U.S. HAD NO HAND IN SIHANOUKS FALL
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Document Page Count:
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Document Creation Date:
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Document Release Date:
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Publication Date:
April 30, 1970
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NEW YORK TIMES DATE Flo
Approved For Release 2004/01/12: CIA-RDP72-00 230010-1
PAGE 1
The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST : Thursday, April 30,1970 E9
1i lw
B Jack Anderson sure over the demonstrations,
v, o,cregiplyy nas suns: so
low that milU04s., of Americans
no tpnger trust the official
statemeiitsr a, Aut gven.t m.in
out, egkt M,- - 7h , p~
has hecn delugged with inquir-
ies, for exaxilpl , pleading for
the truth abot
Manx Amerians apps tly
Stispect that the U S secretly
engineered overthrow f left
leapin. 11 g Z rince; orodtina,A,
hanouk and precipitated th
Cambodian crisis This eolu .
bas carefully investigated the
backstage activities and can
state categorically that the
ouk's ouster.
President Nixon not only
hoped to keep` Cambodia neu-
tral but was pleased to deal
with Sihanouk. At the time of
his downfall, ironically, he
was appealing to Moscow and
Peking to bring pressure Ion
Hanoi to pull North Vietnam-
ese troops out of Cambodia.
Queen Mother Role
His mother, queen Sisowath
Kossomak, at first 'nailed the
anti-communist dein9nstra,-
tions in Cambodia. Not uAtii
her son reached her froln f'e-
king to warn that the demon-
strations had gone, too far dill
she reverse herself.
Then she played a backstage
role in precipitating the show-
down in the National Assoin
bly. In secret meetings with
Cambodian leaders, the Queen
Mother expressed her displea-
her son of treason, and called
for a vote of confidence in Si-
hanouk.
The Assembly, Instead,
voted Sihanouk out. of power,
The new leaders strived , at
first to maintain Cambodian
neutrality and even delivered
two protests to the U .S. em-
bassy over American shelling
and helicopter incursions.
cross, the border. _ .
At this time there were only
staff. No other U.S. officials,
CIA agents or special forces
were present in Cambodia.
The embassy staff has now
been expanded to 16. Four of
the newcomers were $ent?on
temporary duty to improve
the vital colnmunications be-
tween Pnompenh and Wash-
ington.
Ever since diplomatic rela-
tions with Cambodia were re-
stored last July, the embassy
has been instructed to keep a
low profile and not to meddle
in Cambodian affairs.
'Called on Carpet
Uneasy Interior officials
were summoned to Capitol
Hill the other day to explain
why the Interior Department's
top brass spent $117,023 of the
taxpayers' money to redeco-
rate their executive suites.
They appeared behind closed
doors of the House Interior
terior Walter Hickel and other Mrs. Hansen who intoned
high officials splurged on ex- Coldly:
pensive furniture, rich dra- "Have you established any
t ili
f
d
th
t
s
un
a
pery and thick russet carpets cos cengs on
may be spent for refurbishing- '_
in violation of the law. an office?"
look hides a steel-trap mind, Didn't the Bureau of the
first called Assistant Secre- Budget insist on this?" she de-
tary Lawrence Dunn on the manded.
carpet. "The direct answer is 'no,' "
"We are not exactly happy. replied Hite.
It is not good for government, "I don't like your kind of
period!" she informed Dunn, budget then," she snapped. "If
who squirmed and looked to you come up here with justifi-
Budget Director Richard Hite cations that mean one thing to
for help. one person and another thing
"We just did not see the to someone else, we have a .
need to bring this matter to bad situation. This committee
the committee's attention," might just as well sit out in
Hite said lamely. , the, middle of the.Chesapeake
But Mrs. Hansen counts out and flag rowboats as hold
the public's pennies as if they budget hearings."
were a grade schooler's milk The Interior officials tried
money., She commented: , ` to convince the. chairwoman
"When you get down to put- that a Hickel crony from Seat-
ting funds for the pit toilets at tle, who redecorated Hickel's
Fort Union Trading Post in re- office, had, not been illegally
serve because of the preca- hired, because .he was in a
rious (financial) position of "professional" category that
the government, then it cer- heretofore had been reserved -
tainly looks like other projects for physicians and attorneys.
should be curtailed." At the end, they conceded
that their effort to cover up
`Emergency' Luxuries juggled purchase orders was
Dunn tried to argue that "erroneous and ill-advised"
and that they failed to get the
they an had not violated the that
General
ired by
which permits "emergency" lion Services
clearances nes A required by
expenditures without the
law.
safeguards. There was .
an "emergency" need, he i. Hansen extracted a
claimed, to replace the fur- promise from them that hat any'
r
more 1-V" b will b
ur
es
to answer charges by this coIt,,he Democrat;--,T,his "had
umn that Secr tyof thf In suite plush enough to
y
g
brought before her committee
In the future.
0 1970. Sell-McClure Syndicate, Inc.
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U.S. Had No Hand in Sihanauk's Falt
NEW YORK TIMES DATE ter.. *-70 PAGE
SENATORS' ANGRY
Release 2004/01/12 L CIA-
Continue.:. om gage 1, Col. 5
tc Democratic leader,
rge- D, Aiken, Republi-
Some Seek to Cut Off
Funds for Widened
Military Action
By JOHN W. FINNEY
ta't~s xs r..Twxa >
WASHINGTON, April
Tl a Acimini; trati.g n's cCeciston
to, support a South Vietnamese
militlry operation in C dia'
stets in both parties tod`a~ to
cut off, funds for AmOrt -!u.
41itary activities in Cambodia.
The mover-which could lead
to a Constitutional confronts-
Lion w tli the White }ouse-=
were indicative of a wide-
spread, angry - and frustrated
reaction In the Senate.
Some Senators, however,
such as John Stennis of Miss-
Isippi, chairman of the Armed
Services Committee, and Robert
P. Griffin of Michigan, the as
sistant Republican leader, de=
scribed the ' operation as a
(If>tlf tell oie'designed to destroy
fNgr?t Vietnamese and Vietcon
sanctuaries in Cambod apnea
ttfie borer of outh-Vietnam..
?Could?Be a tTurnmg Point`
Senator Stennis said that the
destrictioli of the enemy sanc
ut`C~ in Cam odla was~'ses;
N ue withdrawiin
tlm oil Vietnam.
ppo h'g t e minis
ction, Senator Stennis
providing any "ex-
military aid to the
-Qovrnment , r
Qr r e ooc,,
o no a ieve n
Adzziinistration . move was
stro;i est among members of
etiateorei n Relations
:i+e~ .
les
X'w
r
.
rQ
Sherman
tor John
,
tlcan bf Kentue
of Qr ` ink Charc
were drafting an
can of Ve,yy t, announced
that they w8 o-sponsor the
amendment. :ez}a.tQr Mansfield
expressed hope that the Senate
would act on the measure next
ek.
Senators Aiken, Cooper and
Mansfield have generally sup-
ported President Nixon's Viet-
amiization policy.
. Senator George S. McGovern,
Democrat of South Dakota, and
Senator Mark 0. Hatfield, Re-
publican of Oregon, announced
that they would move to attach
.a similar amendment to they
,,;military authorization bill,
which is scheduled to react the
"Senate floor in the middle of
May.
In view of the critical reac-
tition in the Senate, Senator
Mansfield predicted that some
amendment curbing the Ad-
ninistration's authority in Cam-
'bodia would almost certainly be
adopted. With its sponsorship
by prominent Senators of both
parties? such an amendment
could expect the support of the
liberal-to-moderate majority in
the Senate and would be op-
posed by the minority of con-
servative Republicans and
Southern Democrats.
But whether such an amend-
ment, if passed by the Senate,
would be accepted by the
House, where the reaction to-
day to the Cambodian operation
was more restrained, was ques-
tionable.
Regardless of the outlook for
an amendment in the Ipgse
however, it was apparent that
an influential Senate coalition,
which has long been critical of
-the Vietnam war, was now in-
tent on a direct challenge to
President Nixon on the. Cambo-
dian issue. The constitutional
question now being intentional-
ly raised by this coalition is
whether the President has au-
thority to embark upon military
activities in Cambodia without
the consent of the Congress.
To congressional observers,
Abe Administration apparently
underestimated the critical re-
action in the Senate, particular-
y in Foreign Relation Commit-
tee, which on Monday stronglyy
'advised Secretary' of State Wil-
-1iam P. Rogers against any
American military involvement
iii, Cambodia. ..
the Administration "did not
brief congressional leaders on
decision to support the
Perhaps because of the ab-
sence of communications be-
tween the White House and
Capitol Hill, there were differ-
ing views in the Senate on what
was actually involved in
Cambodian operation.
Some Senators, including,
most members of the Foreign
Relations Committee, saw the
Administration embarking upon]
a critical policy decision that'
would lead to a broadening of
the war in Southeast Asia and
jeopardize plans for withdrawal
of American troops from South
Vietnam.
But Senator Griffin said that
Henry A. Kissinger, the Presi-
dent's adviser on national se-
curity, had called him about
noon-several hours after the,
Saigon announcement-to em-
phasize that the operation was
"a limited action," taken "in
the interest of protecting
American troops in Vietnam."
Mr. Kissinger was said to have
emphasized that the decision
to support the South Vietna-
mese operation was. in no way
related to the request from Pre-
mier Lon Nol of Cambodia for
American military assistance.
Senator Griffin said elimi.
nation of the enemy sanctu-
aries in Cambodia "could has-
ten the day when American
troops are brought home."
Support for the President's
action also , came from such
conservative Republican Sena-
tors as John G. Tower of Texas
and Peter H. Dominick of Colo-
rado, both members of the
Armed Services Committee.
Senator Tower said that he was
"encouraged by this action be-
cause it places anti-Communist
forces in an improved military
tactical position and because it
will result in fewer American
casualties in the long run"
Some Support Lost
By its action, however, the
Administration appeared to
have lost the support of two
key Republican liberals-Sena-
tor Cooper and Senator Aiken
-who have defended Nixon's
policy In Vietnam against Dem-
ocratic criticism.
Senator Aiken said: "I did
not think the President would
do what he reportedly has done,
and I never was so disappointed
in my life."
Senator Cooper described the
'action in Cambodia as a
"U-turn" in Administration pol-
icy In Southeast Asia.
Senator Jacob K. Javits, Re-
publican of New York, said
that the action "must be
deemed to be the President's
decision to expand the war into
Senator Charles E. Goodell,
Republican of New York, said:
"Today's action dramatically
demonstrates how the strategy
of Vietnamization has failed
and. how it pulls us inexorably
into a wider war."
Forlease-2004/01 /12 : CIA Of-00337R000200230010-1
amendment)
as"Through news
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SECRET
JOURNAL
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL
Thursday - 30 April 1970
25X1
25X1
25X1A
25X1
1. C. B. Morrison, in the office of Senator
Allen J. Ellender (D., La. ), called to say that he had talked with the
Senator about the possibility of his addressing the Mid-Career class on
12 June, but that the Senator expressed reservations in view of the very
busy schedule he now has since he is acting chairman of the Senate
Appropriations Committee. Morrison added, however, that there would
be no objection to our speaking directly to the Senator about this if we
wished.
2. Representative Paul McCloskey visited
SAVA, on the situation in Cambodia. McCloskey asked a number of
questions about the military and political situation and prospects in
Cambodia and adjacent areas of Southeast Asia, but at no time did he
raise questions of U. S. policies or U. S. activities.
Headquarters early this morning for a briefing by Mr.
3. Mr. William Miller, in the office of
Senator John Sherman Cooper, called to ask that our briefing of Senator
Cooper in response to questions contained in his letter to the Director
be postponed from 3:30 today until 3:30 on Tuesday, 5 May.
25X1 4. Received a call from Mrs. Mary
McLaughlin, Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, who requested
STATSPEC a copy of the joint communique issued at the behest
of Mr. Sihanouk on Tuesday. Mrs. McLaughlin asked if possible that
it be forwarded to the Chairman this afternoon.
SECRET
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H 3748 CONGRESSIONAI. RECORD - HOUSE April 30, 1970
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gen- First. That neutralization of- Cam- quisite to any U.S. assistance, a decision
tleman has expired. bodian territory, now in Communist by other free world governments in the
(Mr, REID of New York asked and was hands, is essential for the protection of region to send material and troop sup-
given permission to proceed for 3 addi- American troops remaining in South port to defend a government threatened
tional minutes.) Vietnam. The President has mentioned by Communist military takeover. Al-
Mr. REID of New York. Finally, let me repeatedly that he would not permit his though there has been some discussion
just say I think this amendment is con- policy of withdrawal to endanger those that Thailand, the Philippines, Japan,
sistent both with existing law and with American GI's who remain on duty in and Indochina, in addition to South
the President's determination to narrow Southeast Asia. The use of Cambodia, Vietnam and Korea should mount some
the war and not to widen it. particularly the "Parrot's Beak" area joint assistance program to the new
I think it will reassure the country that nearest Saigon, as a military sanctuary Cambodian regime, no positive steps
there are limits to the extension of has made the task of allied troops in have been taken to carry out any such
American power. Vietnam more difficult. The question is plan. There is little question that the fall
Mr. HORTON. Mr. Chairman., will the whether this fact alone warrants Amer- of Cambodia to Communist rule is a far
gentleman yield? lean involvement in the confrontation more Important threat to these East
Mr. REID of New York. I am happy between two opposing Cambodian re- Asian and Pacific nations than to the
to yield to my colleague from New York. gimes, and whether defense of U.S. troops United States.
Mr. 1`ORTON. I wish to commend the requires an active invasion deep into The Nixon doctrine seeks to modify
gentleman for the amendment he has of- Cambodia. the U.S. leadership of the free world,
fered. I support it. I certainly think it is We must continue to protect the lives and to remove from our shoulders the
a reasonable amendment. It is certainly of American soldiers remaining in South primary burden of serving as world po-
in line with the, statements the Presi- Vietnam. In my view, military actions liceman wherever anti-Communist gov-
dent has made on numerous occasions we have been undertaking for many ernments are threatened.
with regard to the Nixon doctrine. months, permitting hot pursuit of enemy These arguments put forth for U.S.
On the eve 'of the President's message units attacking from across the Cam- involvement in Cambodia indicate the
to the Nation on the Cambodia crisis, I bodian border, or seeking sanctuary in far-reaching consequences of the Presi-
want to state publicly my own analysis Cambodia should not be curtailed if dent's decision. First, he must weigh
of the problems and priorities which deemed necessary to protect American what commitment, if any, the United
face us in Indochina. lives. But hot pursuit does not encom- States has to this or any Cambodian re-
Some background review is important pass supporting or undertaking an in- gime. At what point would U.S. involve-
before discussing what our decisions vasion of Cambodia, with the intent of ment or assistance cease if the threat
should be at this juncture. supporting the regime there. It may en- to the current regime is not immediately
First, the President is in the midst of compass supporting an action limited to ended?
a laudable program to Vietnamize the destruction of sanctuary areas used to Second, he must weigh the actual
war in Vietnam and has made-substan_ shelter Communist troops which operate threat to American lives that continued
tial progress in withdrawing' American in South Vietnam. Communist occupation of Cambodia
Marine and Army units which serve in In the final analysis, the best way to would entail. Remembering that the
an infantry or ground combat capacity. defend and protect American lives in Vietcong and North Vietnamese have
During the unfolding of the President's South Vietnam is to continue policies been operating out of Cambodia for sev-
withdrawal program, the Communist that would enable these young men to eral years, the question must be asked
North Vietnamese military threat to two return home at the earliest possible date. whether the current threat to our troops
nominally neutral nations, Cambodia It is doubtful that any extension of our is so much greater now that it justifies
and Laos, has been severely intensified. military commitment into Cambodia a widening of U.S. involvement in the
Both these countries have been impor- would hasten this homecoming. war across all of Indo-China, and going
tant as sanctuaries and supply routes for Second. That the de facto control of beyond the restricted policy of hot pur-
North Vietnamese and Vietcong units most of Laos by the Communists and the suit.
operating in South Vietnam. But, until current threat to Cambodia is proof of Third, and perhaps most important,
recently, the neutralist governments of the domino theory at work, and that if the President must be aware that his
Laos and Cambodia were not immedi- the United States does not help restore decision will set crucial precedents for
ately endangered, although there was neutrality to these areas, Thailand will the application of his own Nixon doc-
partial disclosure of American military be threatened next. trine. If he narrowly construes it to mean
support efforts to help the Royalists in There is little question that Commu- that only the sending of organized units
Laos hold back Communist Pathet Lao nist military persistence, backward so- of U.S. ground troops is prohibited, it
advances. cial organization, and the impoverish- will mean little in terms of the changing
Then the overthrow of Prince Sihan- ment of the people of these countries U.S. role in the world. Also, the role of
ouk in Cambodia by an anti-Communist would have led to North Vietnamese advisers to ground units of other nations
coup dramatically altered the focal point dominance if it were not for the presence must somehow be explained in the con-
of military confrontation in Indochina, of large numbers of U.S. forces and text of the doctrine. If we do not begin
with the North Vietnamese seeking to equipment in Thailand and South Viet- now to apply the principle that free na-
gain military and political control over nam, and for U.S. advisory and hard- tions in the threatened region must
at least a substantial portion of Cam- ware assistance to Laos. The question choose to involve themselves before
bodian territory, and announcing their is, Has our military involvement done America gets involved, then it will be
intention to install Sihanouk as a pre- anything but postpone North Vietnamese difficult if not futile to try to encourage
sumably Communist ruler of this terri- Communist dominance? Or, if Vietnam- or enforce any regional defense concept
ization will be successful, will it take a in the future.
A whole host of U.S. interests and for- similar injection of American lives and The whole question of the Nixon doc-
eign policy questions are being tested by dollars to accomplish a stalemate in trine and its application to Cambodia
the decision our' Government makes in Cambodia, or Laos, or later on, in and Laos includes the consideration of
this crisis. Having been requested by Thailand? the American crisis of national priorities.
the new Cambodian regime to send U.S. Third. A third argument is made that We have, with the President's policy of
military hardware and assistance to use the provision of adviser and hardware disengagement from Southeast Asia,
against North Vietnamese and Vietcong assistance, short of sending U.S. ground been moving toward a realistic balance
who are advancing on Phnom Phen, the units, is consistent with the Nixon for- between military and domestic budg-
President must decide far more than the eign policy doctrine announced in the etary efforts. If suddenly the U.S. role
desirability, of supporting this fledgling summer of 1969 in Guam. This, in my in Southeast Asia is widened, and not
regime., judgment is too narrow an interprets- narrowed, if our financial commitments
The following arguments have been tion of the Nixon doctrine. The doctrine to these countries promises to tie down
put forth in support of American mili- does preclude the unilateral dispatch of billions of U.S. dollars in Indochina for
tary assistance and Involvement in Cam- U.S. ground troops to a nation like Cam- years to come, then we will not have met
bodia: bodia, but it also requires, as a prere- the challenge of our most serious domes-
Extract' from CR 'iMilitary Procurement, Research & Development, & Reserve strength
Ahp roved, For F~Igfse 2004/01/12 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200230010-1
Aut ~ri.za :ion,
By Rep H Reid
Approved For Release 2004/01/12 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200230010-1
April 30, 1970 C01' RESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE H 3747
would also wipe out thousands of 91hall or Thailand. The House, in my ' Judg- Mr. REUSS. Mr. Chairman, I com-
contractors in this country. This could ment, is coequal with the Senate in this mend the gentleman for bringing this
_not work. You could not enter into a con- regard, and it has to some extent been amendment to the floor. I support it.
tract like that, this just simply could not derelict in the past for not taking a We ought to be extracting ourselves
happen. And moreover youw6uid not position that is obviously clear, and I from Vietnam and not implicating our-
have the Poseidon, and you would not think in this instance it must fulfill its selves in Cambodia.
have the retrofitted Polaris, you would constitutional obligation and responsi- I would ask the gentleman whether
not have the S-3A, the P-3C, the C-5A, bility. in his amendment the words "American
which is working. You would not have In the fiscal year 1970 appropriation ground combat troops" include the con-
anything, but you would have the pleas- bill for the Department of Defense, as cept of American combat advisers.
the of stopping a company-you would Members know, there is a limitation Mr. REID of New York. Yes, that is
have the, pleasure of stopping a company: based on the amen TYE-d1Te~,d by Sen- corrtectREUSS. I thank the gentleman.
This might sound fine, but it cannot ator COOPER an enator CHURCH pre-Mr. work. it positively cannot work. That is cluding funds r the use of U.S. ground Mr. REID of New Yor)c. Further, as
how simple'it is. combat troop in Laos or Thailand. Members know, article I, section 8, of the
Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, will the Last Dec, ber, after the bill had been Constitution gives the Congress the au-
gentleman yield? signed and acted into law, the admin- thority to declare war, raise and support
Mr, RIVERS. Of course I will yield to istration, th ough Press Secretary Ziegler armies, to provide and maintain a navy,
said: and to make rules for the government
man from Illinois
ntl
.
e
the ge
Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I thor- Anyone fam r with the Nixon doctrine, and regulation of the land and naval
oughly agree with the' gentleman from as outlined on G , knows the amendment forces.
consists with the President's
ll
t
t
i
y
o
a
c-
These powers were authorized expl
South Carolina that this is a completely is
destructive amendment, rather than be- policy. As we have s on a number of
ing an objective amendment, because if, occasions, there are no . ground troops itly to the Congress as a vital part of
ea the gentleman says, it is going to slow in either country nor did this nistration the doctrine of the separation of powers.
visualize under this bill putting ground Alexander Hamilton, a strong advo-
-
essential production we need In this
eountry so as to keep America strong My amendment would have the si a the Federalist Paper No. 69 showing the
and safe, then T think the amendment effect of adding Cambodia to this pro clear distinction between the British and
ought to be completely and overwhelm- hibition on the use of ground forces. It merican systems in the delegation of
ingly defeated. is a limitation. It provides no sanctions. erican powers to the legislature. He
s been repeatedly stated by the sal
It h
a
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I do not
know how long in the future they make President and high administration offi- The resident is to be Commander in Chief
contracts for ads in one of these maga- cials that there is no present intention to of the my and Navy of the United States.
op and I would re ect his authority would be nomi-
zines. I would imagine it is many, many use our ground combat forces in these in this
CouritrieS. nally the me with stopping h that of the King of
do not know any- Since approving the amendment to the Great Britai but in substance much in-
it, although I do not ierior to it it ould amount to nothing more
thing about this. I do not know anything appropriation bill last year precluding than the supre a command and direction of
about them putting ads in magazines, the introduction of ground combat troops the military an naval forces, as first gen.
but I would recommend that they stop in Laos and Thailand, President Nixon eras and admiral of the Confederacy, while
until they are out of their financial has reiterated his desire to limit the war that of the Britis King extends to the "e-
in Asia-not to broaden it. He has said: Glaring of war and to the raising and regu
Cli sir, We have no plan for introducing ground lating of fleets and armies-all which,: by
ec se are not trying to combat forces into Laos. the Constitution u er consideration, would
Mz. Chairman
helg,anyone b b ecause of sentim,ntI but appertain to the le ,islature.
because it is for the security of America, In addition, on explaining his doctrine Indeed, in 1848 Abraham Lincoln, then
and if it not advantageous to the secu- pronounced at Guam, he said in his No- a Congressman, said:
rity of this country then do not give vember 3 speech: Allow ess Preside t to invade a neigh-
them anything, but cutting off a half a In oases involving other types of aggres-
.loaf will not hurt Lockheed as much as sion, we shall furnish military and economic boring nation when er he shall deem it nec-
essary to ran Invasion assistance when requested in accordance him too do so repel when er he may y choose to say
I urge you to reject this amendment. with our treaty commitments. But we shall he deems it necess y for such a purpose and
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on look to the nation directly threatened to as- you allow him make war at pleasure,
the amendment offered by the gentleman sume the primary responsibility of providing Study to see if ou can fix any limit to his
from New York (Mr . PniE) . the manpower for its defense. power in this espect, after you have given
T1 a question was taken; and on a di- Finally, I would like to briefly quote him so muc s you propose.
vision (demanded by Mr. PIKE) there Secretary Rogers, who, when asked The pr ision of the Constitution giving
were--ayes 21, noes 58. whether Laos would become another Vi- the waking power to Congress, was dic-
So the amendment was rejected. etnam, answered: tats , as I understand it, by the following
OSI~? Kings had always been involving
rM
41 tENDMLNT aF REn 33Y MR. REm air xEwYORK The President won't let It happen. and impoverishing their people in wars, pre-
tending generally, If not always, that the
Mr. of New York: Mr. Chairman, Continuing, he said
I offer an amendment. good of the people was to object. This, our
I mean we have learned one lesson, and convention undertook to be the most oppres-
The Clerk read, as follows: that is we are not going to fight any major slue of all Kingly oppressions; and they re
' wars in. the mainland of Asia again and we
Amendment offered by Mr. RErr~ of New solved to so frame the Constitution that no
York are not going to send American troops there, one man should hold the power of bringing
On page 6, following line 8, add the fol- and we certainly aren't going to do it unless this oppression upon us.
lowing new sectlon? we have the American public and the Con-
gress behind us. Dwight Eisenhower said very explicitly
"BXO. 40$. In, line with the expressed in- March 1954:
tention of the President of the 17nited States, Mr. Chairman, my amendment is also in to be no involvement df
no part of the funds authorize to be appro- consistent with the national commit- There America is in war going unless be n the result of theit is
priated pursuant to this Act shall be used ments resolution passed by the other constitutional process that is placed upon
to dance the introduction of American body on June 25, 1969, by a vote of 70 to Congress to declare it. Now let us have that
%Kaand combat troops into Laos, Thailand 16, expressing the sense of the Senate clear.
ter Cadubo" la
.;a s that the U.S. Armed Forces should not be In a word, therefore, I think it is clear
Mr; tETD, off, New York asked and used abroad or promised for use abroad
tend that the Congress, and this House, must
was given remarks.) to revise and ex- except by joint authority of the Prest-
w ven permission dent and the Congress
~ of New Yor. . not let its powers be eroded. We must not Mr, REUSS. Mr. Chairman, will the back into a wider war.
k.Mr. Chairman,
the purpose of this amendment Is simple;` gentleman yields . Our responsibility is char.
it is to prohibit the use of American Mr. REID of New York. I yield to the Further, this amendment in my judg-
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tic crisis. At a time when the very in- to the gentleman that this is a limitation ment areas. They have all sorts of storage
stitutions _ of American government are on the use of ground combat forces. it areas there. They have training areas,
being tested as to their adequacy and provides no sanction, but it clearly does They have just about developed this
relevancy to respond to the needs of our not preclude the use of funds for advisers country as a staging area from which to
people, this could be a disastrous error. or air support. attack Vietnam.
I believe strongly that the people of Mr. STRATTON. This would not inter- Moreover, they have been flanking our
the United States have, no interest in fere then with advisers, or with air sup- troops and causing terrific damage. We
Cambodia that would override our In- port, or with medevac personnel and so could win the war right here. We tried to
terest in :disengaging from Southeast on, is that correct?
Asia, or that would override the. Presi- Mr. REID of New York. It does not doi Sihanouk to let us do it. Nothing
dent's earlier announced intentions to preclude their use. It provides no sanc- know This crowd t did crowd d is of 3 do be g place the burden for, defense of these tion for it. It provides how long this is ountr, a limitation in business and running this country, but
governments on themselves and on other against the use of regular ground combat while they are giving us the opportunity
free nations in the East and Southeast forces.
Asian area. Mr. STRATTON. Does the amend- mto go in any of our and wipe out American what
boys, t oed so
Any commitment of U.S. troops, to prop ment or does it not eliminate funds for border-less than 25 miles in, n right
because e
up the new Cambpdian. regime, whether the kind of people who are now operating am not talking about going all over this
as advisers or as ground units, will render in the Parrot's Beak area?
it
pp r- we should
the. most important plank of the Nixon Mr. REID of New York. It does not tacountry ke ad vantage and taking
doctrine meaningless. Even if we were to preclude funds for advisers or for air is to our ur advantage ga the and to to the e adva. adThis
vantage
attain a quick military victory in Cam- support. to Vietnamese. get right
bodia, which is extremely doubtful, the Mr. STRATTON. I thank the gentle- of the the brder and can get right
overall effect of U.S. involvement will be man. I am glad to have his statement. across the border and clean out the
a widening of the, Vietnam conflict Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Chairman, This r bases. This r is t along been Ho Chi
across the whole subcontinent of Indo- will the gentleman yield? ight along ht do the this Ch
china. Mr. REID of New York. I yield to the Minh Tng comes, right down and way
We in 1970, are still suffering from the distingiushed minority leader. Cambodia, and through Laos and into
effects
effects of a decision to enter a halfway Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I am glad Cambodia, and opht across into the Me-
in the early 1960's. Any risk of ex- there was an apparent clarification of a kong. Nothing stops them.
tending the United States into an escala- response that was given a moment ago. Chi We can go Minh T iT there and intercept the
tion or widening of this military stale- If I recollect the question asked by the to rail insofar as it applies
mate should be avoided at this stage of gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. REUSS), to Cambodia. the American history, he asked whether We do not want to stop
Your no what the
The military budget in this fiscal year would preclude the military advisers. he President doing that. I do not know what have
and the next is already too high. I have impression I,got from the response was not t talked is to him. say tonight. I have
t is what h-
voted on the House or today, in teller that the amendment, under ground com- has got got to think him. about. this
votes, to cut substantial amounts from bat forces, would preclude the utilization going . If the have to do
the -military procurement bill in. areas of military advisers, this first. this ss succeed,
simple e a that. have to do
s I would
where I believe national security is not Mr. REID of New York. If the gentle- not want It the gentleman's amendment
compromised and where domestic consi- man will permit me, my understanding going in a to keep uderations. are overriding. g to keep from going in and t is that the gentleman from Wisconsin from m doing those things that all of the
e
I fully support the amendment offered asked whether the amendment would generals-including Westmoreland and
by the gentleman from New York (Mr. permit the use of advisers. My under- Abrams-have told us we must do. But
Ram) to prohibit the use of any U.S. standing is that this amendment would while they are letting us do it, we are
ground combat troops into Cambodia, not preclude their use.
Laos, or Thailand. Mr. GERALD R. FORD. In other words, let us do. M web have ust begged ember when
n
No one has suggested that outright your amendment would not in any way Sihanouk captu. captu rs must remember when
sailors.
destruction of all Communist forces and interfere with the current operation the Mr LONG of red our
governments in Indochina is or should President has authorized to destroy the Mr. L gentleman yield? Chair-
be our ,goal., Without any justification sanctuaries of the North Vietnamese and man, will the gentleman yield?
for a decision this drastic,. there is ab- the Vietcong in Cambodia? Mr. RIVERS. I yield to the gentleman
solutely no, justification for America- Mr. REID of New York. It does not from Maryland.
to extend its entry into a military hold- preclude air support. It does not preclude man Mr. is LONG of Maryland. ni Chair- Mr.
Ing action, or standoff confrontation advisers. It does not preclude equipment, the chairman's opinion that
in Cambodia or Laos. It was a mistake But it does .' co accomplish this, we have to use ground
preclude to sacrifice 41,000 Americans in Vietnam. American ground the combat forces are regular in in coMrat troops?
We must not make the same mistake Cambodia. border, 25 RIVERS. . I is across thj
e het bode orders the
again, when the evidence is_so clear that Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I move Chair-
other international and domestic crises to strike the requisite number of words. Mr. LONG of Maryland. Md. ombamay engulf us if we do. man, do we have to use ground combat
The best way to protect American SoThe uth Carolina is ecognizedtleman from troops?
troops is not to enlarge the war to include Mr. yes, RIVERS. but it of ha b the
a t n
Cambodia-but to bring American troops Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I have in soil, yes, but t would not have anything
home, the well of the House two maps I want to do with running the government. It
Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman., will all Members to see. I think if I get beside is doing what we want to do and what
the rSTRATTON. them I can explain them best. I am indi- we need to do. It will destroy these areas.
the gentleman ? of New York. I yield to the cating the areas that are presently af- Until we destroy these areas, they will
geMr. Rtiij
from New York. fected. Just about everyone of my ac- infiltrate South Vietnam forever and
Ml . an from ~G?N, I appreciate the quaintance belives in the concept of hot ever, and the minute Sihanouk gets in,
ger. ST' yielding. I wanted to under- pursuit. The Vietcong troops would go we would not. be able to get in there ny-
sOnd
gent1 whethyl the gentleman's amend- Into sanctuaries inside of Cambodia and way. These are the areas I am talking
mend -p' Laos. We are now talking about Cam- about. See how every one of them is on
the t, i ' it , axe adopted, would prevent bodia. These areas to which I am pointing the border of the countries.
Parrot's liaat `ors now underway in the are the areas where they have been cans- Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, will the
Selma section. of Cambodia, which ing the most trouble. Observe how close gentleman yield?
the Prp~q
.Owt Apparently going to dis- that area is to Saigon-only 30 miles. We Mr. RIVERS. I yield to the gentleman
cuss. o)~ Ylsiq tonight. Would this have been wondering how they could from Missouri.
arirendmen _outlaw that activity even blow up Saigon every week. It was simple Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I think the
before the J?r-esident. has had an oppor- for Sihanouk. They are only 30 miles point needs to be made certainly that,
tunity to explain vat the situation is? away. They could get the stuff where the first of all, this border has not been sur-
N1r. Rte? of New York. I would say troops have It. & R. in very large deploy- veyed and it vacillates, and the sanctu-
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arses are on the places where theoretical- any other single person in America, who there and used our fighters and our
ly the border is not by treaty, but by mu- is motivated by the same things we are bombers out of Thailand.
tual agreement between these peoples motivated by, what is to be done. I re- To keep us from going to their aid is
who oppose each other. peat, what is being done is what has to just a monumental act of ingratitude, in
Second, our only men going in there be done for the sake of this country. my opinion.
are in an advisory capacity to the Viet- Mr. RIVERS. I agree with the gentle- Mr. REID of New York. One final quick
namese who, themselves, need to elimin- man. question, and I thank the gentleman for
ate these sanctuaries. Would the gentle- Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, will the yielding,
man agree with that? gentleman yield? If the President did send ground com-
Mr. RIVERS. Yes. Mr. RIVERS. I yield to the distin- bat troops into Cambodia, for whatever
Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman, will the guished gentleman from Michigan. reason it might be necessary, does the
gentlemen yield? Mr. NEDZI. Would the chairman com- gentleman see an end of the war or does
Mr. RIVERS. I yield to the gentleman ment on the headline which appears in he see that as leading to a wider war?
from Indiana, the Washington Daily News today which Mr. RIVERS. If the gentleman is talk-
Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I think summarizes or epitomizes a radio col- ing about these areas here, it is bound
It ought to be pointed out in addition umn which I heard this morning quoting to shorten the war.
that throughout our history the Presi- the Cambodian Government spokesman. It will do two things. It will eliminate,
dent of the United States as Commander The headline says, "Cambodia as Neu- these things (pointing) and it will inter-
In Chief has had and has exercised the tral Can't Approve Our Aid." cept the Ho Chi Minh buildup, which
-power and the authority on occasion to He clearly indicated, or at least was is coming down there like an interstate
land ground combat troops in case of quoted as saying aid was not asked for. highway. The Ho Chi Minh Trail is very
emergency. But under this amendment, Mr. RIVERS. I do not know a thing vast, over a very wide area. This is a
if American citizens' lives were being about that. part of it.
jeopardized In Thailand or Cambpdia- Any excuse we can get to go in and Mr. CEDERBERG. Mr. Chairman, I
or for that matter, in the Mediterranean help clean out this thing will help Viet- move to strike the requisite number of
or anywhere else-the President could namization and save the lives of Ameri- words.
not send the Marines in, under this cans. I would hate to see us do anything Mr. Chairman, I take this time-and I
amendment. This is no time or place to stop it. hope not to take it all-to caution the
to attempt to circumscribe or reduce the Furthermore, we could never tell the House about taking an action of this
historical powers and perogatives of the President how to run foreign policy. He kind this afternoon just before the Presi-
President of the United States. will tell us, as the gentlemen know, it is dent is going to address the Nation.
Mr. RIVER$. Of course not. The Pres- none of our business. I, for one, might even support this
ident should be eornmended. This saves Mr. REUSS. Mr. Chairman, will the amendment at a different time. I am op-
the lives of our troops. We should have gentleman yield?
done this long ago., posed to the entering of U.S. ground
Mr. RIVERS. Of course I yield to the troops into Cambodia without prior con-
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gen- gentleman. sultation with Congress. However, I
tleman from South Carolina has expired. Mr. REUSS. Do I have the gentleman's would caution the Members of this House
(On request of Mr. NEDZX, and by position straight? Is it that the gentle- this afternoon that if this amendment is
unanimous consent, Mr. RIVERS was man from South Carolina feels the passed, you will see the greatest exodus
allowed to proceed for 5 additional United States should introduce American from that press gallery you ever saw, and
minutes.) ground combat troops into Cambodia they will all be heading for the tele-
Mr. RIVERS, Mr. Chairman, as I say, and therefore opposes the Reid amend- phones. What they will be doing is broad-
I have not talked with the President, but ment? casting all over the country, this is undoubtedly what he has to think Mr. RIVERS. No; that is not true. world, that the Congress of all
the United
about. These people have been standing Mr. REUSS. Will the gentleman state States has predetermined the judgment
there and lunging at us and they have his position?
the stuff in there, and do not let anybody Mr. RIVERS. My position is we should remarks. Thisris the worst time hat this e his
kid us about it. They will bring old introduce troops in there if it is neces- amendment could possibly be brought
Sihanouk back there in short order, sary to remove those things which are forth.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman killing American boys. If we can do it Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the
from Michigan for getting me this addi- by way of the Vietnamese Army, by way gentleman yield?
tional time. of giving them the material they need,
Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, will the when they get there they will find enough Mr. CEDERBERG. I am happy to yield
gentleman yield? material. to the gentleman.
Mr. RIVERS. I yield to the gentleman Mr. REUSS. If we cannot do it by the Mr. RIVERS. I not only agree with the
from Illinois. Vietnamese Army, would the gentleman gentleman, but let me say this: We have
Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I must favor it with the American Army? less than a month of fair weather over
say I am in direct opposition on this Mr. RIVERS. If we are ever going to there. If we are going to eliminate these
particular amendment. secure that country these things have to things, the time to do it is now-the time
Mr. Chairman, those who serve on the be eliminated. is now. When the rainy season comes it
Armed Services Committee, while we do This is the only government that per- is more difficult, and that is what these
not have all the answers, are privileged mitted us to go in there. We have tried people are waiting for.
on occasion tq get some inside informa- every way before. This is the only gov- Mr. CEDERBERG. May I say in addi-
tion. But, being activated, like every ernment left. tion to that that militarily I do not be-
Member of this House, by pure love of Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Chairman, lieve we should allow a sanctuary of this
our country, those of us who are priv- will the gentleman yield? kind to exist. I am all for the South Viet-
ileged to know some of these things are Mr. RIVERS. Certainly I yield to the namese taking care of it and I hope they
in direct opposition to this amendment, gentleman. will do the task, but to allow these troops
It is not in the best interest of this Mr. REID of New York. I appreciate to come in during the day or during the
country, the chairman's yielding. night, into combat and kill our troops
Who can outguess the President of the Might I ask the chairman whether it and maim the civilians and the South
United States at this particular time? is now a matter of law we cannot intro- Vietnamese and then go back to a sanc-
lie is.going to be on the television tonight duce ground combat forces into Laos and tuary and resupply themselves just does
at 9 o'clock. Thailand? not make any combat sense.
Mr. Chairman, let us see what the Mr. RIVERS. That is right. That is a I plead with the Members of this
President is going to say, Then, after mistake.
what is said, we will support him in House, please do not take this action of
what has a
to be
done in the best interest If there is any country we ought to approving this kind of an amendment
of this country. go to the aid of, If needed, it is Thailand, just before the President is going to go on
because they let us come in there In the television. It is a tragic mistake.
.This Is no time, for us to say to the darkest days of our adversity and never Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Chair-
man who has more information than told the world a thing, We built bases man, will the gentleman yield?
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE H 3751
Mr. CEDERBERG. I yield to the gen- Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I move under the Constitution to implement
tleman from Maryland. to strike the requisite number of words. those requirements. 11 Mr. LONG of Maryland. The gentle- (Mr. FASCELL asked and was given It still is, however, if adopted, a very
man's statement puzzles me a little bit, permission to revise and extend his re- important and vital expression of the
The President argued and only last week marks.) sentiment of Congress. But I do not want
the Secretary of State told by subcom- Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I am us to deceive ourselves that we are put-
mittee of the Committee on Appropria- not going into the military aspects of the ting some monetary restriction on the
tions that the Congress would be con- Southeast Asia problem. President or that we are changing some
sulted before any movement into another However, I want to put in perspective treaty commitment or that we are chang-
Asian country would take place. All this what it is we are actually going to do ing the authority under the Gulf of Ton-
amendment speaks to is the introduction under this amendment because I think kin resolution. We are not doing any of
of ground combat troops. Does the gen- that is importaht in the consideration of that with this amendment.
tleman argue that-if the President the overall principle sought to be raised Finally, Mr. Chairman this amend-
makes a good case tonight or any other by the gentleman's amendment. ment can only be effective on the date
night that we need combat troops in I think regardless of how we are going this bill becomes effective, if passed. The
Cambodia to Protect American lives-the to vote, it is important to have a clear effective date is the beginning of the next
.Congress would not give him that au- understanding of the actual operative po- fiscal year, July 1, 1970.
thority in a very short time? tential as compared to its being an ex- Notwithstanding that, Mr. Chairman,
Mr. CEDERBERG. I will not prejudge pression of congressional policy. I believe the amendment is an expres-
what the President will say tonight or at So, first, I would like to ask the chair- sion of a fundamental policy by this
any other time. man of the full Committee on Armed Congress which is vital. However, it does
Mr. LONG of Maryland. Of course, we Services whether there are any funds in not undermine the President's right to
do not know what he will say. this bill to finance ground troops. say anything he wants to say tonight
Mr. CEDERBERG. The gentleman Mr. RIVERS. There are no funds for about this deplorable situation in South-
knows what will happen if the House of personnel and no O. & M. money.
R
i epresentatives
Representatives takes this position this Mr. FASCELL. I am sorry but I did tart Asia; it does not rest ict him mone-
before the President can ad- not hear the chairman. and d; does does not his of him legally,
dress the Nation. Mr. RIVERS. There is no money for obligations, does not and does country's treaty
Mr.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance military personnel and no O. & M. money. idential and does not change Pres-
my time. Mr. FASCELL. What does "0. & M." iIt does policy.
Mr. CARTER. Mr. Chairman, I move money mean? It does say, therefore, by inference and
to strike the last word. Mr. RIVERS. Operations and mainte- construction that doC want the Pres-
Mr. Chairman, today we are faced with nance. toe come back to of Congres
a very serious problem, one that affects Mr. FASCELL. Therefore, in order for l sentiment, this very expression limited in its ac-
every home in our country. In 1964 we the sional livless use-
had a problem similar to this. At that prohibition in the gentleman to be a from tual application, ennevertheless is a use-
time we were told that the Turner Joy New York's amendment to be effective fu guideline.
and thee Maddox had been attacked by
or have any real meaning as far as the Mr. MOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to
North Vietnamese ships. Now in looking subject matter of this bill, it must apply strike the requisite number of words,
into that you find that the.commanding to equipment and other materiel used to and I rise in support of the amendment.
officers of those ships will not state they move ground forces into Laos, Combo- (Mr. MOSS asked and was given per-
were under attack. But under pressure pia, or Thailand; is that correct? mission to revise and extend his re-
such as exists here and under strong Mr. RIVERS. Am I to understand that marks.)
pleading and suggestion from men high the amendment is certainly germane? Mr. MOSS. Mr: Chairman, I must ex-
in the offices of this House, our House Mr. FASCELL. I understand it is ger- press my sense of dismay at the state-
succumbed and passed the Gulf of mane to the bill, but I just want to know ment made by the gentleman from
Tonkin resolution. I want to tell you, that what the fund prohibition really ap- Michigan in talking about his President
since that time we have had 7 years of plies to. and our President over here. I have only
the most horrible war that has ever been The question I raise does not go to the one President, at one time. As I recall,
visited on the people of the United States. overall principle as an expression of that is the precise provision in the Con-
You know, one of the sad things about sentiment by the Congress. I think ex- stitution of the United States. President
this war is that if a, youngster can get pression is worthwhile any time the Nixon is my President, and he is the
into college, he does not go to the war. If Congress wants to speak on such an im- President of the United States, and I
he can get into the Reserves, he does not portant matter. The question of the in- respect the onerous nature of the office
go to the war. If he can get into the troduction of ground troops into any he occupies, and the awesome problems
National Guard, he does not go to the area of Southeast Asia is relevant, but which confront him but I also recognize
war. It is the poor people, the fellows I would like to know whether the fund that this House is one house of a two-
who cannot go to college, who are prohibition in the amendment actually house, coequal body which has very seri-
brought in. If there was ever a war, a is effective as it applies to this bill. ous responsibilities imposed upon it by
horrible war, that was unjustified, this is From what I understand, as the chair- the Constitution and by the people of the
it. Plainly this is a rich man's war and man just responded, it really is not. United States.
a poor man's fight. So, it is not a legal proscription of the
at
In awar involving the poorer sons of President's right to commit troops, or to very Mr. Chairman, if this u d not is
our country. I strongly support the very moment that v should not act s
pay for them out of other funds. It is this moment in advance of the Presi-
amendment of the gentleman from New an expression of the sense of Congress, dent's speech this evening, then it seems
York and I ask that you consider this. however, which might or might not be to me that the appropriate action
I ask that you think calmly and deeply important to the administration and would be for the Committee to rise and
as to whether we are going to enter into which it may consider. But it legally does await the statement of the President,
a war worse than we are in at the present not proscribe the President. This is the and then act, following that statement,
time. I say that this possibility exists to- only point I am making, at this ,juncture. upon the basis of any new evidence. Upon
day and now.
Our country in her intercourse with other action cannot possibly change the treaty to support the amendment offered by the
nations may she always be In the right, but commitments which the United States gentleman from New York (Mr. REID)
nations ma, right l wrong, has with Thailand. As a matter of law, I because I have returned not many weeks
do not believe the Congress can do that. ago from Southeast Asia, where I think
We might alter that today, Mr. Chair- I do not believe, therefore, even as an I undertook a rather responsible inquiry
man, and say, "Our country, right or expression of sentiment, the gentleman's and a very comprehensive inquiry, and
wrong. If right, to be kept right. If wrong, amendment can change the treaty cam- the developments which have occurred
to be set right." mitments and the right of the President since my return have not surprised me
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H 3752 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE April 3O,'1970
greatly, and there are
other develop- caused us to enter into a very timely Mr. RIVERS. That is what I was try-
merits which could take- place which and, I think, very helpful discussion of ing to say. I can find no fault with an
would not surprise me greatly. ' fundamental military policy, one of the amendment like that.
IVIr. Chairman, I would point out that very few such occasions in the 9 years I Mr. FINDLEY. I appreciate the gen-
it is 17 years since we went into South have been here in the House of Repre- tleman's comment.
Korea, and I can see two or three dec- sentatives, years in which I have seen Mr. HORTON. Mr. Chairman, will the
ales of involvemgnt in Southeast Asia, an unfolding of military operations un- gentleman yield? I would like to ask a
and I can see it, on an ever-expanding precedented in our country, and yet al- question on the subject about which you
basis of our material resources, and I most never do we discuss the funda- were just speaking.
know that there is an increasingly stri- mental issue of the role of the United Mr. FINDLEY. I yield to the gentle-
dent demand in this Nation for a greater States in these far away places, man from New York.
share of those resources. The distinguished chairman of the Mr. HORTON. As I understood the
I Have no question as to the motives Committee on Armed Services, I feel, statement the gentleman in the well
of some of those who oppose the United put his finger right on the heart of this made, he was talking about the idea of
States overseas, but I know what dire issue-and I say this -kindly-when he hot pursuit, and as I would understand
dangers we face here at home if we con- closed his comments by saying that if hot pursuit, that would be immediately
tinue to do the bad job of housekeeping, we try, by an amendment of this sort, over the border to protect the ground
to Ignore the ills of our own domestic to tell the President of the United States forces in the immediate vicinity of Cam-
society. We can be destroyed as surely what to do in the field of foreign policy, bodia, the South Vietnamese border.
from within as we can by any force or the President would respond quite Mr. FINDLEY. I will say to the gentle-
combination of forces from without. properly, to use the words of the gentle- man, if I may interrupt, that I would
It is time that we start to realize our man from South Carolina, "It is none of hope and expect the President to exer-
priorities. The fact that a man steps into your business." cise a very narrow construction on this
this well and opposes an expansion of I believe that that Is a rather widely implied authority to use ground troops
military activities is in no sense an in- held assumption, that what happens in outside the borders of South Vietnam,
dictment of his patriotism. I believe that foreign policy, especially in fundamental but I can conceive of instances when
at some times, under the conditions of military policy, is really-none of the this would be necessary.
the moment, it takes more courage to business of the Congress. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
step here and say, "Let us go slow, let It is hard for me to accept that. In gentleman from Illinois has expired.
us.evaluate and reevaluate. Let us know fact, I disagree absolutely with such a (On request of Mr. HORTON, and by
what the hazards of the ac Lion we are conclusion. unanimous consent, Mr. FINDLEY was
taking might be," than it does Just to The amednment I have presented In allowed to proceed for 5 additional
stand up and say "I am going along, and the form of a substitute retains all of minutes.)
I am going to wrap myself up in the the langauge of the amendment offered Mr. HORTON. Mr. Chairman, will the
flag in the process." by the gentleman from New York (Mr. gentleman yield?
Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Chair- REID). But, it adds some things that are Mr. FINDLEY. I am glad to yield to
man, will the gentleman yield? unspoken by the gentleman from New the gentleman from New York.
Mr. MOSS. I yield to the gentleman. York, and I think these unspoken Items Mr. HORTON. The chairman of the
Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Chair- should be spelled out. Armed Services Committee referred to
man, I wish to say I agree with and ap- It deals with the item that has been In the map to the immediate right of the
predate this statement and concur that so much controversy here. Whether in a gentleman in the well. I am not familiar
this is a matter that the House should crisis, requiring a split-second decision with it, but I assume it is a map of
act on. by the President through his command- Cambodia. There are certain MRS with
But I would like to advise the Mem- ers as to whether ground combat forces different numbers. I do not know whether
triers that I suggested to the leadership, should move a few feet across the Cam- those are military targets or what they
due to the seriousness of the matter and bodian border in order to protect the are. But do I correctly understand that
the fact that the President is going to lives of American troops in South Viet- the gentleman's amendment would not
speak tonight, that I thought it might nam-whether or not he could respond. Permit the introduction of ground troops
be appropriate to adjourn so we could Of course, the President has a grave under any circumstances to go into the
vote after the President spoke and not responsibility as Commander in Chief- heart of or into the major portion of
before, But I would advise the Members an overriding responsibility to protect Cambodia?
that suggestion, that I was very sensi- U.S. lives whether they are in American Mr. FINDLEY. The only circumstance
tive to, and which the gentleman men- uniform or not. in which ground troops could be in-
tioned, was declined. So, even if the Congress would say to troduced into Cambodia would be in the
SVBSTITUTE AMENDMENT OFFERED EY the contrary-that he should not do it- event that the President should deter-
MR. FINDLEY it is my belief that he would have the mine that such is required in order to
Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, I of- fundamental responsibility to these protect the lives of American forces
fer an amendment in the nature of a American citizens to take the action-to within South Vietnam.
substitute. Protect their lives. Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Mr. Chairman,
The Clerk read as follows: Mr. FINDLEY. I am sorry, I missed will the gentleman yield?
Amendment offered by Mr. FINDLEY in the the last part of the gentleman's question. Mr. FINDLEY. I yield to the gentle-
nature of a substitute for the amendment Mr. RIVERS. Does the gentleman's man from New York.
offered by Mr. REID of New York: amendment say in so many words that Mr. LOWENSTEIN. I wonder what
In place of the amendment, substitute we may enter Cambodia for the purpose would occur if the success of the Cam-
the following language: of protecting the lives of American bodia forces and our forces and of those
"SEC. 403. In line with the expressed in- troops?
tention of the President of the United allied to us should unexpectedly cause
States, none of the funds authorized by Mr. FINDLEY. Yes. the other side to retreat toward, say,
Shin act shall of used to ds aut the idtrby Mr. RIVERS. Will the gentleman read Phnom Penh? Would we then be obliged,
duction of American ground combat troops that language of the amendment again? under the interpretation the gentleman
into Laos, Thailand, or Cambodia without Mr. FINDLEY. Yes, indeed. I am glad is giving the amendment, to pursue the
the prior consent of the Congress, except to to. It states, "without the prior consent enemy through the rest of Cambodia in
the extent that such is required, as deter- of the Congress"; then it adds the words, order to be certain that at some future
mined by the President and reported "except to the extent that such is re- time they would not come back to the
promptly to- the Congress, to protect the quired, as determined by the President areas where they could harass our troops
lives of American troops remaining within and reported promptly to the Congress, in South Vietnam?
South Vietnam." to protect the lives of American troops Mr. FINDLEY. That is a question to
Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, I think remaining within South Vietnam." which I do not think the answer would
we all owe the gentleman from New I am glad to clarify that point and appear at this moment. It is.up to the
York a debt of gratitude because he has appreciate the question. President as Commander in Chief to
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make his , interpretation of the implied
powers that he exercises as,Commander
in Chief.
I wish to add one other thing before
I, yield further. This amendment to me
is very important, because it speaks to
the role of Congress in dealing with
fundamental policy. It illustrates the
limitations on our role in this area. But
it also shows our authority, our respon-
sibility. You will note that my amend-
ment does express affirmatively the right
of Congress to. consent prior to. the use
of'combat,troops. If that is our decision,
then we can affirmatively make the de-
cision that our ,troops should be used.
But it also requires that if the President
makes a determination to use troops
under the implied powers, then he must
report promptly to the Congress that he
has made that determination. That re-
porting requirement is nowhere spelled
out in present law, to my knowledge. I
think It is high time that we impose that
reporting requirement on the President.
I think this alone will have a salutary
effect and will tend to discourage any
unjust use.
Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. FINDLEY. I promised to yield to
the gentleman from Indiana. I.yield to
the gentleman from Indiana.
,-Mr. JACOB. I wonder if the gentle-
man would state whether or not it would
be correct to say that, the operative lan-
guage of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution-
and the amendment is set opposite the
language in that resolution-was not
contingent ,upon the protection of U.S.
personnel in Vietnam and if, at the time
the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was
adopted, it was not also hoped a very
strict construction of that resolution
might be made by the President of the
United States?
Mr. FINDLEY, I gather the drift of the
gentleman's} comments, and I must 'say
the President may very broadly construe
his implied powers. What we do or fail
to do here cannot diminish, his..respon-
sibility. He may fail to exercise it, but
we cannot diminish his responsibility.
Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Chairman, the gen-
tleman did not respond. My question
was: Was not the operative part of that
language contingent on the protection
and safety of troops? _
Mr. FINDLEY, It had two operative
parts and one had to deal with the
attack on our ships, and the other dealt
with the process through which our Gov-
ernment should. go to counter an attack
h n 'Southcast,.A.? ia..
Mr. JACQB, Yt wad dealing with the
safety of American personnel In Viet-
nam, as I recall..
Mr. F'INDLEY. I believe only section 1
dealt with the safety of American per-
sonnel.
Mr. CEDERBE LG. Mr. Chairman, will
,p #lman-Meld?
t4
Mr CZ E48ERG , I'll 1.
Mr.,,.Chairmmaz}, in-
asmuch _ I spoke In opposition to the
Reid of New , , _0nlen went, because
I felt very strorl _ about that, I do be-
lieve the amen fing pt gf .the _gentleman
from Illinois is a real improvement, and
I see no real reason to oppose that
amendment.
Mr. RIEGLE. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. FINDLEY. I yield to the gentle-
man from Michigan.
Mr. RIEGLE. Mr. Chairman, as I un-
derstand the amendment of the gentle-
man and his explanation, it seems to me
he is inferring by what he said that the
President now has delegated authority,
to act on his own to introduce American
military personnel in Cambodia.
Mr. FINDLEY. He has an implied re-
sponsibility to do so in Cambodia to
protect American lives in South Viet-
nam.
Mr. RIEGLE. Where specifically in
the Constitution can the gentleman find
that? I question that.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gen-
tleman from Illinois has expired.
(On request of Mr. Gaols, and by
unanimous consent, Mr. FINDLEY was al-
lowed to proceed for 1 additional
minute.)
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. FINDLEY, I yield to the gentle-
man from Iowa.
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, in the
event the gentleman's substitute should
be defeated, I wonder if the gentleman
from New York (Mr. REID) would accept
an amendment to his amendment to
provide that in perpetuity no American
combat troops be sent anywhere in the
world, including the Middle East?
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Chair-
man, I move to strike the requisite num-
ber of words.
(Mr. GERALD R. FORD asked and
was given permission to revise and ex-
tend his remarks.)
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Chair-
man, during the full decade of the six-
ties, I had the opportunity to sit down
with several Presidents, and it was my
privilege, following such conferences, to
support the President, whether he was
from my party or another party, in what
he thought was in the best interests of
the United States.
I' am proud of the fact that in this
country we can have that kind of co-
operation between the leaders on one side
of the aisle with a President coming from
the other side of the aisle. I have always
been very proud of the fact that in this
body the Democratic leadership has re-
sponded as strongly in support of a Re-
publican President as most of us re-
sponded and supported a Democratic
President.
I happen to think this is a very crucial
hour-and I use that word not literally,
but figuratively-and it is my strong
hope that at this particular point we,
not as Democrats or Republicans, make
a basic decision in the overall Interest of
the country.
I personally do not believe that either
the Reid amendment or the Findley
amendment ought to be approved here
this afternoon. I do not know precisely
what the President of the United States
is going to say tonight. I think It Is
awfully important that the impact of his
remarks not be hampered or hindered by
some action taken here this afternoon.
H 3753
I am a strong believer in the right
of the legislative branch to. participate
in decisions involving our national se-
curity..But the problem of_ time, right
now is extremely serious. We could very
easily take some action here this after-
noon which might adversely affect the
full beneficial impact of what the Presi-
dent will say tonight.
If I had my choice I would be opposed,
as a consequence, to either amendment.
I have looked over the Findley amend-
ment. I have consulted with experts in
the executive branch of the Government.
The choice between the Findley amend-
ment and the Reid of New York amend-
ment is easy.
The Findley amendment in effect says
what the President has promised he will
do. He has said that before introducing
American ground combat troops into
Laos, Thailand, or Cambodia he will seek
the prior consent of the Congress of the
United States.
On the other hand, he has said that
if emergency situations arise where it is
incumbent upon him as Commander in
Chief to take action to protect the lives
of American soldiers, sailors or marines,
then he will act, but he will report im-
mediately to the Congress and to the
American people his reasons for taking
such action under emergency circum-
stances.
Therefore, it seems to me that this
proposed amendment offered by the gen-
tleman from Illinois (Mr. FINDLEY) does
no harm, because it coincides with what
the President has promised us and the
American people; and therefore I intend
to vote for the substitute, and I would
ask all on our side of the aisle and as
many as possible on the other side of
the aisle to do the same.
It seems to me that this is the best
course in a situation which could be
complicating and harmful. The facts of
life are that since 1965 the Vietnamese
and the Vietcong have occupied sanctu-
aries just across the border from which
they have made forays into South Viet-
nam, and atfer they have made those
forays-
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gen-
tleman from Michigan has expired.
(On request of Mr. PELLY, and by
unanimous consent, Mr. GERALD R. FORD
was allowed to proceed for 3 additional
minutes.)
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Chair-
man, after the enemy has made these
excursions into South Vietnam, killing
Americans and killing our allies, they
have escaped back across the border and
they have rested and recouped and re-
grouped, and they have rearmed. Then
they would come back on another occa-
sion, at their option, with the full pro-
tection of the former Government of
Cambodia.
In order to save American lives the
President has authorized the kind of ac-
tion, in conjunction with the forces of
our allies, which he will describe in de-
tail to the Nation in a few hours.
I hope and trust that we take no ac-
tion here today or tomorrow or next
week that will undermine this long over-
due effort to protect the lives of Ameri-
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Bans now being killed In South Viet-
nam.
I am told that the statement to be
made by the "President tonight is con-
sideretl t.6-be -one a! major importance.
I believe the best answer !or us_ here this
afternoon is to accept an amendment
which I am assured coincides with the
commitments already made by the Presi-
dent. I believe It is a far preferable
amendment to the one offered by the
gentleman from New York (Mr. REID).
Mi. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Chair-
man, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I am glad to
yield to the gentleman from Maryland.
Mr. LONG of Maryland. I believe that
' lords about 'saving American lives con-
fuse the issue. I believe that is what we
are all trying to do, to save American
lives. If Congress had acted many years
-ago, perhaps we could have saved many
of the 40,000 American lives that have
been lost in Vietnam.
is it not true that the Findley amend-
nnent merely pulls the few teeth that the
Reid amendment has in it and allows
the President to do basically as he
pleases?
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I do not think
It pulls the teeth of the Reid amend-
ment, What the Findley amendment does
is tefI us that the President will consult
with us in advance if he takes such a
step in Labs, Cambodia, or Thailand,
which is a promise that he has already
made to us and'to the American people.
Then he is also given the flexibility to act
if there is an emergency that arises to
protect American lives and then report
promptly thereafter. I think that is con-
structive and not harmful.
Mr; REID of New York. Mr. Chairman,
will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I yield to the
gentleman from New'York.
Mr. REID of New York. I thank the
gentleman for yielding.
"I merely ask him, in the light of our
earlier conversation this morning wheth-
er in deference-to the President's speech
tonight he would be willing to recom-
mend-that the House rise so that we can
vote after the President's speech.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
,gentleman has expired.
BY unanimous' consent, Mr. GERALD
R, Foxe was allowed to proceed for 2
,additional minutes.)
T1Qr. GERALD R. FORD. I know that
there can be an argument made that we
should cieier, but "I do not have the privi-
lege nor the prerogative of making that
-decision. Therefore I do not feel that I
should comment one way or another on a
decision that was made earlier to con-
clu ie'the business of the day.
Mr. REID of New'York. If the gentle-
man will yield further very briefly?
lam. GERALD R. FORD. I yield to the
ntienian.
REID of New York. In defe'ence
to the point That the gentleman was
ruaking, Is it not accurate that I said
ati effort should be made to have a vote
after the-President's speech so that we
'wdttld not preclude whatever he might
'Auybut equally protect the right of the
douse to vote on a matter wherein we
have constitutional responsibilities?
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. 1 simply say
an argument can be made-
Mr. REID of New York. I was simply
asking whether the suggestion was not
made earlier by this gentleman.
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. The gentleman
from New York did make that sugges-
tion. Right. It seems to me that in this
circumstance we are faced with today
the wise action, the constructive action,
the action that is in the best interests
of the United States would dictate that
we support the Findley substitute and
get on with the business of approving
this legislation.
Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. GERALD R. FORD.I yield to the
gentleman from Oklahoma.
Mr. EDMONDSON. I would like to
have the gentleman's opinion as - to
whether the Reid amendment or the sub-
stitute offered by the gentleman from
Illinois (Mr. FINDLEY) would Impact in
any way the President's authority to
have advisers in Thailand at this time,
and, in the judgment of the gentleman,
would it withdraw the advisers we now
have operating in Thailand.
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. In listening
to an earlier colloquy between the, gentle-
man from New York and the gentleman
from Wisconsin I was led to believe that
the Reid amendment would preclude the
utilization of military advisers in Cam-
bodia. Subsequently there was another
colloquy that I am not sure clarified it,
but there were more words concerning it.
Mr. REID of New York. It does not
preclude that, I would say to the gentle-
man.
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I am glad to
have that observation.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman has expired.
SILENT EPIDEMIC
(By unanimous consent, Mr. BARRETT
was allowed to speak out of order and
to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Chairman, on
Monday, April 27, 1970, I introduced two
bills, H.R. 17234 and H.R. 17260, designed
to attack and eradicate, what has been
labeled the "silent epidemic," afflicting
an estimated half million infants and
children in our Nation's cities and towns.
An epidemic of poisonings resulting from
the use of lead-based paints in the in-
terior of houses. The effects of such
poisonings are at times fatal and, when
not fatal, far too often tragic-leaving
children with mental retardation, blind-
ness and chronic kidney disease among
other consequences.
Lead-based paint has not been used'
on interiors for over 10 years, but in old
buildings it lies just beneath the sur-
face of newer coats of lead-free paint.
When the old walls are not properly
maintained, the old paint lifts away in
layered chips along with the new. This
is the decor of older housing, particu-
larly of slum housing. The children liv-
ing In deteriorating houses, whose walls
are layered with sweet-tasting flakes of
paint, are the victims. This condition is
a major health problem for the infants
of those families living in older housing.
In fact, aside from infectuous diseases
this is the major Infant health problem.
it 30, 1970
Compared to the major health prob-
lems which we have already solved, the
solution to this problem is relatively sim-
ple. It can be solved on a local level.
Unfortunately, however, our local gov-
ernments are not able to cope with this
matter on their own. Many local gov-
ernments have enacted ordinances
against the use of lead-based paint on
housing interiors. However, enforcement
of the ordinance proves difficult. Fur-
ther, the lead-based paint all too often
has been covered over. In addition, there
is the problem of lack of knowledge by
many parents as to the causes and early
signs of lead poisoning.
This situation can and must be cor-
rected; and, it must be corrected now.
The two bills I introduced are designed
to provide a two-pronged coordinated
attack to remedy the situation.
The bill, H.R. 17234, concerns itself
with the people who live in these homes.
It would authorize the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare to make
grants to assist local governments in de-
veloping and carrying out local programs
to detect and treat incident of lead-based
paint poisoning. In addition, it would
assist In developing and carrying out
programs that identify those areas that
present a high risk to the health of the
residents because of the presence of lead-
based paints on interior surfaces, and
then to develop and carry out programs
to eliminate the hazards of lead-based
paint poisoning.
The other bill, H.R. 17260, is concerned
with the housing itself. It would author-
ize the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development to make grants to units of
local government to assist In developing
and carrying out local lead-based paint
elimination programs. The bill would re-
quire that there be an approved work-
able program for community improve-
ment for the locality, containing a pro-
gram to eliminate lead-based paint. In
addition, the bill would amend other
HUD assistance programs to require that
they include an effective plan for elimi-
nating the causes of lead-based paint
poisoning.
Mr. Chairman, both of these programs
are vitally important to the solution of
this major health problem and a coordi-
nated attack is needed. Therefore, I be-
lieve it is important to note that both of
these bills contain a section requiring the
Secretaries of the respective departments
to "cooperate with and seek the advice of
the heads of other departments or agen-
cies regarding any programs under their
"respective responsibilities which are re-
lated to, or would be affected by, such
authority" under the acts.
Mr. Chairman, as chairman of the
Housing Subcommittee of the Banking
and Currency Committee, to which H.R.
17260 has been referred, I will make every
effort for favorable consideration by that
committee. I will also endeavor to have
H.R. 17234, which was referred to the
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Com-
mittee, receive favorable action.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to
join with me in sponsoring and support-
ing legislation to attack the problem of
lead based paint poisoning.
(Mr. PODELL asked and was given
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lvly ni
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks. )
Mr. PODELL. Mr. Chairman, the
Members of the House and the Senate
and the American people were informed
late yesterday of President Nixon's de-
cision to provide American military ad-
visers and American air support to the
attacking South Vietnamese Army now
in Cambodia. This decision was reached
with the "advice' and consent" of the
President and his advisers and provides
just cause for profound dismay.
The reasons cited for the action are
similar to those given in support of the
1965 decision to widen the war in Viet-
nam-that widening of the 'conflict
would bring a speedier end to the fight-
ing. After 5 years of continued bloody
fighting, 40,000 American lives, $100 bil-
lion, the war in Vietnam continues un-
abated.
The faultiness of our earlier reasoning
is then obvious. Yet, American decision-
makers in 'the executive branch are still
working under the same assumptions
and appear ready to make the same mis-
takes again. The opening of this new
front in Cambodia is in direct contradic-
tion to American experience and to the
recently issued "Guam doctrine."
I am deeply distressed at both the con-
tent of the decision and the manner in
which it was reached. There is a con-
stitutional requirement that the respon-
sibility to commit American forces and
arms abroad rests with two branches of
Government-with the executive and the
legislative branches concurrently. The
President, whose search for a strict con-
structionist for the Supreme Court is
well known, seems unwilling to follow
the letter of the Constitution on this
issue.
Instead, the Congress has, except for
incomplete briefings, been bypassed.
After being consulted "after the fact," it
has been asked to concur in the decision
because of responsibility to our fighting
men.
The logic of such ex post facto reason-
ing escapes me. Recisions of such magni-
tude and potential consequence as troops
to Cambodia require that approval be
given by all representatives of the Ameri-
can people.
,
American policy seems directionless units asking them to give the President
at this point. Vietnamization of the Viet- more time. When the Wright resolution
namese war and widening American in- came before the House, I voted for it
voivementIn Cambodia are contradict- because of my reluctance to restrain the
ary. if the conflict 'expands into a pan- President in the conduct of foreign of-.
Indo-Chinese effort, American lives will fairs. At that time, however, I pointed
be needlessly sacrificed. out. that my support for the resolution
We cannot continue to make up rules should not be interpreted as a blanket
as we go" alotlg=or to - spout outdated endorsement of every facet of the Presi-
slogans. is it too late to ask President dent's November 3 speech, nor as a pledge
Nixon to reconsider his decision? It is of unqualified support for any future
certainly not too late to ask Congress to Presidential action as yet unknown and
express its disapproval. Congress has the undefined. is allowed to have a voice in determining
moral and constitutional responsibility It is difficult for me to support this whether or not expanded American in-
to act. amendment because I do not like to in volvement in Southeast Asian nations is
I 'supportthe amendment of the gen- any way restrict the action of the Presi- in the best interests of the United States.
tierlian from New York (Mr. REID) . $eo,t But Mr. Chairman, the issue today No doubt the safety of American troops
.AiS.TA~`AitY iNt)UxRY .is bxoader than the freedom of move- in Vietnam must be a serious consid-
Zr ST1AT'N. Mr. Chairman, a ment of one man, and that issue is two- eration in determining our Southeast
parliamentary inquiry.-, fold. It is first a question of whether Asian policy. However, the additional
ThBf ti`iMAN The gentleman will this Nation is willing to risk a widening implications of such vital action should
state it. Of the war by involvement of American be approved by debate in the Congress
Mr. STRATToo. Would it be in order troops in another unhappy nation in before America is involved and com-
to move at this' time that the Reid of Indochina, and it is second, a question muted in any other nation. This is the
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\{ l31(t~ J J
New York amendment and all amend-
ments thereto be tabled so that this mat-
ter of grave consequence might be con-
sidered at another time?
The CHAIRMAN. A motion to table
is not in order at this time.
AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. LEGGETT TO THE
SUBSTITUTE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR.
FINDLEY FOR THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY
MR. REID OF NEW YORK
Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I offer
an amendment to the substitute amend-
ment offered by the gentleman from Illi-
nois (Mr. FINDLEY).
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. LEGGETT to the
amendment in the nature of a substitute
offered by Mr. FINDLEY for the amendment
offered by Mr. RlED of New York:
After the word "Congress" strike out the
proviso exception.
[Mr. LEGGETT addressed the Com-
mittee. His remarks will appear here-
after in the Extensions of Remarks.]
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to
strike the requisite number of words.
(Mr. OBEY asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I would
like to support the amendment offered
by the gentleman from Illinois, (Mr.
FINDLEY) but in my judgment that
amounts to little more than a Gulf of
Tonkin resolution for Cambodia.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the
amendment of the gentleman from Cal-
ifornia to prohibit the use of any funds
under this bill to introduce American
troops into Cambodia.
Mr. Chairman, I have most certainly
not harassed any President-Mr. John-
of the responsibility of the Congress in
determining the policies the country will
fallow.
Mr. Chairman, I do not believe we
should vote on this bill, or on this ques-
tion, until after the President's speech
tonight. If we had any sense, we would
postpone our action until at least tomor-
row, and possibly later. But, in the ab-
sence of any delay in the consideration
of this subject, I believe we have no al-
ternative but to support the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, since the late 1950's we
have been involved in Vietnam without
specific congressional declarations of
support. Since 1964 we have required
young men to fight in combat in that un-
happy land without specific congres-
sional approval except for the Tonkin
resolution, which is, at best, of dubious
clarity. We are now faced with the ques-
tion of whether in the absence of specific
congressional consideration of this new
question we should send our young men
into another area of war.
We have been told by the President
"no more Vietnams." Mr. Speaker, if we
continue to send troops into Cambodia
we run the high risk of having at least
one more Vietnam and that is two more
than we can afford. Indeed, it may al-
ready be too late to avoid it. Mr. Speaker,
we cannot in conscience and we should
not, out of respect for the Congress as
an institution, allow involvement in
Cambodia without specific congressional
approval of that added involvement. We
have had men die in an undeclared war
in Vietnam for 9 years. We should not
support actions which would lead to the
killing of Americans in another unde-
clared war. In the absence of congres-
sional consideration of this added in-
and in the absence of con-
volvement
,
war in Vietnam. I have expressed doubts
gressional determination that this added
about President Johnson's policy since involvement is in the best interest of the
1965, but I did not ask for, nor did. I United States, I cannot vote to financially
support immediate unilateral with- support such efforts. I am tired of young
drawal. Americans dying in "unofficial" wars.
When in October Senator ScoTT, the I am opposed to sending American men
Republican minority leader, asked for a into new areas of warfare without a
60-day moratorium on criticism of the statement from the Congress that their
President's policies in Vietnam, I sup- sacrifice is both necessary and wise.
ported that. Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Chairman, the re-
When debate on Vietnam threatened cent unilateral Presidential decision to
to become highly partisan in late Octo- send American combat advisers, tactical
I gave speeches to my own party air support, medical evacuation teams,
ber
and other support to Laos, Thailand,
and Cambodia indicates that there is a
total disregard for the advise and con-
sent role of the Congress in making for-
eign policy decisions that affect our
economy and the lives of our citizens.
The prior consent of Congress should,
in all instances, be obtained before any
decision of such potential military mag-
nitude is made. Surely the lessons of
Korea and Vietnam must not be repeated
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H 3756
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE Apr27 30, .1970
posed by Congressman FINDLEY of Illi-
nois. The Reid amendment would have
prohibited the use of the funds being
authorized for the purpose of introduc-
tion of American ground troops into Laos,
Thailand, or Cambodia. The Findley
amendment to the Reid amendment
added an exception to permit such use
to the extent required to protect the lives
of American troops still remaining in
South Vietnam. It also would have re-
quired a report by the President to the
Congress on any such finding.
My own feeling is that no American
ground troops should be introduced into
Laos, Thailand, or Cambodia and cer-
tainly it should not be done without the
expressed authorization of Congress.
However, the Findley amendment seemed
to me to be consistent with inherent
powers of the President, as to the defense
of our forces and I, therefore, would
have supported both the Reid amend-
ment as amended by the Findley amend-
ment.
Mr. KOCH. Mr. Chairman, there is no
question in my mind that President
Nixon has neither the moral nor legal
right to commit American military
forces in Cambodia without the consent
of Congress.
The administration has now embarked
on widening the war in Southeast Asia
which will further delay the withdrawal
of American troops from South Vietnam.
President Nixon persists in the tragic il-
lusion that military action rather than
political settlement is the answer to the
Indochina turmoil of the last 16 years.
As I have said before on the floor of this
House, the President's policy is simply
the persistence of national pride beyond
any political, economic, or moral justifi-
cation. It is a policy that has cost the
lives of almost 50,000 American young
men. We must not let it continue. Let our
policy be committed to saving lives
rather than saving face.
By ordering American military action
in Cambodia this week, President Nixon
has shown contempt for the overwhelm-
ing desire of the American people to get
our troops out of Southeast Asia. The
President was elected to terminate our
involvement, not complicate and deepen
it. The democratic process is gravely
threatened when any President inten-
tionally ignores such a mandate.
I will urge my constituents to make
known their opposition to the President's
Cambodian decision. It is their sons and
their dollars that he uses without their
consent or the consent of Congress.
The American people know a tragic
mistake has been made in Vietnam. It
remains only for the Nixon administra-
tion to accept once and for all that judg-
ment. So let the Government be re-
minded who is master and who is serv-
ant.
Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, the House
deliberation today on the question of
introducing U.S. ground combat troops
in Cambodia has taken us. a giant step
toward restoring the role of the Congress
in foreign policy.
I am opposed to the introduction of
U.S. combat troops into Cambodia. I
view the presence of American advisers
and medical personnel with the South
Vietnamese attack force invading Cam-
bodia as extremely dangerous. To me,
the Nixon doctrine clearly precludes
sending in American troops, leaving open
the question of tactical air support and
logistical support.
The memory, that advisers were only
the forerunners of combat troops in the
quagmire of Vietnam, is all too fresh.
While the motions before the House
would preclude only combat forces, I
believe the Congress in the exercise of
its responsibilities should be informed
and its consent sought before even ad-
visers are dispatched into foreign war
zones.
In all of this, Mr. Chairman, our at-
tention continues to be diverted from
other troubled areas of the world. In my
opinion, the danger of confrontation
with the Soviet Union and of full-scale
war is in the Mediterranean. While we
have concentrated on Vietnam, the
Soviet Union has placed a major fleet
in the Mediterranean and has developed
bases in Egypt. There is evidence that
the Middle East fighting is entering a
new and dangerous phase with Egyptian
troops, armed with the latest Russian
equipment and backed by Russian tech-
nicians, carrying out a major offensive.
New SAM missile systems have been de-
ployed in Egypt, manned by Russian
technicians. Today there are persistent
reports of Soviet pilots flying Egyptian
jets over Egypt.
This is a very trying time for U.S.
policymakers. But it seems clear to me
that the interest of the United States in
working toward a lessening of tension will
not be served by our involvement in
Cambodia. Our energies, on the other
hand, should be directed toward a politi-
cal settlement in Indochina and our at-
tention directed to dangers of enlarged
conflagration in the Middle East.
Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Chairman, the ex-
tension of the Vietnam war into Cam-
bodia is most regrettable. This is espe-
cially so since the undefined, open-ended
policy of Vietnamization appears to in-
clude a willingness to follow the South
Vietnamese on a course of military
adventurism.
One wonders, with great concern, if,
as we followed South Vietnam into Cam-
bodia, we would also follow South Viet-
nam on an invasion of the north, some-
thing that has been advocated by Vice
President Ky.
Mr. FARBSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, the
President in expanding the war in
Vietnam into an Indochina war is pur-
suing an illusionary dream. We have
heard the "we can win the war if only
we expand it" logic before, and each
time it has turned out to have cruel and
predictable consequences. The Pentagon
told us in 1965 if only we committed
American forces to Vietnam we could
drive Ho Chi Minh out. When that did
not succeed, we were told, if only we
bombed the northern ports, it would de-
stroy the spirit of the North Vietnamese
and bring military victory.
When we sent massive numbers of
young Americans to Vietnam, it did not
deter Ho Chi Minh, and when we began
massive bombing of the north, it did not
break the spirit of the enemy.
Now the President has decided to ac-
cept the advice of the military who say
only way rational foreign. policy can be
established.
Mr. MOORHEAD. Mr. Chairman, I rise
in emphatic support of the amendment
offered by the-gentlemen from New York
(Mr. REID), which says:
In line with the expressed intent of the
President of the United States, no part of the
funds authorized to be appropriated pur-
suant to this Act shall be used to finance the
introduction of American ground combat
troops into Laos, Thailand and Cambodia.
This House, by sustaining this amend-
ment, will make it clear to the President
and more importantly to the people of
the United States and the world, that we
will no longer support America military
excesses in Southeast Asia. Rather than
sending our boys into Cambodia, we
should be loading them on troopships
and bringing them home. And it is at
home, in the United States, where we
should be concentrating our efforts and
our money.
Have the mothers, wives, families, and
soldiers of this Nation not suffered
enough? Why must we perpetuate our
existence hi Southeast Asia, when it has
been demonstrated time and time again
that the people of this Nation want no
More Vietnams.
President Nixon entered office on the
strength of three promises; to end the
war, to cool the economy, and generally
to lower the voices of discontent and
wrangling in our country,
Not only has he failed to do any one of
these things. He took new steps yesterday
to generate new, and who knows how far
reaching, antagonisms when he ordered
Americans into Cambodia. American
blood has stained the earth of Vietnam.
I will not see that same blood wasted on
the soil of Cambodia.
I for one will not waffle on this latest
Nixon folly. No money for a war in Cam-
badia. No American lives lost in a war in
Cambodia. To this I pledge myself. And
I hope that my colleagues will do simi-
larly by voting for the Reid amendment.
Mr. TAFT. Mr. Chairman, while I
support the military procurement au-
thorization bill providing for about $20
billion for military procurement for the
next year, I hope we will be able to scale
the expenditure level back in the appro-
priation bill -that will come later. In any
event, the authorization bill for 1971, on
which we are voting, is $400 million less
than the authorization for last year. It
includes funds for the Safeguard system
that I believe is sound as -a wholly de-
fensiveand deterrent weapon.. Its devel-
opniente may well have been helpful in
the progress to date at the SALT talks.
I believe that that weapon system, as
well as the other military procurements
authorized by the bill, are necessary in
today's world when the Russians con-
tinue their buildup in strategic missiles
and their activities in support of trouble-
m4kers such as the Arab nations.
Wile fl voted on a number of amend-
~.ent today, no final vote occurred on
was deferred
tl?e_ blll, and final action fi
nptil Wednesday, May 6. The deferment
occurred to permit the Congress to study
}ne President's message on Cambodia be-
.f~?re adting on-an'amendlnent proposed
by Congressmani REID of New York, and
an amendment to that amendment pro-
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25X1
25X1
SECRET
Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel
Wednesday - 29 April 1970
Page 3
9.1 Called Martha Klueber, in the office
of Senator John Sherman Cooper, and explained to her that we would be
glad to provide an oral briefing in response to the questions contained in
the Senator's letter of 24 April. I said Mr. Bruce Clarke could do the
briefing and because of sensitive matters involved we would want to limit
it to the Senator alone, with no staff personnel.
Miss Klueber called back shortly and we agreed to 3:30 p.m.
Thursday, 30 April for the briefing.
10. Representative Paul N. McCloskey (R., Calif. )
called to request a briefing on the current situation in Cambodia tomorrow
morning. I said I thought we could arrange an intelligence briefing but
of course would not be in a position to discuss any U. S. involvement or
possible course of action. McCloskey said he fully understood this and
wondered if the briefing could be arranged for 0800.
After checking with the Director and Mr. George Carver, I called
McCloskey back and confirmed that Mr. Carver would brief- him at
Headquarters at 0800 tomorrow.
2VX1A 11o Accompanied I of OSR, to a
briefing of Jim Kendall, Chief Counsel, Senate Subcommittee on Prepared-
ness Investigation, on the Soviet swing wing bomber. Kendall was primarily
interested in checking on a statement made by Senator Dominick,which he
said was made on the basis of information given him at the Agency, to the
25X1 D effect that I
25X1 D
25X1
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
12. Talked with Miss Mary Louise O'Malley,
in the office of Senator Ralph Smith (R. , Ill. ), about the Senator's letter
to the Director concerning the case of I advised
Miss O'Malley that
Mrs. O'Malley
thanked me for this information and said she would close out the file on the
Agency letter without the necessity of a written response. She mentioned
that thel4 v iatF6?tzifeag~vmb&0i ' fAq P 6a3 o60% (:1~-C1'
SECRET
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.SECRET
Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel Page 3
Monday - 27 April 1970
25X1 8. Mr. James G. Lowenstein
and Mr. Richard M. Moose, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
staff, visited Headquarters for a briefing on Cambodia which was
25X1A presented by Mr. R. Jack Smith and Mr. In
departing, Mr. Lowenstein and Mr. Moose noted their appreciation
for the briefing and the coverage given the topic by Mr. Smith and
25X1A Mr Later in the day I picked up from Mr. Lowenstein
a copy of the official itinerary for their travel to Cambodia.
25X1 9. I delivered General Cushman's
25X1A letter concerning to Representative
Lawrence G. Williams (R., Pa.). I also met with his Administrative
Assistant, Mr. Robert Siegrist. They appreciated the Agency's
assistance in this matter and indicated that a firm position has
25X1A apparently been located for Representative
Williams noted during our brief conversation that he has the highest
regard for the Agency and from his information feels that we are
doing a good job.
5X1 10. Met with Mr. Ralph Preston, House
Appropriations Committee staff, who advised that he had shown the
Director's reserve withdrawal letter to Chairman Mahon and
Representative Minshall. He related that they both appeared to take
the letter in stride.
I briefed Mr. Preston on the ChiCom satellite; the multiple
Soviet satellite launch; the Soviet SS-NX-5 test failure; SS-11 tests;
25X1 C French missile testing; Russian fighter squadron
operations; current items on Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; and
Soviet increase in industrial production. With regard to the ChiCom
satellite, Mr. Preston noted that a question was asked this morning
25X1A 25X1A during briefing and he thought Mr. had indicated
25X1A 25X1A E f-
25X1
11. Met with Miss Oneta Stocks till,
House Armed Services Committee staff, and confirmed with her the
administrative arrangements for the Director's meeting with the
Committee tomorrow, 28 April, at 2:00 p.m. in room 2212 Rayburn
House Office Building.
SECRET
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f TT'_ 'VENT
NG S yAPproved For Release 2004/.M1427- 7R00020023A0 -l--
Washington, D. C., Monday, Apiii 27, IYM
bright
repares
DAMES DOYLE Lowenstein and Richard M.
are scheduled to leave
iter Moose
,
} surf wr
to Foreign. Rela- for a two-week inspection tour
ittee is preparing of Cambodia to report on the
res
can
A
p
meri
ork for yet anath- extent of the
price there.
~::th th
e
IC[ become a mayor chai-
To'"President Nixon's similar trip to Vietnam last
01foreign policy. December.
the Presi-
i
ti
to ques
on
called ir
er things,, on the
nistration has dis-
-___ -r this
dent's public optimism con-
cerning large-scale troop re-
ductions. It said most officials
of the American and South Vi-
etnamese governments in Sai-
gon were presuming that 250,-
000 troops would remain in the
the country "for years."
There is an important differ-
ence in the committees quick
action to make an independent
"judgment on conditions in
Cambodia, where Prime Min-
' ister Lon Nol's government
has asked for massive U.S.
aid.
In the cases of Vietnam and
Laos, Chairman J. William.
Fulbright, D-Ark., and the
leading members of the com-
mittee found themselves re-
acting to policy after it was
firmly established, and unable
to convince either the adminis- L
tration or the senate to cancel si
U.S. military commitments. t5
Through a series of recent
actions the committee has pre-
itself to muster wide-
pared
spread support in Congress to
block any attempt by the Pres-
ident to extend military aid to
Cambodia, or any country,
without congressional approv-
al.
One of these was the suc-
cessful passage in the last
session of a National Commit-
ments Resolution expressing
the sense of the Senate that "a
national commitment by the
United States results only
from affirmative action taken
by the legislative and execu-
tive branches... .
-Another was the establish-
ment of a new subcommittee
Challenge thNIxon Asia
ntger Stuart Symington, The testlTnony showe
D Mo., to investigate the ex- tail how t a small d in ae A at this must` Piave nw a American pilots to bomb.
American marked impact on the unwill- When Sullivan was ambassa-
`tent of American commit- commitment multiplied, while ingness of the North Vietnam- dor, Godley was assistant sec-
nlents around the world. successive administrations fol- to negotiate in Paris. retary of state for Southeast
s completed hearings on lowed a deliberate policy of Excised from the report, but Asia. Last year they ex-
is an
tions.
dis
ha hrou
American military in-
ailabl
i
Th
i
d
'This
n
l
a
eny
ng
-
a
hop
' hines Taiwan
s
hat a
f
i
ous idi
atchs av
iLLp,,er alrts onncto ow vd :a aos, and last week volvement. m ycee~ed, after months of Committee sources, by use he scene, was information on the secret warriors ran," said
trug Ie with the administra- of newspaper clippings and a use of the Agency for In- a committee source.
ment mis "S u 11 i v a n made himself
l Develo
ti
a e
p
ona
rna
make
lei, in publishing 90 percent similar dispatches, 3t' the secret testimony taken telling ,case ,that tthe only 1sionF in Laos 11aaaa a p Q Aea nw s quite a
ambassador. Youn can be
the,. past conduct or ine viet- American actions w cuuL?tuc Las mot u, -- - - .
nab war anions congressmen, military activities after the n of third country nationals can defeat in Laos, the
an, led to the passage of a signing of the Geneva Accords. ground troops in Laos, fi- source added.
de en, se appr6priations bill of 1962. The Soviet Union tacit- ced by the United States. The public facets of the Laos
arnkndment forbidding the fi- ly, approved the continuance, on release of the transcript, war were just beginning to un-
nancing of American troops in apparently to maintain an Fulbright said, "I have never fold when Cambodia was add-
Laos or Thailand. anti-Chinese balance in the seen a country engage in so ed to the strategic balance in
devious undertakings as Southeast Asia by the over-
man
y
This reassertion of legisla- area.tive prerogative is expected to it also showed that after the this," and Symington charged throw of Norodom Sihanouk.
have some effect on the Presi- cessation of bombing over that the ambassadors to Laos, At least some high adminis-
dent's actions in Cambodia. much of North Vietnam in No- first William H. Sullivan and tration officials are reported
But committee sources believe vem~rer 1968, U.S. B52 bomb- now G. McMurtrie Godley, to view the pro-Americcaan tggov-
the recently published Laos ers ~4tr?lyffi~ thorlRel e'?42 intl4'~'2- slk
near proconsul y their o
os
L
th
a
ern
transcript may have the great- raids over nor
, war
austed North North V est ^ influence on how Nixon the omm t eietsoaurmese ces border
i sist ingt the select on of targetslfor Vietnamese to x overextend their
Policy
lines.
The argument is that a trick-
le of aid to Cambodia now
might shorten the Vietnam
war by denying enemy troops
their traditional Cambodian
sanctuaries and staging areas.
Other officials are fearful of
both the public consequences
at home and the possibility of
new entrapments in the battle-
field should aid be extended.
This is the position that the
Foreign Relations Commit-
tee's senior members lean to-
rd.
When confronted with the
details of the secret war in
Laos, administration officials
often note that leading mem-
bers of the Foreign Relations
{ Committee, and especially
Symington, knew many of the
details, but declined to oppose
the situation until recently.
This underscores the fact
that the possibility for a simi-
lar secret war in Cambodia is
slight, and probably doesn't
exist.
1 , F ANKEL
is -strugli
Imt=jQme of hiss
*r. Nlxou, appears to be un-
1 ut confli
jj-
Fay a uantities of Ame`er-
e beleaguer'
ie"Iopments in
__ X11 affect his
. meral agreem
I.. titration thatt,
of the new Lone
isle. tq allied op?rl-
qty of the N06-1
flf the` tfmreat fio the Govern-j
-ff-vie-unitea Sues
p ut~vive.
jj-
4Soviet Hinted
nth cctatrie, notably fa-
otut afeial acknowleg-
r used to restrain Com-
~' in Cambodia lest
t h e i r jd-ff- ob and American re
ses spoil-whatever chance
ct p, ;negotiated settle-
muCllrag m0. be
rs of the Joint
g$ gf gaff, contend t
to ;?m new Camfio~
'IVietnam depends on'"'WTV
vival. They define tie srtuaflon
G~sr as Presi err
Wks Decision Viewed 41s.
Fateful Ion lndochin
MFG DATE ':?A- At 1C, _ PAGE
er@b?2/ 2: CIA-F P2-Og337R000200230010-1
are calling for sizab a arms Guns roc to argon
shipments not only to buttress _ . Nixon's press secretary,
the Cambodian Army but also Ronald E. Ziegler, confirmed
to give more Cambodians con- the report about the shipment
fidence that the new leader of captured weapons but dis-
imed any primary American
shW, which ousted Prince oro- s onsibility for the aid. The
mnuk, can `srivr}:`r "-47 rifles were being sup-
'lt r a friendly or even al- pied by South Vietnam; he said,
1regime in Pnompenh, the "with our knowledge and ap-
military men argue. the allies proval."
Mr. Ziegler refused to dis-
wfll be able to harass or even close the size of the shipment
to disperse the North Viet- or the methods of delivery.
natncse a d .. .
that have been using Cambodian anew report from Cambodia
territory as a .base for attacks that American-made weapons
ICLYOV .4 -,
or - he return of Prince Nor; said the delivery did not rep
dom Sihanouk, they maintain, resent "a response to the spe-
would turn not only the frontier cific requests for arms"-by
regions but all of Cambodia into which he apparently means an
a hostile base for Communist urgent appeal from the Cam-
assaults on South Vietnam and bodian Premier in a letter Mon
Laos. day. Other sources said the'
1- in s.. of been a
arently including key officials co
of the, State Department, to earlier. Cambodian appeals
are counseling caution on the for help to providee at least
White_ House. They are wor an interim token of support.
r'red that an increased Ameri- One source raised the pos-
_ntin,:..__ aa..a. +ti.., non+nrn'1 waAn_
ems- rnvorvement in ~,amo s, , ons might actually be passing
no matter now direct or modedest, .__. .+-L- m n>tin_
stilt wider Indochina war as awa,
well as a loss of the popular' arms have been refurbished for
support _ that Mr. Nixon has use by special troops operating'
. - behind communist lines in Viet-
,- nam.
an: end of American participa- Mr. Ziegler justified the arms
tion in the conflict. !aid to Cambodia with a severe
Senators Ask Accounting denunciation of what he called
Meanwhile, influential Dem- 'the massive and overt Com-
already monist aggression there. He said
aats in the Senate, isturbed about the supply of several times that there is no
ema riding an accaunt~ng from
'giveCambodia several thousand
alza and Chinese Communist
t re. Secretary_ of State
a r attve},y minor development
inv'ving no breach or
promise to consult the legisla-
,ator J. V,f. Fulbright, chairman'
of? tie Foreign Relations Com-
t--' e to confirm the report
, -to discount its significance.
,Tr. _ Fulbright is said to have
tailed testimony on the situa
tion,, but Mr. Rogers held to
his plan to meet with the com-
onday.
The White House remained
tglesso and called,the . .. agC s-
violation of the 1962 accords
In Laos."
tivity throughout Indochina. The
conference on. all Southeast
Asia-despite recent denials
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that, Moscow was promoting the
Idea.
Inany caseAmerican offi-
cials are thought to be saying
ssians-and through
untie North Vietnamese
conversion of Cam-
o a Communist-run
be viewed here as a
-crew threat to all of
Asia.
willingness in re-
'to let the North Viet-
mn us2-Cambodian soil as a
ins desire to contain the war.
that Cambodia might
cognized as neutral
elligerent by both
also caused the White
limit allied military?,
sanctuary areas~in
eeks since General
e to power.
defined as great in
ters and as grave in
commanders here
dispatch of some -MM5rTy ac
visers-Americans If possible
but non-Americans if necessary
-to tutor the generally weak
and undersupplied Cambodian
Army of about 30.000 men.
-The military men tend to
put the most pessimistic POs
sible interpretation on in-
telligence reports from
Pnompenh. They see the Cam-
bodian capital imperiled, be-
lieve the road and rail lines
to the port of Sihanoukville are
cut off and the river traffic
on the Mekong severely
curtailed.
However, other sources have
described as convinced that
such an -attack would finally
kill whatever chances remain
of negotiating a settlement for
Indochina, or at least parts of it.
He also described as mind-
ful of the political opposition
that would develop in the Unit-
ed States to a wider war ef-'
fort.
Mr. Nixon's reluctance to be-
come further inolved was por-
trayed not only by usually re-
liable sources in the Adminis-
Mr. Mansfield had declared
himself opposed to military aid
to Cambodia "in any way,
shape or form." He has regret-
ted the overthrow of Prince
Sihanouk, whom he believed to
be a deft and neutral politician
able to keepphle country out
of the Indochina war.
To obtain an.., indenendent
1t Information f the
Senate, e ,Fe
omT ittee anno fed that iwO
is staff co tants woet+~
v
tration but also by a vigorous
opponent of any military aid
to the Cambodian regime, Sen-
eek.
fv
`
C
"
told Mr. Nixon that there is no jority leader.
I
imminent threat to Pnompehn ,11e Senator Fu11%ri
ht de
munist-led forces in different
parts of Cambodia are not en-
tirely clear.
Preferring to accept the less
urgent view, Mr. Nixon is said
to feel that he still has time
to await both military and di-
plomatic moves by the Com-
munist forces and Governments.
He is also awaiting signs of
what Indonesia, France and
other interested countries de-
cide to do to support Pnom-
penh.
Though tempted by the
short-term military advantages
that might esult from an all-
th Vietnam relieve
could turn thetidel off
sievelyy if allowed to
X16,000 Communist
y favor an urgent aid
to prop up Premier
07
A, o s~government and the
out attack on-the Communists
in Cambodia, the President Is
8
cribed the transfer of captured
and S. Muskie of Maine called
"disturbing," Senator Mans-
eeper involvement, though it
erhaps "contains the ele-
response, more by "examin-
g" the situation than "con-,
LOW=
~r
a ee fitYYie'd
ro
'6acX?- r`fl
oche paccaion
n'~outh Vietnam. _?
Approved For Release 2004/01/12 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200230010-1
THE EVE W T Release 2004/01/12: CIA- 2 00 PE
CIA Reported} oinating
Cambodia Military Attack
SAIGON '(AP)-Informed
sources said today two Ameri-
cans believed to be from the
Central fnteliigenee Agency flew
into the Cambodian provincia
capital of Svay Rieng last week
apparently to coordinate mili-
tary operations against enemy
forces.
They reported two South Viet-
personnel carriersbegan a drive Sources said that in the first
across a 30-mile line stretching two days of the operation, South
from the South Vietnamese dis- Vietnamese forces have killed
trict town of Tuyen Binh, 55 221 enemy troops, seized nearly
miles west of Saigon, to the dis- 1,000 new weapons from base
trict town of Tuyen Binh, 55
camps, and destroyed 90 huts
miles west of Saigon, to the dis-
trict town of Hong Ngu, 75 miles apparently used as storage
west of the capital. areas. Field reports said South
Americans intopSvay Ring, 25
nines west of, the South Viet-
nainese border,
The informants gave this ac-
count:
When the helicopters landed'
the two Americans were met by
Cambodian officials carrying'
maps in their hands. The Cam-
the Americans the North Viet-
namese and Viet Cong positions
inside Svay R eng Province.
Shortly after the meeting,
South VIetnamesefighter-.
bombers began attacking sus-
pected North Vietnamese base
camps and troop positions along
a 30-mile stretch on both sides of
the border. Their effort was
aimed at softening up the enemy
positions for a division-sized in-
fantry assault that was to fol-
low.
At daybreak Monday,, as many
as '5 000 V taamese
troop,yys~~~~~,~a,nygsd fiun ens o armored
Vietnamese forces suffered 0
troops killed and 101 wounded
Efforts to reach CIA offici4li
in Saigon for comment werc
fruitless. There was no answei
at the agency's phone. .
Sources have said the South
Vietnamese and Cambodian lo-
cal officials are collaborating in
efforts to crush- up to 20000
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong
troops in base camps in southh'
eastern Cambodia.
Approved For Release 2004/01/12 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200230010-1
proved` or'f e`le sa a 2004101117: -RDP72 0O337R
DISTRlBuTtoN
D PE
flDi
DQi~'I
QNE
OSR
C7;OPCN
PDB
I N OJCO
PO.
.,,psD
e
ems.
1AA
. Date: -- 22. _Apr
Item: No. 4
?roea.
Saop texa ?~
th
A
i
ew
e
mer
cana
. hto SKlee 26 mil es west ? the South Vietnamese border.
The infotmant gave th2e aocountt4
''ca
?~`: _!,_.._... ?. en Ofd'iels
bubdre- --w- -'mo ms's. -?--- .?v+w.r .y 7/WUi G[61~ D 4i-VV~
of armors. parts o~el carriers begam a drive across
'a'50-0_11 e llne stretching from the South Vietnamese die tract
town of Tuy en Bl=ahs 66 mil e!s west of Salgone to the district
town, of Soow~ s 76 miles west of the capital.
Souurces, sA at in the first o drys of the operation* South
V ale a fore as have killed 221 - ene> troops a a eiz eel near ~?y
1s0 ter weapons from bea a came ; and les troy ed 90 huts apparently
.
storage area . Pieldra2rts said-,South Vietnamea a forces
w",MA old "SiI
to iorw a'lox a 0-mile stretch of bo -- c and troop
at sides s he border.
he r. effort , aimed at. softsuai u the eir_ pas itio"s for
r
om era
Mega attaokiig a acted North Vietnam e b ~
4n it i ~ w~? :. ~?, i~ ~ g ur u. , X ~n~rn. ?..,~?! . Y ~, ez Uora
as~1t 1 e vc,
a' after th ~..meetirg. S`t~at`~93Cetnarn ht b b
'
'~-7 ~1~'s?E4aQQ cv ox , ~~a ~or~eazt were fruitl .
''f~r'eiT
of Current Intelligence to the attached item from the news services.
wh
mea
a
s
n
V am UM a
.
the,` eat 0 days s and In one of them lost week a token force
of Cambodian troops fought with the South Vietnamese* The Cambodian
wens supplied ammunition, food and water 1w the South Vietnames am
+~ wv...?w+..r/v ""%% %F"U1W%4iQA= J.VWGFIL
officials are ccllaboratS in arme~t efforts to crush up to 20,000
N'ozrth -Vietnamese aid, Vietcong troops in base can" in southeas tern
Cambodia.
There ha?e am three major
offensive thru
ig
a
t C b d
,,'2'le_.Noxo.o
oo g3~IFIED
App
Ickq 24ig - 700337
EXTENSION
ROOM NO. BUILDING
Appred For Rele se 2004/01/12 : CIA-R P72-00337R
TO:
ROOM NO. BUILDING
REMARKS:
FROM:
~G(
25X1 C
FORM NO . REPLACES FORM 36-8 (47)
1 FEB 55 24 I WHICH MAY BE USED.