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May 20, 1970
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Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 CONft0ENTIAL Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel Page 2 Wednesday - 20 May 1970 25X1 4. Accompanied Bruce Clarke to an unclassified briefing of Ed Braswell, Senate Armed Services Committee staff, on the nature of the Soviet threat. The briefing was primarily directed to the historical background of the Soviet weapons program. Mr. Clarke also reviewed material which had been prepared by Bill Baroody, of DOD, and expressed his agreement with the figures contained in Baroody's paper. Braswell said this briefing would be most helpful to him in assisting Senator Stennis in his work on the ABM issue. I asked Braswell if he had any reservations about our going ahead with the submission of our retirement package as indicated in the outline which we had provided him earlier. Braswell said he had no real problems on this but suggested that instead of a flat repealer of the ceiling on our number of retirements that we suggest a new ceiling figure. With regard to the section on the reemployment of refired annuitants, Braswell expressed some reservations about our following the Foreign Service provisions, but did not state a flat objection. 25X1 5. I 1 Ambassador Torbert, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, called about a letter the Department had received from Senator Jacob Javits inquirying of the possi- 25X1A bility of freeing a prisoner held by the Cubans since participating in the Bay of Pigs invasion. After checking with WH Division, I called Torbert to say our area experts had been in touch with their opposite numbers in State and I thought it best for the matter to be handled through that channel, to which Torbert agreed. 25X1 25X1A 25X1A 6. I .1 Dorothy Fosdick, Staff Director, Senate Governments Operations Subcommittee on National Security and Inter- national Operations, called to request, as early as possible tomorrow, an all-source briefing on the costs of major Soviet strategic weapons programs. I told her I would check and confirm. later called Miss Fosdick and advised that he and of OSR would be there at 9:30 a.m. tomorrow morning. Approved For Release 2eveili4.1115,40:00337R000200210005-9 AfelOpproved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 WASHINGTON POST DATE 1 WA-el -10 PAGE Secrete Pentagon Report By George C. Wilson Washington Post Staff Writer A top-secret report locked , _ Up in the Pentagon throWs a different light on the grim pic- ture Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird recently painted of the Soviet missile threat. The report is based on pho- tographs taken from Ameri- ea's Samos satellites as they passed over the Soviet Union. The secret findings are bound to figure in congressional de- bate on whether the U.S. mis- sile defense should be ex- panded. According to the eye in the sky, the Soviet Union actually built fewer sites for its biggest missiles, the SS-9, in 1969 than It did in 1965. Film parachuted back to earth from the unmanned Samos satellites, the Central Intelligence Agency's succes- sor to the U-2 spy planes, is a major basis for the Pentagon's estimates of Soviet weaponry. Laird revealed part of the SS-9 count when he told Asso- ciated Press editors in New York on April 20 that he was releasing "maximum informa- tion" so the American people could see "that we are liter- ally at the edge of prudent risk" as far as holding back on ? - the deployment of new weap- ons. Laird has argued that an an- tiballistic-missile (ABM) de- fense must be built to protect U.S. Minuteman interconti- nental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) from a surprise at- tack by the SS-9. "In 1965," Laird told the edi- tors, "there were no opera- tional launchers for the large ispu es aird on Red Missiles Soviet SS-9 missile 'which, in Its single warhead version, can carry up to 25 megatons. "Today," Laiid continued, "I can report to YOU that there are Orne 220 SS-9s operational with at least 60 more under construction . . ." Laird did not mention that 66 SS-9 missile sites were spot- ted in 1965, compared to 54 in 1969. The secretary evidently added up each year's construe- tion sincd 1964 to reach his total of 280 for "today." His reference to "no opera- tional launchers" in 1965 ap- parently meant they were not ready to fire. Laird's comparison could be read as a sudden jump in SS-9 missile site construction. In- stead, the intelligence esti- mates show an up-and-down trend for the SS-9. The SaMos, according to in- formed sources, counted a few over 40 SS-9 sites in 1964, then the 66 for 1965. The next three years showed a tapering off before surging upward again to 54 in 1969. How many SS-9 missiles the Sbviets build in 1970 will be watched as one indication of their attitude toward slowing down the strategic arms race. Laird has served notice that if the Soviets do not slow their current pace, the United States will have to move faster into such new strategic weapons as a super-size sub- marine armed with longer- range missiles than the Pola- ris. Soviet SS-9 deployment is one of the concerns of the American negotiators at the strategic arms limitation talks at Vienna. Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 .? CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 Apl 30, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE H 3721 proach continues to look at the South- east Asia problem as simply a military problem and not one which requires a political solution. The events in Cambodia are so omi- nous that prompt and responsible action is required by the Congress to avert a wider war involving the United States throughout all Indochina. Section 401 of the military procure- ment bill, which we are considering to- day, is an open-ended authorization for the very type of action which yesterday resulted in American advisers and air support crossing into Cambodia with a iarge-scale South Vietnamese attack Force. As I have informed my colleagues by etter, today I intend to offer an amend- ment which would strike out section 401? .n an effort to avoid involvement in an- 3ther war created by the executive 3ranch. Section 401 provides that funds author- zed under the military 'procurement Dill or any other act involving the Armed Forces may be used to "support" Viet- namese and other free world forces in Vietnam, and local forces in Laos and Thailand. This is the very support which accounts for yesterday's U.S. interven- tion into Cambodia. What is more, it will enable this country to marshal a proxy army, drawing us further into the well of death and destriaction which has cost over 41,000 American soldiers' lives in Vietnam. The House will have an opportunity todaytto act. By voting for the amend- ment which I will offer, and thereby de- leting the open ended authority for support of South Vietnamese, Thai, and Laotian forces, we will be able to exer- cise our constitutional responsibilities. The President will have to request spe- cific authority, and will have to explain his actions fully. That is the very least we owe this country and its young men, who are risking their lives in misguided con- flict in Southeast Asia. CONFLICT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (Mr. LONG of Maryland asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Speaker, the Pentagon announcement that we are moving into Cambodia in a fairly large way, with advisers, tactical air support, and, other combat support and equip- ment, is upsetting. For '7 years, we have tried to win a war In a nation with as many as a half mil- lion men. Now, the tantalizing vision is held out that with half as many men we can somehow emerge trimphant by spreading the war into two nations. The Pentagon announcement is par- ticularly upsetting because we have been assured repeatedly by the administration that we would not become involved in another Asian Conflict without consulta- tion with the Congress. Just a week ago today, Secretary of State Rogers reiter- ated that assurance to the Foreign Oper- ations Subcommittee of the House Ap- propriations Committee. Our commitment in Cambodia is al- ready substantial enough to remind us of how we gat committed to Vietnani in the first place. It will become even more substantial if the Cambodian Govern- ment is given all the support it has re- quested. The administration has broken both its promise and its constitutional obligation to consult the Congress by committing American troops, American treasury, and American prestige to the defense of one more nation that lacks the will to defend itself. President Nixon has launched us into another undeclared war. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CAM- BODIA OFFER AN OPPORTUNITY (Mr. BLACKBURN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. BLACKBURN. Mr. Speaker, we have heard several comments today re- garding developments in Cambodia in recent weeks. In my opinion, the devel- opments in Cambodia are one of the greatest breaks that the United States has received since our involvement there. Recent developments are favorable to the United States both militarily and psycho- logically; military because the Commu- nists are being denied sanctuary in Cam- bodia and psychologically because it shows that the freedom-loving people in Southeast Asia are anxious to throw off their pro-Communist rulers and stand up and fight. The Communists remind me of a man playing poker who has run out of blue chips when someone else raised the ante. I am glad to say that I can support a cause, the cause of victory in South- east Asia. When I heard the loud cries on this end of the Capitol, as well as the opposite, from those praying secretly for American defeat, I am glad that I can stand up for an American victory. An American victory will be my victory. I pity and hold with some disgust those who must pray for an American defeat in the hope that in some perverted way they might benefit politically. MINSHALL OPPOSES RAISE IN FIRST-CLASS POSTAGE (Mr. MINSHALL asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his re- marks and include extraneous matter.) Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Speaker, as the postal reform hearings progress in the House Committee on Post Office and civil Service, I wish to be recorded in opposition to the proposed 2-cent in- crease in first-class postage. First-class letters already show a profit at 6 cents. There is no reason why first-class mail users should be penalized by an increase in rates. And there is absolutely no justification for the general taxpayer to continue digging in his pocket to subsidize un- wanted, unwelcome third class "junk" mail which does not begin to pay its own way and which is a constant nuisance to recipients. In its most fair form, the cost of de- livering any article through the mail should be a direct-user tax. I hope that the postal reform bill will reach the House floor under a parliamentary sit- uation which will permit us to vote sep- arately on the postal r e i MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RE- SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND RESERVE STRENGTH AUTHORI- ZATION, 1971 Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further con- sideration of the bill (H.R. 17123) to authorize appropriations during the fis- cal year 1971 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked com- bat vehicles, and other weapons, and re- search, development, test, and evalua- tion for the Armed Forces, and to pre- scribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes. The motion was agreed to. IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill H.R. 17123, with Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI in the chair. The Clerk read the title of the bill. The CHAIRMAN. Before the Commit- tee rose on yesterday, it had agreed that the bill be considered as read and open to amendment at any point. Are there further amendments? AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. WYMAN Mr. WYMAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer and amendment. The Clerk read as follows: Amendment offered by Mr. WYMAN: On page 2, line 19, strike out the period, substitute a comma, and add the following: "Provided further, That no funds author- ized to appropriated by this,Act for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States shall be expended for the contract procure- ment of DI) 963 class destroyers unless the procurement planned for such vessels makes provision that the veisels in that plan shall be constructed at the facilities of at least two different, United States shipbuilders." (Mr. WYMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. WYMAN. Mr. Chairman, I shall not take too much time on this amend- ment. However, it is an important amendment in that this DD-963 class of destroyer procurement involves an initial contract for some 30 vessels and an addi- tional commitment Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present. The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will count. Evidently a quorum is not present. The Clerk will call the roll. Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 11 3722 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 ? CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? HOUSE April* 3(), 1V70 The Clerk called the roll, and the following Members failed to answer to their names: [Roll No. 98] Edwards, La. Feighan Foley Gallagher Garmatz Gialmo Griffiths Hanna Anderson, Tenn, Ashley Baring Bean, Md. Berry Biaggi Bolling Brasco Hays Brock Hebert Brown, Cant,. 4Irs IsMass. . acS4 s Burton, Utah Johnson, Calif. Bush Jones, N.C. Cabell Kee Celler Kirwan Clark Langen Clawson, Del Lennon Cohelan Lujan Colmer ' Lukens Cowger McCarthy Cramer Madden Daddario Mahon Dawson Melcher Dent "Meskill Dutra! M011ohan O'Neal, Gs. Ottinger Passrnan Patman Pepper Poage Powell Price, Tex, Roberts Ruppe St. Onge Scheuer Schneebeli Stratton Stubblefield Stuckey Sullivan Symington Taft Taylor Teague, Calif. Tunney Weicker White Whitehurst Accordingly the Committee rose, and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under considera- tion the bill H.R. 17123, and finding it- self without a quorum, he had directed the roll to be called, when 354 Members responded to their names, a quorum, and he submitted herewith the names of ab- sentees to be spread upon the Journal. The Committee resumed its sitting. The CHAIRMAN. When the Commit- tee rose the gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. WYMAN) was explain- ing his amendment. The gentleman will proceed. Mr. WYMAN. Mr. Chairman, this amendment is not a complicated one. It Is designed to require that at least two different souKces shall construct the new DD-963 class of destroyer which Is the projected new destroyer for the Navy over the next 10 to 20 yea's. The initial procurement here involves some 30 ships a a cost of approximately $2 billion. Mr. Chairman, it is my opinion as a member a the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee that this is altogether too much for a single source Kocurement. I think a , dual procurement would strengthen the procurement process as well as our national-shipbuilding capa- bility. As Members remember, last year there -was provision in the bill when it went over to the other body providing for three sources. At the present time in response to specifications and contract definition the competing sources on this procure- ment are down to two. In the long haul many more than 30 such vessels may be required. I think It very much in the interest of the Procurement process and more com- patible with a greater measure of pro- tection...AM national defense that at least two facilities develop and construct this destroyer. Sole source of procurement here Outs altogether too many eggs in one basket Dual procurement will involve a brief Initial delay to assure commonality. In the prototype there may be a small cost increase in the beginning. But shortly down the line as completed ships come off the ways this increase will be recouped and we will have the continuing added protection of two sources of production for this main line item. To me this is a wise and sound policy. I would like to ask the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Com- mittee at this time if the committee has a position in regard to this amendment? Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. WYMAN. Yes; I yield to the chair- man of the committee. Mr. RIVERS. I think this amendment Is substantially the same as the one we had in the bill last year. I can see no harm in it. Insofar as I am concerned I will accept it. Mr. WYMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time I will yield back the balance of my time. Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I rise In support of the amendment. (Mr. LEGGETT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I may not take up the entire 5 minutes. I think we have found we can spend a great deal of money for some of these procurements, but we spend it all in one particular place in many instances. At my instance, we have had some amortization of the work with respect to ship procurement by provisions we added in the bill al- ready providing that of the funds made available, $600 million would be avail- able only for expenditures in naval shipyards. I think there are sound reasons for this. I would like to submit into the RECORD an analysis of this Committee amendment, which I sent to the Chair- man under date of April 6, and which has tables attached to it. I will ask per- mission to print the tables when we get Into the House. The material referred to is as follows: APRIL 6, 1970. Hon. L. MENDEL RIVERS, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, Rouse of Representatives, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Shortly we will be Introducing our Public Law 412 Authoriza- tion Bill for fiscal 1971. A question arises whether our Committee has the power to halt the apparent administrative desecration of our Naval Shipyards. I know you are con- cerned about the sometimes fiscal slight of hand of the Pentagon. What with Congres- sional and Presidential limitations on spend- ing over the past few years, I believe our long-term defense priorities have become confused. When the red tape and official budget mis- information are cleared aside and the num- bers are viewed in perspective, the rather disastrous desecrating action of the Admin- istration comes to light. Toil recall in the early 1960's we fought jointly to maintain a proper balance be- tween public and private shipyard apportion- ment of Naval repairs, alterations and con- , versions (RAC). We opposed mandatory ap- portionment of 35 percent of this work to private yards when for the previous 10 years the average had been 15 percent private. For the past five years, there has been no man- datory apportionment, but it is interesting to note that private yards have enjoyed re- spectively 32.6 percent, 35.4 percent, 40.8 per- cent, 37.4 percent and 32.8 percent of the work. The point is that our victory was rather hollow since in spite of the discretion given the Administration, the Navy has averaged over the last 5 years only $682 million of RAC work whereas private yards have aver- aged $385 million and 36.1 percent of the work. While the Navy has mesmerized us with the repair figures, apparently there has been scrnove in the Administration to work disas- ter in new construction. You recall in 1965, when Secretary Mc- Namara issued his order closing certain Naval Shipyards, he talked of modernizing and building up the remaining yards so that they could be competitive on new construc- tion. The Navy bought and paid for the Kaiser Report which looked to expending $700 million to modernize Naval Shipyards in 5 to 7 years. Now four years later, it is my understanding that the Administration has opted for a 10 year modernization program? recommended for the first time last year a $70 million initial program which was even- tually reduced by budget limitations to $49.9 million. For fiscal 1971, I understand the Navy recommended $98 million and this was cut by OSD to $34.5 million. The lioint is that at best the Navy yards will only get 50 percent of the Navy recommended program, which means that a 10 year modernization is now extended to 20 years. On new construction, there has been a sta- tistical disaster which is now wreaking havoc in Naval Shipyards, and I charge destroying our Defense Shipyard capability. In the 10 year period before 1967, Navy yards were apportioned on the average $405 million of new construction work annually? about 20 percent of the new work. Private yards were awarded 80 percent or about $1.4 billion annually. In 1967, apparently without much fanfare and amid budget confusion, the Navy yard share of new construction was cut to less than 1 percent or $61/2 million, while private yards received a whopping $1.8 billion. Out- side of $71 million awarded to Navy yards in 1968, there has been no new shipwork allo- cated to any Navy yard in 1969, 1970 and now 1971; while there has been apportioned to private yards during this period $553 . million, $351 million, $2.45 billion, and $2.72 billion or a total of $6.07 billion private to 0 for Naval Shipyards. The last figure, as you know, is subject to our Public Law 412 power this year. Not only are private yards fat from Navy contracts, but the new 30 ship per year Merchant Ship Program of the Maritime Ad- ministration and the 10 ship per year Charter and Build Program of the MSTS will swell -private yard coffers an additional billion dol- lars a year. This feast on the one hand, famine on the other, has had its effect in shipyard employ- ment. In 1956, private yard employment stood at 110,000 vs. 102,000 in Naval Shipyards. In 1961, when the Democrats came to power, the ratio was 116,000 to 98,400 for Navy yards. In 1968, it was 144,000 private vs. 95,200 Navy yards. Over the past three years, with the disastrous work allocation policy afore- described, Navy yard strength has fallen to 86,000 and is projected to deteriorate to 82,000 in June and perhaps 72,000 by the end of fiscal 1971. I personally believe that our national de- Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 April i'o 1970 Approved Fctactilditygp8A3Z0fuelNINP7A-8psyR000200210005-9 fense posture Will be substantially com- promised if our Committee allows a 25 per- cent reduction in crucial' shipyard personnel talents in this short space of time. Several solutions present "themselves to ameliorate the foregoing. (A) A proviso could be added which would limit the ship authorization so that $600 million would bR available only for expendi- ture in Naval Shipyards. (B) A proviso could be worked out which would guarantee that at least 20 percent of the new construction funds would be al- located to Naval Shipyards. Either of these provisions are a far cry from the 50-50 apportionment called for in the Vinson Trammel Act, which I understand is still law today. While perhaps only a portion of the Naval Shipyards are involved in new construction, H 3723 the policy aforementioned affects everyone of them lest they all try to survive out of the same paltry repair dollar allocation. Mr. Chairman, I know you are vitally con- cerned with these matters. The contentions can be easily reinforced by calling in civilian and military Navy Shipyard managers to Washington to testify. Very sincerely, ALLOCATION OF SHtPWORK BETWEEN NAVAL AND PRIVATE SHIPYARDS FISCAL YEAR 195$ TO FISCAL YEAR 1970 !Dollars in thousands! EiOBERT L. LEGGETT. Fiscal year New construction Naval Private Percent Total private Total repairs, alterations, conversion and new construction Percent ' Naval Private Total private 195$ 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 $256, 390 $303, 059 $559, 449 54.2 $690, 781 $335, 859 $1, 026, 640 32. 7 0 427, 818 427, 818 100. 0 378, 811 483, 418 862,229 56. 1 320,288 415, 218 735, 506 56. 5 724, 538 491, 618 1,216, 156 40. 4 388,411 861, 390 1,249, 791 68.9 907, 287 949, 101 1, 856,388 51. 1 549, 686 1, 010, 601 1, 560, 287 64.8 1, 233, 521 1, 271, 083 2, 504, 604 50.7 303, 302 1, 281, 300 1, 584, 602 80. 9 825, 856 1, 349, 000 2, 174, 856 62. 0 474, 131 1,376 699 1, 850, 830 74.4 1, 086, 040 1, 472, 998 2, 559, 038 57. 6 86, 160 42, 9615 515, 775 83. 3 531, 478 504, 984 1, 036, 562 48. 7 483, 702 1, 488, 935 1,972, 637 75. 5 972, 352 1, 568, 635 2, 540,987 61. 7 772, 371 1,620, 824- 2, 393, 195 67.7 1, 372, 615 1, 786, 624 3, 159, 239 56.6 274, 192 1, 888, 108 2, 162, 300 87. 3 872, 401 2,214, 795 3, 087, 196 71. 7 321, 945 I, 390, 818 1, 712, 763 81.2 1, 030, 860 1, 690, 154 2, 721, 014 62. I 441, 100 I, 361, 476 1, 802, 576 75. 5 896, 762 1, 581, 996 2, 478, 758 63. 8 255, 300 1,390, 436 1,645, 736 84. 5 932, 444 I, 792, 405 2, 724, 849 65. 8 6, 500 1, 827, 300 1, 833, 800 99. 6 695, 588 2, 343, 794 3, 039, 382 77. 1 71, 500 553, 200 624, 700 88. 6 868, 296 1, 028, 806 1, 897, 102 54.2 0 351, 600 351, 600 100.0 796, 422 741, 221 1, 537, 643 47.2 ALLOCATION OF SHIPWORK BETWEEN NAVAL AND PRIVATE SHIPYARDS FISCAL YEAR 1953 TO FISCAL YEAR 1970 'Dollars in thousandsl Repairs and alterations Fiscal year ' Naval Pi 'vats Conversions Percent Percent Total private Naval Private Total private Total repairs, alterations and conversions Percent Naval Private Total private 1953 $301,700 $32, 800 1954 285, 600 55, 600 1955 255, 400 76,400 1956 294,000 77,200 1957 269,400 64,200 1958 293,300 67, 700 1959 299,500 57,500 1960 350,900 63,500 1961 347,300 79,700 1962 394, 300 133, 400 1963 309,909 140,487 1964 315,053 150,972 1965 432,962 148,620 1966 511,044 349,619 1967 664, 088 352, 494 1968 667, 896 264, 106 1969 665, 022 235, 521 $334,500 341,200 331, 800 371, 200 333, 600 361, 000 357, 000 414, 400 427, 000 527, 700 450, 396 466, 025 581, 582 860, 663 1, 016, 582 932, 002 900, 543 9.8 $132,691 $0 16.3 93,211 0 23.0 148,850 0 20.8 224,876 10,521 19. 2 414, 435 196, 282 18.8 229,254 0 16. 1 312, 409 39,799 15.3 94,418 11,889 18.7 141,350 0 25. 3 205, 944 32, 400 32. 2 288. 300 186, 200 32.4 393,862 148,364 25.6 22,700 71,900 40,6 166,100 20,650 34.7 25,000 121,500 28.3 128,900 211,500 26. 2 131, 400 154, 100 $132, 691 0 $434, 391 $32, 800 $467, 191 7. 0 93,211 0 378,011 55,600 434,411 12.8 148, 850 0 404, 250 76, 400 480, 650 15. 9 235,397 4.5 518, 876 87, 721 606, 597 14.5 610, 717 ' 32. 1 683, 835 260,482 944, 317 27. 6 229, 254 0 522, 554 67, 700 590, 254 11.5 351,208 11.0 611,909 96,299 708,208 13.6 106, 287 11. 2 445, 318 75, 369 520, 687 14. 5 141, 350 0 488, 650 79, 700 568,350 14. 0 238, 344 13. 6 600, 244 165, 800 766, 044 21.6 474, 500 39, 2 598, 209 326, 687 924, 896 35. 3 542, 226 27.4 708, 915 299, 336 1,008, 251 29. 7 94, 600 76. 0 455, 662 220, 520 676, 182 32. 6 186, 750 11.1 677, 144 370, 269 1, 047, 413 35.4 146, 500 82. 9 689, 088 473, 994 1, 163, 082 40.8 340, 400 62. 1 796, 796 475, 606 1, 272, 402 37. 4 285, 500 54.1 796, 422 389621 1, 186, 043 32.8 Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I think that the amendment offered by the gen- tleman from New Hampshire is a good amendment. It is going to allow for dual source procurement, and I think it is go- ing to lead to the construction of these ships more competitively and more rapid- ly, and it is not going to add to the cost. I yield back the balance of my time. AIRPORT AND SEAPORT CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1970 Mr. KOCH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word. (By unanimous consent, Mr. KocH was allowed to speak out of order, and to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. KOCH. Mr. Chairman, today I am introducing the Airport and Seaport Crime Control Act so we can break the grip of organized crime at_our ports of entry. In February, I expressed the hope that this CortgresS wOUld concern itself with stopping the massive theft of interna- thinal cargo by criminals operating with impunity at both our seaports and air- ports. At that time I cited the failure of the New York-New Jersey Waterfront Commission to wage an effective and conscientious fight against the infiltra- tion of organized crime in the port of New York. Now the waterfront commis- sion is seeking to extend its jurisdiction to New York's airports, despite its sorry record in ridding the waterfront of or- ganized crime and protecting valuable cargo. It appears that the problem is beyond the capacity of State or local authorities. The Attorney General has charged that the largest air cargo center in the world, New York's Kennedy Airport, is virtually controlled by organized crime. 'Earlier this year, the Nixon administration an- nounced that it would propose legislation designed to prevent theft of interna- tional cargo at all ports of entry throughout the Nation. But no legisla- tion seems to be forthcoming. As with many other critical problems facing this country, we cannot wait upon the Nixon administration while it tries to decide what, if anything, it will do. For all these reasons, the Airport and Seaport Crime Control Act of 1970, which I am introducing today, seeks to place the responsibility and power for dealing with this problem squarely on the Treas- ury Department's Bureau of Customs. The bill creates a Cargo Protection Divi- sion in the Bureau of Customs for two primary purposes: First, the prevention of infiltration by organized crime of legitimate waterfront and airport business by the use of licens- ing powers; and Second, the creation of Federal stand- ards of cargo protection and the crea- tion of freight security areas in both air- ports and seaports. It is desirable that there be Federal responsibility for cargo protection as it involves the control and regulation of interstate commerce. The exercise of such regulatory functions by local au- thorities does not permit the efficient co- ordination and surveillance of organized crime. In addition, a Cargo Protection Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 H 3724 Approved For Rveiniiimmi atasie82-1414wsloo200210005-mlyrii 40, Division with national powers will pre- vent the circumvention or evasion of reg- ulations by the utilization of other ports for various forbidden transactions. The at provides for the licensing of companies doing business in the airports and seaports. All prospective licensee companies would have to meet the stand- ards of good character and integrity. These companies Would include the steve- dore companies, air freight delivery and warehouse companies, trucking companies utilizing the ports, mainte- nance companies of all kinds, special service companies, such as those that provide coopering, container and car- pentry services on the waterfront. Individuals also would be licensed; they would include longshoremen, pier superintendents, hiring agents, clerks, air employees. Those with very serious or recent criminal records, or with a provable connection to organized crime, would be denied a license. Initially, the licensing power would probably be exercised selectively by con- centrating on the major ports where there is an obvious need for control. Eventually, the licensing power could be ,utilized at lesser ports as commerce in- creases and crimp problems arise. The bill specifically permits bis tate, State, and local authorities to exercise licensing powers of their own. Under the act, the Cargo Protection Division can accept State or municipal licenses of cargo han- dlers, supervisors and transporters in lieu of Federal licenses if the Division deter- mines that the non-Federal standards for licensing are consistent with the pur- poses of the act. In order to enable the Division to in- vestigate violations of laws committed at either airports or seaports, the act provides that the Division possess full subpena and the imniunity powers to en- able it to investigate the penetration of organized crime into various airport and seaport components. It also provides strong criminal penalties for evasion or violation of the act itself. We should not delay in providing the authority and finding the money to at- tack this problem. The volume of cargo at Kennedy Airport will quadruple in the next decade. Reported losses repre- sent only a fraction of what is actually being Stolen. The Senate Select Committee on Small Business which has investigated this problem has emphasized that the ulti- mate victims of this multimillion-dollar thievery and corruption are the small businessmen and the consumer public. The increased costs resulting from busi- ness monopoly, fraudulent practices and cargo theft are passed on to them. It is time for the Federal Government to be given specific responsibility for crime control at our ports of entry if we are to save legitimate businesses arid the Amer- ican consumer from the increasing men- ace of organized crime. Mr. ANDERSON of California. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite nnnaber of words. Mr, Chairman, I use in support of the amehdinert (Mr. 'ANDERSON of California asked arid Wa,s given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. ANDERSON of California. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Wy- man amendment which would require the DD-963-class destroyer contract to be split between two shipyards. I feel that this amendment will serve the national interest in several ways: First, it will revitalize our sagging ship- building industry in two areas?not one. Second, it would avert a total halt in construction if one yard runs into labor trouble and has a strike. At least one yard will be in production. Third, the amendment would allow for continued construction if one shipyard is hampered by mismanagement. Mr. Chairman, I recognize the need to spread our shipbuilding capabilities over several geographical areas. Shortly, I will be presenting an amendment which moves in the same direction as the Wy- man amendment, although much broader in scope. To show that there is no_con- flict, however, I urge support of the Wy- man amendment. The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. WYMAN) . The amendment was agreed to. AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. LEGGETT Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment. The Clerk read as follows: Amendment offered by Mr. LEGGETT: On page 2, line 8, after the words, "For missiles: for the Army," strike "$1,086,600,- 000" and insert "$428,200,000". (Mr. LEGGETT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I intend to offer two amendments this morning with respect to the anti-bal- listic-missile program. The present amendment would purport to cut $660 million, which is the total amount of the procurement in the pending bill for the anti-ballistic-missile pro- gram. If that amendment fails then I intend to offer a second amendment which would cut out $203 million for the phase II deployment. We have spent today for the anti- ballistic-missile system a total of $4.3 billion for research and development, $550 million for procurement, and $1 billion for military construction. In the bill that we have before us today we are laying the foundation to add on addi- tionally this year $660.4 million for procurement which includes the ? $203 million fel' the phase II procurement. $365 million for additional research and development, $357 million will be in the military construction bill which will come out of our committee later this year, $158 million for other research and development on anti-ballistic-missile sys- tems, $53 million for -operation and maintenance, $14 million for personnel compensation, or a total this year which will either be in this bill, the military construction bill, or the military appro- priations bill, of a total of $1.608 billion. Mr. Chairman, I do not think we need an awful lot of new arguments against the anti-ballistic-missile system this year. There are a lot of them available. I think the arguments that we gave 2 years ago and last year against the system are very cogent and appropriate today. 1970 I said last year I do not believe the anti- ballistic-missile system makes much sense. It is clearly costly and ineffective. It is very, very expensive for the very, very limited objective that could be sat- isfactorily handled with other existing hardware, and there is actual question as to its effectiveness under battle con- ditions. There is no doubt it creates massive real estate, personnel, training, and related problems never before at- tempted by modern man and, assuming it is successful, it can lead to added esca- lation between the United States and the Soviet Union. I think we have found this year that is exactly what has happened. The Soviets have escalated. Now we are responding to that escalation with the phase II ABM program right now. I say that we do not build a school un- less you have two-thirds support for the bonds. Again last year we supported an ABM system with a 50-50 vote in the Senate and the 50 Members of the Sen- ate who voted against the system it just so happens represent 58 percent of the . American public. So we have a minority supported pro- gram at the present program, and I have real reservations as to whether or not the Senate is going to support this pro- gram again this year. For that very rea- son, unless you have a strong polarity and strong support for a program, I do not thing it is worthwhile to get into this $10 billion or $12 billion or multibillion- dollar training programs. Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. LEGGETT. I yield to the gentle- man. Mr. RIVERS. Why would not the gen- tleman accept a vote of the House on this? Mr. LEGGETT. As the gentleman will recall, we had a very restricted vote in the House last year as we had this year, and we were unable to get a clear vote on the issue of curtailment of procure- ment alone on the ABM and allow re- search and development to go ahead, If the gentleman would allow us to have a recommital vote this year and limit it just to phase II of the ABM pro- gram, I would almost support it at' this time. Mr. RIVERS. The gentleman is talk- ing about last year and he spoke about the other body. What was the vote in the House last year? Mr. LEGGETT. The vote on a very ob- scure amendment for the ABM, we got 141 votes against them. I do not think I voted against the recommital at that time. Mr. RIVERS. What about our crowd? Mr. LEGGETT. I do not know about "our crowd." Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. LEGGETT. I yield to the gentle- man. (Mr. BINGHAM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I rise, first of all, to cornmend the gen- tleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT) for his leadership in the fight to prevent Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 A il 30; 1970 Approved F5 0005-9 3725 the United States from further escalating 'the arms race by proceeding with the deployment of an anti-ballistic-missile system. I support his amendment. Its adoption would signal support by the House of Representatives for the con- cept that we have a fully adequate sys- tem of security, now and in the foresee- able future, based on the principle that the United States could arid would re- spond to any nuclear attack upon it, whether by the Soviet Union and Com- munist China or any other power, by in- flicting intolerable destruction on the at- tacker. This principle of deterrence, dis- agreeable and unpleasant as it is has been fundamental to our strategic secu- rity ever since World War II and it will continue to be fundamental in the fu- ture. There is no evidence that the Chi- nese Communists or any other power are so irrational as to invite destruction up- on themselves. Again and again in debating amend- ments to this bill the chairman and some members of the Armed Services Committee have told us that U.S. se- curity will be jeopardized if the Con- gress does not approve the Pentagon's desires for bigger and better weapons systems. Yesterday we were told that it was absolutely essential that the United States proceed to deploy MIRV's. To- day we are told the same thing about the latest plans for expanding the Safe- guard ABM system. All this is right in line with the recent scare campaign mounted by the Nixon administration. Secretary Laird has been trying to give the impression that the Soviets are accelerating the rate of de- ployment of their SS-9 land-based mis- siles, when the rate has actually slowed down, since no new sites for SS-9 launch- ers have been detected since last August. Dr. John Foster, Director of Defense Re- search, made headlines by charging that "giant hen house radars" had been erected in the Soviet Union, foreshadow- ing extensive ABM capabilities; he did not say that these hen houses had first been detected years ago and are con- sidered highly vulnerable to attack. The President himself added to the panic atmosphere, charging that opponents of ABM and MIRV would concede to the Soviet Union military supremacy. These speeches comprise a combina- tion of long-known facts trotted out as something new and ominous, exaggera- tions and distortions, and a system of conjuring up remote contingencies for the future as if they present a "real and present danger" requiring immediate ac- tion. The basic case made by the adminis- tration for the Safeguard ABM system has been an alleged potential threat to our Minutemen if the Soviets continue to deploy SS-9's at the rate of the last 2 years and Will be able to equip them with accurate This is pure supposi- tion. Even tf it should prove to be true, we wetild Still: have a fully adequate de- terrent force in our bombers and sub- marines. Tlioi.iite4 out on tbe fiOor yesterday, the Congres,s,is constantly being badger- ed to take Steps based on a fear of what the Soviets might do in the future. What the advocates of these steps always fail to point Out is what the Soviets will be bound to do in response to our escalation through the deployment of weapons sys- tems such as the ABM and the MIRV. The Pentagon, as it stresses the risks involved in restraint, never sepns to be concerned with the risks involved in go- ing ahead full speed with the arms race. For myself, I believe that our security can be best pursued through a system of balanced deterrents, maintained at a rea- sonable level through the process of mutual restraint, and through negotia- tions for controls and limitations such as are now underway in Vienna. Down this road lies not only greater security, but also the opportunity to cut back on our fantastic military spending and to begin to give the necessary priorities to our needs here at home. Mr, LEGGE171'. I thank the gentleman very much. Mr. FRIEDEL Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. LEGGETT. I yield to the gentle- man. (Mr. FRIEDEL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. Chairman, in re- cent months, I have spoken out repeated- ly on the pressing need we have in this country in the early 1970's to restructure and reevaluate our national goals or priorities. It seems to me that this bill to- day, at this time, is the proper place to begin. In recent days, segments of our domestic economy have suffered reverses which remind many of us in this Cham- ber of the late 1920's. This week the sav- ings of millions of Americans in securities went down precipitonsly while we have at the same time the worst price inflation that the Nation has known in a decade. Unemployment levels have recently reached a 6-year high. While this goes on, the White House seems disinclined or powerless to take the necessary steps to reverse or retard the fateful cycle of recession that seems to be occurring. In Southeast Asia, the administration's policy of Vietnamization and withdrawal apparently is being massively subverted with the war daily spreading to Laos and Cambodia. In other words, we see before us absolutely no light at either end of our domestic or international tunnels. I therefore believe that in these particular dark days we must go very, very slowly indeed in any new areas of military procurement. I will therefore, Mr. Chairman, vote against the authorization in the bill for the development of the Safeguard mis- sile system. Yesterday, I voted for the amendments that were offered to cut some of the fat out of the bill. I was dis- appointed that we were not able to elim- inate the $200 million contained in the bill which provides legislative backing for Deputy Secretary of Defense Pack- ard's negotiations with Lockheed Air- craft over the gigantic cost overruns in- volved in the C-5A contract. In my judgment, this is literally throwing good money after bad. I am for the Govern- ment and the company getting together and working out their mistakes without it costing the American taxpayers addi- tional millions of dollars. Mr. Chairman, it is this very kind of military planning and spending which has tinged our pre- viously hallowed Pentagon with credi- bility problems. I was also disappointed that the amendment failed that would have de- leted the $475.2 million requested for the procurement of the Minuteman III, the MIRV, and the ICBM. This amendment would not have stopped this program but merely deferred procurement of the mis- siles pending completion of the current SALT talks. We could have continued the research and development aspects of this program but delayed the actual procure- ment of hardware. If our efforts to reach some accommodation with the Soviet Union on disarmament fail, then the Minuteman III deployment could be un- dertaken and procurement initiated. In essence, I felt that this amendment would have given great force and effect to the action taken earlier this year by the Sen- ate when it passed Senate Resolution 211 by the vote of 72 to 6, which urged Pres- ident Nixon to propose a bilateral halt on new strategic weapons systems deploy- ment including the MIRV at the begin- ning of the SALT talks. Finally, Mr. Chairman, I intend to vote for the efficiency substitute bill which will be introduced today as an amend- ment by my distinguished colleague from Pennsylvania. This substitute measure will be identical to the version reported by the committee but will contain, in its terms, an across-the-board efficiency cut of 5 percent. In effect, this bill will reduce the committee measure by about $1 billion. It will contain, under title IV, a provision that will prohibit the Gov- ernment from making payments to Lock- heed until the Congress has been ad- vised of the arrangements for untangling the financial relationships that exists between the Government and Lock- heed. This is particularly important in light of other important weapon sys- tems contracted currently to Lockheed Including the S3-A's and the Scram mis- sile that have already exhibited signifi- cant cost overruns. The efficiency sub- stitute bill will contain, again under title IV, the legislative basis for quarterly GAO reports to the Congress on major weapons systems and provide the GAO with subpena power to audit defense contractor books. The sad story of the F-ill's and the C-5A cost overruns are indeed eloquent testimony to the ef- fect that we need GAO oversight in these areas. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California has expired. (Mr. LEGGE'rE asked and was given permission to proceed for an additional 5 minutes.) Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. LEGGE'ri . I yield to the gentle- man. Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, I hope that the gentleman will not mind or ob- ject to a facetious comment, but I know of his desire to have the right to offer a motion to recommit. I would suggest to him that the Republican Party is the minority party and has that right. So we will be glad to accept his application for membership. Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RIDP72-00337R000200210005-9 H 3726 Approved For Q Z-qO2OO21 0005-9April -30, 1970 Mr. LEGGJTJ.. I would reply that on this recommittal, and I would do it, as long as I could get out afterward. But I would say this on this question of what about the ABM system?it is a massive escalation? We said last year we were talking about a $10 billion system and this is not the end. When Mr. Packard and Sec- retary Laird came before our committee this year, what they were talking about was escalation which they readily ad- mitted was $1.6 billion in just 1 year. We asked them if we had the ultimate In system and control last year how does it so happen that we have additional costs this year? He said that we have a thing called price increases. I asked how much was that? He said it was $450 million. The cost-of-living increase for 1 year, and it is going to take us 10 years to build this system so extrapolate that and you have about $4.5 billion costs in cost-of-living increases. Then they said we have another esca- lation. I said, "What is that?" They said that is the stretching out of the program. You did not give us an ABM program last year, as fast as we thought we could get ready to build it?$550 million for that stretchout. I said, "Is that the end?" They said, "No, there is another thing called de- sign changes." I said, "How could you have a design change added on?" I asked how we could have additional design changes when we had spent $4 billion to design the ultimate program presented last year. Now we have $680 million worth of design changes and that was the amount. I said "Is that all?" They Said that we are working on the improved Spartan. I said, "Do you have figures on that?" He said, "No." I said, "Maybe you could give us a guess?" They came up with maybe a half bil- lion dollars for the improved Spartan to attack the improved Soviet missiles. That might be launched in a flat trajectory from perhaps some submarines that might be constructed sometime in the future. So we have had two add-on plus a thing called the missile site radar sys- tem?MSR. Why? Because the system we designed last year might be overrun. How much was that? We do not know. Make a guess. That might be another $200 million. You add all these things up and you have an escalation in 1 year of $2.35 billion, Mr. RIVERS, Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Ur. LEGGETT. yield to the chair- man of the committee. gr. ravEns. Would the gentleman's position be different if he knew that the Chinese Communists had-an ICBM? Ur..LEOGETT. I think not. I think we can presume that the Chinese, having launched an orbiting vehicle, certainly have the capability to design and launch standing work in respect to the ABM sys- a modified projectile which is known as tern, and I wish to associate myself with an ICBM. his remarks. Mr. RIVERS. How do we know that Mr. LEGGE-rT. I thank the gentleman the booster to which the gentleman has very much. We have today a total, as referred is not capable of projecting an pointed out in our report last year, now ICBM? projected for the middle 1970's, not the Mr. LEGGETT. I think this. We are 4,000 warheads that were admitted by going to have to live on trust of the Secretary Laird or the 9,000 projected Chinese for the next 5, 6, or 7 years, warheads, projected by Secretary Laird? until we get an ABM system constructed. but by the time you MIRV all these pro- I say that if we can live on diplomacy grams and include tactical warheads and and balance of power, with our tremen- MIRV and warheads in the F-111 and dons 20,000 warhead capability of ther- B-1, we will have better than 20,000 monuclear bombs and warheads, if we ICBM's and thermonuclear warheads? can live on that for the next 5 years and I think that is plenty to deter a first while we are designing this system strike. against the Chinese, certainly it does not Mr. Chairman, let us consider some make a lot of sense to say, Well, we are facts of strategic military life, as they going to design a system and in 5 years, apply to the ABM. we are going to be protected, when we First. A first strike against the United need protection from the Chinese today States is impossible, and will remain so and we do not have it. I think the best in the foreseeable future. Let me emphasize what is required for such a first strike. The generally accepted rule of thumb Is that 400 one-megaton warheads or the equivalent delivered to the Soviet Union would in effect destroy their society. We presently have more than 4,200 warheads in our strategic weapons, plus many more mounted on so-called tactical aircraft which ring the Soviet Union and which, "tactical" or otherwise, could strike deep and hard, particularly if they were sent on one-way missions. This is the problem facing a Soviet general considering a first strike: He must be able to destroy our hard- ened Minuteman and Titan silos before they can be emptied. He must be able to destroy our manned bombers and tacti- cal aircraft before they can take off, or else rely on his antiaircraft defenses to take them out once they arrive over his territory. He must have every one of our deployed and in-transit missile subma- rines pinpointed and ready for instant destruction. More importantly, he must have abso- lute confidence in his ability to do all of these things and to do them simultane- ously, because if only 10 percent of our forces get through, his society is de- stroyed. The impossibility of a simultaneous attack against manned bombers and hardened silos, and the impossibility of any attack against our missile sub- protection against the Chinese is the same kind of protection we have against the Soviet Union, and that is a balance of thermonuclear destruction. That is what we have today. And I think that is necessarily our best defense. I think we have got a program that we are funding in this bill known as ULMS, Underwater Long-range Missile System that gives much better 'bang for the buck' than the ABM. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California has expired. (At the request of Mr. RIVERS, and by unanimous consent, Mr. LEGGETT was al- lowed to proceed for 21/2 additional minutes.) Mr. LEGGETT. The ULMS submarine, which many of us who are for a reduc- tion of defense spending support, seems to be a very cost-effective vehicle. It has 24 tubes and is buried at the bottom of the sea. It is perhaps two or three times the size of the Polaris submarine fully MIRVed. I do not think you can have it both ways. I do not think you can be against MIRV and be against the ABM. That is my personal view. I think we get more bang out of a buck from the MIRV system than from the ABM. The total purpose of the $12 billion ABM system is to assure that 200 missiles will survive in the middle 1970's and middle 1980's. I think if you get 200 missiles out of one ULMS submarine, and we know we have that capability, we will have a much more cost-effective system. marines, have been discussed at great Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, will length and I shall not belabor the point. the gentlemanyield? But I suggest that the development of Mr. LEGGETT. I yield to the gentle- the thermonuclear warhead has ruled man from Missouri. out the possibility of a first strike by Mr. RANDALL. Did I correctly under- either of the great powers against the stand the gentleman to' say that under other virtually forever, regardless o the ULMS system, 24 tubes would be technological developments. buried in the bottom of the sea? If so, I say this because of the fantastically ;would they not be just as vulnerable as high confidence levels required. Let us some of our land-based vehicles? suppose, for example, that the Soviets Mr. LEGGETT. They would be mobile. develop some as-yet-undreamed-of sub- They could be moved. We have a good marine technique which appears to be capability to tie all of that down. effective. It cannot be tested under real- Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, will the istic conditions. They will never know gentleman yield? what countermeasures we have until they Mr. LEGGETT. I yield to the gentle- are faced with them in combat and must man from Michigan. overcome them on the first try. The Mr. NEDZI. I thank the gentleman for history of untired advanced weapons yielding. I take this opportunity of corn- systems living up to theoretical expecta- mending the gentleman for his out- tions has not been good. As one of many Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 Axil 30,, 1970 Approved Empsteeggloggfill3fpfcc?itibRDIffatOca37R000200210005-9 113727 examples, before the air war over North Vietnam began we estimated the effec- tiveness of the Soviet SAM-2 missile at 50 Percent, but in practice its effective- ness turned out to be only 2 percent. Consider the disastrous effect of such a miscalculation on ,the part of a Soviet first-strike planner. If only 10 percent of our Poseidon fleet survived long enough to launch its missiles, the Soviet Union would receive more than 400 war- heads, each twice as big as the Nagasaki bomb. If we turned out to have a counter- measure that enabled our entire fleet to survive, Russia would be showered by over 4,000 of these warheads, plus more than 200 larger Polaris A-3 warheads. The Soviet planner would face a similar problem with regard to a preemptive attack against ,our ICBM's and our mantled aircraft, and his problems would be supercompounded by the need to carry out all elements of his attack simultaneously. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that the prob- lem is insoluble. One would have to be absolutely insane to risk one's national existence on the possibility that an un- tried and highly complex weapons sys- tem would approach 100 percent effec- tiveness. And coming back to reality, the Soviet Union could double its projected military budget for the next 10 years, and it would still not approach even a theoretical first strike capability. Second. Granting for the sake of argu- ment that we need to improve our de- terrent, the Safeguard ABM gives us less deterrence for our money than ani of several other options available to us. The Department of Defense claims Safeguard will increase the number of survivable Minuteman ICBM's from about 100 to about $00. So granting the dubious assumption that Safeguard will perform up to expectations in a heavy sophisticated surprise attack, and grant- ing the even more dubious assumption that the Soyiets will tailor their offense to maximize the effectiveness of Safe- guard, we find ourselves proposing to spend upwards of $12 billion in order to Increase our survivable deterrent by about 200 ICBM's. Let us compare this with our other options. ? For perhaps one-sixth the price of Safeguard we could buy 200 additional Minuteman rn missiles with silos. I do not recommend this course, both because It could be considered provocative and because its deterrent effect would event- ually be washed out by improvements in Soviet MIRV accuracy. But at least in the short run it offers a cost exchange ratio of about 1 to 1, which is a great deal more Clan can be said for Safe- guard. I should also note that the lead time for this option is only 2 or 3 years, as opposed to 5 years for Safeguard. We could thus afford to do nothing for a year while we await SALT developments. For perhaps one-half the price of Safe- guard, we could superharden all 1,000 of cur existing Minuteman ICBM's. I do not recommend this course either, because it too would in time be washed out by im- provements in Soviet missile accuracy. But assuming the technical problems can be worIced out, it would serve to extend the deterrent life of Minuteman by several years, which is more than Safeguard would do. And whereas Safe- guard would be the most complex device in the history of man, with all the pos- sibility of failure that implies, hard rock silos would be simple and reliable. Against the threat for which Safeguard is designed, superhardening would save far more than 200 ICBM's. Finally, su- perhardening differs from Safeguard in that it is totally nonprovocative. Once we have set up production lines for Sprint missiles and missile site radars, the Russians might expect us to build a few more and put them around our cities,. which in a sense would make them pro- vocative first-strike weapons. But one cannot superharden a city. Now let us consider the option of put- ting the Safeguard money into an un- dersea deterrent. Mr. Chairman, the de- terrence we could gain in this way stag- gers the imagination. Let us consider what we could gain by putting this money into the underwater long-range missile system, known as ULMS. One of the most important?probably the most important?factor affecting missile submarine safety is the volume of water in which it can operate. By increasing the missile range from the present Poseidon and Polaris 2,500-3,000 miles to 5,000-8,000 miles, ULMS would convert the Soviet Union's antisubmarine problems from impossible to superimpos- sible. We could even station these ships in controlled environments such as our own great inland bodies of water. I suggest that the Soviets would find it somewhat difficult to conduct antisubmarine war- fare in Lake Superior or the Mississippi River. Official cost estimates of this program are not yet available, but as a rough estimate it appears that for the cost of Safeguard we could build a fleet with approximately the same number of war- heads as the Poseidan fleet now under construction?that is, about 5,000 MAW units. In addition to being supersecure, UtlV1S would be more effective than Poseidon because its longer time on sta- tion would permit a larger proportion of the fleet to be deployed at any given time. Finally, the advanced technology required for ULMS is modest compared to that for Safeguard, and the main- tenance costs would be nominal. Mr. Chairman, let me emphasize that ULMS could mean the end of the arms race. Once we built it, there would be no need to increase it, and no need to further protect it. The strategic weap- ons business would be reduced to the relatively inexpensive task of developing advanced warheads to keep ahead of pos- sible city-defense ABM developments. We could gradually retire our manned bombers and land-based ICBM's. We could cancel the Minuteman III and B-1 programs. This is cost effectiveness. But instead, we are choosing the most ineffective and cost-ineffective of all our options. Third. Ballistic missile defense, like Vietnam, is a bottomless pit that will swallow as much of our Lational treasure as we care to throw into it, and still cry for more. Already we are seeing ourselves being sucked onto the cost-escalation tread- mill. I am not referring merely to the 20-percent increase in total system cost estimates which occurred in the past year, although that is nothing to sneeze at. More importantly, I refer to the fact that, while last year Mr. Laird told us Safeguard as proposed would defend our Minuteman from a heavy Soviet attack, now he tells us Safeguard will not be enough; we will need more. This is going to go on forever; if we are gullible enough to let it. In our additional and dissenting views on this bill, Congressmen NEDZI, PIKE, STAFFORD, WHELAN, and I discussed how an offense-defense arms race places the defense in a progressively more disad- vantageous position. Today I will merely point out, if the offense were to attack with 10,000 warheads, even a 90-percent effective defense would not be noticeably better than no defense at all. And the cost of this defense, assuming it to be possible, would certainly exceed a hun- dred billion dollars. I do not mean to suggest the existence of some God-given principle that ther- monuclear missile offense shall always be placed ahead of the defense. But I do suggest it is an empirical fact of life, and will remain so throughout the forseeable future. Every dollar we spend on ABM can and surely will be offset by the Sov- iet expenditure of a few cents on their missile offense. And the way these things always go, the Soviets will over- compensate for our ABM, leaving us in the end less secure than before the in- sane cycle began. Fourth. A missile defense against China is unncessary. No one denies that a Chinese attack on the United States would result in the obliteration of ,their entire country. What basis do we have for thinking the Chinese would commit na- tional suicide just for the satisfaction of killing a few million Americans? All the evidence points to the opposite conclusion. China has traditionally been one of the most cautious nations in the world in the conduct of its foreign af- fairs. Today it has no troops in combat anywhere. To the best of my knowledge, it has no troops stationed outside its borders. Even in Vietnam, it has yet to commit a single combat soldier?an ex- ample we would have done well to emu- late. Since China now has joined the space age nations, surely it has the pow- ers today to launch a suicidal ICBM attack. We will not be able to stop her for 5 years with the ABM at most. Probabilities dictate that if China does not act for 5 years she will not act. Fifth. An anti-Chinese defense is not possible. Let us set aside for the moment the question of whether the Chinese would be able to penetrate or overwhelm the thin area defense which is the only pro- tection Safeguard would give our popula- tion centers. Let us consider only the alternative methods by which China could kill several million Americans. It would be no trick at all?it would not even be very expensive?for the Chinese to place a thousand mega- tons aboard each of several trawlers or submarines, and to detonate these off Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 H 3728 Approved For RelearaegigelM?Nack-Rttatlya3MeR-00210005-9 April ,30, 197'0 our coasts. The resulting tidal waves would cause great death and destruction; favorable winds would enable fallout to wreak even greater havoc. For that matter, they could place a thosuand megatons aboard a tramp steamer, hoist a neutral-country flag, and tail into /slew York Harbor, or San Fran- cisco, or Baltimore, or all at once. Such a ship could be entering New York Har- bor this very minute, for all we know. If any Member of this House can suggest a practical method of defense against such an attack, I would like to hear it. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that our de- fense lies in our deterrent ability. This is not ideal, but it is all we have, and we had better learn to live with it. We must always be sure that our deterrent is more than sufficient, and more than credible to any potential aggressor. We must al- ways provide a generous safety margin. But we must also distinguish between real threats and imaginary threats. And most importantly, we must rectify our mistakes rather than locking ourselves into them and compounding them. Neither the present Administration nor Its predecessor has brought credit on it- self by beginning with the decision that an ABM should be built and then fran- tically changing from rationale to ra- tionale in tope of finding one that might sell. So I urge adoption of the amendment to strike all ABM procurement funds. In the coming fiscal year,:Lt will save us $660.4 million, In the years to follow it will save many billions, and it may mark the moment when we began to turn our resources to helping our citizens instead of tilting at windmills. Mr. PIRNIE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York is recognized. (Mr. PIRNIE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. PIRNIE, Mr. Chairman in re- sponse to the remarks of the gentleman who preceded me in the well, I would like to remind my colleagues that last year, after the most extensive discus- sions, both in our committee and in public forms of debate, the Congress voted to begin a phased deplOyment of the Safeguard anti-ballistic-missile sys- tem. At that time the opponents of the system said that the Soviet threat was overstated. This year, however, as the commitee report clearly shows, we have learned that the threat was understated last year. The Soviets have gone from 230 to 280 58-9 missiles and, at the present rate, they could by the mid- 1970's provide a threat that would neutralize the deterrence of our Minute- man missiles, When we authorized the program last year, there were all kinds of allegations that it would wreck the chances for the SALT, talks, In point of fact, if anything our affirmative decisions on ABM en- cOttraged, the Soviets to seek strategic arnsiilnit,tjpns talks. There has been no evidence of any kind that the SALT talk are being delayed or held up be- ca Of Safeguard. There has been no evidence of any kind that the Soviets consider It necessary to delay their weapons development because of Safe- guard. When the ABM was debated last year, there were a lot of allegations about the technical feasibility of the system. Our review this year showed that the sys- tern is proceeding on schedule. The test version of the missile site radar is work- ing well at Kwajalein. The work on the software computer programs, the most difficult part of the system, is proceeding at the expected rate. And there is no evidence that the system will not be able to meet its technological goals. The first firing of a missile at an ICBM will take place sometime this fall. In short, there has been no evidence to indicate that the Congress was wrong In the decision it took last year and much evidence to indicate that it was right. There is, therefore, no evidence to Indicate a turn-around should be taken at this time. In addition, of course, if the system was stopped now, the production and construction work would be halted and if it was later determined the system was required there would be a time delay of about 2 years and a great increase in cost on the order of hundreds of mil- lions of dollars. We are discussing the price of sur- vival. I hope the amendment will be defeated. Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. PIRNIE. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina. Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I won- der if we can arrive at some point to cut off debate on this amendment. I ask unanimous consent that all time expire on this amendment and all amendments thereto at 12:45. The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina? There was no objection. The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog- nizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE). Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to express my support of this amendment offered by my colleague, the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT) who has done a tremendous amount of research on this subject and whose arguments I find most persuasive. We are embarking on the business of pouring money down an obviously bot- tomless pit. We are this year spending $1.6 billion on a program whose total cost has in- creased $1.6 billion in 1 year. The thing which concerns me most about our ABM system today is the fact that without any question, the control of the firing of our nuclear ABM weapons must, if the system is to work at all, pass from the hands of humans into the hands of computers. The system simply cannot work in any other way. Deputy Assistant Secretary Packard this year backed off from his statement of last year to the effect that the President would retain the control of this system. In the time frame within which an ABM has to be launched it is just plain impossible to get a message to the Pres- ident of the United States, wherever he may be, and a rational decision from him, under whatever circumstances he may be in, whether he is in Rumania, in the Far East, at a ballgame or out on a sailboat somewhere, as to a command decision to fire the weapon. It is not go- ing to be done that way. It is going to be done by machinery. When we say it is going to be done by the President we are only kidding our- selves. The firing of this nuclear system has now passed into the thoughts and hands of computers. I believe it is a very, very sad age in which we live. This amendment is a thoroughly proper amendment and should be ap- proved. The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog- nizes the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT) (By unanimous consent, Mr. NEDZI yielded his time to Mr. LEGGETT.) Mr. LEGGETT Mr. Chairman, I be- lieve that all the arguments against this system are in the RECORD for last year and are in the dissenting and separate views we have already put in the REC- ORD. One thing we have to keep in mind is that, when we buy the ABM system, we still have an opportunity now, of course, not to buy the system even though we have spent $4 billion or $5 billion in re- search and for construction of sites and so forth. We still barely have our foot in the door. What we are buying with this system, of course, is the most gigantic fire de- partment ever known to mankind. For the first time this year we have the fig- ures on the total number of personnel who are going to be required to man this system and to build it. A $12 billion system of course does not run by itself. When we say $12 billion, we do not include the continuous oper- ating cost of this fantastically large sys- tem. It is going to cost us a billion dol- lars a year at a minimum to run the sys- tem after we get it, to pay the salaries and to pay the housekeeping, even if we do not expand the system to more than $12 billion, and assuming we can rely on the figures we have so far. What we are buying is this: Military personnel to run the system perpetually, 12,550 men; civilian personnel to run the system perpetually, 6,8-70 civil servants; for a total of 19,420. If this system is like the ICBM system that we have we will require, in addi- tion to that, 45,000 separate contract per- sonnel, who are the- contract personnel currently attached to our Minuteman III's and the Titan program we have, and the silos, at the present time. In addition, we would have the salaries of the people to build thesystem; 22,- 300 production people plus 16,000 mili- tary personnel?for a total of 102,720 people. If we are concerned about inflation in this country?and certainly, with an 8.4 percent escalation in the cost of living in the 15 months since President Nixon took office, we should be?we should look around to try to figure out where there Is some place we can help the President, where we can go slow for a year or two and cut down on expensive hardware and massive escalatory systems. I believe the place to do it is not an Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 4pri1 30, 1970 APProve415)&80s?foN9i7iOntOR15:111W2jgg337R000200210005-9 H3729 across-the-board cut in this bill, which I certainly do not support. If we cannot figure out individual places to cut this bill, after working on it all year long, certainly we ought to fold up our tent. The place to cut is in the ABM sys- tem. We have been doing R. & D. for a great many years. We are not at the ultimate in design at the present time. We are still conducting d great number )f tests down at Kwajalein. We can naintain a posture with the state of the Lit by continuing research and develop- nent. The only thing my amendment would to would be to grind to" a halt the pro- urement of this missile at the present ime. It makes good sense, because we are alking now about spending $500 million o develop a new advanced Spartan, vhich is a long-range missile which goes vith this system. Even the Spartan we we buying today is not what we ulti- nately intend to buy. Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, will the rentleman yield? Mr. LEGGETT. I yield to the gentle- nan. from Missouri. Mr. RANDALL. The gentleman sug- cests that there will be a considerable verational expense involved in the cost >f men, military and civilian, to man this >ystem. The gentleman a moment ago nentioned the ULMS system. Would he have us believe there would be no ex- pense involved in operating that sys- tem in terms of military and civilian personnel? Mr. LEGGETT. I am glad the gentle- man brought that point up, because op- posed to the 100,000 people it will take to build and operate this fantastically large ABM system, which would insure 200 missiles are going operation in the 1970's and the 1980's, the ULMS system will Involve the use of 10,000 shipyard person- nel for about a year, to construct one submarine which would have the same capability as the entire ABM system. The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. RANDALL) . Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, last year when this issue was discussed it seemed to me that there were two reasons that the opponents gave for opposing it. No. 1, there is the expense involved and they said it would lead to an escalation. The second was that it would not work. Well, if the vote was difficult for some of our colleagues last year, then on those two principal arguments it should be quite a bit easier this year. In the first place, the argument that our priorities should be reordered is no longer valid, because this has been done. Our priorities have been reordered. I can- not give you the figures, but it runs into several billions of dollars. I am sure that many Members remember the closing of the bases which came to about $1.5 bil- lion in. savings. There was about $5 bil- lion in one phase by the executive branch alone and $1 or $2 billion in the differ- ence between the budget and the final authorization and appropriation last year by the Congress. Now let Us look at this argument as to whether this will work or not. Certainly our Chief Executive, who is my President and your President, our Commander in Chief, has the greatest military sources of intelligence of any man in America. He says it will work. But we do not have to rely on that source alone in our com- mittee. Some of the information is classi- fied, but the tests have been going on for all of this year, since lest year, and I can report to You that these tests have been successful. That is the difference between the situation last year and this year. There has been a significant reduction in military expenditures. The system has been proved in the Kwajalein tests that it will work. As we approach this vote those two arguments should be paramount in your minds. Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, will the gen- tleman yield? Mr. RANDALL. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Missouri. Mr. HALL. I appreciate the gentleman yielding before he leaves that point. It is a relatively simple argument. We all now accept that the ABM is now technologi- cally feasible. We need the defense. But what needs to be said here, is that we are arguing from a humanitarian point of view on this defensive system where we are absorbing the first strike delivery of the enemy aggressor and saving 20 to 60 million American lives. That is argu- ment enough forme. Does not the gentle- man agree? Mr. RANDALL. Thank you, Dr. HALL. The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. FRASER) . (By unanimous consent, Mr. OLSEN yielded his time to Mr. FRASER.) Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, one of the reasons given for the United-States, I think, to go ahead with the ABM sys- tem is that the Soviets are building an ABM system. This argument is fallacious. .The Soviet ABM system has not given them any increase in security because it is so easy for the United States to satu- rate and overcome the Soviet ABM de- fense. Similarly it is wasteful and unwise for us to build an ABM system expecting It to give us any significant defense from the Soviet Union. I think it is worth taking a moment to notice what the Soviet Union is doing. Around Moscow there is a launching sys- ter that has been under construction. To- day they have some 62 or 64 launchers in place and it is said that they are opera- tional. What kind, of a deterrent or a threat does that pose to American offen- sive weapons? Let me tell you how small a deterrent it would be to an American MIRV onslaught. After the Poseidon missiles are in place on an American submarine, one-half of the missiles froth just one submarine could knock out all of the ABM inter- cepts around Moscow and incinerate Moscow. In other words, those 64 launch- ers could be taken out by the firing of seven Poseidon missiles because they each carry 10 warheads and the 70 warheads would exhaust the Soviet ABM system. Then, one more Poseidon missile with 10 warheads would incinerate Moscow. Each of those 10 warheads dropped on Moscow would have a nuclear force of double that dropped on Hiroshima or Nagasaki. So, the fast is today, the Moscow ABM Is nothing. As has been made abundantly clear we could go through that like a hot knife through butter. The reason I presented this was to give you an idea how this situation would look from the point of view of the Soviet Union If the United States deploys an ABM system the Soviets would be forced to put multiple warheads on their offensive ICBM's. If they put 10 warheads on top of each of their ICBM's, they would take out 10 Spartans or 10 Sprints with one of their missiles. This would be the easiest and most effective Soviet response to an American ABM system, They would be compelled to go to multiple warheads as we were when we thought the Soviets were build- ing an extensive ABM defense. We know the ABM was not a well-con- ceived system, because the Department of Defense says today that they have to redesign the missile site radar because it is too big. They have got to go to smaller units that could be scattered around the Minuteman site in order to survive an onslaught such as would be expected. I think, for once, we ought to begin to test what we are being told. For once, the Congress ought to stand up and begin to challenge some of the claims coming out of the Department of Defense. Mr. HUNGATE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. FRASER,. I yield to the gentleman. Mr. HUNGATE. I thank the gentleman for his statement and urge support of this amendment. Mr. FRASER. I would like to further point out in response to some of the remarks which have been made by the gentleman from Missouri, with respect to what this chart. shows with respect to ICBM Soviet nuclear warheads I have added a few more paragraphs to illu- strate exactly what I was trying to say. I have here the additional number of ICBM launchers by the Soviet Union, beginning in 1967 with 380 launchers and have extended it down to 1968, 1969, and to 1970 to an annual rate. It is probably 120 and, perhaps, even less, because we are having to annualize a 5-month period. Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. FRASER. I yield to the gentle- man from Illinois. Mr. ARENDS. The gentleman is say- ing something I know nothing about with reference to the fact that the Depart- ment says we have to reconstruct or re- design this whole system. Where did the gentleman get that information? There is no testimony in the hearings at all to this fact and I have never heard it before. Mr. FRASER. If the gentleman will remember during the hearings they stated that they are redesigning the , MSR. They said the advantages to hav- ing a single missile site radar were very little and stated the fact that they are in the process of redesigning them. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gen- tleman from Minnesota has expired. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. GUBSER) . Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 H 3730 Approved For Releat4789ifigftigiAaledii99.13AR900210005-9 April so, 197c (Mr. OUBSER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his re- marks.) , Mr. GUI/SER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out two errors in the state- ment of the gentleman who has just left the well of the House. First of all, there is no major redesign of the MSR system. There is only the addition of a small MSR radar for the purpose of creating hard point defense. This does not con- stitute a redesign of the MSR, no matter how the gentleman from Minnesota wishes to distort the testimony. The second point I would like to make is this, that the gentleman's chart which he has Just shown us is not a complete chart. It does not include the latest in- telligence estimates. You will note the red line and the straight line. If he had been able to show you the remainder of the Updated chart it would have been evi- dent that the red line would again have curved up and crossed the first line to completely vindicate what Secretary Laird predicted in his testimony before the Congress. So I point out that the chart that was presented is not accurate because it is net complete, and as such it gives a dis- torted picture. Mr, ERASER. If the gentleman will yield, the last figure is from the threat chart given to the committee. It gives the threat as of February 1970. There are no additional published figures. There are no figures available after that. The chart is accurate. Mr. GUBSER. My response to the gentleman is that the published figures are incomplete, and the figures the gentleman has cited are incomplete. Mr. Chairman, in committee I offered amendment to delete $25,000,000 for long leadtime items connected with the itlVe A/3M sites to be constructed after the first three. Last year I supported phase I of the Safeguard system because I believed it was imperative that we insure the sur- vivability of a credible deterrent. I also believed that prudence require that we do not waste a year's time in taking out 81.10h insurance, X, still support phase I for the same rea- sons. I also support that portion of phase I/ Which deals with installations at Grand Forks Air Force Base, lVfahlstrom. , Air nrei 1461,e, and Whiteman Air Force Base- These installations are to protect otr _IVIinuteman missiles and preserve our deterrent capabty. They should be corn- _ _ Pletecl as sOQII as possible. But the five additional sites are for a different purpose and introduce a totally new concept and philosophy of defense. It is a concept which, in my opinion, is not as urgent as protecting our Minute- man sites. I think it can wait and we .should not embark upon what will be a multibillion dollar expenditure in the tIVP. a, was overwhelmingly WOuld be again defeated if y. Nevertheless, I want the c early show my reservations his new commitment. Chair recog- ent eman. frn Illinois (Mr. 1 minutes. .Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the proposed amendment. It is very evident that what is happen- ing here is a continuation of the fight we had last year, and I feel the proponents are weak in their argument. I would like to cite one or two matters: Recall if you will the mood and reaction of Russia a few days after the passage by the Senate in 1968 of the ABM pro- gram. After Congress approved the ABM program, the Soviet leaders suddenly dropped their negative attitude as to arms limitation talks and offered to talk about arms control limitations. The situ- ation of the SALT talks today is basically the same. We are bringing the Soviet leaders to the table to talk about arms limitations, this is, in part, because the Soviets recognize that we are not going to be caught short in the continued de- velopment and improvement of our de- fense posture. The gentleman a moment ago talked about what would happen if we were to initiate an attack on the Soviet Union. That is not in the policy or tradition of the United States, and it has been so stated many, many times. Our position has always been of a defensive nature. Should some hostile situation develop, we might then find this strength indispensa- ble. I feel the objective of this amend- ment is therefore entirely wrong. Let me add that our safeguard posture should always be that if we are going to err we are going to err on the side of having too muck instead of too little. I personally hope we may never need the use of these missiles?and we will not?if we continue to operate from a position of streigth in the troubled and upset world. Mr. Chairman, our position today should be to vote down overwhelmingly the proposed amendment. Mr. HALL, Mr. Chairman, if the gen- tleman will yield, I would like to point out the inconsistency in the alleged number, regardless of the source, or the "military intelligence" of the proponents, Insofar as the number of warheads are Concerned, as displayed before the Mem- bers here on the part of the gentleman from California and the gentleman from Minnesota. Mr. AREMS. Might I also add to what the gentleman has said, that when we talk about numbers we cannot forget to talk about the megatonnage, this is vitally important in thinking about what could happen with the further develop- ment of Russian missiles. The CHAMMAN. The Chair recog- nizes the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Mynas) for 21/2 minutes. Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I want everybody to listen to this: This amend- ment does one thing. It just about kills the whole ABM program. Everybody who is for waste should vote for this Decau,se almost eyerything we have put into this program could disappear, Nobody?but nobody?knows what that booster was that the Chinese used to put that gadget up,into space this week. Nobody knows what Russia has in these gadgets it has put up into space. I would think these two things alone would cause some people to have second thoughts. Now, how on earth can we ever have an ABM system if we do not perfect one that works? This will allow us the capability to build the ABM. We know Russia has one. Is it a crime to defend this country? The gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT) spoke about a balanced defense. This gives it to us. This gives us an even balance insofar as a deterrent is con- cerned. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. The CHAIRMAN. The question is or the amendment offered by the gentlemar from California (Mr. LEGGETT). Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I de mand tellers. Tellers were ordered, and the Chair man appointed as tellers Mr. LEGGETT am Mr. RIVERS. The Committee divided, and the teller reported that there were?ayes 85, noes 131. So the amendment was rejected. Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, I mov to strike the requisite number of words. (Mr. GUBSER asked and was givei permission to revise and extend his re. marks.) (By unanimous consent, Mr. GUBSE1 was allowed to proceed for an additiona 2 minutes.) Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, I talc* this time in an effort to inject cool ra- tionality into what is becoming an ex- plosive, emotional issue. I speak of tilt fast moving situation in Cambodia and along the Cambodian border with South Vietnam. Now is the time for cool heads to deliberate, to cooperate, and guard against hasty action which could com- plicate an already delicate situation. I well remember the highly charged emotional atmosphere in which the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was passed. As one who supported it I can say that I would have second thoughts if I were voting on the resolution today. I believe it has been used beyond all congressional intent to justify an escalation of the war in South- east Asia which none of us envisioned. The House should not forget what hap- pened that day and it should not make the Mistake of legislating again in reac- tion to powerful emotion and on the basis of incomplete information. Mr. Chairman, I am privy to more than ordinary information regarding the situ- ation in Cambodia and within the last 3 days have been thoroughly briefed on highly sensitive matters. Yet, I say to you quite frankly that I have unanswered questions about Cambodia and I submit that not a single Member of the House of Representatives knows the full truth of the situation. Then there is the matter of the con- situtional prerogative of the President of the United States to act as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces. Our Pres- ident will address the Nation tonight on this subject and I presume will give the world his assessment of the situation which prevails. He will make his state- ment on the basis of information not available at this moment in this Cham- ber. This House should hear what the Commander in Chief has to say before it takes hasty action which could have long range consequences. I hold, a strong personal view about what should be done with respect to Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 Al 30, 1970 Approved RoftemakuvifictiR613Driutpx37R000200210005-9 H 3731 Cambodia. Based upon my present in- take out $203 million of the phase II (Mr. SISK asked and was given per- formation I would strongly oppose the item on ABM procurement. mission to revise and extend his re- commitment of a single American Trail- The effect of this procurement an- marks.) tary man to grotind combat in Cambodia. flounced by Secretary Laird the first of Mr. LEGGETT. I thank the gentleman I feel that the time has come to truly the year would be to construct addi- very much. test the Vietnamization program. The tional sites in addition to what we au- Of course, this is just the same kind upper delta area in so-called IV Corps thorized last year at Grand Forks, N. of escalation of support I was talking and IIT Corps have seen what we have Dak., and Malmstrom, Mont. about, in support of this particular been told are the greatest successes in It would authorize a new ABM missile amendment. the Vietnamization program. It is my base, at Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo. If we were really sincere in the ra- understanding that with the exception It would allow for advance procure- tionale last year for the ABM system, of a few American advisers military op- ment at five other additional bases there is no reason for the additional erations in these area are alinost corn- around the country, either included in phase II program this year. b t s of the Re- this i is bill or will be included in the military If Members will look at the second and plete y coflcluceU public of Vietnam. If an operation is to construction bill which will be offered n be conducted against North Vietnamese relation thereto. troops who retreat to Cambodian sane- I believe we have to keep in mind that tuaries, then the ground operation we are talking about a sensitive area, but should, in my opinion, be completely con- we can say this, which is the fact we ducted by South Vietnamese troops even said - in the report: The effect of the without 'U.S. military advisers. If Viet- phase II add-on, adds between 250 and narnization is working, now is the time to 300 percent more missiles than the num- test it. We should not start down another ber of Spartans and Sprints we were road of committing advisers today, addi- talking about last year in phase I. tional U.S. support forces tomorrow and If we can believe the rationale for the a full-scale commitment of manpower reason for the ABM system last year, day after tomorrow. then we ought to stop right there and If one would look at this situation take a look at what we have done and through the eyes of the South Vietnam- where we are going and such as that be- ese he could not help but understand lore we advance additional systems. that this is not a new war?this is the If I were the chairman of the coin- saint 'War against the same enemy, the mittee, defending this system, I believe troops governed by "Hanoi in North Viet- I would be a little bit concerned about narri. I have seen the area referred to as the massive escalation that has occurred the Parrot's Peak and understand the with respect to support for the positions terrain. Many Vietcong and North Viet- opposing the ABM system. namese base camps are situated directly Last year I believe the greatest num- on the border. -Frequently an attack ber of votes we could muster on this floor against this enemy stops in the middle of in opposition was something like 45 votes. a ase camp as he gains sanctuary by This year we have had 80 or 85 votes moving to the western limits of the same against the total ABM system, and I have camp. If South Vietnam on its own voli- had a great number of people approach tion elects to utilize the principle of hot me during the debate and say, "We can- pursuit and attack these sanctuaries or not repeal what we have done last year, North Vietnam forces anyplace else, this but we certainly do oppose any escala- is their decision, but no U.S. ground tion or any add-on." forces of any kind should be employed. Mr. Chairman, this is my strongly held personal view, but despite having been to Vietnam on three occasions, despite dozens of highly classified briefings on t subject I say once again, I still have third pages of my remarks in the report on the bill, on the ABM system, they will see that the rationale for the phase I is given. The office, Secretary of Defense, ra- tionale was, No. 1, to preserve the Presi- dent's future options by establishing a minimum base for expansion if the threat requires it. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California has expired. (By unanimous consent, Mr. LEG- GETT was allowed to proceed for 3 ad- ditional minutes.) Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, gentleman yield? Mr. LEGGETT. I yield to the gentle- man from Missouri. Mr. HALL. I appreciate the gentle- man's yielding. The way it came out in his speech in the well, it sounded as though the gentle- man did not realize Whiteman Air Force Base was a missile center already in existence. Putting in these funds does not go to that purpose. Those Minutemen are al- ready there, in silos. It is well established. This is the defensive base. Mr. LEGGETT. To give it a multiple capability with new ABM's. Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, will the will the Mr. SISK. Mr. Chairman, will the gen- gentleman yield? tleman yield? Mr. LEGGETT. I yield to the gentle- Mr. LEGGETT. I yield to my col- man from Missouri. league from California. Mr. RANDALL. There is classified in- Mr. SISK. I thank the gentleman from formation which we cannot discuss, but California for yielding. I can say there is already a Minuteman . . Unanswered questions about the situation Let me say that, as the gentleman complex surrounding Whiteman In Cambodia. TomorrOw after hearing knows, I voted against his earlier amend- Force Base which is unprotected. This is our Commander in Chief who is the man ment because I supported the Safe- the only unprotected complex in America responsible for decisionrnaking in this guard program in its initial phase. today. Important matter, I will know more. To- As I understand his amendment now, What sense does it make to start on ,. day I could not in good conscience par- it will strike out only those funds dealing phase I and proceed to protect our ticipate in another situation like that with phase II. Is that correct? ICBM's in Montana am:. North Dakota V?Vhich prevailed in passage of the Gulf Mr. LEGGETT. That is true. and leave large numbers of our offensive a Tonkin resolution where Congress ad- Mr. SISK. I am going to support the strength without any protection in Mis- dicated its responsibility. I could not in gentleman's amendment because, souri? Unless we proceed with some kind good conscience participate in writing of frankly, I believe there is a very strong of a defense at Whiteman all these law in a partial vacuum of factual in- feeling that the steps we have taken must ICBM's would become sitting ducks. We formation and which is a reaction to be fully justified. I am not altogether should proceed with phase II without the emotion of the moment. I will not sure I am right. I am sure I do not have delay. legislate tor political purposes. Our duty as much information as the President Mr. LEGGETT. Further analyzing the is to legislate only in the light of truth. has, or as others may have who proposed rationale from last year, we have tried AsatiInmEmr OFFERED In nit. 1.2mtrr this, I recognize we are taking certain to protect the options of the President, ' Air. Lnocaa-.0. Mr. Chairman, I offer Chances.and we have protected them. To those an amendment. I wish to say that basically I believe the who say that we have the SALT talks The Clerk read as follows: initial phase I should be given an op- today because of the ABM, it is important Amendment offered by Mr. LEGGETT: portunity to be in place and to at least to remember it is possible that that could , Q.n. page 2, lino 8, after the word "missiles: have an opportunity to indicate what its be, but there is no reason to expand the Ir ABM system after we have the SALT ;apart St88X00,000". It is doing. talks going. --lo;,,th. g_ Army," strike "$1,086,600,000" and capabilities are and what tests may show 14x,, ttodtTT. Mr. Chairman, this therefore, I propose to support the Second, the Secret,ry of Defense justi- -arrieridifilnt does what I indicated earlier gentleman's amendment to eliminate fies phase I to provide a means for work- it, wentel AO. It relates to the $203 million. Phase II, in the hope we can go ahead ing out problems that inescapably arise It is included in that item on page 2 of with phase I and see what happens. in any major weapons system. We had a the bill with respect to missiles. It would I thank the gentleman for yielding, debate in our committee and we heard Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 113732 Approved For ReleMaRMWOAPINtrigggril0PF31p410200210005-9 A from no less illustrious a member than the chairman of the committee, who sug- gested that we get the phase I system working before we move on to the phase II program. Before we will do that, here we are moving ahead with a 250- or 300- percent escalation of the program. Mr. Chairman, I also think this: As far as the ABM system is concerned, the official testimony before our committee concerning the ABM in Moscow?and as I understand it, they have about 67 me- chanically operated radar type ABM's which are clearly of an inferior capabil- ity?the official testimony before our committee is that Moscow is less safe today with the 6'7 ABM's than they would be without an ABM system. Why? Be- cause we make no secret about it that we have overtargeted our ICBM capability so as totally to account for any defense that they might provide in that area. Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield at that point? Mr. LEGGETT. I am glad to yield to the chairman. Mr. RIVERS. How many ABM's did the gentleman say Moscow had? Mr. LEGGETT. Moscow has 6'7. Mr. RIVERS. And how filmy do we have? Mr. LEGGETT. And they are less safe. If we had no ABM's we would be more safe. Mr. RIVERS. According to the gentle- man's amendment, we would only have two sites. Mr. LEGGETT. With my amendment we would have 300 percent less than we would have with this first buy procure- rnent for the phase II program. Mr. RANDALL,. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment. (Mr. RANDALL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his re- marks.) - Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, the very first thing we should settle is to cor- rect the statement made by the gentle- man from California who just left the well. He said we were starting a new de- velopment at Whiteman Air Force Base. That is not true. It is an old B-47 base and later a B-52 base. The base has been there for several years. The birds have been put in silos in a circumference around this base. I refer to our Minute- men ICBM's. Frankly, with regard to some of the comment that the gentleman naad.e a moment ago, if there is any validity at all to them, about his concern for the cost of operation of the Safeguard sys- tem then he should agree that White- man is the ideal place to locate a Safe- guard unit. The base is well preserved-- with ample facilities to house personnel to operate Safeguard. This is the place it should be located, because these ICBM's are altogether unprotected. There is quite a substantial number of them in this area. The Minuteman com- plex at Whiteman Air Force Base near Secialia?, Mc_g. is the only major Icpm cOMPlex In America today that is unpro- tected by a defensive missile system. The gentleman from California spoke about a, balanced defense system bal- anced tweep the see, and the air. I sup- pose I should not go into this, but maybe we should balance this thing out. Maybe. at the moment there is a need for reduc- tion in some of our naval shipyards? for instance at Mare Island?but that is not the real issue before us now. We are talking about establishing a new unit of the Safeguard system. There has been some talk during this debate about waste in the military. If the gentleman's amendment prevails, it will result in some real waste. There will be big cost overruns because the postponement of the decision to authorize modified phase II would increase both the costs and the risks to the United States. It is estimated that a delay of 1 year could add another $300 million to the total acquisition cost if this, system is later approved. This is the kind of an increase which always occurs in a stretch-out. What the gentleman proposes would disregard the best source of military in- telligence which is the Commander-in- Chief and he is your President and my President. It would disregard the warn- ing from what the Chinese did a few days ago when they orbited a satellite and what the Iku,ssians did a few days later. It should be kept in mind that the Safe- guard program, all of it, has been based on what we call a phased development. The President and the Secretary of De- fense are ready to stop this if the threat reaches an acceptable risk. But there is no ' indication that the threat has reached an acceptable risk. The opposite evidence exists, as a matter of fact, and in the past year the risk from the Chi- nese has increased and the same is true as to the soviet *Union. If this situation turns around to the good and the risk should for some reason diminish, then, of course, we could suspend further deployment. Mr. LEGGETT. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. RANDALL. The gentleman had 8 minutes. I will yield briefly in a minute. I anticipate not taking too much longer, but I may have to ask for some more time. Let me repeat, we can always stop the deployment of the Safeguard missile. But If we lose time now, we will never get that time back again. It is just that sim- ple. For example, if we expect to have any kind of a system deployed and opera- tional by the mid-19'70's when the threat would stand at an unacceptable level if the Chinese Communists proceed, at their present pace which has been admitted to even by those who even oppose the de- ployment of this system. But if we delay today, if we delay the earliest possible deployment of phase II? then we are really going to be losing not 3 months, or 6 months, or a year but perhaps, as much as 2 years time. If we follow such a course we will be losing too much time. That is the issue before us to- day. Can we afford to lose time that can never be regained? Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. RANDALL. I yield briefly to the gentleman and hope the gentleman would return the courtesy sometime. Mr. LacroErr. We are talking about this massive escalation. I believe we brought out a minute ago the fact that ii 30, 1970 there are around Moscow 6'7 launchers, which is the ABM system. There is no doubt about it, we have recognized but we have authorized more launchers than that in our phase I program. So we beat them without the phase II program. With the figures which we have here and which have been submitted by the gentleman from Minnesota, we have already beat them on ICBM's 9,000 to 1,000. Mr. RANDALL, Let me interject. I would like to be able to use a, little bit of my time. As I understand the figures offered by the gentleman from Minne- sota, they presumed all of our ABM's were MIRVed. However, all he described are not MIRVed at present. Moreover, as I understand either the gentleman from New York or the gentleman from Minne- sota will offer an amendment to strike out all funds of MIRV or ABM's either sea based or land based. Mr. Chairman, the figures showing such a large increase in our ABM strength is thus not only misleading but quite false and fallacious. Then also let us not forget the gentlemen who show what strength we will have after MIRV are the very same ones who will try to amend this bill to strike out all funds for MIRV. This is a curious and I may add deceiving way to debate the issue. Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we could arrive at some time to close debate on this amendment. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous con- sent that all debate on this amendment and all amendments thereto terminate at 1:30. The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina? There was no objection. The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog- nizes the gentleman from Texas (Mr. FISHER) . (Mr. FISHER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman, I associ- ate myself with those who are opposed to this amendment. This identical debate on the same subject matter was thor- oughly covered right here last year with the same people being present. There has developed, as we all know, in recent months a very determined drive in this country designed to undertake to weaken our defense structure. In my judgment it is of such serious proportions that we must take note of it. I think this is an example, this and a number of other amendments. Actually, one would almost be tempted to think that the armed limitations con- ference instead of being held in Geneva is being held here in the House of Repre- sentatives with the wrong people calling the shots. It is time, Mr. Chairman, that we take note of this trend and vote this amend- ment down. Mr. Chairman, I desire to also discuss the F-111. The bill has already been well ex- plained by Chairman RIVERS and others and I will therefore restrict my remarks to a brief discussion of one element of the bill. I am referring to the F-111. I have had assigned to me some respon- , Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 A15;r4l 30, 1970 ApprovedFiaktMtift3fERSTOREEMDI:1714-8M7R000200210005-9 H 3733 sibility with respect to this aircraft and I have devoted a substantial amount of time to informing myself on this very Important matter. Let me begin by saying that unfortu- nately a proponent of the F-111 starts his case not at the bottom rung of the ladder rather but down in a hole some- Whereinlow it. Before ie can give infor- mation he must dispel misinformation. One does not start even, so to speak, when talking about the F-111. An example of what I mean is that have found wholly intelligent people? even Members of Congress?people for whom I have the greatest personal re- spect, who believe?I should say who are wholly convinced?that the F-111 has a very bad safety record. Not just a bad safety record but a very bad one, It is almost impossible to convince them that this is not so because in overcoming mis- understanding of the safety record of the F-111 one is not faced with the usual case of persuasion on the basis of mere fact. One instead is faced With the much more difficult job of overcoming a pre- judged, preformed bias, an "I already know" attitude on the part of the lis- tener. -Unhappily, however for those who have been opposed to the F-11.1?for whatever reason?the statistical facts are unavoidable. They leave no room for argument. They are official Air Force fig- ures. I am fully aware that I do not have here today the difficulty I have discussed, but I do think it wise to mention it. And / cannot help but be reminded oi Fin- ley Peter Dunne's "Mr. Dooley" when he said: It ain't what people don't know that hurts them, it is what they do know that ain't so. I would like to speak briefly about the military requirement for the F-111. This is the prime consideration, and indeed the only one. I do not hold, myself out as one capable of making this judgment, al- though my deep interest and intimate as- sociation with the F-111 since its in- cer tion do cause me to be not uninformed in this respect. For judgment as to need we must go to the military and civilian leaders of the Department of the Air Force. And in order that my remarks about the national need for the F-111 can be presented in a context that is both understandable and persuasive I will ask your indulgence while I quickly cite a few authorities whom I know this committee considers to be just that. First. I will quote Dr. Harold Brown, until recently Secretary of the Air Force and, incidentally, previously Director of Research and Engineering for the De- partment of Defense. This is what Dr. Brown had to say about the F-111: We believe that the aircraft is capable of performing and will perform a task, a vital task that we can't do any other way. And Dr. John S. Foster, the present Director of Defense Research and Engi- neering who said just last year: The F-13,1 has more range . . . than our other aircraft , . higher navigation and bombing accuracy . . . probably more ac- curate than any other in our inventory. And Dr. Searrians, the present Secre- tary of the Air Force, who says: The F--111's great Unrefueled range enables it to strike targets much deeper in enemy territory than any existing fighter. And former Chief of Staff of the Air Force McConnell's statement: The F-111 possesses the best night and adverse weather bombing capability of any of our tactical attach aircraft. ? The present Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Ryan says: The F-111 is now coming into its own as the best fighter attach aircraft in the world for the task of all-weather, deep Interdiction. These statements need no amplifica- tion and, while they speak most specifi- cally of capability, they implicitly em- body the need for the F-111 in the light of today's world and the threats of today and the future. I suggest that to define need or re- quirement one first looks at the threat, and second, at the means for countering that threat. So the question is: Have these means been achieved? Let us look at what the planners wanted. The plan- ners sought an aircraft that would be capable of being deployed to austere bases, be capable of all-weather bomb- ing, of penetrating enemy territory at supersonic speed and carrying either conventional or nuclear weapons. The aircraft would have to be able to take off and land on short and unimproved runways and be virtually perfect in its navigation, and therefore bombing ac- curacy. As for penetration of enemy ter- ritory there was, and is, only one way to do this and that is to have an aircraft that could hug the contours of the earth even while traveling at supersonic speed. Aircraft on a bombing mission, even in an atmosphere where air superiority is not in question, such as in Vietnam, re- quire the accompaniment of a number? sometimes a large number?of other air- craft to perform essential collateral ac- tions. There is no such requirement with the F-111. They go it alone. And the number of aircraft available to our forces by itself becomes meaning- less if bad weather or lack of daylight prevents them from flying and bombing with accuracy. There are to such limi- tations on the F-111. Night or day, bad weather or good weather, the F-111 flies and bombs with pinpoint accuracy. Virtually all aircraft can be detected by enemy radar. By the time that radar, or the human eye, has seen the F-111 it is already too late. And coupled with all these enumerated capabilities the F-111 travels two times the distance with three times the load of bombs of our other aircraft. As we all are aware, the F-111 has had actual tactical, operational experience in Vietnam. The detachment of F-111's that was deployed to Southeast Asia and which flew over to combat missions be- fore the bombing of North Vietnam was discontinued. All of the missions were flown at night and 80 percent of the mis- sions were in weather so bad that other aircraft were not operating. I will draw particular attention to the fact that on these missions the bombing accuracy was better than that being realized on day- light visual missions of other aircraft. Also the enemy initiated defensive action on 88 percent of the missions but no F-111 was hit. These operations clearly established the feasibility of low-alti- tude penetration and all-weather bomb delivery. As you know, three F-ill's were lost in Southeast Asia but none of these losses was due to enemy action. The suspected cause of these losses was later discovered and fixed in the F-111 fleet. I hope that the foregoing is an ade- quate presentation of both the need for and the capability of the F-111. And I will point out that every one of these statements is fully agreed to by the U.S. Air Force. Next, I would like to speak of costs. The charge has been made that the F-111 has unreasonably increased in cost. This is a matter with which we have all become very familiar; an increase in cost of aircraft from the time of the original estimate until the aircraft get Into our inventory. The F-111 has indeed increased in cost, but when the details of these increases are understood they appear very much less serious. At the beginning of the F-111 program the belief was that there would be something over 2,400 of these air- craft produced and, quite importantly, there were to be only two versions of the F-111. You could say three ver- sions, but two of them were so much alike as to make little difference between them. So, there was a production plan of some 2,400 aircraft and in only two versions. Obviously, this would make for great efficiency ana an almost ideal learn- ing curve. Together these two elements would virtually insure relatively low cost. But?as it is a very big "but"?the 2,400 aircraft became something around 600 aircraft, and the essentially two versions became seven versions. The planned monthly production rate of 49 became a monthly rate of eight aircraft. Add to these considerations some concededly faulty estimating on the part of both the manufacturer and the Air Force, an unforeseeable increase in the rate and ex- tent of inflation, and a number of lesser matters, and the efficiency and almost ideal learning curve that I referred to becoming almost the reverse of that. Both need and capability are, I sub- mit, established by the fact that those most capable of making judgment in this respect?I am referring to the leading military and civilian people in the De- partment of the Air Force?have con- sistently requested a greater number of F-ill's than the Office of the Secretary of Defense has permitted to be requested of this Committee. In plain words, if they do not know, who does? Mr. Chairman, the F-111 has had its troubles. For the very advanced aircraft that it is, it is a wonder that it did not have many more. And for reasons that I think are apparent to all of us, these troubles?actually in number and kind no more than any other of our aircraft? have been the recipient of an almost obsessive interest by the press. It may seem a little strange to use the word "justice" in relation to an airplane, but if any aircraft or any military develop- ment has been more subject to injustice in the press, and elsewhere, then I am un- familiar with it. Perhaps all of this was inevitable, given the turbulent context of the F-ill's genesis, the difficulty attendant upon its birth and the strongly expressed feelings of some of its parentage, but my own view is that it is pretty hard to success- Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 H 3734 Approved For RVFNERN/p3MiCht-M_R72-003a7R000200210005-9 RD?HOUSE A 30, 1970 fully maintain that a jewel that looks like a diamond, and that the experts say is a diamond, and which cuts materials that can be cut only by a diamond, is not actually a diamond. If the F-111 had troubles, so did every one of our reason- ably advanced combat aircraft. And not one of them that emerged into our in- ventory has anything approaching the capability of the F-111. Mr. Chairman, although almost every- thing I have said has application to all versions of the F-111, I would like to make one specific and very important reference to the FB-111, the strategic bomber version of the aircraft. Over the years we have all heard ref- erence to the matter of assured destruc- tion by our Strategic Air Command. Ity is not my place, but of course it is most assuredly the place of this committee, to make judgment with respect to the size and composition of our Strategic Air Force. I think it is not inappropriate for me, however, to suggest that the present limitation of only 76 FB-111's for SAC poses a very real possibility that there will be, in the very near future a very serious gap in our assured &estruction capability. I state this in the light of the age of even the newest of the :B-52's and the point in time at which the advanced manned strategic aircraft, the B-1, will come into our inventory. One last thought, Mr. Chairman. We have invested over $6 billion in the F-111 to date. Something over $1.5 billion of this is in material now awaiting use in the building of additional aircraft. For this amount of money?over $6 billion? we have 230 F-ill's. For almost exactly $1.5 billion we can acquire 324 more of these superb aircraft. Accepting the un- equaled capabilities of the F-111?the only aircraft specifically mentioned by the Soviets in the SALT talks?sheer economics would dictate that any course other than the continued procurement of the F-111 would verge on irresponsibility. We have already spent the big money. Mr. Chairman, it is time that the F-111 is approached with what I will call an aggressive sanity. The picture of this ex- traordinary aircraft as it has been por- trayed is not, of course, the result of cal- culated imprecision?there has been no "conspiracy" against the aircraft?but had there been a careful, conscientious, coherent and dedicated effort to the end of deprecating this aircraft out of exist- ence it could not have been very much more successful than what has been done through apparent inadvertence. I earnestly urge the support of the whole House for the closely studied pro- grams which are contained in this weap- ons authorization and research and de- velopment bill. The CHAIRMAN. The Qhajr recog- nizes the gentleman from Louisiana (MT. WAGGONNER) . Mr. WAGGONNER. Mr. Chairman, when we authorized phase I of this Safe- guard system last year, we do so with the understanding that we would give to the President of the United States addi-, tional options some time in the future, whenever it WAS lig-tern-tined that the threat to the United States made ex- pansion necessary. It is enlightening to me today, as it wts yesterday, to sit here and listen to predictions about Russian intentions. But how any man who reads the newspapers can possibly believe that the Russians are not expanding their threat is beyond comprehension to me. We cannot continue to prostrate this country before the Russians or the Chi- nese. We Should expand our ABM sys- tem now as the President proposes. The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog- nizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. BINGHAM). (Mr. BINGHAM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, this amendment is aimed to prevent the kind of escalation of the Safeguard ABM pro- gram that was predicted last year. We said last year, those of us who were op- posing this program, that it was going to grow. We now see that very thing happening. If this amendment is not agreed to, the ABM will grow further until it be- comes a monster, devouring resources which we can ill afford, and providing in the long run no security to this coun- try, because it will surely lead to off- setting responses by the other side. When will we begin to accept the fact that there is not just one kind of secu- rity, based on arms? There is another kind of security, and that kind of secu- rity is based on mutual restraint, on bal- anced deterrents, and on the agreements that we hope will come out of Geneva. The question is not whether we want national security; the question is how we get national security. The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog- nizes the gentlewoman from Oregon (Mrs. GREEN) . ? (Mrs. GREEN of Oregon asked and was given permission to revise and ex- tend her remarks.) Mrs. GREEN of Oregon. Mr. Chair- man, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Cali- fornia. I would make clear at the outset that I have resisted and will continue to re- sist the blandishments of those who urge unilateral disarmament on the part of the United $tates because I see no evi- dence on the Communist side of a dis- position to follow this sort of moral in- itiative. To the contrary, the evidence is that in the current phase of the interna- tional arms race, the Soviets are not merely setting the pace but setting a very brisk one indeed, particularly in the stepped-up deployment of their SS-9 intercontinental ballistic missiles. I think it would be wishful thinking, there- fore, to pretend that we can, for the time being let our guard down. At the same time, I believe it not only possible but mandatory to make rational choices even in what is essentially?and tragi- cally?an irrational preoccupation of ci- vilized men. Mr. Chairman, once again we face a whopping appropriations request for defense and once again it involves the making of hard choices. As always, this means hard economic choices because the "guns versus butter" analogy con- tinually reasserts its truth on our Judg- ments?as it seems to be doing with par- ticularly disturbing effects at this very moment. We are faced also with the necessity of hard moral and philosophical choices as well. I need hardly remind anyone in this Chamber that sustained high military budgets at the level proposed in H.R. 17123 imply a continuation of the emphasis on naked military power which Is somehow alien to the concept held by most Americans of American traditions. The youth who are expected to man, and, if need be, use this awesomely de- structive hardware, that it is proposed that we buy, are increasingly the seg- ment of our society most alienated by the implications of these and associated actions undertaken by the Congress. Finally, there are hard choices to be made in the matter of simple survival in a still polarized world armed to the teeth. In such an atmosphere, one uni- laterally disarms himself at his own peril. It is truly unfortunate that the prob- lem of reconciling all of these difficult choices must inevitably involve making complex judgments of some very sophis- ticated and technical proposals. Many will simply defer to the "experts," over- looking the fact that all too often the ex- perts themselves have shown some griev- ous lapses of judgment. In some cases, in fact, they admit?as the outgoing Chair- man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff does on page 22 of the report?that important judgments cannot be made at all and that it is necessary, therefore, to "cover all bets." In this case it involves sustain- ing, through enormously expensive mod- ernization programs, duplicate air arms committed to essentially the same stra- tegic tasks?one on land and one at sea. The possibility that one may have a distinct competitive edge over the other?becoming in the parlance of the defense experts more "cost effective"? studiously ignored and instead we are distracted with arguments for such "re- dundancy," another favored word of late in the lexicon of defense planners. What we would have considered in another day as unforgivable "gold plating" has now become "redundancy" and, further- more, a military virtue. My point in all this is that someone is going to have to make these hard judg- ments and for the moment the "ball is," so to speak, "in our court." One cannot agree tirelessly with his constituents that our national priorities are badly awry and that defense spending is at the heart of the problem?and hold forth a defense appropriations bill which pares off a miniscule seventeen one-hundredth of 1 percent of the total that the admin- istration has asked for?and not inci- dentally, apparently everything the Pentagon could possibly have hoped for. Against the background of the impera- tives as I see them, I am forced to make some necessary judgments. The first of these concerns the highly controversial ABM system which, in my view, should never have been given the go ahead in the first place and which at this time certainly does not merit my support in the matter of the $665 million being re- quested for Safeguard procurement. There is sufficient "redundancy," I think, guaranteeing the survivability of our Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9, April 30, 1970 Approved Fot8sItypfs,?sqRaOki-W9P7WHRO00200210005-9 II 3735 strategic retaliatory forces, in 1,054 ICBM's, the bulk deployed hi hard-to-hit underground silos, in 41 Polaris-firing nuclear submarines in the trackless depths of the ocean and, finally, in 255 nuclear-carrying strategic bombers dis- persed at airfields around the world. The problem of mounting a credible first- strike capability against this force is, in my view, sufficiently complicated with- out ringing three ICBM missile fields With the Safeguard system. In passing, I might add that I am not dissuaded by arguments advanced favor- ing matching the Soviets missile for mis- sile and plane for plane. Neither "parity" nor "superiority" should concern us in these considerations: only considerations of strategic "sufficiency" should. In a World where there is weaponry enough to kill at least twice over every man, woman ahd child on the face of the globe, "parity" and "superiority" have lost whatever meaning they may have once had. It is logical that I oppose not only the procurement proposal for the basic Safe- guard system but the proposal to enlarge the deployment to a phase II level. Bigger Is not necessarily any better. All of up ought to be wary of any proposal that has gone through as many planning convul- sions as this one has in slightly less than 2 years. Just as there appears in the report to be some lack of unanimity among the service chiefs on the need for More nuclear-poWered aircraft carriers, there appears to have been a great deal of difficulty encountered in their ar- riving at a consensus on what they de- sired in the way of missile defense. It has been reliably reported that neither the Air Force nor the Navy preferred the option to protect Minutemen ICBM's in their silos and that the Army was not particularly enthusiastic for the mission in the , first place. One wonders, then, why we are proceeding in this direction. As "Nike X," the Joint Chiefs of Staff originally proposed that populations in 27 selected cities be defended against Soviet attack. As "Sentinel," Mr. /vIcNa- Maxa proposed instead that a "light" defense of the entire population of the United States be provided solely and ex- clusively against a developing Chinese threat. AS "Safeguard" it was proposed by President Nixon a few months after assuming office that Minuteman ICBM's in their underground silos be protected against Soviet attack. Now for a few billion more, it is proposed that with "Safeguard phase II" we can do both? protect ICBM's from Soviet attack and People from Chinese attack. One has the instinctive feeling that more heat than light is being generated in all this fever- ish activity. For this reason I am supporting the amendment to strike Safeguard procure- ment funds and, failing this, the amend- ment to foreclose the phase II extension of Safeguard. ? The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog- nizes the gentleman from Massachusetts, My. ICErria, `a\liK.TOITU,asiced arid was given per- mission t,o revise and extend his re- marks,) Mr. KEITH. Mr. Chairman, when de- ployment of an ABM was first voted on by this House in 1968, I was one of the few on this side of the aisle who raised questions about the wisdom of such a step. However, at that time, and again last October, I supported deployment of a limited system, largely because it would give us the added technological know- how upon which we could base future de- cisions about expansion of the program. Additionally, I felt that phase I of the Safeguard system would prove to be a valuable bargaining card at the SALT talks?and perhaps it has been. Now we are being asked to expand that limited system of two sites to include an additional ABM base and advance work on five others. Such an expansion at this time, I believe, is unwise. The enormous and escalating cost of this system and the fact that the original two sites are not yet operational or tested, lead me to question the advisability of authorizing phase II. The marginal increment in se- curity which it would provide, does not justify the expenditure of an additional $203 million. Without further involving myself in the technological arguments on this question, I would point out that the ICBM's protected by phase I, linked with the capability of our Polaris fleet and our manned bombers, should adequately de- ter any Soviet first strike. As far as the Chinese are concerned, the unquestioned superiority of our nuclear forces, with or without an ABM, clearly provides an adequate deterrent against nuclear ag- gression or blackmail should Peking ac- quire a deliverable nuclear weapon. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that ex- pansion of the Safeguard system at this time will enhance the chances of success at the Vienna SALT talks. What should impress the Soviets and make them more amenable to bargaining is not the size of our ABM program but rather the fact that it exists and that we have the tech- nological capability of expanding it if circumstances require such steps. Indeed, a show of restraint on our part at this time might underline our good faith as we establish our bargaining position at Vienna. It certainly could not be inter- preted as a sign of weakness in view of our past resolve in facing up to the challenges of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Mr. Chairman, the time has come for the Congress to show more prudence as it exercises its powers of authorization and appropriation in the field of military weaponry. Excessive cost overruns, the danger of obsolescence and the apparent- ly hopeful developments in Helsinki and Vienna dictate that we move more de- liberately, in the future as we procure military hardware. Phase II of Safe- guard, in my view, is a good place to begin exercising that restraint. The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. THOMPSON). (Mr. THOMPSON of Georgia asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. THOMPSON of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment. Not only do I rise in opposi- tion to the amendment, but I want the Members of this body to know that the gentleman from Georgia will not feel safe until we have an ABM shield for our cities as well as our missile sites. Mr. Chairman, I do not trust the Rus- sians, and until there is concrete evidence that they are willing to cut down their offensive capability, I have no intentions of cutting down on our defensive ability in this country. The gentleman made the comment a moment ago that Moscow is worse off because there are 67 ABM's protecting it. But I would like to make this point: that if we have to overtarget to get to Moscow because of the interception of our missiles by their ABM, then, because of this, there would be other areas in the Soviet Union that would be safe because the missiles we would otherwise have used on those places would then be go- ing to Moscow. This is the sane approach, and I am for defending and protecting the people of our country. and not for placing my faith and confidence in the Russians. The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog- nizes the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. FRASER). Mr. FRASER,. Mr. Chairman, I would only like to emphasize that phase I of ABM will put in place-many, many more launchers than the Soviets have around Moscow. The number of launchers is classified, but I think it is safe to say that they will substantially exceed the number in place around Moscow today. I am a little surprised at the reac- tion I get from some Members of the House when I display in front of them figures submitted by the Pentagon for the public record. They act as though this is an act of treason or subverting the Republic by publishing the Pentagon figures. The figures lhave published are effec- tive as of February 1, 1970. I have the hearings right here and it says as of February 1970, the operational ICBM's of the Soviet Union are over 1,100. Those are the figures I have on my chart. If in 60 days there has been some dramatic turn-around?which is totally incredible?I have yet to hear of it. The reason why it is incredible, of course, is that we know of the launchers under construction. We know ahead of time what is coming out. But this is the figure that is operational and these are the figures I have used on my chart throughout. I do not understand why people get up -and announce in such a loud voice that I am misleading the House. I am only trying to bring to them some facts that I think are very much worth reading. But the posture statement is in the hearings and it lays out very clearly that the Soviets appear to be on a declining rate in ICBM construction. {Mr. PIKE addressed the Committee. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.] The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog- nizes the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. RANDALL). Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment. At this point in the debate we are Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIALRDP72-00337R000200210005-9 113736 Approved For Relee pretty much baCk Where we were in th discussion of last year. We hear again the arguments as to whether Safeguard will work or not. That is, whether it wil be effective. 'The .fact remains that there have been repeated tests since the au- thorization and appropriation of las year arid the fact also is that the great majority of those tests have been suc- cessful. Last year we were talking about a billion dollars to deploy phase I of Safe- guard. The gentleman's amendment to- day involves a total of $203 million. To those who say that the ABM will not work, I would say I am not so much concerned about Whether they are right. But I am concerned if they are wrong. Because if they are wrong, we are going to wake up witout any ABM system of any kind and be subject to pure and sim- ple nuclear blackmail. So today we are talking not about a billion dollars but of $203 million. The issue is the expendi- ture of an XJ11.1Mber of dollars as against the security of this country. If those who oppose the Safeguard are right then we will have lost Some money?or we will not have lost it completely because as the tests continue we will have gained more knowledge to make the system ultimately workable. munimorNATAfiewiT29186 (Mr. HALL asked and was given per- mission to revise and extend his re- marks.) 1 Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, if one con- siders the question of credibility as brought up by the proponents of this t amendment, one wonders wherein we differentiate between hope on the one hand and truth insofar as military in- telligence and the security of our Nation are concerned, on the other. I think the song has pretty well been sung. We have a technically feasible de- fensive means. We know what the op- position is doing in their singing satel- lite from Red China and the multiple capability of delivery of Red Russia. The thing that needs to be emphasized in our capability is technical feasibility, which has been proved regardless of all the soothsaying that has been stated here on the floor, some out of context and others, I feel, wilfully with half- truths. Finally, it will save American lives with us in a purely defensive pasture. I am for saving those lives. The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog- nizes the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ARENDS). Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I oppose the amendment with all my heart. I think it must be recognized that our But, if the opponents are wrong and the system was workable then we would be in pretty bad shape Without it and they are asking all of ,us to do without the Safeguard at our owarisk. Mr. Chairman, There is the issue. As our distinguished Speaker said last year if we are to risk error let us err on the side of the security of this country. The CHAIRIVIA.N. The Chair recog- nizes the ?gentleman from California (Mr. LEsour). Mr. LEGGE'TT, Mr. Chairman, the amendment relates only to modifying the procurement amount. It is $203 mil- lion. It does not preclude us from mov- ing ahead with the phase 1 program that We. a.uthollzed last year. Former Secretary of Defense McNamara, said a few Years ago that the danger of pro- viding this relatively light but reliable Chinese-oriented ABM system is going to be that pressures will develop to ex- pand it into a heavy Soviet-oriented sys- tem. Vast year we expanded it into a light Sovlet system, Now we are moving to a reaSconably heavy system at the present time. The PAR?perimeter acqusition ra- dar?that support this total system can be knocked out. There are only 12 PAR in the whole ABM system. Then they could be kneelmd ont by 12 Shillelaghs or Tow missiles. If anyone can feel safer Under this system, they certainly do not know_ the international facts of life that prevail at the Present time. I. do not think that the escalation on the part of the 201riet Union from 200 S8-9 jas.Silea in 106.6 to 235 missiles at the beginning of last year and 255 mis- siles at the Aline we heard this. bill last year and,_ now escalating it to 275 this yea? aictate that_ we move ahead with thieniUltibiliiRR-Clollar.PYstern today. The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog- nizes the gentleMan from Missouri (Mr. HALL). , 1200210005-9 April 30, 1970 (Mr. HUNT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog- nizes the gentleman from South Caro- lina (Mr. RIVERS). Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, this is $200 million. What does it do? What does it do? The gentleman from Minnesota spoke about numbers of missiles. Not once did he mention megatonnage; not once. He did not mention MIRVed mis- siles. Russia has more megatonnage, and I positively believe they have the M1RV missile. This amendment for $200 million im- proves your Sprint missile. You get more Sprint missiles for the existing bases. You build one other base and put in your long lead items for five others. It does not take an adult to know that with only two bases they could saturate them and church would be out. Unless you start, you will never get started. It is as simple as that. For the want of $200 million, you might lose the ball game, and that is what the question is all about. The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT). The question was taken, and on a di- . sion (demanded by Mr. LEGGETT) there ere?ayes 48, noes 89. Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I de- and tellers. Tellers were ordered, and the Chair ppointed as tellers Mr. LEGGETT and Mr. IVERS. committee studiously went into this w whole matter. We in the committee col- lectively believe, without partisanship of m any kind, that this is the best thing to " do in the interest of the American pee- a ple, for our security in the future, and R to b Y 101 any eventuality. I yield to the gentleman from New te Jersey (Mr. HUNT). Mr. HUNT. I thank the gentleman from Illinois for yielding. Mr. Chairman, I want to set the record straight today. a The New York Times, 2 days ago quoted Representative DONALD FRASER, of Minnesota, as saying the Pentagon's 3, own figures prove the Russians have 700 slowed down their production of strategic nuclear weapons. miss I am afraid the gentleman allowed the wish to be the father to the thought. The fact is that the Soviet Union con- all tinues to increase its production of mi ICBM's at a constant pace. In 1965 the Russians had about 220 th ICBM's. In 1066 they were up to 250. ut Then they really took off. By 1967 they had a little over 500. From then on the me graph shows not a curve but an almost R. straight line slanting upward at a rate is t of increase of about 180 ICBM's a year. B- r should point out, though, that it th deals only with ICBM's. When it comes bo to ABM's they have 64; we have none. tha Other figures show they are rapidly in- ess creasing their numbers of submarine- is launched ballistic missiles. vel The facts are plain: the Soviet Union evi in some areas is rapidly reaching parity me with the United States. In other areas ret it has gone beyond us. fled The gentleman heads the Democratic T Study Group. I would suggest the group !lied spend more time at study?unpleasant Nin as that may be?and less with its col- c" The committee again divided, arid the Hers reported that there were?ayes 86, oes 128. So the amendment was rejected. AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. NEDZI Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, I offer an mendment. The Clerk read as follows: Amendment offered by Mr. Nom: On page line 16, after the comma, strike out $2,909,- ,000" and insert $2,809,700,000." (Mr. NEDZI asked and was given per- ion to revise and extend his re- arks.) (By unanimous consent, Mr. NEDZI was owed to proceed for 3 additional flutes.) The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes e gentleman from Michigan for 8 min- es in support of his amendment. r. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, this amend- nt strikes $100 million from the D.T. & E. funds for the Air Force. This he amount in the bill provided for the 1, formerly known as the AMSA? is is the go ahead for the new manned mber. For years we have determined t a new manned system is not nec- ary for our national security. There no evidence that the Soviets are de- oping a new heavy bomber. There is dence that they are developing a new diurn bomber, however, to quote Sec- ary Laird on page 105 of his unclassi- posture statement: he intelligence.. community believes that him bombers do not figure prominently Soviet plans for an initial attack on the h American continent. lective head in the _sand. hile thentnount in this bill appears Approved For Release 2007103/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 April SO, 1976 Approved FeEfteffgsiefg/n/lify:61DPN0N7R000200210005-9 113737 'relatively modest, the fact of the matter is that this authorizes the Air Force to enter into procurement agreements for five prototypes which are presently pro- gramed to cost $2.3 billion. I emphasize programed because we are all aware of what happens to programed costs. Mr. Chairman, we are presently in- volved in the strategic arms limitation talks, aALT talks, in order to determine Whether arms limitations are feasible. Some may argue, as do some proponents of the ABM, that we need this authoriza- tion as -a bargaining chip. They argue further that we can abandon our pro- gram should there be success at the talks. Of course, there would be closing costs?it is obvious, however, that the further along a program, the more it will cost to close it out. Not only will it cost more, but it will be so much more difficult to stop this program because of the in- trinsic momentum which weapons sys- tems develop. Weapons program advo- cates develop a proprietary psychology which increases the enthusiasm with which they support a system which they have once sold to their colleagues or the public. It is difficult for one to admit an error in judgment and reverse course. Add to this the vested interest which de- fense contractors 'develop and that of their employees, usually represented' by influential labor unions, and you have a momentam which can be braked only in a very slow and costly manner as was the Case with the B-70 when we built 21/2 aircraft at a cost imexcess of $11/2 billion. I am deeply troubled, Mr. Chairman, by the double standard which our Secre- tary of Defense uses in appraising the in- ternational arms race. His emphasis on Soviet capabilities as opposed to inten- tions is understandable and justifiable. However, his sweeping review of new Soviet deployments skirts the fact that we are still far ahead of the Soviets and that they have a corresponding desire not to be a second rate military power. If "sufficiency" is our policy, we must define it?for if it means superiority then we may just as well face the fact that no nation in the world with the "capability" is going to sit still and per- mit this kind of condition to persist with- out international agreement and the im- pact on the arms race is obvious. While Secretary Laird views Soviet de- ployment as developing a "first-strike capability," he assures the world that our ABM deployment is defensive?avoiding the fact that an effective ABM has a very significant "firststrike" role in that it could protect us from any missiles not destroyed in a first strike. The world is eXpected to rely upon our word that MIRVing our missiles, both Minuteman and Poseidon, is defensive. The world is expected to rely upon our word that the development of an ULMS?underwater long-range missile system?is defensive; that the procurement of a new fighter for the lsl'avy and for the Air Force is de- fensive* that the capability to deploy enorMoUs Van-titles of men and materiel afound'tlie *orld in the C-5A is defen- sive; and that the deployment of a new nialth,ed ttack bomber?the B-1 is de- fensive. Can we fairly expect the world to look to our intentions and not our capabilities? I have avoided getting into the tech- nical details of the B-1 since the new "open news policy" described by my col- league (Mr. PixE) has imposed certain constraints. An unclassified comparison Of the F13-111 and the new B-1 furnished upon my request by the Air Force has all the pertinent B-1 data deleted and the House must again have faith in the expertise of the majority of the Armed Services Committee. In summary, there is testimony that our B-52's, and I appreciate how old our B-52's are, but let me remind the House that $100 million is in this bill for SRAM's for their modernization, and FB-111's will be effective into the late 1980's. We have awesome deterrent power In our Minutemen and Minutemen III being added to the inventory?we have an invulnerable deterrent in our Polaris and Poseidon submarines. We boast about our capability to destroy sophisticated incoming missiles and yet we are ex- pected to believe that another nation does not have the capability to destroy incoming manned aircraft. The B-1, Mr. Chairman, is not essen- tial to our security?its ability to per- form a meaningful role in our defense posture is extremely skeptical?its effect on the arms race cannot be salutary, and it has all the earmarks of another ex- pensive mistake at a time when there is a pathetic requirement for resources in other areas. Mr. NEDZI. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois. (Mr. ARENDS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. ARENDS. It seems to me that the gentleman has left the impression that we want to go on the offense with some of our weapons. However, the gentleman should recall what has taken place in Vietnam. As you know we have followed a defensive pattern in Vietnam. We have exhibited our bombing. We have not used nuclear warheads. Mr. NEDZI. I had no intention of sug- gesting that we do intend to go on the offense. However, we do have the ability to go an the offense. I think we are using a double standard when we fail to con- sider our capability. They have no way of knowing our intent. I think what is good for the goose is good for the gander. Mr. ARENDS. And, if the gentleman will yield further, we, of course, have no way of knowing or determining what Russia's intentions are for the future. Mr. NEDZI. Nor do they have any way of knowing what our intentions are. Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. (Mr. HEBERT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment. Mr. Chairman, if ever there was an ill-timed amendment, it is this amend- ment. The distinguished gentleman who offered the amendment has listened to the story for the need of the so-called follow-on bomber for 7 years. He has been one of the most devoted members of the committee. We have had exhaus- tive hearings on this matter. He has told us many things which, apparently, would be very significant if the sugar was tak- en off the top of the cake. The things he has not said are the things that are important. The gentleman has not told you that over $140 million is already invested in the research and development of an . AMSA. He has not told you that when the last B-52 goes out of existence, it is the last of the strategic bombers. We have no follow-on. He has not told you that the Joint Chiefs unanimously have advocated the development of a bomber, against the resistance of the former Sec- retary of Defense Mr. McNamara. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Michigan has not told the Members of the committee that the B-58 has been phased out over the objection of the military by the former Secretary of De- fense. He has not told you the answer as to what will be the situation if we do not have a follow-on to the B-52. In other words, we will have no mixed stra- tegic force. Mr. Chairman, I am sure no one in this body would want to have all our eggs put into one basket. The greatest offense or defense, whichever one you want to take, is to be found in the fact that we have a mix in our strategic inventory. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman sug- gested that the bomber can be mended, ? modified, or tied up with wire, in effect, and perhaps last a little bit longer. How- ever, that is like asking one to rehabil- itate a 90-year-old man. How many times can you fix him up to continue life? Mr. Chairman, the B-52 is running out of time. Unless we proceed with this par- ticular advance we will have no succes- sor to the strategic bomber. Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. HEBERT. I yield to the gentle- man from Michigan. Mr. NEDZI. Are we not purchasing the FB-111? Mr. HEBERT. We are, and I am glad the gentleman asked me that question. Mr. Chairman, the F-111 has been cut from 264 to 76. But the most important thing about the F-111, as the gentleman knows, it was never to have been con- jectured in any manner, shape or form to replace the B-52. It was only at best to have been an interim bomber while the follow-on was being developed. The gentleman I think knows this. The gentleman sat in the committee, and he has heard all of this. Mr. NEDZI. The gentleman knows that the Air Force has commended the air- craft as being a fine airplane. Mr. IIEl3ERT. The gentleman admits that the Air Force has commended the F-111 as being a fine airplane to do the job for which it is intended to do, but it was never held up as a follow-on bomber. Mr. NEDZI. But it is expected to be in the inventory until the late 1980's. Mr. HEBERT. In the late 1980's the B-52 will be 27 years old. Mr.NEDZI. The F-111. Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R00.0200210005-9 H 3738 Approved For ReclemtipaMiCketEgp-owmpo2oo2i 0005-9 ? Kivu April 30, 1970 Mr. REBERT, But only 76 aircraft at the most. How long sloes the gentleman think you can have an interim airplane, and how long does the gentleman think you can have an interim bomber? You cannot have them forever. Mr. NEDZI. For as long as it does a good job. Mr. HEBERT. Maybe the gentleman has some new formula of everlasting light and power for fixing up a 90-year- old man forever, But I do think it is MI-- portant that we do have this bomber which, incidentally, can only be pur- chased after it flies, It is a fly before you buy program. I suggest that any thought ?or any suggestion of stopping this par- ticular plane at this time is ill advised. Mr. DRAY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out to the Members that buying a bomber is not the same as going to a hardware store and buying a hammer. There are many years of developmental work involved in developing a bomber. We do note know whether we will ever have a need for this bomber, and every- body in this body hopes that we will never have to use the bomber. However, r would like to point out that In 1961 Secretary McNamara stopped all development on the long-distance bomber. He also refused to build any more bombers. He stopped all production on the long-distance bombers we had; that is, the B-52's and B-58's. In fact, this body for 2 years after that, author- ized and also appropriated money for these bombers. However he refused to use the money. Secretary McNa,mara,'s philosophy, as we all know, was that if you had a deter- rent, a massive deterrent of many, many missiles that could destroy this city or that city, that we worild not need a manned bomber. I for one do not want to come to the place where the only defense that we have is massive destruc- tion by the use of ICBMs. So for tnat reason we do need a bomber, but whether we might need to use that bomber no one will ever know for certain. We hope not. The Russians are developing a bomber. It is not as large as this bomber, frankly, and not as good as this bomber will be, I hope. But if we approve this amendment we will place ourselves out of the development of a long distance bomber. If this amendment is carried, would do, would be saying to ourselves, that the only defense to an enemy action would be surrender, or resort to massive retaliation, and all the destruction that such action would bring. RUNT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. BRAY. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey. Mr. HUNT, Mr, Chairman, I want to CoMmend tbg _gentleman from Indiana for his observations, but I would like to stipplement his thoughts with this: that about 14) days ago we were apprised by thepress and by intelligence sources that the Rtissians were conducting massive clPera.,49As Off the northern part of their conntry, 1,vere Wing all of their bombers and using refueling techniques, and en- larging their rilriways, and. so forth. So in the case of any hostilities, or any offensive action, the Russians have a very fine bomber fleet ready. There- fore we simply cannot be so naive as we were, say, back in 1940, where we were caught off base. I say to you that this message is well taken, we do need to go ahead with new bombers that will at least be a protec- tive factor for this country, and there- fore we should be thinking about it now, , and not find ourselves in the position of wondering whether we can protect America or whether we cannot. (Mr. HEBERT asked and was given permission to revise and extend remarks he previously made.) Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word and rise in sup- port of the amendment, Mr. Chairman, the thing that intrigues me most under the new complete infor- mation policy about cost of weapons sys- tems, which has been enunciated by the Secretary of Defense, is as always?what they really do compared to what they are saying. On page 7517 of the hearings, Mr. Nedzi tried to find out how much the B-1 program cost: Mr. Nnozi. Have we any estimates at all as to the cost of this program? Secretary SEAMANS. Yes,, we do. The present estimate for the research and development, including the test aircraft, and the tests with the aircraft, is $2.3 billion in 1970 dol- lars. And the production estimate for the [deleted] aircraft is $7 billion, which in- cludes the initial spares. Mr. NEDZI. What does that come to per unit? Secretary SEAMANS. It comes to a program unit cost of about [deleted] million, that takes all the cost, research and development and production, dividing by the total num- ber of the aircraft. Or it comes to [deleted] million on a production unit-cost basis, that Is just taking the procurement costs and dividing by the [deleted]. So that is what you know, if you read the hearings about what this thing costs. Now if you also want to go into it fur- ther and find out what it can do, you can look at page 7590 where they make a comparison between the FB-111 and the B-1. Out of about 20 questions, they have deleted all but two answers on the FB- 111 and they have deleted all of them on the B-1. So you cannot find anything about What it can do and you cannot find any- thing about what it is going to cost. However, the Russians know all about this. They know how much it is going to cost and they know what it is going to be able to do because they all subscribe to a paper caned the Defense Marketing Survey Intelligence Report. Back last December that included the maximum speed was mach 2.5 to 3; the range was 10,000 miles; the crew was four; the price range was from $25 to $30 million per copy?at that time. Now the Russians know all this. The Russian Army and Navy and Air. Force have access to all this information. But you do not have it?the public does not have it?unless you read the Defense Marketing Survey Intelligence Report. You cannot get it out of the hearings. Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. PIKE. Of course, I yield to the gentleman. Mr. RIVERS. The gentleman keeps saying "they." Does the gentleman say that the Committee on Armed Services did this and hushed this up? Mr. PIKE. We raised this point last year?and you are absolutely correct?I do not say that the Committee on Armed Services did this in any manner. It is done in the Pentagon. I know the chair- man has tried time-after time after time to get some of this stuff unclassified, but they will not unclassify it. The Secretary of Defense says we are going to give the public complete cost figures and he does not give the members any cost figures. The last time we went this route was with the B-70. We spent $1.5 billion and we built 21/2 planes. One crashed?one is in the Air Force Museum at Wright-Pat- terson and nobody knows where the pieces of that half are and we have to admit that $1.5 billion was wasted. This is only going to cost $2.33 billion to build what they now say is five pro- totypes. But we do not know what it is going to cost and we do not know how much it is going to be. Mr. EVANS of Colorado. Mr. Chair- man, will the gentleman yield? Mr. PIKE. I yield to the gentleman. Mr. EVANS of Colorado. While we are trying to shed some intelligence on the question we are discussing here, and with all deference to the committee, because I know they tried very hard to get the facts before us?we are talking about $100 million for another advanced manned bomber. You have mentioned the B-70 and in your minority report you Pointed out the acquisition of 21/2 planes at a cost of $1.5 billion. I would like to know what happened to that plane and why it is not being carried forward? Mr. PIKE. Because the people who are responsible in the Pentagon for the plan- ning and procurement of strategic air- craft said it was not worth the money. Secretary Foster this year said in ret- rospect we were right to cancel it. Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. (Mr. GROSS asked and was given per- mission to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I address my remarks particularly to the gentle- man from New York (Mr. Prim). What he has said with respect to lack of in- formation concerning this new bomber, sounds strangely like the beginning of the F-111, better known originally as the '110..x., back in the days of Defense Secre- tary McNamara. This business of being unable to obtain information concerning moves to obtain new planes is repre- hensible. Back in those days the then Comptroller General, Joseph Campbell, tried to obtain information from Mc- Namara, and McNamara tapped his head nd said he was crrying the specifictions In his hed. Is that the kind of situation that still confronts us? Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, if the gen- tleman would yield, I would simply say to the gentleman in response that despite all of the fine speeches and press releases about the availabilit of info m ti I Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 r a on, A il 30, 1970 Approved Ftraelitswohem3DPH6ogyR000200210005-9 113739 have seen no improvement whatsoever since that time. Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. GROSS. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina. Mr. RIVERS. For over 7 years Mr. HEBERT has been working on this matter. He tried to get McNamara to come for- ward with an answer in respect to the ad- vanced strategic manned aircraft. He has held special hearings on the subject. McNamara sent one excuse after an- other. Curtis LeMaiwanted it. O'Connell wanted it. The radar was blamed; the configuration of the plane itself was blamed. He blamed it on everything. He blamed it on aeryonics. Finally here it is. It has been almost 20 years since we have had anything that resembles a new bomber as such. I am not talking about the TFX. I am not talking about a multi- purpose airplane. We have nothing like this. We have had nothing since the B-18 was laid down. We have changed the en- gines. This is the last version of the en- gine, a fan engine. No one has done the work that Mr. HEBERT has done on this question. He has tried to give America something that will work. This plane can go a foot from the ground, 10 feet from the ground, or 90,000 feet from the ground. Mr. GROSS. I am not criticizing the House Armed Services Committee. What I am criticizing is the repetition of what we ran into several years ago in connec- tion with what is now the F-111--in- ability, almost total inability to find out what was going on. After all, the com- mon, garden variety of -members of the House of Representatives ought to have some information about what is going on in the DefensePepartment. Mr. RIVERS. We could not get them to get to the point of a definition of it. Shrive r begged for it. Now Ferguson has begged for it. It is long overdue. It is due to the credit of this great Louisianan, who has been after them for over 6 years, to my certain knowledge. Mr. GROSS. And we are still asked to take on faith the F-111 with a half bil- lion dollars in this bill for it. Mr. RIVERS. May I finish my state- ment. This administration has what is called a milestone concept. Every so often a report is made on the progress. This thing is being run in a businesslike fash- ion under Secretary Packard. This is a good program. Mr. pIKE;Mr. Chairman Will the , , gen- tleman yield? Mr GROSS I yield to the gentl? man from New York. Mr, PIKZ. I will simply say it has been a long, long time since we have bought a new bow and arrow in this couritrY, too, but if we were doing it, I guarantee the gentleman that both its cost and its performance characteristics would be ClasSifteahy the Pentagon. ma% Gross, AU t an trying to say here today is that do not want to vote - for another fl,Y111,g Edsel? That is all. Mr. RIVERS. You are not doing so. Mr. HEBERT. Mr, Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. GROSS. I yield to the gentleman from Louisiana. Mr. HEBERT. I assure you this will not be. a flying Edsel, because it will not be put into the inventory until it is a proven flying machine to do the Job it is sup- posed to do. I want to say to the gentle- man from Iowa I share his opinion and his observations about the difficulty of getting information. Mr. GROSS. I thank the gentleman. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Iowa has expired. Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we could place a limitation on the de- bate. I ask unanimous consent that all debate on the amendment be ended at 2:15. The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Louisiana? There was no objection. The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog- nizes the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. BUCHANAN) . Mr, BUCHANAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment, and address myself to the remarks made ear- lier concerning the alleged double stand- ard in which we seek to judge the Soviets by their capabilities while we ask the world to judge us by our intentions. I would say we have a single standard, a standard of performance, of the his- tory of these two nations. Where is our Poland? Where is our Hungary? Where is our Czechoslovakia? Where are our captive nations? Where is there one shred of evidence that this Nation has sought anything other than the freedom and self-determination of the peoples of the world at great sacrifice to the United States? Yet look at the record of the Soviet Union, and it becomes crystal clear we had better judge the Soviets by their capabilities. Their record is one of the subjection of the people by force and without free elections to the absolute rule of a Communist minority, both in the Soviet Union and in its captive na- tions. Their record is one of the extreme and persistent abrogation of human rights, including an absolute disregard of the right of self-determination for any people to whom they can extend their Colonial rule. Nor has there to my knowl- edge been any retraction of their stated and restated intention to "bury us" and to ultimately achieve world domination. Before the judgment bar of history, their growing military strength stands as a clear threat to world peace. The same record reflects our strength to be, in con- trast, the world's best hope for peace. The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog- nizes the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. JAcotts). Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Chairman, I com- mend the gentleman from Alabama for pointing out the problem of a double standard, because we have been told here in this debate that the Soviet Union has anti-ballistic-missile weapons that can shoot down items in the sky going 1,700 miles an hour. And we are also being told we must update, as the gentleman from New York says, a bow and arrow that will go 2,000 miles an hour. My question is: How will these up- dated bows and arrows get past that superduper defense that has been estab- lished in Moscow? The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York, (Mr. PIKE). (By unanimous consent, Mr. PIKE yielded his time to Mr. NEDzi.) The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. FRASER) . Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, again we are asked to approve a new version of our strategic delivery system, a new strategic bomber which will add to our nuclear arsenal. In addition to the figures which are on this chart, indicating 9,100 warheads after we MIRV our submarines and half of our Minuteman missiles, we are asked to add a new bomber to this 9,100, giving something on the order of an additional 1,700 deliverable warheads or bombs, to take us up to a total of about 11,000 warheads or bombs. Let me again, contrast that with the Soviet position as of September 1 of last year of 1,300 deliverable warheads or bombs. Every single strategic system we have?the three modes?is going to be increased by the money in this bill. At some point we need to call a halt. The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. HALL) (Mr. HALL asked and was given per- mission to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I think we need to clarify the atmosphere. This is a follow-on, armed, manned, strategic air- craft. We have been planning it for a long time in the Research and Develop- ment Committee and in the Airlift Sub- committee. It does have the planned capability of standoff penetration by long-ranged air to surface missile, be- cause of the Golosh and the Tallinin sys- tems of Soviet defense; which we will need in case of response, or retaliatory capability. Members of the Airlift Sub- committee have visited the mock-ups of these B-1's. There are definite fall-outs from the XB- or SB-70, on the beryl- lium and titanium techniques, honey- combing, hi-thrust propulsion units, and so forth. It is in competition. The competition is ready for announcement and/or decision on or about May 15. It would be disas- trous to the future defense of this Nation if, by an action of those who live on hope instead of full backgrounding and knowl- edge, we struck by amendment in a willy- nilly fashion the capability of following on our B-52's and B-58's and the FB- 111's, under these circumstances. Mr. Chairman, I strongly recommend that this amendment be defeated. The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. NEozr). Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, I shall not belabor the arguments which have been made, but it appears to me, when we are having such dire economic problems in the country, it is a time when we should be absolutely certain of what we are doing when we launch upon a $2.3 billion program. That is precisely what we are doing. Approved For Release 2007/03/06: CIA7RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 113740 Approved For Re 30, 80, 1970 The B-1 program is of questionable value when it comes' to our military posture. We do not know what the costs will be. In the light, of the pathetic require- ments which exist in other problem areas of the country, this amendment should be agreed to. The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Muss) . (By unanimous consent, Mr. RIVERS yielded his time to Mr. Mimi') . - The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. HEBERT) . Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, obvi- ously there is little or nothing more to be added to the debate which we have had today. Backed up against what has been said on the floor today I submit the record of 7 years of hearings by a special sub- committee of the Committee on Armed Services, of which the distinguished gen- tleman from Michigan was a ranking member. I cannot too eagerly or too strongly Stress the necessity for defeating this - particular amendment at this particular time. We cannot throw away 7 years of constant study and effort on the part of the Armed Services Committee, in its endeavor to protect this Nation and to give it a mix in our attack forces and a Mix in our defense forces. The passage of this amendment would be the abandonment of a follow-on bomber, which we cannot afford at this particular time. The rejection of the amendment will give notice to the Russians that we are dedicated to the proposition that we will fill our inventory from day to day with the most advanced weaponry at our com- mand. Mr. Chairman, I certainly urge once again the defeat of this particular amendment, The CHAIRMAN, The qnestion is on the amendment offered by the gentle- man from Michigan (Mr. NEnzr) . The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes ap- peared to have it. Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, I demand tellers. Tellers were ordered, and the Chair- man appointed as tellers Mr. NEozx and Mx. RIVERS. The ,committee divided, and the tell- ers reported that there were?ayes 51, noes 91. So the amendment was rejected. AleiENDMENT OFFERED DT MR. RINGTIA1VI Mr. BINGTIAM. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment. The Clerk read as follows: Amendment offered by Mr. BlIsTGHAM: On page 2, line 3, delete "$2,452,200,000" and insert in lieu thereof "81,724,200,000". (ML Bzygivoil asked and was given perinission to revise and extend his re- Mr. BINGHAM, Mr. Chairman, this iliteridinentyretkld eliminate $658 million of procurement funds?and] emphasize procurement funds?for the P-14. It would not touch research arid develop- ment funds for the development of the F-14A, B, C. The F-14 is a plane which is highly controversial. It is controversial both as to cost and as to performance. The Pentagon estimates the total cost anticipated for these planes at $11.8 bil- lion. Other experts estimate the total cost will run as high as $25 billion. The performance of.. the F-14 is also gravely in doubt. It is one of the most complex fighter-bomber carrier planes ever proposed. It is supposed to perform many missions including fleet air defense, air superiority, escort, air-to-ground at- tack, and cruise missile defense missions. It must carry a Phoenix missile for the purpose of the defense of carriers. This is one of its primary responsibilities. This means it will be a heavy aircraft. Many of the pilots who have flown this plane are known to have criticized it on the ground that it will not be as maneuver- able as the Mig-21 that it will be up against. Its acceleration will be relatively poor, at least until the new engine can be developed for the F-14B. This bill provides for the procurement of 26 copies of the F-14A, the one with the unim- proved engine. If the F-14 as designed proves out, it will indeed be a miracle plane, but no- body knows whether it will prove out, because it has not been flight-tested and will not be flight-tested until next January. The Congress knows what happened with the F-111. Let us not have a repiti- tion of that disaster. Mr. Chairman, the GAO has recom- mended against the procedure of going ahead with procurement before R. & D. is completed, which is the procedure con- templated here. There is no need for a special speed-up in this situation because the Navy admits that the potential threat to the carrier fleet, which is the primary threat that the F-14 is supposed to meet, is years away. Mr. Chairman, last year I proposed a similar amendment to defer the produc- tion funds and proceed with research and development on the F-14. The House re- jected that amendment in the authoriza- tion bill, but the Appropriations Com- mittee in its wisdom recommended that the procurement funds be eliminated and added to the research and development funds so that research and development could proceed. Mr. Chairman, no one argues that a successor to the F-4 will not be needed, but there is grave question as to how we should proceed. Should we go ahead with the procurement which would be called for in this bill of 26 copies of this plane at a cost of $658 million when it is still 8 months away from any flight testing whatsoever? What this amendment would do would be to defer the production procurement funds and to allow the Navy to proceed with the necessary research and devel- opment. Mr. Chairman, I ask for support of this amendment in order to save $658 million and to prevent what may otherwise prove to be as great a disaster as the F-111. Mr. STRATTON. I move to strike the last word. (Mr. STRATTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment. Mr. Chairman, I do not anticipate tak- ing the full time because I think the members of the committee are aware of the fact that this amendment, which has just been offered by the gentleman from New York, is the same amendment he offered last year and which did not get very far last year, and there is even less reason for considering it seriously this year. The gentleman says that this is a highly controversial plane, the F-14. As a matter of fact this is so uncontrover- sial a plane that even the bitterest critics of excessive and wasteful spend- ing in the Pentagon who are members of our committee have not undertaken to oppose this particular aircraft. They are familiar with it. They know what it can do. Mr. Chairman, I think this amend- ment is an example of what happens when one who has not had the oppor- tunity of examining some of the details of the defense budget nevertheless offers an amendment?in good faith, of course?but one that is not going to accomplish what he thinks it would accomplish. Mr. Chairman, let me just point out that we have recently been told some of the horrors of the F-111, the old TFX. Well, of course, the biggest problem that the F-111 got into was in connection with the version to be used by the Navy. And the Navy recognized, very wisely, at a very early stage, that there was no point in going ahead with the F-111 for car- rier use because it could not effectively be used on a Carrier. So, what the Con- gress ordered was an adaptation of the F-111, with all of the existing tech- nology, in a reduced version so that we would not have to go beyond the present state of the art. We ordered the Navy to come up with a modern fighter air- craft for carrier use to be flown now and not at some vague, future time. That is what the F-14 is. As the gentleman from New York him- self indicated, this plane is going to be flying by January of next year. We are not talking about something that might happen in the remote future. These are the planes that are going to be needed on our carriers in the immediate future. Mr. Chairman, I have had the privi- lege of serving on the Carrier Subcom- mittee?and, presumably, we, will be into that question in a few moments?but let me just say that of all the critics of the CVAN-70 that came before our subcom- mittee, not a single one was opposed to the aircraft carrier as such. Some of them were opposed to the total number of carriers that the Navy wanted. Some of them were opposed to authorizing a new carrier in this 1971 budget rather than another year. But they all said carriers are great and that America needs them. But you cannot have carriers without having planes to fly on them. The F-4 is a great plane, but that was first put down on the drawing boards back in 1953, and hi the years since then Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 30, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE the Soviets have developed eight new modern, fast fighters. So if we are going to have an up-to-date Navy, and if we are going to have up-to-date carriers that will protect our forces as we with- draw from all our exposed positions in Europe and the Pacific, as the Nixon doctrine suggests, the one thing that will provide American power around the world and back up our forces wherever they may be, and will serve as a dem- onstration of support for our friends without requiring us to go ashore and put men ashore, it is the aircraft car- rier. So for heaven's sake let us put a modern plane on the carriers that we still have. This F-14 is the plane that will do the job. Mr. KING. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment of the gentleman from New York (Mr. BING- HAM). A great deal of thought, effort, and discussion has been expended in rela- tion to the needs of the modern Navy's attack carrier fleet. I should like to take this opportunity to present a few perti- ? nent remarks on the defense of that fleet, regardless of its ultimate size or com- position. I refer to the aircraft known as the F-14. The need for a new air superiority fighter aircraft has been well-doCU- mented.. The current backbone of the car- rier fighter force is the F-4 Phantom. This venerable aircraft has, unfortunate- ly, reached its ultimate designed capa- bility. It has been modified and improved to the extent that further effective modi- fication is no longer economically feasi- ble. Although still an excellent fighter and proven versatile tactical bomber, the Phantom can be beaten, At least two air- craft in the current, operational inven- tory of the U.S.S.R. have exceeded the performance characteristics of our best bird. Now what this means is that in terms Of fighter air defense, in particular the defense of attack carriers, the United States is second, not first. We can no longer claim that our fighter escorts and carrier air protection are unbeatable. We can no longer be absolutely assured of adequate protection for our bombers, our attack aircraft, our reconnaissance air- craft, or even our aircraft carriers. Mr. Chairman, we cannot tolerate such a situation. We must never accept any role that would place the Armed Forces of this country at an acknowledged dis- advantage. This bill provides $517 million for the Purchase of 26 F-14A's with $60.1 mil- lion for advanced procurement of long- lead-time items, $80.9 million for initial spares, and $324.2 million for R.D.T. & E. These expenditures would remove the serious handicap currently facing our at- tack carrier forces. They would, in my opinion, return the,Navy to its deserved status of quiet confidence from its pres- ent state of prayerful hesitance. Mx, Chairman, the F-14 is no antique biplane. Conversely, the Mig-21 is not the ultimate weapon. But does the mag- nitude of difference have to reach such ridiculous proportions before we do something about it? I certainly hope not. Mr. Chairman, the United States is in second place in air superiority aircraft. The F-14 will change that and I urge its authorization. (Mr. WRIGHT, asked and was given permission to revise and extend his re- marks.) [Mr. WRIGHT addressed the Com- mittee. His remarks will appear here- after in the Extensions of Remarks.] The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr, 13mIcHANI) The question was taken, and on a divi- sion (demanded by Mr. BINGHAM) there were?ayes 22, noes 66. So the amendment was rejected. SUBSTITUTE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. MOORHEAD Mr. MOORHEAD. Mr. Chairman, I of- fer an amendment in the nature of a substitute. The Clerk read as follows: Amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Mr. MOORHEAD: Strike out all after the enactment clause and insert the following: "TITLE I?PROCUREMENT "Sac. 101. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated during the fiscal year 1971 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and other weapons, as authorized by law, in amounts as follows: "Aircraft "For aircraft: for the Army, $279,775,000; for the Navy and the Marine Corps, $2,329,- 590,000; for the Air Force, $3,149,155,000 of which $344,400,000 is authorized only to meet unfunded prior year production commit- ments on C-SA aircraft. "Missiles "For missiles: for the Army, $1,032,270,000; for the Navy, $899,270,000; for the Marine Corps, $26,220,000; for the Air Force, $1,430,- 035,000. "Naval Vessels "For naval vessels: for the Navy, $2,863,- 205,000, of which $570,000,000 is authorized to be appropriated only for expenditure in naval shipyards: Provided, That none of the funds authorized for appropriation by this Act for the construction of naval vessels shall be obligated until the National Security Council has advised the President of its rec- ommendation in respect to construction of the attack aircraft carrier designated as CVAN-70. "Tracked Combat Vehicles "For tracked combat vehicles: for the Army, $195,890,000; for the Marine Corps, $46,265,000. "Other Weapons "For other weapons: for the Army, $64,790,- 000: Provided, That none of the funds au- thorized for appropriation by this Act shall be obligated for the procurement of M-16 rifles until the Secretary of the Army has certified to the Congress that at least three active production sources for supplying such weapons will continue to be available within the United States during fiscal year 1971; for the Navy, $2,649,550; for the Marine Corps, $4,180,000. "TITLE II?RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION "Sze. 201. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated during the fiscal year 1971 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for research, development, test, and evaluation, as authorized by law, in amounts as follows: ? 113741 "For the Army, $1,565,505,000; "For the Navy (including the Marine Corps), $2,087,435,000; "For the Air Force, $2,764,215,000; and "For the Defense Agencies, $437,665,000. "Sm. 202. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Department of De- fense during fiscal year 1971 for use as an emergency fund for research, development, test, and evaluation or procurement or pro- duction related thereto, $47,500,000. "TITLE III?RESERVE FORCES "Szc. 301. For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1970, and ending June 30, 1971, the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces will be programed to attain an average strength of not less than the following: "(1) The Army National Guard of the United States, 400,000. "(2) The Army Reserve, 260,000. "(3) The Naval Reserve, 129,000. "(4) The Marine Corps Reserve, 47,715. "(5) The Air National Guard of the United States, 87,878. "(6) The Air Force Reserve, 47,921. "(7) The Coast Guard Reserve, 16,590. "SEC. 302. The average strength prescribed by section 301 of this title for the Selected Reserve of any Reserve component shall be proportionately reduced by (1) the total au- thorized strength of units organized to serve as units of the Selected Reserve of such com- ponent which are on active duty (other than for training) at any time during the fiscal year, and (2) the total number of tndividual members not in units organized to serve as units of the Selected Reserve of such com- ponent who are on active duty (other than for training or for unsatisfactory participa- tion in training) without their consent at any time during the fiscal year. Whenever any such units or such individual members are released from active duty during any fis- cal year, the average strength for such fiscal year for the Selected Reserve of such Reserve component shall be proportionately increased by the total authorized strength of such units and by the total number of such in- dividual members. "TITLE IV?GENERAL PROVISIONS "Sze. 401. Subsection (a) of section 401 of Public Law 89-367 approved March 15, 1966 (80 Stat. 37), as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows: " 'Funds authorized for appropriation for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States under this or any other Act are au- thorized to be made available for their stated purpose to support: (1) Vietnamese and other Free World Forces in Vietnam (2) local forces in Laos and Thailand; and for related costs, during the fiscal year 1971 on such terms and conditions as the Secretary of Defense may determine? "SEC. 402. No part of the funds appro- priated pursuant to this Act may be used at any institution of higher learning if the Secretary of Defense or his designee deter- mines that at the time of the expenditure of funds to such institution recruiting per- sonnel of any of the Armed Forces of the United States are being barred from the premises of the institution except that this section shall not apply if the Secretary of Defense or his designee determines that the expenditure is a continuation or a renewal of a previous grant to such institution which is likely to make a significant contribution to the defense effort. The Secretaries of the military departments shall furnish to the Secretary of Defense or his designee within 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act and each January 30th and June 30th thereafter the names of any institutions of higher learning which the Secretaries deter- mine on such dates are barring such recruit- ing personnel from the campus of the insti- tution. Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 113742- Approved For RelEGONgaffigN9ATAVAkPait33??3h7819gg2 00210005-9 April 30, 190 V?QUARTERLY CONTRACT - RE- . PORTING AND GAO AUDITS "SEP. 501. (a) After January 1, 1971, the Secretary of Defense (hereafter referred to in this section as the Secretary'),' in coopera- tion with 4he Comptroller General of the United. States (hereafter referred to in this section as the 'ComPtroller General'), shall develop a reporting system for major acqui- sition programs managed by the Department of Defense, any department or agency there- of, or any armed service of the United States, for the development or procurement of any Weapons system or other need of the United States. "(b) The Secretary shall cause a review to be made of each major acquisition program as specified in subsection (a) during each period of three calendar months and shall make a finding with respect to each such contract as to-- '(1) the estimates at the tinie pf the origi- nal plan as to the total dost of the program, with separate estimates for (A) research, development, testing, and engineering, and (B) production; "(2) the estimates of the Department of Defense of Q0,5t for completion of the pro- gram uri- to the time of the review; "(3) the reasons for any significant rise or decline from prior cost estimates; "(4) the options available for additional procurement, whether the department or agency concerned intends to exercise such options, and the expected cost of exercising such options; "(5) significant milestone events associ- ated with the acquisition and operational deployment of the weapon system or item as contained In the plan initially approved by the Secretary, actual or estimated dates for accomplishment of such milestones, and the reasons for any significant variances; "(6) the estimates of the Department of Defense as to performance capabilities of the subject matter , of the program, and the reasons for any significant actual or esti- mated variances therein compared to the performance capabilities called for under the original plan and as currently approved; and "(7) such other information as the Secre- tary shall determine to be pertinent in the evaluation of costs Incurred and expected to be incurred and the effectiveness of per- forzna,noe achieved and anticipated under the program. "(c) The Secretary after consultation with the Comptroller General and with the chair- man of the Committees on Armed Services and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall prescribe criteria for the determina- tion of major acquisition programs under subsection (a). "(d) The Secretary shall transmit quarter- ly to the Congress and to the Committees on Armed Services and to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives reports made pur- suant ti? EillbSOCAOLI (P), which shall include a full and complete statement of the find- ings made as a result of each program re- view. (e) The Comptroller General shall, through test checks, and other means, make an independent audit of the reporting sys- tem developed by the Secretary and shall furnish to the Congress and to the Commit- tees on ArMed. Services and the Committees on Appropriations not less than once each year a report, as to the adequacy of the re- porting system, and any recommended im- ."(1) The Comptroller General shall make independent audits of major acquisition pro- grams and related Contracts where, in his opinion, the -Wets inourred and to be in- curred., e delivery schedules, and the ef- fectiveness of performance achieved and anticipated are such as to warrant such audits and he shall report his findings to the Congress and to the Committees on Armed Services and the Committees on Ap- propriations of the Senate and of the House of Representatives. "(g) Procuring agencies and contractors holding contracts selected by the Comptrol- ler General for audit under subsection (1) shall file with the General Accounting Office such data, in such form and detail as may be prescribed by the Comptroller General, as the Comptrolled General deems necessary or appropriate to assist him in oarrying out his audits. The Comptroller General and any authorized representative of the General Ac- counting Office is entitled, until three years after final payment under the contract or subcontract as the case may be, by subpena, inspection, authorization, or otherwise, to audit, obtain such information from, make such inspection and copies of, the books, records, and other writings of the procuring agency, the contractor, and subcontractors, and to take the sworn statement of any contractor or subcontractor or officer or em- ployee of any contractor or subcontractor, as may be necessary or appropriate in the discretion of the Comptroller General, re- lating to contracts selected for audit. "(h) The United States district court for any district In which the contractor or sub- contractor or his officer or employee is found or resides or in which the contractor or sub- contractor transacts business shall have ju- risdiction to issue an order requiring such contractor, subcontractor, officer, or employee to furnish such information, or to permit the inspection and copying of such records, as may be requested by the Comptroller Gen- eral under this section. Any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by such court as a contempt thereof. "(1) There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such shills as may be required to carry out this section." Mr. MOORHEAD (during the read- ing) . Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be consid- ered as read and printed in the RECORD. The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Penn- sylvania? There was no objection. (Mr. MOORHEAD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. MOORHEAD. Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. SCHWENGEL) and myself, I rise in support of this efficiency amendment which I be- lieve is a step all of us can take on behalf of the increasing beleaguered American taxpayer. We have limited resources in this Nation to maintain our national se- curity and sustain a quality of life befit- ting a great nation. We can no longer tolerate wasteful and inefficient use of our resources in the name of national security or aggregate demand or any other guise. Over the last year I have heard testi- mony before the Military Operations Subcommittee and the Joint Economic Committee, on which I serve, which would make any taxpayer weep. We have heard procurement horror stories which range from the infamous $2 billion cost overrun on the C-5A; to the Mark II Avionics?the brain of the F-111 h' h now costs more than the original estimate for the whole aircraft; to the Mark 48 Torpedo which the Navy told the Con- gress they could buy for $65,000 a copy and for which they just let a contract for the astronomical figure of $1.2- million per copy; to the production of tanks for which the Army had no usable amuni- tion; to the deletion of overrun figures from Air Force internal reports because of possible adverse effects of the con- tractor stock on the stock exchange if the information became public. It is instructive to point out that the first casualty of poor procurement prac- tices is the guy out in the field or in the air who either does not have the weapon system because of schedule slippages or is provided with a faulty weapon or one that does not meet specifications. Our submarine forces still do not have the Mark 48 torpedo. They were scheduled to receive it in 1968. The Air Force cur- rently has several hundred F-ill's which do not meet specifications and are cur- rently grounded with wing problems. Yet, according to press reports, the contractor for the F-111 may make a profit on this defective aircraft. These are only a few of the stories that could be recited. Gordon Rule, the Chief of Naval Procurement, told the Joint Economic Committee that contractors and the Pentagon play games with the Congress. How much longer can the Con- gress and the American taxpayer tolerate these games?when billions of dollars are involved? ' Waste and inefficiency in defense pro- curement is not a partisan issue. The tax money of the American public has been wasted by the Pentagon under Demo- cratic as well as Republican administra- tions. It is interesting to note that this amendment is supported by various groups spanning the political spectrum from the National Taxpayers Union to the Americans for Democratic Action. It is not our purpose here to discuss the question of national priorities?rather, what we are concerned about here today is the single important issue of eliminat- ing waste at the Pentagon and of reliev- ing an unfair burden on the American taxpayer. We are also concerned about making information on Pentagon pro- curement available to the Congress of the United States, the representatives of the American people. Mr. Chairman let us consider these two effects of the amendment. First. It would provide for a 5-percent efficiency cut in the total authorization of $20.24 billion, or a little over $1 billion. Second. It would create a quarterly re- porting system to the Congress by the GAO on major weapons acquisition pro- grams. THE 5-PERCENT EFFICIENCY CUT The 5-percent cut would mean an immediate savings of $1.012 billion. Many procurement experts have appeared be- fore committees on which I serve and have testified that if the Congress adopted uniform accounting practices, a Wider use of the "should-cost" pricing technique, and tougher costs-perform- ance measurement systems we could cap- ture up to 30 percent of the total price of many contracts in costs savings. This also requires that the military services get tough with contractors and deal with them on a business-like basis. The sponsors of this amendment feel that the 5 percent figure is conservative, realistic and attainable. Hopefully by Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 April h, 1970 forcing increased efficiency we can also realize future savings. It is also the intention of the sponsors of the amendment that the services do not absorb this 5-percent cut by merely reducing the number of weapons bought, but to turn the efficiency screw on as many contracts as possible on behalf of the American taxpayer. I think that two steps can be taken now to partially remedy this situation: First, but the military on notice that they no longer have unlimited funds with which to buy their hardware; and Second, upgrade Congress' ability to scrutinize major procurement programs where billions of the taxpayers are in- volved. Approved For Release 2007/0310_6 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE 113743 aao QT.martaty nEpoars This part of the amendment--title V?would provide a legislative basis for the submission to Congress of quarterly reports on costs and performance of major weapon system contracts. The re- ports would be analyzed by the GAO and transmitted to the Congress. This much of the amendment is already being car- ried out. In addition the GAO would be empowered to conduct independent au- dits and analysis on programs and to su- poena books which defense contractors have in the past refused to supply. All too often the Congress finds it nearly im- possible to receive understandable and timely information on costs, perform- ance, specifications, and schedule changes In major weapons programs. The amend- Ment would establish a reporting system designed to improve the timeliness and qUality of information On major weapon acquisition programs. A similar amendment passed the Sen- ate last year but was defeated on the ? floor of the House by a teller vote of 99 to 102. This year, hopefully, we in the Congress are wiser and " will demand more and better information on these costly programs. I urge the adoption' of the substitute. Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. MOORHEAD. I yield to the gen- tleman. Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Chairman, I rise In support of my colleague and his amendment and congratulate him on his leadership. Mr. Chairman, we have been allowed to debate the military procurement and research and development bill only 4 hours. A mere 4 hours is not enough time for a serious discussion of a bill amount- ing to $20 billion?one-tenth of our na- tional budget. Such a meager time allo- cation simply illustrates and underscores many Members' dissatisfaction with this bill, I oppose this bill, however, for rea- sons far more susbtantial than the time limitation on the debate, namely the un- necessary and overpriced programs funded by this bill. I would call the attention of the Aleut- bers to a r2cent report by the Congres- sional ,quart,erly about Our defense ep..(j2ing, in which they, citect the con- c'1181941 (4 top most Defense Department offi4als-7both, Military and civilian? that we could cut $10 billion out of our Military budget and improve our fighting capability. The most objectionable feature of this bill is the ABM System. This country already has, and plans to maintain, three separate nuclear deterrent sys- tems, each capable of destroying the homeland of any attacker by itself?our land-based missiles, our missile equipped submarine fleet, and our jet bombers. A Soviet attack could neutral- ize only one of these deterrents and would thus leave the Soviet Union open to a fatal counterattack. As our leading experts point out, only one deterrent is necessary to deliver a successful coun- terattack. For years our experts have also told us that missiles and jet planes were diminishing the importance of the Navy. Reportedly the Soviet Union is deemphasizing its own Navy. Yet this bill inexplicably gives the Navy $435 million more for ship construction than even the Defense Department requested. Far less justifiable is the $200 million slush fund for the Lockheed Corp.'s negligence. In effect, this provision di- rects the citizens of this country to pay for a company's lax managerial prac- tices that would make any normal com- pany go bankrupt. The Government of- fers no such subsidies to other com- panies and should not establish a pre- cedent for Lockheed. In the past few months, the President and the Congress have taken stanch stands against inflation. This bill pre- sents us with a sufficiently clear case of financial irresponsibility to mandate the striking of these flagrantly over- priced giveaway programs from the bill. Otherwise, 1970 will become "the year of the military giveaway" just as 1969, in the words of the House Appropria- tions Committee, was "the year of the cost overrun." " Our scrutiny of this bill should be more stringent, not less, not only to reorder our priorities, but also to achieve a disciplined and efficient military de- fense, which continual cost overruns and faulty planning have prevented us from realizing. A vote against H.R. 17123 is not a vote against our country's military interests. On the contrary, as Admiral Rickover has indicated, a vote against this bill would spur the Defense Department to improve its programs and, in the long run to serve this Na- tion's military interests far more effec- tively and economically. Mr. MOORHEAD. I thank the gen- tleman, (Mr. MOORHEAD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) (Mr. SCHEUER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. SCHWENGEL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word. Mr. Chairman, I have listened with avid interest to this debate. I think I perceive a new day in the House. Mem- bers of the House are beginning to assert themselves. They are reflecting that they are giving some very serious thought to some important business that prevails here and they are acknowledging once again the spirit of our Government which dictates that we as citizens should pre- side over the Army, Navy and the defense of our country. I want to commend the debaters on both sides who have been honest, fair and forthright and who have spoken with deep conviction. So are we, the co- sponsors speaking with convictions and after rather thorough study. In addi- tion, we are reflecting the thinking of the country?we think. It is true, Mr. Chairman, one of the major elements in the Defense Depart- ment budget is military procurement. Over the past few years, a number of programs that have received congres- sional support have proved far more costly than originally estimated. In some cases, it appears that contractors have been woefully, and sometimes, some believe wilfully inefficient in determining the probable cost of producing the sys- tems for which they are responsible. Because of such wasteful practices, my distinguished colleague (Mr. MOOR- MAD the Congressman from Pennsyl- vania, and I have offered an amend- ment to the military authorization bill which will answer to many of the charges leveled against current military procure- ment policy. The efficiency amendment has two parts. They are: A 5-percent cut in the total authorization of $20.24 billion, re- sulting in a saving of $1.012 billion; and creation of a reporting system whereby the Government Accounting Office will report to the Congress on major weap- ons acquisition programs on a quarterly basis. It is evident, Mr. Chairman, that cor- porations that do busir ess with the Gov- ernment follow a variation of Parkin- son's law. In its latest incarnation, the law reads: Corporate expenses rise to a level that is equal to the amount that can be squeezed out of the Government. In order to combat this pernicious trend, the amendment would in effect require companies to become more efficient or cease to do business with the Govern- ment. A number of persons have commented on the gross inefficiency of defense pro- curement. The indefatigable Admiral Rickover, in testimony before a commit- tee of Congress, stated that "paying more than we should prevents us from buying many items we need to defend the coun- try." Over the past decade, Admiral Rickover has pointed a number of times to the wasteful management practices both in the Defense Department and those corporations that contract with it. Robert Benson, formerly of the Comp- troller's Office in DOD, wrote that "wip- ing out the inefficiency would annually save the Government $2.7 billion." All too often, we in Congress are un- aware of the development problems that plague contractors. The second element of the efficiency amendment would g9 a long way in meeting that problem. It would require the General. Accounting Office to report to the Congress every 3 months , on the development of each major weapons system. This reporting would, in all probability, obviate such problems as the Mark 48 torpedo and the C-5A transport aircraft. At least Con- Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 11 3744 Approved For Iteepluirtmemi:iipeNB7_2_,Tiacy00200210005-Apr., u 1970 gress Would not be presented with an un- conscionable cost growth as was wit- nessed in the case of the C-5A. Congress would be able to assess on an on-going basis vniether or not a Program was being properly funded. We would not be confronted with a cost growth of 443.9 percent in the case of the Mark 48 tor- pedo, a 151.6 percent cost growth in the case of the F-111, or a 249.2 percent cost growth as in the case of the short range attack misslle?SRAM. Congress would then have the option of questioning the management" practices of those concerns responsible before they have become too entangled in production problems, as happened with the Lockheed Corp. as regards both the C-5A and the Cheyenne AH-56 helicopter. The third section of the efficiency amendment is more specific than the other two. It is the deletion of the $200 million contingency fund for payment of claims to Lockheed under the C-5A con- tract pending outcome of litigation. This amount represents nothing more than a slush fund for Lockheed?sort of a gra- tuity for mismanagement. The procure- ment bill includes $544.4 million for pro- curement, none of which will purchase a single aircraft. Of this amount, the Air Force admits to $344.4 million in cost growth for which it is responsible. The remainder is apparently to be allocated to Lockheed in the event that after liti- gation it turns out that the Air Force is also responsible for further cost growth. It is patent that the Air Force might have a greater incentive to defend its own position if it did not have money to give away. The efficiency amendment does not cut the numbers of weapons to be purchased. Rather, it is designed as an incentive to contractors to be aware of and more careful with the taxpayers' money. There is no contention here Mr. Chairman that contractors have no inherent right to make a fair profit. It is my contention, however, that they have absolutely no right to so mismanage program= within their area of responsibility that the tax- payers pay far more than originally anticipated. I include the following: ? FACT SHEET IN SUPPORT OF THE MOORHEAD - SC HWENGP, EFFICIENCY AMEN DMENT ? This Amendment to the $20.24 billion Procurement Bill is offered in the form of a substitute bill. The Amendment is a con- servative effort to build in an incentive for more efficient acquisition of major weapon systems and to gain greater visibility for the Congress concerning the many multi-billion , dollar contracts let bythe Pentagon. The Amendment will not affect the purchase of any weapon systems. TIlE AranNsiassri ? The ArnentiMent consists Of two sections: a) A 5% efficiency cut in the total au- thorization of $20.24 billion?resulting in a reduction of 0,01.2 billion, b) Creation of a !quarterly reporting sys- tem to Vfig ,congress by the GAC on major wenlibut itC0isition programs. itatratsr,'t PERCENT EFFICIENCY CUT ' rag 5 R Over thets , ar e Congress and the atV American taxpayers have been shocked by the revelations ot tinge cost overruns and charges of 'contractor inefficiency in almost eyery-weaporiS program. The GAO in a recent report to the Congress documented over $20 billion in cost overruns on only a few sys- tems. (Attached is a partial list of those overruns.) Statements on contractor inefficiency A. E. Fitzgerald, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, before the JEC on June 11, 1969 testified: "We annually spend over one-third of our military pro- curement funds to buy only waste and in- efficiency . . in the operation of the major contracts we could save as much as $5 billion without compromising our national se- curity." A survey of the top corporate executives as reported in "What Business Thinks" in Fortune, September, 1969, concluded: "De- fense expenditures are higher than they need to be, mainly because of waste and ineffi- ciency." Robert Denson, a farmer analyst in Office of the Comptroller of DOD, in the Washing- ton Monthly wrote: "Wiping out the ineffi- ciency would annually save the Government $2.7 billion." Admiral Hyman Rickover testified before Congress: "Paying more than we should pre- vents us from buying many items we need to defend our country." Senator Len Jordan (R-Idaho) during the JEC Hearings in June, 1969, concluded: "The ineffectiveness of cost control procedures have been a result of the fact that contracts with major suppliers tend to adjust to the financial needs of the contractors." The sponsors of the Amendment will make it clear on the floor that the objectives of this Amendment is to turn the efficiency screw 5% on as many contracts as possible on behalf of the American taxpayer and not to merely cut the number of weapons bought. RATIONALE OF GAO QUARTERLY REPORT ON WEAPONS PROGRAMS At present the Congress has no systematic means of determining the cost and perform- ance status of major weapons programs. The Congress is too often at the mercy of the eiltagon, who reveal only what they choose and when they choose. Congress is often faced with accomplished facts when it is too late for corrective action. This Amendment would enable the Con- gress to determine systematically and fac- tually the status of programs soon enough to avoid repetition of some of the worst dis- asters of the recent past. Last year, the GAO documented over $20 billion in cost overruns on only selected programs. By aiding effective congressional scrutiny, this example of preventative medicine will help Congress meet effectively its responsibil- ities to the American taxpayer. (A similar amendment passed the Senate last year and failed 102-99 on a teller vote in the House.) NEWS RELEASE FROM THE NATIONAL TAXPAYERS UNION The National Taxpayers Union today called upon all members of Congress to support a 5% reduction in FY 1071 Military Procure- ment and Research & Development Author- ization. James Davidson, Executive Director of NTU said, "Congressmen Fred Schwengel (R. Iowa) and William Moorhead (D. Pa) have stood up on behalf of every taxpayer in America in recommending an efficiency reduction in Defense spending. It is common knowledge that there is much waste in Pen- tagon procurement. The examples of the C-SA, the F-111, and the Mark 48 Torpedo are still fresh in the memories of many tax- payers. We cannot afford to provide a "carte blanche" for waste merely because it oc- curs under the guise of 'defense.' "Leading experts," ,Davidson continued, "whose knowledge and "patriotism are un- questioned have testified that several bil- lions more could be cut with no loss of mili- tary potential Congressmen who fail to sup- port the Amendment should be asked upon what principle they support waste in the Pentagon. There is simply no excuse for tolerating misuse of the taxpayers money. Ernest Fitzgerald, now of NTU'8 Board of Advisors, was fired from the Pentagon when he told the truth about military spending. Politicians who fail to support prudence should expect no better treatment at the hands of the voters." "The Schwengel-Moorhead proposal elimi- nates only one billion dollars of the amount authorized by the House Armed Services Committee. Of this amount, as much as $435 million could be deleted from authorizations for naval ship construction. This Naval Ship Add-on was never requested by the Navy. There is no dobut that It could be cut with- out jeopardizing defense capability." "The Congress should remember that pas- sage of unnecessary appropriations for mili- tary spending lends credit to the Marxist charge that the U.S. economy is kept going because of wasteful defense allocations. If we spend one cent more than is necessary we secretly acknowledge that the Marxists are right. For this reason alone, every effort at stewardship should be applauded by those who understand that much of the world's fate is decided in men's minds. We cannot expect to defeat collectivism if we act as if its policies were correct." Davidson called upon Congress to remem- ber the words of the late General Douglas MacArthur . . . "indeed, it is part of the general pattern of misguided policy that our country is now geared to an arms economy which was bred in an artificially induced psychosis of war hysteria and nurtured upon an incessant propaganda of fear, While such an economy may produce a sense of seeming prosperity for the moment, it rests on an illusionary foundation of complete unreli- ability and renders among our leaders al- most a greater fear of peace than is their fear of war." Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that all debate on the amendment close in 3 minutes. The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina? Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I object. I would like to be heard on the amend- ment. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Indiana is recognized. Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I am for a strong national defense and always have been, and I have been voting con- sistently that way in this debate as I have in the past and expect to continue to do in the suture. But it is indeed diffi- cult to determine in these matters, when you are also a person who would like to save some money for the taxpayers if he could do so without damage to the na- tional defense, as I happen to be, just what if any proposals for reduction ought to be supported. Mr. Chairman, this becomes particu- larly difficult because of the situation which we always seem to have in this body on this particular subject matter. Unfortunately,. from my point of view, most of the reductions which are pro- posed seem to be advanced by gentle- men, or at least too often are advanced by gentlemen, whose devotion to the principle of a strong national defense I am not as well satisfied about as I would like to be; and also often by gentlemen whose standing as economizers do not appeal to me as much as I would like, be- cause, as to many of them, I practically Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 April 30, 1970 Approved 113745 113745 never hear them asking to reduce an ex- penditure here except a defense expen- diture. On the other hand, gentlemen knowl- edgeable in this field in whom I have a little more confidence in some of these respects and who might be able to en- lighten me, by the time we get to this stage on the floor, have done their argu- ing in the committee, and they are com- mitted to defend the bill. Therefore, it Is very hard for an independent Member of a cast of mind such as mine to decide when, if ever, it is in order to accept a cut. , This particular amendment does two things, as I understand. It gives a statu- tory basis for a cost report, which seems to me a sound idea in and of itself, as far as I can tell. Then it cuts each item 5 percent. That at least has the advantage that I do not have to determine here how many C-5's we need or what the technical merits of the ABM mmY. be or how many carriers we ought to have, because none of these things are cut out by the amendment. It is just a reduction in each figure right across the board. On the other hand, it is not a particularly scientific approach, because undoubtedly there are some items that ought to be cut more and some that ought not to be cut at all. We have just about one guide perhaps, which is that on almost all appropria- tions, defense and others, almost always we have enough fat to take a 5-percent cut. Mr. RAILSBACK. Mr. Chairman will the gentleman yield? Mr. DENNIS. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois. Mr. RAILSBACK. Mr., Chairman, I commend the gentleman from Indiana, whom I think everybody at least on our side of the 'aisle resiiects for his judg- ment. I do not think anybody can call him a flaming liberal. If anything, think he is very economy minded and conservative. I associate myself with his remarks. It seems to me the conservatives ought to be every bit as concerned, if not more so, about defense spending, and I think they ought to be willing to take the lead to cut what I believe is a great deal of fat out of the defense budget. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Indiana. Mr. DENNIS. Mr, Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Illinois for his sup- port, which I do appreciate. Mr. Chairman, I was about to say that It really is a puzzle to me, on a great many of these things. I cannot say a cer- tain element ought to be cut 5 percent and something else not at all, from per- sonal knowledge, and I do not want to jeopardize- defense; yet I do feel that almost any budget I have ever known anything about has had at least 5 per- cent of fat in it and possibly it will not endanger anything to cut that. I have wOndered why the gentlinnan who offered thefi,mendment did not offer it as a cut 41 the overall or total authori- zation figj.ire. The C14414:44N, The tiple'of the gen- tleman from Indiana has expired. (BY unanimous consent, Mr. DENNIS was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.) Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman, / would like to say that I am honestly inquiring a bit on this one. I do not have a fore- gone conclusion right at this moment, although I have some inclination to sup- port the amendment, but if I am wrong, I would like to have the gentlemen on the committee, perhaps the distinguished chairman or others, give me some really good convincing reason why we cannot absorb a 5-percent cut, or why it would jeopardize anything important if we did. Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. DENNIS. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois. Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that I also, like the gentle- man, want a dollar of defense for every dollar we spend. In addition, I would like to see us economize. But if the gentle- man will recall?I do not have the exact figures just now?the percentage of ex- penditures for national defense today in comparison with the gross national prod- uct is the lowest since 1952. Mr. Chairman, I have a real concern in my mind that we are moving down the road very rapidly to where we might not get more time when we ought to have more. Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in Opposition to the amendment. Mr. Chairman, I have been here 30 years and 7. have heard of military waste since I have been here. I have to make the decision now. The buck stops on my desk. So I told the gentleman from Il- linois (Mr. PRICE) who is one of the most dedicated Members in this Congress, to find out where we can cut research and development. I said, You cannot tell me there is not some place where we can cut research and development." He had the best brains of the committee to work with him to come up with a cut of a little over a million dollars out of $7 billion. When the President told the Congress to reduce expenditures in the executive department, he took it out of the De- partment of Defense?$3 billion. We re- duced, at the word of the distinguished chairman of the Appropriations Com- mittee, $5 billion, and most of it came out of the Department of Defense. It is always the Department of Defense? those are the soldiers, sailors, marines, and coastguardsmen, Do Members know how much money we spend a year on people in the Defense Department?just people? Over $40 billion a year. Go ahead and cut the 5 percent across the board. We can cut it 1p percent. We can cut it all out. We can throw the whole kit and caboodle out. But if we take a 5 percent across on this, we will pay for it. It is as simple as that. Of course, we can do it. But it is very un- wise. Th,e gentleman asked a question. Let me see if I can answer it. Of course, the gentleman is sincere about it. But the bill which the gentleman brings to us is a new bill. We have been in session for over 10 weeks having hearings. Not once did the gentleman ask us to come and let him bring these things to our at- tention. Yet he gets up here and he tells us, with the authority of which he is capable, the things that are wrong with it. Even the gentlemen on the front row, who have been disagreeing with me en- tirely, are not going to support this. They know this thing is ridiculous. This is the most idiotic way on earth to run a railroad. The gentleman asked me how much we cut this? It is $473 million less than was authorized last year, and $1.7 billion less than the Departmen,, requested last year. We have cut it. We are down to the bone. This is a new bill the gentleman brings in here to us. My job is to state what the military needs. I will tell you that if you want to really serve your country, raise this budget. The bill is too low. Ask any )ailitary man who is worth the salt of the rank he holds in the service. You cannot vote for a provision like this, You will hurt everything we have in the military. If you want to cut, close up all the bases and put your faith in the SALT talks. Then you may live with your memories, but your memories will not be security. This is a bad amendment. This is a bad bill. You cannot do it this way. Our doors are always open. Nobody has knocked trying to help us find a way to answer the questions, based on the allegations that have been made in this well under this amendment. Mr. RAILSBACK. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. RIVERS. Of course I yield. Mr. RAILSBACK. Mr. Chairman, I ap- preciate that you have done a great deals of work. I know this is a very complicated subject matter. I believe this is why many of us are concerned about this particular procure- ment bill. About 2 years ago I asked you on the floor of the House how much it cost to develop the F-111B, the Navy version of the so-called TFX. You said at that time that you did not have those figures, but .you would get them for me. To date, I have never received that in- formation from you. I wonder how much it did cost to de- velop the F-111B, which was completely scrapped. Mr. RIVERS. I am sorry that I do not have that information. I just do not know at the moment. Mr. RICKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment. Mr. Chairman, this is a serious amend- ment and it should be seriously con- sidered. I believe that what Chairman RIVERS has just said is absolutely right. This is not the place to try to cut, nor the way to cut. If we are going to cut defense spend- ing, the way we can do it, and the way we can hurt the least, is to cut personnel. As the chairman said, $40 billion of our defense costs go into personnel. We do not need the number of people we have right now, but those we do keep need the best weapons. Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 113746 Approved For RtLmtiEmakuticitiast3,2_724Rescp020021000519Aprii so Certainly we need the research And devtopnentI we have" authorized or are authorizing in this bill. Our committee did cut. research and development. We should not have cut re- search and development, to keep our defense strong. To answer specificalli the question of the gentleman from Indiana, this is a bare bones budget as far as the Procure- ment of weapons is concerned. If wc want to Cut defense spending, then start scaling down the ceiling on the anion/it of personnel the military, serv- ices can have. That is the way to cut the budget. That is the way to cut it fast, and the 'defense of this country will re- main just as strong as it is right now. Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. HICKS. I yield to the gentleman. Mr. DENNIS. For 4nformatton, what would the gentleman say to the proposi- tion which, instead of trying to do what the gentleman from Pennsylvania is do- ing here in cutting each of these items 5 percent, would cut 5 percent off the total and put a 5 percent lower ceiling on the total expenditure, leaving the selection of items to be reduced to the Secretary? Mr. HICKS. Of course, that has been done in the past, as I understand it, in times prior to when I came on this com- mittee, and I understand it just does not work when that is done, The military have certain systems they want to get or retain and they go ahead and push them. If we are going to do our job, we have to help to select those systems. If I were going to choose that path, I would say fine and cut out the ABM system, for example, because I do not believe we need the ABM. Ilowever, this nOUSe de- cided we do need it. That is, the reason why we cannot do it the way the gentle- man suggests. I do say that we can save substantial sums by placing a lower ceil- ing on personnel and then give them the very best weapons that we have, and we will continue to have a strong defense. Mr. JACOB8. Mr. t hairman, I move to strike the last word. Mr. Chairman, just a few minutes ago I sat and listened to the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services slan- der the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. IL/ma's/km) by saying that "apparently the gentleman from Illinois did not care about his country." I have heard a lot of excessive debate since I have been in the House, but this rises to a new low. The fact is that the gentleman from Illinois cared enough about his country to serve in its Armed Forces. I yield back the balance of my time. The, CH-AMMAN. The question is on the amendment in the nature of a sub- atitute offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MOORHEAD) . -? The question was taken; and on a di- via= (demanded by Mr. MOOEHEAD) Ulvri.W.95IeS 27, noes 74. the substitute amendment was re- I ec Ontatti irr ma. rust Mr. ,FIKE, ph% Chairman, I offer an anientitileat, The Clerk read as follows: Amendment offered b Mr. Pram Page 6, after line 6, insert a new section 403 as follows: - "No more than half of the funds appro- priated pursuant to this bill for G-5A or S-3A aircraft, Cheyenne helicopters, or SRAM shall be used until congress has approved a settlement of the fiscal differences between Lockheed Aircraft Corp. and the Department of Defense." Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. PIKE. I yield to the chairman. Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, a little while ago, even though the gentleman from Illinois accused me cif not giving him certain information, that did not justify me in reflecting on his patriotism. I want to apologize to the gentleman, and I ask unanimous consent to delete that remark from the RECORD. This is not based on what the gentleman from Indiana said. Not at all. The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina? There was no objection. Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, yesterday when we started this debate I expressed the hope that we could go through it all without anybody questioning any- body's motives at any time. Frankly, I think we have done pretty well in relation to what happened on the floor last year. I think this has been a pretty good debate. I think that we can question the judgment of each other very, very frequently and we frequently do. Mr. Chairman, this amendment which I have offered does not cut one dime out of the bill, because it has been made somewhat obvious to me that the great ground swell for reordering our na- tional priorities is not yet quite strong enough to cut any money out of the bill. What it does is it says that on four pro- grams, all of which are Lockheed pro- grams, no more than one-half of the money which this bill authorizes to be appropriated can be spent or used until there has been some overall settlement between Lockheed and the Department of Defense. Now, the reason I offer this amend- ment is to first, acknowledge that there has to be some overall settlement be- tween Lockheed and the Department of Defense. They are about $1 billion apart, with Lockheed saying the Government owes them $660 million, I think, and the Government saying, I think, that Lock- heed owes them some money. Mr. chairman, if we are going to re- solve this by litigation, it is going to dribble on for years and years and years. For example, we are starting new C- 5A's at the rate of two every month and with every one we start the spread be- tween what Lockheed and what the Government says gets bigger and bigger and bigger. In the meantime, Lockheed comes in and says they are broke. Well, what are they doing while they are saying they are broke? Here is a publication dated PeCember 1969. It, is aJAocklieed pub- lication.. it is 100-and-something pages- 108 or 109 pages?of glorious public re- lations on behalf of Lockheed. They are 197?0 mailing it around the country. This one came to my district. Now, Mr. Chairman, we say this is a bare bones budget. Two weeks after the Secretary of Defense came to the com- mittee and said what trouble Lockheed was in, they were spending their money in this manner. This happens to be Newsweek, a two-page ad in Newsweek. This same ad was carried all over the country in different publications. This is how their money is being spent. Well, if we are going to be asked to bail them out, I think we have a right to insist that the money not be spent in this way. The postage alone in mail- ing this from Burbank, Calif., was 14 cents. I do not know how many of them they mailed out. I do not know how much it cost to produce them. These ads, I think, cost $27,000 in Newsweek. The same ad was in Life magazine and in Time magazine at one time. Mr. Chairman, this is how they are spending their money. Well, if they are broke and if we have to bail them out because they are broke, I think we ought to get a final settlement of it. My amendment would permit them to spend one-half of the money. This would let them get halfway through the year before they had to come to a settlement. but that could be done and should be done. Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. (Mr. RIVERS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. RIVERS. Now, Mr. Chairman, let us analyze this amendment. It is true that Lockheed is in trouble. However, it seems that the gentleman from New York wants to keep on their back for- ever and ever. We settled the item of the $200 million last night. I produced the document from the Deputy Secretary of Defense saying that he would not permit any of the $200 million to be spent until satisfactory contractual arrangements had been made with Lockheed and then was cleared with the committee having jurisdiction over this matter. Now, Mr. Chairman, the gentleman in his amendment takes in the whole busi- ness of Lockheed's operations, including the Cheyenne, the SRAM, the S-3A as well as the C-5A. If you are going to do this to Lockheed, why do you not do it to every other defense contractor who is having trouble, and they all are. Look at their earnings. They do not make any money out of the Government. Have you forgotten World War II, the arsenal of democracy? Now it is called a vicious military-industrial complex. I asked one of the contractors how much he made out of the Government contracts, and he said he did not make anything. He said that if he did not have a sideline on tools that he would not make anything. What does this amendment do? It completely?completely?cuts off this company's capacity to make long lead- time contracts, and they will never be able to achieve the thing that Admiral Rayburn described as the bringing of all systems together so that you do not lose time. They would be wiped out. You Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 ? CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE 11 3747 would also 'wipe out thousands of small cOntractors in this country. This could not work. You could not enter into a con- tract like that, this just simply could not happen. And moreover you would not have the Poseidon, and you would not have the retrofitted Polaris, you would not have the S-3A, the P-3C, the C-5A, which is working. You would not have anything, but you would have the pleas- ure of stopping a company?you would have the pleasure of stopping a company. This might sound fine, but it Cannot work. It positively cannot work. That is how simple it is. Mr. &RENDS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? - Ur. RIVERS. Of course I will yield to the gentleman from Illinois., Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I thor- oughly agree with the gentleman from South Carolina that this is a completely destructive amendment, rather than be- ing an objective amendment, because if, as the gentleman says, it is going to slow down or possibly stop some of the essential production we need in this country so as to keep America strong and safe, then I think the amendment ? ought to be completely and overwhelm- ingly defeated. Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I do not know how long in the future they make contracts for ads in one of these maga- zines. I would imagine it is many, many -inenths, and I would recommend them stopping it, although I do not know any- thing about this. I do not know anything about them _putting ads in magazines, bit I would recommend that they stop until they are out of their financial Mr. Chairman, we are not trying to help anyone because of sentiment, but because it is for the security of America, and if it not advantageous to the secu- rity of this country then do not give them anything, but cutting off a half a loaf will not hurt Lockheed as much as It will hurt you. I urge you to reject this amendment. The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr, Pu). The Question was taken; and on a di- vision (demanded by Mr. PIKE) there were?ayes 21, noes 58. ?So the amendment was rejected. AMENDMENT OFFERED DT MR, REID OF ilsw FORK Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment. The Clerk read as follows: Amendment offered by Mr. REID Of New York: On page 6, following line 8, add the fol- lowing new section: "Sm. 406. In dile With the expressed, in- tention of the President of the OniteAS tate% no part of the funds authorize to be appro- priated pursuant to this Act shad be used t9 41-1=4.- $41.0 int4)7431Etion, _?of American ground - combat Jroops into Laos, Thailand or tar00410.." ? ? - 434E, RVID tiew York asked and was Aven,-PerNissiOn to reldse an ex- 044.414 nal,eaud RgulZ 44-$NeX York, Zolr. Chairman, the purpose or this amendment is simple; it is to prohibit the 13,se 4merican ground conibat forces in Cambodia, Laos, or Thailand,' rhe House, in my judg- ment, is coequal with the Senate in this regard, and it has to some extent been derelict in the past for not taking a position that is obviously clear, and I think in this instance it must fulfill its constitutional obligation and responsi- bility. In the fiscal year 1970 appropriation bill for the Department of Defense, as Members know, there is a limitation based on the amendment offered by Sen- ator COOPER and Senator CHURCH. pre- cluding funds for the use of U.S. ground combat troops in Laos or Thailand. Last December, after the bill had been signed and enacted into law, the admin- istration, through Press Secretary Ziegler said:, Anyone familiar with the Nixon doctrine, as outlined on Guam, knows the amendment is totally consistent with the President's policy. As we have said on a number of occasions, there are no U.S. ground troops In either country nor did this Administration visualize under this bill putting any ground -combat troops into these countries. My amendment would have the simple effect of adding Cambodia to this pro- hibition on the use of ground forces. It is a limitation. It provides no sanctions. It has been repeatedly stated by the President and high administration offi- cials that there is no present intention to use our ground combat forces in these countries. Since approving the amendment to the appropriation bill last year precluding the introduction of ground combat troops In Laos and Thailand, President Nixon has reiterated his desire to limit the war in Asia?not to broaden it. He has said: We have no plan for introducing ground combat forces into Laos. In addition, on explaining his doctrine pronounced at Guam, he said in his No- vember 3 speech: In cases involving other types of aggres- sion, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to as- sume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense. Finally, I would like to briefly 'quote Secretary Rogers, who, when asked whether Laos would become another Vi- etnam, answered: The President won't let It happen. Continuing, he said: I mean we have learned one lesson, and that is we are not going to fight any major wars in the mainland of Asia again and we are nOt going to send Arnerican troops there, SM we. certainly aren't going to do it unless 'we have the American public and the Con- gress behind us. Mr. Chairman, my amendment is also consistent with the national commit- ments resolution passed by the other body on June 25, 1969, by a vote of 70 to 16, expressing the sense of the Senate that the U.S. Armed Forces should not be used abroad or promised for use abroad except by joint authority of the Presi- dent and the Congress. Mr. REUSS, Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr, REID of New York, I yield to the gentleman. , Mr. REUSS, Mr. Chairman, I com- mend the gentleman for bringing this amendment .to, the floor, I support it. We ought to be extracting ourselves from Vietnam and not, implicating our- selves in Cambodia. I would ask the gentleman whether in his amendment the words "American ground combat troops" include the con- cept of American combat advisers. Mr. REID of New York. Yes, that is correct, Mr. REUSS. I thank the gentleman. Mr. REID of New York. Further, as Members know, article I, section 8, of the Constitution gives the Congress the au- thority to declare war, raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, and to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. These powers were authorized explic- itly to the Congress as a vital part of the doctrine of the separation of powers. Alexander Hamilton, a strong advo- cate of strong Executive power, wrote in the Federalist -Paper No. 69 showing the clear distinction between the British and American systems in the delegation of American power S to the legislature. He said: The President is to be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would be nomi- nally the same with that of the King of Great Britain, but in substance much in- ferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first gen- eral and admiral of the Confederacy, while that of the British King extends to the de- claring of war and to the raising and regu- lating of fleets and armies?all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature. Indeed, in 1848 Abraham Lincoln, then a Congressman, said: Allow the President to invade a neigh- boring nation whenever he shall deem it nec- essary to repel an invasion and you allow him to do so whenever he may choose to say he deems it necessary for such a purpose and you allow him to make war at pleasure. Study to see if you can fix any limit to his power in this respect, after you have given him so much as you propose. The provision of the Constitution giving the warmaking power to Congress, was dic- tated, as I understand it, by the following reasons. Kings had always been involving and impoverishing their people in wars, pre- tending generally, if not always, that the good of the people was to object. This, our convention undertook to be the most oppres- sive of all Kingly oppressions; and they re- Solved to so frame the Constitution that no one man should hold the power of bringing this oppression upon us. Dwight Eisenhower said very explicitly in March 1954: There is going to be no involvement of America in war unless it is the result of the constitutional process that is placed upon Congress to declare it. Now let us have that clear. In a word, therefore, I think it is clear that the Congress, and this House, must not let its powers be eroded. We must not back into a wider war. Our responsibility is clear. Further, this amendment in my judg- ment is consistent-- Approved For Release 2007/03/06 :CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 H 3748 Approved For RetedwaymvietE80-091.1M0200210005-9 A The CHAIR/WAN. The time of the gen- tleman haS-q1Pired. - (Mr. 4,440 pt New torKASILect#Pel VMS given permission to proceed for 3 addi- tionalnutes,) Mr, Vhlt? pf New Xork, Axially, let me just say I think this amendment is con- %latent both with existing la4,? and with the PreSidenw t's determination to narrow _ the war and not to widen it. I thin) 4,.Will,reassure the country that there are limits to the extension of American power. Mr. IIORTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. RID of New York, 3 am happy to yield to my colleague from New York. Mr. *DORTON. I wish to commend the gentleman for the amendment he has 9f- fgred. I support it. I certainly think it is a reasonable amendment, It s certainly In line with the statements the Presi- dent has made on minierous occasions with regard to the Nixon doctrine. On the ,eve of the President's message to the Nation on the Cambodia Crisis, I want to state publicly my own analysis of the problems and priorities which face us in Indochina, Some background review is important before discussing what our decisions should be at this juncture. First, the President is in the midst of a laudable program to Vietnamize the war in Vietnam and has made subatan- tial progress in withdrawing American Marine and Army units which serve in an infantry or ground combat capacity. During the unfolding of the President's withdrawal program, the Communist North, Vietnamese Military threat to ,two nominally neutral nations, Cambodia and Laos, has been severely intensified. Both these countries, have been impor- tant as sanctuaries and supply routes for North Vietnamese and Vietcong units operating in South Vietnam. But, until recently, the neutralist governments of LaOS and CAMbodia :were not immedi- ately endangered, although there was partial disclosure of American military support efforts to help the Royalists in Laos hold back Communist Pathet Lao advances. Then the overthrow of Prince Sihan- ouk in Cambodia by an anti-communist coup dramatically altered the focal point of military confrontation in Indochina, with the North Vietnamese seeking to gain military and political control over at least a substantial portion of Cam- bodian territory, and announcing their intention to install Sihanouk as a pre- sumably Communist ruler of this terri- tory. A whole host of U.S. interests and for- eign policy questions are being tested by the decision our Government makes in this crisis, Having been requested by the neW"Cambodiap rsgime to send U.S. militau hardware and assistance to use against North Vietnamese and Vietcong who are advancing on Phnom Phen, the President must decide far more than the desirability of supporting this fledgling regime. The following arguments have been put forth m support of American mili- tary assistance and involvement in Cam- bodia: First. That neutralization of Cam- bodian territory, now in Communist hands, is essential for the protection of American troops remaining in South Vietnam. The President has mentioned repeatedly that he would not permit his policy of withdrawal to endanger those American GI's who remain on duty in Southeast Asia. The use of Cambodia, Particularly the "Parrot's Beak" area nearest Saigon, as a military sanctuary has made the task of allied troops in Vietnam more cliffigult. The question is whether this fact alone warrants Amer- ican irivolvement in the confrontation between two opposing Cambodian re- gimes, and whether defense of U.S. troops requires an active invasion deep into Cambodia. We must continue to protect the lives of American soldiers remaining in South Vietnam. In my view, military actions we have been undertaking for many months, permitting hot pursuit of enemy units attacking from across the Cam- bodian border, or seeking sanctuary in Cambodia should not be curtailed if deemed necessary to protect American lives. But hot pursuit dqes not encom- pass supporting or undertaking an in- vasion of Cambodia, with the intent of supporting the regime there. It may en- cdrnpass supporting an action limited to destruction of sanctuary areas used to shelter Communist troops which Operate In South Vietnam. In the final analysis, the best way to defend and protect American lives in South Vietnam is to continue policies that would enable these young men to return home at the earliest possible date. It is doubtful that any extension of our military commitment into Cambodia would hasten this homecoming. Second. That the de facto control of most of Laos by the Communists and the current threat to Cambodia is proof of the domino theory at work, and that if the United States does not help restore neutrality to these areas, Thailand will be threatened next. There is little Question that Commu- nist military persistence, backward so- cial organization, and the impoverish- ment of the people of these countries would have led to North Vietnamese dominance if it were not for the presence of large numbers of U.S. forces and equipment in Thailand and South Viet- nam, and for U.S. advisory and hard- ware assistance to Laos. The question is, Has our military involvement done anything but postpone North Vietnamese Communist dominance? Or, if Vietnam- ization will be successful, will it take a similar injection of American lives and dollars to accomplish a stalemate in Cambodia, or Laos, or later on, in Thailand? Third. A third argument is made that the provision of adviser and hardware assistance, short of sending U.S. ground units, is consistent with the Nixon for- eign policy doctrine announced in the summer of 1969 in Guam. This, in my judgment is too narrow an interpreta- tion of the Nixon doctrine, The doctrine does preclude the unilateral dispatch of U.S. ground troops to a nation like Cam- bodia, but it also requires, as a prere- 21 30, 197O quisite to any U.S. assistance, a decision by other free world governments in the region to send material and troop sup- port to defend a government threatened by Communist military takeover. Al- though there has been some discussion that Thailand, the Philippines, Japan, and Indochina, in addition to South Vietnam and Korea should mount some joint assistance program to the new Cambodian regime, no positive steps have been taken to carry out any such plan. There is little question that the fall of Cambodia to Communist rule is a far more important threat to these East Asian and Pacific nations than to the United States. The Nixon doctrine seeks to modify the U.S. leadership of the free world, and to remove from our shoulders the primary burden of serving as world po- liceman wherever anti-Communist gov- ernments are threatened. These arguments put forth for U.S. involvement in Cambodia indicate the far-reaching consequences of the Presi- dent's decision. First, he must weigh what commitment, if any, the United States has to this or any Cambodian re- gime. At what point would U.S. involve- ment or assistance cease if the threat to the current regime is not immediately ended? Second, he must weigh the actual threat to American lives that continued Communist occupation of Cambodia would entail. Remembering that the Vietcong and North Vietnamese have been operating out of Cambodia for sev- eral years, the question must be asked whether the current threat to our troops is so much greater now that it justifies a widening of U.S. involvement in the war across all of Indo-China, and going beyond the restricted policy of hot pur- suit. Third, and perhaps most important, the President must be aware that his decision will set crucial precedents for the application of his own Nixon doc- trine. If he narrowly construes it to mean that only the sending of organized units of U.S. ground troops is prohibited, it will mean little in terms of the changing U.S. role in the world. Also, the role of advisers to ground units of other nations must somehow be explained in the con- text of the doctrine. If we do not begin now to apply the principle that free na- tions in the threatened region must choose to involve themselves before America gets involved, ?then it will be difficult if not futile to try to encourage or enforce any regional defense concept in the future. The whole question of the Nixon doc- trine and its application to Cambodia and Laos includes the consideration of the American crisis of national priorities. We have, with the President's policy of disengagement from Southeast Asia, been moving toward a realistic balance between military and domestic budg- etary efforts. If suddenly the U.S. role In Southeast Asia is widened, and not narrowed, if our financial commitments to these countries promises to tie down billions of U.S. dollars in Indochina for years to come, then we will not have met the challenge of our most serious domes- Approved ForRelease 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 Approved FiebROsgs2007/g3/06 :e1A-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 April 1970 E ION I, RECORD ? HOUSE 113749 tic crisis. At a time When the very in- stitutions of American government are being tested as to their adequacy and relevancy to respond to the needs ?of our people, this could be a disastrous error. I believe strongly that the people of the United States have no interest in Cambodia that would override our in- terest in disengaging from Southeast Asia, or that would override the Presi- dent's earlier announced intentions to place the burden for defense of these gdverninents on themselves and on other free nations in the East and Southeast Asian area. Any commitment of U.S. treops, to Prop up the new Cambodian regime, whether as advisers or as ground units, will render the most important plank of the Nixon doctrine meaningless. Even if we were to attain a quick military victory in Cam- bodia, which is extremely doubtful, the overall effect of U.S. involvenwnt will be a widening of the Vietnam conflict across the whole subcontinent of Indo- china. We in 1970, are still suffering from the effects of a decision to enter a halfway war in the early 1960's. Any risk of ex- tending the United States into an escala- tion or widening of this military stale- mate should be avoided at this stage of American history. The military budget in this fiscal year and the next is already too high. I have voted on the House floor today, in teller vdtes, to cut substantial amounts from the military procurement bill in areas where I believe national security is not compromised and where domestic consi- derations are overriding. fully support the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. REID) to prohibit the use of any U.S. ground combat troops into Cambodia, Laos, or Thailand. No one has suggested that outfight destruction s:if all Communist forces and governments in Indochina is or should be our goal. Without any justification for a decision this drastic, there is ab- solutely no justification for America to extend its entry into a military hold- ing action, or standoff confrontation In Cambodia or Laos. It was a mistake to sacrifice 41,000 Americans in Vietnam. We must not make the same mistake again, when the evidence is so clear that other international and domestic Crises may engulf us if we do. The best way to protect American tropps is not to,.enlarge the war to include Cainbodiabut to bring American troops home. Mr. sraxmoN, Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. REID of New York. I yield to the gentleman from New york, , Mr., STRATTON. I appreciate the gentleman's yielding. I wanted to under- stand whether the gentleman's amend- met, if it were Adopted, would prevent the zi:Otbn thatls neW underway in the Parrot's Beat seetion ef Caminclia, which the, President is oparentLy going to dis- eits,s 6.4 14037,140tenight. Would this ameildnient _outlaw, that Activity even before the PresIdent.has had an oppor- tunity to explain what the situation is? Mr. hvip of N'ew -York. I would say to the gentleman that this is a limitation on the use of ground combat forces. It provides no sanction, but it clearly does not preclude the use of funds for advisers or air support. Mr. STRATTON. This would not inter- fere then with advisers, or with air sup- port, or with medevac personnel and so on, is that correct? Mr. REID of New York. It does not preclude their use. It provides no sanc- tion for it. It provides a limitation against the use of regular ground combat forces. Mr. STRA.TTON. Does the amend- ment or does it not eliminate funds for the kind, of people who are now operating in the Parrot's Beak area? Mr. REID of New York. It does not preclude funds for advisers or for air support. Mr. STRATTON. I thank the gentle- man. I am glad to have his statement, Mr, GERALD R. FORD,_Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. REID of New York, I yield to the distingiushed minority leader. Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I am glad there was an apparent clarification of a response that was given a moment ago. If I recollect the question asked by the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. REuss), he asked whether your amendment would preclude the military advisers. The impression I got from the response was that the amendment, under ground com- bat forces, would preclude the utilization of military advisers. Mr. REID of New York. If the gentle- man will permit me, my understanding is that the gentleman from Wisconsin asked whether the amendment would permit the use of advisers. My under- standing is that this amendment would not preclude their use. Mr. GERALD R. FORD. In other words, your amendment would not in any way interfere with the current operation the President has authorized to destroy the sanctuaries of the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong in Cambodia? Mr. REID of New York. It does not preclude air support. It does not preclude advisers. It does not preclude equipment. But it does preclude the use of regular American ground combat forces in Cambodia. Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from South Carolina is recognized. Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I have in the well of the House two maps I want ell Members to see. I think if I get beside them I can explain them best. I am indi- cating the areas that are presently af- fected. Just about everyone of my ac- quaintance belives in the concept of hot pursuit. The Vietcong troops would go into sanctuaries inside of Cambodia and Laos. We are now talking about Cam- bodia. These areas to which lam pointing are the areas where they have been caus- ing the most trouble. Observe how close that area is to Saigon?only 30 miles. We have been wondering how they could blow up Saigon every week. It was simple for Sihanouk. They are only 30 miles away. They could get the stuff where the troops have R. & R. in very large deploy- ment areas. They have all sorts of storage areas there. They have training areas. They have just about developed this country as a staging area from which to attack Vietnam. Moreover, they have been flanking our troops and causing terrific damage. We could win the war right here. We tried to get Sihanouk to let us do it. Nothing doing. This crowd did let us do it. I do not know how long this crowd is going to be in business and running this country, but while they are giving us the opportunity to go in and wipe out what has killed so many of our American boys, right on the border?less than 25 miles in, because I am not talking about going all over this country and taking it over?we should take advantage of the opportunity. This is to our advantage and to the advantage of the Vietnamese. We can get right across the border and clean out the bases. This is what they have been doing. This is right along where the Ho Chi Minh Trail comes, right down this way (indicating) and through Laos and into Cambodia, and right across into the Me- kong. Nothing stops them. We can go in there and intercept the Ho Chi Minh Trail insofar as it applies to Cambodia. We do not want to stop the President from doing that. I do not know what the President is going to say tonight. I have not talked' to him. But this is what he has got to think about. If the Vietnami- zation is going to succeed, we have to do this first. It is as simple as that. I would not want the gentleman's amendment to keep us from going in and to keep us from doing those things that all of the generals?including Westmoreland and Abrams?have told us we must do. But while they are letting us do it, we are doing what we have begged Sihanouk to let us do. Members must remember when Sihanouk captured our sailors. Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Chair- man, will the gentleman yield? Mr. RIVERS. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland. Mr. LONG. of Maryland. Mr. Chair- man, is it the chairman's opinion that to accomplish this, we have to use ground combat troops? Mr. RIVERS. It is just across the border, 25 miles across the border. Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Chair- man, do we have to use ground combat troops? Mr. RIVERS. They would be on the soil, yes, but it would not have anything to do with running the government. It Is doing what we want to do and what we need to do. It will destroy these areas. Until we destroy these areas, they will Infiltrate South Vietnam forever and ever, and the minute Sihanouk gets in, we would not be able to get in there any- way. These are the areas I am talking about. See how every one of them is on the border of the countries. Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. RIVERS. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri. Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I think the point needs to be made certainly that, first of all, this border has not been sur- veyed and it vacillates and the sanctu- Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 H 3750 Approved For Rvemangwei wsms2_0 immip 0 20 0 210005-9A arles are on the places where theoretical- ly the border is not by treaty, but by mu- tual agreement between these peoples who oppose each other. Second, our only men going in there are in an advisory capacity to the Viet- namese who, themselves, need to elimin- ate these sanctuaries. Would the gentle- marragree with that? Mr. RIVERS. Yes. Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlemen yield? Mr. RIVERS. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana. Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I think it ought to be pointed out in addition that throughout our history the Presi- dent of the United States as Commander In Chief has had and has exercised the power and the authority on occasion to land ground combat troops in case of emergency. But under this amendment, if American citizens' lives were being jeopardized in Thailand or Cambodia? or for that matter, in the Mediterranean or anywhere else?the President could not send the Marines in under this amendment. This is no time or place to attempt to circumscribe or reduce the historical powers and peroga Lives of the President of the United States. Mr. RIVERS. Of course not. The Pres- ident should be commended. This saves the lives of our troops. We should have done this long ago. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gen- tleman from South Carolina has expired. (On request of Mr. NEDZI, and by unanimous consent, Mr. Ft's/Eas was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.) Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, as I say, I have not talked with the President, but this is undoubtedly what he has tcfrthink about. These people have been standing there and lunging at us and they have the stuff in there, and do not let anybody kid us about it. They will bring old Sihanouk back there in short order. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Michigan for getting me this addi- tional time. Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. RIVERS. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois. Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I must say I am in direct opposition on this particular amendment. Mr. Chairman, those who serve on the Armed Services Committee, while we do not have all the answers, are privileged on occasion to ?get some inside informa- tion. But, being 'activated, like every Member of this House, by pure love of our countrk, those of us who are priv- ileged to know some of these things are in direct opposition to this amendment. It is not in the best interest of this countrY? Who can outguess the President of the United States at this Particular time? He is going to be on the television tonight at 6' 0'.61Qpk. . Mr. Cbairrnan, let us see what the President is going to say. Then, after what is ,4aid, we will support him in what hwts;) done in the best interest O f this 00111147- , . This is ril? time fel' is to say to the man who has more information than any other single person in America, who is motivated by the same things we are motivated by, what is to be done. I re- peat, what is being done is what has to be done for the sake of this country. Mr. RIVERS. I agree with the gentle- man. Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman yield? ?Mr. RIVERS. I yield to the distin- guished gentleman from Michigan. Mr. NEDZI. Would the chairman com- ment on the headline which appears in the Washington Daily News today which summarizes or epitomizes a radio col- umn which I heard this morning quoting the Cambodian Government spokesman. The headline says, "Cambodia as Neu- tral Can't Approve Our Aid." He clearly indicated, or at least was quoted as saying aid was not asked for. Mr. RIVERS. I do not know a thing about that. Any excuse we can get to go in and help clean out this thing will help Viet- namization and save the lives of Ameri- cans. I would hate to see us do anything to stop it. Furthermore, we could never tell the President how to run foreign policy. He will tell us, as the gentlemen know, it is none of our business. Mr. REUSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. RIVERS. Of course I yield to the gentleman. Mr. REUSS. Do I have the gentleman's position straight? Is it that the gentle- man from South Carolina feels the United States should introduce American ground combat troops into Cambodia and therefore opposes the Reid amend- ment? Mr. RIVERS. No; that is not true. Mr. REUSS. Will the gentleman state his position? Mr. RIVERS. My position is we should introduce troops in there if it is neces- sary to remove those things which are killing American boys. If we can do it by way of the Vietnamese Army, by way of giving them the material they need, when thcy get there they will find enough material. Mr. REUSS. If we cannot do it by the Vietnamese Army, would the gentleman favor it with the American Army? Mr. RIVERS. If we are ever going to secure that country these things have to be eliminated. This is the only government that per- mitted us to go in there. We have tried every way before. This is the only gov- ernment left. Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. RIVERS. Certainly I yield to the gentleman. Mr. REID of New York. I appreciate the chairman's yielding. Might I ask the chairman whether it is now a matter of law we cannot intro- duce ground combat forces into Laos and Thailand? Mr. RIVERS. That is right. That is a mistake. If there is any country we ought to go to the aid of, if needed, it is Thailand, because they let us come in there in the darkest days of our adversity and never told the world a thing. We built bases ii 30, 1970 there and used our fighters and our bombers out of Thailand. To keep us from going to their aid is just a monumental act of ingratitude, in my opinion. Mr. REID of New York. One final quick question, and I thank the gentleman for yielding. If the President did send ground com- bat troops into Cambodia, for whatever reason it might be necessary, does the gentleman see an end of the war or does he see that as leading to a wider war? Mr. RIVERS. If the gentleman is talk- ing about these areas here, it is bound to shorten the war. It will do two things. It will eliminate these things (pointing) and it will inter- cept the Ho Chi Minh buildup, which is coming down there like an interstate highway. The Ho Chi Minh Trail is very vast, over a very wide area. This is a part of it. Mr. CEDERBERG. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. Mr. Chairman, I take this time?and I hope not to take it all?to caution the House about taking an action of this kind this afternoon just before the Presi- dent is going to address the Nation. I, for one, might even support this amendment at a different time. I am op- posed to the entering of U.S. ground troops into Cambodia without prior con- sultation with Congress. However, I would caution the Members of this House this afternoon that if this amendment is passed, you will see the greatest exodus from that press gallery you ever saw, and they will all be heading for the tele- phones. What they will be doing is broad- casting all over the country, all over the world, that the Congress of the United States has predetermined the judgment of the President even before he made his remarks. This is the worst time that this amendment could possibly be brought forth. Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. CEDERBERG. I am happy to yield to the gentleman. Mr. RIVERS. I not only agree with the gentleman, but let me say this: We have less than a month of fair weather over there. If we are going to eliminate these things, the time to do it is now?the time Is now. When the rainy season comes it is more difficult, and that is what these people are waiting for. Mr. CEDERBERG. May I say in addi- tion to that that militarily I do not be- lieve we should allow a sanctuary of this kind to exist. I am all for the South Viet- namese taking care of it and I hope they Will do the task, but to allow these troops to come in during the day or during the night, into combat and kill our troops and maim the civilians and the South Vietnamese and then go back to a sanc- tuary and resupply themselves just does not make any combat sense. I plead with the Members of this House, please do not take this action of approving this kind of an amendment just before the President is going to go on television. It is a tragic mistake. Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Chair- man, will the gentleman yield? Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 "CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 April 3.0, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? HOUSE Mr. CEDERBERG. I yield to the gen- tleman from Maryland. Mr. LONG of Maryland. The gentle- man's statement puzzles me a little bit. The President argued and only last week the Secretary of State told by subcom- mittee of the Committee on Appropria- tions that the Congress would be con- sulted before any movement into another Asian country would take place. All this amendment speaks to is the introduction of ground combat troops. Does the gen- tleman argue that?if the President malres a goad case tonight or any other night that we need combat troops in Cambodia to protect American lives--the Congress would not give him that au- thority in a very short time? Mr. CEDERBERG. I will not prejudge what the President will say tonight or at any other time. Mr. LONG of Maryland. Of course, we do not know what he will say. Mr. CEDERBERG. The gentleman knows what will happen if the House of Representatives takes this position this afternoon before the President can ad- dress the Nation. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. CARTER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the,last word. Mr. Chairman, today we are faced with a very serious problem, one that affects every home in our country. In 1964 we had a problem similar to this. At that time we were told that the Turner Joy and the Maddox had been attacked by North Vietnamese ships. Now in looking into that you find that the commanding officers of those ships will not ?tate they were under attack. But under pressure such as exists here and under strong pleading and suggestion from men high in the offices of this House, our House succumbed and passed the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. I want to tell you that since that time we have had 7 years of the most horrible war that has ever been visited on the people of the United States. You know, one of the sad things about this war is that if a youngster can get Into college, he does not go to the war. If he can get into the Reserves, he does not go to the war. If he can get into the National Guard, he does not go to the war. It is the poor people, the fellows who cannot go to college, who are brought in. If there was ever a war, a horrible war, that was unjustified, this is It. Plainly this is a rich man's war and a poor man's fight. In a war involving the poorer sons of our country. I strongly support the amendment of the gentleman from New York and I ask that you consider this. I ask that you think calmly and deeply as to whether we are going to enter into a war worse than we are in at the present time. I say that this possibility exists to- day and now. Mr. Chairman, Stephen Decatur once said: Our country in her intercourse with other nations may she always be in the right, but our coUntry, right or wrong. We Might alter that today, Mr. Chair- man, 8,nd saY, dour Countny, right or wreng. If right, to be kept right. If wrong, to be set right." Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. (Mr. FASCELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I am not going into the military aspects of the Southeast Asia prOblem. However:, I want to put in perspective what it is we are adtually going to do under this amendment because I think that is important in the consideration of the overall principle sought to be raised by the gentleman's amendment. I think regardless of how we are going to vote, it is important to have a clear understanding of the actual operative po- tential as compared to its being an ex- pression of congressional policy. So, first, I would like to ask the chair- man of the full Committee on Armed Services whether there are any funds in this bill to finance ground troops. Mr. RIVERS. There are no funds for personnel and no 0. & M. money. Mr. FASCELL. I am sorry but I did not hear the chairman, Mr. RIVERS. There is no money for military personnel and no 0. & M. money. Mr. FASCELL. What does "0. & M." money mean? Mr. RIVERS. Operations and mainte- nance. Mr. FASCELL. Therefore, in order for the prohibition in the gentleman from New York's (amendment to be effective or have any real meaning as far as the subject matter of this bill, it must apply to equipment and other materiel used to move ground forces into Laos, Cambo- dia, or Thailand; is that correct? Mr. RIVERS. Am I to understand that the amendment is certainly germane? Mr. FASCELL. I understand it is ger- mane to the bill, but I just want to know what the fund prohibition really ap- plies to. The question I raise does not go to the overall principle as an expression of sentiment by the Congress. I think ex- pression is worthwhile any time the Congress wants to speak on such an im- portant matter. The question of the in- troduction of ground troops into any area of Southeast Asia is relevant, but I would like to know whether the fund prohibition in the amendment actually is effective as it applies to this bill. From what I understand, as the chair- man just responded, it really is not. So, it is not a legal proscription of the President's right to commit troops, or to pay for them out of other funds. It is an expression of the sense of Congress, however, which might or might not be important to the administration and which it may consider. But it legally does not proscribe the President. This is the only point I am making, at this juncture. Furthermore, Mr. Chairman, I submit that this amendment as a matter of legal action cannot possibly change the treaty commitments which the United States has with Thailand. As a matter of law, I do not believe the Congress can do that. I do not believe, therefore, even as an expression of sentiment, the gentleman's amendment can change the treaty com- mitments and the-right of the President ? H 3751 under the Constitution to implement those requirements. It still is, however, if adopted, a very important and vital expression of the sentiment of Congress. But I do not want us to deceive ourselves that we afe put- ting,. some monetary restriction on the President or that we are changing some treaty commitment or that we are chang- ing the authority under the Gulf of Ton- kin resolution. We are not doing any of that With this amendment. Finally, Mr. Chairman this amend- ment can only be effective on the date this bill becomes effective, if passed. The effective date is the beginning of the next fiscal year, July 1,1970. Notwithstanding that, Mr. Chairman, I believe the amendment is an expres- sion of a fundamental policy by this Congress which is vital. However, it does not undermine the President's right to say anything he wants to say tonight about this deplorable situation in South- east Asia; it does not restrict him mone- tarily; it does not restrict him legally, and does not modify this country's treaty obligations, and does not change Pres- idential policy. It does say, therefore, by inference and construction that it does want the Pres- ident to come back to Congress. * Therefore, this expression of Congres- sional sentiment, very limited In its ac- tual application, nevertheless is a use- ful guideline. Mr. MOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in support of the amendment. (Mr. MOSS asked and was given per- mission to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. MOSS. Mr. Chairman, I must ex- press my sense of dismay at the state- ment made by the gentleman from Michigan in talking about his President and our President over here. I have only one President, at one time. As I recall, that is the precise provision in the Con- stitution of the United States. President Nixon is my President, and he is the President of the United States, and I respect the onerous nature of the office he occupies, and the awesome problems which confront him but I also recognize that this House is one house of a two- house, coequal body which has very seri- ous responsibilities imposed upon it by the Constitution and by the people of the United States. Mr. Chairman, if this situation is so very delicate that we should not act at this moment in advance of the Presi- dent's speech this evening, then it seems to me that the appropriate action would be for the Committee to rise and await the statement of the President, and then act, following that statement, upon the basis of any new evidence. Upon the absence of that evidence and under the compulsion to act now, I am going to support the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. REID) because I have returned not many weeks ago from Southeast Asia, where I think I undertook a rather responsible inquiry and a very comprehensive inquiry, and the developments which have occurred since ray return have not surprised me Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 ? CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 H 3752 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE AprilST, 1970 greatly, and there are other develop- ments which could take place which Would not surprise me greatly. Mr. Chairman, I would point out that it is 17 years since we went into South Korea', and I can see two or three dec- ades of involvement in Southeast 4sia, and I can see it on an ever-eXpanding basis of our material resources, and I know that there is an increasingly stri- dent demand in this Nation for a greater share of those resources. I have no question as to the motives of some of those who oppose the United States overseas, but I know what dire dangers we face here at home if we con- tinue to do the bad job of housekeeping, to ignore the ills of our own domestic society. We can be destroyed as surely from within as we can by any force or combination of forces from without. It is time that we start to realize our priorities. The fact that a man steps into this well and opposes an expansion of Military activities is in no sense an in- dictment of his patriotism. I believe that at some times, under the conditions of the moment, it takes more courage to step here and say, "Let us go slow, let us evaluate and reevaluate. Let us know what the hazards of the action we are taking might be," than it does just to stand up and say "I am going along, and I am going to wrap myself up in the flag in the process." Mr. REIT) of New York. Mr. Chair- man, will the gentleman yield? Mr. MOSS. I yield to the gentleman. Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Chair- man, I wish to say I agree with and ap- preciate this statement and concur that this is a matter that the House should act on. But I would like to advise the Mem- bers that I suggested to the leadership, due to the seriousness of the matter and the fact that the President is going to speak tonight, that I thought it might be appropriate to adjourn so we could vote after the President spoke and not before. But I would advise the Members that suggestion, that I was very sensi- tive to, and which the gentleman men- tict\ned, was declined. SUBSTITUTE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY Ant. FINDLEY ? Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, I of- fer an amendment in the nature of a substitute. The Clerk read as follows: Amendment offered by Mr. FINDLEY in the nature of a substitute for the amendment offered by Mr. REID of New York: In place of the amendment, substitute the following language: "SEC. 403. In line with the expressed in- tention of the President of the United States, none of the funds authorized by *this act shall be used to finance the, intro- duction of American ground combat troops into Laos, Thailand, or C,arnbodia without the prior consent of the Congress, except to the extent- that sucla is required, as deter- Mined by the President and reported peoMptly to the Congress, to protect the lives of Apae Amu troops remaining within South Vialaag;0-" Ur. PrzmX.Ey. Mr. Chairman, I think we all we the gentleman from New York a debt of gratitude because he has caused us to enter into a very timely and, I think, very helpful discussion of fundamental military POLICY, one of the very few such occasions in the 9 years I have been here in the House of Repre- sentatives, years in which I have seen an unfolding of military operations un- precedented in our country, and yet al- most never do we discuss the funda- mental issue of the role of the United States in these far away places. The distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, I feel, put his finger right on the heart of this issue?and I say this kindly?when he closed his comments by saying that if we try, by an amendment of this sort, to tell the President of the United States what to do in the field of foreign policy, the President would respond quite properly, to use the words of the gentle- man from South Carolina, "It is none of your business." I believe that that is a rather widely held assumption, that what happens in foreign policy, especially in fundamental military policy, is really none of the business of the Congress. It is hard for me to accept that. In fact, I disagree absolutely with such a conclusion. The amednment I have presented in the form of a substitute retains all of the langauge of the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. REID). But, it adds some things that are unspoken by the gentleman from New York, and I think these unspoken items should be spelled out. It deals with the item that has been in so much controversy here. Whether in a crisis, requiring a split-second decision by the President through his command- ers as to whether ground combat forces should move a few feet across the Cam- bodian border in order to protect the lives of American troops in South Viet- nam?whether or not he could respond. Of course, the President has a grave responsibility as Commander in Chief? an overriding responsibility to protect U.S. lives whether they are in American uniform or not. So, even if the Congress would say to the contrary?that he should not do it? it is my belief that he would have the fundamental responsibility to these American citizens to take the action?to protect their lives. Mr. FINDLEY. I am sorry, I missed the last part of the gentleman's question. Mr. RIVERS, Does the gentleman's amendment say in so many words that we may enter Cambodia for the purpose of protecting the lives of American troops? Mr. FINDLEY. Yes. Mr. RIVERS. Will the gentleman read that language of the amendment again? Mr. FINDLEY. Yes, indeed. I am glad to. It states, "without the prior consent of the Congress"; then it adds the words, "except to the extent that such is re- quired, as determined by the President and reported promptly to the Congress, to protect the lives of American troops remaining within South Vietnam." I am glad to clarify that point and appreciate the question. Mr. RIVERS. That is what I was try- ing to say. I can find no fault with an amendment like that. Mr. FINDLEY. I appreciate the gen- tleman's comment. Mr. HORTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? I would like to ask a question on the subject about which you were just speaking. Mr. FINDLEY. I yield to the gentle- man from New York. Mr. HORTON. As I understood the statement the gentleman in the well made, he was talking about the idea of hot pursuit, and as I would understand hot pursuit, that would be immediately over the border to protect the ground forces in the immediate vicinity of Cam- bodia, the South Vietnamese border. Mr. FINDLEY. I will say to the gentle- man, if I may interrupt, that I would hope and expect the President to exer- cise a very narrow construction on this implied authority to use ground troops outside the borders of South Vietnam, but I can conceive of instances when this would be necessary. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Illinois has expired. (On request of Mr. HORTON, and by unanimous consent, Mr. FINDLEY was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.) Mr. HORTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. FINDLEY. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from New York. Mr. HORTON. The chairman of the Armed Services Committee referred to the map to the immediate right of the gentleman in the well. I am not familiar with it, but I assume it is a map of Cambodia. There are certain MRS with different numbers. I do not know whether those are military targets or what they are. But do I correctly understand that the gentleman's amendment would not permit the introduction of ground troops under any circumstances to go into the heart of or into the major portion of Cambodia? Mr. FINDLEY. The only circumstance In which ground troops could be in- troduced into Cambodia would be in the event that the President should deter- mine that such is required in order to protect the lives of American forces within South Vietnam. Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. FINDLEY. I yield to the gentle- man from New York. Mr. LOWENSTEIN. I wonder what would occur if the success of the Cam- bodia forces and our forces and of those allied to us should unexpectedly cause the other side to retreat toward, say, Phnom Penh? Would we then be obliged, under the interpretation the gentleman Is giving the amendment, to pursue the enemy through the rest of Cambodia in order to be certain that at some future time they would not come back to the areas where they could harass our troops in South Vietnam? Mr. FINDLEY. That is a question to which I do not think the answer would appear at this moment. It is up to the President as Commander in Chief to Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 Aii 40, 1970 Approved FotWitstesg98140A3LOWEENINP7A-R347R000200210005-9 H3753 ? make his interpretation of the implied powers that he exercises as Commander in Chief. I wish to add Qne other thing before I yield further. This aniencirnient to me is very important, because it speaks to the role of congress in dealing with fundamental policy. It illustrates the limitations on our role in this area. But it also shows our authority, our respon- sibility. You will note that my amend- ment does express affirmatively the right of Congress to consent _prior to the use of combat troops. If that is our decision, then we can affirmatively make the de- cision that our troops should be used. But it also requires that if the President makes a determination to use troops under the implied powers, then he must report promptly to the Congress that he has made that determination. That re- porting requirement is nowhere spelled out in present law, to my knowledge. I think it is high time that we impose that reporting requirement on the President. I think this alone will have a salutary effect and will tend to discourage any unjust use, Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? ? Mr. FINDLEY. I promised to yield to the gentleman from Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana. Mr. JACOBS. I wonder if the gentle- man would state whether or not it would be correct to say that the operative lan- guage of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution= and the amendment is set opposite the language in that resolution?was not contingent upon the protection of personnel in Vietnam and if, at the time the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was adopted, it was not also hoped a very ,Strict construction of that resolution Might be made by the President of the United States? ? Mr, rarpLgy. I gather the drift of the gentleman's comments, and I must say the President may very broadly construe his implied powers. What we 0.0 or fail to do here cannot diminish his respon- sibility. He may fail to exercise it, but we cannot diminish his responsibility. Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Chairman, the gen- tleman did not respond. My question was: Was not the operative part of that language contingent on the protection and safety of troops? Mr. FINDLEY. It had two opeiative parts and one had to deal with the attack on onr ships, and the other dealt with the process through which our Gov- ernment should go to counter an attack in Southeast Asia. Mr. JACOBS. It was dealing with the safety of American personnel in Viet- nam, as I reeall. Mr. FINDLEY. I believe only section 1 dealt with the safety of American per- sOnnel. Mr. CEDERBERG. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlemanyield? _ ,zar, Mpg, gv. I yield to the gentleman fromNI-ight Mr. CEaD ERG, Mr. Cnairman, in- asartiCh as spoitp,, in opposition to the Reid of V* Xi:Mk ainendment because I felt very strongly about that, I do be- lieve the aniendrilent Of the gentleman from Illinois is a real improvement, and I see no real reason to oppose that amendment. Mr. RIEGLE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. FINDLEY. I yield to the gentle- man from Michigan. Mr, RIEGLE Mr. Chairman, as I un- derstand the amendment of the gentle- man and his explanation, it seems to me he is inferring by what he said, that the President now has delegated authority to act on his own to introduce American military personnel in Cambodia. Mr. FINDLEY. He has an implied re- sponsibility to do so In Cambodia to protect American lives in South Viet- nam. Mr. RIEGLE. Where specifically in the Constitution can the gentleman find that? I question that. The CHAIRMAN. The time a the gen- tleman from Illinois has expired. (On request of Mr. Gaoss, and by unanimous consent, Mr. FINDLEY was al- lowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.) Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. FINDLEY. I yield to the gentle- man from Iowa. Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, in the event the gentleman's substitute should be defeated, I wonder if the gentleman from New York (Mr. REID) would accept an amendment to his amendment to provide that in perpetuity no American combat troops be sent anywhere in the world, including the Middle East? Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Chair- man, ? move to strike the requisite num- ber of words. (Mr. GERALD R. FORD asked and was given permission to revise and ex- tend his remarks.) Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Chair- man, during the full decade_ of the six- ties, I had the opportunity to sit down with several Presidents, and it was my privilege, following such conferences, to support the President, whether he was from my party or another party, in what he thought was in the best interests of the United States. I am proud of the fact that in this country we can have that kind of co- operation between the leaders on one side of the aisle with a President coming from the other side of the aisle. I have always been very proud of the fact that in this body the Democratic leadership has re- sponded as strongly in support of a Re- publican President as most of us re- sponded and supported a Democratic President. I happen to think this is a very crucial hour?and I use that word not literally, but figuratively?and it is my strong hope that at this particular point we, not as Democrats or Republicans, make a basic decision in the overall interest of the country. I personally do not believe that either the Reid amendment or the Findley amendment ought to be approved here this afternoon. I do not know precisely what the President of the United States is going to say tonight. I think it is awfully important that the impact of his remarks not be hampered or hindered by some action taken here this afternoon. I am a strong believer in the right of the legislative branch to participate in decisions involving our national se- curity. But the problem of time right now is extremely serious. We could very easily take some action here this after- noon which might adversely affect the full beneficial impact of what the Presi- dent will say tonight. If I had my choice I would be opposed, as a consequence, to either amendment. I have looked over the Findley amend- ment. I have consulted with experts in the executive branch of the Government. The choice between the Findley amend- ment and the Reid of New York amend- ment is easy. The Findley amendment in effect says what the President has promised he will do. He has said that before introducing American ground combat troops into Lios, Thailand, or Cambodia he will seek the prior consent of the Congress of the United States. On the other hand, he has said that if emergency situations arise where it is incumbent upon him as Commander in Chief to take action to protect the lives of American soldiers, sailors or marines, then he will act, but he will report im- mediately to the Congress and to the American people his reasons for taking such action under emergency circum- stances. Therefore, it seems to me that this proposed amendment offered by the gen- tleman from Illinois (Mr. FINDLEY) does no harm, because it coincides with what the President has promised us and the American people; and therefore I intend to vote for the substitute, and I would ask all on our side of the aisle and as many as possible on the other side of the aisle to do the same. It seems to me that this is the best course in a situation which could be complicating and harmful. The facts of life are that since 1965 the Vietnamese and the Vietcong have occupied sanctu- aries just across the border from which they have made forays into South Viet- nam, and atfer they have made those forays? The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gen- tleman from Michigan has expired. (On request of Mr. PELLY, and by unanimous consent, Mr. GERALD R. FORD was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.) Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Chair- man, after the enemy has made these excursions into South Vietnam, killing Americans and killing our allies, they have escaped back across the border and they have rested and recouped and re- grouped, and they have rearmed. Then they would come back on another occa- sion, at their option, with the full pro- tection of the former Government of Cambodia. In order to save American lives the President has authorized the kind of ac- tion, in conjunction with the forces of our allies, which he will describe in de- tail to the Nation in a few hours. I hope and trust that we take no ac- tion here today or tomorrow or next week that will undermine this long over- due effort to protect the lives of Ameri- Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 11 3754 Approved For RV8migliKR0 itfM132-901%%?0200210005-9 A I se, 19 7-0 Compared to the major health prob- lems which we have already solved, the solution to this problem is relatively sim- ple: It can be solved on a local level. -Unfortunately, however, our local gov- ernments are not able to cope with this matter on their own. Many local gov- ernments have enacted ordinances against the use of lead-based paint on housing interiors. However, enforcement of the ordinance proves difficult. Fur- ther, the lead-based paint all too often has been covered over. In addition, there is the problem of lack of knowledge by many parents as to the causes and early signs of lead poisoning. This situation can and must be cor- rected; and, it must be corrected now. The two bills I introduced are designed to provide a two-pronged coordinated attack to remedy the situation. The bill, HR. 17234, concerns itself with the people who live in these homes. It would authorize the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to make grants to assist local governments in de- veloping and carrying out local programs to detect and treat incident of lead-based paint poisoning. In addition, it would assist in developing and carrying out programs that identify those areas that present a high risk to the health of the residents because of the presence of lead- based' paints on interior surfaces, and then to develop and carry out programs to eliminate the hazards of lead-based paint poisoning. The other bill, H.R. 17260, is concerned with the housing itself. It would author- ize the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to make grants to units of local government to assist in developing and carrying out local lead-based paint elimination programs. The bill would re- quire that there be an approved work- able program for community improve- ment for the locality, containing a pro- gram to eliminate lead-based paint. In addition, the bill would amend other HUD assistance programs to require that they include an effective plan for elimi- nating the causes of lead-based paint poisoning. Mr. Chairman, both of these programs are vitally important to the solution of this major health problem and a coordi- nated attack is needed. Therefore, I be- lieve it is important to note that both of these bills contain a section requiring the Secretaries of the respective departments to "cooperate with and seek the advice of the heads of other departments or agen- cies regarding any programs under their respective responsibilities which are re- lated to, or would be affected by, such authority" under the acts. Mr. Chairman, as chairman of the Housing Subcommittee of the Banking and Currency Committee, to which H.R. 17260 has been referred, I will make every effort for favorable consideration by that committee. I will also endeavor to have H.R. 17234, which was referred to the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Com- mittee, receive favorable action. Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to join with me in sponsoring and support- ing legislation to attack the problem of lead-based paint poisoning. (Mr. PODELL asked and was given cans now being killed in South Viet- nam. I Sifijold that the statement to be Matie by the President tonight is con- Sidered to be one of Major importance. , I belieye the best answer for its here this afternoon is to accept an amendment which I am assured coincides with the commitments already made by the Presi- dent. I believe it is a far preferable amendment to the one offered by the gentleman from Nev York (Mr. REID) . /dr. LONG of 1Vlaryland. Mr. Chair- man, will the gentleman yield? Mr. GERALD 11. FORD. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Maryland. Mr, LONG of Maryland. I believe that words about saving American lives? con- fuse the issue. I believe that is what we are all trying to do, to save American " lives. U Congress had sieted many years ago, perhaps we could have saved many of the 40,000 American lives that have been lost in Vietnam. Is it noetrue that the Findley amend- ment merely pulls the few teeth that the Reid amendment has in it and allows the President to do basically as he pleases? Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I do not think It pulls the teeth of the Reid amend- ment. What the Findley amendment does Is tell us that the President will consult with us in advance if he takes such a step in Laos, Cambodia, or Thailand, which is a promise that he has already made to us and to the American people. Then he is also given the flexibility to act If there is an emergency that arises to protect American lives and then report promptly thereafter. I think that is con- structive and not harmful. Ur. REID of New York. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I yield to the gentleman from New York. Mr. REID of New York. I thank the ? gentleman for yielding. I Merely ask him, in the light of our earlier conVersation this morning wheth- er in deference to the President's speech tonight he would be willing to recom- mend that the House rise so that we can vote after the President's speech. The CHAIR1VIAN. The time of the gentleman has eXpirecl. (By unanimous consent, Mr. OERALD R. Faso was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.) Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I know that there can be an argument made that we should defer, but I do not have the privi- lege nor the prerogative of making that decision. Therefore I do not feel that I slaoul4 comment one way or another on a decision that was made earlier to con- clude the business of the day. Mr. REID of New York. If the gentle- man will yield further very briefly? Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I yield to the gentleman. Ur. VIM of -New York. In deference to the, point- that the gentleman was ? =king is it not accurate that I said an effort should be made to have a vote 'after the President's speech so that we would not preclude whatever he might eaY" hut equally pr'Otect the right of the House to vote pn a matter wherein we have constitutional responsibilities? Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I simply ,say an argument can be made? Mr. REID of New York. I was simply asking whether the suggestion was not made earlier by this gentleman. Mr. GERALD R. FORD. The gentleman from New York did make that sugges- tion. Right. It seems to me that in this circumstance we ire faced with today the wise action, the constructive action, the action that is in the best interests of the United States would dictate that we support the Findley substitute and get on with the business of approving this legislation. Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma. Mr. EDMONDSON. I would like to have the gentleman's opinion as to whether the Reid amendment or the sub- stitute offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. FINDLEY) would impact in any way the President's authority to have advisers in Thailand at this time, and, in the judgment of the gentleman, would it withdraw the advisers we now have operating in Thailand. Mr. GERALD R. FORD. In listening to an earlier colloquy between the gentle- man from New York and the gentleman from Wisconsin I was led to believe that the Reid amendment would preclude the utilization of military advisers in Cam- bodia. Sul3sequently there was another colloquy that I am not sure clarified it, but there were more words concerning it. Mr. REID of New York. It does not preclude that, I would say to the gentle- man. Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I am glad to have that observation. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. SILENT EPIDEMIC (By unanimous consent, Mr. BARRETT was allowed to speak out of order and to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Chairman, on Monday, April 27, 1970, I introduced two bills, H.R. 17234 and H.R. 17260, designed to attack and eradicate, what has been labeled the "silent epidemic," afflicting an estimated half million infants and children in our Nation's cities and towns. An epidemic of poisonings resulting from the use of lead-based paints in the in- terior of houses. The effects of such poisonings are at times fatal and, when not fatal, far too often tragic?leaving children with mental retardation, blind- ness and chronic kidney disease among other consequences. Lead-based paint has not been used on interiors for over 10 years, but in old buildings it lies just beneath the sur- face of newer coats of lead-free paint. When the old walls are not properly maintained, the old paint lifts away in layered chips along with the new. This is the decor of older housing, particu- larly of slum housing. The children liv- ing in deteriorating houses, whose walls are layered with sweet-tasting flakes of paint, are the victims. This condition is a major health problem for the infants of thoke families living in older housing. In fact, aside from infectuous diseases this is the major infant health problem. Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 A I 197u Approved FOor Release 20073/ O Q6_? CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 30, CNGRE'SSION L KLCRD ? HOUSE Et 3755 permission to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. PODELL. Mr. Chairman, the Members of the House and the Senate and the American people were informed late yesterday of President Nixon's de- cision to provide American military ad- visers and American air support to the attacking South Vietnamese Army now in Cambodia. This decision Was reached with the "advice and consent" of the President and his advisers and provides Just cause for profound dismay. The reasons cited for the action are similar to those given in support of the 1965 decision to widen the war in Viet- nam?that widening of the conflict would bring a speedier end to the fight- ing. After 5 years of continued bloody fighting, 40,000 American lives, $100 bil- lion, the war in Vietnam continues un- abated. The faultiness of our earlier reasoning Is then obvious. Yet, American decision- makers in the executive branch are still working under the same assumptions and appear ready to make the same mis- takes again. The opening of this )new front in Cambodia is in direct contradic- tion to American experience and to the recently issued "Guam doctrine." I am deeply distressed at both the con- tent of the decision and the manner in which it was reached. There is a con- stitutional requirement that the respon- sibility to commit American forces and arms abroad rests with two branches of Government?with the executive and the legislative branches concurrently, The President, whose search for a strict con- structionist for the Supreme Court is well known, seems unwilling to follow the letter of the Constitution on this issue. Instead, the Congress has, except for Incomplete briefings, been bypassed. After being consulted "after the fact," it has been asked to concur in the decision because of responsibility to ow fighting men. The logic of such ex post facto reason- ing escapes me. Decisions of such magni- tude and potential consequence as troops to Cambodia require that approval be given by all representatives of the Ameri- can people. American policy seems directionless at this point. Vietnarnization of the Viet- namese war and widening American in- volvement in Cambodia are contradict- ory. If the conflict expands into a pan- Indo-Chinese effort, American lives will be needlessly sacrificed. We cannot continue to make up rules as we go along?or to spout outdated slogans. Is it too late to ask President Nixon to reconsider his decision? It is certainly not too late to ask Congress to express its disapproval. Congress has the Moral and constitutional responsibility to act, A su,pport the amendment of the gen- tleman from New York (Mr. Pam) ? purrowNr45T INQUIRY Mr. STRATTON, Mr. Obairman, a parliamentary inquiry. The CHATR1VIAN. The gentleman will state it. Mr. S'TRATTON. Would it be in order to move at this time that the Reid a New York amendment and all amend- ments thereto be tabled so that this mat- ter of grave consequence might be con- sidered at another time? The CHAIRMAN. A motion to table is not in order at this time. AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. LEGGETT TO THE SUBSTITUTE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. FINDLEY FOR THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. REID OF NEW YORK Mr. LEGGET.C. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the substitute amend- ment offered by the gentleman from Illi- nois (Mr. FINDLEY). The Clerk read as follows: ? Amendment offered by Mr. LEGGETT to the amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Mr. FINDLEY for the amendment offered by Mr. RIED of New York: After the word "Congress" strike out the proviso exception. [Mr. LEGGETT addressed the Com- mittee. His remarks will appear here- after in the Extensions of Remarks.] Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. (Mr. OBEY asked and was given per- mission to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to support the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois, (Mr. FINDLEY) but in my judgment that amounts to little more than a Gulf of Tonkin resolution for Cambodia. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment of the gentleman from Cal- ifornia to prohibit the use of any funds under this bill to introduce American troops into Cambodia. Mr. Chairman, I have most certainly not harassed any President?Mr. John- son or Mr. Nixon?on the conduct of the war in Vietnam. I have expressed doubts about President Johnson's policy since 1965, but I did not ask for, nor did I support immediate unilateral with- drawal. When in October Senator SCOTT, the Republican minority leader, asked for a 60-day moratorium on criticism of the President's policies in Vietnam, I sup- ported that. When debate on Vietnam threatened to become highly partisan in late Octo- ber, I gave speeches to my own party units asking them to give the President more time. When the Wright resolution came before the House, I voted for it because of my reluctance to restrain the President in the conduct of foreign af- fairs. At that time, however, I pointed out that my support for the resolution should not be interpreted as a blanket endorsement of every facet of the Presi- dent's November 3 speech, nor as a pledge of unqualified support for any future Presidential action as yet unknown and undefined. It is difficult for me to support this amendment because I do not like to in any way restrict the action of the Presi- dent. But Mr. Chairman, the issue today is broader than the freedom of move- ment of one man, and that issue is two- fold. It is first a question of whether this Nation is willing to risk a widening a the war by involvement of American troops in another unhappy nation in Indochina, and it is second, a question of the responsibility of the Congress in determining the policies the country will follow. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe we should vote on this bill, or on this ques- tion, until after the President's speech tonight. If we had any sense, we would postpone our action until at least tomor- row, and possibly later. But, in the ab- sence of any delay in the consideration of this subject, I believe we have no al- ternative but to support the amendment. Mr. Chairman, since the late 1950's we have been involved in Vietnam without specific congressional declarations of support. Since 1964 we have required young men to fight in combat in that un- happy land without specific congres- sional approval except for the Tonkin resolution, which is, at best, of dubious clarity. We are now faced with the ques- tion of whether in the absence of specific congressional consideration of this new question we should send our young men into another area of war. We have been told by the President "no more Vietnams." Mr. Speaker, if we continue to send troops into Cambodia we run the high risk of having at least one more Vietnam and that is two more than we can afford. Indeed, it may al- ready be too late to avoid it. Mr. Speaker, we cannot in conscience and we should not, out of respect for the Congress as an institution, allow involvement in Cambodia without specific congressional approval of that added involvement. We have had men die in an undeclared war in Vietnam for 9 years. We should not support actions which would lead to the killing of Americans in another unde- clared war. In the absence of congres- sional consideration of this added in- ? volvement, and in the absence of con- gressional determination that this added involvement is in the best interest of the United States, I cannot vote to financially support such efforts. I am tired of young Americans dying in "unofficial" wars. I am opposed to sending American men into new areas of warfare without a statement from the Congress that their sacrifice is both necessary and wise. Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Chairman, the re- cent unilateral Presidential decision to send American combat advisers, tactical air support, medical evacuation teams, and other support to Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia indicates that there is a total disregard for the advise and con- sent role of the Congress in making for- eign policy decisions that affect our economy and the lives of our citizens. The prior consent of Congress should, in all instances, be obtained before any decision of such potential military mag- nitude- is made. Surely the lessons of Korea and Vietnam must not be repeated over and over again before the Congress is allowed to have a voice in determining whether or not expanded American in- volvement in Southeast Asian nations is In the best interests of the United States. No doubt the safety of American troops In Vietnam must be a serious consid- eration in determining our Southeast Asian policy. However, the additional Implications of such vital action should be approved by debate in the Congress before America is involved and com- mitted in any 'other nation. This is. the Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 fl 3756 Approved For R j-32-09Jo2oo210005-9Ail 30, 1970 only way rational foreign policy can be established. Mr. MOORHEAD. Mr. Chairman, I rise in emphatic support of the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. REID) , which says: In line with the expressed intent of the President of the United States, no part of the funds authorized to be appropriated pur- suant to this Act shall be used to finance the Introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos, Thailand and Cambodia. This House, by sustaining this amend- ment, will make it clear to the President and more importantly to the people of the United States and the world, that we will no longer support America military exceSses in Southeast Asia. Rather than sending our boys into Cambodia, we should be loading them on troopships and bringing them home. And it is at home, in the United States where we should be concentrating our efforts and our money. Have the mothers, wives, families, and soldiers of this Nation not suffered enough? Why must we perpetuate our existence in Southeast Asia, when it has been demonstrated time and time again that the people of this Nation want no more Vietnams. President Nixon entered office on the strength of three promises; to end the war, to cool the economy, and generally to lower the voices of discontent and wrangling in our country. Not only has he failed to do any one of these things. He took new steps yesterday to generate new, and who knows how far reaching, antagonisms when he ordered Americans into Cambodia American blood has stained the earth of Vietnam. I will not see that same blood wasted on pe soil of Cambodia. I for one will not waffle on this latest Nixon folly. No money for a war in Cam- badia. No American 'lives lost in a war in Cambodia. To this I pledge myself. And I hope that my colleagues will do simi- larly by voting for the Reid amendment. Mr. TAFT, Mr. Chairman, while I support the military procurement au- thorization bill providing for about $20 billion for military procurement for the next year, I hope we will be able to scale the expenditure level back in the appro- priation bill that will come later. In any event, the authorization bill for 1971, on whiph we are voting, is $400 million less than the authorization for last year. It Includes funds for the Safeguard system that believe is sound as a wholly de- fensive and deterrent weapon. Its devel- opment may well have been helpful in the progress to date at the SALT talks. believe that that weapon system, as well as the other military procurements authorized by the bill, are necessary in toclay'S world when the Russians con- tinue their buildup in strategic missiles and their Activities in support of trouble- makers such as the Arab nations. le I voted on a numbc'T of amend- WIlt4 tOda,y,, n9 final vote occurred on tile bill, and final action was deferred uco, 'Wednesday, May 6. The deferment curred "to permit the Cone res.s to study g?P-Psictent's message on Cambodia be- fore actir,ig on an amendment proposed by Congressman REID of New York, and an amendment to that amendment pro- posed by Congressin-an FINDLEY of Illi- nois. The Reid amendment would have prohibited the use of the funds being authorized for the purpose of introduc- tion of American ground troops into Laos, Thailand, or Cambodia. The Findley amendment to the Reid amendment added an exception to permit such use to the extent required to protect the lives of American troops still remaining in South Vietnam. It also would have re- quired a report by the President to the Congress on any shah finding. My own feeling is that no American ground troops should be introduced into Laos, Thailand, or Cambodia and cer- tainly it should not be done without the expressed authorization of Congress. However, the Findley amendment seemed to me to be consistent with inherent powers of the President, as to the defense of our forces and I, therefore, would have supplorted both the Reid amend- ment as amended by the Findley amend- ment. Mr. KOCH. Mr. Chairman, there is no question in my mind that President Nixon has neither the moral nor legal right to commit American military forces in Cambodia without the consent of Congress. The administration has now emharked on widening the war in Southeast Asia which will further delay the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam. President Nixon persists in the tragic il- lusion that military action rather than political settlement is the answer to the Indochina turmoil of the last 16 years. As I have said before on the floor of this House, the President's policy is simply the persistence of national pride beyond any political, economic, or moral justifi- cation. It is a policy that has cost the lives of almost 50,000 American young men. We must not let it continue. Let our policy be committed to saving lives rather than saving face. By ordering American military action in Cambodia this week, President Nixon has shown contempt for the overwhelm- ing desire of the American people to get our troops out of Southeast Asia. The President was elected to terminate our involvement, not complicate and deepen it. The democratic process is gravely threatened when any President inten- tionally ignores such a mandate. I will urge my constituents to make known their opposition to the President's Cambodian decision. It is their sons and their dollars that he uses without their consent or the consent of Congress. The American people know a tragic mistake has been made in Vietnam. It remains only for the Nixon administra- tion to accept once and for all that judg- ment. So let the Government be re- minded who is master and who is serv- ant. Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, the House deliberation today on the question of Introducing U.S. ground combat troops In Cambodia has taken us a giant step toward restoring the role of the Congress in foreign policy. I am opposed to the introduction of U.S. combat troops into Cambodia. I view the presence of American advisers and medical personnel with the South Vietnamese attack force invading Cam- bodia as extremely dangercius. To me, the Nixon doctrine clearly precludes sending in American troops, leaving open the question of tactical air support and logistical support. The memory, that advisers were only the forerunners of combat troops in the quagmire of Vietnam, is all too fresh. While the motions before the House would preclude only combat forces, I believe the Congress in the exercise of its responsibilities should be informed and its consent sought before even ad- visers are dispatched into foreign war zones. In all of this, Mr. Chairman, our at- tention continues to be diverted from other troubled areas of the world. In my opinion, the danger of confrontation with the Soviet Union and of full-scale war is in the Mediterranean. While we have concentrated on Vietnam, the Soviet Union has placed a major fleet in the Mediterranean and has developed bases in Egypt. There is evidence that the Middle East fighting is entering a new and dangerous phase with Egyptian troops, armed with the latest Russian equipment and backed by Russian tech- picians, carrying out a major offensive. New SAM missile systems have been de- ployed in Egypt, manned by Russian technicians. Today there are persistent reports of Soviet pilots flying Egyptian jets over Egypt. This is a very trying time for U.S. policymakers. But it seems clear to me that the interest of the United States in working toward a lessening of tension will not be served by our involvement in Cambodia. Our energies, on the other hand, should be directed toward a politi- cal settlement in Indochina and our at- tention directed to dangers of enlarged conflagration in the Middle East. Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Chairman, the ex- tension of the Vietnam war into Cam- bodia is most regrettable. This is espe- cially so since the undefined, open-ended policy of Vietnamization appears to in- clude a willingness to follow the South Vietnamese on a course of military adventurism. One wonders, with great concern, if, as we followed South Vietnam into Cam- bodia, we would also follow South Viet- nam on an invasion of the north, some- thing that has been advocated by Vice President Ky. Mr. FARBSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, the President in expanding the war in Vietnam into an Indochina war is pur- suing an illusionary dream. We have heard the "we can win the war if only we expand it" logic before, and each time it has turned out to have cruel and predictable consequences. The Pentagon told us in 1965 if only we committed American forces to Vietnam we could drive Ho Chi Minh out. When that did not succeed, we were told, if only we bombed the northern ports, it would de- stroy the spirit of the North Vietnamese and brink military victory. When we sent massive numbers of young Americans to Vietnam, it did not deter Ho Chi Minh, and when we began massive bombing of the north, it did not break the spirit of the enemy. Now the President has decided to ac- cept the advice of the military who say Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 Ail 30, 1970 Approved Fe EgediefsesinTe/iVcBlketp_Ph2ciles3?7 R00020021 0005-9 113757 an expansion of the war to Cambodia can bring military victory in Vietnam. I believe the President is wrong, both In terms of the situation and in terms of the legality of his move. This is the kinil of situation that can only get worse. The Chinese will not per- mit Hanoi to be defeated. If we escalate, they can do so more easily. We must get out; we must not widen this war. Under no circumstances can we permit this country to get into an Indochinese war. No amount of Presidential explanation can overcome this fact that we have sent our soldiers into Cambodia?call them advisers or whatever. From the legal standpoint, I believe the President has overstepped his au- thority. The Constitution requires the consent of the Congress to declare war. The President has not gotten nor even asked for this. To go into any nation, requires an In- vitation from the government. As far as I know, we have received no request from the Cambodian Government to invade its territory. The recently passed national commit- ments resolution supported py the ad- ministration required Presidential con- sultation with the legislative branch be- fore taking any new military action. And last year, the administration re- jected the Gulf of Tonkin resolution as legal justification for our presence in the area. We have no legal justification for being In Cambodia, This is a new war. We should get out right now. Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we could arrive at some reasonable limitation of time with respect to these amendments. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous con- sent that all debate on this amendment and all amendments thereto close at 5 o'clock. The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina? Mr. GIBBONS. I object, Mr. Chairman. Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that all debate on this amendment and all amendments thereto close at 10 minutes after 5. The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina? Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Chairman, I object. The CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard. MOTION ormaxp BY MR. RIVERS Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I move that all debate on this amendment and all amendments thereto terminate at 5;30 o'clock. The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from South Carolina. The motion was rejected. _ r/tRiAttAgzupx meonly Mr. 1OLgA,ND. Mr, ChairMan, a par- liamentary inquirx The CHAIRMAN, The gentleman will state it, lqr: BOLAND.' jr. chairman, is it in order to move that the CoMMittee do now rise? ? The, cumurAN. Yes; it is in order. ? MOTION OFFERED BY MR. BOLAND Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise. The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts. Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, on that I demand tellers. Tellers were ordered, and the Chair- man appointed as tellers Mr. BoLAND,and Mr. RIVERS. The Committee divided, and the tellers reported that there were?ayes 131, noes 100. So the motion was agreed to. Accordingly the, Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under considera- tion the bill (H.R. 17123) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1971 for procurement of aircraft, mis- siles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and other weapons, and re- search develepment, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve compo- nent of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon. COMMUNICATION FROM THE COM- MITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS - The $PE4kFIR laid before the House the following communication from the chairman of the Committee on Public Works, which was read and referred to the Committee on Appropriations: APRIL 24, 1970. The Hon. JOHN W. McCoameicK, speaker of the House, Washington, D.C. MY DEAR Mn. SPEAKER: Pursuant to the provisions of the Independent Offices and Department of Housing and *Urban Develop- nlent Appropriation Act, 1969, the House Committee on Public Works on April 23, 1970, approved the following lease prospectus re- visions: Area of Fresno, Calif., Treasury Depart- ment, Internal Revenue Service Automatic Data Processing Center Suffolk County, Long Island, N.Y., Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service Auto- matic Data Processing Center Memphis, Tenn., Treasury Department, In- ternal Revenue Service Automatic Data Proc- essing Center, with an amendment that the annual rental cost of the required space not exceed $7.00 per square ft., including service.. Sincerely yours, GEORGE H. FALLON, Chairman. PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY Mr. BURTON of California. Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry. The SPEAKER. The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry. Mr. BURTON of California. As I un- derstand, the armed services bill will not be further dealt with today. Is that the Chair's understanding? The SPEAKER. That is the under- standing of the Chair. Mr. BURTON of California. In that event, that will permit the country to tell the Congress whether or not they want us to vote in approval or disap- proval of widening the war in Southeast Asia. Am I correct in that, Mr. Speaker? The SPEAKER. The Chair will state that the Chair does not understand that to be a parliamentary inquiry. Mr. BURTON of California. I thank the Speaker. LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM FOR WEEK OF MAY 4 (Mr. GERALD R,. FORD asked and .was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.) Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker, I take this time for the purpose of ask- ing the distinguished majority leafier the program for the remainder of this week, If any, and the program for next week. Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield? Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma. Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, in re- sponse to the inquiry of the distinguish- ed minority leader, may I advise that after consulting with members of the committee and Members of the leader- ship on both sides, it is generally agreed, and we will act accordingly, that the military procurement bill, should go over until Wednesday next. That decision will vary the program that we had in- tended to announce. Members know that tomorrow is Law Day, and there are numerous Mem- bers?large numbers of Members?who have petitioned me that they have com- mitments which they have made in an- ticipation of being able to fulfill them. With that in mind, Mr. Speaker, we will ask to go over at the conclusion of busi- ness today. The business for next week is as follows: Monday is Consent Calendar day, and there are eight bills under suspension: H.R. 6951. To enact the interstate agreement on detainers into law; House Joint Resolution 546. To provide for commemoration of the 100th anni- versary of Yellowstone National Park; H.R. 16661. To authorize a maximum of $15,000 coverage under servicemen's group life insurance; H.R. 16739. To extend the authority to maintain Veterans' Administration offices in the Philippines; S. 856. To provide for participation in international expositions; H.R. 11628. To transfer the authority to purchase office equipment and furni- ture for the Library of Congress; ? H.R. 12619. To amend the act re- lating to the policing of the Library of Congress; Senate Joint Resolution 193. To pro- vide for the appointment of James E. Webb as Citizen Regent of the Smith- sonian Institution. Tuesday is Private Calendar day. Also on Tuesday we have H.R. 10138, Public Health Service commissioned officer re- tirement benefits, with an open rule and 1 hour of debate. Then for Wednesday and the balance of the week the continuation of H.R.. 17123, the Military Procurement Author- ization Act for 1971, also the second sup- Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 NEW YORK - esolution Urges a Proposal _ oratorium to soviet iie House Is Cool r .??????????????.,.4?,,t4,44.,4,,. w York reg Api? 9? e ejiateL?. upon ffixontodkv- to propoaf trtre viet,Vnion an imrnediate:sttt lot In--farther development defensIve stri- p...roma TINL Villmr- At" DATE 0 bved or Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-- ? - ea ens.. (PPP, ?L,4?1??1 Sa4111. ? 11.4 ecorninq n a Repu ican- ton adore/I" The re o on _sense of t e e -m .... resident IrsumTnirtil iraantive stage, are to be re- ed next Thursday in Vienna. At e Soviet devern- al. en, a private dinner last night, ' late sus 1tenTal 1 y A Kissinger, the Presi- States arlite' dent's national security adviser, ,varit rutton iid, how- ever, 'over whether the compre- hensive approach also contem- plated an interim moratorium on weapons deployment. Th committee headed jv -'' J. McCloy, consiSts of leading representtatives of busi- ness, labor and scientific ,pr-: tions as well as former merit officials. Several orils members have informed Republican Senators that they interpret their recommendatjpn as. including the moratorium apProach advocated today in th,e-fienate resolution. But this _ interAretation was disputed by other members of the commit- tee, who said they were not indorsing a moratorium. . White House officials today ere passing the word that the dministration was not pre- gared to accept such a mora- tprivin .as its opening propiisal fpr the resumption of the talks with the Soviet Union on the limitation of srategic arms. The talks, now entering the sub- Df the !ay.,: -*as reported to have offered principal objections to the all lpffensive nuclear s iW-nate proposal for a mutual tlite ?F to" i on weapons de- ms, subject' o ployment. en ication Of -oilier' " One was that such a step iservation ATV-Alfa -got the United States be appropVvilf trapped in an open-ended mora- some te. torhun that would be difficult ,mernbeirit tp terminate, even if there was lvisory cOmirtTie nosrogress in the arms-limita- -States Arms-tiki- dim talks. Second, Mr. Risen- te-r was said to have argued, Is "riot accurate the Unitted States must proceed The New 4row wsutioulsy in what are expected Senator Edmund S. Muskie, e ld retTarl- .Democrat of Maine, sought to a WeaponsWeE67 meet at least some part of these Ilium to the 160?-Afections today by propOSIng the initial "standstill" in ??? 4444"- ?iPpolutt ' 44444 ? staling _that to be protracte nego a ons. weapons deployment be limited ot Disclosed' rrhs. At the same t , ,,.,_ . . committee's report IS e the Maine Democrat, in a ate,' and committee milir ate speech, accused the Ad- .j4 to discuss furtlinistration of "massive am- angua ge of the rF e to ti in is aatt " , 't attitude toward S'c-"'n- ttguy 9 , - ?4=7- 4nia_Time Limit Asked to committee _Ina- 'In contrast to the Muskie 14'4 i-Ob-e-idexITT: i, the resolution adopt- , Was that the milted' Sls Araz oihne zatseugaescteesdnomtimorae_ Ould propose a comprehensive torrium on weapons deployment, agreement limiting state-41c :4tholitit Senator Edward W. WhIRMS. This would be in con: otthlfirmIctriake- of Massachusetts, the "with a.inore -ex rftfir sponsor, talked of a . -treene lasting months to two erli recommendation, lite% Mat 18VVITor Release 2007/03/ ithrient cOvertrig WtatiOria 'systems. I.C.) As Mr. Kissinger s comtnents indicated, this indefiniteness of the proposed moratorium is ex- pected to be a major point of Administration criticism of the risolution. On the technical level, objections also are ex? pt cted to be raised about the fteasbility of monitoring a halt it testing of multiple-missile Ata,rhgads which is contemplat- 1 in the Senate resolution. . The- resolution was adopted NstIth almost no opposition, al- though Senator John Stennis., chairman of the Senate Armed Sprvices Committee, objected at 6he point in the final debate teat the Senate was interfering With the negotiating preroga- tives of the President. Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, retorted that by means of the resolution the Senate was just reassert- * its constitutional right to advise the President, as it had done yesterday in rejecting the reme Court nomination of Harrold Carswell. ' The six Senators voting- attainst the resolution were jimes B. Allen, Democrat of Alabama; Henry L. Bellm.on, Republican of Oklahoma; Paul Fannin, Republican of Ari- zona; Barry Goldwater, Repub- lican of Arizona; Russell B. Long, Democrat of Louisiana, and Strom Thurmond, Republi- can of South Carolina. Idea Discussed by Nixon At a recent news conference, President Nixon dismissed the proposed resolution as "irrele- vant" since, he asserted, it merely stated the Administra- tion's objective of reaching an arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union. But through- out the Senate debate, the sponsors of the resolution argued that their purpose was to seize the psychological in- itiative by having the United States propose a morotorium on weapons deployment right at the outset of the resumed talks with the Russians. 'Without such a pause, they contended, the chances for a permanent agreement might be Inst as both sides continued deploying such weapons as niultiple-missile warheads and antiballistic missile systems. 'Now that the Senate has approved the resolution, the President finds himself caught between conflicting counsels as he decides unon the opening American position for the talks in Vienna. Mr. Kissinger and other Ad- rrrinistration officials are be- lieved to be urging a cautious "building block" approach in the talks, seeking agreement in certain areas, depending upon the Soviet reaction, rather than 64rotaittligR721i0013,7cROOD 2 0 0 21 0005-9 Atensive freeze on strategic Wirt#44114*,-- PAGE 200210hi90-9 W e he advisory committee of the Arms Control and Dig- armament Agency is urging the President to seek, a compre- hensive agreement, its recom- mendation is open to varyine frtteapretations on whether it also contemplates an immediate moratorium on weapons deploy- ment. ., -Though the Senate resolution ti riot binding upot 'Mr. Nixon. It teflects the preponderande of bipartisan opinion within the tipper chamber and thus can not be ignored by the President, who will ultimately have to re- turn to the Senate with any treaty agreed upon in the arms- limitation talks. The resolution was initially introduced by Senator Brooke, amended by Senator John Sherman Cooper. Republican of Kentucky, and then indorsed by the Senate Democratic Policy Committee. , In the resolution, the Senate, in effect, is telling the Presi- dent that he can count upon bipartisan support if he pro- poses a moratorium at the opening of the Vienna talks. Conversely, he faces the possi- bility of Senate criticism if he Ifails to take such an initiative it-the talks. April 7, 1970 of his unanimous-consent request those statements and to that type of business which is conducted prior to and during the period for the transaction of routine morning business which would not exceed 10 or 15 minutes, so that we would be protected in the event that some item of business at that point were to go on for, say, an hour or an hour and a half. Mr. MANSFIELD. That was under- stood. I do not want the Senate to get caught short again by having an un- objected to bill brought up in the morn- Mg hour and then have the rule of ger- ataneness apply. In my opinion, that is indefensible. It runs against the intent of the Senate. It violates the Pastore rule, It was for that reason that I offered the unanimous- consent request, that little bills to which there is no objection do not have the rule of germaneness apply, but that the germaneness rule will apply only after the morning hour and the laying down of the unfinished business. The PRESIDING OFFICER, Is there objection to the request of the majority leader? Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, re- seryin.g the right to object? Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the Senator from New Jersey yield for a brief comment? M. CASE. Mr. President, I yield first to the distinguished majority leader. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if there is any argument about the request, I will withdraw it. There are other ways by which I can accomplish its purpose. Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr, President, under the rule of germaneness I have not been able to make a statement on the floor for the better part of a week. Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is cor- rect. But he was coming in under theess rule of germanen when it actually ap- plied, not during the morning hour or routine morning business. Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, is It possible to ask unanimous consent to extend, the 3 minutes to say 10 minutes in the morning hour? Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes, indeed. Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, it was virtually impossible to get the floor during the debate on the Carswell nomi- nation. Approved For Release 2007/03/06: CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 5191 to Mr. MANSFIELD Mr. President, I withdraw it. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres- ident, I hope the majority leader will not withdraw the request. Mr. MANSFIELD Mr. President, I feel remiss at holding up the Senator from New Jersey. Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I did not know what the request was. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the request. The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK. The Senator from Montana (Mr. MANS- FIELD) asks unanimous consent that for the remainder of the second session of the 91st Congress, the Pastore rule of germaneness of debate shall not begin to run until the conclusion of routine morning business or until the unfinished business is laid before the Senate, whichever comes later. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, does the request that was just read include the modification that the Senator from West Virginia proposed? Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct. I have so asked that the modification of the Senator from West Virginia be in- cluded. Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, may. I have the modification restated? Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Presi- dent, if I might restate it-- Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if this goes on for 1 additional minute, I withdraw it. It is too picayune a matter. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Montana renew his re- quest? Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ob- ject. I withdraw it. The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is objection. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I would have no objection. Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, has the minority leader been consulted? Mr. MANSFIELD Yes. The Senator is In full accord with this, because he un- derstands the rule of germaneness. Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, the Sen- ator from Iowa did not know that If the-minority leader has indicated that he has no objection, I have no objection. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I dis- e it with the Minority leader as well as the understanding of the inter- pretation placed on it by the Senator from West Virginia. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the majority leader renew his request? Wiz. MANSFIELD. Yes. Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I do not be- lieve I know what the request is. side mistrusts OPPOSITION TO USE OF SAFEGUARD ABM EXPANSION AS A "BARGAIN- -11TG-CPOUNTER" IN SALT NEGOTIA- TIONS , Mr. CASE. Mr. President, two decades of the greatest arms race the world has ever seen have brought the Soviet Union and the United States to the realization that neither country can or will permit the other to achieve a P permanent advantage in nuclear capa- bility. Both nations understand that the nuclear weapons deployed by each deny d the other the opportunity of launching n a surprise attack without being destroyed e in return. They have come to realize that e this rough parity is in the interest of each country to preserve. That, of t course, is the reason we have been able to g enter into the strategic arms limitation w talks. a Maintenance of this parity is both the aim and the condition of effective arms c limitation. By effective, I mean limitation fr which will be observed because neither w side feels disadvantaged by it. Effective a arms limitation will lessen tensions and p permit the allocation of resources to B more productive purposes. glf Conversely, an agreement which either other side gains an advantage is ob- viously worthless. The nation that be- lieves it is disadvantaged will be more determined than ever to "catch up," setting off another round of arms escala- don and thereby increasing tensions once more. But, like all simple truths, this hard- won knowledge which has brought us to Vienna is elusive. It must constantly be restated. Too readily can it be lost in the mechanics of bargaining, tactics, and countertactics. Too easily can each side slip back into the mistaken view of the other side as an opponent to be coerced or outwitted. There is some evidence that this cor- rosive process may already be underway. In recent weeks, a disturbing argument has been resurrected to justify further expansion of the Safeguard Anti-Ballis- tic Missile system, an argument which can endanger the very mutual interest and confidence which is vital to success- ful negotiations. It is privately urged, though seldom publicly stated, that Safe- guard expansion must be approved so that it can serve as a "bargaining coun- ter" by the United States in the SALT talks. The suggestion is that congressional approval of the proposed Safeguard ex- pansion is necessary in order to con- vince the Soviet Union of a fact of which I think they are well aware?that we, the United States, can and will match them in another arms race if they do not cooperate at Vienna. I believe that the Congress and the American people should be told in clear terms whether or not the executive branch is requesting the expansion of Safeguard as a negotiating counter in Vienna. I, for one, will not believe this unless I am forced to. Certainly it is clear that our negotiators at these talks, the Arms Con- trol and Disarmament Agency, do not hold this view. For understandable reasons, Mr. Ge- rard Smith, head of this Agency, felt he could not respond directly to my question on this point in recent Foreign Relations Committee hearings. But he did say: I do not think that the United States should start new programs Just for the sake of trying to establish additional bargaining ower. I think there is plenty of bargaining ower on our side with our present on-going rograms. . . . The hard advice of those who have ealt with the Soviet Union across the egotiating table is as direct and un- quivocal as it is realistic in view of our xperience. Again, Mr. Gerard Smith: For two nations who are grappling with he immense problem of controlling strate- ic arms, it probably is more likely that there ill be some sort of arrangement if the sides re more nearly alike in strategic forces. This mutuality of interest in, and the onfidence of both sides which comes om, the existing parity in strategic eapons are the condition for successful fans limitation talks. Moreover, their reservation is the goal of such talks. oth are endangered by the use of Safe- ard expansion as a bargaining counter. If Safeguard is approved and if it turns ut that the SALT taw are .stretched because it believes the o Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 S 5192 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE April 7, 1970 out over a period of years, then this We all are aware that what followed country will have on its hands a bur- this bold initiative was one of the most geoning ABM system, one to which the important breakthroughs in American- Soviets would have to respond on the Soviet relations since World War II. possible chance that it might prove ef- Within 5 days of the President's fective. By our actions we will have guar- speech, Chairman Khrushchev had wel- anteed the very continuing Soviet SS-9 corned the proposal and further had or- deployment which we are seeking to halt, dered a halt in the production of So- a deployment which, according to Sec- viet strategic bombers. Within a month, retary La,ird, Safeguard could not defend negotiations were underway on the nu- us against, clear test ban treaty. Then, on August There is already some evidence that 5, 1963-8 weeks to the day following this "bargaining counter" approach may the President's speech?the treaty was be feeding Russian suspicions and in- signed. It never has beeli, broken. spiring fundamental uncertainty regard- This initiative did not originate in any lug the U.S. intentions toward the SALT wishful view of Soviet good will or out talks, of any expectation of a sudden revolif- As pointed out by Dr. Shulman of tion in human nature. But the President Columbia University, the Soviet press re- did warn the American people not to cently has been posing two basic ques- look upon communication with the So- tions: viet Union "as nothing more than an First. Is the United States really pre- exchange of threats." And, as he noted, pared to accept approximate strategic even the most hostile nations can be parity as a basis for negotiations? relied upon to keep those agreements Second. What is the meaning of Amer- which are in their own interest. ican moves to deploy MIRV, expand Safe- Mr. President, I emphasize that again guard, develop a new strategic bomber? because it is the basis of all international We can be certain that this Soviet relations: The recognition that nations puzzlement to some extent is put on for act and will always act in their own in- r benefit terest; that the problem in dealing be- in its original form had been cosponsored by some 45 Members of the Senate. Mr. President, I would like to add this observation. We shall be dealing in this body at considerable length somewhat later in this session on the justifications offered by the administration and the Department of Defense for the expansion of the Safeguard anti-ballistic-missile system. Of course, the major justifica- tions were three: The defense of our missile sites, protection against the so- called Chinese threat, and protection against stray or accidental missiles which might be fired and which might have devastating effect in a particular locality. Many questions will be presented as to the effectiveness of the Safeguard sys- tem from the standpoint of its tech- nology. I have not attempted to go into these questions in this talk, since such technical issues must be gone into at length at the proper time. But at this time I did want to bring out into the open and express my own belief that any further justification? apart from the technical question, apart from the question of the necessity of Safeguard as a weapons system?does ou not have a sound basis in fact, and, in But we also can be certain--if the long tween countries and among nations is fact, would be counterproductive; name- years of the cold war have taught us anyt based upon the recognition by each of ly, the argument that we need it as a thing?that at least some among the them that the other will act in this bargaining counter for the SALT talks in Vienna I think this argument is Soviet leadership can be expected to place the worst possible construction on our actions. They will seize upon the fact of Safeguard expansion, if we do go ahead with it, as an immediate threat to be responded to. All they will want to knew is whether this so-called bargain- ing counter shoots missiles. Sepculation about American motives they will leave to the philosophers. Vastly more direct and constructive is the proposM of Senate Resolution 211 that: First, prompt negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union to seek agreed limitation of both offen- sive and defensive strategic weapons should be urgently pursued; and second, the President should propose to the So- viet Union an immediate mutual suspen- sion of the further deployment of all offensive and defensive nuclear strategic . weapons systems, subject to national verification and other inspection meas- ures as may be appropriate. The Soviet Union well may consider such a freeze in their interest. Instead of confronting the Soviet Union with Safeguard expansion and letting them figure out what we are really up to, the United States should, in Prof. Roger Fisher's words, present the Soviets with a "yesable proposition," sernething to which they have only to agree. That, of course, was the intent and spirit of the resolution which I offered last summer calling upon the President to suspend flight tests of multiple reentry vehicles for so long as the Soviet Union does the same. Almost 7 years ago, President John F. Kennedy confronted the Soviet Union with a sinlijar, proposition, saying: manner; and that the problem is to things on which agreement can be wholly without a sound basis, and even reached, things which are in the interest to urge it could present an added dif - of all nations concerned?in this partic- ficulty to the success of the SALT nego- ular case, in the interest of both Russia tiations. and the United States. Any other agree- I yield the floor. ment between two nations which is not Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, the able based on the recognition of this prin- Senator from New Jersey (Mr. CASE) has. ciple cannot be relied upon at all for made another of his incisive contribu- the future. tions to this vital debate. I wish to em- The results of President Kennedy's in- phasize one of the points he makes; itiative, which reflected this principle, are namely, his reference to the character of every day with us in the decreased levels Soviet discussions of SALT and arms of atmospheric radioactivity and in the control prospects in general. health of our children. It has long been common for some U.S. The lesson is clear. . observers to suggest that the Soviets were not interested in a general freeze Of course there is no prospect that a on strategic weapons. In particular, some sweeping, permanent freeze on the de- spokesmen in and out of the T.J.S. Gov- ployment of all strategic nuclear weap- ernment have implied that the Soviets ons, or even of any single major weapon were not interested in or concerned system, can be quickly and easily agreed about MIRV technology and would not upon at SALT. But precisely because the agree to a limit on ABM systems. SALT negotiations undoubtedly will be I believe any such conclusions are lengthy and involved, it is vital that the plainly unfounded. We do not yet know present rough strategic parity between what the Soviets may be willing to ac- the Soviet Union and the United States be cept and will not find out until firm frozen at its present level while these proposals have been thrashed out. That negotiations take place. is why it is so essential for the United To present the Soviet Union with a States to advance a concrete, compre- specific, "yesable" proposition designed hensive plan when the SALT talks re- to buy time for these negotiations is no sume in Vienna. confession of weakness. /t is a prudent Much has been made in the West of a recognition of our mutual interests and comment by Premier Kosygin some years of the realities of modern technology, ago indicating that defensive weapons The present mutuality of interest be- were not destabilizing and apparently tween the United States and the Soviet suggesting that they should not be sub- Union must not be endangered in the ject to the same controls as those pro- effort to achieve what could not be even posed over offensive weapons. But I think a temporary advantage of bargaining it is now clear that the Premier's re- position, one which could only inspire un- marks were not read in context and were certainty and suspicion imperiling the given exaggerated weight. As a current SALT talks themselves, article in the Soviet periodical, Twentieth I urge that the Senate overwhelmingly Century and Peace, reveals, only 3 days I now declare that the United States does not propose to conduct nuclear tests approve Senate Resolution 211 as it was after Kosygin's famous remark in a Len- in thq atmosphere so long as other states unanimously reported out by the Senate don press conference, Pravda offered an do not do so. Foreign Relations Committee and which explicit corrective, stating: Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 April 7, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE S 5193 The Soviet Government is ready to nego- tiate the problem of prohibition of further armament race both in the field of offensive as well as defensive weapons, Indeed, the authoritative chairman of the Soviet Academy of Sciences Com- mittee on the Scientific Problems of Dis- armament, Prof. V. S. Errielianov has re- peatedly underscored this receptivity to controls over both offensive and defen- sive weapons. Emelianov has stated that? The salvation from the dangers which face the peoples of our planet in connection with the creation of modern weapons, should be sought not in the creation of illusory means of defense, but rather in the annihilation of the very source of the dangers--the nuclear weapons. There is good reason to believe that the Soviet Government is divided on some of these issues, as the U.S. Govern- ment has always been. But it would be incorrect to approach the SALT nego- tiations on the assumption that the old myths of Soviet disinterest in limits on both offensive and defensive weapons will apply. The situation is different from past arms negOtiations and the prospects are more hopeful, if we but realize the opportunity for mutual restraint. The fluidity of Soviet attitudes, though marked by caution as are our own, is a fact we should recognize. Helsinki has been followed, for example, by a number of quiet Soviet feelers which appear to be inviting a proposal such as that contem- plated in Senate Resolution 211. It is to help President Nixon seize this great opportunity for turning the arms competition into more secure.chan- neis that the supporters of this resolu- tion believe the Senate's opinion should be expressed in this manner. If the So- viets do not prove receptive to the rec- ommended suspension of deployments of both offensive and defensive weapons, there will be ample opportunity there- after to explore more limited arrange- ments. Once again I commend the distin- guished Senator from New Jersey for his enlightened and constant efforts to ad- vance this great cause. ORDER OF BUSINESS Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I May pro- ceed for not to exceed 10 minutes. The PRESIDING OlorICER. Is there objection? Without objection, the Sena- tor from Arizona is recognized i'or not to exceed 10 minutes. NEW EVIDVICE SUPPORTS JUDGE CARSWPILL Mr. GOLDWATER, Mr. President, the debate on Judge Carswell has greatly interested me because of figures which have been used which just have not Sounded reasonable to me non/awyer. Questions kited of judges in other courts, who are friends of mine, have verified my misgivings and research by My staff has backed this up, am able to releaSe today the results of a study which proves beyond any doubt that Judge Carswell is eminently well suited for a position on the Supreme Court bench. This study is the first complete anal- ysis that has been made of Judge Cars- well's decisions while he was sitting as an appellate judge. It clearly reveals two previously overlooked facts which are highly pertinent to Judge Carswell's qualifications. First, the study discloses that the nominee holds the special distinction of having been assigned, while he was a dis- trict judge, to sit with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in no less than 54 dif- ferent cases. What is more, his record in these cases gives him an average of 93 percent as an appellate judge. In other words, his deci- sions and opinions as a visiting judge on the circuit court have prevailed 93 per- cent of the time. When his record of 54 cases as a visit- ing appellate judge is added to the mini- mum of 100 decisions which he has joined in since coming to the higher court, it becomes clear that his judicial record on the Court, of Appeals is over 50 percent more extensive than the number, of his published decisions from the district court. This means that his critics have built their attack against Judge Carswell based on much less than half of his total record. Mr. President, this new data provides convincing evidence of the high esteem - with which Judge Carswell is held in the Fifth Circuit. It is an unusual tribute for any district judge to be chosen so many times to sit with circuit judges in the decision of appellate cases. Of particular interest is the fact that none other than Chief Judge Tuttle, who headed the Fifth Circuit, picked out Judge Carswell time after time to be a member of the same review panel of which he, Judge Tuttle, was a member. Judge Carswell sat together with Judge Tuttle on at least 25 different occasions. This certainly gives a true picture of the high regard and great confidence which Chief Judge Tuttle had for the creden- tials and skills of Judge Carswell. It clearly gives renewed meaning to the let- ter of endorsement which Judge Tuttle had written on behalf of Judge Carswell. Mr. President, throughout this debate, I have noticed an unusual preoccupa- tion by Judge Carswell's opponents with various sets of statistics compiled by law students. I hope they will give equal con- sideration to the striking new data that I have released today. This evidence, going as it does to Judge Carswell's performance as an appellate judge, is much more pertinent than the incomplete and misleading statistics which the critics have been using. His detractors have ignored the total of 4,500 cases which Judge Carswell has handled as a district judge and have focused only on those cases which were appealed. There is no question that this is a greatly distorted method of examin- ing the nominee's credentials. It gives no weight at all to the vast majority of cases which Judge Carswell handled so well that there was no ground for appeal. Also, it completely ignores the setting of each decision. It hides such important considerations as whether or not new law was handed down by the higher courts after the lower court decision. For example, many of Judge Carswell's critics have pointed to two school de- segregation cases of his which were reversed by the fifth circuit court of appeals. These are supposed to demon- trate that Judge Carswell is hostile to civil rights. What his detractors neglected to tell us, however, was that 11 other district judges in the fifth circuit were reversed by the same higher court ruling. And someone forgot to mention that Judge Carswell himself voted to reverse 11 of these cases-419 F.2d 1211. He was in complete agreement with his fellow judges that an intervening Supreme Court case required swifter school de- segregation in the fifth circuit. In fact, Mr. President, the statistics used by the opponents are not even ac- curate. They have accepted data pre- pared by law students without making an examination on their own. My office has discovered five cases of Judge Cars- well's that were affirmed by the circuit court, but overlooked by his critics- 293 F.2d 261, 337 F.2d 753, 341 F.2d 351? two cases, 21107 and 21111-399 F.2d 93, and 420 F.4160. Who knows how many more they may have omitted before arriving at their misleading statistic? Mr. President, the school integration decision I have cited is not the only one which demonstrated the nominee's con- cern with human rights. The study which I have initiated has uncovered 11 aditional decisions that are without any question procivil rights- 353 F.2d 585; 415 F.2d 325 and 1377; 417 F.2d 838, 845, and 848; 418 F.2d 549 and 560; and 420 F.2d 379, 527, and 690. Mr. President, the opponents could have discovered this for themselves. It should not be necessary for a Senator who is not a lawyer to have to seek out these hidden facts. In the face of this balanced record, the minority report on the nomination of Judge Carswell makes the unqualified charge that the nomi- nee's supporters can find no activities to show "his commitment to equal rights." Now each of my colleagues who signed this report is a lawyer. With all due re- spect, I must suggest to my colleagues that if I, who am not a lawyer, can turn up 10 or 11 decisions solidly backing minority rights then surely they can do even better. This same failure to do their home- work has marked the testimony and speeches of nearly every one of Judge Carswell's critics. As another example, I might refer to Dean Pollak, who is nor- mally well prepared. And yet he appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee to express his con- cern about Judge Carswell when he had merely read some of his district court opinions _covering a period of 5 years. This is 5 years out of an 11-year span on the lower court. To top it all off, Dean Pollak admitted that he had only spent the Saturday evening and Sunday morning previous to his testimony running through these Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9 S 5194 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE April 7, cases. He did not study any of Judge Carswell's Circuit Court cases at all. Now, I really must ask?is this fair? Can Senators trenly reach a reasoned de- cision on the basis of opinions volun- teered by individuals who have failed to review the whole record? Or have we been fed a bunch of snap reactions founded solely on emotional judgments? Mr. President, the study I have under- taken reveals 54 decisions in which Judge Carswell joined while he sat as a Visiting judge on the Fifth Circuit bench and at least, another 100 in which he participated after he became a circuit judge. In fact, I have come across seven opin- ions which Judge Carswell himself wrote during the years he sat as a visiting Judge on the higher court and another 16 which he has written since becoming an appellate Judge. In all, his decisions from the appellate bench total over 150. This is half again as large as his printed decisions as a district judge. In other words, his op- ponents have ignored more than half of Judge Carswell's judicial record in reaching their position. To my mind, anyone who is actually seeking the truth of the matter will ex- amine each of these cases before jump- ing to the conclusion that judge Cars- well is not fit for the Supreme Court. In my opinion, his complete career leaves no doubt that Judge Carswell is a highly capable individual and a skilled jurist. His record is a balanced one. His de- cisions prove that he has often voted on the side of human rights. His testimony before the Senate com- mittee rings out with expressions of deep concern and knowledge about human problems. There is no sound reason for opposing his nomination. Judge Carswell is extremely well qual- ified to serve as a member of the Su- preme Court. I shall support his nomi- nation 100 percent. Mr. President, at this point, I ask unanimous consent to insert in the REC- ORD a table of citations which will verify the findings have released. There being no objection, the citations were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: STUDY OF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE CARSWELL'S RECORD OF DECISIONS AS AN APPELLATE JUDGE An analysis of every Fifth Circuit appel- late decision published in the Federal Re- porter, Second Series, beginning with 19 59 cases and continuing into 1969 cases, reveals that District Judge Ilarrold Cars cell has been assigned to sit on the higher court bench as a visiting judge on at least fifty-four occa- sions. Chief Judge Tuttle participated as a mem- ber of the mile appellate court as Judge Carswell in twenty-five of these cases. Only three of the fifty-four decisions were reversed by the Supreme Court. One was vacated, In all, the decisions In which Judge Cars- Federal Reporter, 2d series well Joined have prevailed as sound law in Volume: 92.6 percent of the cases. This data clearly establishes the creden- tials of Judge Carswell to sit as an highly competent member of any higher court. It definitely proves his capacity and experience to serve as an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court. The list of decisions in which Judge Cars- well participated on the appellate bench, while he was a District Judge, is as follows: Federal Reporter-2d series Volume: Page 286 46 286 72 266 742 287 252 287 623 301 630 304 304 304 305 305 307 307 307 308 309 809 310 310_ 310 310 310 310 311 311 311 311 312 312 313 813 314 317 340 340 340 ? 351 351 351 351 351 351 351 351 351 351 351 351 352 352 353 353 355 364 1 876 881 158 934 790 802 894 724 1 397 11 53 66 77 82 328 291 '429 3437 3438 134 207 187 3 85 295 707 1 708 2 708 278 304 384 455 456 468 470 489 609 611 671 'p52 69 76 485 585 2 543 1 829 First case. 'Second case. 'Subsequently reversed. Subsequently vacated. An analysis of Fifth Circuit appellate deci- sions published in the Federal Reporter, sec- ond series, from volumes 415 through 420, discloses, at least, 10i decisions which Judge Carswell has joined in since he became a judge on the court of appeals. The decisions include cases in which Judge Carswell wrote the court's opinions. These cases are as follows: 1970 Page 415 325 415 743 415 766 415 773 415 1 1007 415 1012 415 1017 415 1115 415 1129 415 21377 416 10 416 18 416 379 416 407 416 412 416 441 416 451 416 914 416 917 416 949 416 968 416 2972 416 1042 416 1077 416 1235 416 1246 416 '1257 416 1332 416 1333 417 94 417 135 417 198 417 218 417 296 417 303 417 329 417 518 417 628 417 629 417 633 417 838 417 845 417 848 417 1042 417 1134 418 134 418 '238 18 306 48 405 41 417 41 441 418 206 418 275 418 439 418- 482 418 1093 418 560 418 549 418 847 418 849 41 873 41 1112 48 1 1250 8 1305 419 10 419 30 419 91 419 122 419 152 419 223 419 381 419 128 419 149 419 1209 419 384 419 572 419 (11 cases) 1211 419 1806 419 1310 419 1312 419 1325 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9