C.I.A. SAYS LON NOL SOLD REDS RICE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72-00337R000200230001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 30, 1970
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release h'1-M414&i4'-RDP72-00337R000200230001-1
S 0 MAY 1970
C. LA. Says Lon Nol Sold Reds Rice
#+p:cinl to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, May 29- General Lon Nol held when
A report of the Central In- he was engaged in the re-
telligence Agency a serts ported transactions with the
that Premier Lon Nol o p
SfC- "
Vietcong. Ile was made com- '
odic, who led the ous or o
nnorodom Sihanouk 'as mander in chief of the armed
Chief of State in March, sold forces in 1960, Deputy Pre-
rice to the Vietcong on scv mier in 1963 and Premier in
eral occasions a few years 19GG~
ago. There have also been fro.
Reliable sources say that qucnt reports from -intelli-
an intelligence document pre- gence sources and Cambo-
pared to inform high Ameri- 'dian officials that members
can officials on Cambodia of Prince Sihanouk's family,
reports that General Lon Nol, including his wife, Monique,
who is now anti-Coriimunist, were heavily involved in
sold the rice at a time when smuggling operations.. This
Cambodia was formally neu- is thought to have been one
tralist and, at the same time, of the factors that caused'
was allowing the North Viet- dissatisfaction against ' the
namese to use her territory Prince and led to the coup
as a staging area for attacks d'ktat in which he was
on American and South Viet-
namese forces in Vietnam. While ? confirming the re-
The C.I.A. report,, appar- port about General Lon No],
ently prepared in 1967, said some sources pointed out
that Vietcong representatives that since Cambodia was
stopped buying from the Gen- neutralist at the time, there
eral when they came to dis- was nothing illegal in his
trust him. It did not ' say actions. One official added:
what had prompted the dis- "You have to put this in the
trust. Asian context. These are
The sources could not say pragmatic people, this Is a
what Government position pragmatic guy.
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200230001-1
 NEW YORK TIMES DATE V 4) %
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RD - 0200230001-1
Reported Recruiting
Cambodian? in Vietnam
By .1 ALPH BLUMENTTHAL
*edfa to lt'l%e N6VYA Timis
SAIGON, South Vietnam, May for operations inside Cambodia
27--American soldiers were re- several years ago.
of ted day to` be recruiting Of the 230 ethnic Cambodians
I5 . , _ __ i~ recruited last week in Vinhbinh,
ethnic GamI,odian residentsof about 200 were described as
the, Mekong delta for fighting members of Khmer Serai or
Cambodia.
sympathizers.
;Col-1~"ip'hard W. Ellison, senior According to Colonel Ellison,
```Arlierican adviser in Vinhbinh who along with the Vinhbinh
`-Province, said that Special province chief, Col. Ton That
orc soldiers in the company Dong, was interviewed at the
f "ahead of the fthmer Serai" Cantho Airport, Colonel Dong
d.-the Cambodian rightist move- vas startled to hear last week
tllent-recruited and "shipped that Green Berets and "a head
#iits' 230 Cambodian militiamen of the Khmer Serai" were re-
',last week. cruiting at camps of the Re-
He said, however, 'that the gional and Popular Forces.
'.drive in his province came to Colonel Dong immediately
'"a screeching halt" when the sent a message to the chief mili-
`,`5outh Vietnamese province chief tary adviser of President Thieu
-`cottiplained to President Ngu- asking whether the recruiters
`i'"yett Van Thieu that the re- had any authority. The drive
confirmed the account and ac self ordered the recruitment
knowledged that the drive was drive.
'cruiting had been going on was stopped'the next day al-
;, i thout, his knowledge, though some sources reported
tinder way in other delta prov-
inces with large Cambodian
populations, but they declined
to provide extensive details.
One said that the matter was
"classified" and "in the hands
of the - green berets;" or Spe-
prince Norodom'M'6fiouk when
he was Cambodia`n""Cfiter-
`Bad Moral Effect'
Colonel Dong said his con-
cern over seeking members for
Civilian Irregular Defense
Groups - the term used for
United States-led mercenary
soldiers - among the Regional
and Popular Forces was based
on "the bad moral effect of
the money offer." He did not
name the amount, but it is be-
lieved to be many times more
than the $30 a month that
members of the Regional Forces
earn.
Colonel Dong said he did not
raise anj objection to orders
from the Government "but I
just expressed my concern over
how'to carry out orders wisely
and logically."
He called the recruiting "il-
logical."
"Fighting on the border and
in Cambodia is the responsibil-
ity of the South Vietnamese
army," he said, "and defend-
ing the province is the job of
Regional and Popular Forces.
So if the Regional and Popular
Forces are pulled out of my
province, how can t defend the
province?
There was no official esti-
mate available of the number,
of ethnic Cambodians whohave?
been accepted for special train-
ing or already sent into Cam-
bodia. Early in May, about 2,-
000 were reported sent there,
but under Cambodian leader-
--reported presence
of Khmer Serai with the Special
Forces in Vinhbinh was the
first recent indication that the
Green Berets were again work-
involvement of the Special
Forces leaves open the possi-
bility that they could command
the recruited Cambodian forces
as 'they are commanding similar
mercenary troops now in South
Vietnam and Laos. There was
no information available on
who was paying the newly re-
crulted Cambodians;
The recruitment camj5algn
appears to be an'aspect of an
effort reported earlier to sign
up some of the 600,000 ethnic
Cambodians in South Vietnam
for military service In Cam-
ernm as had requested of, the
.,rnmen1 4uested s
South Vietnamese.
However, -the ' In1lications
#hen were that the Cambodians
would be integrated into the
Cambodian armed forces. The
600,000 Men Sought
PAGE- ~
ApprovedeF6r less e2 "'Ilia -R 200230001-1
 1970 CQNGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
,
May 28
fulfilllg their own responsibilities as Mem-
bers of Congress in this area of war-making.
Mr. McKAY. I think we're all in agreement
on that.
Mr. CIOAYES. I think it is important to say
that is true, regardless of whether you think
the President was within his authority of
going in, even if you think he wasn't within
his authority of going in, you still have the
Constitutional power to stop him now. -
Senator KENNEDY. Let me ask one final
question: In terms of the Church-Cooper
Amendment, if that were to pass, what kind
of restrictions do you think that places upon
the President in terms of any future activi-
ties and expansion back into Cambodia under
his stated reasons for the protection of Amer-
ican lives? Do you feel that it serves as a
sufficient kind of restrictions upon his ac-
tivity for future Cambodian ventures, even
within his so-called declaration that it is
essential and necessary for the protection of
American lives?
Mr. MCKAY. Speaking only for myself, it
is an important restriction, and here Senator
Fulbright is right, it would have a political
impact. But it is not in my judgment, as
great a restriction as might be ultimately
desirable.
Senator KENNEDY. Say it passes. If it is en-
acted, does that bar the President in. the
future from going on into Cambodia, or will
he be able to say the Senate has acted but
still the action in Cambodia is for the pro-
tection of American lives and, therefore, I
feel no compulsion not to move?
Mr. MCt AY. As I read the amendment, it
is clearly designed to say he would no longer
have that power.
Mr. DE WIND. I think the question goes to
the heart of our Constitutional arrangement.
This is a sweeping declaration of Congres-
sional viewpoint. And if the President follows
the dictates of history, he would observe it.
Our tradition has been that there is a
response to this sort of thing, but if a Presi-
dent is determined to seek a confrontation of
Constitutional power, there is no very :satis-
factory way of testing; the Constitution
doesn't provide for it; you can't take it as a
practical matter to court, I think, and one
must ultimately rely on our Constitutional
system having built into it that kind of ac-
commo?dation and restraint that makes it
work, and all you can say that history indi-
cates'that Presidents faced with this kind
of thing do back down and I see no reason
to conclude at this point that our present
administration would, be any different.
Senator SAXBE. I can't help fear we are
tying a lot of legal nicities here that are
proper, and as a lawyer who was actively
General, I recognize that most of these things
that we are discussing are the real meat of
our Constitution. But I think that we have
an area where the will is much more impor-
tant, perhaps, than the substance of what
we are talking about.
Now, the will of Congress to enter this
area has to be very determined today, be-
cause Congress itself has not exercised the
powers that they now have under the Con-
stitution, and they can die, and many have
died or withered, anyway, from disuse.
Now, If Congress exerts this will, then I
believe that .the Constitution will become
alive dn; these various areas. This is 'where
we must work and the people that come in,
the lawyers who represent, and others say
what can we do?
One of the big questions is: How deter-
mined is this_gffort? Will it die in two weeks?
Will they go back to the routine business
as usual? Will the students go back home
this summer or will this interest. continue?
I, personally, am not convinced, because
we had a crisis in ecology three weeks ago;
we' had a crisis in something else before that.
Now, I feel that the only way Congress
can assert its will is to cut off the money,
because this is one thing where we definitely
have not given up this power. If we cut off
And I am prepared to vote for a 25 percent
reduction in all defense spending, if it will
curb thfs runaway bureaucracy, but this is
where Congress has to assert itself.
You know the story of Richard the Second.
I certainly don't recommend what happened
after his funds were cut off. But the power
of the purse strings goes back to 1350 when
that happened under the English concept,
and I certainly feel that it exists today just
as powerful as it ever was.
Mr. DEWIND. Justice Jackson in 1951 put
it very succinctly: "While Congress cannot
deprive the President of the command of
the Army and Navy, only Congress can pro-
vide him with an Army and Navy he may
command."
Mr. BICKEL. I want to make a point about
the language of the Cooper-Church Resolu-
tion. I don't think that it deprives the Presi-
dent of the power in an emergency situation
where he has to react to attack, to go into
Cambodia and protect in combat as he sees
it, American troops. All it prevents him from
doing is going into Cambodia and engaging
in combat activity in support of Cambodian
troops. It does not prevent a reactive decision
on his part to defend the threat of attack
or react to an attack on American forces in
Vietnam, and that is one reason I don't
think this job is complete until you get to
the McGovern Resolution, of course, though
I favor this one.
Senator KENNEDY. Gentlemen, I want to
thank all of you very much. I want to extend
the thanks of the offices of Senator Pearson
and myself and my colleagues who have been
able to come this morning, for your discus-
sion and your comments and insight into
some of these most complex and difficult
questions.
I think this has been extremely construc-
tive and positive and enormously useful. I
know it has been to me and I know it will
be to the other members in the Senate who
will have access to the transcript, and I want
to thank you and the people that you repre-
sent for your attendance here.
(Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m. the meet-
ing was adjourned.)
CBS TELEVISION COMMENTARY ON
NOMINATION OF JUDGE CARS-
WELL
Mr. LE. Mr. President, lest anyone
get the I a I a going out of my way to
pick on t Col bia Broadcasting Sys-
tem, let m set im straight.
Once in 'le CBS does something
that offers e ouragement to those of us
who see unb' ed media as the hope of
On April 10, I rote to CBS and asked
them to in icate ho had appeared on
CBS netw k telev ion for and against
Aceordi gly, I received a reply that
indicates that CBS had 24 Senators on
behalf o Judge Carswell and 24 opposed
I must say that one could not ask for
fairer treatment, unless one goes so far
as to ask that the commentators observe
the same balance in inflection, lifted eye-
brow, and choice of adjectives.
I ask unanimous consent to have
printed in the RECORD the list of pro- and
anti-Carswell Senators who appeared on
CBS television between January 19 and
April 8, according to CBS President
Frank Stanton.
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 CIA-RDP72--00337R000200230001-1
S 7975
There being no objection, the list was
ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
Scott'______________
Eastland'___________
Scott'-------------- J
Ervin'-------------- J
Hruska'__________Irr 2
Eastland'_________6
Griffin r____6
Hruska'1
Hruska'________-6
Thurmond'------- 0
Scott'___________ 2
Bayhs------------- Feb. 17
Bayha------------- Mar. 11
Case 2-------------- Mar. 13
Bayh'------------- Mar. 16
Bayh r------------- Mar. 20
Tydings'__--------- Mar. 25
Packwood'- ________ Mar. 25
Fulbright'---------- Mar. 26
Hatfield'___________ Mar. 26
Hruska'______ _____ M r. 26
Spons I ------------ Apr. 1
Cranston 2__________ Apr. 3
Saxbe'_____ ___ A r.-I
Hart'___ ___________ Apr. 3
Griffin r___
A
3
Fong' -------------- Apr. 5
Gurney'__ --------- A .
5
Tydings'----------- Apr. 5
Gurney 6_ ___r______ AP
5;
Dodd 3------------- Apr. 5
Apr
5
'
Prout
Dominick'---------- Apr:
.
------------
y
Tydings ______ Apr. 5
Griffin'_____________ Apr.
T dings'----------- Apr. 6
Gurney'____________ Apr.
Brooke'__________ Apr. 6
Hruska'____________ Apr.
Bayh'------------- Apr. 7
' The Evening News with Walter Cronkite.
' The Morning News with Joseph Benti.
'The Evening News with Roger Mudd.
4 The Sunday News with Harry Reasoner.
S Face the Nation.
CONCLUSION OF MORNING
BUSINESS
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
further morning business? If not,
morning business is closed.
AMENDMENT OF THE FOREIGN
MILITARY SALES ACT
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
that the unfinished business be laid be-
fore the Senate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
HOLLAND). The bill will be stated by title
for the information of the Senate.
The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK.
H.R. 15628, to amend the Foreign Mili-
tary Sales Act.
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the bill.
Mr. STEVENS obtained the floor.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Alaska yield without
losing his right to the floor?
Mr. STEVENS. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
think that the distinguished Senator
from Alaska is entitled to a more atten-
tive audience than is in the Chamber at
the present time and, therefore, with his
permission, I suggest the absence of a
quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
Thd assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
EAGLETON). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
INTRODUCTION
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, for the
past 2 weeks I have listened to a great
number of statements on the recent ac-
 Approved For CRelease ONGRESSIONAL ECORD72 ~A 00200230001-1 May 28, 1970
S 7976
In early 1951 the Indochina affair nett come
tions in Cambodia. I feel that this con- However, the area is strategically im- emphatically to my attention when I was
centration of attention on the actions in portent to surrounding territories. It Allied commander of the NATO troops with
this one area have caused some loss of borders on Burma and the Indian sub- headquarters in Paris. The NATO defense
perspective on the Indochina conflict, continent, on Thailand, the bridge to needed greater French participation, but this
and I would like to bring some salient Malaysia and Indonesia and is only a was largely denied because of France's Losses
facts to the attention of my fellow few hundred miles from the Philippines. and coats in the Indochina war, as mentioned
Senators. It is this basic strategic importance that earlier.
By way of quantitative importance of led to the development of the "domino These losses and costs to the French
might be lessened, I believe, if allies could
these recent actions, I think it important theory." be brought in to carry part of the load in
to note that even at" the height of the THE DOMINO THEORY defending Indochina. Such a development
recent campaign, only 10,000--or a little stripped to its bare essentials, the would depend, of course, upon a clear %P-
over 2 percent-of our forces in Vietnam "domino theory" states that the fall of preciation throughout the Free World that
were in Cambodia, 'and they are already one country will provide the base from the war was in no sense an effort on the part
on their way out. Similarly, something which attacks against geographically of nation the Forree cth> area, bu was in fact a clear
less than 5 percent of South Vietnam's contiguous states may take place. These case of freedom defending itself from Com-
military forces are in Cambodia. states in turn will fall and thus provide monist aggression. To bring about such an
The real question then-and the issue the bases from which attacks can be appreciation, there would have to be a
I would like to see discussed more fully- launched against even more distant definite and public pledge on the part of the
is what can we do to bring the remain- countries. These attacks can be overt ag- French to accord independence and the right
ing American troops in 'South Vietnam gression or a more subtle "liberation of self-determination upon the Associated
home. The proposed amendment, which movement" supplied and given sanctuary states as soon as military victory should be
is now the pending business on the floor by the adjacent, recently fallen "dom- Eventually, the French did indicate their
of this body, would deal only with the ino" country. intention to establish the independent states
smaller question of specific tactics in the There are two conditions which must of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.
larger scale conflict. If this amendment be present if the "domino theory" is to
is to be properly assessed, it must be con- apply. First, there must be a series of However, world conditions have
sidered in light of our overall policies in contiguous states whose geography and changed decidedly since 1951. National-
Indochina-and indeed in the whole ethnic and political structure provide no ism is still stronger than any interna-
Southeast Asian area. substantial opposition to engulfing con- tionalist ideology and allegiances based
OVR NATIONAL iwrERzrr quest. Second, there must be a force with on national interest, not ideological
The first and most basic question that the desire and the ability to carry on this ideals, are the strongest ties we know.
extended conquest. Thus, we see that the Soviet Union ap-
must be asked here is precisely what is Let us now apply these criteria to the pears to get along better with the United
our national interest in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian situation. States than with her ideological part-
A number of elements could form the First, we do have a number of con- ner-China. Yugoslavia is a well-known
basis for our interest in sustaining the tiguous countries whose geography does example of an independent Communist
South Vietnamese Government. They not offer natural borders which can be state. Had it 'not been for the ruthless
include: easily defended. These countries include and cold-blooded suppression of the re-
First, strategic military significance of Vietnam, China, Laos, Cambodia, and formed' Czechoslovakian Government,
the area; northeast Thailand. Beyond these areas, 'another version of a Communist State
Second, critical resources important to we have, open seas or mountain ranges would have been born,
our economy; and which do offer substantial natural im- . We also recognize that Hanoi is not an
Third, protection of American lives pediments to advancing armies. Beyond extension of Chinese will in Southeast
and property. these areas we also have decidedly dif- Asia, but rather is a nationalistic state
I would like to discuss each of these in ferent ethnic peoples with, in some cases, carefully playing off her two giant bene-
turn. and long-lived governments. factors, one against the other, to achieve
First, I do not believe our interest is The "domino theory," therefore, can be her own national ends.
based on the strategic geographic im- validly applied only to the areas I have Viewed in these nationalistic terms,
portance of the area as either a direct set forth; that is, Indochina and north- we see that extension of the "domino
threat to our territorial security or as a east Thailand. theory" beyond the Red River and Me
useful military base. Guam is closer to The second criterion-a force both kong River basins will not survive the
Peking than Saigon, and the city of capable and desirous of carrying forth second criterion-the presence of a
Anchorage in my home State of Alaska the conquest-is also apparently present power with the desire and ability for ex-
Is closer to Moscow than Saigon. We have in Hanoi, supported by China. However, tended conquest, North Vietnam's na-
malor military installations in Thailand there is no reason to believe that Hanoi tional interests are not served by ex-
and the Philippines. We have repeatedly has interests beyond the traditional In- peditionary incursions into southwestern
indicated that we have no desire to estab- dochina area. The long and protracted Thailand or Malaysia. Nor does North
lish permanent military bases in this war fought between the Vietminh under Vietnam have the navy to carry revolu-
area. President Nixon made that clear Ho Chi Minh and France was envisioned tion to the Philippines even if she were
when he said in may of last year: by the supporters of Ho as a war for the so inclined.
. The 'United States has suffered over a mil- national independence of Indochina from From this analysis we can see that,
lion casualties In four wars in this century, French colonial rule. The French, on the while the "domino theory" does extend
Whatever faults we may have as a 'nation, other hand, saw it as an effort by an to Indochina and northeastern Thai-
we have asked nothing for ourselves in re- avowed Marxist-Ho Chi Minh-to ex- land, it does not extend outside this area.
turn for those sacrifices. We have been gen- tend the international Communist move- The natural conclusion to be drawn from
erous toward those whom we have fought. ment into Southeast Asia. this determination is that we must seek
We have helped our former foes as well as This country agreed at that time with an areawide settlement in Indochina and
o frlends in the task of reeoastruction. We not just a settlement affecting South
are proud of`this record, and. we bring the the French View, as is evident from this
same" attitude lir our search for a settle- excerpt from President Eisenhower's Vietnam. If we do not take into account
ment in Vietnam. memoirs: actions in Laos and Cambodia, we will
In this spirit, let me be explicit about Ho Chi Minh was, of course, a hard-core find that ultimately South Vietnam will
several points: Communist, while the Vietminh, the Forces be engulfed by the "domino theory". It
under his command, were supported by the is lust as easy for the "dominos" to fall
We seek no bases in Vietnam. Chinese Communists in the north. Although in the order of Laos-then Cambodia-
We seek no'military ties. guerrilla fighting was sporadic, the French then South Vietnam as it is for them to
It is thus? safe to conclude that South controlled the deltas nod the cities and an fall South Vietnam-then Cambodia-
area along the waist of Vietnam, whereas then Laos.
Vietnam is not of direct strategic im- the back country, including most of the We must examine the entire area if we
'potance to our' territorial security nor province of Tonkin and a sizable area in are to reach a long-lasting solution for
as a military base for operation in central Annam, was controlled mainly by South Vietnam.
Southeast Asia. the Vietminh.
Approved for Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP72-00337R000200230001-1
 A Approved For Rele 22~~ / 1i M-1 R 37R000200230001-1 S 7977
May 28, 1970 CONGRE S E IUEC6-: g
In summary, while Indochina has no the Free World such an unequivocal com- During this period of overt aggression
to mitment. But the French government did in Korea, A number of "wars of libera-
direct strategic military importance not make its position unmistakably clear, tion" were also being conducted, the
the United States, Laos and Cambodia, especially to the people most concerned, the most well known, of course, being the
as well as North Vietnam, are profoundly Vietnamese. Had it done so, the effect would Indochina conflict. But similar,
important to the military security of soon have been-we in NATO believed-to French-lthough smallna sale, conflicts were
South Vietnam. make the war the concern of all nations out-a RLsovacEs side the Iron curtain, and could have as- also going on in parts of the Dutch East
sured France of material help, as well as Indies, British Malaya, and the Philip-
If our desire to maintain South Viet- the support of world opinion. Furthermore, pines. A look at each of these will help
nam as an independent state is not based it would have immeasurably raised the make clear our overall policy toward
on the military importance of the real fighting morale of the loyal Vietnamese. At these wars.
estate, perhaps it is in the resources of that time the French government apparently First, as already noted, we encouraged
the area, saw no need to publicize any such sincere, the Dutch to establish the independent
it is true that great quantities of tin simple and selfless pronouncement. As far
and molybdenum, both of which are as I could tell, this reluctance seemed to state of Indonesia, which came into being
have its source in the French conviction that as a friendly pro-Western nation. As it
strategically important metals, are making an all-out statement would weaken took on greater and greater pro-Com-
found in Indochina. But we have sub- their leadership in the war and might have munist leanings under the leadership of
stantial deposits of both these metal:, in serious effects in other portions of the French President Sukarno, we attempted to en-
my State of Alaska. Empire, Including Algeria; moreover, the courage it to hold a more neutral course;
Indochina is considered to be the rice civil officials with whom I often talked in- but at no time did we directly inter-
bowl of Asia. But we are a rice-exporting variably agreed that while in this one Pere with the internal affairs of this rel-
natiori, go that cannot be the reason. special situation their difficulties could be
It has been suggested that we would greatly diminished by making clear their atively stable new country. Instead, we
like to deny the resources of this area to intention to offer freedom to Indochina, they continued to offer economic assistance
felt also that an announcement of voluntary to help develop the vast store of natural
our enemies. But Russia has no need for withdrawal from the area during hostilities resources and fledgling industry of Indo-
either the metals or the rice. And China would be a tremendous blow to French pres- nesia. Eventually, through an unfortu-
seems to be able to buy sufficient food- tige and influence in the world. nately violent and bloody catharsis, In-
stuffs. In the absence of such a statement, the donesia returned to its friendly status.
Nor are there large American invest- war was naturally looked upon in most cases in Malaya the British fought
a protracted war with guerrilla fought
menus in private industry in Indochina as a domestic difficulty between France and Second,
we might want to protect. The one part of her empire. This attitude pre-
area waslargely developed by the French, could the possibility that other free nations Brit. It was the announced intention
te
could help in what the French reneh themselves Britain to establish an independent state
and all Industrial development took considered so much a family quarrel that it once the guerrillas were suppressed.
place in that part of Indochina which is could not even be submitted to the United Since this was consistent with our own
now North Vietnam. Any large landhold- Nations for adjudication, national policy of ending colonialism and
ings will soon be broken up as part of ^ * * * * establishing viable, independent nations,
a land reform program we urged the The strongest reason of all for United we supported the British effort. However,
government of South Vietnam to adopt. States refusal to respond by itself to French at no time did we introduce American
It' can be safely concluded, I believe, pleas was our "tradition of anti.colonialism. military forces into the Malaya conflict.
that we do not have as our national in- This -tradition, violated-almost accidental- Third, in the Philippines guerrillas who
had fought the Japanese had now turned
terest in this area a desire to have access ly-for a time in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, was born in the cir-
or dominion over the resources, either cumstances of our own national birth in 1776. their attentions to the new Philippine
agricultural or mineral, of the area. Ouh deep conviction about colonialism has Government. This was another pro-
Since neither military geographic sig- often brought us embarrassment in dealings tracted jungle war in which we supplied
nificance nor critical resources can be with our friends in Western Europe, whose both economic and military aid to the
assigned to the Indochinese area, our na- histories as colonialists are largely alien to recognized government. Again, however,
tional interest in Indochina must not our history. But the standing of the United we did not commit our own military
be based on either, but rather on some states as the most powerful of the anticolo- forces to the guerrilla war, despite the
-letzs tangible factor, nisi powers is an asset of incalculable value fact that American forces were on the
to the Free World. It means that our counsel
'U.S. ROLE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA is sometimes trusted where that of others island at the time. We recognized that in
An analysis of the intangible benefits may not-Se. It is essential to our position of order for a government to be viable and
of involvement in Southeast Asia must leadership in a world wherein the majority independent it must develop the ability
necessarily include an examination of of the nations have at some time or another to police its own internal affairs. We
felt the yoke of colonialism. Never, through- would help, but we would not do the
the role we feel the United States should out the long and sometimes frustrating polic'ng for the government.
perform in that area search for an effective means of defeating Finally, in Indochina we- did carefully
Following World War II, we assumed the Communist struggle for power in Indo-
a custodial role in the Pacific and in Asia. china, did we lose sight of the importance consider the possibility of committing
There were no other ribbons in this of America's moral position. our own combat forces to help the
area who could provide leadership, secu- It was our basic goal to foster .the French. We decided against this for sev-
rity, a sense of law and order, or the eral reasons. One I have already outlined.
growth and development of independent, France refused to make a clear commit-
papital necessary to rebuild a war-torn viable nations in Southeast Asia and to ment to end her colonial rule in Indo-
area. One item that was high on our end colonialism in the area. In this role china. To support a colonial power would
priority list was to end coloniali:an. In we provided military security from ag- be inconsistent with. our basic national
the area and to establish independent gression and financial assistance for eco- policy in the Southeast Asian area.
viable nations in the region. nomic development.
We began, as was fitting, by cleaning AGGRESSION AGAINST LIBERATION A second powerful influence was the
refusal of other free world powers to join
with us in aiding France. In Korea we
dependence our own to house. the P1946 hilippines. In hillweppines. We granted in- then Korea offers the clearst example of
urged the Netherlands to establish the our attitude toward overt military ag- acted with the approval of the entire
independent state of Indonesia, which gression. When the North Koreans in- free world and with substantial material
was accomplished in 1953. We also felt vaded without warning the independent and manpower aid from a number of
deep concern that the French should . nation of South Korea, the United States other countries. In Indochina we would
indicate. an end to colonialism in Indo- took immediate action, both militarily have had to act unilaterally, and we were
china, as is evident from this excerpt and diplomatically. But it was not until unwilling to do this,
from President Eisenhower's memoirs, in we had the approval of our allies and A third factor was the growing belief
which the former Chief Executive dis- eventually of the United Nations that that the French did not really want help.
cusses the consequences of France's fail- we actually threw the full force of our As President Eisenhower pointed out in
ure to renounce any colonial interest in powerful military machine into the con- his memoirs:
Indochina: flict. This was overt aggression con- Some of my advisers felt that the French
I repeatedly urged upon successive French demnedlby the entire free world and we had actually reached the point where they
would rather abandon Indochina, or lose it
L .
l .
decisivel
ick
an
y
Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP72-00337R00020023000171
 S 7978
Approved For RC;ft
&&S&NOAI.I &DD?-OSENATE0200230001-1 May 28, 1970
as a result of a military defeat, than save it
through international Intervention.
At the height of the conflict we did
supply 200 technicians, but that was the
limit of our manpower aid.
We can see, I think, from these ex-
amples of actions taken in Southeast Asia
that we do not hesitate to act when overt
aggression takes place, but that we re-
strict our aid to material and technical
assistance where the internal stability of
a nation is involved., This is policy under
which President Eisenhower operated,
and this is essentially the policy that
President Nixon has reaffirmed in his
now famous Guam speech.
OUR POLICY IN VIETNAM
While this policy of restrained aid to
governments involved in internal strug-
gles has been followed consistently in
all other areas of Southeast Asia, the
conflict in Vietnam raised difficult ques-
tions not raised by the. other conflicts I
have briefly discussed.
Indochina, while under coordinated
French rule, had consisted at various
times of three relatively independent, if
not fully sovereign, states. The division of
Vietnam into two states by the Geneva
accords was based more on military and
political necessity than on traditional
national boundaries, although it should
be noted thatVietnam was actually three
countries---north, middle, and south-be-
fore the French colony of Indochina was
established.
The viability of the two new Vietnams
was also problematical. The north had
all the industry, since that was the cen-
ter of French influence, while the south
was an agrarian economy based on rice
production.
The proximity of North Vietnam to
China gave increased credibility to the
idea that this was a Communist-inspired
aggression directed, supplied and per-
haps even manned to some extent by
Chinese Communists. The inability to
demonstrate conclusively that the Viet-
nam conflict `really was expansion on the
part of China was of considerable im-
portance to our decision not to intervene
As President Eisenhower pointed out in
his memoirs: ?
A. I viewed the prospects of military in-
tervention in the relative calm of early 1954,
it seemed clear that if three basic require-
ments were fulfilled, the United States could
properly and effectively render real help in
winning the war. The first requirement was a
legal right under international law; second,
was a favorable climate of Free World opin-
ion; Ind third, favorable action by the Con-
gress.
Regarding the legal right, the course was
clear. Any intervention on the part of the
United States would sgroely be passible save
on the urgent request of the French gov-
ernment, which. request would have to re-
flect, without question, the desire of the local
governments.
World- opinion represented a different
question. We carefully examined methods
and procedures calculated to win the appro-
bation of 1,406t, Of the; Free World. One
Ifietpod woii4?have been for the three Asso-
dated ,States of the French Union to go to
the United Nations and request help of that
bod . Another would be to confine United
intervention, to participation in a
coo it On, including Britain, the ANZUS
powers, and some of the Southeast Asian
nations, While .we recognized that the bur-
Approved For Release 2001111/01 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200230001-1
den of the operation would fall on the
United States, the token forces supplied by
these other nations, as in Korea, would lend
moral standing to a venture that otherwise
could be made to appear as a brutal example
of imperialism. This need was particularly
acute because there was no incontrovertible
evidence of overt Red Chinese participation
in the Indochina conflict. (Emphasis added.)
Because of a basic conflict between our
policy of not intervening militarily in in-
ternal conflicts on the one hand and
simultaneously employing military force
to prevent the overt expansion of Chinese
Communist domination on the other
hand, our activities in Vietnam took on
the nature of a holding action while we
attempted to determine precisely what
our policy toward Indochina should be.
This difficulty was further complicated
by the fact that it was not yet clear
whether this was an internal struggle or
aggression of one nation against another.
When President Ngo Dinh Diem de-
cided not to participate in the elections
which were contemplated by the Geneva
accords, the United States supported his
decision. We had not been a party to the
accords, so we were not bound to see that
they were carried out. Support of Diem
was consistent with our policy of con-
twining Communist China and with end-
ing colonialism. However, the question of
creating a viable, independent state in
South Vietnam remained open.
In reaction to Diem's refusal to par-
ticipate in the elections North Vietnam
and those in the South who wanted Ho
as their President began undermining the
Diem government. As the level of vio-
lence increased, we became concerned
that South Vietnam could not survive as
an independent state. Consistent with
our Policy in internal conflicts, we pro-
vided material and technical assistance
to the South Vietnamese. But we did not
lose sight of the fact that we were, at
least initially, dealing with an internal
conflict.
When President Kennedy decided to
send in advisers to aid the South Viet-
namese in developing an effective mili-
tary force, he made this point absolutely
clear in a CBS interview with Walter
Cronkite on September 2, 1962. In re-
sponse to being asked what he thought
of the recent actions taken by the Diem
government to repress the Buddhist Ap-
position to the policies of his govern-
ment, President Kennedy said:
Our best judgment is that he (Diem) can't
be successful on this basis. We hope that
he comes to see that; but in the final anal-
ysis it is the people and, the government
itself who have to win or lose this struggle.
All we can do Is help, and we are making
it very clear.
We can see then that at this point
our reliance was still on the South Viet-
namese to win their war and put their
own house in order.
CHANGE IN POLICY
This policy was changed with the in-
troduction of U.S. combat forces into
Vietnam in 1965. The buildup was in-
credibly rapid, and it was anticipated
that the addition of troops in such num-
bers would decisively turn the tide of
battle. By the end of 1965, we had 184,300
American soldiers in Vietnam. By the end
of the following year this number had
reached 385,300, but the tide had turned.
The introduction of American combat
soldiers represented a departure from
our previous policy of not committing
American military manpower to what
had, up to this point, been deemed a con-
flict that could only be resolved by the
people of South Vietnam itself. This step
indicated that this Government had ap-
parently decided to view the conflict as
an overt aggression of one country
against another rather than a problem
of internal order. The presence of North
Vietnamese regular army troops in South
Vietnam contributed to this decision.
I think at that point we may have
lost sight of our real objective in South-
east Asia. As I have indicated, this ob-
jective was basically to end colonialism
and establish independent and viable
states to replace the former colonies.
Our goal then should have been to make
South Vietnam viable.
Instead of focusing on this goal, we
continued to increase our military pres-
ence. By the end of 1967, our troop
strength had increased another 100,000
to 485,600. By the end of 1968 we had
536,100 American soldiers in South Viet-
nam, and, when President Nixon took
office in January of 1969, the authorized
troop level in Vietnam had reached
549,500.
President Nixon realized that this
policy would not end the Indochina con-
flict, and he set about finding a way to
achieve our goals in Southeast Asia.
THE EMERGING POLICY
On May 14, 1969, the President ex-
plained how he would proceed toward
our goals in Southeast Asia. The points
he made in this address to the Nation
are exceedingly important in under-
standing America's policy in Indochina.
First, he explained his initial steps
after being elected President:
Our first step began before inauguration.
This was to launch an intensive review of
every aspect of the Nation's Vietnam policy.
We accepted nothing on faith, we challenged
every assumption and every statistic. We
made a systematic, serious examination of
all the alternatives open to us. We carefully
considered recommendations offered both by
critics and supporters of past policies.
An example of the extent to which
the administration went in challenging
the old assumptions is given by the fol-
lowing excerpt from Don Oberdorfer's
March 27 Washington Post column:
One result of the initial Key Biscayne
meeting about Vietnam was a day-long ses-
sion of the National Security council shortly
after January 20 at which intensive discus-
sion and study was devoted to four possible
military options, and five possible interna-
tional political results, in the Vietnam situ-
ation. In each case, consideration was given
to the costs of the course of action, to the
specific instruction, which would have to be
given, and to the consequences of failure.
About the same time, a series of toughly-
worded questions was dispatched to the
major U.S. agencies dealing with Vietnam in
an effort to establish the facts on which
policy could be based. In Saigon, the field
headquarters of each agency-including the
Embassy, the military and the CIA-was en-
couraged to give its own honest assessment
without clearance with the other. When the
answers were in, they showed that the Viet-
nam-related empires of the U.S. Govern-
meixt do not agree even on the facts, much
less on the solution,
 May 28, 19 70
Approved &XJ3,e~nj A1L1' (tb l&- QpZ +37R000200230001-1
We are prepared to accept any government
in South Vietnam that results from the free
choice of the South Vietnamese people them-
selves.
We have no intention of imposing any form
of government upon the people of South
Vietnam, nor will we be a party to such
coercion.
We have no objection to reunification, if
that turns out to be what the people of North
Vietnam and the people of South Vietnam
want; we ask only that the decision reflect
the free choice of the people concerned.
In this manner, the President set forth
our policy toward South Vietnam: Self-
determination for the South Vietnamese.
Our goal then was to create an environ-
ment in South Vietnam which would
permit the people of that area to make a
free choice, not a coerced choice, as to
the type of government under which
they would like to live.
In order to create this environment, it
was clear that eventually all foreign mili-
tary forces would have to be removed
from South Vietnam.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of
a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. AL-
LEN). Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I con-
tinue my statement about our policies in
Vietnam.
As I have said, the President set forth
our policy toward Vietnam, which was
self-determination for the South Viet-
namese.
Our goal, then, was to create an en-
vironment in South Vietnam which
would permit the people of that area
to make a free choice-not a coercive
choice-as to the type of government
under which they would like to live. In
order to create this environment, it was
clear that eventually all foreign mili-
tary forces would have to be removed
from South Vietnam. To this end, the
President, made the following offer:
To implement these principles, I reaffirm
now our willingness to withdraw our forces
on a specified timetable.. We ask only that
North Vietnam withdraw its forces from
South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos into
North Vietnam, also in accordance with a
timetable.
We Include Cambodia and Laos to insure
that these countries would not be used as
bases for a. renewed war. Our offer provides
for a simultaneous start on withdrawal by
both sides; for agreement on a mutually ac-
ceptable timetable; and for the withdrawal
to be accomplished quickly.
The North Vietnamese delegates have
been saying in Paris that political issues
should be discussed along with military
issues, and there must be a political settle-
ment in the South. We do not dispute this,
but the military withdrawal involves outside
forces, and can,, therefore, be properly ne-
gotiated by North Vietnam and the United
States, with the concurrence of its allies.
The political, settlement is an internal
matter which ought to be decided among the
South Vietnamese, themselves and not im-
posed by outsiders. However, if our presence
at these political negotiations would be
helpful, and if the South Vietnamese con-
S 7979
cerned agreed, we would be willing to parti-
cipate, along with the representatives of
Hanoi, if that also were desired. Recent
statements by President Thieu have gone
far toward opening the way to a political
settlement. He has publicly declared his gov-
ermment's willingness to discuss a political
solution with the National Liberation Front,
and has offered free elections. This was a
dramatic step forward, a reasonable offer
that could lead to a settlement. The South
Vietnamese Government has offered to talk
without preconditions. I believe the other
side should also be willing to talk without
preconditions.
The South Vietnamese government recog-
nizes, as we do, that a settlement must per-
mit all persons and groups that are pre-
pared to renounce the use of force to partici-
pate freely in the political life of South
Vietnam. To be effective, such a settlement
would require two things: First, a process
that would allow the South Vietnamese
people to express their choice; and, second,
a guarantee that this process would be a
fair one.
We do not Insist on a particular form of
guarantee. The important thing is that the
guarantee should have the confidence of the
South Vietnamese people, and that they
should be broad enough and strong enough
to protect the interests of all major South
Vietnamese groups.
This, then, is the outline of the settle-
ment that we seek to negotiate in Paris. Its
basic terms are very simple: Mutual with-
drawal of non-South Vietnamese forces
from South Vietnam, and free choice for the
people of South Vietnam. I believe that the
long-term interests of peace require that we
insist on no less, and that the realities of
the situation require that we seek no more.
And now, to make very concrete what I
have said, I propose the following specific
measures, which seem to me consistent with
the principles of all parties. These proposals
are made on the basis of full consultation
with President Thieu.
As soon as agreement can be reached, all
non-South Vietnamese forces would begin
withdrawals from South Vietnam. Over a
period of twelve months, by agreed-upon
stages, the major portions of all U.S., Allied,
and other non-South Vietnamese forces
would be withdrawn. At the end of this
twelve month period, the remaining U.S.,
Allied and other non-South Vietnamese
forces would move into designated base areas
and would not engage in combat operations.
The remaining U.S. and Allied forces would
complete their withdrawals as the remain-
Ing North Vietnamese forces were withdrawn
and returned to North Vietnam.
An international supervisory body, accept-
able to both sides, would be created for the
purpose of verifying withdrawals, and for
any other purposes agreed upon between
the two sides.
This international body would begin op-
erating in accordance with an agreed time-
table and would participate in arranging su-
pervised cease fires in Vietnam.
As soon as possible after the international
body was functioning, elections would be
held under agreed procedures and under the
supervision of the international body. Ar-
rangements would be made for the release
of prisoners of war on both sides at the
earliest possible time.
All parties would agree to observe the Ge-
neva Accords of 1954 regarding South Viet-
nam and Cambodia, and the Laos Accords of
1962.
I believe this proposal for peace is realistic,
and takes into account of the legitimate in-
terests of all concerned. It is consistent with
President Thieu's six points. It can accom-
modate the various programs put forth by
the other side. We and the Government of
South Vietnam are prepared to discuss its
details with the other aide.
The analysis was not easy and It oc-
cupied a good deal of the President's time.
But some important conclusions were
reached within a short time, as President
Nixon explained in his May address:
From the review, it became clear at once
that the new Administration faced a set of
immediate operational problems. The other
side was preparing for a new offensive.
There was a wide gulf of distrust between
Washington and Saigon.
In eight months of talks in Paris, there
had been no negotiations directly concerned
with a final statement.
It was clear to the President that some
action had to be taken to move the Viet-
nam stalemate off deact center. An in-
creasing military buildup was not the
answer, since this was being consistently
met by an increasing buildup of North
Vietnamese counterforces.
The President described the action. he
took in response to the "operational
problems" he had found :
'Igzerefore, we moved on several francs at
once.
We frustrated the attack which was
launched in late February. As a result, the
North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong failed
to achieve their military objectives.
We restored a close working relationship
with Saigon. In the resulting atmosphere of
mutual confidence, President Thieu and his
Government have taken important initia-
tives in the search for a settlement.
We speeded up, the strengthening of the
South Vietnamese forces. I am glad to report
tonight, that as a result, General Abrams
told me on Monday that progress In the train-
Ing program had been excellent, and that
apart from any developments that may occur
if,. the negotiations in Paris, that time is ap-
proaching when South Vietnamese forces
will be able to take over some of the fighting
3ronte now being manned by Americans.
In weighing alternate courses, we have
had to recognize that the situation as it
exists today is far dtferent from what it
was two years ago or four years ago or ten
years ago.
One difference is that we no longer have
the choice of not intervening. We have
crossed that bridge. There are now more than
a half million American troops in Vietnam
and 35,000 Americans have lost their lives.
We can have honest debate about whether
we should have entered,the war in Vietnam,
We can have honest debate about. how the
war has been conducted. But the urgent
question today is what to do now that we are
there.
Against that background, let me discuss
first what we have rejected, and second, what
we are prepared to accept. We have ruled out
attempting to impose a purely military solu-
tion on the battlefield.
We have also ruled out either a one-silded
withdrawal from Vietnam, or the acceptance
in Paris of terms that would amount to a
disguised American defeat.
Let me put it plainly: What the United
States wants for South Vietnam is not: the
important thing. What North Vietnam wants
for South Vietnam is not the important
thing. What is important is what the people
of South Vietnam want for South Vietnam.
We are willing to agree to neutrality for
South Vietnam is that is what the South
Vietnamese people freely choose.
We believe there should be an opportunity
for full participation in the political life of
South Vietnam by all political elements that
are prepared to do so without the use of force
or intimidation.
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200230001-1
 S 7980 Approved For F ft etWggf1V/OA1i ~ P 2-ORjW
~2T0200230001-1 May 2$ 1970
This new policy was hailed by many
persons who were critical of the policies
the United States had been pursuing up
to that point.
My good friend, the distinguished Sen-
ator from Kentucky stated :
The President's report to the Nation on
Vietnam was welcome and necessary. it was
a summation of the effort he has made dur-
ing the 4 months of his administration to
bring the United States closer to peace in
Vietnam.
It was a clear statement of the President's
purpose to secure a settlement through nego-
tiation, rather than the use of military force
which has only deepened the tragedy of Viet-
nam; and which could go on for many years.
In my view the decisive statement, and one
which marked an advance over past positions,
was his unambiguous affirmation that the
administration was prepared and willing to
consider in negotiation, in addition to the
concrete proposals he made, "Hanoi's four
points, the NFL's 10 points, provided it can
be made consistent with the, few basic prin-
olples I have set forth here." For while the
President's proposals are certainly reasonable,
and consonant with the principle of self-
determination which is a basic One for our
country, we may not be dealing with a rea-
sonable Government or people in terms of
our own values and we must consider care-
fully their proposals.
I liked particularly that part of his speech
in which he affirmed that the United States
and "all parties should agree to observe the
Geneva Accords of 1954 regarding Vietnam
and Cambodia, and the Laos Accords of
1964." It has been my view, as I have ex-
pressed in a number of speeches in the Sen-
ate, that the accords provide the best basis
for a settlement of the Issue of Vietnam, and
'Of Cambodia and Laos, and would have in-
fluence in all of southeast Asia.
In 1965, I opposed the commencement of
the bombing of North Vietnam. In the fol-
lowing years, I urged on numerous occasions
that the United states cease the bombing
as a means of testing North Vietnam's often
declared statement that such a. cessation
would bring about negotiations. I recognized
that the cessation of bombing would not
necessarily mean that negotiations would be
fruitful or satisfactory to the United States,
but I considered that it was the only means
of opening. negotiations. Unfortunately,
negotiations. thus far have not been very
productive, but a start has been made. It
is my hope that the President's address has
opened the way for active and innovative
negotiations, that will be successful in bring-
ing about a settlement and peace in Viet-
nam. I hope also that his concrete proposals
will immediately bring about a reduction in
the fighting and violence in South Vietnam
on both sides.
If North Vietnam and the NLF giant peace,
the President has opened the way .toward
a negotiated settlement and peace. I believe
the Congress and the people should support
the President In..his initiative to achieve
peace through negotiations and., peaceful
means, (Congressional Record, May 16, 1969 )
And the distinguished Senator from Illinois:
Mr. President, Wednesday night President
Nixon spoke wisely as he discussed the status
of the Vietnam war and made proposals to
end that war. His remarks were honest. They
were constructive. They indicated a flexi-
bility of approach which.,. gives promise of
brea4pg the impasse at Paris. Speaking as
one Who. has been critical of the handling
of the Vietnam war over a period of 3 years,
I can now say that r have confidence that
President Nixon is doing his utmost to bring
the war to an end and Ito do it responsibly.
I was' especially pleased to hear the Presi-
dent say that "the time is approaching when
Sout+ Viet os Iygrceg will be able to take
Over soineof' the fighting fronts now being
manned by Americans." And I was pleased
to hear the President say that he has ruled
out attempting to impose a purely military
solution. These are important points with
which I agree completely.
The President's report to the Nation was
certainly the most comprehensive Presiden-
tial statement on the war so far. It was a
contribution toward a -peaceful solution of
the conflict. And it was a contribution to-
ward public understanding of the complex
issues involved.
Mr. President, I am very pleased to offer
every possible degree of support that I can
to the President of the United States. (Con-
gressional Record, May 16, 1969.)
Unfortunately, Mr. President (Mr.
METCALF), this offer of reconciliation
was not. accepted by the North Vietnam-
ese and no workable joint program for
mutual withdrawal of troops has been
worked out.
But our basic policy still requires that
the Vietnamese must settle their own
problems and that we cannot remain for-
ever in South Vietnam. To this end, a
parallel-and essentially unrelated-sec-
end step was begun.
WITHDRAWAL
An indication of this change in policy
was reported to this body by the distin-
guished Senator from Tennessee:
Mr. President, in recent weeks, there have
been many news stories about phased with-
drawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam. Some of
the hints or trial balloons have emanated
from the Pentagon, some from the White
House, some from the State Department, and,
significantly, some from Saigon.
Since early last fall, there have been un-
confirmed "reports" that increments of U.S.
troops would be withdrawn as the South
Vietnamese troops improved their capabili-
ties. The flow of such "reports" has been
stepped up since the inauguration of Presi-
dent Nixon.
President Thieu was quoted on February
38 in the Washington Post as saying: "One
and possibly two United 'States divisions can
leave South Vietnam during the last 6
months of 1969."
He indicated that one more division might
leave in 1970.
Upon his return from an inspection trip
to South Vietnam in March, Secretary of De-
fense Laird spoke of implementing what he
called phase II of a program to train and
develop the South Vietnamese army to take
over a larger role in the fighting. There were
two clear implications in what Secretary
Laird had to say: One, that the Johnson
administration had not done very well with
this phase of the "program"; and, two, that
the Nixon administration had adopted the
program but would do better with it.
In his press conference on April 7, Secre-
tary of State Rogers was asked about reports
of troop withdrawal. In his reply, he empha-
sized'U.S. willingness to proceed with a plan
for mutual withdrawal of troops, stating that
this could be done "at once" if the "other
side',, a famous phrase of his predecessor,
agreed to it. But the Secretary did not rule
out the possibility of unilateral withdrawal,
saying with respect thereto, "we are consid-
ering all possibilities."
Mr. President, the return of U.S. troops
from Vietnam would surely be welcomed by
the American people. The return of even a
small segment of the more than 500,000 serv-
icemen we have there would likely be widely
interpreted as a de-escalation of U.S. efforts,
and as offering hope of "withdrawal" of all
our troops in due course. (Congressional
Record, May 8, 1969)
The program of withdrawal of our sol-
diers from Vietnam continued, and it
became clear that considerable support
for the President's program was dLvel-
oping. Congressman BOLAND, speaking on
the floor of the House of Representatives
indicated this growing support:
The peace negotiations in Paris have given
all sides to the Vietnam dispute an opportu-
nity to sit down and discuss the issues and
the conflict at great length. Nevertheless, the
apparent deadlock at the peace table and
the shooting in South Vietnam continues.
Mr. Speaker, after years of war, after years
of new "military solutions," we have learned
that the kind of conflict the United States
is engaged in at present in Southeast Asia
cannot end in military victory.
What can we do to achieve peace?
One proposed solution-further military
escalation-is senseless. A new buildup in our
military strength would only plunge us deeper
into the military morass in Vietnam and
might even push us to the brink of a nuclear
war.
The record of the past 6 years shows-
plainly and indisputably-that military esca-
lation has not worked. The bombing of North
Vietnam, for example, was trumpeted as the
final step toward peace.
It was supposed to bring North Vietnam
to its knees, convincing Hanoi that its war
effort was futile. The bombing, instead,
merely steeled North Vietnam's resolve to
continue pressing for victory. A small
agrarian nation with few cities and little in-
dustry, North Vietnam weathered the most
intense bombing raids since World War II.
Renewed bombing-or renewed military
strikes of any kind-would be equally fruit-
less. The only way to extricate ourselves from
this war-short of a sudden meeting of the
minds in Paris-is to begin an orderly with-
drawing of our troops from South Vietnam.
Senator Edward Kennedy, in a mojor
foreign policy speech delivered last August, in
Worcester, Massachusetts, suggested troop
withdrawal. He pointed out-rightly, I
think-that a significant decrease in our mili-
tary activity and military personnel would
make clear to Saigon that a netgotlated peace
is the only tenable solution. He emphasized,
too, that such a withdrawal would help con-
vince North Vietnam.of our genuine desire
for peace. Senator Aiken last week also made
this proposal, calling for what he termed an
"orderly withdrawal." His proposal, I think,
is sound. I am not talking here about a sud-
den overnight flight from South Vietnam,
leaving the country in chaos and its leaders
stranded naked before their enemies. Mr.
speaker, I am talking about a steady and
measured withdrawal of American forces-tea
withdrawal that would increase commensu-
rately, step by step, with South Vietnam's
growing ability to defend itself.
The briskly disciplined new Army that
South Vietnam is developing should take over
the bulk of the war effort. We must convince
the Government of South Vietnam that we
will not remain there forever.
The prospects for a negotiated settlement
in Paris should be hopefully brighteer once
Saigon and Hanoi are convinced that the
United Staetes is not prepared to fight an
interminable guerrilla war in Asia. (Con-
gressional Record, May 6, 1969)
On November 3 of last year the Presi-
dent explained what had happened to his
efforts to obtain the mutual withdrawal
agreements he had described in his May
14 speech.
The President said:
In order to end a war fought on many
fronts, I initiated a pursuit for peace on
many fronts.
In a television speech on May 14, in a
speech before the United Nations, and on a
number of other occasions, I set forth our
peace proposals in great detail.
We have offered the complete withdrawal
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP72-00337R_00200230001-1
 Approved For Release L1 RD 78000200230001-1 S 7981
Mc~y 28, 1970' CONGRESSI0p0~ ~N2 10CI RD
of all outside Ce Bret undere international shall look to the atio directly hr atened an orderly scheduled timetableSeThis with-
' a to assume the primary responsibility of pro- drawal will be made from strength and not
supervision. from weakness. As South Vietnamese forces
We have offered free elections under inter- viding the manpower for its defense.
national supervision with the Communists After I announced this policy, I found become stronger, the rate of American with-
participating in the organization and con- that the leaders of the Philippines, Thailand, drawal can become greater.
rea and other nations I have not and cal force. the The elections Sai as an nGovernmentt has which mightube threatened by Communist the timetable for ours program. There are
duct of
pledged to accept the result of the election. aggression welcomed this new direction in obvious reasons for this decision. As I have
We have not put forth our proposals on a American foreign policy. The defense of indicated on several occcasions, the rate of s take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have indicated America's is business. And ibis ness not just t with aalswill depend on developments on particularly that we are willing to discuss the proposals whose freedom One is the progress which may be made
m of a
announce
that have been put forth by the other side responsibility of the people
. An
the
- at
revious
of the
and that the anythin is neotiable excet the is threatened. The peo le of South Vietamto de- ministration not on lylresulted in our assum- fixed timetable) for our withdra al would
right of the peop
termine their own future. At the Paris peace ing the primary responsibility for fighting completely remove any incentive for the
did enemy
conference, Ambassador Lodge has demon- the war but even more signnaflcaantl it
They would t simply waitement our forces
V Vietnamese so that they had withdrawn and then move in.
public fed our flexibility and good faith in 40 ennot ingdthea South stress
Hla meetings. refused has refused even to discuss our pro- could defend themselves when we left, The other two factors on which we will
withdrawal decisions are the level
posals. They demand our unconditional ac- Not only did this new doctrine meet base of our enemy attiviy and the progress of the
training program of the South Vietnamese
American ce of their terms; that we withdraw all
can forces Immediately and uncanaf- with favorable response from our Asian fronts has
tioallyy and that we overthrow the govern- allies, but it was also greeted as a posi- forces. Progress on both these than
anticipat meat dP South Vietnam as we leave. htive ome. step in days right a to direction
President Nix- startedrthe wi hdr wal p ograme in June. As
It has became clear that the obstacle in on's Guam press conference, the distin- a result, our timetable for withdrawal Is
guished majority leader of the Senate more optimistic now than when we made
negotiating an end to States. war is not the our first estimate in June. This clearly dem-
the Vietnamese States. And it'ls not made the following remarks: onstrates why it is not wise to be frozen in
the South Vietnamese Government. The President is moving with caution and on a fixed timetable. We must retain the
The obstacle t the other side's e to refus to absolute join consideration but also with a sense of real- flexibility to base each withdrawal decision
us in a show jut )peace. . Ititin ill not do join Ity based on the changes which have oc- on the situation as it is at that time rather
in it is co a just peace. has t is curred on this globe. He is not advocating iso- than on estimates that are no longer valid.
while wait for out next that , has to do it lationism, nor is he advocating the aban- Along with this optimistic estimate, I must-
until it fe our next concession, and the next donment of Asia. In his candid statements, in all candor-leave one note of caution. If
now gets everything it wants. There can both in this country and in Guam, he has the level of enemy activity significantly in-
above that progress emphasized that the United States is a Pa- creases we might have to adjust our time-
be no in now s oonderany doubt
deciding negotiatin depends ab all on Hanoi's cific power with peripheral interests on the table accoordingly.
deciding to negotiate serioove usly. Asian mainland.
Bdt Hanoi's intractable position did The first two steps on the journey of un- withdrawal, Under he our President op s s pro ram has in t
lippin
and In- not preclude us from taking independent a ne ia, two w natio sh which areeprimarily dropped from a high of 549,500 author-
and unilateral l action to terminate out Pacific powers but with greater interests on ized by the previous administration to
involvement in this conflict. President Asian mainland than the United States. 429,550 as of May 21 of this year. And
Nixon described that action by recount- What the President has done, in short, is to the President has indicated that this
ing what, he had said in Guam : signal the less likelihood of American par-
At the time we launched our search for ticipation in wars on the Asian mainland in level will decrease to no more than 285,-
peace, I recognized that we might not suc- the future. The President has also en- 000 by next April 15.
ceedYn bringing an end to the war through couraged the Asian nations to depend more U.S. PRESTIGE
negotiation. I, therefore, put into effect an- on themselves in both internal security and one aspect of our policy in
other plan to bring peace-a plan which will military defense which, to me, seems to be a There is Asia which I have not policy in
bring the war to an end regardless of what sound long-range policy. Soutere re c~~ st A is whi Stahel has byet is-
ha ris the negotiating front. U.S. for- Consistent with this new policy, Presi- fective in maintaining peace in this area
Flail line with a m maajj or shift in
elfin policy which I described in my y press dent Nixon announced in his November and in the rest of the world because of conference at Guam on July 25. Let me 3 address his plan to bring our boys two factors: prestige and credibility,
briefly explain what has been described as home: China backed down from its planned in-
the Nixon doctrine--a policy which not only The Vietnamization Plan was launched vaslon of Quemoy and Matsu because
will help end the war in Vietnam, but which following Secretary Laird's visit to Vietnam they knew the 7th Meet was ready to
to an essential element of our program to in, March. Under the plan, I ordered a sub- repel their efforts. They respected both
prevent future Vietnams, stantial increase in the training and equip- our position as a world power and our
We Americans are a do-it-yourself people- ment of South Vietnamese forces. determination to use that power in the
an impatient people. Instead of teaching In July, on my visit to Vietnam, I changed
someone else to do a job, we like to do it General Abram's orders so that they were defense of those islands. Prestige and
ourselves. This trait has been carried over consistent with the objectives of our new credibility-these two factors make the
into our foreign policy. policy. Under the new orders the primary United States a world power.
In Korea and again in Vietnam, the United mission of our troops is to enable the South In the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet
States furnished most of the money, most of Vietnamese forces to assume the full re-
the Union also decided that discretion was
arms, and most of the men to help the sponsibility for the security of South Viet- the better part of valor withdrew don against Communist aggression. Before Our air operations have been reduced by their better missiles from that island. Again,
any Ameade troops were committed to Viet- over twenty percent, prestige and credibility prevented World
was t ax- We have now begun to see the results of War III.
pan, d a leaser n another Asian country
pressed this opinion to me when I was tray- his long overdue change in American policy When the Chinese invaded India in
you ug are in trying to as a assist private another citizen: ' nation de- When in Vietnam. 1962, we indicated our intention to help
yo , After five years of Americans going into India repel this attack and the Chinese
-fend the freedom, w but should be to Vietnam, we are finally bringing American withdrew. Aprestige and credibility
help them fight the war but not to fight the men home. By December 15, over 60,000 men
success.
war for them." will have been withdrawn from South Viet- were our key Again
In Gs gui I ines down these erica grin- nam-including twenty percent of all of com- The conflict in Indochina has done,
icyitoward Asiaes loft future American poi- bat troops I believe, some damage to our credibility.
cy United The South Vietnamese have continued to We have not achieved a military victory, 11 1. The hlitinents. States will keep all of our gain in strength. As a result they have been because we have not sought one. But in
treaty commitm able to take over combat responsibilities from the eyes of those who think we were try-
welgt shall provide shield a a nuclear our American forces. ing the for such a victory, it appears that
power threatens the freedom of a nation + +
lied with us its of a nation whose survival s al-
urvival We have adopted a plan which we have we were incapable of achieving it. This
n
$, In cases other types ag- worked out in cooperation with the South has resulted, I believe, in the feeling
-8, cases involving ou'r' security.
gression, we shall furnish military and d eco- Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of among some revolutionary elements in
nomic assistance when requested in accord- all U.S. ground combat forces and their re- the world that the United States can-
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200230001-1
 S 7982
Approved FO r " liO'I lR8 P7 20002002300011} ay 28, 1970
simple. There is no one else who can do the
job. Our power is essential, in the final
test, if the nations of Asia are to be secure
from expanding communism. Thus, when
'India was attacked, it looked to us for help,
and we gave it gladly.
We believe that Asia should be directed
by Asians. But that means each Asian peo-
ple must have the right to find its own way,
not that one group or nation should over-
run all the others.
Make no mistake about it. The aim in
Vietnam is not simply the conquest of the
South, tragic as that would be. It is to show
that American commitment is worthless.
Once that is done, the gates are down and
the road is open to expansion and endless
conquest. That is why Communist China op-
poses discussions, even though such discus-
sions are clearly in the interest of North
Vietnam.
not be effective in aiding a government
beset by guerrilla warfare.
It is therefore important that our pol-
icy toward Vietnam also consider the
credibility of the United States as a
power that can effect its will once it has
decided that such action is in its national
interest.
"Precipitous withdrawal"-that is, the
immediate and pellmell retreat with
enemy soldiers chasing our last troops
oUt-is unacceptable. It would, indeed,
be a humiliating defeat that would se-
verely cripple our credibility as a world
power. For this reason President Nixon
has rejected "precipitous withdrawal."
But "precipitous withdrawal" is a far
cry from the orderly withdrawal that
President Nixon has announced. By re-
placing our combat units with newly
trained and equipped South Vietnamese
combat units,`we can withdraw without
military defeat, leaving the South Viet-
namese to defend their nation after we
have gone. This policy will permit us
to end our direct military involvement
in this area which retaining our credibil-
ity and simultaneously accomplishing
our other goals.
The second factor In our ability to
keep world _ peace--prestige-has, con-
trary to much that has been said by
critics of this war, not seriously been
injured. No one. doubts our sincerity or
purpose at this point. But our prestige
could suffer serious damage if we "pre-
cipitously withdrew." .9ven a country
with credible power is not to be believed
if it does not have will to carry out its
announced intentions in international
affairs. All four of our most recent Presi-
dents have commented on the impor-
tance of 'our prestige to keeping world
peace.
President Eisenhower wrote in his
memoirs:
One possibility was to support the French
with air strikes, possibly from carriers, on
Communist installations around :Dien Bien
Phu. There were grave doubts in my mind
about the effectiveness of such air strikes
on deployed troops where good.' cover was
plentiful. Employment of air strikes alone to
support French forces in the jungle would
create a double jeopardy; it would comprise
an at of war and would also entail the risk
of having intervened and lost. Air power
might be temporarily beneficial to French
morale, bulb I had no intention of using
United states forces in any limited action
when the force employed would probably not
be decisively effective.
And. President Kennedy, in an inter-
view with NBC newsmen Chet Huntley
and I3ra,vid Brinkley, said:
The fact of the matter is that with the
assisltiance of the United States and SEATO,
Southeast Asia and indeed all of Asia has
been, maintained independent against a
powerful am force, the Chinese Communists.
WJlat I am concerned about is that Amery-
catis will get impatient and gay, because
they don't like events in Southeast Asia or
they don't like the Government in Saigon,
thaw w.,e ahoulrl withdraw. That only makes
it ens iror time Coinnlunists. I think we
silo 14d, stag. We should use our influence in
as effective away as we can, but we should
11 not draw.
President Johnson. in a message to
to are , thane who ask why this re-
bi1tty Should be ours. The, answer is
President Nixon addressed himself to
the importance of our prestige in his No-
vember 3 address to the Nation:
A Nation cannot remain great if it betrays
its allies and lets down its friends. Our de-
feat and humiliation in South Vietnam
would without question promote recklessness
in the councils of those great powers who
have not yet abandoned their goals of world
conquest.
This would spark violence wherever our
commitments help maintain peace-in the
Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in
the Western Hemisphere.
Ultimately, this would coat more lives. It
would not bring peace but more war.
We must, therefore, accomplish our
announced goal of withdrawing all com-
bat troops from Vietnam in a manner
which will preserve both our prestige
and credibility.
This course has been suggested on
many occasions by numerous critics of
this war. On February 17, 1965, the dis-
tinguished Senator from South Dakota
stated:
This is basically a political fight ... That
in the long run will have to be settled by the
Vietnamese people rather than by outsiders.
(senator GEORGE McGovERN).
The Senator on June 27, 1965, endorsed
a consolidation of our present position,
keeping our casualties at a minimum. He
said:
The strategy I have suggested the tight-
ening of our defense in South Vietnam and
the holding of the cities and the enclaves in
the coastal area--is a policy that involves
primarily political patience and military
restraint.
It will demonstrate to friend and foe alike
that we have the staying power to keep our
commitment according to the guidelines that
are most practical for us, rather than playing
the game according to guerrilla rules, which
includes the jungle ambush, at which they
are, the admitted masters.
A speedy resolution of the conflict is
the policy the President has attempted to
follow. Unfortunately, the intractability
of North Vietnam has made a negotiated
settlement impossible, at least for the
moment. I am hopeful that this situation
might change, but, if it does not, the
President has also been following a path
that will end our combat role in South
Vietnam without negotiated agreement.
VIETNAMIZATION
The purpose of my lengthy remarks
and liberal quotation of the statements
of others has been to provide the back-
ground necessary to understand the
merits of Vietnamization. In short, t14ey
are:
First. It is essentially an action we can
take with our South Vietnamese ally re-
gardless of what other nations do. In this
sense we are in control of our destiny.
Second. Our national goal of anti-
colonialism and the creation of viable in-
dependent states will be served.
Third. Our prestige and credibility in
international affairs will be preserved
and even enhanced.
The major difficulty that has developed
in this country over the policy of Viet-
namization is one of opinion. An increas-
ing segment of our society does not be-
lieve it will work. The actions in Cam-
bodia have been viewed by some as an
indication that it is not working, a view
with which I do not agree. The mere fact
that the South Vietnamese army, which a
few years ago could hardly defend
Saigon, is now functioning effectively in
the very sanctuaries of the enemy, is to
me an indication of its success rather
than its failure.
But if this one factor is not adequate to
dispel the feeling that Vietnamization
cannot work, let me describe to you the
success this program has been meeting
in South Vietnam.
When we speak of Vietnamization we
are essentially speaking of the process
by which the major military, paramili-
tary and civil responsibilities that Amer-
icans have assumed in South Vietnam
are returned to the South Vietnamese
Government.
The war has patterned the entire fab-
ric of South Vietnamese living. As the
United States withdraws from its con-
siderable involvement in the affairs of
that country, we have sought to be as-
sured that the South Vietnamese Gov-
ernment could provide for the legitimate
needs of the South Vietnamese people
who have depended on us. As we reduce
our committment in Vietnam, it is en-
cumbent upon us to coordinate with the
South Vietnamese and our other allies.
We must not pull the rug out from under
this nation after defending it for so
many years. Vietnamization is the pro-
gram we have chosen to fulfill our com-
mitment in Vietnam and at the same
time fulfill the commitment we have to
our own Nation to terminate U.S. in-
volvement in the fighting there.
IMPRESSIONS FROM PERSONAL VISIT
The responsibilities which the South
Vietnamese people want to resume for
themselves are many-fold and encom-
pass socioeconomic and political activi-
ties as well as military activities. I see
this implementation of the Vietnamiza-
tion program as possible primarily be-
cause of the success of the pacification
program carried out since our early par-
ticipation in the war.
When I visited South Vietnam last
summer I was greatly impressed by the
success of the relatively unheralded pac-
ification program. At that time, 76.4 per-
cent of the rural population of South
Vietnam lived in areas under control of
the Thieu government; and only 11.8
percent of their rural population were in
areas not controlled by the government.
If all urban and rural areas are consid-
ered together 84.2 percent of the total
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP72-00337l 000200230001-1
 May 28, 1970 Approved Fef)%Mf?gilLl/?1 ? 2DPgJR_R7R000200230001-1 S7983
poj~ulation-17,219,100-Were in pacified United States achievement. As the United As part of our overall United States troop
areas under complete South Vietnamese States effort increased, the public expected reduction in Vietnam, the number of
Government control while 8 percent lived a corresponding advancement toward victory infantry-type maneuver battalions has been
in areas occupied by, but not completely and peace, since there is no measurement of reduced by approximately 29% from one year
achievement the public cannot see the prog- ago. The forthcoming redeployment will, of
pacified by, the Thleu government and ress. As a -result, the war appears to some course, include more maneuver battalions as
only 7.8 percent of the total population people to be a hopeless quagmire. well as support forces.
did not live in pacified areas. Conversely, the enemy gets all the credit. We have also turned over to the South
The observations reflect an increas- In spite of the enormous military effort Vietnamese, or withdrawn some of our
ingly stable government structure in against them they continue to exist. Ergo: ground forces from about 26% of the tacti-
South Vietnam. My visit there was after the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese cal areas for which we once had complete
President Nixon's withdrawal of the first are victorious. Some people actually believe responsibility.
,000 troops, as I reported "thee, my this fantasy. Some go so far as to claim that As a direct result of our efforts at Vietnam-
25,000 United States forces are Immoral, illegal, izing the war, we have seen a 63% decrease
strongest impression was that it is only and have lost the war. in United States personnel killed in action
a matter of time before the very capable from the first quarter of 1969 to the same
South Vietnamese forces, trained by U.S. Colonel Tocci served in Vietnam from period in 1970. Similarly, the number of
forces, will replace our fighting men. The May 1966 to May 1967 as an air briefer United States military wounded in action
Vietnamization program has given the and later as chief of combat news for has been reduced by 54% during the same
South Vietnamese time; time to train the Seventh Air Force. That experience period. effective equipment
and arm themselves to resist further developed for him an intimate and inde- We have provided more
pendent knowledge of Vietnam opera- to the Republic of Vietnam Air Force to al-
agTiming is the essence of the Vietnami- tions. When he addressed himself to low them to proeecut the war. Their use of
Vietnamization in the Armed Forces this equipment to assume a greater portion
zation program. Most of us agree with of the combat role is encouraging. For ex-
President Nixon's goal of withdrawing Journal, he too spoke of the element of ample, attack sorties flown by the Vietnam
our forces. The element of time is the time: Air Force between first quarter 1969 and 1970
only dispute. In this program emphasis is placed on have increased more than 40% while the
The village of Gia Dang, which I visit- training and equipping the Vietnamese. As United States Air Force has decreased its
ed last summer with Senator BELLMON, they increase their capability and assume a sorties by over 47 %.
is a graphic illustration of what the stronger defensive posture, the United States To provide the Republic of Vietnam Air
redeploys its troops. More than 116;000 Amer- Force with adequate facilities not only to
Vietnamization program can achieve. leans have departed Vietnam in less than a conduct military operations, but also to as-
The people there told us how their year; more will follow as the Vietnamese po- sist iiny the United economic States development s turned over
former homes and villages had ber-n de- tential becomes fact.
stroyed by the war. They hid in eaves, But first it will take time. Training, equip- several key installations no longer required.
and scrounged for food along the rivers. ping, and building an experienced fighting The 9th Infantry Division Base at Dong Tam
Not until the ARVN was able to wrest team is not an overnight project. And second, is now the home of the ARVN 7th Infantry
control of that area were these dis- since this is a war for people, progress must Division. The United States Navy Base at My
include many nonmilitary aspects. Economic, Tho is now a Vietnamese navy facility. The
placed persons able to establish new social and internal security development 3rd Marine Division Base at Dong Ha is now
homes in the village of Gia Dang. With must advance along with the military. And used by the ARVN 1st Infantry Division. The
their security established by their awn third, the Communists must disrupt the Vietnamese Air Force now operates the air
army, Gia Dang is an active fishing vil- Vietnamization of the war or find themselves base at NHA Trang with remaining United
lage, self-supported by the initiative of without popular support and facing a strong States units as tenants. Recently, the base
the residents. Gin Dang showed me the all-Vietnamese armed force capable of pro- camp of the 4th United States Infantry Divi-
sound utility of.the Vietnamization pro- tecting its own people's freedom. The at- sion at Camp Enari, near Pleiku, was turned
gram. If we can provide the South Viet- tempts at disruption may cause temporary over to the Republic of Vietnam. Additional
slowdowns in the Vietnamization process. facilities at Danang. Vung Tau, Bien Hoa, Lai
namese forces time to train for the gen- Vietnamization combines the best ele- Khe, Can Tho, and Binh Thuy are also pro-
eral protection of their country as we ments of United States involvement with grammed for turnover in the near fixture.
did in Gia Dang, our troops will return Vietnamese aspirations. The end result, given The task of training the RVN serviceman
home and remain home. time for implementation, is in keeping with not only in the basic skills of his branch but
EVALUATING VIETNAMIZATION the American commitment and position as also in the technical skills required to oper-
a responsible leader in the free world. ate and maintain the newer equipment, has
In the national media and here on been formidable. We have assisted the GVN
the Senate floor we have heard much When considering the Vietnamization in establishing more and better training fa-
about different, methods of calculations program, we cannot overemphasize its cilities to accommodate the requirement for
to measure' sucesses or failures in the broad effect-military, political, and training centers and service schools. These
Vietnam war the Vietnamization pro- socioeconomic. Each of these aspects so facilities currently have a student training
load of over 600,000, up 27% from 1969 and
gram should be subject to the salve interacts with each other and this is the up over 50% from 1968.
scrutiny. The perspective offered by Lt. complexity of the subject. I asked the De- In addition, a substantial number of Re-
Col. Vince Tocci writing in May's Armed partment of Defense for information on public of Vietnam Air Force personnel are
Forces Journal is pertinent to this point: each of these aspects. Let me present this brought to the United States each year to re-
There are statistics on nearly evety con- report on the progress of Vietnamization calve technical training not yet available in
ceivable activity in the war. How many in- to you: _ Vietnam. This year, over 7,000 Vietnamese
direct attacks? How many fish? How much PROGRESS IN VIETNAMIZATION-MILITARY military personnel will be trained in a wide
rice? How many weapons? How many de- variety of advanced skills in the United
serters? How many bars? It's a wonder same- I would particularly like to direct interest States, compared with approximately 2,600
one doesn't ask, "How many-'how manys' to two areas of progress resulting from pure- last year, and 1,900 in 1968. Over half of the
are kept?" The real question is, "What does ly military operations. The first is the In- 1970 student load in the United States con-
it all mean?" creased presence throughout the Vietnamese sists of helicopter and fixed wing pilot
It is important if it fits into a proper con- countryside of stabilizing agencies of the trainees and mechanics.
text. In the wrong framework these statis- government of Vietnam which promote in- As you know, the regular forces of the
tics are practically worthless. Unfortunately, creased basic security for the people; sec- Republic of Vietnam Air Force have been
statistics have become ends in themselves ondly, the social and economic Improve- allowed to devote more and more attention
rather than substantive items which help to ments throughout the countryside which to purely tactical operations due to the for-
explain or clarify the situation. The wrong are visible to, and directly assist, the Viet- mation of paramilitary security forces rang-
framework-iersimplified and overquanti- namese people at the lowest level. ing from the popular forces to national po-
fled-will not, clarify this problem. For its We are making visible progress in Viet- lice to peoples self-defense forces.
part, the U.S. Government, while keeping namizing the military portion of the war. These security forces provide visible evi-
the American public apprised of all these The results of our efforts to turn over the dence of GVN presence to the villagers. The
numbers, has probably added to the con- fighting to the RVNAF are encouraging. Fore- National police have expanded from a force
fusion. - most among the results, of course, is the 21 level of approximately 17,000 In 1964 to
What is needed is a new device for measur- percent reduction in our total troop strength nearly 90,000 today. The national police have
ing progress Ii a guerrilla war. The measur- to below the 434,000 directed by the Presi- two distinct roles: support of pacification
ing devices currently in use do net really dent. The recently announced reduction of measures and national development. In both
measure progress In a war of insurgency. an additional 150,000 will, of course, be roles, attention is focused on creation of a
The statistics reported to date have been paced by the progress of Vietnamization, as stable government with an effective civil
measuring United States effort and not well as the level of enemy activity. police force throughout urban and rural
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200230001-1
 S 7984 Approved For R* /bNWt: jRW-aRlb720 j 0200230001-1 May 28, 1.970
areas. In its paramilitary role In pacifica- primary means of moving farm-to-market
Lion, trained police field forces companies products. The RVN highway system includes
are employed in the villages, hamlets, and 12,500 miles of roads comprised of national
urban areas to identify and.neutralize the highways (2,400 miles), interprovincial high-
Viet Cong infrastructure. ways (1,600 miles), and 8,500 miles of pro-
,A a civil police body,'the national police vincial roads. United States efforts have been
protection and services have been expanded directed toward upgrading about 2/3 of the
downward from province and district loca- 4,000 mile national and inter-provincial sys-
tions into the. villages. Currently, more than -tem, not only to facilitate military opera-
6,000 uniformed police are assigned to ap- tions, but also to assist in the economic de-
proximately 1,700 villages. During the next velopment of the nation.
several months, the bulk of police increases Of these approximately 2,570 miles of
will be a# village level. To be effective in highway, upgrading construction is under-
both roles, police training (wilth United way or completed on nearly 1,800 miles or
States assistance) is provided in three basic about two-thirds of the total. 25,000 meters
training centers which have a combined of bridges are included in the line of com-
training capacity of over 4,500 trainees for munication upgrading program, of which
the 12-week cycle.' Additional training fa- over 40 percent have been completed. The
ellities for medium and'higher level police construction effort required to pave these
command training are in'operation. To date, roads has been provided primarily by U.S.
approximately 140,000 Vietnamese police have military engineer construction units (80%).
been trained in Vietnam while about 300 About 65%u of the total road network in
have received. specialized training in the Vietnam is now classified as secure ('open
United States. An.additional 1,900 have been during daylight') with the bulk of these
trained in selected third countries. roads being in areas necessary for economic
Approximately 50~I% of all police now op- development.
erate outside urban areas, with lncreastng US. and Vietnamese river and canal op-
numbers, being assigned to district and vil- erations have provided security for over 70%
lage level.. Their presence complements the of the commercial waterways in Vietnam.'
paramilitary functions of the popular forces, A major effort during the last half of 1969
who also operate under the direction of the has opened railways which have been closed
village chiefs. for many years. 55% of the 1,240 kilometers
The popular forces have been increased in of main line and branc}I lines are now open
size by over 20% in the past year and are to traffic., Approximately 64% of the railroad
the military arm of the village chief. They is now considered secure, as compared with
are organized and trained as platoons and approximately 21% at the beginning of 1967.
assigned as local area security for villages Medical care and health facilities in the
and hamlets. They live with the population villages has been a pressing need, while the
they serve and are tangible examples of the number of doctors available in the country
government's efforts to provide security to all is far below the requirement, ambitious ef-
the population. The PF have been equipped' forts are underway to provide health care
with M-16 rifles and newer radios for better programs to every citizen. A coordinated
effectiveness. military-civilian health plan is in effect in
I think we can see here that the which joint utilization of health facilities
and exchange of personnel is being carried
bolstered South Vietnamese forces-on out, first at province hospitals and then at
all levels.the extensive training pro- district and military sub-sector dispensaries.
grams and the modernized equipment In a nation of 17 illion people, 20 mil-
are all substantial contributions to. the lion smallpox, cholera' and plague immune=
Vietnamization program. nations were administered in 1969 as com-
pared with 16 million the previous year.
soclo-ECONOMIC To provide an education to as many Viet-
Land reform and other assistance to namese children as possible, massive strides
the predominantly agrarian interests of have been made in educational facilities. The
the South Vietnamese people have Elementary Education System is now capable
of enrolling approximately 85% of the school
secured social and economic benefits un- age population.
der the Vietnamization program. Again I wish I could say the same for my
I quote the Defense Department briefing
The farmer requires land on which to The most recent statistics show that over
grow his crop, seed to start the growth, and 2,340,000. or 80% of the school age children
a means of getting his crop to market. To are enrolled in public and private schools.
provide more land to the farmers, the Viet- Enrollment in secondary education schools
namese Government has redistributed over increased from 472,OOQ in 1968 to 543,000 in
267,500 acres of land to the people during 1969. Total teachers in the secondary (high
the past two years. Of this total, approxi- school) education system increased from 11,-
mately 75% was turned over in the past 12 500 to 13,400 during the same period.
months. Enrollment in the 21 vocational schools
The recently enacted 'land-to-the-tiller' (which include junior technical, trade tech-
law (commonly referred to as the Land Re- nical and polytechnic schools), has increased
form haw) will provide approximately 21/4 by over 3,000 to 11,360 from 1968 to 1969,
nuuwu acres. vi senu cwnersuip to Iarmers
who actually cultivate the land. Under this
law, the government will direct the transfer
of land from .approximately 50,000 absent
land owners to approximately 600,000 tenant
farmers with appropriate compensations. The
new program'will be administered. at village
level.
Improved strains of rice (IR-$which in-
crease the yield up to 150% have--been intro-
du.cefi under the accelerated rice production
In the five universities and five normal
schools, over 41,000 students are enrolled.
I have dwelt in some detail on the meas-
ures of progress which have been made in
Vietnamization. The continuation of this
progress, with the ultimate objective of a
self-reliant government in South Vietnam, is
dependent on a climate of security through-
out the country. Threats to, or actual dis-
ruption of this security is of grave concern to
program. By the end of 1970, Vietnamese rice POLITICAL
farmers should be producing sufficient quan-
tities of rice for Vietnamese cQLlsumption It can be said of the political aspect of
to no longer require imports of rice from the the Vietnamization program that the
United Statesl Government of South Vietnam Is more
to' mar a Ito s and waterways are the decade. Since 1966 seven election periods
have been held in South Vietnam As
Marine Gen. Lewis Walter put it, elec-
tions are important-
Not only because they reflect the nature of
the government, but also because they indi-
cate the degree of commitment which the
Vietnamese people have made to their gov-
ernment.
In each of the seven election periods
the Vietnamese have demonstrated re-
sounding support for the democratic
process. More than 80 percent of all the
eligible voters turned out in each elec-
tion. I might add that this compares
favorably with the United States, where
only about 60 percent of eligible Ameri-
cans exercise their right to vote.
VIETNAMIZATION AND THE NIXON DOCTRINE
Vietnamization is the embodiment of
the Asian doctrine President Nixon enun-
ciated at Guam last year. Secretary Laird
has stated that this program "supports
our obligations to our allies in South
Vietnam, and, at the same time, imple-
ments our expectation and insistence
that in the future military defense will
and must be a responsibility increasingly
shouldered by the Asian nations them-
selves." Vietnamization is our first appli-
cation of that doctrine. And as Secretary
Laird has aptly pointed out:
If the test succeeds in Vietnam, other
nations in Asia which wish to live in peace
will be encouraged, and nations that seek
conquest by war-waged directly or by
proxy-will be deterred from aggression. In
short ... Vietnamization provides the Amer-
ican people with a practical middle course
between isolationism and the role of world
policeman.
Mr. President, I have asked the De-
partment of Defense to provide me with
a list of the countries to which we pro-
vide military aid or training under the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. This is
dated May 28, 1970. This information
shows that we provide assistance to the
following countries:
Afghanistan
Australia
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Ceylon
Chile
Nationalist China
Colombia
Congo
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Ethiopia
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Honduras
India
Indonesia
Iran
Jordan
Lebanon
Korea
Liberia
Libya
Malaysia
Mexico
Morocco
Nepal
Nicaragua
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Portugal
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Spain
Tunisia
Turkey
Uruguay
Venezuela
Three countries are receiving assist-
ance under the defense appropriations
bill-namely, Laos, Thailand, and Viet-
nam.
I note that the pending amendment
would prevent the executive branch from
furnishing military instruction to Cam-
bodian forces or providing military in-
struction in Cambodia.
AMENDMENT NO. e63
I send to the desk-and request that
it be printed-an amendment to the
Approved For Release 2001111/01 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200230001-1
 May 28, 1970 Approved CONGRESSIONAL /REODP~7~2~I7R000200230001-1 S 7985
Cooper-Church amendment No. 653
which would delete from subsections 2
and 3 the prohibition against providing
military training to Cambodians or mili-
tary training in Cambodia.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem.-
pore , (Mr. METCALF). The amendment
will be received and printed, and will lie
on the table.
The amendment is as follows:
AMENDMENT NO. 663
Delete the following:
(1) Sec. 47, subsection 2. ``. furnish
military instruction to Cambodian forces
or
(2) Sec. 48, subsection 3. " . . . to provide
military instruction in Cambodia, or .. ."
. Mr. STEVENS. I cannot see why we
should cut off from Cambodia the train-
ing we are giving to so many other na-
tions to increase their own ability to de-
fend themselves. I can understand full
well why some of the other provisions of
the Cooper-Church amendment were of-
fered, but I do not understand the prohi-
bition against military instruction to
Cambodian forces or military instruction
in Cambodia. It would prevent us, for
exalliple, from training their pilots. It
would prevent us from training any of
their people in Vietnam or in Cambodia
itself. This is a provision of the Cooper
Church amendment which I just do not
understand, and I would be very willing
to listen to anyone who wants to explain
it.
I am informed that every time we
either give or sell military equipment to
a foreign nation, we provide advisers who
instruct them in the use of that equip-
ment. Why is it that Laos, Thailand, and
-Vietnam should receive this advice and
this service in providing for their own
defense, while we simultaneously pre-
vent the President from giving similar
instruction-or ordering the military
to give similar instruction-in Cambodia
or to Cambodians? I think this is one of
the serious defects of the Cooper-Church
amendment.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence
of a quorum.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the
roll.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unani-
mous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded. ,
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
. Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, on yester-
day I offered an amendment to the pend-
ing Cooper-Church amendment. The
purpose of the amendment I have offered
is to foreclose any possibility of denying
rescue to Americans being held captive
in Cambodia.
So that there will be no mistake as to
the language of my amendment, I will
state it again: .
On page 4, line 21, insert "(a) " after "Sec.
On page 5, between lines 18 and 19, insert
the following new subsection:
"(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of
this section shall be inoperative during any
period that the President determines that
citizens or nationals of the United States
are held as prisoners of war in Cambodia by
the North Vietnamese or the forces of the
National Liberation Front."
Mr. President, this amendment has but
one purpose. It has but one aim. It is ad-
dressed to but one issue.
That issue is the plight of Americans
held prisoner by the enemy. Primarily
these Americans are servicemen, . but
there have been instances of journalists
being captured.
Mr. President, the amendment which I
have offered will serve not only as notice
to the enemy of the U.S. determination
to do whatever is possible and necessary
to secure the release of American cap-
tives. It will also stand as an expression
of the Senate's concern to the parents,
wives, and families of captured and miss-
ing American servicemen.
This is not an idle gesture. Those who
await the return of their loved ones be-
lieve-and with reason-that every bit of
pressure which is put on the enemy re-
sults in better treatment for their men.
And every action taken by our Govern-
ment-whether at the negotiating table
in Paris, at the White House, or in the
Hails of Congress--everything done to
show concern, interest, and awareness
gives some measure of comfort and
strength to the brave and courageous
families who keep watch for their absent
fathers, sons, and husbands.
Earlier this month, I received a let-
ter from the wife of an Air Force major
missing since November 1967. In closing
she said:
Our five children and I have been sustained
by the belief that our Government will not
abandon my husband and his fellow service-
men.
Mr. President, what more clear-cut
notice of abandonment could be given
than through legislation which would
forbid American troops to cross an imag-
inary, meaningless line in an Asian jun-
gle-even if that crossing were to secure
the freedom of captive Americans?
The Cooper-Church amendment, as it
now reads, would forbid U.S. forces from
entering Cambodia, even if the purpose
of their mission were to rescue Americans
being held prisoners of war by the
enemy.
Mr. President, the Senate cannot serve
such cold and abrupt notice on the men
who are being held prisoner, on the men
who daily risk capture, or on their
families.
I urge my colleagues to consider these
points and to join In approving this
amendment as an expression of concern
for our military personnel and their
loved ones. An expression to them and
to the enemy as well.
Mr. President, I would urge my col-
leagues seriously to consider the amend-
ment I offered yesterday, to give the
President the right to say, in effect, that
the, provisions of the Church-Cooper
amendment shall become inoperative if
the President determines that Americans
are being held captive by the North Viet-
namese and by the National Liberation
Front in the country of Cambodia.
I think the amendment would express
the concern that we feel in the Senate
and Congress as a whole for those who
are now prisoners of war or missing In
action, not only in Cambodia but also
throughout Southeast Asia.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of
a quorum.
The PRESIDING OP'FYCER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceed-*
ed to call the roll.
Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I ask unani-
mous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
SPARKMAN). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
CORRECTION OF VOTE
(NOS. 150 AND 151 EXEC.)
Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, during the
vote taken yesterday on the two treaties,
the Senator from Indiana was standing
at his seat as the rollcall proceeded for
the first time. I voted.
One of the officials of the Senate at the
table here recorded my vote, but for
some reason or other, it was not recorded
in the official rollcall.
I therefore ask unanimous consent
that my vote be cast as "aye," as I au-
dibly cast it yesterday in person.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, th-orrection will be made.
AMENDMENT OF THE FOREIGN
MILITARY SALES ACT
The Senate continued with the con-
sideration of the bill (H.R. 15628) to
amend the Foreign Military Sales Act.
UNANIMOUS-CONSENT REQUEST
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
SPARKMAN). The Senator from Arkansas
(Mr. FULBRIGAT) is now recognized.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Arkansas yield, with-
out losing his right to the floor?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, with
the concurrence of the distinguished
chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, who now holds the floor, and
with the proviso that he does not lose his
right to the floor, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the vote on the pending Dole
amendment occur at the hour of 11:30
o'clock on Wednesday morning next.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Reserving the right
to object-
Mr. GRIFFIN. Reserving the right to
object-
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, does
that exclude, may I ask, the right to move
to table-
Mr. MANSFIELD. No. Every Senator's
right is preserved.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. In other words, I
would still be free to move to table prior
to the rollcall vote.
Mr. MANSFIELD. The vote would oc-
cur at that time, otherwise-
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not make my-
self clear-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair
would state that-
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
withhold the motion.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Let me restate it.
If I can still move to table, I have no
objection.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Will the Chair
please clarify that point?
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
SPARKMAN), I am advised by the Parlia-
mentarian that a motion to table would
not be in order, unless that specific pro-
Y
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200230001-1
 S 7986
Approved For e & 4 " Q 8 1 1 ~172 A7 000200230001- lay 28, 1970
vision is included in the unanimous-
consent request.
4 Mr. FULBRIGHT. If it would allow
me to move to table before that. time,
then I have no objection to a vote. It
would come either in the form of a mo-
tion or on its_ merits. I think there should
be a right to move to table. That is cus-
tomary.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Every Senator's
right on that is understood.
Mr. FULBRIGHT, I want it clear by
agreeing to this that I would not be fore-
closing a move to table prior to a vote.
Mr. GRIFFIN, Mr. President, may I
inquire of the Senator--oh, just prior,
he said-I caught that last part-It
would not allow a motion to table on
Monday ar Tuesday
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I ajn not trying to
be technical, just reserving "the right to
make a motion to table before the vote
on its merits.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Montana 'included that in his
unanimous-consent request. Is there
objection?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. president, re-
serving the right to object-I 11
Mr, GRIFFIN. Mr. Presid nf, for the
moment, I object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection
is heard.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, r be-
lieve I have the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator is correct.
PETITIONS RECEIVED PRO AND CON
TB1HT. Mr. President, on
two previous occasions, May 13 and May
19, I have reported to the Senate on the
large numbers of petitions I have re-
ceived in recent days.
These petitions are only a part of the
tremendous amount of correspondence I
have received. Altogether I have heard
from more than 260,000 people, and the
mail is still being counted.
I have received petitions from 145,486
people-counted thus far-who are op-
posed to the continuation and widening
of the war in Indochina. I have also,re-
ceived petitions from 1,202 persons in
support of President Nixon's policies.
Once again I have summarized the
petitions, and I ask unanimous consent
that this additional list be printed in the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the petitions
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
SUMMATION OF PETITIONS
Petitions circulated by Friends Seminary,
New York, containing 3,411 signatures. They
oppose the Administration's policies in In-
dochina and call for withdrawal of U.S.
troops.
A statement from 10. faculty members of
the Ofadluate SG4ool of Social,. Work of the
University of Arkansas stating:
It is our belief that the violence in Indo-
china is related to the current climate of
violence, repression and distrust which is in-
creasingly prevadi_.g our nation ... We de-
plore the senseless murders of 'college stu-
dents, at Iien,t State University and at Jack-
son State Cgl,le a ... We urge an immediate
cessation of unlawful attempts to quell any
participation in public protest against so , A petition with 116 names from the Sch' of
costly and so inhumane a war.
A petition from 27 students at the Arkan-
sas Graduate School of Social Work calls for
a withdrawal of troops from Indochina and
a re-ordering of national priorities.
A petition from 29 persons in Hope, Arkan-
sas, favoring the "Amendment to End the
War".
A petition from 60 persons in Gassville,
Arkansas, and another from nine persons in
Little Rock, average age 51, supporting the
"Amendment to End the War."
Thirty signatures on a petition from Little
Rock in support of the Cooper-Church
amendment.
A petition with 24 signatures from the
College of Liberal Arts at Arkansas State
University in support of the "Amendment
to End the War."
120 additional signatures on petitions from
the University of Arkansas.
A petition from 18 members of the Ar-
kansas Chapter of the National Association of
Social Workers backing the amendments to
discontinue funds for the war in Indochina.
Petitions with 20 signatures from Moun-
tain Home, Ark., five from Monticello, Ark.,
23 from Little Rock, 30 from Jonesboro, 13
from Fayetteville, 31 from Batesville, 46
from Sheridan, 20 from Searcy, 41 from Cam-
den, seven from Bentonville, 65 from Tex-
arkana, and 40 from Henderson State Col-
lege, all in support of the "Amendment to
End the War." These were hand written
petitions, circulated among friends and
neighbors.
A petition from 62 federal employees of
the Western Regional Office of Economic
Opportunity stating:
"We fervently oppose America's presence
in Southeast Asia ... The war may be the
greatest threat to America's security and its
future in our history. ,
Petitions from 21. persons in Iowa City,
Iowa, and 68 in Granada Hills, Calif. sup-
porting the "End-the-War" Amendment.
A petition from 37 faculty and students of
the graduate religious studies program at
Mundelein College, Ill.
Petitions from 27 persons in Los Altos,
Calif., 16 in Sacramento, 35 in Chicago and
12 in Pontiac, Mich., calling for American
withdrawal from Indochina.
Petitions and letters from 12,324 persons
throughout the New York area Galling for
withdrawal from Southeast Asia as "the only
path to a just and honorable peace." The
signatures were collected by the Women
Strike for Peace, East Meadow, N.Y.
Petitions from 645 persons in Forest Hills,
N.Y., supporting the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee's position against military involve-
ment in Cambodia.
A petition from 15 workers and the man-
agement of Central Molded Products Co.,
Chicago calling for an end to the war and
"a beginning in the fight to improve our
quality of life at home."
A petition from 278 students and faculty
of the College of Engineering, University of
Wisconsin which concludes:
"Repression by force will only fan the
flames of conflict and will tear to sb sds the
fabric of our society. To end violence at home
we must first put an end to violence abroad.
The invasion of Cambodia must stop at once.
The war in Vietnam must be ended quickly.
Then we must work together toward the goal
of a better society for all."
A petition from 38 faculty and staff mem-
bers at Sequoia High School, Redwood City,
Calif., urging Congress to exercise its Con-
stitutional powers to halt the war, and a
similar petition from the Department of
History and Social Science of Rye Neck,
N.Y., High School.
A petition from 27 faculty members of
Queens College, Charlotte, N.C. urging in-
creased efforts for early termination of U.S.
military involvement in Southeast Asia.
of Architecture and Planning, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology urging "withdrawal
of all funds spent on military Action in
Southeast Asia, with the exception of money
needed to bring the troops home."
A petition with 180 names from Yuba Col-
lege, Marysville, Calif., opposing the Presi-
dent's policies in Southeast Asia and "his
disregard for Constitutional and democratic
processes."
A petition from 72 persons in Los Angeles
supporting the Cooper-Church and McGov-
ern-Hatfield Amendments.
A petition with 37 signatures from Oswego,
N.Y., and one from Harrisburg, Pa., with 33
signatures opposing further American .mili-
tary action in Southeast Asia.
Petitions with 19 names from Redwood
City, Calif., 23 from Evanston, Ill., seven
from East Boston, Mass., 17 from Davis,
Calif., 19 from Fort Worth, Texas, all favor-
ing the "Amendment to End the War.""
A petition with 186 names from Rice Uni-
versity, Houston, Texas, opposing the
President's action "without seeking the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate.-
A "petition for peace" from Princeton,
N.J., with 122 signatures, urging "immediate
Congressional passage of legislation to limit
and end the war."
Petitions from Houston, Texas, with 106
signatures opposing the President's actions
and additional petitions with 14 signatures
favoring the Cooper-Church Amendment and
16 signatures supporting the "Amendment to
End the War."
A petition from 23 students and faculty of
the School Psychology Training Program at
the University of Minnesota strongly dis-
agreeing with President Nixon's expansion
of the war.
Sixteen signatures on a petition from
Franklin and Marshall College, Lancaster,
Pa., "wholeheartedly opposing the Nixon
Administration's actions in Indochina."
A petition from 60 citizens of Oak Park,
Ill., expressing "strong opposition to our
country's economic and military involvement
in Southeast Asia."
A petition from 83 persons at Willamette
University, Salem, Oregon, supporting an end
to American military involvement in South-
east Asia.
Petitions from 51 persons in Detroit and
12 persons in Crawfordsville, Ind., opposing
the President's actions in Cambodia.
A petition from the faculty and students
of Albany Medical college, N.Y., with 86 sig-
natures calling the war in Indochina "un-
necessary, illegal, militarily hopeless, moral-
ly wrong and destructive to our society."
A petition from 51 correctional workers for
the Adult and Juvenile Probation Depart-
ments, Santa Clara County, Calif., support-
ing the Foreign Relations Committee.and
calling for withdrawal of American troops
from Southeast Asia.
A petition from 14 members of the
Department of Linguistics, University of Ha-
waii supporting the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee and opposing the "invasion of
Cambodia".
A statement signed by 28 faculty members
and students professional involved in East
and Southeast Asian Studies at Indiana Uni-
versity which concludes:
. We deeply doubt the assumptions that
the United States may become a second-rate
power unless we win a military victory in
Vietnam, and that American "credibility"
and the future of the free world are at
stake . . . Real victory for America lies in a
speedy military disengagement from the in-
ternal conflicts of the Southeast Asian
peoples.
A petition from 60 persons In Millis, Mass.,
opposed to the expanded war.
A petition from 30 employees of a State
of Connecticut agency and another from
eight persons in Boulder, Colo., calling for
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200230001-1
 -rr
Mc 28, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECOR - fro
Southeast Asia and the
tection Athdrawal of our forces from Southeast the tion hof the war "ca ealth and welfaarreooftther peoples of our rights to protest and pe itionroas guaran-
Asia.
A petition from a group of 35 psycho- Indochina and of the United States." teed by the Constitution."
therapists in the New York area which A petition from 250 students and proles- A petition from 10 Southern New Jersey
concludes: sors of the School of Law, University of Call- lawyers stating that "law and order becomes
We call upon the Congress to use its Con- fornia, Berkeley, urging Congress "to reassert a hollow chant" when the President ignores
stitutional powers to bring the war in Indo- Constitutional power over the declaration omit violates Constitutional duties and li.
china to an immediate end. This may be the and conducts of foreign wars."
only means of retrieving into America the A petition from 141 faculty, staff and grad- A petition from 34 members and friends of sup thousands of disaffected young people who uate students in the Department of Biologi- the Episcopal Se ami on nary of the Cari b smart In p
termin -
to save t cothe people who will save or Incal Sences, Purdue diana, deploring the escalation oft heewr Cambodia and a rapid withdrawal from
are-ultimately-the
fall to save the e country'
A petition from 237 member, of the acs- and calling for a rapid, orderly withdrawal Viet pemtion with 108 signatures from Min-
of community of the Stevens Institute of American troops. n A pet i osing with the of the war
of Technology, N.J., calling for an end to Petitions with 184 signatures from Albany, p pP
the war. N.Y., 15 from Schenectady and 52 from and favoring a "total reordering of American
A petition from 29 members of the fac- Poughkeepsie, supporting the Foreign Rela- priorities."
ulty of The Lawrenceville School, Lawrence- tiona Committee and stating that "the tragic Petitions containing 1,440 signatures gath-Calif ville, N.J., deploring the action in Cambodia experience in Vietnam must not be re- School s udentsnf the PB eresidentkeley, Nixon's in
and a petition from 23 faculty members at peated in Cambodia."
Kellogg High School, St. Paul, Minn., ex- Telegrams signed by 21 art critics, art his- vasion of Cambodia", "the resumption of
pressing "overriding concern over President torians and educators in New York and, 17 bombing in North Vietnam", and "the murder
Nixon's dangerous and ill-advised course of medical social workers of four students in Kent, persons in Brooten,
action in Cambodia." County, Calif., opposing the President's Minn., irsand fr200 om In 114 p pens supporting the
A petition from 325. students at Balboa actions.
High School, San Francisco, who'"non-vio- A petition from 420 persons in Racine, Wis., "Amendment to End the War." petit
f
m 57 staff members nambodi ,. the action of President Nixon tivescalling to oppo e~this and clared warandgto Fmilly Se vi n eroAssociation of America opthe
in Cmodia.' sin
war. A petition from 132 New Jersey citizens reduce all military activity in Southeast Asia P?A petit on fomd24 students and professors
opposing further appropriations for war in as quickly as possible."
Cambodia, Vietnam or Laos. Statements of support from 102 persons of the Associated Colleges of the Midwest
A petition from 106 persons in Newfolden, at San Francisco College for women for the Central American Field Program in Costa
Minn., opposing the President's actions in Foreign Relations Committee's efforts to "de- Rica opposing further U.S. involvement in
Cambodia. fend the Constitutional rights of the Senate." Southeast Asia.
A petition from 75 persons In Columbus, A petition from 58 students, staff and fac- A petition signed by 72 faculty, students
-
Ohio, deploring "the United States' military ulty in behavioral science at the University and staff of the Department of German, Unithe
intervention in Cambodia." of Colorado calling for an American with- versity of California, Berkeley, opposing
Petitions from 31 computer industry em- drawal from Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and escalation of the and petition of Ch m-
ployees in Cupertino, Calif., 14 persons in Thailand. by 3 380 members of the Chem-
Kansas City, Mo., 43 persons in Fresno, Calif., A petition from 58 members of the faculty istry expressing "opposition Department
and 35 persons in Houston, Texas, support- and administration of Hamilton College, Clin- istration's current policy in Southeast Asia"
ing the "Amendment to End the War." ton, N.Y., deploring the Cambodian action and urging Congressional action to bring forces.
Petitions with 80 signatures from staff and urging instead "a rapid acceleration of about withdrawal U.S. 700 persons in Brook-
Library of the Northwestern University American withdrawal from Vietnam." Petitions signed by
Library advocating withdrawal of U.S. troops Forty-six letters from citizens of the com- lyn, N.Y., "supporting the Foreign Relations
from Southeast Asia. munity of Hauppauge, L.I., New York, ex- Committee's position against any escalation
A petition from 60 persons in Skokie, Ill., pressing deep disapproval of the "continua- of the war" from favoring The of all U and one from 1S persons in San Jose, Calif., tion and furtherance of the war." U.S. troops collm Soted t as t the Asia. n Com-
apposing the President's actions. A petition with 490 signatures from Spring-ons by
A petition signed by 51 United States citi- field, Mass., opposing our involvement in m nica iioa ActioiniCo 222 rigor P ace.
zens in Florence, Italy, strongly opposing the Cambodia.
Presidents move in Cambodia. Petitions with 553 names from Park Forest, the New York area in support of the Mc-
A petition from 246 persons at Wellesley Ill., opposing the expanded war and calling Goven of tfleld to endl power nd tha e eas-
College calling upon the Congress to reassert for American withdrawal. ser =its Constitutional powers. A petition from 50 members of the Iliff gress.
A petition from 16 persons at Meadville School of Theology, Denver, Colo., which A petition from 408 San Francisco Bay
Thoelogical School, Chicago, calling for' with- states: Area trade unionists and a copy of a letter to
drawal from Cambodia, a planned program We are convinced that President Nixon's President Nixon which states:
with withdrawal from Vietnam, and uphold- policy can serve no rational or moral objec- The economy of our country is steadily
ing the right of dissent. tive. The policy only perpetuates and intensi- being eroded . . . Promises to stabilize the
A petition from 11 faculty members of the ties the needless suffering of countless peoples economy and control inflation have become
School of Advanced International Studies, and the destruction of lands not our own. less meaningless. Our paychecks buy less for
Johns Hopkins University, expressing "strong The policy makes a mockery of values such as our families; our standard of living has been
opposition to the United States incursion peace, justice and freedom . assaulted. We are suffering increased infla-
into Cambodia and the resumption of bomb- Petitions from 154 persons in Northville, tion and unemployment. Now Cambodia!
ing of North Vietnam." Mich., 84 in New York and 41 in Santa Mon- What next? There must be an end to these
Petitions signed by 170 students and adults ica, Calif., in support of amendments to cut military adventures . .
in Middlesex, N.J., calling for an end to off further funding for military action in Eighty-two letters from Chicago citizens,
our involvement in Cambodia and Vietnam. Southeast Asia. forwarded by the Roosevelt University Stu-
A petition from 17 students and 20 teach- A petition from 180 faculty and students dent Senate, advocating withdrawal from
ers at Saint Elizabeth High School, Oakland, of the Music Department of San Fernando Cambodia and Vietnam and repeal of the
Calif., supporting efforts to change our policy Valley State College, Northridge, Calif., op- Tonkin Gulf Resolution.
in Southeast Asia and "bring a speedy end to posing the expansion of the war. Petitions with 1,274 names gathered in the
U.S. Involvement in the affairs of Vietnam Petitions from 23 persons in Syracuse, N.Y. New York area and forwarded by the Women
and Cambodia." and 43 in Euclid, Ohio, favoring action to Strike for Peace in support of the Hatfield-
A petition from 35 staff and students of the proonhsibn Cmbodfunding for military opera- McGovern Amendment and other actions to
Center for Research in Human Learning, halt further funding of military operations
University of Minnesota, urging U.S. with- Petitions from 3,681 persons in San Diego in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.
drawal from Cambodia and a petition from "opposed to United States military interven- A petition from 609 persons in Honolulu
165 students and faculty of the University tion in Cambodia." calling for the rapid withdrawal of Amer-
of Minnesota Law School calling the "inva- A "Declaration of Peace" from 195 women ican military forces from Indochina and
sion of, Cambodia" an "unconstitutional ex- in the Bethlehem, Pa., area. urging all citizens "to the higher patriot-
erOise of executive power" and a "shameful Petitions supporting the "Amendment to ism-Help save your country."
expa~l$ion of an already immoral and in- End the War" signed by 15 persons In Los Petitions hearing 3,176 names from North-
humane war." Angeles, 18 in Hyannis, Mass., 21 in Norman, western University, Evanston, Ill. The peti-
A petition with 65 names from Cornvallis, Okla., 117 in Columbus, Ohio, seven in Orin- tions read: Fou
S Ore., opposing further American involvement da, Calif., 30 in Fremont, Calif., and 141 in ha a r students i at Kent sla nt t rUnvvenity
in Cambodia. Santa Cruz, Calif. been A petition with 142 names from medical A petition from 171 employees of the Man- what we consider an immoral and uncon-
and paramedical personnel of -St. Luke's Hos- hattan State Hospital Complex, N.Y., calling stitutional decision made by President Nixon.
pital Center, New York, opposing the escala- for "the withdrawal of all American troops We strongly urge Congress to take action
ti
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 :CIA-RDP72-00337R000200230001-1
 S 7988
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200230001-1 -
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 28, 1970,
a
citizens. The petition supports the move to
restrict further funding for the war except
for the safe withdrawal of American troops.
The petition continues . . .
We should all be blushing with shame that
our United States of America has been a
partner in the Southeast Asian War .
We are an "association of retired persons"
but we don't believe in retiring from our re-
sponsible duty to our Creator and our fel-
low-beings. In other words, we strongly be-
lieve in standing for what we are strongly
convinced is\right.
to see that our men are taken out of Cam- against any military involvement in Cam-
bodda immediately, and that we become dis- bodia."
engaged from Southeast Asia without de- Petitions containing 2,765 additional sig-
lay . . natures from the New York area opposing
1,303 signatures on petitions gathered by further funding for military operations in
students at New York University calling for Southeast Asia.
a withdrawal of American troops from South- 2,205 additional signatures on petitions
east Asia, gathered by the Queens College community
Petitions containing 3,766 names collected in New York for a total of 7,532 persons pro-
by students and faculty of Hofstra Uni- testing "President Nixon's unconstitutional
versify. The petitions read: escalation in Indochina" and reaffirming the
We ... who live, work or study in Nassau right of peaceful dissent.
County, N.Y., oppose the involvement of A petition signed by 704 persons at the
American forces in Cambodia and implore Mount Sinai Medical Center, New York, urg-
the President and the Congress to take what- ing that we "end the killing in Indochina
ever steps are necessary to withdraw Ameri- by bring our troops home now. Human lives
can forces from Southeast Asia immediately. are too valuable to be lost In order to save
Letters from 15 students at Mount Vernon, the Thieu dictatorship."
N.Y., High School opposing our involvement A petition from Knoxville, Tenn., with 21
In Cambodia. names in support of the Foreign Relations
Petitions from 21 persons in the Hillside, Committee and calling the intervention in
N.J., area, 26 in Chicago and a group of seven Cambodia "a constitutionally unauthorized,
architects in Kalamazoo, Mich., all protest- presidential war in Indochina."
ing our involvement in Cambodia. A petition with 816 signatures collected
Petitions from 34 staff members of the by students and faculty of Evanston, Ill.,
Survey Research Center, seven members, of Township High School supporting efforts in
the Yale faculty, University of California, the Senate to bring about the withdrawal of
Berkeley, and, 26 members of the staff of In- Americans troops from Cambodia and call-
Inc., Now York, urging an end to the war
and return of U.S. troops.
A petition from 60 law enforcement of-
ficers employed by the Alameda County Pro-
bation Department, Oaltfornia, expressing
deep concern. over our increasing involve-
ment in Southeast Asia and urging curtail-
ment of further funding for military opera-
tions in that area.
A petition from 12 members of the faculty
of St. Patrick's Seminary, Menlo Park, Calif.,
calling for "swift and orderly de-escalation
of military action in Southeast Asia and. for
total effort at the diplomatic table. The
peace and unity of our country is at stake."
A petition from 114 students at Ganzaga
University, Spokane, Wash., calling for "a
rapid and consistent withdrawal of our fight-
Ana, Calif., area, 21 in Simi, Calif., 26 in
Rancho Cordova, Calif., 12 in Sonora, Calif.,
Petitions containing 185 signatures gath-
ered by chemistry students at the University
of California, Berkeley, expressing opposition
to the deployment of U.S. forces In Cam-
bodia, urging "'continued withdrawal of
American forces from Southeast Asia" and
opposing "any increase or extension of that
War.-
A petition from 293 members of Phi Beta
Kappa at Stanford University expressing
"strongest opposition to the immoral in-
vasion of Cambodia." The petition continues:
We share the concern of the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee about the uncon-
stitutionality of this escalation of the war
and request Immediate withdrawal of all
U.S. forces from Cambodia.
A petition with 75 signatures from the
Boston Area Clergy and Laymen Concerned
About Vietnam calling for withdrawal from
Cambodia, a halt of bombing of North Viet-
nam and "that the war in Indochina be
and 20 in Dallas, Texas, opposing further _ ended with all possible speed."
funding for military operations in South- A petition with 610 names from the Ameri-
east Asia. can Humanist Association. The . petition
A petition from 60 law students and pro- reads:
fessors at California Western School of Law, The war in Vietnam has gone on too long.
San Diego, Calif., calling for "firm and forth- We demand that the Congress exercise Its
right Congressional action" to reverse U.S. Constitutional power to end a war that has
policies in Southeast Asia, never been declared. We . . . support the
A_petition with 133 names from Farming- Amendment to End the War ... which will
ton, Conn., opposing the extended war and stop appropriations for wars In Cambodia,
calling upon Congress "to reverse the Pres- Laos and Vietnam,
dent's misguided decision". 209 additional signatures on a petition
A petition from Graceland College, La- from the University of Iowa, opposing the
moni, Iowa, with 458 signatures supporting President's policies.
Amendment 609. Petitions collected by students, staff and
Petitions from 247 persons in the San faculty of the Department of Anthropology,
Francisco area supporting the "Amendment Stanford University, from 420, California
to End the War." citizens supporting efforts "to restore Con-
2,889 additional signatures on petitions gressional control over military appopria-
from the San Francisco area calling for "ces- tions."
sation of the invasion of Cambodia"; "with-. A petition in support of the Hatfield-Mc
drawal from Indochina and that the Pres- Govern amendment signed by 190 persons
ident, in keeping with the Constitution and from various Virginia communities.
his oath of office, take no further military A petition from 44 staff members of the
action without the advice and consent of the Leake and Watts Children's Home, Yonkers,
Congress." This brings the total of names on N.Y., expressing "horror and Indignation at
such petitions from the San Francisco area the immoral extension of the war in Indo-
to 7,967. china."
Petitions bearing the names of 1,565 Mas- A "protest register" from the American
sachusetts residents calling for the Senate Center for Students and Artists in Paris
Foreign Relations Committee and the Con- with 200 signatures protesting President
gress to "take whatever strong action is Nixon's "extension of the Indochinese War"
necessary to reverse this latest tragedy in and calling for withdrawal of American
United States foreign policy." The total of troops from Southeast Asia. A petition from
names on these petitions is 2,231. five American students at Rennes, France,
934 additional signatures on petitions from supports the protest.
the New York area "in support of the Sen- A petition from 53 persons at the Idlehour
ate Foreign Relations Committee's position Lodge, Murfreesboro, Ark., a home for senior
AMENDMENT OF THE FOREIGN
MILITARY SALES ACT
The Senate continued with the con-
sideration of the bill (H.R. 15628) to
amend the Foreign Military Sales Act.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, hav-
ing participated in a filibuster or so my-
self in the past on issues that were, I
thought, quite legitimate, I am sym-
pathetic to those now conducting a fili-
buster. Thus, I thought it would not be
inappropriate for them to give me some
time today so that I could make a few
remarks and relieve them of some of the
onerous duties of holding the floor until
some time next week. I hope that they
will appreciate that properly, because my
remarks are germane to the matter of
the Church-Cooper amendment.
THE HEART OF THE MATTER
Mr. President, President Nixon keeps
assuring us that he wants peace, as if
his decision for peace were a matter in
doubt. In fact, I know of no one in the
Senate who questions the President's de-
sire for an end to the war, but many of
us are very doubtful, indeed, that his
present course can lead to peace, or to
anything but endless, spreading war in
the jungles of Indochina.
When we come right down to it, the
enemy almost certainly wants peace too
but, like the President, they want peace
on their own terms. Neither side can be
said to have shown a fondness for fight-
ing for its own sake, but neither side has
shown any willingness to make signifi-
cant concessions for peace. Both are bent
on a victory as they conceive that term,
and until one side or the other achieves
it, the fighting will go on.
That is the heart of the matter, and
it benefits us not at all to use the enemny's
stubbornness as an excuse for our own.
If we want peace, someone must take
the first step, and while many of us
would welcome such an initiative on
the part of the Vietnamese, we--also
should recognize that as the smaller,
weaker party to the war, fighting as they
are on their own part of the world where
they belong, they must find it far more
difficult than should we, to break the
impasse. Even if it were clear on the
merits that they ought to take the first
step, that judgment shCuld not serve as
a policy for us. The fact is they have
shown that they are settling in for the
long haul of indefinite guerrilla warfare,
and we are not able to control the de-
cisions that are made in Hanoi. We can
only control the decisions that are made
in Washington, and that, basically is
why it is up to us to take an effective
step toward peace.
It is indeed incumbent upon us, and
Approved .For Release 2001 /11 /01-: CIA-RDP72-00337R000200230001-1
 May 2.8, 1970
Approved ES 8RAV 1 'C 9,&RD?gA-)i 37R000200230001-1 S 7989
urgkntly so, because this war has be-
come a 'domestic disaster for the Ameri-
can people. Our economy is racked by
unchecked inflation and, perhaps even
worse, by signs of collapsing confidence
in the economy on the part of the finan-
cial community. Morally and socially, we
are in a condition beyond mere division
among ourselves. We are in a condition
indicative -of social disintegration. The
students are not the only people who
have become alienated from the Gov-
ernment and its policies; as the Mock
market shows, the bankers and business_
men are losing confidence in the Gov-
ernment's policies, if not indeed in our
national leadership altogether. If it was
not clear before, it is crystal clear now
that this war has become a moral and
economic disaster for America. That is
why we cannot wait the enemy out. That
is why we must take the first step.
The primary obstacle to peace is the
administration's unbending commit-
ment to the Thieu-ley military dictator-
ship in South Vietnam. Thieu and K y, of
course, have no real power of their own.
Lacking both a reliable military force and
the support of their. own people, they
have survived as clients of the late
Johnson and the present Nixon admin-
istrations. Their enormous influence over
American foreign policy derives' almost
exclusively from their astonishing suc-
cess in persuading two American Presi-
dents that their own personal loss of
power would represent "defeat and hu-
miliation" for the United States. This
disastrous notion has given t e Saigon
dictators something more than a veto
on American policy. It is a 'case, as the
majority leader recently put it, of "Sai-
gon being the tail wagging and pulling us
around." Or, as the Senator from Ten-
nessee recently commented, speaking of
our Government's subservience to Mr.
It is as if we had traded resources, our
strength for his weakness, so that the organ
grinder dances to the monkey's tune.'
In pursuit of the phantom of military
victory, the Nixon administration in-
vaded Cambodia. Having stated at the
time that the sole purpose of the invasion
was to break up the. Communist sanc-
tuaries, the administration has now
shown beyond a doubt that the effect of
its policy_ is a much broader one. Relying
as much as possible on its South Viet-
namese clients, and'perhaps also on. That
and, if possible, Indonesian "advisers,"
the administration now apparently in-
tends to sustain an indefinite, fulllscale
military, intervention by proxy in Cam-
bodia,
_, There is abundant evidence of this in-
Step by step the administration has enough find ourselves summoned to the
hedged, backed off, and now all but re- rescue. Mr. Ky boasts that the South
pudiated the President's confident pre- Vietnamese forces "have the capability
diction of South Vietnamese withdrawal. of mounting military operations inde-
In a statement at Andrews Air Force pendently in Cambodia as well as in
Base on May 24, Secretary Rogers in- Vietnam." If that were sa, as it patently
dicated unmistakably that the adminis- is not, there would be no further reason
tration expected South Vietnamese for American military involvement either
forces to remain in Cambodia. Any such in Vietnam or Cambodia.
operations, Mr. Rogers added, would fall From the narrow viewpoint of the
under President Nixon's doctrine that Saigon dictators, getting. in over their
"Asians work together to solve. Asian heads in Cambodia is by no means a
problems." In a television interview on "silly argument of silly people." It serves
the same day, Mr. Herbert Klein, the the double purpose of advancing tradi-
President's communications director, tional Vietnamese designs on Cambodia
contributed further to the backtracking and of drawing the United States further
from the President's prediction of May 8. into the swamp.
Speaking of further South Vietnamese Sometimes we are reminded that Mr.
military operations in Cambodia, Mr. Thieu is boss, and that we ought not to
Klein said that he "could not really rule take Mr. Ky's colorful assertions too
in or rule out the possibility of air sup- . seriously. Perhaps Ky is no more than an
port." Asian AGNEW but there is every reason
On the basis of these and other cryptic to believe that his chief is no less deter-
comments by administration officials, it mined than he to keep the Americans
is now apparent that the South Viet- mired in the swamp. "You are in it with
namese forces are planning to remain in us," Mr. Thieu recently told an Ameri-
Cambodia after June 30, contrary to can reporter, with what the reporter de-
President Nixon's prediction and, in all scribed as "a broad grin."
probability, they will receive American Mr. Thieu even has the temerity to de-
air and logistic support, in direct repu- fend the Cambodian invasion in Ameri-
diation of the President's statement of can domestic political terms. A reporter
May 8. It is equally clear that the pur- quotes him as saying:
pose of this proxy military campaign is If Lon Nol and Cambodia stand for the
not merely to eliminate the Communists' next six months, then I think Mr. Nixon will
border sanctuaries, which the adminis- win the congressional elections this year and
tration already claims to have had great be re-elected in 1972, because then the
success in accomplishing, but to sustain operations will have proven a success.
the feeble Lon Nol military regime in I am reminded by that passage of the
Phnom Penh. report that Mr. Thieu and his colleagues
One does not have to rely on cryptic declined to enter into negotiations in
statements by administration officials to 1968, hoping that the delay in negotia-
ascertain the administration's plan for tions would further the electoral fortunes
sustaining the war by proxy in Cam- of Mr. Nixon. It was also widely reported
bodia. Mr. Ky, as usual, has come that one of the local hostesses in town
through with some blunt and colorful played a part in that little incident.
language. In an astonishing insult to Besides Thieu and Ky, the only peo-
President Nixon-unless, of course, he ple who appear to be delighted by the
had not heard about the President's press American invasion of Cambodia are the
conference of May 8-Mr. Ky said on Chinese. Assuming that the Chinese wish
May 21 that the notion that South Viet- to expel American military power from
namese troops would withdraw from Asia, to curb Soviet influence and expand
Cambodia with the Americans was "a their own, they cannot fail to take pleas-
silly argument of silly people." Expand- ure in seeing the Americans blunder into
ing on his own notion of a grand strategy, a new hopeless military adventure. From
Mr. Ky also said: the Chinese point of view, the extension
The Cambodian operation offers us an op- of the war into'Cambodia serves to drain
portunity to form an anti-Communist front American resources and isolate the
consisting of Cambodia, Thailand, Laos and United States internationally, while giv-
South Vietnam. ing the Chinese an opportunity to dis-
As certain newspapers have com- place Soviet influence with the Indo-
mented, the design seems to be one of chinese Communists by demonstrating
"Vietnamizing" the Cambodian war. their own more militant support. In ad-
Mr. Ky may boast that the invasion of dition, the "protracted war" to which the
Cambodia will bring security to all of Vietnamese Communists are now settling
Southeast Asia, but the Cambodians down can only serve, from China's stand-
..... a,. .-..+ mo,,, on enra An nf_ nnint. to bring a dependent and ex-
tent. In his press conference of May 8, fl_-_--'-- _
cial of the Phnom Penh regime rom- haunted North Vietnam
the President said that, although the mented recently that- under Chinese influence. In a strikingly
deadline of m June 30 for American with- We now have two invasions being con- candid comment to an American some
drawal from Cambodia did not apply to ducted in Cambodia, the North Vietnamese time ago, a North Vietnamese official
South Vietnamese forces. He said and the South Vietnamese. said:
furt der: You think you are blocking China by
r For the United States, of course, the fighting us, but in fact, you are destroying
I ld would come expect
out that the South at t the the s same continuing involvement of South Viet- a barrier to Chinese expansion in Southeast
me thaat t we.d w do,,'b sewhen -approximately ti
time eeause we come out namese forces in Cambodia only tightens Asia if you destroy us.2
n
di
t
t
ors O
a
c
our logistical support and air suppcit will the hold of the Saigon
come out with them. American policy. If the ARVN are no
. ~.:_._ more successful in defending the Phnom
= Co icaEss otrAL hECQRP, 9' st Long., 2d Penh government than they had been
Sens.; Aril 16, 1970, Senate, p. 55846. in defending their own, we will soon
2 Quoted by Stanley Karnow in "Nixon's
Expansion of the War Seems to Delight
Chinese," Washington Post, May 11, 1970, p.
A23.
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200230001-1.
 S 7990
Approved For F (l(j 1RL: flj 72-% AF900200230001-lMay 28, 1970
Anticipating protracted warfare, China
appears to have pledged full backing to
the Communist forces in all three Indo-
Chinese countries,'I'he Chinese indicated
long ago that they welcome 'American
involvement in Asian wars of attrition.
It is worth recalling a significant edi-
torial which appeared in the People Daily
of Peking on August 30, 1966:
"To be quite frank," the editorial stated, "if
United States imperialism kept its forces in
Europe and America, the Asian people would
have no way of wiping them out. Now, as it
is so obliging as to deliver its goods to the
customer's door, the Asian people cannot but
express welcome. The more forces United
States imperialism throws into Asia, the
more will It be bogged down there and the
deeper will be the grave it digs for itself.
The tying down of large numbers of
United States troops by the Asian people.
creates a Yavorable condition for the further
growth of the anti-United States struggle of
the people in other parts of the world. With
all the people rising to attack it,.one hitting
at its head and the other at its feet, United
States imperialism can be nibbled up bit by
bit."
We are being "nibbled up bit by bit,"
not only in Indochina but, far more seri-
ously, by the repercussions of the Indo-
china war within our own country. It is
most urgent, therefore, that we change
our course and seek a political settlement
based on the two general principles which
the North Vietnamese have repeatedly
indicated will motivate them to engage
in serious bargaining. These two prin-
ciples are, first, the establishment of a
transitional coalition, government for
what would become an independent, neu-
tralist South Vietnam; and second, a
commitment to a definite schedule for
the ultimate total withdrawal of Amer-
ican forces.
The major single obstacle to serious
negotiations on these bases is the dis-
astrous notion that there is a, connection
between our own national interests and
the survival and power of the Saigon
military dictatorship. We do not have to
impose anything on Mr. Thieu and'Mr.
Ky or On anybody else in order to open
the way to negotiations. We have only to
put them on notice that they are at lib-
erty either to join us in negotiating, a
compromise peace or to make some ar-
rangement of their own. Should they
prefer to continue the war, that would
be their, privilege, and they have an army
of over a million men of which to do it.
All that I would take away from the
Thieu-Ky regime is their veto on Ameri-
can policy.
Perhaps the really difficult thing for
Americans is not in recognizing what
needs to be done but In recognizing the
disastrous consequences of what has al-
ready been done. The nature of this
.dilemma was: summed up eloquently by
Rabbi Irving Greenberg in a statement
before the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions on the moral impact of the war:
SbaU we pqw. go to_ the parents of the
44 000 ' (American- dead) and say: we have
efrei~ and your children have died in vain?
Shall all this patriotism and sacrifice mean
nothing? I realize the full force of this
dilemma. But the., only corresponding answer
must be; Shall we condemn another 10,000
Americans and another 50,000 Vietnamese to
death rather than not admit?
$ut inability to accept the tragic, the
ironic, the possibility of mistake and failure
is to be less than fully human. Perhaps this
is our national problem.
Looking beyond this war which has so
drained our substance and spirit, things
need not look so bleak for America after
all. Drawing a parallel between American
feelings about Vietnam and British anx-
ieties over the revolt of the American
colonies two centuries ago, an English
military analyst, Correlli Barnett, points
out that the British leaders of that day
suffered feelings of failure and frustra-
tion no less acute than those of our own
leaders today. But, Mr. Barnett writes:
Once the American war was liquidated,
Britain's mood changed with astonishing
speed. National hope and self-confidence were
reborn. Instead of the decay and distintegra-
tion to which men had looked forward, Brit-
ain's greatest wealth, greatest power and
greatest influence in the world were yet to
come.
With some commonsense and moral
courage, the same might be arranged for
America,
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the RECORD an
article which was printed in the New
Republic of May _23, 1970, entitled
"Chairman Mao's Breakthrough.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be .printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
CHAIRMAN MAo's BREAKTHROUGH
(By Robert H. Yoakum)
My Chinese acquaintance was impeccably
dressed and spoke almost perfect English.
I asked what kind of work he did.
"My work is traveling for the People's
Republic of China," answered Mr. Hee. Then
he added with a mischevious grin, "To see
how things are going."
"And how are things going?"
"Very, very well. Your government's in-
vasion of Cambodia was exactly on sched-
ule."
"What schedule?" I asked.
"Our schedule," said Mr. Hee.
"I don't understand," I said, feeling ir-
ritated and embarrassed.
"Well," said Mr. Hee, "several years ago
our great leader, Chairman Mao, made a
major psychological-geopolitical break-
through. He learned that Americans fear,
above all other things, losing face. This dis-
covery by itself would not show that Chair-
man Mao is a genius; it was the application
he made of it.
"'What we shall do,' said Chairman Mao,
'is to use this American fear of losing face to
suck them deeper and deeper into a psycho-
logical-economic-political-military struggle
that they cannot win. We shall help them to
bleed themselves to death. And we shall do
this without employing one Chinese soldier.'
"This new policy was tested in a few small
incidents," Mr. Hee continued, "the way your
capitalists test products in local markets
before selling them nationally. It worked
perfectly. Then we launched the full pro-
gram in Vietnam. From that point on you
have been moving on our schedule.
"Our Chairman then further refined this
plan. He called it the Self-Perpetuating Prin-
ciple of Self-Destructive Face-Saving. It
means that you make your enemy lose face
in such a way that he thinks he is keeping
it while everyone else is watching him lose
it. He undermines his own prestige, and pub-
licly humiliates himself-all the while talk-
ing loudly about how he will not be humili-
ated. It is the ultimate form of humiliation.
And the enemy himself sustains the processes
of his own unwitting suicide."
I shuddered.
"For example," Mr. Hee continued, "fit the
invasion of Cambodia it was necessary fo!
President Nixon to say...." Mr. Hee pulled
a newspaper clipping from his pocket ". . .
'I would rather be a one-term President than
be a two-term President at the cost of seeing
America become a second-rate power, and
see this nation accept its first defeat in its
proud 190-year history.'
"You understand?" asked Mr. Hee. "We
tell the rest of the world that you are fight-
ing in Asia, killing tens of thousands of
Asians, because you are powermad and terri-
fied of defeat at the hands of the ordinary
people. You say you are fighting in Asia to
help the Asians. But who do they believe
when they read that your President has said
he fears American defeat, and America be-
coming a second-rate power? The Asians see
that you are mainly afraid of losing your
face, not of their losing their heads. You do
not see this. So you unwittingly hasten your
own doom.
"Another example of how you lose face
while you are keeping it: Your President
says one day that he will withdraw 150,000
troops. Then ten days later he says it is nec-
essary to invade Cambodia in order to pro-
tect American troops. If they are in such
great danger now, how could he earlier have
promised to weaken them by greatly reducing
their numbers? That is precisely the kind of
public announcement that is anticipated in
the Self-Perpetuating Principle of Self-De-
structive Face-Saving.
"Look at the results wrought by the ap-
plication of Chairman Mao's Principle:
"First, your military men have been dis-
credited. The more mistakes they make, the
more ridiculous they look. The more ridicu-
lous they look, the more face they lose. The
more face they lose, the more they extend
themselves. And the more they extend them-
selves, the more mistakes they make.
"Second, ten years ago there were almost
no Communists in America. Now there are
Communists in every slum and on every
campus.
"Third, you have spent more than $100 bil-
lion on the Vietnam war, or the equivalent
of about $3500 for each Vietnamese-an
amount on which one could retire in that
country. But instead of buying peasant pros-
perity, which could have ruined us, you have
used the money on war and killing and face-
saving, leaving yourself a legacy of hatred on
which we will flourish.
"Fourth, you have not made South Viet-
nam into a showplace of capitalist glories,
but rather into a showplace of continued
poverty, disease, prostitution, and massive
corruption.
"Fifth, your economy is beginning to come
apart under the pressure of maintaining face
everywhere, just as we thought it would.
"Sixth, your society is also coming apart
because there are some Americans who do
not care about saving face. The black faces,
especially, do not care about saving white
faces."
"But," I protested, "what if the people
who want to save the country prevail over
those who want to save face? Wouldn't your
whole plan go down the drain?"
"Yes, it would," Mr. Hee admitted, "and
we were concerned when President Johnson
left Washington. No one worried more about
saving face than he. But we need not have
worried. The three most admired men in
your nation; according to the Gallup Poll-
President Nixon, Billy Graham, and Vice
President Agnew-are all greatly afraid of,
loping face. We have nothing to fear."
Mr. Hee giggled, as though remembering
something funny. "You know," he said,
"until Chairman Mao made the break-
through we had much trouble understanding
you Occidentals. You look alike, you sound
alike, and you hold your life very cheaply.
Even on the streets you attack one another,
and your 'television each night dramatizes
Approved For Release 2001/11/01-: CIA-RDP72-00337R000200230001-1
 M Approved F~ RQGx11eeaafgS~iNA/1 /~tE1 DPgJR000200230001-MV 28, 1970 '~ G~~I~ l~~i
hunreds of horrible, violent, senseless
deaths. You even, let children watch. We had
no idea how to deal with you.
"Now, after Chairman Mao's discovery, we
still don't understand you very well, but we
do know how to deal with you."
,Can you tell me what is planned for our
future?" I asked.
"The future, " Mr. Hee smiled scrut-
ably;. I could see that much had been planned
for us. "Well, we shall wait until you are as
mired in Cambodia as you are in Vietnam.
Then Laos. Then Burma, India, Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq. .
"Wait!" I almost shouted. "You're taking
us right into the Middle East. That might
mean war with Russia as well!"
"Ah, so?" said Mr. Hee.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the
application of those thoughts to the
pending business, particularly the
Church-Cooper amendment, only em-
phasizes the effect upon the relative
power and influence of the United States,
of China, and of Russia. The effect on
that relative power, it seems to me, is so
persuasive that anything this body can
do to hasten the solution of the war in
South Vietnam rather would be greatly
in the national interest.
So I do hope the Senate will be able to
proceed to a vote on the Cooper-Church
amendment at the earliest opportunity.
The amendment offered by the Sena-
tor from Kansas-and, of course, he has
every right to offer that or any other
amendment to the bill-is quite obvi-
ously designed to destroy, the effective-
ness of the Church-Cooper amendment.
It is designed so that, if adopted, it would
be the equivalent of rejection of the
Church-Cooper amendment. So I hope
at the proper time it will be rejected or
tabled, as I would expect to propose, if it
seems appropriate next Wednesday when
this matter comes up for a vote,
ORDER Or S4SINESS
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, is
it in order to put this material in the
RECORD?
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Presi-
dent, at what time will the Pastore
germaneness rule become inoperative
today?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. At 1. min-
ute to2.
Mr. FUIBRIGHT. Mr. President, if I
may ask a parliamentary inquiry, some
of the material I have relates directly to
my discussion. I consider it to be persua-
sive and relevant to the merits of the
Cooper-Church amendment. These cer-
tainly are not unrelated to the wax and
to the effect of that war upon our domes-
tic economy. I did not wish to intervene,
in view of the anxiety of so many Sena-
tors to discuss this matter, but both the
letters and the insertions that I wish to
offer-except for one item, as to which
I will certainly defer, which I mentioned
a moment ago, and which has to do with
nutritio4 ,in gertain counties in A.rkan
sas-are relevant to the war in Indo-
china.
May I make a parliamentary inquiry?
Where do we draw the .line as tp when
a matter is or is not relevant?
The PRESIDING OFl~e'ICER. May the
Chair state to the Senator from Arkan-
sas that'if the Senator believes the mate-
rial is relevant, the Chair will consider
that that is accurate and the Chair will
entertain a unanimous-consent request.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, if the Senator will yield for just a
moment, I am going to say the same thing
the Chair has stated, that if, in the
opinion of the Senator from Arkansas,
the subject matter which he wishes to
discuss is relevant and germane, certain-
ly the Senator from West Virginia is not
going to question the judgment of the
Senator from Arkansas.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Let me say to the
Senator from West Virginia that I have a
letter which I received this morning from
a constituent that comments on events
in this country which I believe are di-
rectly related to the war in Vietnam.
I think anything that throws light
upon the effect of that war on the sit-
uation in our country is relevant to the
Church-Cooper amendment, because the
Church-Cooper amendment, if it has any
purpose at all-and I think it has-is to
bring this war to an end at the earliest
possible date in order to prevent the dis-
integration of our society here in the
United States. So in that respect I think
it is relevant.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. The Sen-
ator from West Virginia would raise no
objection.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thank the
Senator.
Mr. President, I recently received a
letter, which disturbs me very much,
from an instructor in a high school in
my State. This sentiment for the extreme
repression of students is an eloquent in-
dication of how far some of our people
have gone in departing from the con-
stitutional democratic system for which
this country has stood throughout its
history. This letter indicates holy the
same sentiment that mutilated Germany,
and has mutiliated Greece and other
countries in this century, is developing
within our own society. It should be a
warning that we must change our priori-
ties and begin to deal with the problems
which afflict our own people.
I'ask unanimous consent that the let-
ter be inserted in the RECORD as part of
my remarks.
There being no objection, the letter
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows :
MAY 12, 1970.
Hon. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
MY DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I am a high-
school industrial arts printing instructor
with four years of U.S. Air Force training,
five years of college (B.S. and M.T. degrees),
and nine years as printing instructor at
Northside High School, Fort Smith.
I am becoming more and more concerned
about the destroying of public property and
total disregard for law and policemen. The
Kent State University shooting of four stu-
dents is exactly what is needed in this coun-
try. Some idiots started to riot in Mexico
and the police shot to death thirty-two of
them. That put an end to the riots.
When (if ever) will the lawmakers wake
up and quit coddling the criminals and put
some teeth in the laws? The true American
people are VERY tired of paying high taxes
to support the government officials who sit
and pass laws such as the gun and ammu-
nition laws which hinder the law-abiding
citizens, and on the other hand, they turn
S 7991
the criminals loose. Also of concern are the
riots where tax-paid property is destroyed
and the government does nothing.
The men who fired the shots which took
the lives of four Kent students should re-
ceive a medal. They were trained to protect
themselves and government property, and
they did just that. Let's punish the crim-
inals (anyone who riots Is a criminal) or
close the tax-paid institutions and quit
PLAYING school.
When I was in military service and college,
the policemen were respected. WHEN will
the lawmakers and the VERY criminal-cod-
dling Supreme Court take the handcuffs off
the police and put them where they belong?
Why are the lawmakers and courts MORE
concerned about the rights of the criminals
but disregard the rights of the murdered,
the raped, the robbed, the burned out, and
the widows and children?
Sir, as you can see by this letter, I am
thoroughly disgusted with the high taxes
to support a government that condones the
criminal's acts, finances him and the rioters
with welfare checks, and sits back and points
a finger of blame at the police or military
who try to protect the peaceful people and
government property.
When, when, will the government be for
the law-abiding, peaceful, tax-paying citi-
zens? The United States-is it?
Respectfully yours,
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I did
not intend to read it all, but in view of
the exchange and the possibility that
it is not relevant to what is going on
resulting from the war, I will read only
two paragraphs.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Presi-
dent, if the Senator will yield, the Sena-
tor from West Virginia is listening with
great interest.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I want to read two
paragraphs.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Presi-
dent, if the Senator will yield, the Sena-
tor from West Virginia would urge that
the Senator read the entire letter.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Well, it is too long.
It relates to a point I have been making.
This letter is from an instructor who
has had 5 years in college. He wrote:
I am a high-school industrial arts print-
ing instructor with four years of U.S. Air
Force training, five years of college (B.S. and
M.T. degrees), and nine years as a printing
instructor at Northside High School, Fort
Smith.
I am becoming more and more concerned
about the destroying of public property and
total disregard for law and policemen. The
Kent State University shooting of four stu-
dents is exactly what is needed in this coun-
try. Some idiots started to riot in Mexico
and the police shot to death 32 of them. That
put an end to the riots ...
The men who fired the shots which took
the lives of four Kent students should re-
ceive a medal. They were trained to protect
themselves and gorvernment property, and
they did just that. Let's punish the criminals
(anyone who riots is a criminal) or close
the tax-paid institutions and quit playing
school.
Mr. President,- to me that is a very
disturbing sentiment, especially since it
arises from a man with the kind of edu-
cation which he indicates he has had.
Mr. President, in a little different
vein, but within the same area, of the
tens of thousands of communications I
have received in the past few weeks,
many have been impressive and moving.
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200230001-1
 FAYETTEVILLE, ARK.,
May 8, 1970.
Senator J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR FULSRIGHT: Since I have
always been criticized by my liberal friends
as being too conservative and by my con-
servative friends as being the opposite, I have
always figured I was somewhere in the mid-
dle. Recent events, however, have begun to
push me-toward the left, if I am to believe
definitions of the news media.
President Nixon's actions leave me only one
recourse: to fully and completely oppose
him in the expansion of the war in Southeast
Asia. (I had hoped this country could sur-
vive his wave of mediocrity, but I am now
willing to admit I am mistaken.) Put on
your list one more supporter of your actions.
Though I will miss this fall's elections due
to age restrictions, you may be assured that
Mr. Nixon will have one more vote on the
other side in 1972. And for you, in 1974,
a vote to the positive.
As a moderate (until now) at the Uni-
versity of Arkansas, I feel it my duty to
warn you that the Cambodian campaign and
the Kent State Massacre have created on
this campus unimaginable frustrations. I
am afraid it might ultimately lead to violence
as will all unalleviated frustration. You must
impress on your colleagues that if and when
this happens, it will not be the result of
agitators, but of a raging feeling of help-
lessness at going through the peaceful chan-
nels again and again with no results. If
there is an agitator, it is President Nixon,
who insists on ignoring the people. I
I might further ask you to consider legis-
lation that would forbid any militia-type
force as the National Guard from being
used in situations like that at Kent State.
Whenever untrained (for that is the only
way to describe week-end soldiers) troops
are used, you can count on at least one
killing through panic. Trained regulars per-
haps would have been better prepared and
prevented this tragedy.
Sincerely,
COLLINS HEMINGWAY.
LITTLE ROCK, ARK., May 7, 1970.
DEAR MR. FULBRIGHT: I am a student of
Eden Theological Seminary in Webster
Groves, Mo. We at Eden, acting in the prin-
ciples of humane Christian concern, struck
from classes. By observing a disruption of
normal daily activity, it was our hope to
stimulate a widespread public consideration
and reaction to serious social and political
issues which have surfaced in the past week.
I feel to conduct routine and normal daily
business in light of these recent events is to
condone and encourage further an atmo-
sphere of expanding violence that currently
pervades our society. I believe that the time
has now arrived when violence in any of its
manifestations can no longer be tolerated as
a rational form of human thought or be-
havior. Furthermore I have dedicated myself
to continue to protest and resist against
Incipient violence, in all forms of levels of
sooial and political life. I would also like to
take this time to thank you and support you
on your stand against all forms of political
and social violence. I am behind you and
wanted to let you know you are appreciated.
Please continue to give us hope. A concerned
Christian in a troubled world,
JIM ZINE.
CONFERENCE OF MAJOR SUPERIORS
OF JESUITS,
Washington,,D.C., May 20, 1970,
Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
U.S. Senate, New Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: We write to you
as a corporate body of Major Superiors of the
Society of Jesus, as leaders of the Jesuitslrho
work throughout the United States. Meeting
in Tampa. for our semiannual review of our
ministries, we take this occasion to bring
to your attention our concern over moral is-
sues afflicting the conscience of every ditizen
of this nation.
We speak to you out of our deep apprecia-
tion of the dignity of all human life said of
the brotherhood of all mankind. We can no
longer be silent in the face of an issue which
encourages and fosters hostile divisions be-
tween man and man, at home and abroad.
The tenents of our Christian faith cry out
for peace among all men.
We wish to express to you our deep con-
cern over the moral implications of the war
in Indochina. We must ask whether the re-
sults, which are sought in good conscience
by those who support the war, are any
longer proportionate to the evil involved. Our
concern is further heightened by the clouded
origin of American involvement in this war
and by the questionable morality of the re-
cent escalation of the war by the inva-
sion of Cambodia and the resumption of
the bombing of North Vietnam. In addi-
tion, we deplore any attempt to motivate the
American people to accept this escalation on
the basis f cur never having lost a war.
Over and above the moral ambiguity of
the war itself we have a further concern over
the effects of the Indochina war in our own
country, namely, violence in our streets, un-
rest on our campuses, and the problem of the
military draft.
Moved by these considerations and by our
profession as ministers of religion, we call
for immediate action from every member of
the Senate of the United States:
1) We urge that you take steps to end
this war without delay.
2) We urge that the national budget be
channeled into peaceful directions by cutting
back military appropriations.
3) We urge you to modify Selective Serv-
ice regulations (the draft) to allow selective
conscientious objection, as recently espoused
by the United States Catholic Conference.
4) We urge that you take these positive
actions to heal the alienation of our youth
from this country.
We earnestly address these requests to the
Senate of the United States, as American
citizens and ministers of religion, grievously
distressed over the present moral stance of
our beloved country.
Most sincerely yours,
JOHN V. O'CONNOR, S.J.,
Executive Secretary.
GRACELAND COLLEGE,
Lamoni, Iowa, May 12, 1970.
President RICHARD M. NIXON,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
MR. PRESIDENT: We who have the respon-
sibilities for the leadership of Graceland
College and its student body believe that
we must express to you the feelings of fac-
ulty and students on this campus over the
conduct of the war in Indochina. The events
of the past two weeks, primarily your de-
cision to take military action in Cambodia
and the reactions on so many college cam-
puses across America, have prompted a deep
concern on this southern Iowa campus for
the effects the war is having in those tragic
countries in Southeast Asia and across this
great nation of ours. It is our joint judg-
ment that large numbers of thoughtful
young men and women on our campus,
deeply devoted to their country and its rich
heritage of freedom, see in the blighting ef-
fects of this protracted military engagement
a threat to the lives of its young men, a
waste of resources vitally needed to meet
America's own problems of poverty, racism,
pollution, crime and other such forces di-
minishing the quality of life in our country,
but most of all a threat to cherished free-
Approved For Release 2001 /1 1101 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200230001-1
S 7992
Approved For RCQIeNGEOSSI8NALECD72,ENATE 0200230001-1May 28, 1970
I would like to call attention to several
of these letters which I believe have a
particular point to make. The first is
from a lady in Dover, Ark., who relates
sow this "senseless war" has touched
ner family's life. She writes:
Please give our young people the chance
to live, to seek their own way of life free
to love and have faith in our country and
I am sure that if this war was necessary,
if our country was in danger, the majority
of our young people would go forth' and do
what was right to defend our country. But
we are not in danger.
Mr. President, I think that Mrs. E. R.
Edwards, the author of that :letter, has
.expressed herself better than many of
those of us' who have spoken or written
thousands of words on the subject.
I would also call the Senate's atten-
tion. to two letters from Arkansas stu-
dents. One, Collins Hemingway, ' a stu-
dent at the University of Arkansas, re-
fleets the views of many of the students
from whom I have heard. Another, Jim
Zine, a theology student, expresses his
concern about the expanding violence in
our society.
I would like tp take? note of two fur-
ther letters which I think deserve notice.
One is a letter to me from the Conference
of Major Superiors of Jesuits expressing
"deep concern over the moral implica-
tions of the war in Indochina." The other
is a copy of an open letter to President
Nixon which was sent to me by the `stu-
dent body leaders of Graceland College,
Lamoni, Iowa. I think it makes a num-
ber of excellent points.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous mous con-
sent that these five letters be printed in
the RECORD.
There being no objection, the letters
were ordered to be printed in, the RECORD,
as follows :
DOVER, ARK., M* y 15, 1970.
DEAR MR. FULBRIGIXT: YOU Will probably
never see this letter as it will likely be opened
by someone other than yourself. Still I feel
it in my heart to write you.
Yesterday my daughter received a letter
from her husband who 16 in Vietnam telling
of the death of his dearest. friend. He, like
my son-in-law, is a motion picture photog-
rapher. His plane was shot down over Cam-
bodia. The hurt in my daughter's eyes was
unbelievable. The idea that this friend had
.died in something as senseless as this .war
is something hard to live with. To think of
all the suffering and agony the young people
are going through is unbelievable. No won-
der there is so much unrest in our young, our
leaders of tomorrow. Please urge our leaders
of our country to stand up and be the lead-
ers we can be proud of and the men you are
capable of being. Any man can hide behind
some one else's mistakes 'but it takes a real
roan to say "I was wrong." Please give our
young people the chance to live, to seek their
own way of life free to love and have faith in
our country and our fellow man.
I am sure that 'if this.. war. was necessary,
it our country was in danger, the majority
of our young people would go forth and do
what was right to defen our country. But
We are not ih danger
so it its my prayer that this war will end
gbOn and our young boys can come home and
to about their lives, havg their children and
believe that .life can be beautiful.
Yours truly, -
 May 28, 1970 Approved Fcjx& ? /0 J-e ffiDP7 ,I7 ER000200230001-1 Q 7QO0
dorm as polarization becomes extreme
among us.
On our campus there is disillusionment
because so little, if any, progress has beep
made in bringing an end to our tragic in-
volvement in Southeast Asia. We do not
understand the failure of your administra-
tion to appoint a successor to Ambassador
'Lodge to represent us at the Paris peace
talks, your failure to give vigorous sup-
port to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks,
your seeming indifference to the United Na-
tions. We see no imaginative program com-
ing out of your administration to bridge
the widening gulf between the races. We are
dismayed that in a time of bitterness and
polarization, your Vice President travels the
country setting people against each other
and engaging in inflammatory and irrespon-
sible rhetoric.
But we are confident that the faculty and
students at Oraceland have not given up.
They want to work with you to cleanse Our
country of 'violence, to ease the burdens of
poverty, to establish liberty for all our peo-
ples, to safeguard the environment for our
children, to restore American prestige among
the nations.
We see these tasks, so urgent upon the
national agenda, all subverted by our mili-
tary involvement in Vietnam and now Cam-
bodia. We ask you to -listen to our young
people and others throughout this nation.
We ask you to mobilize the best insights
available in the nation today to bring an
early end to the military engagement in In-
dochina and to direct the energies of the
youth of this nation to its restoration.
Yours respectfully,
WILLIAM T. HIGDON,
President.
DAN F. ORAYBILL,
Student Body President.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Again, Mr. Presi-
dent, I think these underline the point
and the persuasiveness of the need for
the Church-Cooper amendment to the
pending legislation. Of course, there are
some with a different view; I would not
pretend it is a unanimous belief, by any
means; but, in my view, from my own
experience, the great majority of the peo-
ple of this country would like to see this
war brought to a close. I think they are
persuaded, as I am, that adoption by a
substantial majority of the Church-
Cooper amendment would contribute to
that purpose.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT
-Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I am
about to propound the same unanimous-
consent agreement that was suggested
earlier, and which will fit in now, as it
did then, with the question raised by the
distinguished Senator from Arkansas,
chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Relations.
I send to the desk a unanimous-con-
sent request and ask for its immediate
consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will -read the proposed unani-
mous-consent agreement.
The assistant legislative clerk read
as follows:
Ordered, That the Senate proceed to vote
at 11:30 a.m., Wednesday, June 3, 1970, on
the pending amendment (No. 662) by the
Senator from Kansas (Mr. Dole) to HR.
16628, an Act to amend the Foreign Military
Sales Act. Should a. motion to table be made,
the vote on that would, occur on 11:30.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there dent, the amendment which I have sub-
objection? Without objection, it is so mitted today and which will be printed
ordered. I. the d
a
t
h
ORDER FOR CONSIDERATION OF
AMENDMENT TO BE OFFERED BY
SENATOR BYRD OF WEST VIR-
GINIA
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that when the pend-
ing amendment is disposed of, an amend-
ment to be offered by the distinguished
Senator from West Virginia (Mr-. BYRD),
which will be printed in the RECORD to-
day, be in order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UN-
TIL MONDAY, JUNE 1, 1970, AT
11: 30 O'CLOCK A.M.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that when the Sen-
ate completes its business today, it stand
in adjournment until the hour of 11:30
a.m. Monday morning next.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SEN-.
ATOR SMITH OF MAINE ON MON-
DAY NEXT
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that at the conclu-
sion of the prayer by the Chaplain, the
distinguished senior Senator from Maine
(Mrs. SMITH) be recognized for not to
exceed 30 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
ORDER FOR TRANSACTION OF ROU-
TINE MORNING BUSINESS ON
MONDAY NEXT
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that on Monday at
the conclusion of the remarks by the dis-
tinguished Senator from Maine there
be a morning hour for the transaction of
routine morning business, with a limita-
tion of 3 minutes on statements made
therein.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
AMENDMENT NO. 684
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Presi-
dent, I send to the desk an amendment,
and ask that it be stated by the clerk and
that it be printed.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be stated.
The assistant legislative clerk read
as follows:
On page 4, line 25, after "Cambodia" in-
sert "(a) ".
On page 5, between lines 18 and 19, insert
the following: "(b) Nothing in subsection
(a) shall preclude'the President from taking
such action as may be necessary to protect
the lives of United States forces in South
Vietnam or to hasten the withdrawal of
United States forces from South Vietnam."
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be received and printed,
and will lie on the table.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Presi-
men men
w
ich I intend to can
up Immediately following the vote on
Wednesday next on the pending amend-
ment authored by the Senator from
Kansas (Mr. DOLE).
UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREE-
MENT-ORDER FOR ADJOURN-
MENT FROM CLOSE OF BUSINESS
ON MONDAY UNTIL 12 NOON ON
TUESDAY AND FROM CLOSE OF
BUSINESS ON TUESDAY UNTIL 10
A.M. ON WEDNESDAY
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent, in view of develop-
ments which have occurred, to amend
the unanimous-consent agreement to
provide that when the Senate completes
its business on Monday next, it stand in
adjournment until 12 o'clock noon on
Tuesday.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. And that at the'
conclusion of business on Tuedsay, the
Senate stand in adjournment until 10
o'clock Wednesday morning next.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I ask unanimous
consent that at the conclusion of the
prayer on Wednesday morning next, and
the reading of the Journal, the time be
equally divided, between 10 o'clock and
11:30 a.m., between the sponsor of the
amendment, the Senator from Kansas
(Mr. DOLE) and the Senator from Mon-
tana, or any Senator he may designate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I sug-
gest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceed-
ed to call the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. On the question of
the division of time on Wednesday morn-
ing next, I ask unanimous consent that
the request already agreed to be modified
as follows: That the time be equally di-
vided between the majority and minority
leaders, or any 'Senators they may desig-
nate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time
to begin after the reading of the Journal
on Wednesday?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
The unanimous-consent agreement
was subsequently reduced to writing, as
follows :
Ordered, That the Senate proceed to vote
at 11:30 a.m. Wednesday, June 3, 1970, on
the pending amendment (No. 662) by the
Senator from Kansas (Mr. DOLE) to li.R. .
15628, an act to amend the Foreign Military
Sales Act, with the time after the reading
of the Journal to be equally divided and
controlled by the majority and minority
leaders, or whomever they designate. Should
a motion to table be made, the vote on that
would occur at 11:30 a.m. on said date.
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200230001-1
 S 7994
Approved For A CI 72 S0 3A7, 00200230001- lay 28, 19-70
THE CALENDAR
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Presi-
dent, if there are no further speeches by
Senators on the unfinished business, I
ask unanimous consent that the Senate
proceed to the consideration of Calendar
Order Nos. 911 and 912, which have been
cleared with the minority.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
GODDARD ROCKET AND SPACE
MUSEUM, ROSWELL, N. MEX.
The resolution (S. Res. 406) to print
as a Senate document materials relating
to Senate Concurrent Resolution 49 was
considered and agreed to, as follows:
Resolved, That there be printed with illu-
strations as a Senate document, in such
style as may be directed by the Jodnt Com-
mittee on Printing, a compilation of materi-
als relating to S. Con: Res. 49, providing
congressional recognition to the Goddard
Rocket and Space Museum, Roswell, New
Mexico, together with certain tributes to Dr.
Robert H. Goddard, American rocket pio-
ncer; and that there be printed for the use
of the Aeronautical and Space Sciences Com-
mittee seven thousand additional copies of
such document.
The title was amended so as to read: "Au-
thorizing the printing of a compilation of
materials relating to congressional recog-
nlton of the Goddard Rocket and Space
Museum (S. Con. Res. 49) as a Senate docu-
ment".
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, I ask unanimous consent to have
printed in the RECORD an excerpt from
the report (No. 91-903), explaining the
purposes of the measure.
There being no objection, the excerpt
---was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
The Committee on Rules and Administra-
tion, to which was referred the resolution
(S. Res. 406) to print as a Senate document
materials relating to S. Con. Res. 49 (congres-
sional recognition of Goddard Rocket and
Space Museum), having considered the same,
reports favorably thereon with an amend-
ment and recommends that the resolution
as amended be agreed to.
The Committee on Rules and A,dministra-
tion has amended the title so as to clarify
the nature of the materials to be printed.
Senate Resolution 406 as amended would
provide (1) that there be - printed with
illustrations as a Senate document, in such
style as may be directed by the Joint Com-
mittee on Printing, a compilation of ma-
terials relating to Senate Concurrent Res-
olution 49 (providing congressional rec-
ognition to the Goddard Rocket and Space
Museum, Roswell, N. Mex.), together with
certain tributes to Dr. Robert H. Goddard,
American rocket pioneer; and (2) that there
be printed 7,000 additional copies of such
document for the we of. the Committee on
Aeronautical and Space Sciences.
The printing-cost estimate, supplied by the
Public Printer, is as follows:
Printing-cost estimate
To print as a document (1,50)
Ies) ------ ------ ----- $2,19.13
7,000 additional copies, at $177.84
per thousand --------- ------ 1,244.88
Total estimated cost, ' .,
Res 406_ _--- 3,864.01
SELECT OO,1VMMITTEE ON CRIME
The Senate proceeded to consider the
noncurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 580)
authorizing certain printing for the Se-
lect Committee on Crime which had been
reported from the Committee on Rules
and Administration with an amendment,
at the beginning of line 4, to strike out
"ten" and insert "twenty-five".
The amendment was agreed to.
The concurrent resolution, as
amended, was agreed to.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Presi-
dent, I ask unanimous consent to have
printed in the RECORD an excerpt from
the report (No. 91-909), explainingpthe
purposes of the measure.
There being no objection, the excerpt
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
The Committee on Rules and Administra-
tion, to which was referred the concurrent
resolution (H. Con. Res. 580) authorizing
certain printing for the Select Committee on
Crime, having considered the same, reports
favorably thereon with an amendment and
recommends that the concurrent resolution
as amended be agreed to.
House Concurrent Resolution 580 as re-
ferred would authorize the printing for the
use of the House Select Committee on Crime
of 10,000 additional copies of House Report
91-978, entitled "Marihuana".
The Committee on Rules and Administra-
tion has amended House Concurrent Resolu-
tion 580 by increasing the number of copies
to be printed from 10,000 to 25,000. This
action was taken by the Committee at the
request of Congressman John Dent, chair-
man of the Subcommittee on Printing of the
House Administration Committee, and Con-
gressman Claude Pepper, chairman of the
House Select Committee on Crime, and in
order to meet unusual demands for the re-
port from Members of the- House of Repre-
sentatives.
The printing-cost estimate of H. Con. Res.
580 as amended is as follows:
Printing-cost estimate
Back to press, first 1,000 copies---- $696.84
24,000 additional copies, at $124.94
per thousand------------------ 2,998.58
Total estimated cost, H. Con.
Res. 580 as amended ------ 3,695.40
ORDER OF BUSINESS
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr.
President, I ask unanimous consent that
the unfinished business be temporarily
laid aside.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
RESULTS OF THE CAMBODIAN
SANCTUARY OPERATION
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I submit
for the information of the Senate the
results of the Cambodian sanctuary op-
eration as of 8 a.m., May 28, 1970, a.id
ask unanimous consent that the sum-
mary be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the sum-
mary was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
Number
24-hour
change
dual weapons ____________
In
11,976
+131
divi
weapons---- -------------
2,100
+69
Bunkers/structures destroyed - _
7,101
+115
achinegun rounds __________
3,176,512
+90,808
Rifle rounds. __--------------
5.822,903
+103,185
Total small arms ammunition
(machinegun and rifle rounds)-
8,999,415
+193, 973
Grenades ------------------------
20.973
+4,183
Mines ---------------------------
Satchel charge--------------------
3,204
500
+102
24-hour
change
Miscellaneous explosives (pounds)-_
72, 000
(1)
Antiaircraft rounds---------------
134,299
A
______________
Mortar rounds
31,470
______
Large rocket rounds______________
1,097
~)
Smaller rocket rounds-------------
Recoilless rifle rounds_____________
17, 952
20,395
+1,805
5
Rice (pounds)--------------------
9,790,000
+2,340,000
Man-months -----------------
215,380
+5,148
Vehicles-------------------------
317
+7
Boats--------------------------
40
Generators_______________________
36
Radios---------------------------
180
Medical supplies (pounds) ---------
36,000
Enemy KIA______________________
8,128
POWs (includes detainees) --------
1,797
+20
I Unchanged.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Presi-
dent, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceed-
ed to call the roll.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Presi-
dent, I ask unanimous consent that the
order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
CORRECTION OF THE RECORD
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, at the request of the Senator from
Maine (Mr. MusKIE), I.have been asked
to state that on page S74&2 -of the REC-
ORD appears an error listing the senior
Senator from Alaska (Mr. STEVENS) as a
cosponsor of Senate Resolution 405.
On behalf of the Senator from Maine,
I ask unanimous consent that this error
be corrected by deleting the name of
Mr. STEVENS from this list of additional
cosponsors and adding the name of the
junior Senator from Alaska (Mr.
GRAVEL).
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
AMENDMENT TO STRIKE ALL
FUNDS FOR THE SST FROM
TRANSPORTATION APPROPRIA-
TIONS
AMENDMENT NO. 6e5
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I sub-
mit an amendment to the Department of
Transportation appropriations bill, H.R.
17755, which would strike all funds for
SST development for the coming fiscal
year. I ask that it be printed and referred
to the Committee on Appropriations.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
GRAVEL). The amendment will be re-
ceived and printed, and by unanimous
consent will be referred to the Com-
mittee on Appropriations.
The amendment is as follows:
AMENDMENT No. 665
On page 2, line 20, strike all language
beginning with the words "Civil Supersonic
Aircraft Development" through the end of
line 2 on page S.
Mr, PROXMIRE. Mr. President, yes-
terday the House of Representatives
passed H.R. 17755, appropriating funds
for DOT for fiscal 1971. The line item
for development of the SST is $290 mil-
lion. The effort in the House to strike the
SST from the bill was led by Representa-
tive SID YATES of Illinois, who did an
outstanding job of marshaling arguments
against this program. Although his ef-
fort failed narrowly yesterday, I think it
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 CIA-RDP72-00337R000200230001-1