that both Hunan and Kies si are potentiaal. &reas of expansion. (2) Popular resistance to the Japanese invasion was not well organised and local population, has remained larger apathetic and indifferent to the course of the war. Chungking-appointed s isstrat;es are in power In the occupied area and some Puppets ha been used by the Japanese." Precise information concerning the an strength was although there was considerable material concerning d ;sc+aaa information concerning the direction of troop movements, Area Army and Army headquarters,, six Infantry Divisions and two Approved For Release 2002/07':P72-00121 A000100190001-3 Approved For RQ&ease 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A99'0100190001-3 of the ' di1elopments in Chine Sims, the ,ton aad j Tiev of the heights to whit note #2 Pa 78 obov.)i . ntu417 rose xissibl* to q estion, deipite rishfa ins at the tiles, the degree to Bch the Comet guerri l"I 'connection with the Yemen resixe has long been "vered and their acti l.- tiea turned to band trj." ' ' This doubt is strengthened by sA ea ination of the letter part of the paragraph *bovo conesm f ng the C niet guerrillas in 'fig ,e Approved For Release 2002/07/3.0 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/300CCIA-RDP72-00121 A000100190001-3 Independent Mixed Brigades had been identified in the Japanese corridor. These forces, with which ii.B1RY would have reclkon, had a Table of Organization strength of about lOO,t men. This figure was not definitive however, since the strength of the 86th independent Mixed Brigade was listed as ftt r nownn and since that of the 6th and 68th Infantry? Divisions was about 91,000 and was no more definitive than their Table of Organ Lion strenrt The op. e.rationa . strength of these eight units of the 86th Independent Mixed Brigade was listed as 65,9000 (?)" and since that of the 64th and 68th, Infantry . Even less was available concerning the of these units. The only figures listed were " each for the 6lath and 68th Infantry Divisions. Although these forces ncentrated in the South - North. Japanese-hold corridor, their general movements were north and east,, in accordance with the enemy wit de Canton and other cities on or nearer the coast. trthereare, on concerning the reads, rive roaeds, some sizeable part of the personnel of these unite were being employed in garrison and convoy duty along the lines of cormuni ation. The enemy ly compelled to disperse some of his strength., thus confirming ement about the Japanese having 91 description and analysis of the ssion with I was charged and of the general situation in th, - Hemp yang area has shown that it was an ideal area for the of guerrilla operations and provides some idea of why LtBERRT's .mission Approved For Release 2002/07/ 72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 -102- differed from that of AT in was rough and the enemy was in a position of dependence on vulnerable lines o: d; tion and was engaged in withdrawing his iorcen the 1 1 political sentisrnt, while not burning with hatred for the invaders, would in all lity at the very least not Oppose ? C . RY; and there were already sans and native irregular forces at work In the area. she this territory was not in the line of advance slapped out for CARBONADO, there was less reason than in the case of APPLE to tie the corando to rt of regular military operations and consequently to &UbJ to strict control of higher headquarte was actually in the field and engaged in operations less a month, Owing to this and to the relative scarcity of available br otion from the field, a acco of necessity be a brief one. Furthermore, LfJBFRRY' a activities present no features essentially different from those of its. predecessor in the 1 field. As they had done in APPLE r s case, the OG autho to drop into the area and make contact with fore there. In BLU? ! ' as case one an dropped in and made eontac, Team MKINE which had been there for so; . Together these poop made the final arrangements for 3LFRR.YTr a reception and sent back the 2 latest available information. A radiogram from the field gave an optimistic picture of the possibilities fbr good guea operations. These in the following terms, the principal points made in 3 d, Approved For Release 2002/07/ PQP SEMET 72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Rd ase 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A 100190001-3 A cow of this document will be found in OSS Archives - Kunming. oa.t}?.5. - 2nd Comando (Combat) - #18. The couplets plane-load manifestas personnel rosters, financial supply and re-supply packaging (with cods- rkings , co mi nna- tions, and other administrative arrangements for BLTB ! will also be found in this folder. On to OPSO,0 Weekly Operational Report, 19 July 19h5, and Cox to OPSO, i eek ,y Operational: Report* 26 July 19 -5, both in 083 Archives - Kam. OG.AD 1 ? Operational Report. Radiogram, Riokerson (81) to Oozq 20 July 19455, 088 chives a Kunming. 0000P.5. ? 2nd Oaem ndo (Combat) Approved For Release 2002/0 c t$?P72-00121A000100190001-3 R Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 "4HHAVE MADE PER 7NAL CONTACT WITH ALL PRINCIPAL GVERP.SLLA L'AI'RS R LA. ALL AGREE ON FULL s 0PEMTION. PLENTY FOOD AND H Lax AVAILABLE. .., OUR TEAMS N ZDEB AS SOON AS POSSIBLE D TO HEAVY NIP TRAFFIC ON MAIN HIGHWAY AT NIGHT BECAUSE OF RTREAT FROM PP^CHING AND t WE TLING. JARS ARE D IN ALM PA0CHINO - EWOYANO 3 ~?AI3. HAVE R ACHED SEVERAL LILY BASES ONLY SHORT DISTANCE F i , IA# HIGHWAYS, RAILROADS AND C0194UHI ATIoww5. NIPS VERT VERY SHORT OF AI0, FOOD AM SUPPLI&S.u message sent three days later added the information that the local co riander was *completely loyal, oonscientious. Has complet support of _s apulace." However, the same note of warning capabilities, already shown to have been true in the case of APPLE's operations, was added. The local soldiers were described as "mod,, but officers lack training." Above all, the unit 'east avoid friction with locals."' On July 3l Cox reported that the unit had been dropped success- fully. Local guerrillas saved BLUEBERRY from an unpleasant tige, for the Japanese were in the vicinity, observed the drop, and attempted to destroy the commando. These local units beat off the enenr attacks. The condo imaedistely established contact with the local guerrillas and arranged for what proved to be its only major operation of record before the and of hostilities.' Soon after scene there took place a meeting with General Wang General Chi aani the commander of the loth Army Guerrillas. .4 uerri llas..4 At this Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 sECxEr Approved For Base 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121'`0100190001-3 103 Radiogram, Rickarscn (31) to Cox, 23 July 1945,. in 085 Archives- Xunming. OCI.dP.S. ? 2nd Coin nando (Combat) . #18. 0S3 Archives - 1[ufaing. 0.0P.3. - Monthly Report. ?older Cox to Hsppner, 00 Monthly Report, dated 31 July 1945, OG. P.5. - 2nd rands (Combat) X1.8. and 03S Archives - punting. . Radiogram, BLUSSE ! to Generatl Li., 1 A'i zst 19145, Material for the account and discussion of this operation is taken from the following sources: Radiogram, B!LtJRH to Ccx,, 6 August 1.9 , in 085 Archives - Running. .o ! 5. - Pad Commando ( bai) ? 5. to Reppner, 00 Monthly Report, dated 3L August 19145, in 0BS Archives - Rurei.ng. OG.OP.l - C I1A (Co "B") . OPZRATTOHS. Rsacendatione for the award of the Silver Star Medaal to one American officer and one American enlisted man for their roles in this operation. These recomrendationa were addressed by Cox to the Strategic Services Officer/Hg/08S/CT and dated 21 August 1945 and 25 August 1945. They will be found in 083 Archives - Kunsing. 00.0P.?. - Citatiions, ?older #25. 4. Chiang is not to be confused with Generalissimo while a @ report to Reppner calls his " Gensril Chiang of the 10th Guerrilla Are r.a He was probably the commander of the 10th Querrilla There is some contradiction concerning his exac, The radiogram refers to his troops as the "10th Army, since the situation swp overlay neither lists nor *mw Chinese 10th Army among the units of the regular Chinese forces the area. This map overlay idn be found in 0S8 Archives .. Kunming. OO.oP.h. - Folder #26. Misc. The point is not, in any aase, a vital ogee, nine* there is no question that the troops in question were guerrillas and that they were under Chiang e s command. Approved For Release 2002/07/ ,Q~ k(1r72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 -104- meeting it was decided to attack enemy installations in or near the village of 'fsiyuaenehih.l The attacking forces, consisting of U BE tT plus an assortment of Chinese guerrillas belonging to Wang,, Chiang, and others, outnumbered the Japanese garrison by a ratio of more than two to one. The ene> was entrenched behind permanent fortifications which included a pillbox system and an outer and inner ring of defenses, The attack was an unqualified failure. Although the attackers inflicted casualties on the Japanese they themselves suffered 18 oaten killed, 9 mounded,, i. ludIn two Americans, and one The fire. fight lasted for five hours, after which the besiegers withdrew without being pursued by the defenders. However., not only did the guerrillas fail to capture the position,., but they either could not or would not prevent the Japanese from sallying forth and burning s, houses in the hills west of the town. At the conclusion of the engagement the ammunition was about exhausted and they were being menaced by Japanese reainforawement5. The chief reasons advanced advanced for the failure were familiar ones. Some of the Chinese would not fight. The radiogram stated: "10th Army fought none, lousy," Coordination among the attackers was poor. And, insofar as BLUEBERRY was concerned, the unites Chinese commending of. cer exhibited the same lack of initiative and aggressiveness already noted in the case of his APPLE colleague. Cox stated the matter thus: His American bfficer7 only criticism was that the Chinese C.O. .was not capable and had greatly hampered the employment of the Commando during the attack." Approved For Release 2002/07/30SMKI 2-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Rlase 2002/07/30: CIA-RDP72-00121AOe100190001-3 Cox's report. to 'Heppner states that the attack was on Taiyuan: not otherwise described. The radtagraa states that the .eaaton was to take and hold Tom. One of the t citations states that the *Cowmft atta&ed the Japanese garrison near the village of TAI " TZE." The other sae that the " Coe endo attacked eneaeey installations near the village of TAT TtMN' Tom:. All Wes that the date of the operation was lugust 5, 1945. CoT's report and the citations were in part based on the radio- great Thera is no doubt that all refer to the same operation. gee the intelhigeeioe reports discussed.anbow% whim describe the types of Japanese installations in this area. Taiyuanshih me *vIden ly one of these. Approved For Release 2002/07/3 P72-00121A000100190001-3 S Of Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 The radioed report from the scene expressed it this way: "A rican Q.Q.'s .fought very well, but are extremely displeased with Col. Chia; O.C. commander. T think be spoils all." Tt concluded with the statement that the chief value of all Chinese lay in "ambushes and smell operati, na."e As a resfnit of the evident failure of the Chinese the coaand and control of the unit tended, as in the case of APPLE, to fall by default into Am, scan hands. This is shown by the two citations, both of which state specifically that the ren cited had led frontal assaults on the Japanese positions and emphatically that owing to the bravery of one of them "the American and Chinese troops were inspired to follow him with the result that heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy." It is unfortunate that in the cases of both AMP, and PILMERRY there is no material available to indicate at they accomplished apart from these fruitless attacks on Japanese nositinns. It is also unfortunate to be compelled to judge their accomplishments on the basis of the relatively brief tire they spent in the be little questie however that the attempt to have the Commandos operate in the manner of regular infantry troops was a failure. In each case were the unit attempted to attack a fortified position they were repulsed. The fault lay not with the men, since testimony shows that they conducted themselves very well. That much speaks well for the training which Cox and his associates had given them. Part of the trouble was owing to the general incompetence and lack of aggressiveness on the part of the Chinese officers. A greater part was the impossible situation of having the Americans present CI D 2-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 :SECREt Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 -106- forbidden to exercise oom nd of any sort. And by greatest part of the trouble was that the uni actically for which they were neither ntical experiences of both APPLE and the inherent compelled to do some- d nor ecoaippad. The Y, which operated in different areas and under different circumstances general plan for the OGs, weaknesses for which OSS cannot Id responsible. 00 OPE-qATTOt "3LAmmy," my - AmusT', 19L5. In terms of concrete results achieved, OO Operati of number was the largest, including as it did, the full complement of three coean of the information which is available concerning its activities, any of the do operations. And yet it presents no features not evident in the other two unite. This fact is eloquent testimony to the existence of certain basic problems and weaknesses in the 00 organisation and in the methods which circumstances and higher ertere forced upon During the early part of July the Chinese Combat Viand regi assted ore to be attached to C O' a operations in the Vest River valley. The units were ave eastwards and capture the laanchuk airfield, then held by the Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 _107- Japanese. They continut to move eastwards and operate ahead ,he advancing Chinese armies engaged in putting into practice the plans of operation CARBONADO. A provisional battalion headquarters was to be attached to Chinese Headquarters and under Chinese orders maintain opera- tional control of the three co an units.I The force consisted of the 8th, 9th, and 10th Commandos,, known respectively by kde-nerves $PICCT .AVOCADO, and BANANA. The provisional cowm aando battalion headquarters re calved the code-name of BLACK T. The total battalion stre Americans, 25 interpreters, and 500 Chinese. On 18 BLA R was airlifted to Liiachow. The departure from Chengkung airdrome was hold up for some tine on account of various avoidable administrative cul.ties. A series of ccoraantaa on the a following a for the serious delays at operations listed 2 "a. Furies t centrally located b. Shortage of 2 ton -truce c. Lack of Go aando Rosters d. Issuing of a munition Brad equipment in dark e. Each Commando wt having assigned area f. Com rwndQs carrying too much heavy ea uipay nt" The olasnning and execution of ?LACKB eas departure plan was avid less well-massaged than A?PVs had been. From Lihi :mans dothe river to Kwei -pingr ai ch they reached on July 23 and where theRv remained for tx dams. On July 25 they resumed their voyage, followed by the 255th Regiment of the 89th Chinese Infantry Division, This regiment was to be the *striking force" of the attack on ' anch- airfield and. was to receive the support in this endeavor of the 266th Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SEMI Approved For Rease 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A0@e100190001-3 k OPSO, Weekly operational report, 19 July 1945, and ,o OPSO, weekly operational report, 26 July 1945, in 033 Archives Snnring, OO,I 3 Operational Report, A copy of this document will be 05$ Archives - Kurod ng. OG.OP.S. Operation R?At RRT, Pblder ,O$ Letter, 'Dosce (M or John I. 8+eeblet, NO) to eColoneil (Ooz dated 7 August 1, in 03$ Archives - funning. OG.OP.?". ETA Operation. Folder #9.. The foregoing statements are borne out by the , fbl3 ng dociaents and radiograms;, to be found in the folders indicated. Conc1usionsw on Tanchuk Operation, undated, in 038 Archives ? Ewming. 00.OP.?. BANANA Operation. Folder . Radiogram, Cox to APPLE and bL ERIT, 9 August 19)45, Radiogram, Cos to BLACUIMT (fit), 13 August 1945, 088 ,archives - !un2I ing. 0Q.OP,5. Operation ELACKI$PRi. Foldw , Coot to Reppner, 00 Xonthly Report, 31 July 19 088 Archives - Kunming. OOOP.3 Monthly Report. Folder Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For.Selease 2002/07/30 CIA-RDP72-001210600100190001-3 Cox to Hepper, 00 monthly Report, . July 1' 088 Archives - g? oG.OP.3 -. $onthlir Aepa 1 Voider #3. Coac to C ding aaneral/Chinese C mbst mod: 10 A 19115, in 050 Archives ? oo.9P.1. g Chinese: Co*bat Cctmtrw-d. 14,10-Or eec to ieppuer, 00) onthi7 Report, '.. Au 1916, woo jw%;u&vvw tai l1 (Co R -~ 0P190.SIONS. a" Tab 010 for peps and sketches to serve as 'en annex to stuc of t operation ""UM' Cox to Commending General/Reserve Cow and to -endi in t 1916 , General/Chiness aandos, b Augus OSS Archives ? R aceral,~ 1st parachute Re e~snt, OG.OP.t4. a andif #13. inner. GG Monthly Rsport, 33 August 1916, ing i eS g ,,,~.. A&-ch 00.0p.1, - QI1 (Co "3" 'a QPRRIflOMS. Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/396 lA-RDP72-00121 A000100190001-3 or re age fro Liuchc w the TaT at least standards o *Ad was the usual Chinese delays t Join the 00s in the Tanobuk area "the refusal of the reginent . coraa an his was the divi- sion arrived. This despite orders from i'[arsharl Tang at Lf4 C '."2 the Japanese strength at the airfield was from two to three hundred sawn, d by artillery Pieces,* 2 anti-aircraft s quzaantit. in seal tnths ago.' d had failed, owing to the lack of suppor d mars. Large stores of sapliee had been brought On August 6 it was reported that n roes co The 00s had captured their objectives, buts in the resistance had had to relinquish th.n.4 During the course of ,, however, the Japanese opposition.4 on. The nese regiment thereupo as, was a "corn Lsturbed by say 265th did not ks on the the use re.at, Tenobuk against a attespt and the ass alt es suffered "The 265th Regiment did not norea, and except for a oraadic fire, they did not contribute any effort to the enc?aunt , notwith- standing the fact that the re ntal 00mander had been in on the planning of the attack. The failure of the 265th Regiment to be cottted, allowed the Jape to turn *11 their attention to the commandos and a five hour pitched battle took place, during which the t ommandos were subjected to deadly mid accurate mortar fire, and mach .ping. When this ammnition gave out, the Coa ndos were forced to Withdraw to safer ground. They had suffered casualties to the nwi*r of 22 killed, 31 wounded, and one interpreting officer killed. some raacle., no Averican casualties were sustained, even though they had been in the thick of the fight, Daarin, the night of 3 A st$ the Japs withdrew fro* 'f CRUK and the 265th Regiment moved into the town and the airfield." Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 Japanese the airfield in an easterly SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 -109- Following this action RY remained at Tanchuk until the end of the Z to mission, as defined by conforms to the pattee already observed in the cases of d BL1 'I RRT. The chief difference is that the tactical employment of the unite in direct support of regular military more important than the guerrilla activittes. The Operation plan, dated July l5, 1945p spelled out BLAC 'RRYas anion in considerable detail and attempted to resolve the problem of aho was to exercise cors> end. The ton was as fol.iowas a nFirast Battalion Chinese Commandos (Provissional), consisting of provisional Battalion Headquaarters, eighth, Ninth and Tenth Coos, will move via air transportation, on 1-19 July 1945, to LIt HOW ..., and will there be placed under the commanding General., 89th Chinese Divi.ssion, for the purpose of carrying out such missions as may be within their capabil- ities. These missions may include: a. ccnneiasance of the area of operation in advance of the b. 0. Leaders and as directed by the Division Oomsander. Attack and destruction of such enemy garrisons and instal latious along the route of advance, as may be within the capabilities of the Commandos, as determined by their and seizure of such key to or f'eaatass, of advance,, an may be within the capabilities of the Compaandos, as determined by their leaders and as ordered by the Division Comander. Raiding of such points until re. li.eved by elements of the Division or as directed by the Division !Ceea:aaaxtr, d. During coordinated attack of an enemy position by elements of the Division, to establish such road blocks as may be directed by the Division Commander for the purpose of preventing withdrawal of enemy forces or their reenforce- ment. Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-0012140100190001-3 109 tip ians~~~ ! ~ ~l~n APO *. ill be found in A copy t ~'n 15 July Archives ? d n . 00.0p.. 5. operation WO Folder The complete personnel rosters, financial, supply and z'e,supply packagirg (with code markiiags),, communications,, and other admin- istrative arrangements for SLACK RY will also be found in this Folder, 120 l eratiorta~. Qroupst BLAC1 R , APO 62 15 July 195, in 038 Archiver. - gtiame ng.. 06.OF.J, operation ffi.28-1- Folder ration Plan, Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 .410. e, Disruption of snowy lines of con unicaation in the WSST RIVER area, along the route of advance of the Division, at such times and places as may be directed by the Division Commander, Seizure of enemy transportation equipment, land which would assist the advance of the Division. Particular attention will be paid. to the intelligence derived from . the .conduct of these operations. A high priority will be assigned to the transmission or forwarding of enemy information to this headquarters," another Additional material bearing on BL.ACICBERRT's mission was included in another part of the Operation Plant1 1* 3. MOVSKM M Ak OF OPERATION L. h. it is expected that the Battalion will be net at L tEROW by representatives of Commanding Genera,. 89th Chinese Division, who will be able to provide information as to ration procurement# availability of coolie labor, acceptable currency, etc." Subject to orders, to be issued by representatives of Commanding General 89th Chinese Division, at LIU'CFI1 , units will be held in readiness to r ve out along route of advance within, first t my-four hour period after arrival. Decision as to employment of subordinate elements of the Battalion or individual Commandos will rest with the Battalion Commander or Commando Leaders concerned as the situation requires. This 00 mission coat clearly called for guerrilla units to operate in direct support of regular military operations and under the, close control of Division commanders. Excluding the missions concerning the collection of intelligence information, it is at once evident that none of BLUEBERRY's authorized authorised activities include true guerrilla operations, For one thing, the units a area of operations was closely confined in every Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 case to that lying athwart the Division's route of advance. In other words, BLACKBERRY was to provide the closest of tactical suppo ese 89th Division. There was no provision for the type of harassing a contemplated by Donovan and his associates. In addition, all parts of the missions envisage regular infantry assaults upon, and. defense of, prepared positions, rather than the hit-and-run type of guerrilla attack, harassment, and destruction. BLACKBE R! was k and destroy enerW garrisons} to attack, seize, and hold towns and 'features" i to establish road blocks and defend them against advancing or witrhdrawing regular enemy units; and to seize and hold enemy transports- equipment and disrupt enemy lines of communication, Thaw was set n concrete terms the Y aning of "direct tactical support o:. advancing armies," which was quite a different resnsibilit which both Cox and Do iavan had contmplated for the s. had been directed from the beginning in China that control over the the Theater Commander, who might delegate it to sub- ordinate cam ande rs. In this case the commander of the 89th Chinese Infantry Division had complete control of the unit, although he was com- pelled, by the terms of this Operation Plan, to consult BLACKBERRY'* Condo Leader. The directive stated that BLACK RRY was to "be placed the Commanding Goneral, 89th Chinese Division, for the purpose of carrying out such missions as may be within their capabilities." The existence of this "capabilities" clause gives rise to an interesting who. was to determine the capabilities? Tn two of the paragraphs Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SE&%T Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 which define the miset es in detail the following answers were provideds "b. Attack and destruction of such eneiq garrisons and lations, along the route of ad i e, as capabilities of the Commandos, as determined ' Leaders and as directed by the Division Coxa sander. c. Attack and seizure of such key to or features Corerandoa,, as determined by their Leaders and as ordered b the Division Commander." _. route of advances, as maybe within the capabilities a remaining paragraphs it was simply stated either that ordered by the Divi through the use of unusual powers of persuasion, be able to The directive therefore provides on legal job when some possibility of the Commando Leader's being able to influence the conduct of the operations of his unit. He was to determine caapabilit: On practical grounds, however, this possibility seems rather remte. BLACKBERRY was, after all, specifically pieced under the an + rider to modify a ssion on the ground accomplishment was not uLthin, the C' do''as c abilities. But Division Corr=der nevertheless persisted in his decision there was, on practical grounds, no option for the Cora endo Leader but to obey. In sun, despite the existence of such q'. no d, Commander. es as these, there can be Cora ando was completely at the disposal of the Division this case it rested completely tiry organisation. The point to Approved For Release 2002/07/ SEW 72-00121A000100190001-3 g General of the 89th Division. It is possible that the Co sndD b or that they were to do a Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 413-w there was a vast difference in this case between what was "legally" possible and what was "practically" possible. It is therefore clear that in term of mission and function the ration bore no resemblance other than the most superficial ila operation of the ype originally Some idea can be gained of conditions in the operational area several intelligence reports drafted dsri the period from BLA . T' a departure from Liuchow and eneaa tea in the field.2 A venture into the West River red. AV AD Oees team encountered no enemy units, since they were either in the process of withdrawing eastwards or southwards or also were installed in fortified village and hill positions. At Shilur , on July 23, for instance, the toaadt hoard automatic rifle Lion turned out to be the result of the atrug1 political factions for vosseaaaion of the town. One of these factions was "opposed to Central Oove:r ssamnt..e No Japanese were involved. the tee interviewed a local b been no Japanese in the area since the ddle of June, but that e of regular Chinese units had passed through. From the same source they heard a report that Jape se strength at Tanchuk was in the neighborhood At Kweiping they interviewed the commander of the local defense Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 d. Approved For Rase 2002/07/30: CIA-RDP72-00121AN6100190001-3 213 The intelligence, available to BLACKBZRF ' before its departure . from Nursing did not differ materially fro* that supplied to AM'P'LE. Bee, therefore, 'the appropriate part of the section devoted to the activities of APPIL. Then prat-departure intelligence reports for BLACKBMW All be' four. in turning, O&ST Archives - OG.OP.5?. - Operation BLACI RRt. Folder fl. mad in O$S Archives - King. 00.bPeC - 8LACKBMY, etas, Polder #I. following reportes Report . from AV ADO intelligence t., dated 26 J'uly 1945, and covering the period 23 - 25 July l945i Report from AVON intelligence tease, dated 8 August 194,5;1 and covering the period 25 July - 4 Asst 19451 Report from BANANAA, ' dated 7 July 19115 , aio. 7 August Is t ende ,, and acivoring the period 26 July - 5 Asst 1945. Copies of these reports will all be found in Os8 Archives -? Ruasing. OG.OP.7. BANANA Operation. Folder ilk'. Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 R Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 ?l14' tin. He informed them that the enemy had left Kt tpi.ng during the third week in June and that Japanese strength at Tanchuk was in the neigh- borhood of 1 Off?, euntorted by mortars and i.f ht and heavy machine guns. The Tanchuk Japanese were said to be &.n "radio and steamboat co -: caationaa& with their fellows down-river at Wuchow. 'Chinese Special Troops," o turned out to be U. Navy-trained guerrillas. From these and other sources tnfb r ti on was gat be red to indicate that ene was preparing to evacuate Tanchuk, since on July 25 "at 0130 hours more than eight (8) large boats left TANUE ? filled with equipment and Jap soldiers. More boats are being prepared to move at the wharf in TAAC . " 13~r July 2T the group had mved to the Tanchuk neighborhood, where "the special Troop comaaander of this area was greatly pleased at visiting his front lines and staged an attack on the village of WIILTNO for my benefit." The attack was, ominous portent, repulsed. However, the enemy evacuated Mehling shortly thereafter. ` enchu'k itself was found to be under attack and harassment by an undetermined number of local guerrillas. The nnrpose of these citations has been to show that the pre. operational intelligence reports were substantially correct in their view of the situation: the Japanese clinging to fortified positions and their lines of coz unicaation; the open countryside under the control of uhatever had been able to impose its will on the i abita nts; and the fact that these local powers might or might not be particularly the central Chinese government. Such was, the situation into Bch were thrust the Chinese commandos. Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 UQU Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 The `anchuk airfield operation was one in which B AC RRY participated before the end of the war. It is poeeit rather fully, since three accounts and several field sketch maps have been preserved. These include one report written by an officer in battalion headquarters, which is usef;z. for gaining a general picture of the operation,, two reports written by an American officer with the 8th Co ndo (A1. Ct r), n by the 5arl A ericar Officer of the 10th Co aanciar (9k I' ,). These are particularly valuable, because their authors all participated in cording to the battalion report, the Chinese 265th Regiment, which n assault on Tanchuk, left tiuchow ti m the city, By the tip Fir -nam was reached, however, the coa,*ndo was five days ahead of the regiment,, "despite orders from CCC and Marshal fang of the 13 h Amy to the Co sting him not to delay anywhere enroute." After further delay, again attributed to the sloth of the Chinese cozen ander of the 265th, both units assembled in the Tanchuk neighborhood. The Tanchuk position was as follows .2 The air ?ia north of the West River, while Tanchuk village was on the ri bank. About 500 yards east of the airfield was the village of To-Chung, which served as a Japanese headquarters, To-chug nestled at the foot of a ridge which ran generally in a north-south direction and which had several h peaks. The village of Met-Lin lay at the root of the ridge a? Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Rairase 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121ABW100190001-3 Repot by APRICOT: an Tanahuk Operation, dated 7 August 1945; Report by APRICOT on Tancheek Operation, datod 8 August 1945; Report by ARARA on T*nehuk Operation, no date, signed Captain George Ounderman, Jr., Senior American Officer; Report by RLLC1 RRY on Tanchuk Operation, 10 August 1945. These will all be found in 058 Archives - Kunming. o4.OP.7. BANANA Operation. .Folder #9. It will be recalled that "BLACKBRRr was the code-ems given to the operation as a whole and that it also was the code-are e given to the battalion headquarters. The battalion consisted of the 8th, 9th, and 10th Contandosa whose code-sees were, respectively, APRICOT,, AVOCADO, BABABl. same folder for a complete list of American officers sted son engaged in Operation ST A a. Since the radiograms from the field do prat present any features different from the written accounts of BL,AC RM e s part in the Tanohuk operation,, they will not be included here. See the following folders, horeve rs for copies of therm 088 Archives - Kunning. MOM. ? Operation .CKZflRT. and chives ? frig. Reg. OP.3. Proiectee 348108, Operational 149b. . See Tab #B.ee.,s I for the sketch situation this passage Is A copy of this map will be found in 065 Archives - Kunming. OQ.OP.7. BANAMA Operation. Folder Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 -116- do north of To-Chung. At the southern end (and h ridge were located one set o and east. This ridge was known as 'Hill #5. Ab 000 yards east of eneaey works on Hill 5 was another and more precipitous ri had several peaks. The highest of these was approximately i of the ridge and contained another and more formidable set 0 The enemy defenses were arranged so as to provide a field of fire in any direction. This ridge also ran gem and was known a ill A, BLACKBERRY on the extreme northerly slopes of Hill 4 during the action, yards to the north of Bill , and not connected AP TCOP occupied from July 28 to July 30 and spectively. These Japanese positions ugh terrain, partly to the fortification, pill boxes, machine gun and mortar emplacements, and and partly to the support which the enemy was able to give vith his 41m r mortars and other light artillery pieces. Sore of these were located in To-chin and. others on the hills themselves. Capture and retention of both Hills 14 and # was essential to capture and control of the airfield. After the arrival of the 265th and BLACKBERRY in the Teach* area the Senior kaerican Officer of the undo battalion suggested that the 26th the actual attacking "be placed d unstre in an of the airfield and that the ro an Japs." The Chinese Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECR(T Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 -117- ad to agree to this plan,, which, incidentally, was far more .sal concept of what the cox andos were supposed to do than what was actually done. Since, however, the Chinese colonel of the 265th would have nothing to with i RRMS plan, the Americans could do nothing rther. This was the result of Theater directives concerning Chinese - American relations in combat waits. Accord- the following plan was adopted..I shortly after midnight and contini a, BIAMMRRZ's. This and the eucceeMng otation are }n from the report by the battalion offs cerjmai.n attack gaanchuk. At (300 PM the 8th Cos wando was to open its attack on a high bill which had a strongly entrenched pill-box with other gun a acenents. At the same time a barrage of and 83 rt-ar fire was to be laid dos on two s ll er hills which overlooked and surrounded the stall village containing the Jap CP and their 70mm gm positions and an Rl mortar position. Won that fire was lifted,, the 10th Co ndD, which meanwhile was. to have crept up to the base of the two aaall hills;, was to attack the bill and ire a yellow flare,. indicating to the regiment that the line was taken by us and they would send a battalion to take the stall town containing the Jaap CP. The airport would than have been sure. This plan was accepted and agreed upon by the 0 of the 26!;th and us, Meanwhile# the 9th Commando less 2 sections, held back as reserve for the main retail,, was to be on the river for an ambush against any Japs es pinyg in boats.' attack on the southwest end of the airstrip near the villa was launched, the regiment was to create a sz ll. diversio The dispatch of the 9th o cndo {A M. } for ambush preparations on the river shows that at least part of the American officer's plan was adopted. On the otter handy AP IC ` and BA A were given the uncongenial task of reducing Hills 4 and / respectively, while the 26th was to create diversion and to secure the airstrip once the vital hill positions bad been captured. Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For RbWase 2002/07/30: CIA-RDP72-00121AMM100190001-3 117 1. The state rent 06too in in error and should read *600 AN," messing the moruing of Aug st 3. The ?i mortare mentioned in the text oar s orting the core mauddeas were not part of their table of equi ent, but belonged to the wse. The only mortars ioh the om-*ndoa used were the ones. Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 +1I3- 'is scheme went awry, however, in that the Chinese gave no support. and that the Americana In one case were unable to capture their objective and in the other to hold it. Furthermore,, the 9th Co ando becaaae involved in an unfortunate Incident on the river. In one sense the operation did succeed,,, however, since the Chinese and Americans did ultimately get control of the airport and village. The Japanese voluntarily evacuated Tanchuk during the night of Au, st 3 - I. The brief account of these events followas "The attack of the 8th and 10th Coe ndoa went off as planned and the 10th Commando fired the yellow flare and kept the line waiting for the 3n of the regiment to follow through on its part of the agreed plan and take the ton. No activity was noticed at all on the part of the regiment save a few shots at the far other end of the field., instead of a. battalion to take the town only a small party was sent and they were repulsed by the Daps. After holding the two =all bills for about 6 hours under murderous mortar fires! 70a fire,, 57 fire and snipers fire and never receiving the expected and promised help from the regiment, they were forced to withdraw because of high casualties and a complete expending of all their ammunition. The 8th: CCo ando ran into much heavier opposition than was expected and about Is o'clock in the afternoon were given order to withdraw, for the awe reasons as the 10th. The 9th Conmaesndo at about 6:00 sighted 6 sampans floating down the river toward their ambush. Mhan the boats were within range of the =bush the Chinese CC gave orders to open fire on the boats. When the ambush was over, it was discovered that the boats con- tained Chinese civilians who had been carrying salt for the Jape at Tanchuk and other dap points down the river. ?irat aid was given the wounded by the Americans, At about :2C the American CO requested permission ..* to with- draw the Commando back to the base. ht Jap sniper fire kept up on our positions on the high ground and then about midnight stopped. The next morning observed Chinese of the regiment walking all over the hills we had fought on and taken the deny previous. The renumts of the Daps had withdrawn during the night after the attack in very much of a hurry via the river and overland south of the Vast River. "' Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 ?1191% The two APRICOT reports give a more detaileed account of the assaults in rich that unit was engaged. The August 7 report speaks of the assault on Hill ! as "the high point of Apricot's part in the operation." This divided roughly into four phases, all on August 3, 1945t to 0700, the approach # from 0700 to 0800, the assault attempt; from 0800 to 1500 o reduce eneny emplacements with z tar and bazooka fire"; from 1500 to 1530, the withdrawal. The August 8 report goes into 1. AICtT'ar first objective was a ridge on the approaches Japanese positions on Hill #4. 1 This ridge was to be reached by dawn. that point the attack on enemy positions at Z was to be launched with support from 81= mortar on Hill 3 and from our own mortars and ligh guns." Coincident with this assault, "a diversionary, attack against poss. south slope at dawn." The 'First Branch (Rifle) "provided security at eastern base of Rill h and provided squad for the diversionary attack." Branches Twos Three (both Rifle), Four (Mortar), and Five (TM) made up the force a o the rain attack. and Five were to support Two and Three. Branch Six (liti was broken up into ammo bearing details." Coolies were to help with uni- Lion bearing and general? resupply. "lack of intellige terrain and ene'r positions," no specific plans had been decision to attack position Z from li The approach to the jump-off pain on the peak of Hill #4 (position Z) was delayed by overcast weather and confusing terrain. From this point the weaknesses in the command structure Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SEW Approved For Rse 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A0Q&100190001-3 go* Tab *Z. f.,5 item II. This is the sketch > at Kill #l on which this account based, The letters (Via,,* line IF* etc.) .11 refer to this, sketch map. *A m III shows in more detail the Japanese positions on Hi U ft, 1. The point 4 in blue is meant hero, The point 0 in red reform to the second Japanese counter-attack. The stteapt was certainly made to recognize this ails efforts? since he was recommended for a battlefield commission, This was denied his by higher headquarters, Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : C DP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECR Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 definition of what must be the relattonasbtp between Atr sricane and Chinese ,nntnated the proceedings. Once position EF had been reached, a delay occasioned by the Chinese reluctance to proceed. At about 0630 the diversionary attack was la ached from the point G. The squad came under Japanese fire when about 100 yards from position Z. Thereupon ensued a remarkable incident. The American non-co atesioned officer assigned to that squad was unable to -get the Chinese aqd. ldr. to rave forward and attempted lead an assault on his own. But the squad did not fallow him." This American thereupon aide sn ird vidual rush at the Japanese position Z and came within 25 yards of It. Although this 0 attack accomplished little Japanese fire (which it was intended to do), At this point ti> main attack have seized the Japanese position on, the sumi ailed in a masterpiece of under-statement wheel, he said of the one-gran diversionary attack, that the Anarican's *efforts are worthy of recognition" these events were t did have the result of drawing their difficulties. When the diversionary attack opened t commando mortars and machine guns opened fire on position most of their anao firing blindly in the direction of Z befo ted Aneri? cans could got them on the proper target." This was not easy* because nod the crest of the hill was covered by a cloud bank and ervation was poor." The two branches maneuvered back and f Approved For Release 2002/07/30 tg~ Y-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 :t}CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 ..1.21? a time between positions E Ps CD, and A18, some of the movements being out the knowledge of the Americans. Meanwhile the cloud bank lifted. The enemy "with its excellent fields of :fire pinne 7d and 3d branches to the ground," Soon thereafter the Jap +aese made a counter-attack at point , which failed to dislodge the corgi which inflicted casualties on them. Japanese snipers also took tit toll and s ~.cceedod in disrupting accuracy of the commanadDs' a artar and bazooka fire. This stalemate endured until mid-afternoon, at which time, owing to a second Japanese counter-attack th time against point r3, and to the withdrawal of BANANA from its positit on Hill #5 drawal was ordered. The enemy was left in possession of his position The 10th Co ando (B, t eALA) received the mission of taki 1 in order to support the 26th Regiment a s assault on To-chung? of this goal BANANA attacked the hill and had rapt red it off in the process an estimated squad of Japanese soldiers. T of the ti.m up to 1100 was spent in m changing fire with the an 9 n pursuit , driving latter returned BA `ANNA' a fire "and proceeded to lay, an 81 barrage on our positions which was very effective and produced casualties," At ? 0 the Chinese unit (of the 26th), after neither giving nor receiving much fire, began to withdraw. This withdrawal put BRA-'iii in a moat unco fortable position,,, since 'both sniping &. artillery fire was being directed at our rear and left fla.a' A good deal of this hostile fire was coatis from the ener positions on Hill #ls, which APRICOT had been unable to Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SEI~IET Approved For Rase 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121AO 100190001-3 See Tab Its, for a sketch map showing the area general and the moaem is of the 10th Co' ndo (BANANA) in Particular. Note ' that on this map tat Hill is mistakenly labeled "Kill #Ox and that Hill #2 (or 13) is mistakenly labeled *Hill A.* Us Items 1 - lIr for the enact version. Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 x.22 - Lnate. By noon the Chinese supporting unit had retreated to Net-tin which action completely exposed BANANA a s enemy to concentrate his entire volume of fire on our positions." With- drawal was finally authorised and, after a 'Benzaat* attack b Japanese had been repulsed with heavy casualties the attack successfully completed 1a As has been already stated, the Japanese voluntarily withdrew from Tanohuk during the night, leavir both village and airfield in possession of the 26th and BLA T. In. the sense of. results achieved, the opera- tion was thus a success. However, the enemy had repulsed the Allied effort to dislodge him by force, From the attar,, therefore, the operation was a failure, This even assuming that the Japanese withdrew because they feared that heavier attacks would fallow;, This is only an assumptions however, since there is no evidence available to prove it and s# the general Japanese policy beginning early in 1945 had been to withdraw their forces gradually but steadily towards Canton. The Japanese hold their position on Hi at between fifteen and thirty men. They squad. The remainder of the total. N with a sail force estimated h an estimated ted available Japanese strength of three hundred at Tanchuk was in Taanchuk village, To?chung village, and on the airfield, The A u 3P force allotted to the main attack on Hill #4 comprised Branches Two and Three,. with a total strength of 6% Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 -123- supported by Branches Your and Fiv?a, with a total strength of Ia.- Thus, if the four branches we lumped together, the attackers outnumbered the defenders by between three and one-half and a bit more than seven to one, depending upon the number of Japanese actually on the hill. If only the fin assault force (Branches Two and Three) are considered, the ratio in favor of the attackers was between a little more then tuo and a little less than five to one. The First Branch, which had the responsibility for mount- ing the diversionary attack, had at least a strength equal to that of the defenders and at most an advantage of more than two to one. The ratio of attackers to defenders on Hill # was equally favorable to the attackers. The total strength of BLACkI:.R c?! Chinese, 60 Aericsns, and 2 Interpreters. And yet the operation failed. Despite the ene advantage of hol dig. ng he ight s behind .fear ti fi cations it is difficult not to agree with the statement of APRIC 's reporter in his August 8 report that *a bayonet and grenade assault by thee 2d Branch under covering fire of the other branches would have carried the hill with possibly medium casualties." Various valid reasons were advanced for the failure. BANANA blamed the supporting unit of the 26th Regiment, which withdrew and left the co.wmndo wmyosed to unrestricted ens ;W fire, and the rest of the Regiment, which failed completely to perform Its part in the operation. Both APRICOT and BANANA attributed the failure to the conduct of the Chinese officers in corn of their units and to the weaknesses in B C RRY battalion headquarters. APRICOT' a reporter recommended in his August 8 report that Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECIET Approved For Rase 2002/07/30: CIA-RDP72-00121AOM100190001-3 123 See- Tab 'B" for the Commandasw Table of ,Organisation.. The actual strength varied little from, the T/O strength. Toe figures given In the text include Chinese# Americans, and interpreters. This tijpre includes AVOCADO# which did not take part in the main attack. In addition, of course# there was the Mines. 265th - eRiUMt. Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : C DP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRf Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 -1214- Lneae coax rider be replaced and castigated his in these termst The conduct of the Chinese C.Qo during the fight was graceful. At no time would he saga out of his covered sition to coordinate and direct the maneuvers of the two Is branches. He never personally observed the forward of his troops or .race any awe forward to do so. In my opinion he was dared with fright and must be replaced ere in the same document the reporting officer stated that there for the failure, 3. Poor resupply; 4. Senior in his coaasn 2. Lack of coordination; er," B ANA's used towards the Chinese officers the exception of the conirtander. Concerning the battalion he reportede "it is the opinion of this Officer that throughout the recent action, the Bu co and was extremely weak and lacked aggres- siveness. Too much indecision was evident where a quickly, calculated decision at the propitious time would have had more desirable effects and would have moat certainly assured the annihilation of the Japanese ibroes." "The failure of Chinese Officers to recognise iineent sits. tons loses valuable time. Many occasions in the past few weeks have proven the Chinese Officers unwilling to cooperate to the point of uncalled for obstinacy." There is no question but that the Theater Directives concerning the question of coaand and the relstionaatp between americans and Chinese personnel had created a situation wherein the conduct of the Chinese officers was of paramount importance. There is a remarkable consist at act of those Americans who served with 0PI . B P' Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-f~72-00121A000100190001-3 SE Approved For Release 2002/07/30 {: MCIIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 ?l25.. r T. They all called attention to the unsatisfactory performance of the Chinese condo officers* such circumstances the burden of command fell by default upon the shoulders of the i ricane assigned to the tur of the reports of the Tanchuk action reveals that in most the orders to advance, deploy, or retreat were given by the Americans. This is particularly true in the case of A ICOTts diversionary attack. Support for these statements is to be found in the citations fbr distinguished performance by the A ricans. The recowrendations invariably erphasized generally took the on led thei ive in action.I ted fire' and A third major reason for the failure of the operation was the generally good use which the Japanese .i erican Officer did not speak of them. MINA' a Senior reports A.P IC reporting, officer spoke of Japanese tactics and bows they affected the ie. in his August 7 report he states that the Japanese fortifications re disappointingly fra :le# but praises the enernra s tactics$ "They pinned Apricot don with automatic weapons or sniper fire from crest of hill.,. They infiltrated snipers around Apricot's left flank, clear dozen to lower reaches of mountain, and succeeded in pinning dog let Branch minus one squad at back of hill. At same time snipers hold 'd. and 3d branches static in their positions, precluding maneuver. counter- attacks ... led by Nambu lights making lots of noise also i bilised our force. Action of the Jap snipers, operating individually was superior. The Jape amipere operating over the mountain to our left and in the rear was extremely deceptive and effective. We should have sent our counter snipers - also operating an individuals, This would have allowed us to maneuver. His light counter attacks around Apricot's left flank were noisy. Again their tactics were good, as it kept Apricot worried." Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For'R.Iease 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121 $0100190001-3 See the Willa ng fbiders for the" citatif) OS& Archives -, 1uuemi s.. OG.OP.7. BANANA Operation. Folder !. OSS Archives - Euaing. OG.OP.?. ? citations. Folder 02 o88 Archives lCvrAdng Oo.Op.bs ? Promotions aM C.ttetiora$. Pol t It should be remembered that BANANA pined its objective * little difficulty. 1. "Conclusions" on the Tmchuk operations =&"d* 08$ Archives - tus arcing. G.OP.7. UNA Operation. ?alder Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIAA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 :CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 .l26w August 8 report he says t "Five snipers (estimate) infiltrating behind Apricot forced tvo, branches into bowl below ZF and discouraged - maneuver. Also harried let Branch at base of hill pinnixg it dots. he Jap use of individual snipers using their ova Initiative waa clever. The Jap proved resourceful as an ndivtdual and as a unit." Clearly, Japanese skill combined * ith the inertia of AP ICOT t s Chinese officers played an important part in the failure to take Hill e. Finally, it is necessary to consider the conduct and quality of the Chinese soldier. It has already been noted in the cases of APPLE and that there is little information on this subject beyond general to case likewise most attention was directed towards the soldiers conducted themselves well or that they fought the Chinese officers. However# the reports on the Tanchuk operation do provide a few clues and permit the drawi not too surprising con. clusion that the Chinese soldiers for the most part behaved ratio to the way in which their Chinese officers behaved. the usual statement that "high praise must be vex: to the Individual Chinese soldier who fought gallan' While this may be true in general it is certainly not true in all crises, since the comments of APRICOT's and HANA#s reporting officers differ radar headquat'te e only in their unfavorable rents about battalion oh contained very few Chinese PICOT r a A ugu 8 report, in speaking of the approach novemen Approved For Release 2002/07/3 I72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRff Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 27? "Upon reaching initial objective 2d Branch thought that they had reached the crest and that the positions Were unoccupied. Immediately the Chinese began to rejoice and it took soar time to convince them that the dep positions were beyond this point." ionax ' attack on ,Hill #4 was carried out si te-handedly by an because the squad refer: o follow him. At the same time "the tartars and machine guns went into position and, opened fire. They wasted m st of their a s.o firing blindly in the direction of Z before the ihneri.- cans could met them on the proper target." The bazooka and mortar fire from ArRTM ' during the stalemate around Hill # before the unit's wtth- e "very, inaccurate due to accurate sn ow the Jap positions. The pill box was still in good condition at 1200." On the other hands, RANA apparently c n ted itself in an eXe 1e ' canner, for their Arioan officer corimented as followst "The 10th commando had trot aggressive assault spirit. They deployed we3ll and held excellent fire discipline throughout the entire action. A cool, well, aimed deliberate fire accounted for many Japanese casualties. Excellent marksmanship was dis- played by the BAR crews and LAS crews. The preparatory mortar fire was excellent. Prior to the launching of the attack, it was delivered at a range of 1500 yards and needed very little adjustment, The American Senior Officer expresses the utmost admiration for the Chinese personal of the 10th Commando and the Chinese officers." The evidence has made it clear that BMWs porfor general superior to that of APRICOT. Not only did it take and hold its objective until forced oft` by a combination of withering Japanese fire and the failure of APRICOT and the Chinese supporting unit from the 265th Regiment,, but also the comments of its Senior A ri.can Officer are far favorable than are those of APRICOT's reporting officer. Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET . Approved For Release 2002/07/30: CIA- P72-00121A000100190001-3 thus an uneven quality in the rfori the tactical failure of the operation. Another reason for lps to explain huk is therefore that .APRICOT'a men,, probably owing the inferior quality of their Chinese officers, proved, on the whole, wanting had. been described as the requisite coerrrerdo qualities of initiative, iveness. That PAUAJA's personnel apparently Possessed these qualities in greater a re was insufficient to co ?ensate for P ICOTOm shcrteo .inr;s. Finally, it must be reared that the co dos were not desied ed an rea .ar assault troops. In particular they did cessary effectively to carry- out attacks on prepared osi.- such as those of 8anchuk. When their support failed to materialise, as it did at Tanch , they were exposed to mot unpleasant consequences, Such were some of the results of the Theater cl.ic, governing the organise- tion,, use, and control of the OSS Operational Groups units. AND CONCLUSION The Operational Group effort during World War extent in Europe, was influenced by three The first was what role should gmrrills warfare play in the Allied effort against the Axis? This question was never "ally answered In a r. Two schools of thought put fortis their ideas on the subject. The first school, identified with Donova., Car, and their seso_ rri]le warfare should be waged and should be essentially Approved For Release 2002/07/3 tc P172-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 in nature. Their basic promise was that where he was the most vulnerable ability to defeat the enemy in battle Allied guea by their very nature, could not without support hops to meet the enemy troops on equal ter was they should concentrate on hit-an attacks. These advocates felt that the cumulati offset of guerrilla activity could be tremendous, in that it mould diminish the one capabilities by attacking and destroying them and by compelling him to divert raga and acre troops to the task of protecting them. In a warfare represented the Allied capability of in eraey pending an increase in their taut regular power. Such a situation pertained in Eux pe prior to the IM invasions. In China? the Chinese armies remained in being, completely incapable of inflicting decisive defeats on the Japanese invaders. This school of thought therefore considered the situation as ideal for laarx scale guerrilla warfare operations. They felt that to be or the strategic point of view t a should be centrally controlled from highest headquarters in Washington and relatively free from local control by the Theater Commanders, Thus, they would devote themselves exclusively to strategic objectives as indicated. The second school of thought felt that under no circumstances should any military units, including guerrilla unite, operate in a Theater of era; without being controlled by the Theater Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 of co d sprint i,ple. thex x , as s by 00 activities both in Europe and in China, this school of the ht Undid to consider arfare as an activity which test be directly co-ordinated '~Ath military operations. In other wards, they considered-it to ctical in nature than did their opponents. It must tied very regular military units. in :th ry the hi It heeade .r to t of guerrilla uni never really settled and no clan 1 *117 in China, the OOs were or the co lete control of th d guerrilla d then as advance regular infantry t Their efficiency wa, The second basic question was: shall the g personnel a question essentially of d forces? and foreign relations and with along those lines. The bate decision was participation to what was called the bulk of the guerrillas to co from the unit was to operate. It has anal nuol.et 0" as in the territory in ich been ,teal that in wee not too succeessf*ilj since the natives tented in terms of poet-war politics an in terms of the varti military problems. in China this policy led to the organization of the co r from among Approved For Release 2002/07/P72-001 21A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 personnel# with the Americans limited to the role of advisers is n combat operations. It cannot be considered idea worked in practice. The third basic question is related to the second one and like it was a diplomatic rather military or organizational matter. This wa should the A ri.can "operational nuclei" exorcise command, or should the indigenous elements in the units do so? It was finally decided in China that, owing to Chinese sensitivity in the matter of sovereignty, command would rest with the Chinese. They were to follow American advice, The decision was unfortunate, strace instead of settling the problem of command and control it merely complicated it. The Chinese of American superiority in techniques and of the necessity to o American advice, yet were usually unwilling to allow either this superiority or this advice to influence their conduct o operat; Thus? of these three basic questions, the firs tent problem ntal philosophy or doctrine? while the last two represent one of y kind. Rio fields they refused to allow them to command guerrilla units. But at the nature of this decision may be explained by remembering that the very idea a warfare was not one which had gained universal acceptance in higher or lower military circles. ulties to be faced in w as the highest beadctr Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 eerning the three basic questions, hasees of 00 affairs. In the :tatter d an unfortuna d under a t rendous disadvantage, in that they adequate n= rbers of ten or in the ratter of supplying man of the necessary qualifications for 00 to rk# the' nese promises cowsrni personnel pmcuremr t. When the minas to bombard both Chinese and American headquarters which grew more desperate and pleea n as tip went on. Faced with a `haatar order my corn andos ready for the .field by An gust 1 086 had to postpone and charge training schedules a n ber of tinaz and had to a sonnet who did not et r&n# 00 standards. Neither Chinese -war a headquarters rave the project any tactical infantry tasks .sq being cowl; ed to operate as infant ions, The missions given the 04s, as has been mated, were actually chiefly nothing for the ,ricans to organization and w-mament, were matter. Despite their tacking fixed pa d accordingly. art was either totally lacakir,, as in the cees of APPLE units, nothing the Americans could da aba r oos tnents wither in the matter of auppl n 1upposed t n the case of BU ". Otis were compelled, totally unaided, to attack a etaa,barn dl enemy. These attacks failed. Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 The most dual failure was the twin attempt to combine for field operations the use of American advisers with Chinese commanders and per- tel. and to solve the language problem by the use of int eerpreters. The ng excerpt from a letter to ax from one of the Americans in the nstrates this point clearly, in the absence of authority there Such understanding was totally lacking... of view of language and from that of good relations nese officers were usually t cooperate; the Americans were always forbidden to oorvAnd. Consequently erloaaas diminished, 'Howaev.rs there are many thin s to be corrected. ... V. relations of the first part of the boat trip . KBMf a e trip by sampan from Lit; chow to ttae Taanoht were changed when the Americans started talking in terms of ethese Chinese',, ate. They understand that stuff Uk. we do 'Ding How#, only in the opposite sense. Then what was a comfortable ride for the nese was so much more ainese country for the Americans, Then a search among Chinese troops individually to recover lost American property didalt help. The val of the Chennault attitude cant be overemphasized. it was suggested that there be fever Americans in csmbat. Here very serious incidents occurred through: misunderstandings, avoid- able by intimacy & friendship between Chinese officers & ny by straightening out about who's to take commands from whom. The Americans can't coed directly on the field - 1. Chinese officers already have their orders. 2. The circuit American - interpreter - Chinese officer interpreter - American is too easily broken In combat. . The Ch. officers threaten to shoot the soldier who follows the American rather than hi elf. My impression was that the whole thing should be made clear before action & then cut the a. This means that the Ch. officers have to be made certain of, before they would take off completely on their own. Again - the matter of th. & Am. not knowing each other. Contrary to this is the isolated story a Chinese officer having complete,%& lasting confidence in the American, but this is excep- Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Rase 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121AO 0100190001-3 Letter, w a $ r John Bt Hfeeh1ot,,, ) dated T August 19, 5, In Archives - Kunming. ~e 00.0P.7;, 1*W A Operation. 7otdw # . The foregoing etatereante borne out by the U d*awu ets and radiogram,, to be found in the folders Indicated. 'CondIu o if on Tmchuk 'Operation, ui dated,, in Archives - Xing. OO.OP#?s SA ANA Operatio*# !bider #9. Radiograms, Cox to APPS,R a ILZ R i,, 9 Avast 1945j Radiogrn, Ccx to DL RR (REAR), 3,3 Avast IA5a in 085 Archives - Kung., r, 0G.0P.5o Operation ~ T. roIder . AMcoT on Tanchu Operation, dated D mgt 1915, in .7. ARA Operation. an Tmn* k Operatio s 058 Archives - T to .7. BAN"A Operation. bid. Cox to APPs BLt O51 wear - iuISInd?: OO.0P. S,k Operation DL Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 -134- Above,, press for aove form of reoranis; to of affairs responsibility." FatlLa this lie =could "fir it American personnel use the OSe according to v at was ostensibly their o author of the August 8 APRICOT report on the Tenchuk operation re( that the nu ;bc r of American and interpreter personnel be reduced "to two veers onc?_ h EN, 2 interpreters."1 HARTAHA a Senior A rican Officer con- sidered in his report that the ideal solution would be to re +ve all the Chinese OS officers and replace then with Americans who would, "assume full too *.. Chinese Officers to exert full co r d responsibility for all actions."2 And Cox wrote what might well be considered a fitting epitaph for the entire C project in China. ndicated. ON R IATTONS OF CHIN967 AND A3 ICANS PD TOTT M93T W? 1''!AT SAPS MY) 7V AWE DAAS OUCH PD R CO W YOU 00 NOT ATTACK FORTI','M, H'RAV`LY CMA COOPERATION OF CHH14 OFFICERS D PH R 3ULTS THUS FAR t1 TAMED I ICATE C1TI! E POSITIONS UNLESS YOU HAVE COMPLE S' P E OR 3 TO 1 tJ PJ} CANCENTRATE ON PAT LS C 14A F Y (MUMS CMA SUPPLY L FITC PS" 3 As it was the Chinese Combat Co and (CCU) and the Chinese thensely ad the type of zdesion in which the OSs w tions, it. is rather ironic that at the very end of the war they should have Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 x .hat the co operated best as guerrilla bands and that they should concentrate on true guerrilla targets. n i'dkt results that bought. noes we The pri is pal emphasis in this aeries of papers has been on the 01 in China. The 035 put a tremendous aseount of devotion and effort into the project, but did not succeed in its ai as The Japanese were not hampered particularly from either a strategic or a tactical point of view. 00 attacks on Japanese positions failed. 00 attacks did not disturb in any particular wad a Japanese withdrawal vh chi was being carried out according to plan. ust judge the results of the effort must do so only after consideration the situation in China and the answers to the three basic questions dtecuseed at the beginning of this section. The OGs appeared on the scene late in ?~e war, too late, and decisive effect on ter course of operations or, as has been indicated, th act-ow.," shnent the Japanese of their withdrawals to the east and north, T*t the OOs did appear so late s not their fault, since higher adquarters la d for so long on to employ them. The fail a to answer the first of the three basic < ueattons causedthe OGs to have to operate under a vast handicap, The unrealistic answers givm to t?,ao basic questions made it impossible for the commandos to perform efficiently under arm situation hatsoever. Basic al 1, , therefore was given a large responsibility, but waz denied the freedom and authority necessary to fulfil that responsibility and was saddled with unrealistic Approved For Release 2002/07 P72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 36- restrictions on the activities of its ( u of modern rfasre, with its combination of regular and guerrilla operations difficult art, and while it is true that the waging of warfare by, coalition presents nany complex probleea s planners ignored, either partially or completely, the realities and tended to give half-answers to very important ' estionse it in regrettable that the industry the training camps, and his ran ii utilized. it is indeed doubly ,#brtu in cause. old ayhoul8 not have been better that none of then were killed in 3LiOAPCAL NOTE The study of the OSS rratio pa activities World War ii is easy In some respects and hard in others. readily available in abundance on some topics 'ce and incomplete. It is difficult for the pu to classify this material fro point., since the contents of the sly correspond exact at with their titles. For example,* attho folder deals with on various other subj Baader will find must therefore be inventoried with rtant documents be overlooked. The topical titles oar d as anything re than incomplete and tentative. Approved For Release 2002/ DP72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 th oral, the most coa 'rlete documentary materi; and ope ational field* while the topics isfactorily covered are those of administration, supply,, finance? and other such amtters. It has been fortunate,, therefore, that the emphasis of the present series of papers has been on precisely those aspects for the study of which the most documents are availa e. It would be ideal to have the entire supply of documents on the OQ project in China com- pletely reclassified in a more rations]. manner, according to sub ec?. and to have it competently cross-indexes. The following is a lists with notations,, of the material used in this 1. War i ce , Office of Strategic se=gga (O& )s, Prepared by cry Project, Strategi rvicos U t,, Office of the taut Secretary of War, War Department. Washington, ted by .5. Government Printing Office, Department of Service office, July, 191L9, Two Volumes. (Volume I: Washington Organization; Volume II: Operations in the Field) These well-known volumes give a comprehensive account of both the Washington and overseas activities of 05S. The first volume contains many transcripts of important cu ats, etch are vital for any a nslyssis of planning for unorthodox warfare. This work was used extensively in the preparation of Paper Number I of this series, in particular Volume I. Study of Volume IT is essential, for an introduction to OSS overseas operations,. rims it gives brief accounts of planning and operations In all the fields in which 068 was active. tions of space prevent any extended treatment of selected operations. It is unfortunate that the wait as a whole tends to lay stress upon the positive and successful accompl ments of OSS? while glowing over.,, although admitting the existence of, problems and failures. It in equally unfortunate than no indication of sources is given, In sums while this Approved For Release 2002/07ffi-cR ,P72-00121A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA~.l 972-00121A000100190001-3 book is extremely useful, and while its character and appr should wt be equated with Parson mat life of George Waashington,* it is essentially an uncritical piece of work. Its internal organisation has led to a certain amount of repetitiousness. This is a fairly long history, of the Operational Group osnd from its origins to the conclusion of operations in lurope* 'It appears to be among the meterial from *:Leh the sections in the Mar Re rt on 00 activities were written. Contains a few refer- ace documents. Devotes cce t derable space to early plane and decisions end to accounbaaa of oper?atloas in B e. Particu- larly valuable as an extended intro duct ion to the subject, C ti caal as well as chronologica . . OSS Archives - 11. .0P.2. O ratio l Group t aaud,. History of Operations in China. This is a nine-page historical report cxa . tlac Chiataeee oa dos. Written by the commanding officer at the 00sp Alfred T. Car, t... 061., Inf., and addressed to the. C ding General,, United States Forces, Chins theater,, 7 October, 1944, in. respora a to a require- that all branches submit historicaal reports of their activi- ties. Contains no references to dos ant . Covers briefly an phases of the 00 p jsst, A virtually am-ei-ItIcal... chronological aaa :sry. Stuc ' of this report is essential as introduction to 00 activities in China, 03S Archives - Washington. 218. CHINA - Chinese o to s. Contains an 00 history similar to Cox's report No original documents except a collection of pho 00 activities. 053 Archives ? Washington, Dir. AD.. Baas 2. J. 2k. Contains staff udiea, cam a n enee, 'a a a inn pa s,} And the final text of J .2115, MSpeeiaal Military Plea for U. S. Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 Psychological Warfare Operations Against th the Asiatic Theater', March, l943 togeth4 088 operations in the Far i sst (two pages), writte in 1944. Study of this folder is essential for information on plans for the use of psychological warfare. OS3 Arehivem - Tu ing. Reg.OP.:3. Subj z P6 HOLOOICAL WARFARE BOARD (PW Inf or ation)) . 108. Contains a limited number of radiograms and letters concerning general psychological warfare In the Far East. Valuable chiefly for the China Theater directives on the subject. Wile these contain nothing on 00 matters, they do reveal the concepts acescerdt to which unorthodox warfare was to organized and waged in the China Theater. The value of this folder is thus limited and lies chiefly in the realm of Obackgr+oundt i.nfores- tion.. . 0S Archives - Kunming. )SS.QP.1. Contains an incomplete file of directives and letters issued the following authorities in the China Theater dur'# period February - September 1945-. U. S. Forces; Chinese Combat Cormand; Tactical Headquarters, U,$,m Forces. Contain the following documents important for a stue' of 00 (and 038) plans and activities: Operations). Directive No. 10 (to regarding the organization ofa authority for the 00 units); eats concerning the organization aal role of the Chinese Combat td; letters and directives governing American - Chinese ralati ors and the role of interpreting officers. 033 Archives - Chungking. teg.CP.l. {1SF/CT. q. Directives. 019. Contains United States Forces, China Theater, PP"bruaxy to October,* 1945 (including one , Of partioalar i ortance is Operationeal. 'Directive No, is (to O$S' authorizing and describing 083 operations. Not a complete file. 083 Archives -- Chungking. *Opel* /CT. Subject Directives. Approved For Release 2002/07/30 CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SE MT Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 Contains United States rorces China mater directives from late M4 to October, l9 S, a variety of subjects, some of iddeh are of interest to the studontt of 085 activi- ties. Not a complete file. i4 y documents governing lend- lease and other aspects of Chinese - American relations. Val bls for background and general authorizations. Also contains mom intelligence directives. 6. 0S8 Archives - Knnatn . ResT.C.?'.1.. OSS CT: Ca (to 1 Oct. 19145). Contains A file of OS5 and Theater a other directives I October 1945. This folder is essential to any study of 08S activities in China during World War II. Of particular ia- ne portance is the transcript of the January 24, 19451, "Clandestine Conference No. 1, at which the C di General of the U. S. Forces in China laid down the principles by which such activi- ties mould be Vverned. 7. 0SS Archives C.C3P.a. Questions. Folder 122. Contains two sets of questions concerning 0 first set deals with questions arising concerning the CSC project. The second deals with intelligence questions con- cerning the Nanning and Linchow, areas. Valuable for any- stu4 of the early phases of the 00 pro OS S Archives King. QSIO.2. Contains material important for any onsideration of the early planning for the CSC units, February s. 1945. CSS Archives - PCian ,ng. OO.0P.d7. 085, C: MKI ? LETTERS. l contains various letters concerning 00 matter 191, 5. Of particular interest is the answer from Chiang to 'sdeeeyert s letter of February concerning C orgardsatioral s. Approved For Release 2002/0 /3Q DP72-00121A000100190001-3 SEC Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 -la_i. 10. OBS Archives - Klat ain . Co:andixag General - lst t*arachute Retnent. Folder l3. Contains correspondence between OG headquarters and the Chinese authorities, arch - oust, 19145, chiefly concern- inr s minjstrat :.ire matt rs. Of particular interest are the text of the Sine-.!dean agreement co erntn the s and vhe delineation of Chinese and Amrican responsibilities and Cox's listing of 00 job qualifications for the information of the Chinese authorities. 11. 053 Archives - Kuning. o S.O1''. C. RASHNESS. GP& . Contains draft plans and correspondence concernin participation in Operation tAWWADO. Included are maps show pha .ng, areas of responsibility, and co nntca- tiana networks (for use during operations), a charts hawing airlift requirements and schedules. Valuable for any study of the role in Operation CARM04ADO assigned to 05 11% S Archives - Kum ing. Folder #8k - CA ONAD0. TOP SEAT. A. Reg. Op. 6. Contains, 0 Plans and General Correspondence; Sr Prnlett "P ',r and 30 Project "COUGARffI Theater directives and cor- respondence (including the Chinese Combat Con. xand, Tactical q, and Rear Echelon)1 10th Air ice material. Invaluable for any stut ' of Operation CA' B NAD0. 11. CAS Archives - Washington. .ir. Files - 6,320. i D& fie - China. Contains 0SS organization charts and some General Orders particularly governing organizational matters, Theater supply charts, co and charts, and organisation charts. Important for any study of OSS activities in the China Theater. 14. O SS Archives - Kunming. ag.a .6. Meetings, Coandere, through 15 tug, ( ). 141 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 -1 2. Contains agendas and minutes of the regular meting* of U.S. `orcea authorities with the t sari organisation commanders in the China Theater. Valuable for information concerning all phase* of the American effort in China daring 1945 and to an introduction to the abject. The minutes are,, how- ever, merely recordings of decisions wend actions and are are correespongly brief. 088 Archives ~~tt~~-~I '.O `.6. O SOOM. ?older 07. Contains minutes of 055 *okly Operations Oowdttee Meetings* March - Ray, 1945. Useful for a general picture of 088 operational activities and problem. 0S8 Archives - Kunming. 03.0?.7. Staff Meetings. Folder #-1. Oontaaiz oat minutes of 058 moldy Staff Meetings, J - August, 1945. Useful for information on various prof faced 088. 17. O Arrwhives - gin;. O0.AD.1. Op.raatiowl Report. or taa, March - , 1945. ral idea of events of 18. 053 Archives - Kunming. Of.O?. 3. Monthly Report. Folder #3. Contains instructions for preparation of monthly reports well as Ofd soutbly reports, March - Julys, 1945. VaaluNble for obtaining a general Idea of the events of this period. 19. 088 Archives 00.0? . 1. CRTNk (f aBe) - QPZ A?iOW . stains 00 monthly reports, July - August., 19t 5, a ohs photographs, and descriptive accounts co erning oo+er& tions in China generally. Of general interest and value. Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 -l.3- 20. OSS Archivos ? Awing. OG.OD.l. (Oo n ) - 'REPORTS. la Of and reportso are of but 0 Arekivas - Kunnt . .OP.4.. 0P?. Folder .7. Contains correspondence to and from the OSS operations Officer on 00 matters, March - Kay, 1945j, chiefly concerning adminis- trative matte", 22. 055 Archives - Anl OG OOP. # 112. Chinese Combat CDM nd. folds. Contains correspondence betw,c 033 ate. the CCs, May - Asti 19)A5, concerning 00 administrative and $o r* operational matters. lbs value of this folder is dWnisheds because very few answers to 055 letters are included. 23. 03 ebi.vea - lut ing. 00.0p.Ii. 0#y, ifs - i,EZR i. Volt #15 0 ence between Q35 a the United motes he Chinos* Combat Co d, con- (February, 194 corning O0 setters, Februarys - Maafn 1945- of patrt Ur interest are the detailed command* training Schedule, a lengthy progress rust (18 War 1-945),v and a s e rsn s fr= United States Fore as Chiang co er .ng the 00 or ga satl of 24. 05$ Archive ca .C w.6. 'Fable of OrgW.s.ation. Folder :bls of Organization ani weapons charts,, with ery - Marcha~ 19450 035 Archives - lamina. oa,O .6. Table of ipaasent. Folder A. Contains undated tables Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 1915. SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CI RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 26. 088 Archives - FwMn '. 00 .0.4. Table of Basic A1loimn tbs. Th1er 45. containe undated tables of basic allowances for the 00s lI?. 27. OSS Archives - K -. 00.Q! .7. C - LETTERS. Folder 8. carrespoz once within 063 nc.rning 00 attar , Faye copies of OSS Research and . De .opeerzt cosittee mac s ariea personal histories of several officers, and 00 tables of or anis ation (approved by Donovan), M5arch. August* 2945. 28. o Archives - Kunming. MOM, co, H q.& Rq. diet.. Folder 122. correspondence and reports on 00 administrative, - :r7, etc., matters, addressed by t p col tinder to the Commanding Officer, ea adquarters t*c ent,, , March - July, 191 29. 06S ~~ Archives - uit, 0G.An. . Strength Reports. Contains Option. Gmxps Noy 1945, 038 strength reports and rosters, 34. OSS Archives - Kaneaing. t.op.Ic. Person . Folder 21. Contains personnel correspondences rosters, strength. repo s, and some tentative 00 assignment lists for American personnel# 1ebruar Aug t, 1945. Of particular interest ;I a report of information concerning the Chines ; `irst Parachute Kepi- a ent, dated 5 bruax7 1945 (this regin nt was to supply the Chinese personnel for the co ndoa). L. S Archives - KmnMng. Reg.OP.7. US?/CT C (Chinese Oombat Command). 22. Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CI RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 Contains correspondence, radiograms, to and from the Chinese Combat- Coffin and on 00 natters, (hinese-Arerican relations tzation of the O CC, February - cen 9rr, 1945w- OSS Archives - Kunming Reg-OP. 3. pies:ter: B0511%. Administration, etca 14yao Contains a large amount of original documentary material on the Chinese 00 projects train ?ng, pay and rations, tables of organization,, tables of equipment., and press releases. Invaluable for any etuc of the C0 protect. 33. osS Archives - Kunming, Special Fuids. Folder 11. i ce iflcations and other maternal concerning the use ., ?arch - August, 1945, Inasuf fi. c e material to be more than little value. OSS Archives ? 3x 1mmin . oo.CP.6. Detacmtt Letters. Folder #12- Contains a few letters of general interest concerning 00 matters,, Mar, 1945. of very limited value, 35. 086 Archives - Kuning. Aa.op.6. Training. Folder #17. Contains a miscellaneous collection of documents and proposals concerning training, as well as items concerning tables of equipment and other such matters. Little of this material concerns the Est directly and much of It dates from 1944. ao.0p.5. 9th Commando (.W Contains AVO 's record of events (very brief), rosters of Chinese personnel and progress and efficiency reports (incom- plete). 37. 08S Archives - Kunming. +0.Q?.5. 2nd Commando (Cbnbat). 018. Approved For Release 2002/07/30 ? IA- DP7`2-00121 A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 -1,6. Contains much information, in the form of the eeratia , intelligence reports,, a progress report rosters, and a large file of radiograms to and from field, concerning BLS . ". ?alder also contains a file of APPI1's radiograms to and from the fiend. Invaluable for any study of 00 operations in China. 088 Archives - Kunming. OG.OP.7. BANANA Operation. Folder 09. Contains sketch maps of the "I~anchuk area,, casualty li, recommendations for awards and promotions. inteiligenc al reports, and other documents coneerni9 he Tanchuk operation. Invaluable Orl activities. 39. 088 Archives - Kunming. 00.0P.5. 10th Co ndo (Combat). #1! a a few efficiency progress reports period,,, personnel rosters, and vacancy list of h Corm Pndcl. hO, 088 Archives - Kunming. 00.O?.?'. APPLE Operation. Folder e11. O ntains equipment packing list for re-supply, intellige and operational reports concerning AP Essential to any study of OG operations. Archives - Kunming. ~;gp/~ 000OP.6. BLACK T, etc. Folder #1. Contains communications and other maps,,, intel and intelligence cff.reativea bearrix the We: Valuable for obtaining data on this area prior to e s and 2. 0SS Archives ? Reg.OP, 3. BOSTON, Operations Contains operational radiogr tional plans for APPLS? CK P- Y , ligence material,, and maps of the area, study of 00 operations. the field, opera- reports, Intel ? 1toany Approved For Release 2002/07/30~~QIA$p,P72-00121 A000100190001-3 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 -147- h3- CAS S Archives - Kurni 00.0p.4. Folder #26, Misc. Contains intelligence reports, e tiont and maps of the Changsha area, in which operated. Essentit?a for any study of 00 activities. dal. OSS Archives - Kunming, 0o,op.6. "older #3. Misc. Contains city and area maps of West River valley, communica.a bone ,ap overlay of the area, intelligence reports'. and essential elements of information, Essential to any study of 00 activities, 45. OSS Archives - Kunming. 0G.0P. t. Oeneral ?u Lei Ming. Folder #11. Contains progress reports and letters concerning the Chinese commandos from Cox to the General, June - ,August,. 1916, and to other Chinese authorities, Valuable for getting information on commando problems during the training period an a general sury of their activities in the field* h6. OSS Archives - Kunming. SQ.op:12. a OCR - APPLE, BLACK RR!, CHEM. Contains several copies of a report on the airlift phase of APPLE operation, with coamRents and suggestions for and several, air re-supply manifests and pilots' reports, Augnett 1945. Invaluable for information on this phase of 00 activities. 7. 0SS Archives - Kunming. 00.0,P.5. Om.ration "BLACI ERRYf . Folder Contains radiograms to and from BLACKBERRY in the field? the complete operation plan for BLACKBERRY, intelligence reports, Communications diaggram, and notes on pla movement of BLACK- BERRY from Chsngkung airdrome to Liuchow. Essential to any study of this operation, Approved For Release 2002/07/30 CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 h.B. 0SS Archives - Kuniz . p.5. Co tndo (Combat). #19. Contains efficiency progress reports,. plane-loading rani; oDeration plan, and loading schedules for APPLE. Essent: to any, study of this operation. h9. 058 Arebivee - Kunming. 0 .0P.3. 'old r 401, ins a vast miscellany of documents concerning O&S activities in general and the primarily administrative aspects of the Operational pup Comand in particular. There are several personnel. rosters, strength reports,, co rendations,, correspondence, intelligence directives,, etc. The chief value of this folder list in the adsainisstra- ti a field. co. aa"Archives - Kunming. P.7. Citations. ?older #25. Conta.ina recos :e ndatione for awards for rican, 00 per- sonnel, with description of deeds support the reco ends- tions, July - August, 1945. 1. 055 Archives - Kunming. .01.h. 'aromotiot s and Citations. Polder #25. Contains reoo ndations for prrorotiona and for awards for American 00 peraonnel1 with facts to substantiate the redo - ssendatiom, March - Au tsst, 1945, in. Y"s and Charts (Apperldixes)s These maps will serve to illustrate the general situation in China in 1954-1945, with particular reference to gyration CARiNA, and should be used with Paper ber Zl an a whole, particularly with Section "En (Operation ACt f ADO" and the Projected OSS Role Therein) thereof. Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 a. Na: p"Jap nese and Chinese Reld Areas in chirze, 1944-1945, tion mad,; Ate' map service (First ation - AMS 2), 1913. Scale 1i2, ,000. h. Mao U5615): "Situation in China, 1 February 1945.1 Drawn T" & A, OSS,, from & A, OSS, Map No. 5611. Scale Is 4,000,C . + ilod f ra information supplied by A.2, lhth A.F., and R& ! (414539 H421-16) sbima d Dispositions of Japanese Army ",round forces in (hina., 17 February 19,45." d. 2 (#17805 H421,-16)s "China V, scale is k,000#000. Source for all of these raps: These charts will se and equipment of the psrtt cular1y with Section- ,,, of Paper Number IT. They vii 19450 w the +rgani action, personnel., ana1-ses of Operations kPPL1, TZBERRT, and WAc t!) the same paper. a. Chart: Exh hit i, "Natiai T ani zatl.on of Chinese Cor ands s march, 1945). utoil Commando" probably Source. 088 Archives ? Kunming. oci .OP.6. Table of organization. ?older L6. b. Chart; Exhibit 11, "National Militate Council a.ndo" rnerican Personnel): 3 March 19h5. OSS Archives -- 1 ui in . 00.OP. ,. Table of Organisation. Folder 16. c. Chartt Tabibit III, "Organization o h nese 'Personnel), 8 March 1945. Sources 088 Archives ? gassing, t .O?,6. Table of Or ardsation, Folder #16. the and should be used ,,fora. Group Organization be of assistance in con- the descriptions and Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 S triGR E T Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 d. Chart; xhibit IV, "Table of Organization and Table a uiprn for C Oo and Hsi, Bn Hg, Co , Section (Americ4m Personnel ), 19 March 1915. Srsur+? es OS$ Archi. ee - I ur=in . 040P,7- O G - Letters. Folder #8. Charts xhibi t V, "Organization of Chinese Co ndos" A .erican Peroonnel: Headquarters and Headquarters Co spar no date (probably March, 194). Sources OSS Archives Kunming. oo.OP.6. Table of organization. Folder #16. Tab AC": These maps will serve to ilinstrete the o: rid should used in eDnj=ation with r 11,, Section I (OG, Operation "APP *, 5 1935). Map "a9t.9 is ediately below U 3110v the Rene - ral area of China in which all the 00 units operated. It should be compared with the s in Tab 'All for assessment of Japanese trength and disposition and for appreciation of the Japa nd iae.aee held areas. On this mar are outlinod, for -purposes or orientation) the areas covered, as indicated, by the larger scale taps used in Tabs N PI, "DR., an ft t*. The purpose of the laar ;e-:sea1e maps is -to show the type of terrain in which the OOs operated and . to indicate the plates in Mich they were found and the routes over which they traveled. Except where they cannot be idtified, place-nos and routes of siifi- canoe are, respectively, underlined and outlined in red. Ins Ku ng. C ou (n n,, hina,, sheet ,, Asia Transporta. Lion Map, Army Map Service (First edition: ? ANS ), 1943. Scale, lt2,,O;OQ, . b. M & 'fsea -wtat, China, Sheet, China Proper, SW (Sheet 9 , Series L582). Printed by Army Mop Service,, Corps of ere {end Edition - AMS). Scale 1 2c0,OOO. a. Main nginea ng, China, Sheet, China Proper, (Sheet F 49 J L$82). Printed by Army Map Service, Corps of Second Edition - MIS). Scale 10 50#000. d. M s Tien pai.,, China, Sheet,, China Proper, (Sheet F 9 ', b582) . Printed by Army Map Servi ces Corps of !users (Second .tton - MIS). Seale is 5o, c . Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 h ,, China, skeet, China Proper, T...AXES eriee L58i). Printed by Army Map Servtc , Corps of-Engineers (Third Edition - AN 3). Scale 1:250, 1. I4ar T'ai.-ehan, Chins, Sleet, China Wiper, (Sheet A Series L581)., Printed, by Army ) Se ice, Corps of r ineeers (Fifth Edition - A) S). Scale 1 254, . g. i Ch+ih-Ch'i, Ana,, Sheet, China Px?oper, St (Sheet :e9 L581). Printed ArAy Nap Service, Corp Engimerv ( a.ir d Edition - AY-S). Scale It 25D, . Source 'or 011 of these i apss CIA Yap Library. 3s. Tab "B': a These > ps wIU serve to illustrate the operatio $ o; unit B,' R Y. See comment under Tab "041, which applies "DO. ecually to the s deg Tab a. See Tab "Ot, item a. above. b. Map: Hang-yang ('en --c- ow) a China, Sheet,, China Proper, (Sheet 53, ASS Series L581). Printed by Ate' Map Service, Corps of ' n i ers (Third Edition - A N$). Scale 1.250,00, c. Mapt Hsiang-tan (Siang-tan),, China, Sheet, China Proper, (Sheet k3, AR C' Series L5B1). Printed by Arzzr Map Service, Corps of Engineers (nUrd Edition - AMtS). Scale 1x250.. . d. MDr Chtaug-ache, Chine, Sheet, China Prope 33, &MS Series L581), Printed by Aar of Engineers (Third Edition - .W). Scale 1-.250#000. -7azg (Paok .nso,), Chia, Sheet, China Prop S4 (Sheet G 49 D, Abu Series L582)- Printed Army tee, Carps of Engineers (Second Edition - ). Scale 1. 250,4. .nrce for all of these raps: CIA Nap Library. 5. Tab "Eaz These maps and sketches mill serve to. illustrate the operations of 00 unit P ACKBEI ! (.API` ICOT, AVOCADO, B , 1). Sees csaza ent under Tab "C", which applies equally to the zaps aand sketches under Tab "E". Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 SEful ORE T Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3 at b, a, above. a-p'tn (Liuch a s), ina, et Mina rmper'. Sc t1e 1, 25. Sot rce for Naps a., b., c.,, and cd. immediately sere: Library. f. Detailed rdli.tary sketch rap of Fill As Tanch s, Tina, Au ast, 1945 (Item II). APRICOT attack. retailed military sketch Map Of the s it Of Hill. 11 and the Japane a defenses thereon Tanchlk, Chatnas Lu ast, 1945 (Item: ITT). APRICOT attack. h, Detailed military sketch map of the action of DANA at :eet a* 1 a2 ,{ 0.` Detailed military and topographical situation sketch map of the Ta nehuk, Tina, area, Au tst,, 1945 (Its T). Approved For Release 2002/07/30: 0121A000100190001-3